Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Bill (Sixth sitting)

Charlotte Nichols Excerpts

Wednesday 15th September 2021 Public Bill Committees

[Matt Western]

I thank my—I was about to say hon. Friend. I thank the right hon. Gentleman for that point. I am sure that my hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull West and Hessle will elaborate.

The reality of the academic community in higher education is that their areas of work are fluid. They do not see themselves as necessarily specialists in one field or another. As we heard in our evidence session, a statistician is a mathematician, but a mathematician could become a specialist or well versed in issues such as migration or epidemiology—medical science, in essence. How does one define “their area of expertise”? We have to be extremely careful. The right hon. Gentleman’s suggestion may well be in the right area, but much more consideration is needed, and for the purposes of the Bill we have to remove these words.

I will not expand on what Professor Nigel Biggar said. That has been done already.

[Charlotte Nichols (Warrington North) (Lab)]

On amendment 27, I am interested in what form of words other than

“within their field of expertise”

could be used to act as a safeguard, because we might see cases in which academics are picked up for use of their freedom of speech more widely, but there is a distinction between freedom of speech and academic freedom.

[Matt Western]

My hon. Friend is quite right. We have not proposed anything that necessarily refines that. At this stage, I think, it is important to remove the words, and minds greater than mine—perhaps in the House of Lords—may come up with an alternative. It is a really important area that needs to be defined.

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[Charlotte Nichols]

I am interested in the examples that the hon. Member has raised as things that should be protected as part of academic freedom, but I would draw the distinction back between academic freedom and freedom of speech.

Just because someone is an academic, for example, does not mean that any topic that they choose to wax lyrical about should necessarily be protected, particularly if they are engaging in harmful stereotypes, discriminatory behaviour and so on. As much as I agree with the broad thrust of taking this out, I think that we need to reflect in the legislation a way in which we might draw that distinction between academic freedom and freedom of speech. Does the hon. Member not agree?

[Fiona Bruce]

The objective of the Bill is to secure freedom of speech within the law. We are saying that, provided that someone speaks within the law—whether about their field of expertise or not—they should be covered by the Bill. They should have the freedom, as academics, to express views and not be penalised if those are unpopular, unfashionable or not mainstream. I hope the Minister will look at amendment 27 very seriously, above all those I have put down, and consider it in a positive light as the Bill progresses.

Amendment 28 is self-explanatory, setting out a number of factors that need to be covered and clarified in the definition of academic freedom. Not the least of those is the importance of academics being able to set the reading matter for subjects that they are teaching. I will set the amendment in context, underneath amendment 27.

A deeply concerning trend has emerged in our universities that has seen academics lose their jobs, students suspended from courses and refused affiliation with their unions, and visiting speakers refused a platform, due only to their expression of non-mainstream viewpoints. Some are not, in fact, non-mainstream. In his evidence, Matthew Goodwin, a professor of politics and international relations, told us he was an outlier when speaking of Brexit, with only 10% of academics sharing his support of it. However, Brexit was actually voted for by over 50% of those who voted in the referendum across our country.

We also heard of instances of academics being subject to vilification or discrimination for exercising their right to academic freedom and freedom of speech within the law. Although we did not hear of these instances in evidence, I will give two examples. In 2019, I raised in this House the well-publicised and worrying experience of respected academic John Finnis, an emeritus professor of law and legal philosophy who had taught at the University of Oxford for some 40 years at that point, yet students were calling for him to be removed from office simply for holding traditional Catholic views. Much more recently in the press, we had the case of David Palmer, a Catholic who was denied recognition by Nottingham University for the post of chaplain due to comments he made on social media expressing no more than the Church’s traditional views on euthanasia and abortion.

Professor Goodwin told us:

“This is how it typically works: a group of students will make a complaint about an academic. They may take that academic’s words out of context. They may imply that something was said that may not have been said—who knows? That academic is typically investigated and, as we saw in the case at Edinburgh recently, they are suspended and asked to leave campus for six weeks or so while the case is investigated. There is a reason why academics say that the punishment is the process. The reputation of that academic is now in tatters. Nobody will hire that academic. His or her chances of getting a research grant are probably minimal, and those of getting published have been severely damaged. That individual is tainted.”––[Official Report, Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Public Bill Committee, 13 September 2021; c. 97, Q197.]

