Dominic Grieve
Main Page: Dominic Grieve (Independent - Beaconsfield)Department Debates - View all Dominic Grieve's debates with the Attorney General
(13 years, 10 months ago)
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Mr Davis
My hon. Friend is right—he makes a very good point. The then Labour Government well understood this when they excluded from the text the words “universal suffrage”. They did that because although we have a very wide and general suffrage and a very democratic state, we do not have universal suffrage. The Strasbourg Court has imposed judgments on Britain that are outside the original treaty. We have signed a contract; it has gone beyond that contract.
The Attorney-General
I have one advantage over my right hon. Friend, which is to have been able to go and look at the archives on what happened in 1951. I think the reasons why we objected to the use of the words “universal suffrage” were twofold: first, there was some anxiety over the position in the colonies; and secondly, there was a concern about whether proportional representation would be imposed on us as a result. Once those issues were clarified and removed, the United Kingdom signed up.
Mr Davis
I am sure that my right hon. and learned Friend, who is a very close friend as well, checked the travail préparatoire in which one of his predecessors—Dowson, I think—said in terms that we had general suffrage but it could not be described as universal suffrage. That is what I was resting the point on.
Since about 1978, the European Court has adopted the view that the convention was what it termed “a living instrument”. That meant that the Court could arrogate to itself the right to decide what its remit was. It did that without any mandate from this House or any other house of representatives of the member states of the Council of Europe. This has been picked up, not by some Tory or right-wing Eurosceptic, but by Lord Justice Hoffmann, an eminent judge with enormous civil liberties credentials, who said that the Strasbourg Court has
“been unable to resist the temptation to aggrandise its jurisdiction and to impose uniform rules on member states”.
Even the Court itself understands this. In the minority report, Judge Costa, the President of the Court, a man who believes in extending the powers of his own court, said that he
“accepted that the States have a wide margin of appreciation to decide on the aims of any restriction, limitation or even outright ban on the vote”
and pointed out that the judges were not legislators and should not overrule the legislatures of the Council of Europe.
I want the European Court to succeed at its main business, which is why I differed from my hon. Friend the Member for Harlow (Robert Halfon). However, I do not want it to try to interfere in the business of legislatures around the European continent.
Mr Straw
No, I have to make progress.
The issue before us today—here is the heart of the matter—is by no stretch of the imagination a breach of fundamental human rights. Rather, it is a matter of penal policy, which the minority of judges at Strasbourg—and very senior they were, too—said should be left to the UK Parliament. Through the decision in the Hirst case and some similar decisions, the Strasbourg Court is setting itself up as a supreme court for Europe, with an ever-widening remit. That is why the tension that I mentioned now threatens to become a collision.
Even in countries with supreme courts much more powerful than ours, there is a democratic override of their decisions. For example, in the United States or Germany, which have very strong courts that can strike down primary legislation, the courts’ decisions can be overridden by, for instance, democratic amendment to their constitutions. There is no such democratic override available for decisions of the Strasbourg Court, so we are faced with a court judgment following which, without warrant from the treaties to which we signed up, we as elected MPs are expected to do the opposite of that in which we believe.
My predecessor as Lord Chancellor, Lord Falconer, and I wrestled for five years to find a way through the problem. Initially, Lord Falconer’s view was that the requirement on us following the 2005 Hirst decision was simply
“to consider carefully the basis”
of our law. He went on that it could be the case
“that it is a proportionate conclusion that all people who are convicted and sent to prison cannot vote.”
He began one consultation, and when that was inconclusive I launched a second. However, unless and until I found a way—if one existed—that could satisfy the Strasbourg Court, this House and the British people, there was no appetite throughout the House, or among our Whips, for me to bring forward legislative proposals.
The Attorney-General
I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for giving way and for how he is articulating his powerful case. Does he not agree that, with hindsight, it is rather unfortunate that such a debate did not take place? When we were first confronted with the problem we had only the Hirst judgment, but since then we have had a number of further judgments without the UK Parliament’s having had an opportunity to influence how the Court’s jurisprudence evolved. He may recall that I asked for such a debate when we were in opposition.
Mr Straw
I understand the right hon. and learned Gentleman’s point, and hindsight is a wonderful thing. If I thought that the only thing preventing the Court from coming to a reasonable compromise was the fact that I had not organised an earlier debate, I would be happy to be taken to Strasbourg to make my apologies. He knows better than anybody that neither set of Whips was keen on such a debate, not least because it was clear that it would be impossible, particularly in the pre-election atmosphere, to have the sober debate that we are to have today.
The Attorney-General (Mr Dominic Grieve)
I congratulate my right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis) and the right hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw) on securing this debate. My right hon. Friend quoted my belief that this was a subject that needed debate. That was something I said in opposition, but it is a view that I continue to hold in government. I am therefore delighted that the House at last has an opportunity to have this debate. If I quipped the right hon. Gentleman, I am grateful to him for having facilitated it now that he is freed from the shackles of Government.
