Turkey

Emily Thornberry Excerpts

Tuesday 19th July 2016 Commons Chamber

[Emily Thornberry (Islington South and Finsbury) (Lab) (Urgent Question)]

To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs if he will make a statement on recent developments in Turkey.

[The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Sir Alan Duncan)]

I thank the hon. Lady very much for applying for the urgent question.

As Members on both sides of the House will have seen from events unfolding on their television screens, it became clear on Friday evening that a military uprising was under way in Turkey. In plain terms, it was an attempted coup, which we condemn unreservedly. It was ultimately unsuccessful, and constitutional order has been restored, but 210 people have reportedly been killed, and some 1,400 injured. I am sure that the whole House will join me in expressing our sympathies and condolences to the people of Turkey on the tragic loss of life.

Her Majesty’s Government have, of course, been closely engaged throughout the weekend. Foreign and Commonwealth Office consular staff worked tirelessly throughout Saturday and Sunday to support British nationals who have been affected, and they continue to do so. We have thankfully received no reports of British casualties. Our advice to British nationals remains to monitor local media reports and to follow FCO travel advice, including the advice provided by our Facebook and Twitter accounts.

My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister spoke to President Erdogan last night. She expressed her condolences for the loss of life, and commended the bravery of the Turkish people. She underlined our support for Turkey’s Government and democratic institutions, stressing that there was no place for the military in politics, and also underlined the importance of our co-operation on counter-terrorism, migration, regional security and defence.

My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary was regularly updated by officials as events unfolded. He visited the teams in the FCO’s crisis centre who responded to Nice on Friday morning, and visited those responding to Turkey on Saturday morning. He spoke to his Turkish counterpart, Mevlüt Çavusoglu, on Saturday to express our concern and our support for Turkey’s democratic Government and its democratic institutions, to urge calm, and to encourage all parties to work to restore democratic and constitutional order quickly and in an inclusive way. Her Majesty’s ambassador in Turkey has been in constant touch with his Turkish counterparts. I spoke to him myself yesterday, particularly in order to express our concern for the welfare of embassy staff, and I plan to visit Ankara tomorrow.

The Foreign Secretary attended the Foreign Affairs Council yesterday, and participated in a discussion about Turkey. There is a strong sense of common purpose between us and our European partners. The Foreign Affairs Council has issued conclusions strongly condemning the coup attempt, welcoming the common position of the political parties in support of Turkey’s democracy, and stressing the importance of the prevailing of the rule of law and its rejection of the death penalty.

The Turkish Government now have an opportunity to build on the strong domestic support that they gathered in response to the coup attempt. A measured and careful response will sustain the unity of purpose which we have seen so far, and which was so evident on the streets of Istanbul and Ankara. The United Kingdom stands ready to help Turkey to implement the reforms to which it has committed itself, and to help the democratically elected Government to restore order in a way that reflects and supports the rule of law.

[Emily Thornberry]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his answer, and may I take this opportunity to welcome him to his new position? It is unfortunate that he and his team have had to be brought to the House and did not think it right to make a statement themselves. I hope that the emergency landing at Luton of the right hon. Gentleman’s boss is not a bad omen, but we do wish the all-male ministerial team well at this crucial time.

Turkey is of pivotal cultural, political and strategic importance to the world, straddling as it does the east-west divide with borders to eight countries. It is a vital NATO ally and has important minorities, particularly Kurds and Armenians, as its citizens. Half a million people of Turkish or Kurdish descent live in the UK and they are desperately worried about their families. With 2 million British visitors a year, Turkey is greatly loved in this country, and the interests of our two countries cannot be separated.

How many British citizens have been arrested, if any, and what support is being provided to them? What is the current advice to British nationals within Turkey and to those who may be booked to travel over the next few days and weeks?

On Friday we saw the Turkish people, whether they supported the current Government or not, coming out to support democracy and making a clear statement that military coups have no place in modern Turkey. The question is whether President Erdogan will use this as an opportunity to deepen and strengthen democracy or to undermine it. The signs so far are deeply worrying, with 9,000 police officers and a third of the generals dismissed, 7,500 people arrested, including the most senior judges in the country, and the death penalty being introduced.

What reassurances has the right hon. Gentleman had that there will be fair trials for those accused of complicity in the attempted coup? Was the Foreign Office taken by surprise by this attempted coup? How big is the Turkish team in the Foreign Office? Does he have plans to expand it? What will happen to this vital ally—what will happen next to this partner, this friend? It is vital that we work together to ensure that Turkey has a secure foundation of democracy, freedom of speech and human rights into the future.

[Sir Alan Duncan]

I thank the hon. Lady for her warm welcome—to me at least—but I respectfully point out to her that the noble Baroness Anelay, who is also a Minister of State at the Foreign Office, was, when I last spoke to her, a woman. From a personal point of view, may I point out that I am also able to add to the spectrum of choice the hon. Lady would like to see in our ministerial team? [Interruption.] I might say to the hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) that he, of all people, should be aware of how exactly I add to that spectrum.

I am not aware of any UK citizens having been arrested, but obviously that is a very serious consular objective for us to pursue, find out and make sure that it remains the case. I think the whole House will agree with the hon. Lady’s point about the importance of wanting the due process of law to be upheld, and for any trials, should they happen, to be fair, and to make sure that the highest principles of democratic standards are upheld, for which of course one needs a functioning and independent judiciary.

I will be discussing all these matters when I go to Ankara tomorrow, and I very much hope that in the reaction Turkey displays to this coup attempt it will be able to remain a very important member of NATO and a partner to other countries in Europe. The answer to the hon. Lady’s straightforward question about whether we were taken by surprise is, yes; I am not sure there is anybody who was not.

Report of the Iraq Inquiry

Emily Thornberry Excerpts

Wednesday 13th July 2016 Commons Chamber

[Emily Thornberry (Islington South and Finsbury) (Lab)]

If this is the Foreign Secretary’s last appearance at the Dispatch Box in his current role, he has made a typically serious and thoughtful speech for his farewell. It behoves all of us to reflect seriously and thoughtfully on the Chilcot report, and the Labour party has a duty to apologise for the mistakes made to all the families of the British servicemen and women and civilian personnel who lost their lives, to all those who suffered life-changing injuries, and to the hundreds of thousands of Iraqi civilians who have died and are still dying today. The Leader of the Opposition has rightly done that.

