Bank of England and Financial Services Bill [Lords]

George Kerevan Excerpts

3rd reading: House of Commons & Report stage: House of Commons
Tuesday 19th April 2016 Commons Chamber

[Harriett Baldwin]

I will make sure that that person makes him or herself known to the hon. Gentleman with the greatest of speed. It is important to point out that the agents do not engage with us as politicians. The agent for the west midlands and Worcestershire is very engaged with my local businesses, but I as a politician have never had a meeting with them. That is how it should work.

[George Kerevan (East Lothian) (SNP)]

I realise that the Economic Secretary is trying to be helpful, but does she not recognise that there is a strategic difference between the process of information-gathering through the agents and that of policy-making through the bodies of the Bank itself? That is where we are asking for representation.

[Harriett Baldwin]

I will get to that point later in my remarks. As always, I seek to be helpful to the hon. Gentleman, so I hope that he will enjoy those remarks when I get to them.

We believe that it is unnecessary to impose the requirement in new clause 2 to have regard to regional representation on the court, which is effectively the board of directors of the Bank of England, because of the comprehensive framework for regional information gathering that already exists. In addition, if we found a candidate with the perfect profile to serve on the court, but we insisted on downgrading them because they lived in an over-represented part of the country, that would not be the best way to produce an effective court.

I have been clear that in setting both monetary and financial stability policy, the Bank must take into account economic conditions in, and the impact of policy decisions on, every part of the UK. Monetary and financial stability policy must be set on a UK-wide basis. None of the 65 million people whom this House represents would be well served if, for example, different capital requirements applied to banks in different parts of the UK. Of course, monetary policy must be consistent. It is completely impossible to set different interest rates in different regions, so monetary and financial stability are, rightly, reserved policy areas.

The men and women who make up the Bank’s policy committees must have their decisions scrutinised, but since policy must be set UK-wide, this Parliament must hold them to account. This Parliament holds power over reserved matters, which these issues rightly are, and the Members of this Parliament represent people from every part of the country on an equal basis. Likewise, Ministers, who are accountable to the House and who hold their positions with the support of a majority of the House of Commons, must be responsible for making the external appointments to the Monetary Policy Committee, each member of which is responsible for considering the impact of their policy decisions on all 65 million people in the UK.

We also return to the question of the Bank’s 300-year-old name. It is important to recognise the reputation associated with a name built up over such a long period. During that time, the Bank has come to be globally renowned as a strong, independent central bank. We should not underestimate the importance of that. International confidence in the Bank of England helps to support international confidence in our economy and currency.

I turn to the monetary framework. The Government amendment in this group is modest. The Bill reduces the minimum frequency of Monetary Policy Committee meetings from monthly to at least eight times in every calendar year, and our amendment adjusts the reporting requirements of the Monetary Policy Committee to match.

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[Harriett Baldwin]

The hon. Gentleman tries to tempt me down the path of comparisons with sports teams, but I decline to be tempted. The Government amendment is modest: the Bill reduces the frequency of MPC meetings from monthly to at least eight times in every calendar year, and the amendment will simply adjust the reporting requirements of the MPC to match.

New clause 6, tabled by the hon. Member for Carmarthen East and Dinefwr, suggests that we give the MPC a second primary objective of maximising employment. We conducted a comprehensive review of the monetary policy framework in 2013 and concluded that a flexible inflation targeting framework offered the best approach. Employment is already explicitly part of the MPC’s objectives. Its secondary objective is

“to support the economic policy of Her Majesty’s Government, including its objectives for growth and employment.”

The most recent MPC remit letter summarised the Government’s economic policy as being

“to achieve strong, sustainable and balanced growth that is more evenly shared across the country and between industries”.

[George Kerevan]

I thank the Minister for her forbearance in giving way again. She is taking refuge in the Bank of England’s existing mandate, a mandate that all Members, on both sides of the House, know has long since become redundant. The inflation target has been dead in the water for years and years, because inflation is nowhere near 2% and is not likely to be for a long time. Implicit in the new clause is the fact that we are questing about for other policy measures to replace the 2% inflation target. Will the Minister address the question of what future targets the Bank of England should have to address the needs of a deflationary era, rather than the inflationary era of the last 20 years?

[Harriett Baldwin]

The hon. Gentleman asks an important question. There are many opportunities in Parliament, in the scrutiny of the Bank of England by the Committee of which he is a member, to ask those important questions. The Government choose to use the mechanism of the letter process and the remit. The hon. Gentleman and I are both old enough to know how inflation has changed over the years—[Hon. Members: “Surely not!”] I know; surely we are not. We should all welcome the significant lowering of inflation expectations, and we should all remember how important it is that we continue to ask the Bank of England to keep inflation under control, so that we never return to the kinds of impoverishing inflationary policies that so harmed people—particularly the poorest and oldest in society—during the 1970s.