Given that Professor Kaufmann told us how there can be over 100 applicants for any post in academia, that is a serious disadvantage that can be experienced and suffered. We were also told by more than one witness that self-censorship by academics is the most pervasive impact of all—the so-called “chilling effect”.

We heard about that from several witnesses during the course of evidence. The case of Dr Ahmed is particularly instructive. We heard how he struggled to get just 25 signatures of people willing to put their name publicly to a motion on whether to change the wording of a university’s policy. That goes directly to the reason why we need amendment 28. Once it was put to a vote by secret ballot, it passed by 80%. Some witnesses spoke of staff and students refraining from saying things they considered to be important or not pursuing lines of research they thought would be fruitful, because they feared adverse consequences, such as disciplinary action or another form of marginalisation or vilification.

Amendment 28 seeks to augment and clarify that academic freedom should include the freedom to express opinions about a university, including its curricula, governance, affiliations, teaching and research, without the risk of being adversely affected. Amendment 60 seeks to ensure that students do not suffer any impact on their educational process, such as being marked down. We have already had a good debate on amendment 59, with which amendment 60 is linked, so I will leave that with no further comment, save the hope that the Minister will reflect on amendment 60 with amendment 59.

[John McDonnell]

I want to repeat my declaration of interest as an honorary fellow of Birkbeck, University of London, which is the same as the hon. Member for Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner. I failed to declare that my wife is an educational psychologist and is now a part-time tutor at the Institute of Education at University College London. I just want to make sure that our register of interests is full. I cannot think of any other family who are involved, but at least I will get that on the record.

Before considering the amendments, I want to reflect on the fact that we have come a long way since section 28 in the 1980s. We are no longer tolerating any Government interference in matters—for example, at that stage, in just talking in an educational setting about LGBT rights. It is interesting and gratifying that we have come this far.

On amendment 80, I want to warn the Minister. The right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings has a propensity to get people into trouble. On one occasion some years ago, the Speaker called for a question in the House and shouted out “Hayes, the Whip”, but nobody was there and I got the blame for it, even though it was John Hayes, not the Member for Hayes and Harlington, so I caution the Minister. Ever since Pepper v. Hart, material in the House can be taken into account in legal actions, and the right hon. Gentleman is enticing the Minister into expressions around his amendment. I actually have some time for his amendment. All we are trying to do today is get a formulation—maybe by Report stage and certainly by the time the Bill gets to the Lords, which is packed full of legal experts—with more than even the Commons—who might well be able to assist us. I can understand exactly where he is coming from in wanting to maximise that freedom of expression of freedom of academic activity.

I want also to consolidate the alliance I now have with the hon. Member for Congleton. It is interesting that a number of witnesses raised the point that this form of words does not work—we have to find some other formulation. I have worked with a whole range of economists in recent years who have commented on a whole range of matters unrelated strictly to economic matters—for example, wellbeing, health, social care. Areas of interest evolve over time. They cannot be defined just by the job description of that academic. We are digging ourselves into a hole by leaving this in the Bill. To the hon. Member for Congleton, I say: screw your courage to the sticking place, because if we had a vote on that today, we would most probably win it. I would be careful about the assurances that she may get from the Minister, which might not completely eradicate that form of words from the Bill.

[Charlotte Nichols]

The Minister may find herself promoted and able to follow through on the assurance she has given today, so perhaps the vote is the right way to make sure that we sort that out.

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Division 6

Ayes: 6

Noes: 10

[Charlotte Nichols]

I beg to move amendment 32, in clause 1, page 2, line 20, at end insert—

“(7A) The objective under subsection (2) does not apply to any person or body that—

(a) has made any statement in public that amounts to the denial of genocide; or

(b) intends to make any statement that amounts to the denial of genocide within the premises of the provider or to any students of the provider.”

This amendment ensures that the objective of securing freedom of speech within the law does not cover those who make statements that amount to a denial of genocide.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 69, in clause 1, page 2, line 36, at end insert—

““denial of genocide” means the malicious condoning, denying or trivialising of an act of genocide;

“genocide” has the meaning set out in Article II of the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.”

This amendment defines genocide denial against Article II of the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide Amendment 54.

Amendment 33, in clause 1, page 3, line 28, at end insert—

“(2) For the purposes of this section, “freedom of speech” and “academic freedom” do not extend to any statement that amounts to the denial of genocide.”

This amendment ensures that the objective of securing freedom of speech and academic freedom do not cover those who make statements that amount to a denial of genocide.