If there is one grave danger that we face, it is that we will assume that all the lessons of Chilcot have been learned. I listened carefully to the Foreign Secretary, and I am concerned about some of his statements. One draws from them that he assumes that the mistakes made in Iraq cannot be made again. Indeed, the outgoing Prime Minister, in his statement last week, seemed to pick out the same five lessons that the Foreign Secretary mentioned today and said that he felt the lessons had been learned. He seemed to say that the actions that have already been taken, such as the setting up of the National Security Council and the creation of the conflict, stability and security fund, had effectively fixed the problems that arose from the Iraq war.

[Mr Philip Hammond]

I will repeat what I actually said. I am confident that many of the most important lessons identified in the report have already been learned and the necessary responses implemented, but in the weeks and months ahead, as we examine the report in greater detail, the Government will look further at whether any additional steps are required.

[Emily Thornberry]

I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for that, because it is important to emphasise that further lessons need to be learned, some of which I hope to address. I will not spend time repeating any of Chilcot’s factual findings, because, looking to the future, we need to consider the lessons and make sure that we do not make any of the same mistakes again. The Secretary of State for Defence will speak later about operational lessons that the military must learn, and it seems to me that there are more lessons than the five that Ministers have outlined so far.

I want to outline some of the points that jump out at us from the report. It seems to me that we have continued to make mistakes during the current Prime Minister’s time in office, and I will explain why.

On the flawed intelligence, although Chilcot finds that no deliberate attempt was made to mislead people, the intelligence on which the war was based was clearly flawed and did not justify the certainty attached to it by the Government. Has that lesson been learned? Last year, the Government asked this House to authorise military action in Syria. By contrast with Iraq in 2003, the military action did not include the deployment of ground troops.

[Ian Austin (Dudley North) (Lab)]

Is my hon. Friend aware of an attempt to get the House to consider a contempt motion against Tony Blair? Does she agree that, whatever else is in the Chilcot report, it does not give grounds for such a motion?

[Emily Thornberry]

That is a serious point, and I hope that Members will consider it. The question is whether the House was deliberately misled. Chilcot concluded that, although the intelligence may have been flawed and the House misled, it was not deliberately misled. Therefore, in my opinion, if the House tried to make any findings of fact and act on them, it would move away from those previous times when the instrument of a contempt motion has been used. When it has been used previously, there has been a finding of fact upon which the House has been able to act, meaning that someone has either been found guilty or admitted an offence. There has been no admission of deliberately misleading the House, so if the House attempted to make a factual finding, it would become a kangaroo court, because the person accused would not be allowed to represent themselves or speak. In my view, such circumstances would fly in the face of this country’s established principles of justice. Opposition Members are particularly interested in the Human Rights Act, and in article 6, on the right to a fair trial.

[Mr Dominic Grieve (Beaconsfield) (Con)]

The hon. Lady has pre-empted what I was about to say. It seems somewhat strange that some Members who rightly proclaim our need to adhere to the European convention on human rights should suggest a process that cannot meet article 6 requirements under any circumstances.

[Emily Thornberry]

I always get very worried when I agree so thoroughly with the right hon. and learned Gentleman, but I find it happening on many occasions. [Interruption.] I hear from a sedentary position, “You lawyers are all the same”, but we do agree on certain principles. Frankly, our concern is sometimes to ensure that our colleagues who are not lawyers understand these basic legal principles.

[Alex Salmond]

Instead of worrying about agreeing with Government Members, should the hon. Lady not be worrying about disagreeing with the comments that her leader made just at the weekend? Has she actually read the private notes that the former Prime Minister sent to the President of the United States of America, and compared them with his public and parliamentary remarks? Does she find the two things consistent?

[Emily Thornberry]

Chilcot considered those notes and statements over a long period. Sir John Chilcot is a man of great standing, and the report is very thoughtful, and I will not gainsay what he says. There are plenty of lessons to learn from the report, and in my view they go much further than simply focusing on one individual and what happened many years ago. What is important is what is happening now. We need to make sure that the Government make the correct decisions before intervening in other people’s countries and risking loss of life.

[Alex Salmond]

Is it the hon. Lady’s position that someone can be found in contempt of this House only if they admit that contempt? That is what she seemed to say.

[Emily Thornberry]

No. What I am saying is that there are standards that we have always upheld. For example, I believe Warren Hastings was tried by this House 200 years ago, but he was tried by judges, he was represented and he was given an opportunity to say what he had to say. We should not draw conclusions that Chilcot did not without the person involved having an opportunity to speak or be represented.

[Alex Salmond]

In that case, will the hon. Lady tell us in which court the former Prime Minister could be tried?

[Emily Thornberry]

I appreciate that there is speculation about what may or may not happen to the former Prime Minister. That is not within my brief today, speaking as the shadow Foreign Secretary and attempting to draw the lessons from Chilcot. It is important that I address that this afternoon and leave it to others to take such legal action as they think appropriate. It will be for them to take that to the proper court, which will make a decision. We cannot, within the great traditions of our country, constitute ourselves as a court.

Last year, the Government asked this House to authorise military action in Syria. By contrast with Iraq in 2003, the deployment of ground troops was ruled out, which meant a reliance on local forces instead. I mentioned flawed intelligence; at that stage, we were told that there were 70,000 moderate rebels in Syria who would help defeat Daesh, which would force Assad to negotiate a peace agreement and step down. Many of us were sceptical about that 70,000 figure, and I was certainly one of them. That figure was produced by the Joint Intelligence Committee, and the Government declined to say which groups were included in that figure, where they were, what the definition of “moderate” was, how we could be sure that all these rebels were signed up to the coalition’s military strategy, or how they would get to the battlefield. All those questions mattered.