Price stability must have primacy, because we judge that having a single lever aimed primarily at a single objective is the best way to make sure that the inflation target is credible. That, in turn, anchors all-important inflation expectations and helps us to keep inflation under control. Our system has shown that it produces good labour market outcomes. Despite global uncertainty, we have record numbers of people in work, an unemployment rate that is at its lowest in a decade, and a claimant count that has not been lower for more than 40 years. Moreover, targeting low inflation ensures that hard-earned wages are not eroded by inflation.

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[Mr Tyrie]

Of course my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset (Mr Rees-Mogg), as a great and learned constitutional expert, will explain this apparent contradiction to the House in, I hope, a lengthy disquisition in a few minutes’ time.

I really am trying to conclude, but I have just one more point. It is essential in a 21st-century democracy that appointees to an increasing number of quango positions—this was the general point I said I would refer to earlier—should be forced to explain their actions before Parliament and also should feel accountable to Parliament. To achieve that, the means of their appointment and their protection from dismissal are relevant, and that is why a change such as this can offer us something.

Over decades, successive Governments have offloaded their responsibilities to quangos, leaving the public with the sense that nobody is ultimately democratically accountable for anything. I believe that accountability for decisions that were formerly taken directly by Ministers, but now sit with unelected appointees in quangos, needs thorough scrutiny and cross-examination, and that is what we have been trying to do in the Treasury Committee over the past few years.

The agreement with the Chancellor is a sizeable step in the right direction. Of course, in an ideal world, I would like access to the statute book to write exactly what, on behalf of the Treasury Committee, I feel should be on it. However, we live in the real world, and I am very happy with this exchange of letters and grateful to Ministers for their agreement. I shall not press new clause 1 to a Division today.

[George Kerevan]

I agree with the right hon. Member for Chichester (Mr Tyrie) that there is a lot to be commended in the Bill, although some of the good things, as with new clause 12, were pushed on the Government. I also think that there are still some negative aspects to the Bill, which brings me to a conclusion—[Interruption.] As usual, it will be quite a long conclusion!

The Bill began as a tidying-up operation, which is why it was launched in the House of Lords. It was seen to be about just tidying up a few things, making a few additions and changes to the Financial Services Act 2012. As the Bill proceeded through its various stages, however, the more it became apparent that it exposed a whole series of issues in the financial regulatory system that were not fit for purpose.

We have convinced ourselves—or at least the Government have convinced themselves—that bar a little tidying up, all has been done to resolve the crisis of 2007, but that is not true. What we discovered time and again as the Bill proceeded were issues with the operation of the Bank of England and issues with the functioning of the regulatory bodies and how fit for purpose they are. Furthermore, new issues have emerged only in the last few weeks regarding tax havens. All those problems have appeared. I do not see this Bill putting the problems away and putting the issues to bed. Rather, we are seeing the start of a whole series of pieces of legislation coming into force until we get it right. Far from it being a tidying-up operation, we have started something new.

I am speaking to new clauses 2 and 3, which stand in my name and those of my SNP colleagues. I believe they get to the nub of the issues we are facing as a result of what has been uncovered. In the last 20 years, and more particularly in the last 10, the Bank of England has acquired an extraordinary range of new powers. I do not mean just forecasting or supervising powers over banks, because fundamental policy levers for running the whole economy have been transferred from this House and the Executive to the Bank of England itself. This began with the transfer of powers over interest rates to the Bank of England in 1997, along with the power to set the exchange rates, which no one seemed to notice at the time. This gave the Bank de facto control over our external sector. More recently, of course, with quantitative easing, the Bank has forced interest rates down to the zero band. If monetary policy cannot be manipulated, what else can be done? Gradually, the Bank has been given powers over large swathes of fiscal policy.

Nowadays, the Bank of England even operates our housing policy, as housing determines the whole direction of economic growth. In recent weeks, the Bank has been deciding between buy for let or buy for homeowners. Micro-decisions have been transferred, and my worry is that we have crossed a line of accountability with respect to the Bank of England. This is not a criticism of individuals working for it or indeed of the Governor of the Bank of England, for whom I have high regard. Gradually, however, we have allowed it to take over from this House far too much of the operational policy that directs the economy.