Amendment 34, in clause 2, page 4, line 13, at end insert—

“(4B) The objective under subsection (2) does not apply to any person or body that—

(a) has made any statement in public that amounts to the denial of genocide; or

(b) intends to make any statement that amounts to the denial of genocide within the premises of the students’ union or to any members of the students’ union.”

This amendment ensures that the duty on students’ unions to secure freedom of speech within the law does not cover those who make statements that amount to a denial of genocide.

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[Charlotte Nichols]

It is an honour to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Cummins. The amendment would make it clear and explicit in the Bill that the legal protections afforded to academics for their freedom of speech would not cover denial of the holocaust or other genocides recognised by the UK Government, namely the subsequent genocides in Rwanda, Darfur, Cambodia and Bosnia.

As I have previously explained, I feel that my concern is justified by the Minister’s comments on the radio about how holocaust denial constitutes lawful free speech, however objectionable everyone in this room would find it. There was a swift back-pedalling on that, with the newly sacked right hon. Member for South Staffordshire (Gavin Williamson) saying in the Chamber that freedom of speech would not protect holocaust deniers. However, I am not sure that assurances will be enough, and that is why it needs to be explicit.

One of the witnesses who came before the Committee, Professor Goodwin, stated that he would invite a speaker to address his students

“from the British National party or the National Front”.––[Official Report, Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Public Bill Committee, 13 September 2021; c. 91, Q187.]

Mr Griffin has a degree from the University of Cambridge, so he could potentially argue that he would be covered by academic freedom when promoting his views. Clearly, this is not an extreme hypothetical; this is someone who has been invited to address a number of universities, including my own, the University of Liverpool. He has also addressed the Cambridge Union society, taking part in a panel debate with Abu Hamza. When we consider the academic rigour of courses and the benefit of what students are being taught, I am not sure that any of us could argue that there was academic rigour in a debate between an Islamic fundamentalist and an out-and-out renowned Nazi. Mr Griffin has engaged in holocaust denial on a number of occasions, including at the trial for his 1998 public order offence, where he said:

“I am well aware that the orthodox opinion is that six million Jews were gassed and cremated and turned into lampshades. Orthodox opinion also once held that the world is flat.”

Over the course of our debates on the Bill, we have heard a lot about the need to challenge certain orthodoxies: that such debate is healthy in an academic setting and improves academic rigour, allows students to develop their critical thinking and debating skills, and so on. However, there must be a limit. Professor Goodwin made it clear that, if the Bill were enacted, he could invite someone such as Nick Griffin on to his campus. That is why it needs to be explicit in the Bill that, if he were to do so and his university provider tried to cancel the event, that is not something for which Mr Griffin would be able to seek damages against the university.

[Emma Hardy]

My hon. Friend is making an absolutely excellent speech. To pre-empt what the Minister will say—“Well, everything is allowed unless it’s unlawful”—I refer back to the evidence given to us by Sunder Katwala, who said:

“Most racist and antisemitic speech does not meet the legal threshold of being unlawful. Intimidation and violence are unlawful, and other forms of stirring up are unlawful, but holocaust denial is not unlawful.”––[Official Report, Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Public Bill Committee, 13 September 2021; c. 101, Q209.]

So having a definition of allowing speech unless it is unlawful is not enough to stop holocaust denialists coming and speaking at universities.

[Charlotte Nichols]

I thank my hon. Friend for that really important contribution. As we have heard from a number of witnesses, holocaust denial—as I said, I am sure that everyone present finds it objectionable—is, in fact, lawful free speech that could be protected under the regulations currently in the Bill, unless we ensure that the limitations of free speech and academic freedom are spelled out explicitly on the face of the Bill.

As we have talked about a lot over the past couple of days, it is really important that speakers, academics and students have academic freedom. Clearly, other pieces of legislation that are in place—not least libel law, the limits that are set out in the Prevent duties that universities have to abide by, and the limits set out in the Equality Act 2010—must be read alongside the Bill, but none of those is sufficient to prevent holocaust denial. I am particularly keen to expand the definition of holocaust denial to genocide denial. Just as we not only commemorate the Nazi holocaust of Jews, disabled people, Roma and Sinti, LGBT people, trade unionists and other minority groups within Europe on Holocaust Memorial Day every year, we also commemorate the subsequent genocides in Rwanda, Darfur, Cambodia and Bosnia.