As the Government acknowledged, no military strategy could succeed without forces on the ground. Time will tell whether those 70,000 moderate Sunni rebels existed and whether they were in a position to fight the battles that it was claimed they would be able to. However, it seems to me that there is a parallel to be drawn between the intelligence that was relied on in relation to the 70,000 figure and the flawed intelligence that has been relied on in the past. It is therefore important for us to learn a lesson from Iraq 12 years earlier. Serious questions have been raised about the intelligence that underpins our decisions to take military action. Once again, Parliament was asked last year simply to take on trust what the Government said about intelligence.

There are further issues to consider, including a lack of ability for people to challenge things internally. Chilcot makes it clear that both civil servants and Cabinet Ministers lacked the opportunity, information and encouragement to challenge the case being made to them. The Prime Minister says that his National Security Council has fixed all that, but if so, why does the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy say that the NSC has so far proved itself to be

“a reactive body, rather than a strategic one, which seems to us to be a lost opportunity”?

That criticism is important, and we should not be complacent in the face of it.

The NSC certainly did not challenge the short-sighted and highly damaging cuts to our armed forces in the last Parliament, despite the huge and justifiable misgivings of senior military figures about the impact on our defence capabilities. Nor is there any evidence of the NSC doing anything to challenge the inadequate planning for the aftermath of the intervention in Libya, a subject that I will address shortly. Ultimately, while making progress in small ways, the NSC has failed to address the fundamental problem, which is a culture in Whitehall of overly optimistic group-think, which exposure to independent views could help us challenge. It is not good enough to say that it has been fixed, because it has not. [Interruption.] The Foreign Secretary asks how I know that. I am giving him the evidence of how I know that there is overly optimistic group-think. It is partly because of the results of decisions that have been taken, but there is more, which I will go into later in my speech.

[Mr Mitchell]

The hon. Lady is completely wrong in her analysis of how the NSC approached the strategic defence and security review in 2010. All the papers were put before members of the National Security Council—I was one of them—and we spent weeks reading the best possible advice. We made our decisions in the light of the very difficult economic situation that the country found itself in and the £38 billion black hole left in the defence budget by the Labour Government, but the idea that we lacked expertise before us at that time is completely wrong.

[Emily Thornberry]

I spent only six months in the area of defence, but although I spent a great deal of time immersing myself in it, I am not just relying on my own views in saying what a disaster the coalition’s first so-called strategic defence review was. It is not just me who thinks that. Senior military figures, not just in this country but among our allies, were very concerned about what cuts to the military budget were doing to our capability. It is my view that the second strategic defence review spent a great deal of time patching up the holes that had been created by the coalition’s first one.

[Mr Mitchell]

The hon. Lady is being generous in giving way. However, once again, she is wrong. The most senior military officials and soldiers in the country were at the table for the first security and defence review. They were part of the discussion; they were not locked out.

[Emily Thornberry]

The right hon. Gentleman has had his opportunity to put his views on the record, and I am sure that he will speak later. My view is that if things had been fixed in the way that the Foreign Secretary has stated, we would not be swinging backwards and forwards on our military budget. We make cuts and create holes in our defence capability, then the next time we try to patch them up.

[Sir Gerald Howarth (Aldershot) (Con)]

As one of the Defence Ministers at the time, let me say that it was a most unpleasant experience, as a Conservative, having to make cuts in our armed forces. However, the truth was that the Budget deficit we inherited of £156 billion was itself a threat to our national security. We had to take action. Sadly, defence had to take some of those cuts. Where would the hon. Lady have made cuts, if not in defence?

[Emily Thornberry]

We are moving a long way from the lessons that need to be drawn from Chilcot, and if I may, I will return to my speech. The hon. Gentleman and I have discussed defence on many occasions. I always enjoy the discussions, and I am quite happy to take his points at another time. However, I do not want to spend the entire afternoon discussing defence, much as I am tempted to. I simply say that if the NSC has brought in outside perspectives from time to time, it has clearly not done so enough to deal with the underlying problem.

Another issue that comes out in Chilcot, and that has not been fixed, is the lack of challenge in Parliament. That was the other potential source of challenge to the Government. Although there were vigorous debates in the House, those debates and the 217 MPs who voted to indicate that the case had not been made were ultimately not enough to stop the march to war. I was not yet in the House; I was on the demonstrations. Although more Labour MPs than MPs from any other political party voted against the war, there were not enough of us to stop it.

Have we moved on since then? Many people have said that the 2013 vote against taking action in Syria was a watershed moment. It cemented the convention that whatever the views of the Executive, this House has the final say. The House was asked to approve a broad mandate for the use of military force without a coherent strategy, clear objectives or a long-term plan. It was all too reminiscent of the approach to Iraq. Members from all parts of the House exercised a healthy degree of scepticism, and they were right to do so.

At the same time, the Government have increasingly taken advantage of loopholes in that convention to intervene in more conflicts with less oversight. They have developed military capability in cyberspace, but they refuse to say in what circumstances it might be used or when Parliament might be informed. They have increased investment in drones and special forces at a time when there have been many cuts to other parts of the armed forces. They have shown a willingness to use both as a means of intervening in conflicts to which the UK is not a party; that has included the use of special forces in quasi-conventional combat roles. In doing so, the Government seek to bypass not only parliamentary support for their interventions but any form of parliamentary oversight. The development of hybrid warfare demands new mechanisms for holding the Executive to account. All parties, on both sides of the House, should be working on developing those mechanisms, because as we all know, hybrid warfare is likely to be the future.

[Mr James Gray (North Wiltshire) (Con)]

Does the hon. Lady acknowledge that there is at least an argument that to use the whipping system to secure a parliamentary majority for a predetermined war emasculates the House of Commons rather than empowers it, because it prevents Back-Bench Members of Parliament from thereafter holding the Government to account? Does she agree that there might be an argument in favour of introducing some kind of UK war powers Act to get around that difficulty?

[Emily Thornberry]

There is continuing debate about the matter. As long as we can be confident that a decision made in this House will not need to be taken off to the courts, for the judges, eventually, to decide whether we go to war—that would be entirely inappropriate—and as long as we can keep control of any such legislation so that it ensures that, where possible, the Government will come to Parliament and allow us to express our view, I think that that is right.

