Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Bill (Sixth sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateEmma Hardy
Main Page: Emma Hardy (Labour - Kingston upon Hull West and Haltemprice)Department Debates - View all Emma Hardy's debates with the Department for Education
(3 years, 2 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI hear what the hon. Gentleman says. I would like to think that the very concerning case of the midwifery student is a case in point.
I recognise the point that the hon. Lady is making. My concern is with the definition of academic freedom applying to academics and therefore not being applicable to students. I draw her attention to my amendment 44, which would insert the words
“and in the conduct of research”
to cover PhD students and other students involved in research. The point my hon. Friend the Member for Brighton, Kemptown was making was that we cannot say that academic freedom, in its entirety, which belongs to academics, can apply to every student, whereas students involved in the conduct of research behave more like academics, so it could apply to them. That is my issue with the amendment.
I thank the hon. Lady for that gracious intervention. It is a pity that I cannot speak to amendment 60 in the same moment, because I think that would help clarify my reasoning for this amendment. I am concerned that without the express inclusion of students, there is a risk that those most vulnerable to self-censorship and adverse consequences in academia, such as being marked down, will remain unprotected.
There is the argument that freedom of speech, as referred to in the Bill, is sufficient to adequately cover students without the need to cover them through the term “academic freedom”. However, I would question that, as demonstrated by the examples I have given involving Professor Biggar and the midwifery student. I look forward to the Minister’s comments and ask her to consider the amendment as the Bill progresses.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Cummins. I listened to what the hon. Member for Congleton said. We have to be wary of where the amendment could take us in terms of the status conferred on academics by the term “academic freedom”. As the Minister herself said, it is a subset of a freedom of speech, but it is a really important one. That is why we sought to eke that out earlier, in order to make it sacrosanct: it stands alone, but it is linked to freedom of speech.
As regards the notion that students in their third week on campus could gain the status of academic freedom, I am not entirely sure, speaking from personal experience, that it would have been right for me to have been given that status when I had a degree of naivety about a particular subject, but I would be under the hon. Member for Congleton’s amendment. I do not think that that is right, because we are essentially putting students on the same level as those who have gone through a process of academic rigour to arrive at a position where they deserve this particular freedom and status.
We all agree that we want freedom of speech to apply to students. I wonder whether, as the Bill progresses, we might find an alternative place to make specific reference to them.
I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his point and, likewise, my hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull West and Hessle for hers. I accept that there is a need for protection under freedom of speech. The differentiator for me is about academic freedom. I totally concur that all students, whether they be postdoctoral students or students in week two, arriving on campus in September or October of this year, have the right to freedom of speech, to say what they wish to say—with responsibility. But there is an area where I differ, and this was what I was edging towards in my questioning to various academics during the two witness sessions. What Professor Stock actually said was interesting. She made this very distinction. She thinks that
“the difference between academic freedom and freedom of expression”—
I am quoting her word for word—
“assuming there is one, can only be in principle grounded in expertise.”––[Official Report, Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Public Bill Committee, 7 September 2021; c. 11, Q17.]
That is the case however we wish to define that expertise. And there is a problem, actually, about how people might consider what expertise is. I would say that the expertise is much more to do with methodology and understanding of academic rigour and discipline and how an academic arrives at a process of thinking, which a student is not necessarily—
Yes, learning—going through that development. That is why students are attracted to going into higher education. It is to understand about the process of that academic rigour and methodology.
Will the hon. Gentleman reflect for a moment on the position of doctoral students, which was mentioned by Professors Goodwin and Kaufmann? A student studying for a doctorate has considerable expertise in their field and, at the same time, might be tutoring some more junior students—undergraduates. Is it not a somewhat distorted situation and a strange irony that they could claim the protection of academic freedom for anything said in the tutoring, but not as a doctoral student?
I will give way to my hon. Friend, and respond to the interventions together.
I am sorry, Mrs Cummins, I did not realise that in declaring our interests we had to say what our partners do. My partner is at the University of Hull doing degree apprenticeships, which I am very proud of.