That is why I am happy to support new clause 12 as a step forward in beginning to redress the balance of accountability. New clause 12 and the Government’s acceptance of the general line of march from the Treasury Select Committee means that we are beginning to move to the point where key members of the regulatory regime can be confirmed in their appointments by this House.

We now have two precedents in that direction, with the Treasury Committee as a servant of the House confirming the appointment of the director of the Office for Budget Responsibility and now the head of the Financial Conduct Authority. That is the line of march, but I want to put on record, however, that SNP Members view this as a down payment. We are moving in a direction where the Governor of the Bank of England and all the key members of the regulatory agencies have to be confirmed by this House. I know that will take a long time and that there is always a struggle—sometimes gentle, sometimes not—between the Executive and the House over who has the real say. What we are seeing is a move towards more democratic accountability being held by the House, which I welcome.

Let me move on briefly to new clause 2, which takes this process a little further. Given the policy direction and powers that now lie with the Bank of England, we have to make sure that its committees and, above all, its ruling court of directors are democratically accountable. That is why we tabled this simple new clause, stating:

“In making nominations to the Court of Directors of the Bank of England, the Chancellor of the Exchequer must have regard to the importance of ensuring a balanced representation from the nations and regions of the United Kingdom.”

That new clause was carefully written. There is no suggestion that the court should be a federal body. Our suggestion is that in the balance of its make-up, there should be representation for the whole nation. Rightly or wrongly—much more rightly than wrongly in my opinion—there is a perception that the City of London and its major banks and financial institutions have historically had too big a sway over the court and the Bank.

[Helen Goodman]

The hon. Gentleman is making a powerful point. Does he agree that it must be significant that the economic performance of the peripheral areas of these nations is also peripheral?

[George Kerevan]

I could not agree more. In fact, if we look at the long history of the regions and nations of the United Kingdom—Scotland, Wales, the north of England and Northern Ireland—we see that they have suffered a deflationary cycle since the second world war, because from 1945 onwards, by and large, interest rates were set to control inflation that was triggered by the City of London and over-lending by the City of London. As a result, the north-south divide became a deflationary line, with the nations of the north, and the regions of the north of England, suffering high interest rates. Although those rates were not germane to their economic problems, for most of the post-war period UK interest rates have, on average, been set at a higher level than those in the rest of Europe, simply in order to control and curb over-lending by the City of London, which has resulted in deflation in the industrial regions.

I consider that that might have been mitigated to some extent if there had been broader representation of the nations and their industries on the leading bodies of the Bank of England, and, although I know that the Executive will challenge my proposal, I think we need to move in that direction. I remind Members that the court of directors is not the institution of the Bank that actually makes monetary or fiscal policy. It has oversight over the whole of the Bank’s operations, in the sense of giving value for money, and, above all, ensuring that there is no group-think between the different committees that make operational policy. I therefore think that, at that level, we need to begin the process. At that level, we need wider representation on the court.

Surprisingly—and I raised this in Committee—such representation already exists to a small degree. Since world war 2, traditionally, there has always been a trade union representative on the court of the Bank of England, and there still is, to this day. Even the Government—indeed, successive Governments—have recognised that there can be wider representation on the court, including wider social representation. However, when I asked Ministers whether, if they were rejecting the notion of a court with a wider representation of the economy and the community, they were going to remove trade union representation, there was a deafening silence, and that is why I am putting the question again today. Those who accept the principle that there should be trade union representation—and there should—ought to widen that principle, and that is what I am asking for now.

We tabled the new clause carefully in order not to suggest that the court should be federal or too detailed, with someone representing this and someone else representing that, but simply to suggest that a balance was needed. As anyone who has sat on the board of a company will know, the first thing that one must do when creating a board is ensure that there is some representation of different skills and different interests, so that the board’s members can act as a collective. My point is that the court, and to some extent, I think, the new policy committees of the Bank of England, do not act as collectives. They are in danger of adopting silo thinking, and, ultimately—because of the power that we have given to the Bank of England—they are also in danger of beginning to act with the kind of hubris that central banks begin to wield when they are given too much power. They begin to think that they know everything when they do not. We need democratic accountability in the Bank of England, and we need it not in the sense in which the Bank understands it, but in the sense in which the nation, and the nations of the UK, understand it. That is why I will press the new clause to a vote later on.

We have made some progress with the Bill. I fear that that progress has consisted mostly of discovering more about what we need to do to improve the regulatory structures of the economy, but at least more is out in the open, and the debate is more open. Where do we go next? Where we go next is towards more accountability. The Bill makes a down payment on that accountability, but it does not finally deliver it. That is where we go next.