I understand that this is the system that we have at the moment, but I am concerned that although the convention continues to develop and strengthen as time goes on, it is still in the gift of the Executive to decide whether they will bring the matter to Parliament. There is an argument for putting the convention on a more formal footing, but there is the danger of court intervention. It is a moot point, and something that we must continue to look at.

[Tom Tugendhat (Tonbridge and Malling) (Con)]

I am grateful for the hon. Lady’s strategic lesson in the modern combat capability of Her Majesty’s armed forces. I was interested in her description of the use of special forces in almost-combat capability. Having served with various parts of Her Majesty’s forces in the past, I know that most foreign deployments are considered to be near to combat even if they are in a training role, because of the pressures on them. It is a very novel interpretation to suggest that hybrid warfare may not continue to exist.

We are getting into a rather bizarre discussion, if the hon. Lady will forgive me for saying so, on the strategy and use of the armed forces, when surely the focus should be on the legality and the appropriateness of the deployment. It might be best to stick to the areas that the House is qualified to talk about, rather than to dress up as armchair generals and pretend that we know what is going on in different areas.

[Emily Thornberry]

It is important that we look to tomorrow’s problems. Special forces are likely to be used increasingly. On the idea that we will send, for example, special forces into Libya in a training capacity, I agree with the hon. Gentleman about how that might end up a quasi-combat role. Presumably, if the training forces are in Libya, they will be in a camp. They may be in a part of Libya that is allegedly safe, but they will need to be guarded. Who will guard them? We can see how it is possible to slide down a slippery slope. At the moment, although it would be inappropriate in the case of a decision to send special forces or trainers into an area, if we can have parliamentary scrutiny of our secret service—if the behaviour of MI5 and MI6 is at least answerable to a Committee of this House—it is not beyond our wit to allow there to be similar accountability over special forces. I have written about this issue.

[Mr Philip Hammond]

It is important to point out that the oversight that the Intelligence and Security Committee, prominent members of which are present, exercises over the intelligence community is always post the fact. The only kind of meaningful oversight over special force deployment of the type that the hon. Lady is talking about would have to be before the fact. That would be a very different proposition.

[Emily Thornberry]

I am grateful to the Foreign Secretary for making that point. I do not expect special forces, before they are used, to have to go before a Committee of Parliament and get permission, but I do think that there should be some form of accountability and some explanation. It was embarrassing, and it demonstrated the democratic deficit in relation to hybrid warfare, to read in the papers that the King of Jordan was gossiping with Congressmen in America about our special forces, when nobody in this House had officially been told about it. That highlights the democratic deficit in this country. We should learn lessons from Chilcot. We should learn lessons about accountability and about not simply trusting the Executive to get a decision right. We should make sure that there is more accountability, and that we are on our toes. We must be prepared to modernise our structures as necessary to reflect the changing nature of warfare in the 21st century.

Let me go back to my speech. I talked about the development of hybrid warfare and new mechanisms for holding the Executive to account, and I believe that all parties should work together on that. Another point was raised about American-British relations. Chilcot made it clear that American-British relations would not have been harmed had the UK not joined the US-led coalition. Chilcot argues that that was not a basis for joining the invasion. In my view, that is another lesson that we have not learned. In 2013, pressure from the United States played a major role in the Government’s rush to intervene in Syria. It became obvious that the US Administration’s efforts to persuade Congress to back intervention hinged on the Prime Minister’s success in persuading Parliament to do so. Speaking after our House declined to support the action in Syria, the then Defence Secretary—now the Foreign Secretary—said that the vote would “certainly” damage the Anglo-American relationship. In my view, the relationship has endured. We have got over it without any adverse consequences, and it serves as a reminder that our alliance with the United States rests on stronger foundations than an expectation of unquestioning British compliance with American wishes.

[Tom Tugendhat]

The hon. Lady speaks of the special relationship, and I would be the first to acknowledge that the relationship with the United States goes much deeper than one incident or one vote, but is it not also valid to listen to the words of various American generals, including General Jim Mattis, who, as she knows, commanded Centcom? After the vote, he pointed to the damaging impact that it would have on the enduring commitment and understanding between the US and British militaries. Does she recognise that just as that special relationship is made up of many threads, undermining it thread by thread will weaken it?

[Emily Thornberry]

I am sure that some American generals were disappointed that Harold Wilson would not agree to British involvement in Vietnam, but we got over it and our relationship is strong enough to endure differences of opinion. If we are to be good friends, it is important to recognise that good friends trust each other enough to disagree at times. The 2013 Syria vote made it clear that Parliament understood that; it also suggested that the Government did not. That is why it is such a tragedy that cuts to the Foreign Office budget have weakened Whitehall’s institutional knowledge of the world. It is important for our leadership role in the world to have proper understanding of it, and for hundreds of years we have had an insight into the world that other countries have not had. We have a leadership role, and we can have a voice that is different from that of the Americans because we will have a different understanding. To have 16% cuts in the Foreign Office year on year, and a hollowing out of our institutional knowledge, has in my view been a tragedy.

[Tom Tugendhat]

rose—

--- Later in debate ---

[Emily Thornberry]

I am sorry but the hon. Gentleman has already intervened twice. I am taking a very long time, and I ought to get on with it.

Chilcot says that Tony Blair ignored warnings about the sectarian violence that would sweep Iraq after Saddam fell, and after the appalling loss of life that has followed in Iraq and surrounding countries, we are still very much living with that mistake. Again, has that lesson been learned? If we consider the intervention in Libya, it is clear that it has not been. During the uprising against Gaddafi, armed militias across the country focused their attention on toppling the regime, and the British Government later seemed almost surprised that once that goal had been achieved, those militias turned their fire on each other. Although divisions in Libya were always more tribal than the sectarian divisions in Iraq, the result has been the same. The belief that democratic elections would help to fill the power vacuum proved hopelessly optimistic, when factions that found themselves in the minority simply refused to accept that the result was legitimate.