To respond to the hon. Member for Congleton, our amendment 44 includes the words
“and in the conduct of research”,
to close the loophole that she has just mentioned, of a doctoral student involved in research. We would like to close the loophole with that amendment.
I thank the hon. Member for Congleton and my hon. Friend for their interventions. Yes, there is a differentiation between doctoral and undergraduate students.
Vitally, with academic freedom, special status is conferred. It is not something someone gets just because they turn up on a campus, or sign up to the Open University or whatever; it has to be conferred on those individuals who are, in essence, academics in the traditional sense. What they have is founded on their research—that thinking, the methodology, the scholarly debate. Ultimately, because their work is peer reviewed, it is understood to have a robust methodology. They have earned that—I used “earned” in the witness sessions, which was perhaps slightly the wrong word, and there might be a better word. It is an appreciation that the academic has gone through the academic thinking that has led them to express a particular thought or piece of research and outcome.
To my mind, that is the essential element, the primacy of academic freedom, which is why it is so important to separate it out from freedom of speech—hence our points this morning. Academic freedom defends the right to express ideas based not simply on opinion, but on academic research. I stress that point.
In the evidence session, the hon. Member for Congleton said:
“I am thinking not only that academic freedom is important generally for anyone at a university, but that some students, such as doctoral students, may also be tutoring.”—[Official Report, Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Public Bill Committee, 13 September 2021; c. 97, Q196.]
As she said earlier, that is an important distinction because that role has been given to them by the university. It has conferred on that person a status, and there is a responsibility that goes with it. That is a very important distinction.
I will in a moment, but now that I am flowing poetically I do not want the hon. Gentleman to break into the stanza. [Interruption.] All of these things are a matter of opinion, John. There is also a point about what I might describe as top-down pressure. We know—Members who have been involved in higher education, including many on this Committee, will be familiar with this—that there is often a tension between university management and particular university departments; between the academic staff and the senior management team who are often long detached from their original academic roots. It is a concern that sometimes university authorities will instruct academics to teach particular things, possibly even in a particular way. Defending the integrity of the people at the academic coalface is really important, and that is what the second part of my amendment seeks to do.
As a former teacher who had the statutory national curriculum and regular reviews from Ofsted on the best way to teach x, y and z, there is part of me that reads the right hon. Gentleman’s proposed paragraph (c) and thinks, “Wonderful! Yes, the passion and the ability to teach in the way you want on the subjects you want”. However, as has been alluded to—and this is where we get to the detail of it—there are subjects at university that require things to be taught in a particular way to get through a certain amount of basic knowledge components on that course. It might be suitable for some courses, such as government and politics, where there can be greater freedom, but studying medicine, for example, might need to be more instructive. Therefore, much as in my heart I am with him, in my head I find that, as it stands, it is not quite the right sentiment.
I am pretty certain that the hon. Member for Brighton, Kemptown is going to make a similar point, but I will let him do so when I give way to him.
Of course, the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull West and Hessle is right that it cannot be a free-for-all. Every academic knows what their professional duty is: to transmit a body of knowledge, but also to stimulate a range of ideas, to stimulate people to think freely and openly about the subject matter, which they are missioned to teach and their students are missioned to study. I take the hon. Lady’s point. The amendment is not saying, “Do what you like and it really does not matter”, because in the end academics have a responsibility to their students. That is an important professional duty as well as a responsibility. We must not be too permissive in our approach to what academics can or cannot say and do. However, I am just as concerned—in fact, I am more concerned—about the character of leadership in some universities.
We have talked informally outside this Committee about governance and accountability within universities. When the Minister has a spare moment after getting this Bill on the statute book and is looking for her next Bill, I think that all of us across this House, including those on the Front Bench, should spend time reflecting on and considering the very important issue of university governance.
The hon. Gentleman is of course right about the changing balance of power within universities. Many senates no longer play the role they once did routinely. If anything, universities have become more pyramidical in their management structure. It is and always has been important to ensure rigour in the disciplines he describes, and validation of courses, including external validation, is an important part of assuring that rigour. I have been involved in that myself.