[Helen Goodman]

Obviously, in the new landscape of the City, the head of the Financial Conduct Authority holds an extremely important post, and the question of who fills that post is therefore vital. I am extremely pleased about the change that was agreed this afternoon and announced by the Minister at the Dispatch Box. It opens up the process, it gives the Treasury Committee a proper role, and it will, we hope, reinforce the independence of the person concerned.

Another person with considerable independence is, of course, the Comptroller and Auditor General. I am pleased, too, that we have moved away from the idea that the court should decide which part of the Bank’s homework the Comptroller and Auditor General should be allowed to mark. There is clearly a parallel with the CAG’s role in respect of the BBC. On Second Reading, we asked Treasury Ministers to publish the memorandum of understanding. They have now published it, and it is an extremely useful document, which sets out, in advance, an agreed framework for the CAG’s remit. That will prevent ad hockery, and will also prevent both the reality and the possible perception of political interference, or inappropriate avoidance of scrutiny of certain areas of the Bank’s work.

New clause 13, which stands in my name, would make the Bank of England subject to the Freedom of Information Act 2000. It seems to me that, as the Bank is a public authority which is fulfilling public policy purposes, the case for covering it does not really need to be made; it is the case against its being covered that needs to be made. The Minister made some important points about why she was not minded to accept the new clause, and I want to respond to what she said. She singled out three areas in particular: monetary policy, financial operations, and private banking.

I am not entirely sure of all the details of the 2000 Act, but we all know that local authorities are FOI-able. Equally, we all know that when we submit freedom of information requests to local authorities, we are not able to see the personal reports on individual members of staff in those authorities. The Act does not give access to that kind of personal information, and I should have thought that the same approach would exempt the private banking work of the Bank of England.

As for monetary policy and financial operations, I do not believe that my new clause would run into those parts of the Bank’s work, because they would still be protected by section 29(1) of the Act. That section states:

“Information is exempt information if its disclosure under this Act would, or would be likely to, prejudice…the economic interests of the United Kingdom or any part of the United Kingdom, or…the financial interests of any administration in the United Kingdom, as defined”,

blah blah blah. I should have thought that as long as we were not amending section 29, we would be able to protect the areas about which the Minister was particularly concerned.

I was alerted to this matter by a letter from the Governor, which the Minister herself waved at us in the Chamber last June, about the sale of shares in the Royal Bank of Scotland. I am sure that the Minister remembers the occasion well. In his letter, the Governor said that

“it is in the public interest for the government to begin now to return RBS to private ownership”.

Writing that letter was not part of the Governor’s role on monetary policy, financial policy or prudential policy; it was an intervention in Government policy at the Chancellor’s request on the issue of a share sale.

When the Governor appeared before the Treasury Committee, I asked him whether he would share the analysis that underlay the letter that he had written. He refused point blank to do so. I am not going to read out the full exchange that I had with the Governor on that occasion, because I went into the matter in detail on Second Reading and it has now been placed on the record twice. However, I really feel that in refusing to provide that underlying analysis, the Governor is evading public scrutiny of what is a perfectly proper matter for the public to understand.

The Governor also said in his letter that

“a phased return of RBS to private ownership would promote financial stability, a more competitive banking sector, and the interests of the wider economy.”

In fact, none of that is true. It will not promote a more competitive banking sector. We are hoping that the Comptroller and Auditor General will, in his separate audit of the RBS share sale, secure that analysis. However, there should be a more straightforward way of dealing with this. The share sale is a particular issue and the Comptroller and Auditor General always looks into share sales, so we might get at the truth on this one occasion, but I am sure that there will be other similar loopholes.

The topicality of seeing this analysis was further underlined last week by the interview in the Financial Times given by Sir Nicholas Macpherson on the occasion of his retirement from the Treasury, in which he described the sale of more RBS shares as “tricky”. He went on to say that there was a judgment to be made over whether to sell further shares below the 2008 purchase price. These are not straightforward matters; they do not fall within the normal remit of the Bank of England and they are of public policy significance. They are but one example of why it is appropriate for the Bank of England to be subject to the Freedom of Information Act.

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Fiscal responsibility, when combined with a genuine no-detriment fiscal framework, increases the political accountability of the devolved Governments to their respective electorates and, critically, incentivises those Governments to boost economic performance in order to invest in public services. The co-ordination of monetary and fiscal policy is vital in any economic policy. Obviously the central bank is independent, but there is undoubtedly co-ordination with the Treasury, as would be expected. Similar protocols and links need to be developed with the Welsh, Scottish and Northern Irish Exchequers. The national Parliaments should nominate a member to serve on the MPC to ensure that those involved in interest rate setting have an understanding of economic conditions and events in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.