Had those with knowledge of the country been directly consulted at the time, they would have warned the Government that such things would happen. Had informed and impartial advice been sought out, such warnings were readily available and in the public domain. It was also clear to many experts in the region that if Gaddafi was toppled there was a huge risk of knock-on instability when well-armed, highly trained mercenaries returned to their native countries such as Mali, Niger and Chad. Again, the warnings were there, but such advice was either not heard or not listened to until it was too late. Again, a parallel can be drawn between our intervention in Libya and our understanding of what would happen next and listening to experts, and what happened in our first intervention in Iraq when we did not listen to expertise or pay attention to what was said.

[Mr Philip Hammond]

First, the intervention in Libya was at the request of the Arab League, which I suggest would have had an insight into the region and would count as people who knew what was going on. Secondly, although I understand the hon. Lady’s analysis, does that lead to the conclusion that toppling any despot always runs the risk of creating chaos and confusion? That is the nature of despotism. We are five years down the line from ending a 40-year brutal dictatorship in Libya. The game is not over yet, but I predict that Libya will end up a better place than it was under Gaddafi.

[Emily Thornberry]

It is interesting to hear what the right hon. Gentleman says, but that issue is one of speculation. In my view it is not legal to intervene in a country to topple a regime, and morally we should not intervene in a country unless we have some form of strategy to ensure that the country we leave is in a better state than when we first arrived.

[Mr Grieve]

When I was in government I had some involvement in the Libyan intervention, and from memory I do not think that there was a blinding of oneself to potential problems as a result of that intervention. We must also bear it in mind that the trigger for the intervention was the fact that Colonel Gaddafi was about to kill tens of thousands of his own citizens. That prompted the Security Council resolution that provided the legal basis for the intervention. That highlights—I will come on to speak about this—some of the really difficult decisions in those areas, where even questions of legality do not come into it. I certainly would not be willing to characterise that intervention as having been wrong in the circumstances that prevailed at the time.

[Emily Thornberry]

I hear what the right hon. and learned Gentleman says, but my point is that, again, information was available and could have informed the intervention. Once the initial intervention had been made, what happened thereafter? How were manifest and obvious dangers protected against? I do not think that those important points were considered, and again we learn a lesson from Chilcot and Iraq that is so much more important that any form of soap opera regarding Tony Blair or not Tony Blair.

The other important issue is post-war planning, some of which has been touched on—this is my final point, Mr Speaker, as everyone will be glad to hear. Perhaps most devastatingly, Chilcot highlights the total absence of adequate planning for what would happen after the war and the long-term strategy for Iraq. If ever a mistake should never be repeated, it is the idea that we enter into another military intervention with no idea of its consequences, no plan for the aftermath, and no long-term strategy. And yet, that is the exact hallmark of all the outgoing Prime Minister’s interventions.

Again, we see the evidence in Libya. In the words of President Obama, the Prime Minister became “distracted”, and once the Gaddafi regime had been overthrown, the lengthy, arduous task of post-war reconstruction was all but ignored. In the years since, Libya has been riven by factionalism and violence. Its experiment with democracy was brief, with power in the hands of rival militias, and the ungoverned space that that created was an invitation for Daesh to establish a strategic foothold on the Libyan coast. It is a stain on this Government that they began to pay real attention to the mess they had left in Libya only once that terrorist threat from Daesh became too urgent to ignore.

[Joanna Cherry]

I am not sure whether the hon. Lady has said anything about Chilcot’s findings on the circumstances in which it was ultimately decided that there was a legal basis for UK participation in Iraq, but he says that they were far from satisfactory. I am sure she will agree with me and endorse the view presented earlier that the Attorney General should give independent and impartial advice. According to evidence to the Committee, Chilcot details how the then Attorney General initially resisted the legality, and eventually acquiesced in the view that the use of military force against Iraq could be legally justified. Has the hon. Lady formed a view about what changed the then Attorney General’s mind?

[Emily Thornberry]

Tempting though it is to debate that issue with the hon. and learned Lady, it is important to note that any Attorney General knows that they are the only person in the Cabinet who can say to the Prime Minister, “No. You can’t do that. It is not legal. You are not allowed to.” That heavy burden must be exercised by people of great courage and substance. It is about the rule of law and the fact that no one is above the law. All AGs need to learn that lesson, and they must be confident and capable of standing up to their leader. That is an important point and perhaps another lesson.

Britain has always been a leading light in the development of international law, and much international law has been a result of documents that we have drafted. Our adherence to international law has been a very important part in its development. One thing that has been clouded, as a result of the Iraq intervention and other interventions since, has been the need for a clear law on the circumstances in which one can and cannot intervene. That has not developed as well as it might have if there had not been a temptation to try to press the facts into what is understood of the law. My right hon. Friend the Member for Leeds Central (Hilary Benn) is a big fan of the Responsibility to Protect. The effect the Iraq war had on the development of RtoP is very sad: Cook was attempting to develop it at the time of the Iraq war and it was held up as a result of the intervention in Iraq. Were the lessons on long-term planning from Iraq learned in Libya? I would say absolutely not. The central lesson is this: you cannot bomb a country from 30,000 feet into a western-style democracy.

In conclusion, we cannot turn the clock back. We cannot correct the mistakes that were made. We cannot bring back the lives that were lost. We cannot undo the chaos we have created, but we can, and we must, stop those mistakes being repeated. Unfortunately, as I have pointed out today, whatever his rhetoric and whatever his well-meaning intentions, too often the outgoing Prime Minister has repeated exactly the same mistakes in his own military interventions: relying on speculative intelligence, keeping Parliament in the dark, and failing to plan for what happens afterwards. It is to be hoped that the new Prime Minister will study the Chilcot report not as a commentary on decisions made in the past but as a guide to the decisions she will have to make. Let us hope she does so. As she takes on her new and onerous responsibilities, we wish her well.