I take the hon. Gentleman’s point, but my worry is that these days there may even be ideological top-down instruction, so that one has to sanitise one’s curriculum in a particular way. It might be politically motivated, but it might be, as the right hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington implied, about all kinds of other things. It is not all about politics; it is sometimes about non-political orthodoxies. The whole point about academic freedom is that one can challenge what are assumed to be a priori assumptions. That is what the greatest among us have done over time.
I think I can find further agreement with the hon. Gentleman. The wording added may require further work to reflect the sentiment he articulated, but my purpose in tabling the amendment is to get the Government to think again about the relationship between freedom of speech and academic freedom, which populated quite a lot of the evidence we received from witnesses. The concern that we, across the Committee, and the witnesses shared is that academic freedom should, of itself, be placed at the heart of the consideration. The Minister has been reassuring about that, and what she has said so far publicly and in Committee encourages me, but I wonder if we need something in the Bill to reinforce the point.
As I said, my heart is definitely in agreement with the principles being outlined, but one of the depressing realities we face—I know this from a particular university—is universities having to drop courses because they are not as marketable and attractive to students and they cannot get the people on. Universities are making decisions to wipe out entire courses, because it costs too much to run them. I would love to say that, yes, academics should have complete freedom to design and deliver courses however they want, but we have to be mindful that there is a cost involved. There have to be some conversations with the management team about whether the course they are putting on will make ends meet and will not end up costing university more in the long run. I wish we did not have to talk about this.
The hon. Lady now really is opening a hornet’s nest with the issue of money, how universities are motivated, and how far that is skewed. I have struggled against the narrow interpretation of learning as an entirely utilitarian matter for all my political career, including my ministerial career. As Committee members will know, I was a stout defender of adult and community learning, not because it was necessarily and directly linked to employment, but because it fed societal wellbeing. Let us make the case for the glory of learning for its own sake.
The hon. Lady provoked me into that digression, Mrs Cummins, but she is right to say that sometimes universities are driven by those utilitarian purposes, hence my point about senior management. We have recently heard about money from outside sources—China was mentioned in our witness sessions, and rightly so, given recent revelations. There are all kinds of ways in which what is taught and learnt at universities can be altered by factors that go well beyond the interests of either academics or students. I am concerned about the matters that the hon. Lady has raised, and the Government will have a watchful eye on all that, too.
I have a fundamental disagreement with Opposition Members, in that I think the Bill is welcome and a good thing. I know that they have reservations. However, I am equally sure that if the Bill is to be effective, it needs to be as well drafted as it can be. That is precisely what scrutiny is designed to do. In that respect, drawing out and codifying the distinction in some way seems to me to have value. I make no definitive judgment about how that should be done; my amendment is very much a first stab.
I should not say before the Minister has spoken that I will not press the amendment to a Division, or I will extract no concessions from her. Instead, I shall hang on, hold fire, and hear what she has to say. The amendment is very much designed to push and probe the Government, but if she says it is a complete load of nonsense, I will have to test the Committee’s view.
I feel some responsibility to reflect the fact that the amendment is one of a group. There are some very good amendments in the group, tabled by Members on both sides. I will not name them all, but amendment 48, in the name of the hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington, is helpful, and amendment 60, in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Congleton, brings value to what we are doing. A number of strong amendments in the group are designed in a constructive way to hone and improve the Bill. I will not go through them all because that would be tedious and people can speak for themselves, but there are some good amendments worthy of further consideration by the Committee and the Government.
I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his remarks and his amendment, which has generated a huge amount of debate. It is interesting that several of us have had a go at the same provision to embellish and improve it. The definition of academic freedom is loose and hard to pin down. The fact that three amendments are addressing it emphasises how concerned we all are about how it is defined.
The right hon. Gentleman’s amendment seeks to expand academic freedom to encompass how a teacher delivers their classes. The amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Congleton goes a little further in seeking to protect academics under the umbrella of academic freedom whenever they express an opinion about the practices of a provider. I guess that this is where we get into subjective interpretations of what academic freedom should be.