[George Kerevan]

Is the hon. Gentleman aware that in the United States, the central bank is called the Federal Reserve for the very simple reason that it is appointed federally, and the interest rate setting committee is a federal committee? The principle is therefore well established in other jurisdictions.

[Jonathan Edwards]

I fully agree with my hon. Friend on that point. I also agree with the points he made earlier about the north-south divide and the impact that monetary policy has had on that reality. It is no surprise that the UK is the most grotesquely unequal state in the EU in terms of geographical wealth, and one of the main reasons for that is that for far too long monetary policy has been determined in the interests of a very small part of it—namely, the square mile just down the Thames.

All current MPC members are either Bank staff or in one of the four positions nominated by the Treasury. Fittingly, there are four countries in the UK, which makes the MPC ripe for modification to ensure that all nations are represented when it comes to the highly important task of deciding interest rates. I am also interested in the emerging debate on changing the MPC’s remit with regard to setting interest rates. New clause 7 seeks to expand the mandated objectives of the MPC to include maximum employment. It is already specifically charged with keeping to an inflation target of 2%. Other central banks, such as the US Federal Reserve, to which reference was made in my exchange with the hon. Member for East Lothian, have a dual mandate that goes beyond inflation. In 1977, the US Congress amended the Federal Reserve Act 1913 and mandated the Federal Reserve to target long-term moderate interest rates and, critically, maximum employment. I heard with interest the Minister’s point that the Bank does consider the Government’s employment target, but there is a difference between that and a mandate for maximum or full employment.

New clause 8 seeks to improve the Bank’s accountability to Wales and the other devolved Governments. The British state is changing rapidly as powers and responsibility flow from Westminster to the devolved Administrations, although the pace is perhaps not as quick as those like me would want. We are not privy to the meetings between Treasury Ministers and the Governor and his senior team, but we can safely assume that they are frequent. On top of that, the Governor and his team meet the Treasury Committee at least five times a year. As I mentioned a moment ago, fiscal powers already exist in the devolved nations, with more planned, so I hope that the Bank and the Treasury agree that it is in their interests to strengthen relations with the devolved Governments and Parliaments. I am not aware of any formal structures for meetings between the Governor and Ministers of the devolved Governments, or for scrutiny of the Bank by the devolved Parliaments. In the interest of mutual respect, those structures need to be formalised.

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I also hope that funding will be available for the other providers, and that they will not be left in the unsustainable position of having to pick up a large number of people all at once. It might be sustainable to pick up 16,000 people over a few months, but to pick them all up immediately when a company goes bump is really difficult. I have sympathy for the motives behind new clause 10, but I do not feel that it will solve the main problem, which is that many debt solutions providers do not have sufficient funding. The new clause would focus on only one solution and could well skew the market in the wrong way, to the advantage of the providers rather than of the people who need the solution.

[George Kerevan]

I should like to speak to amendments 1 and 2, tabled in my name, and in passing to amendments 8 and 9, tabled by Labour Members. I shall not press amendments 1 and 2 to a vote, but should Labour Members move on amendment 8 and the consequential amendment 9, we will support them.

There is much in the Bill to commend it to us and to the House, and much that will add to the regulatory regime and its performance in the UK. However, the worst part of this legislation—the time bomb ticking away inside it—is the Government’s attempt to shift legislation that they put in place only four years ago on the reverse burden of proof for major financial infractions. That is the nub of the matter. Legislation was introduced four years ago that identified senior managers in major banks and other financial organisations and stated that if a serious infraction of regulations was encountered on their watch, they would automatically be held responsible unless they could prove that they had taken due steps to prevent it from happening.

That legislation had a great deal of support in the House and among the public, because it was the one sure way of ensuring that those at senior level in the financial sector would not continue to do what they had done all through the 2007-08 crisis: blame everyone else and say that it was not their fault. The legislation made senior managers responsible, just as senior managers in other organisations and utilities have become responsible for major crises.

Why would the Government want to change that law before it even came into operation this month? That sends out the wrong signal. When we put legislation in place that has consensus behind it, we should try it and see whether it works. However, the Chancellor, whose constant refrain is that he has a long-term economic plan, has decided to change the legislation before it has even come into operation. That change sends out all the wrong signals. The Minister will probably say that the measure is disproportionate now that the Government have widened the number of people being caught up in the senior management regime to tens of thousands, and that applying the law could become problematic. I know all the explanations, but I put it to her that by reneging on legislation that was put in place with great fanfare four years ago before it is even operational, the Government are simply signalling to the rest of the world that they are loosening the regulatory bonds. They might think that they are not doing that, but they are sending out the wrong signal.