Oral Answers to Questions

Emily Thornberry Excerpts

Tuesday 12th July 2016 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

This issue is not just about Scotland; it is much wider than that. I will say two things. First, as long as we are a full member of the EU and are paying the full sub, we must ensure that there is no discrimination against the UK, UK institutions, UK applicants for funding or UK citizens. Secondly, the point of negotiating an arrangement for Britain’s relationship with the EU 27 after we have left the EU is precisely to protect collaborative research, educational projects and cultural exchanges in addition to our important trading relationships.

[Emily Thornberry (Islington South and Finsbury) (Lab)]

May I begin by thanking the Foreign Secretary for welcoming me to this new job? It is right to say that we are compact team, but we have the advantage of being made up of two blessed difficult women, and so we are formidable and up for the task. If rumours of promotion are true, this may be my final session with him before he takes another job. It would seem that everyone is in flux. He has a reputation of being a formidable but approachable Minister to shadow, so I will be sorry if our acquaintance is so brief.

The Foreign Secretary rightly said that he has given assurances that he will consult Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, London and Gibraltar on the Government’s negotiating strategy for Brexit prior to triggering article 50. Will those assurances also apply in respect of Her Majesty’s Opposition, to ensure that the needs and concerns of the communities we represent are reflected as the Government develop their negotiating strategy?

[Mr Hammond]

First, I am surprised to hear the hon. Lady saying that she expects promotion. I thought that those in the Labour party who were expecting promotion threw their hat in the ring yesterday—perhaps she is going to be a late entrant to that competition. On the substance of her question, of course there will be extensive discussion about all these issues in Parliament. The Opposition will have an opportunity to present their views, and we shall listen carefully to them.

[Emily Thornberry]

I thank the Secretary of State for that answer, but I was hoping that I would get greater assurance than that and that there would be formal consultation with Her Majesty’s Opposition prior to the start of negotiations. We must avoid the mistakes made by the outgoing Prime Minister before his resignation. He had no proper consultation with Opposition parties, no proper discussion took place and there was a totally artificial timetable. Had the Prime Minister done those things, perhaps he would have got a better and more inclusive deal, the country might not have voted for Brexit and he might not be stepping down tomorrow. Does the Foreign Secretary not accept that the Prime Minister made a mistake and can he guarantee that those mistakes will not be made by the new Prime Minister?

[Mr Hammond]

Perhaps I dare say to the hon. Lady that I might have been a bit closer to those negotiations than she was and I can confidently say that engaging with the Opposition would not have affected the outcome.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Hammond]

The hon. Gentleman is referring, I think, to the situation in Syria, where there are two separate battles going on: the civil war between the regime and its opponents, and the battle by the international community against Daesh. We are clear, and always have been clear, that there cannot be lasting success against Daesh unless we resolve the political crisis in Syria and create a regime that is acceptable to the Sunni Muslim population of Syria, giving them an alternative to the appalling offer from Daesh.

[Emily Thornberry (Islington South and Finsbury) (Lab)]

Countering Daesh in Libya requires a stable Government and an end to the country’s ongoing civil war. On 19 April, the Secretary of State said that the new Government of National Accord is

“the only legitimate Government of Libya.”—[Official Report, 19 April 2016; Vol. 608, c. 781.]

Will he therefore assure the House that, since the GNA was formed last December, no British support has been provided to any Libyan militia group that is not allied to the GNA, such as those working with former general Khalifa Haftar?

[Mr Hammond]

The hon. Lady knows that if we were minded to commit combat forces to activity in Libya, we would first come to the House of Commons. We are working very closely with the Government of National Accord, including talking to them about how we can use exemptions from the UN arms embargo to forge a closer working relationship between militias and that Government. She will be interested to know that later this afternoon I will meet Prime Minister Sarraj here in London.

European Union Referendum Bill

Emily Thornberry Excerpts

Monday 7th September 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mike Gapes]

Just as we in the Labour party have, for better or worse, widened our franchise, so the widest possible franchise should be involved in the referendum, which is likely to be held next year. The Government have proposed that the referendum should not have the same franchise as there was for the Scottish referendum, which was the local government franchise, but should simply have the parliamentary franchise. They propose restricting the franchise to those who vote in parliamentary elections and not including some people who vote in local government elections and in European Parliament elections, some people who can vote in the London mayoral election next year and some who were eligible to vote in the Scottish referendum in 2014.

[Emily Thornberry (Islington South and Finsbury) (Lab)]

Is it not the case that in many constituencies across the country, including mine, a large number of people will not be allowed to vote in the European referendum simply because they are Europeans, even though they pay their taxes, their children go to school in the area and they see themselves as Londoners?

Iran: Nuclear Deal

Emily Thornberry Excerpts

Wednesday 15th July 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

Now that my hon. Friend has reminded me of that, I shall certainly put it in my briefing note for the meeting.

[Emily Thornberry (Islington South and Finsbury) (Lab)]

This is tremendous news and, in my view, a great result for the international community. Since we are congratulating, it is only right to mention the great work of Baroness Ashton, who worked on this matter for five years. It is important to recognise her work. Does the Foreign Secretary agree that bringing such a major power in this region in from the cold may well have a more positive effect on security in the area than practically anything else?

[Mr Hammond]

I am delighted that the hon. Lady has mentioned Baroness Ashton, and I am pleased to have the opportunity to endorse her important role. Yes, I agree. That is the point I have been making. There are two parts to this. There is the nuclear deal and the robust verification of Iran’s compliance with it, but let us move beyond that and exploit the wider opportunity for this large, wealthy and important country to be part of the wider region or picture rather than to be isolated from it.

Iraq and Ending Sexual Violence in Conflict

Emily Thornberry Excerpts

Monday 16th June 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hague]

I do not exclude at all the need for international conferences to try to bring together all the countries in the region, as well as key players in Iraq. My hon. Friend is right to point to the formidable difficulties facing those who need to work together in Iraq. However, underneath that there is tremendous support among the people of Iraq for the functioning of their country. They have turned out in very large numbers in elections. They have made every effort to participate in their democracy, and I believe that the mass of the people in Iraq want that democracy to succeed. Their leaders, as in any country, need to respond to that and harness that.