During my research I came across part 6 of the UNESCO definition of academic freedom, which guides my thinking and that behind amendment 46, tabled by me and my right hon. Friend the Member for Hayes and Harlington. Under the UNESCO definition, the concept of academic freedom is broken down into five parts: freedom of teaching and discussion; freedom in carrying out research and disseminating and publishing the results thereof; freedom to express freely their opinion about the institution or system in which they work; freedom from institutional censorship; and freedom to participate in professional or representative academic bodies.
My concern about the amendments tabled by the right hon. Gentleman and the hon. Member for Congleton is that they are trying to nail down a definition, but may have left out a couple of crucial components. Amendment 46, tabled by me and my right hon. Friend the Member for Hayes and Harlington, is a compromise with the position of the right hon. Gentleman and the hon. Lady. It touches on two of the most of crucial elements in providing that clarity: freely pursuing chosen topics and expressing views of their institution. Interestingly, the University and College Union favours an amendment in the realm of ours. It is also deeply concerned that narrowing the definition of academic freedom will limit the ability and willingness of education staff to speak out on wider social or political issues, or indeed against their employers. An amendment such as ours would offer expansive protection for the academic freedom of staff, including from pressure and censorship by public authorities like the Department for Education and the Office for Students or by employers.
The amendments would offer protection against redundancies targeted at particular academic disciplines or those perceived to be politically motivated.
My mistake, Mrs Cummins, for not realising that the amendments are grouped and that I should be talking about all of them. An aspect of academic freedom and the importance that we want the Bill to place on the role of academics is illustrated by amendment 27, tabled by the hon. Member for Congleton. We should not restrict academics with the narrow definition including:
“within their field of expertise”.
We do not know who will make the definition. That is an important issue, too.
I thank my hon. Friend and I shall address that important point shortly.
Amendment 47 would protect academics against not securing promotion in respect of different jobs in other institutions. It aims to ensure that academic freedom is protected across the range of roles that someone may hold, not simply where an issue may arise. For instance, an academic may be employed by two HE institutions or hold various visiting professorships. The amendment would ensure that an institution cannot punish an academic for disagreeing with research or published work at another institution.
This links with open, transparent career development —an honest approach. We heard from Tom Simpson that decisions on research grants and appointments are made in the culture of the office. To a certain extent, that is inevitable. That is the reality of how organisations work, but I get what he was trying to say. Amendment 48 would prevent a university from denying training opportunities. as a way to punish an academic for the views they hold. The essential difference from our amendments is that they seek to protect those who can benefit from academic freedom.
Amendment 60, tabled by the hon. Member for Congleton, on the inclusion of adverse impacts on educational progress, implies that academic freedom ought to be given to students. We had a long debate about that. I have reservations about it, and I am not convinced by the argument that was made in the previous debate. The experience that I have gleaned from discussions with higher education institutions in the past six months is that many assessment methods are anonymised. Each student is given a unique number and papers or their equivalent are marked by several academics to avoid discrimination. Institutions do their utmost to ensure that discrimination does not prevail and damage students’ progress.
For those who can and should benefit from academic freedom, I have sought to expand the definition to include innovative research. Amendment 45 would ensure that the definition of academic freedom includes the world-class innovative work carried out in our universities. The current definition in the Bill simply covers new ideas or controversial or unpopular opinions, but most of the socially or scientifically beneficial or prize work conducted by academics is innovative, rather than falling into those narrow categories. The right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings expanded on that point, and said that it would be valuable to include that, mentioning Galileo and Darwin, who conducted innovative research centuries. The two go hand in hand. Think about Rosalind Franklin and the ground-breaking work she did in the face of a counter-view in society about genetics; she clearly did incredibly important research. More recently, we have Oxford’s work on vaccines. That kind of work has to be protected at all costs.
One of our witnesses, Dr Ahmed, believes that certain forces are leading academics not to pursue lines of research that they think might be fruitful. Research is fundamental, and it is important to protect it. I can well understand the perspective of institutions on the work that is done and why they seek to have some sort of direction over research and teaching wherever possible. Various Members, however, spoke about how institutions present themselves in what has become an incredibly marketised sector. The institutions did not create that situation; it is the result of what was put in place years ago, and they have to respond not just to a UK market but to a global market for higher education. They are trying to appeal to the needs of the UK, what students wish to study and what research is needed, as well as looking at trends, approaches and the needs of global society.