The Government have been sending out another signal as well. For years, the Chancellor and other Treasury Ministers have been telling us that we should pay lower taxes, that taxes are bad, and that we should keep more of our own money. Suddenly, however, when we discover that hundreds of thousands of people are setting up secret offshore bank accounts, the Government get all holy and moral, saying, “We didn’t mean you to do that!” This Government sometimes speak with two voices. Individual Ministers are honest and sincere, but they do not understand that they sometimes speak with one voice on taxes and regulation and then do the opposite. It sends out the wrong signal. The Government cannot go on blaming other people. They are to blame if they change the rule without having put it into force for at least a few years to see whether it works. That is why we must leave the provisions in the Financial Services Act 2012 until it has been proven that they do not work.

[Richard Burgon]

I rise to speak to new clause 14, amendment 8, and amendments 9 and 10, which are consequential on amendment 8, tabled in my name and those of my hon. and right hon. Friends. I will first discuss new clause 14 on combating abusive tax avoidance arrangements and then our amendment on the reverse burden of proof, or the presumption of responsibility, as I choose to call it, for senior managers in the banking sector.

Labour tabled new clause 14 in the wake of Panama papers leak, which the hon. Member for East Lothian (George Kerevan) just mentioned. The new clause sets out that combating abusive tax avoidance should be established as new regulatory principle for the FCA, and requires the FCA to

“undertake, in consultation with the Treasury, an annual review for presentation to the Treasury into abusive tax avoidance”.

The new clause makes it clear that the new principle should involve

“measures to ascertain and record beneficial ownership of trusts using facilities provided by banks with UK holding companies or entities regulated by the Bank of England or the FCA, control of shareholders and ownership of shares, and investment arrangements in an overseas territory outside the UK involving UK financial institutions.”

Members will be aware that Labour published its tax transparency enforcement programme following the Panama papers leak, and the release of the information that thousands of companies listed in the Mossack Fonseca papers have financial services provided by UK banks. Our programme makes it clear that Labour will

“work with banks to provide further information over beneficial ownership for all companies and trusts that they work for.”

The new clause seeks to establish a procedure to enact that.

Last week, the Government announced a deal on the global exchange of beneficial ownership. We of course welcome that as an initial step, but it is insufficient. The measures announced by the EU this week are also welcome, but they do not go nearly far enough, because they require only partial reporting. My hon. Friend the shadow Chancellor said last week:

“The turnover threshold is far too high, and Labour MEPs in Europe will be”

doing the right thing in

“pushing to get that figure reduced much lower to make it more difficult for large corporations to dodge paying their fair share of tax.”—[Official Report, 13 April 2016; Vol. 608, c. 369.]

Banks need to reveal the beneficial ownership of the companies and trusts with which they work. That means establishing a record of ownership of the companies and trusts supported by UK banks, whether or not the owners are resident in the UK. We must ensure that Crown dependencies and overseas territories enforce far stricter minimum standards of transparency for company and trust ownership, but when UK banks are involved, it is right that a record is maintained of the beneficial owners that they advise.

The tax expert Richard Murphy has written that Jersey, Guernsey and the Cayman Islands are

“cock-a-hoop at having rebuffed calls from David Cameron that they must have readily accessible registers of beneficial ownership even for the use of UK law enforcement agencies”.

The shadow Chancellor said in response to those calls that the

“agreement is a welcome step in the right direction but it fails to do anything to tackle the tax havens based in British Overseas Territories. Failure to take responsibility for these British Dependencies substantially undermines the effectiveness of this agreement.”

Similarly, we are aware that the Financial Conduct Authority wrote to banks urging them to declare their links to Mossack Fonseca by 15 April. The FCA’s call on UK financial institutions to review links with Mossack Fonseca is welcome, but the regulator should recognise the need for complete transparency to retain public confidence.

The FCA should seek full disclosure and act without delay. The slow, drip-drip responses of the Prime Minister’s office in recent weeks have served only to fuel public concern and have been very much a lesson in how to raise suspicion unintentionally. The FCA should publish details of which financial institutions it has written to and why; what information it has asked them to provide; and what action it will take, now that the 15 April deadline has passed. Importantly, it cannot allow banks and their subsidiaries to conduct an open-ended internal investigation, but must establish an early deadline for the disclosure of all information on their relations with Mossack Fonseca, so that the regulator can take all necessary action. Campaigners Global Witness responded by saying:

“These are welcome first steps…but the UK authorities are missing the wider point. Mossack Fonseca is no bad apple; it is just one small part of a much deeper problem.”