[Emily Thornberry (Islington South and Finsbury) (Lab)]

May I ask the right hon. Gentleman about the second part of his statement? Does he share my alarm about the reports of increasing numbers of Tamil asylum refugees being refused asylum status despite entirely credible accounts of their being subjected to rape by the security services? Will he please give an undertaking to the House that the Foreign Office will look again at the country profiles on which the Home Office and the courts rely before making decisions in those cases, particularly highlighting the problems in relation to women being raped?

[Mr Hague]

There have been major problems of sexual violence in Sri Lanka. I spoke about this to the Sri Lankan media and with the many NGOs that I worked with when I was at the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in Sri Lanka in November. In this country we take our responsibilities to asylum seekers very seriously, as the hon. Lady knows, but in a strict and, we hope, fair system. Where there are serious and valid complaints, of course they will be looked at. As she knows, this matter is primarily the Home Secretary’s responsibility, not mine, so either I or a Home Office Minister will write to the hon. Lady about that point.

Gaza

Emily Thornberry Excerpts

Tuesday 15th June 2010 Westminster Hall

[Emily Thornberry (Islington South and Finsbury) (Lab)]

I rise to my feet as a friend of Palestine, and much to the furious incomprehension of a large number of my constituents, I do so as a steadfast friend of Israel, despite the provocation. Last summer, I sponsored an Adjournment debate on the Spirit of Humanity—a boat carrying humanitarian supplies that was trying to break the siege of Gaza. On that occasion, Israeli forces intercepted the boat—we presume in international waters, although the Israeli Government refused to provide details of the boat’s position, despite requests from British Ministers—but thankfully there was no violence. In the light of that and other previous incidents, should not the British Government have been alert to possible problems with the latest flotilla? Given that the Israeli media reported threats from the Israeli defence forces, making it clear that the ships were likely to be attacked, what actions, if any, had the British Government taken to avert those attacks, particularly knowing that British citizens were on board?

My constituent, Alex Harrison, was on board the Spirit of Humanity last year, and undeterred by that experience, she was also a passenger on the Challenger 1 ship, which formed part of the flotilla that was attacked again by Israeli forces on 31 May. Could the Minister tell us what assessment the Government have made of the legality of the Israeli attack on the humanitarian convoy? What assurances has he had from the Government of Israel about whether there will be any more attacks in international waters on boats carrying British citizens?

Over the weekend, we heard more detail about the inquiry that is to be set up by Israel. We understand that it will include a foreign element and observers such as David Trimble. Will the international community have full confidence in that inquiry and its findings? Will it be independent and transparent? Will the Israelis, the Palestinians and, perhaps most importantly, the people of Turkey have full confidence in its findings? As Cathy Ashton, the High Representative of the European Union put it in The Times yesterday, will that inquiry be “credible, rigorous and impartial”?

In the debate yesterday, my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Northfield (Richard Burden) stated the obvious: there have been inquiries in the past on Israel, and perhaps one need go no further than to ask Tom Hurndall’s family about their experience of Israeli inquiries to explain why some people might be slightly cynical about an Israeli inquiry. Another issue is just how wide that inquiry will be and who will be questioned.. Will Alex Harrison be asked about her experience on that boat?

In preparation for this debate, I spoke to Alex. As I said, she was on board Challenger 1. It was flagged in the United States. She would like me to highlight the illegality of the Israeli action. The men who were killed were on the Marmora, which was registered in the Comoros islands, which are off Madagascar. It is her view, and that of many others, that the seizing and killing of the flotilla’s passengers while in international waters is nothing less than piracy. She says that they were some 80 miles away from Israel and were sailing away from Israel when they were boarded.

The Israeli action on 31 May may constitute breaches of international law that could be tried in the International Criminal Court. Alex was one of the boat’s crew. She told me that the Israeli forces came on to the boat, firing plastic bullets. All the glass on the boat broke. People were then pushed to the ground on to the glass. She was the last to be stopped, as she was on the bridge. Two members of the Israeli defence forces came up. Two Australian journalists—Kate and Paul from The Sydney Morning Herald—were with her, and they identified themselves. In response, they were tasered. It was a completely terrifying experience.

There was no violence from Alex’s boat towards the Israeli defence forces, yet those on board were treated with huge violence. She says that she has hand marks on her arms and legs from when she was picked up and carried from the boat. Once they were carried from the boat, all their items were bagged up and labelled. They have not had them back. The Israelis now say that they do not know where they are. She was told that she would be deported to Turkey. She had the clothes she stood up in. She had no passport and no money. She had not been to Turkey—she had come from Greece—and yet the Israelis said that they would deport her to Turkey.

Alex refused to go and so was one of the last to be deported. She was in a pen with 15 other women, and she witnessed some women next to her being hit about the head. They were not treated as badly as the men. She saw some men at the airport who were badly beaten, including Ken O’Keefe, who was so badly injured that he was not able to board the plane. She was some 5 yards away from an Irishman called Fiachra O’Luain as he was beaten around the head—she saw that going on. She also saw Turkish men, who had been injured and come out of hospital, being put on to the plane. Well, to say that they were put on to the plane is inaccurate—they were walking on to the plane as best they could. Some had been shot in the feet and were on crutches. There were no wheelchairs. She was not allowed to assist the men. If any attempt to try and assist them was made, people were hit again. Although she had experienced brutality from a distance in the past, she had never experienced such face-to-face, one-to-one brutality over such a sustained period. She said that they were sworn at, abused and laughed at throughout. That was unnecessary—gratuitous, in her view—and she certainly would like to give evidence to any inquiry. If necessary, she would like the matter to be taken to the International Criminal Court. One can understand why, given her experiences.

[Mark Lazarowicz]

May I put it on the record that the constituent whom I referred to was also one of the protestors on the Challenger 1? She reports a similar account of what happened on the boat and in Israeli custody. Her account illustrates the real issues being raised by a number of credible people from the UK, and I hope that the Government will respond to them in the positive way that my hon. Friend requests.

--- Later in debate ---

[Emily Thornberry]

Many hon. Members have constituents who have been on the flotillas. I suspect that we have many constituents who will be on them again. Alex Harrison has said that she will go back.