I risk straying from the Bill, so I will be quick. The evidence that we heard and our discussions today show that the marketisation of higher education has had a negative impact on the student experience. I hope that the Minister takes that evidence seriously, as well as the remarks that Members on both sides of the Committee have made about the impact of marketisation on education, so that in a future Bill Committee we can secure consensus on an alternative model.
I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his intervention. Yes, we heard virtually all the academic witnesses and others express the importance of this point. Dr Ahmed, referring to Professor Stock, spoke about Professor Richard Dawkins, saying:
“theology is not his area of expertise. Many…would argue that it is not even his area of competence. I would dispute that myself, but it could be argued. Nevertheless, we would certainly want a Bill that protects his freedom to muse about religion as he likes. That is one issue.”––[Official Report, Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Public Bill Committee, 7 September 2021; c. 11, Q18.]
This is crucial. This small amendment would remove five words from the Bill; it is incredibly small and very easy for the Minister to agree, but incredibly important. If the Bill is what it is claimed to be—a Bill on freedom of speech and academic freedom—and if the Minister honestly believes that that is what is written here, she will accept the amendment to remove
“within their field of expertise”,
because that is a limitation on academic freedom. It is clear, and no future guidance will change it. If those words are left in the Bill, academic freedom is limited. I cannot put it any more strongly than that. All the evidence we heard made the same point. I hope the Minister will accept the amendment.
The original definition of academic freedom did not have these five additional words. The Government chose to add them. I do not believe we need to rewrite or put in words. Originally, the definition of academic freedom was:
“freedom within the law to question and test received wisdom…put forward new ideas and controversial or unpopular opinions, without placing themselves at risk”.
The Government added the unnecessary words
“and within their field of expertise”.
My hon. Friend is right. I sense that we agree across the Committee—
Some of us are agreed that it should not be in there, and I think the House of Lords should explore whether further definition is required.
From talking to academics over the last six months and more, I want to stress how incredibly fluid the areas of research they work in are. They go through wholesale change in areas of interest and exploration. That is the kind of innovative research we want, and it is one of the great things about our institutions. People talk about UK universities being the best in the world in different categories, but we genuinely do have a very strong reputation for higher education globally. It needs to be protected.
We support the amendment by the hon. Member for Congleton on the removal of those words. We will, of course, support the amendments standing in my name and that of my right hon. Friend the Member for Hayes and Harlington.
Amendments 80, 28, 45, 46 and 49 seek to set out the type of speech that the definition of academic freedom in clause 1 covers, and to ensure it includes the right of academic staff to express opinions about the curricula, governance, affiliation and the teaching and research at their provider, to design and deliver their teaching and do innovative research. Amendment 28 would also remove the limitation in the current provision that it covers only law speech that is within the person’s field of expertise, and makes other changes that I will discuss shortly.
As currently drafted, the definition of academic freedom includes the freedom to put forward new ideas and controversial or unpopular opinions. To be clear, that includes the right of academic staff to put forward opinions about any issue, including the curricula, governance, affiliation and teaching and research of their provider. It would also include the right to put forward research proposals that some might see as controversial or to pursue a range of methods when designing and delivering high-quality course material. There is therefore no need to specify in the Bill the type of opinions and speech that are covered, since all opinions and speech are covered as long as they are within the law and one’s academic field of expertise—a point I will return to in a minute. Of course, I shall consider once again the comments made in the debate.
Amendment 28 would make other changes to the definition of academic freedom. The first is the requirement that academic freedom means freedom within the law, which is a vital qualification in the Bill. Let me be clear once again that the Bill does not cover unlawful speech. The amendment would remove the qualification, but I do not see why the lawfulness of speech should not apply to academic staff as it does to anyone else on campus. Amendment 28, as well as amendment 80, would also remove the requirement that the protected speech should be within an academic’s field of expertise.