That is why it is necessary for us to have a clear direction of travel towards recording beneficial ownership of trust services by UK banks, as we are seeking to do with this new clause.

Given the widespread concerns about tax avoidance, the British public, who bailed out the country’s banking sector, deserve to know the facts about the role of UK banks in this unfolding story. With new clause 14, Labour has made a positive and practical proposal to take steps to increase tax transparency and publicly available information on the beneficial owners of companies and trusts registered in tax havens.

Let me now deal with the remainder of the amendments. Labour’s position was set out clearly on Second Reading and in our amendments in Committee: removing the reverse burden of proof—the presumption of responsibility—is unreasonable, unwise and, I am sorry to say, risky. We continue to support the current legislation, which was agreed by the Chancellor and in both Houses as recently as in consideration on the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013. That is why we have re-tabled our amendments on keeping the presumption of responsibility. It should not be forgotten that this measure was a key recommendation of the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, which said that it

“would make sure that those who should have prevented serious prudential and conduct failures would no longer be able to walk away simply because of the difficulty of proving individual culpability in the context of complex organisations.”

The presumption of responsibility, as currently set out in legislation, applies to senior managers. It means that to avoid being found guilty of misconduct when there has been a regulatory contravention in an area for which they are responsible, they will have to prove that they took reasonable steps to prevent that contravention. This Bill removes that onus on senior bankers. The onus is entirely reasonable, proportionate and, as bitter experience tells the British people, necessary. Misconduct and misdemeanours in financial services are not merely a tale from history. In 2015, for example, the FCA had to fine firms more than £900 million, and we have also seen the LIBOR scandal, foreign exchange fines and the mis-selling of payment protection insurance to the value of up to £33 billion. The presumption of responsibility is so reasonable and necessary that the policy was introduced with cross-party support; that should not be forgotten.

The 2013 Act applied the presumption of responsibility, through the senior managers and certification regime, to all “authorised persons”. This Bill extends that authorised persons regime to a wider range of businesses but has watered down the presumption of responsibility to a mere “duty of responsibility”. The vast majority of people working in the financial sector were not, and are not, affected by the existing legislation, and would remain unaffected should our amendment pass. That is why the legislation was passed by Government Members in the first place.

In December 2013, speaking of the stricter measures being introduced by the Government, including the reverse burden of proof, the then Economic Secretary to the Treasury, the right hon. Member for Bromsgrove (Sajid Javid), said:

“The introduction of this offence means that…in future those who bring down their bank by making thoroughly unreasonable decisions can be held accountable for their actions…Senior managers could be liable if they take a decision that leads to the failure of the bank…The maximum sentence for the new offence…reflects the seriousness that the Government, and society more broadly, place on ensuring that our financial institutions are managed in a way that does not recklessly endanger the economy or the public purse.”—[Official Report, 11 December 2013; Vol. 572, c. 252.]

On that, at least, I agree with the right hon. Gentleman. It is a shame that there has been a change in position.

--- Later in debate ---

[George Kerevan]

We, too, will oppose the Bill on Third Reading. During Treasury questions today, the Chancellor said—I wrote the phrase down, because I was rather taken with it—that he was quite certain that we now have “better and tougher regulation of the financial system.” That is a good test, and it is a good test for this Bill. Do we have tougher regulation? As the law stands this evening, if a senior named manager in a major financial institution discovers that there has been major corruption, wrongdoing and regulatory failure at their bank on their watch, they are culpable unless they can prove to the FCA that they took reasonable steps to stop that happening. As we speak, they would be responsible, and that has been the case for a month and a half.

If we pass the Bill tonight, the situation will change. That manager will no longer be personally responsible. They will be able to argue, “Actually, I ticked all the boxes, signed all the forms, went to all the group therapy sessions with those on my trading floor and told them all to be good boys and girls, but do you know what? They weren’t, and they hid it from me.” And so we will go through the whole cycle again. The law as it stands, as passed by this Government and this Chancellor, makes each individual senior named manager responsible, like the captain of a ship or ferry; if something goes wrong, they are responsible and they cannot claim otherwise. If we pass the Bill, far from toughening the law, we will weaken it.