The terrible events of 31 May have brought the eyes of the world back to what has been going on in Gaza, highlighting the suffering of its people. The three-year blockade of Gaza has been compared to a mediaeval siege. There are some similarities: there is no free movement of people; no goods can leave Gaza, leading to the complete collapse of most businesses; no building materials have been allowed in to repair the damage caused by the Israeli attack of December 2008; one in 10 babies in Gaza are malnourished; one third of babies have anaemia; and a large proportion of the population is food insecure. However, the big difference between a mediaeval siege and the siege of Gaza is that the third crusade, when besieging Acre for two years, was intended to topple the garrison and not to behave in such a way that actually bolstered the garrison. That is effectively what has been happening. Instead of undermining the regime—which they seek to do—the Israelis are, by their actions, bolstering Hamas. Israel has got this fundamentally wrong. It is incumbent on those of us who are genuine friends of Israel to tell the truth: this is wrong, and to continue to behave in that way towards Gaza and Hamas undermines the security of Israel.

[Mrs Ellman]

Does my hon. Friend accept that approximately 15,000 tonnes of goods a week have gone into Gaza, although that is clearly inadequate? Does she agree that if the European Union and the Palestinian Authority had been able to carry out their responsibilities in manning the crossings, goods could have gone into Gaza at a much faster rate?

[Emily Thornberry]

In the end, if Gaza were treated how it should be treated, the gates would be open and the tunnels would be closed. Yes, I fully understand. I have been to Sderot and have seen how Israeli children are terrified of incoming bombs that rain down on their town. I fully understand why it would be necessary to search trucks going in—to make sure that they do not have weapons in them. However, it is not a challenge to Israeli security to stop biscuits going into Gaza, and that is the fundamental point. Gaza is being treated completely differently and in a way that is fundamentally unfair. It is incumbent on us to say loudly and clearly that that is wrong.

[Stephen Williams (Bristol West) (LD)]

The hon. Lady referred to biscuits. On the visit that I attended with the hon. Member for Westminster North (Ms Buck), we saw the bombed biscuit factory that, ironically, produced goods for export to Israel. Does the hon. Lady agree that, in controlling the substances that are allowed into Gaza, Israel has been entirely arbitrary? Such substances change from week to week and include random items such as jam and pasta, which were referred to by the hon. Member for Westminster North. When we were there, we were told that nappies—or diapers, as they were called—were not being allowed in. The sole purpose of that seems to be to play with people’s minds and do psychological damage to the civilian population.

[Emily Thornberry]

It goes further than psychological damage: the fact that there is not a steady stream of proper goods going into Gaza also undermines people’s health. Moreover, the fact that no exports are allowed out of Gaza means that the economy has been undermined and that the people are dependent on Hamas, which allows and taxes the tunnels. Civil society is therefore undermined even further and people become increasingly dependent upon Hamas. When a poor woman wakes up in the morning wondering how to feed her six children, she does not think to herself, “This is Hamas’s fault,” but, “This is Israel’s fault.” That continues to feed extremism and undermine the very security of Israel. Those of us who believe in a two-state solution are fundamentally worried about that and are very concerned about what is happening.

I will not go through all my examples—I am sure that hon. Members are aware of them—but Cadbury’s creme eggs somehow get through the tunnels and nobody can afford them. Some 12,000 buildings need to be rebuilt, and 44% of Gazans are unemployed and so on. The fundamental point, however, is that the siege of Gaza is not hurting Hamas; it is destroying the lives of thousands of ordinary Gazans. The EU is the largest donor to Palestine, but aid is not enough. It is also Israel’s largest trading partner, and we have some clout at EU level. We in the EU must be more confident and do more to put pressure on Israel to ensure that the people of Gaza are treated fairly. I very much hope that EU Foreign Ministers will adopt a united position and that Britain will fully support it. That may include questioning whether an internal Israeli investigation of what happened to the flotilla on 31 May is sufficient.

It is also important for us to be more active diplomatically in the middle east. The problem is not going away—we must address it. We must end the blockade, which is morally outrageous and politically self-defeating, and as I said here last summer, we must open the gates and close the tunnels. Many organisations based in my constituency—such as Medical Aid for Palestinians, Save the Children, UNICEF and Merlin—work very hard to support the people of Gaza; but, ultimately, their good work simply gives us the space to exert moral and political courage to ensure a two-state solution and peace for everyone.

UK Policy on the Middle East

Emily Thornberry Excerpts

Monday 14th June 2010 Commons Chamber

[Alistair Burt]

My hon. Friend makes a point that almost immediately illustrates the complexity of the area. Whatever Hamas might be as an expression of a movement, it also represents a repressive, authoritarian force which has had a grip on Gaza for too long and held Gilad Shalit unfairly as a hostage for too long. In illustrating that point, I note the clear sense that there must be some movement in the middle east peace process, involving all parties and, inevitably, the slow steps towards progress which invite compromise. Of that, we wish to see more in the future. The Government’s position on dealing with Hamas remains the same as the previous Government’s, requiring as it does an adherence to Quartet principles before it can move. I do not see any change in that position.

[Emily Thornberry (Islington South and Finsbury) (Lab)]

rose—

[Jo Swinson (East Dunbartonshire) (LD)]

rose—

[Alistair Burt]

I shall give way, first, to the hon. Member for Islington South and Finsbury (Emily Thornberry).

[Emily Thornberry]

Does the hon. Gentleman believe that the proposed Israeli inquiry into the terrible events of 31 May will be “credible, rigorous and impartial”? What discussions have the Government had with the Americans on that issue?

[Alistair Burt]

I thank the hon. Lady for her inquiry. We have had a lot of conversations, both with the Americans and the Israeli Government. We are keen proponents of the United Nations Security Council resolution, which was adopted quickly and called for exactly what the hon. Lady asked about—an independent and impartial inquiry. The international element is necessary to ensure credibility. At present, we believe that there is no reason why the inquiry announced by Israel today, with the external component that includes Lord Trimble, should not meet the requirements of the world to provide the answers necessary to the inquiry. That is an important standard, to which we will hold.