I commit to the Committee that I will take the topic away. We have heard a very compelling case from both Opposition Members and Government Members today. I want to outline why the provision is in the Bill, but I commit to taking the topic away.
Does the Minister commit to taking away the topic relating to amendment 28? Or was it amendment 27?
Sorry; I commit to taking away the topic of field of expertise, which is covered in amendment 28, as well as amendment 80.
I will outline the reason why the topic is in the Bill in the first place. Academic staff will have extra protection under the Bill, in addition to the more general protection for freedom of speech. That is the reason that the additional protection only covers speech where an individual has expertise. For example, a maths professor should not have greater protection than a non-academic colleague or a student when they are speaking about matters unrelated to their role as an academic, but in that case the professor would still benefit from the same freedom of speech protections.
I thank the hon. Member for that helpful point. I commit to taking away that very topic.
I take the commitment, but it does not have a lot of detail. A commitment to do what? A commitment to rewrite those five words? A commitment to reassess whether those five words need to be in there or not? I would like a little more detail on what the Minister is committing to.
I and the Government commit to taking the topic away, listening to Members from across the Committee today and their very valid points and concerns on the topic, and to look at the topic again.
On the rationale behind the topic, the Government intend the definition to be interpreted broadly, so that a maths professor who uses their mathematical or statistical skills to analyse a non-mathematical subject would be covered, for example—that references the point made by the hon. Member for Brighton, Kemptown. It would also cover situations where an academic discusses teaching generally or the governance of their department—all that is within their area of work and subject expertise.
The wording reflects Strasbourg case law, where it has been held that academic freedom is not restricted to academic or scientific research, but also extends to an academic’s freedom to freely express their opinions in the area of their research, professional expertise and competence. Our courts must take this judgment into account when considering the question of what academic freedom is.
Further on amendment 28, I will move on to the inclusion of the wording that seeks to clarify that academics should enjoy academic freedom without “unlawful interference”. That is unnecessary, because any such interference with academic freedom will by definition be unlawful, which does not need to be stated in the Bill.
Finally, amendment 28 adds “without being adversely affected” to the definition. Being placed “at risk” of adverse effect is already covered by the Bill. It would be sufficient for an academic to show that they were at risk of adverse effect. It would not be necessary to go further and show that there had actually been adverse effect. Even a threat to damage an academic’s career, for example, could be sufficient. Therefore that aspect of the amendment is not required, as the current drafting is actually wider.
Amendments 27, 57 and 58 all seek to broaden the definition by removing the requirement for speech to fall within an academic’s field of expertise—once again, we shall cover this topic. Clause 1 provides that higher education providers must take reasonably practicable steps to secure freedom of speech for their staff and members. This includes securing the academic freedom of academic staff. As I have already said, this means that academic staff will have particular extra protection, in addition to the more general protection that the Bill offers for freedom of speech. This will allow academics to bring complaints to the Office for Students or a tort claim before the courts, which will reflect the high level of importance that the courts have consistently placed on academic freedom. I have outlined our rationale behind the “field of expertise” requirement and that it should be interpreted broadly, but as I have already stated to the Committee, I will take away and consider the issues raised regarding this topic.
My hon. Friend is making an absolutely excellent speech. To pre-empt what the Minister will say—“Well, everything is allowed unless it’s unlawful”—I refer back to the evidence given to us by Sunder Katwala, who said:
“Most racist and antisemitic speech does not meet the legal threshold of being unlawful. Intimidation and violence are unlawful, and other forms of stirring up are unlawful, but holocaust denial is not unlawful.”––[Official Report, Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Public Bill Committee, 13 September 2021; c. 101, Q209.]
So having a definition of allowing speech unless it is unlawful is not enough to stop holocaust denialists coming and speaking at universities.
I thank my hon. Friend for that really important contribution. As we have heard from a number of witnesses, holocaust denial—as I said, I am sure that everyone present finds it objectionable—is, in fact, lawful free speech that could be protected under the regulations currently in the Bill, unless we ensure that the limitations of free speech and academic freedom are spelled out explicitly on the face of the Bill.