We have spoken about universities trying to appeal not only to a market within the UK, but to a global market. If there are no limitations on free speech, what message would it send to students from places such as Rwanda, Darfur, Cambodia and Bosnia? What would it say to students from Germany, where they have much more robust laws in place to ensure that holocaust denial and denial of other genocides—which is of course a disgusting desecration of all those who lost their lives and who suffered in those genocides—is not perpetuated within higher education institutions? The duty of care that institutions have towards their students is incredibly important, and it is something that we need to ensure is not lost as a result of the unforeseen consequences of passing a Bill that does not have the limitations that I have set out in amendment 32. The following amendments, which are in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington, clarify some of the technical points throughout the Bill to ensure that amendment 32 can stand.

I think that any right-minded person would want to ensure that protections are in place. It is something in which there is a clear public interest, because it is objectionable that universities might have to spend money to fight legal cases against genocide deniers who demand a right to a platform on their campuses. There is also a really important public order point, because when people from the far right are invited to speak on university campuses, there is often, naturally, a reaction from the student body, who protest their presence. Nick Griffin turning up on various campuses over the years has meant skirmishes. Sometimes, such people bring along heavies with them, who will cause problems, start fights with students and make students on that campus fundamentally less safe while they are there. Of course, they are there to radicalise people and bring them round to their far-right cause. They are there to recruit, so the idea that it is an academic exercise is for the birds—these are people coming on to campuses to radicalise young people.

We expect a vote shortly and we want to discuss a lot of other things, but I want to ensure that the amendment is given proper consideration and that those safeguards are put in the Bill to make sure that the well-meaning, I am sure, assurances of the Government do not turn out to be meaningless in effect.

[Matt Western]

Briefly, I thank my hon. Friend for her clear and considered speech in support of the amendments, some of which are in my name, given that we were not entirely sure how they would fall over the four days of the Committee.

In the evidence sessions and on Second Reading, we heard just how concerned people are. My hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull West and Hessle mentioned the evidence given by Sunder Katwala, but I am think too of the moving comments by my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds North West (Alex Sobel) about his experience at Leeds University and the prospect of having the likes of David Irving or Nick Griffin coming on to campus to speak. I will also just pick up on the point made by Professor Whittle:

“If, for example, somebody who clearly denies the holocaust wishes to speak at a university, I would think that was not acceptable. There are certain historical facts that are sacrosanct and you cannot say that they do not exist, unless you have extremely good evidence to the alternative.”––[Official Report, Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Public Bill Committee, 7 September 2021; c. 39, Q73.]

The amendment seeks to draw a line under the question, what constitutes reprehensible but lawful speech that is inimical to academic freedom? I cannot see any academic benefit to denying any genocide, and it would do great harm to an academic were such views espoused on campus, as well as to the wider academy, let alone damaging student welfare.

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[Michelle Donelan]

If the hon. Member will forgive me, I will carry on and respond to her point regarding the balancing act that universities will perform.

Holocaust deniers often have clear links with neo-Nazi extremism, and with antisemitic violence and intimidation. As I said on the Floor of the House, the Government are clear that there is no place in our universities for an extremist view that is a complete work of fiction and one that grotesquely seeks to misrepresent our global history.

Let me once again be clear that nothing in the Bill encourages providers or student unions to invite speakers who have denied or deny genocide. The Bill will not give anyone the right to a platform, and on that I am categorical.

[Charlotte Nichols]

As we have heard about the broad range of individuals and organisations covered by the Bill, any student society that sought to invite a holocaust denier or genocide denier on to campus could technically have protection under the Bill as drafted. For example, if a free speech society wishes to test the absolute limits of what its university would tolerate regarding free speech and decided, as the Oxford Union did, to invite Abu Hamza and Nick Griffin along, I think it would be irresponsible of the university to allow such events to go ahead. There is nothing to say that the university has to invite them, but clearly there is nothing to say that a society or the students union could not invite them, or what would that mean for the university if it chose to intervene accordingly.

[Michelle Donelan]

Two points are being made. One is about the right to a platform, whereby an individual can, in essence, demand to speak at a university. In no way does the Bill give anyone the right to a platform.

The second point that the hon. Member is referring to is if an individual is invited by a society, a union or a university itself. With regard to that, freedom of speech is not an absolute right; it does not include the right to harass others, or incite people to violence or terrorism. The Bill requires reasonably practicable steps to be taken to secure freedom of speech within the law. That is the crucial point. The Bill is not about unlawful speech.