The only explanation we have heard from the Government is that it is a bit more complicated now because the Bill widens to tens of thousands the number of people who will be designated as responsible people when it comes to identifying who is in charge when something goes wrong. I understand that, but it is perfectly possible, as we tried in Committee, to ring-fence and say that the very senior people in the major banks—the systemically dangerous banks—should be held personally responsible, unless they can prove that they took proper steps. But no, the Government are using the widening of the designated persons regime to weaken and water down the current legislation. That tells me that they are not really serious about being tougher; they are more concerned with getting by.

There was an interesting debate in Committee about transfer vehicles. Those are a bit technical, but they are to do with how the insurance market reinsures itself to spread risk. There are clauses in the Bill—this is a good thing to put into it—that give the Treasury powers to regulate the use of transfer vehicles in the reinsurance market in a tougher fashion, to use the Chancellor’s key word.

I do not have time to go into detail about what is happening, but insurers can offset some of their risk in the reinsurance market, and they usually do that by selling some of it to specialist wholesale houses, which buy into the risk, but whose capital covers the risk if something goes wrong. Now, the insurance market is instead moving towards reinsuring through specialist vehicles of the kind that got us into trouble in the mortgage market in the lead-up to 2007.

When the issue was discussed in Committee, it was interesting that Ministers argued that we needed to put in place a regulatory framework that made it easier to shift the burden in the reinsurance market away from wholesalers that are capitalised and towards special vehicles using all the financial markets’ tricks of the trade, which led to the disaster in 2007. That said to me that, deep down in the Bill, the Government are up to their old tricks—they want to deregulate and to have less tough regulation, rather than more regulation. On those grounds, the Bill fails the Chancellor’s test, and we should vote against it.

There are good things in the Bill. In particular, we can pride ourselves on the fact that, through the Committee stage and leading up to Report stage today, the Government have been persuaded—I use that word in inverted commas—to take the Treasury Committee’s advice and to set a precedent, in that the FCA’s chief executive will in future be subject, de facto, to having their appointment approved by the Committee and, therefore, by this House rather than the Executive.

That does two things. First, it makes the FCA more accountable, because it is accountable to the House rather than the Executive. Secondly, it protects the FCA from interference by the Executive. That is a good precedent. If it is extended, we will be able to ensure that all the key regulatory bodies and their senior staff are approved by the House and, in particular, that the Governor of the Bank of England is subject to scrutiny and approval by the House, rather than simply appointed by the Executive. That is important because of the large powers that have been transferred to the Bank of England since the crisis of 2007.

However, there are still loose ends, and so I come to the word “better” in the Chancellor’s little homily. Have things got better? They have got a little better, given the ability of the House to protect the FCA and to have a role in appointing its head, and we can take that further into other regulatory bodies. However, there are loose ends at the FCA. Much of the Bill and much of the debate has been about the FCA. In the last instance, the FCA is the consumer’s champion: it regulates how the banks sell. Many of the problems we have had in the last 10 years have been about mis-selling by the banks. Every Member in the House will know we have a number of legacy organisations and legacy campaigns because we have still not put right the mis-selling that has taken place across a range of banks and products since the turn of the millennium.

The FCA is important, and protecting it is important, because, in the last instance, it is the consumer’s champion. A few weeks ago I went to FCA headquarters and had a meeting with Mr John Griffith-Jones, who is the chairman of the FCA. I put it to him, “You are the consumer champion,” but he demurred. He does not feel that the FCA is the consumer champion. He thinks that that would go too far and that it would be partisan and take up the consumer’s choice. At present, the FCA is still too much the creature of the Treasury. If we want a tougher and better regulatory regime, we have to make the FCA truly independent.

The FCA is getting a new chief executive, but I am not going to offer platitudes and pleasantries. When the new chief executive starts, I think that the chairman of the FCA should consider his position, because I think it also needs a new chairman. We are only starting on the road of making sure that our regulatory bodies are fit for purpose; we have not got there yet.

Finally, many people in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland are disappointed that the Government stood on ceremony and decided not to widen the remit of the membership of the core bodies of the Bank of England, starting with its court, to allow proper representation of all of the regions and nations, including the north of England. Most people in this country, and certainly those in the Celtic regions, are long of the view that the Bank of England, the banks and the key regulatory authorities are far too focused on the square mile of the City of London and its needs. We will never have a tougher, better regulatory system unless we widen the remit until the whole of the UK—the individual nations and the regions of England—is represented. Until we do that, the Bank of England is still suspect. That has not been delivered, so there is still a suspicion across the UK that the banking regulatory system operates ultimately in the interests of the bankers, rather than the people. Until that changes, we will not have a better or tougher regulatory system; we will simply have the same old regulatory system dressed up under a different name, and the same old banking crisis will be around the corner yet again.

Question put, That the Bill be now read the Third time.