As we have talked about a lot over the past couple of days, it is really important that speakers, academics and students have academic freedom. Clearly, other pieces of legislation that are in place—not least libel law, the limits that are set out in the Prevent duties that universities have to abide by, and the limits set out in the Equality Act 2010—must be read alongside the Bill, but none of those is sufficient to prevent holocaust denial. I am particularly keen to expand the definition of holocaust denial to genocide denial. Just as we not only commemorate the Nazi holocaust of Jews, disabled people, Roma and Sinti, LGBT people, trade unionists and other minority groups within Europe on Holocaust Memorial Day every year, we also commemorate the subsequent genocides in Rwanda, Darfur, Cambodia and Bosnia.
We have spoken about universities trying to appeal not only to a market within the UK, but to a global market. If there are no limitations on free speech, what message would it send to students from places such as Rwanda, Darfur, Cambodia and Bosnia? What would it say to students from Germany, where they have much more robust laws in place to ensure that holocaust denial and denial of other genocides—which is of course a disgusting desecration of all those who lost their lives and who suffered in those genocides—is not perpetuated within higher education institutions? The duty of care that institutions have towards their students is incredibly important, and it is something that we need to ensure is not lost as a result of the unforeseen consequences of passing a Bill that does not have the limitations that I have set out in amendment 32. The following amendments, which are in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington, clarify some of the technical points throughout the Bill to ensure that amendment 32 can stand.
I think that any right-minded person would want to ensure that protections are in place. It is something in which there is a clear public interest, because it is objectionable that universities might have to spend money to fight legal cases against genocide deniers who demand a right to a platform on their campuses. There is also a really important public order point, because when people from the far right are invited to speak on university campuses, there is often, naturally, a reaction from the student body, who protest their presence. Nick Griffin turning up on various campuses over the years has meant skirmishes. Sometimes, such people bring along heavies with them, who will cause problems, start fights with students and make students on that campus fundamentally less safe while they are there. Of course, they are there to radicalise people and bring them round to their far-right cause. They are there to recruit, so the idea that it is an academic exercise is for the birds—these are people coming on to campuses to radicalise young people.
We expect a vote shortly and we want to discuss a lot of other things, but I want to ensure that the amendment is given proper consideration and that those safeguards are put in the Bill to make sure that the well-meaning, I am sure, assurances of the Government do not turn out to be meaningless in effect.
Amendments 32 to 34 and 69, taken together, seek to exempt providers and student unions from the duty to secure freedom of speech of persons who speak or intend to speak to deny genocide. The Government, however, are clear that genocide denial, including denial of the holocaust, is abhorrent and morally reprehensible. The new director will produce extensive guidance to assist universities, further to the points made by hon. Members. That guidance will make it clear that the European Court of Human Rights has held that holocaust denial is not protected speech under article 10 of the European convention on human rights. As such speech is intolerable in a democratic society, and that holocaust denial, even if dressed up as impartial historical research, must be seen—
I refer the Minister to the evidence given by Sunder Katwala:
“Comparing the Israeli Government to Nazi Germany, for example, is a lawful position that we wish to stigmatise.”––[Official Report, Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Public Bill Committee, 13 September 2021; c. 102, Q209.]
He complimented—if that is the right word—the Government on trying to get universities to adopt the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance definition; likewise, we support that. However, that is still a “lawful position”. What this amendment would do is to make that, even though it is within the law to hold those opinions, we do not want them in our universities.
If the hon. Member will forgive me, I will carry on and respond to her point regarding the balancing act that universities will perform.
Holocaust deniers often have clear links with neo-Nazi extremism, and with antisemitic violence and intimidation. As I said on the Floor of the House, the Government are clear that there is no place in our universities for an extremist view that is a complete work of fiction and one that grotesquely seeks to misrepresent our global history.
Let me once again be clear that nothing in the Bill encourages providers or student unions to invite speakers who have denied or deny genocide. The Bill will not give anyone the right to a platform, and on that I am categorical.
Again, my partner works at the University of Hull’s degree apprenticeship course.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Michael Tomlinson.)