If the House is to have the debate that I think can help to inform this tension between ourselves and the European Court of Human Rights, it is important that as many Members as possible participate. I note, therefore, that the Government Benches are well crowded; I am sorry, however, that, for reasons on which I cannot speculate, the Opposition Benches seem to be, with a number of notable and eminent exceptions, rather bare. That might be a problem later in terms of the impact that this debate may have. From that point of view, the contribution of the right hon. Member for Rotherham (Mr MacShane), even if many Members disagreed with it, was nevertheless very valuable.
My reason for speaking at this stage of the debate, with the leave of the proposers of the motion, was to try to provide some assistance to the House in explaining the legal considerations relating to this complex, difficult and extremely controversial issue. As the House is aware, there will be a free vote for Government Members, so that the Back Benchers can express their views. Ministers will abstain. The Government believe that the proper course of action will be to reflect on what has been said and think about what proposals to bring back to the House in the light of the debate. The Government are here to listen to the views of the House, which are central and critical to this debate, as was acknowledged in the Hirst case and as was the subject of the critique that I raised earlier about the fact that we have not had this debate before. I look forward to taking on board and considering all the points raised, and to doing my best, as far as I can, to join the debate and assist the House.
Mr Jenkin
I am sure that it will be useful to the House that my right hon. and learned Friend intervenes at this stage. However, when he says that the views of the House are critical, does he not mean that they are decisive? We are a sovereign House; we make the law and the courts interpret it. This is a matter of policy, not a question of legal technicalities. If we do not want prisoners to have the vote, Parliament can legislate for it and that will be final. Does he agree that that is the power of the House?
The Attorney-General
First, I would say this to my hon. Friend. I am very respectful of the powers of this House and, having been a Member of it for 13 years, consider it to be very important. As he will also be aware, it is Parliament that is sovereign. I hope that he will excuse my making that delicate point. The Queen in Parliament is sovereign, and that includes the ability of both Chambers to legislate and to enact primary legislation. We are dealing with an international treaty. That international treaty was signed by the United Kingdom Government under the royal prerogative and was laid before both Houses of Parliament for their consideration. The rule that has been long established in this country is that once a treaty has been ratified by the United Kingdom Government through that process, the Government and their Ministers consider themselves to be bound by its terms. Indeed, as the right hon. Member for Blackburn will know, the ministerial code specifically says that that is the case, and the new ministerial code says it in exactly the same way as the old one did. From that point of view, although my hon. Friend is absolutely right, that does not remove the necessity for the Government to be bound by their treaties and international obligations.
The Attorney-General
It is certainly true that our international legal obligations may alter by virtue of what Parliament has enacted, but the current position is that we have an international obligation that, if I understood correctly from what they said, is not one from which, in its principles, my right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden or the right hon. Member for Blackburn would wish to resile. We are bound by it as Ministers of the Crown. However, if my hon. Friend will bear with me, I will come to that in a moment.
I repeat the point that the Grand Chamber in the Hirst case commented on the lack of any substantive debate in Parliament. It must be the case, therefore, that the existence of a substantive debate—indeed, we may have to have more than one substantive debate on this issue—will be helpful to the process of finding a way through the problem that is exercising many Members of this House. However, although Members are fully entitled to express their disagreement with the judgment of the European Court—indeed, I have done so myself: I said that I consider the judgment in the Hirst case to be an unsatisfactory one, for precisely the reasons, which I will not repeat, that the right hon. Gentleman and my right hon. Friend articulated—the fact that we may be in disagreement does not in itself solve the problem.
In order for the views of this House to be helpful, we need to demonstrate that we are engaging with the concerns of the Court and that we are not just expressing our frustrations—although I have to say that on occasion I have felt very frustrated on this issue in the last few years, and actually rather angry. Through a dialogue about what the House considers to be proper and reasonable in respect of prisoner voting, we have to see whether we can bring our weight to bear as a legislature in the development of the jurisprudence of the Court. That will give us the best possible chance of winning the challenges that may arise thereafter. As we know, given the litigiousness of those who think that there is a gravy train on which they might be able to climb, we can guarantee that, whatever we do, there will be legal challenge to it that will go back to the European Court of Human Rights for determination.
Ian Paisley
I appreciate the Minister’s helpful guidance. Will he address the point made by the right hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw) when he quoted Lord Hoffmann, the former Law Lord, saying in a lecture that it cannot be right for a European supranational court
“to intervene in matters on which Member States of the Council of Europe have not surrendered their sovereign powers”?
Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman give us some guidance on that point?
The Attorney-General
The hon. Gentleman is right that there has been a great deal of commentary, including in some learned lectures by judges, such as Lady Justice Arden, Lord Hoffmann and others, who have expressed growing concern about the way in which the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights is being developed and about the Court’s tendency towards micro-management. That is the nature of the challenge. That said, for the reasons I gave a moment ago, the judgments of the Court constitute an international obligation, so far as we subscribe to the convention and to membership of the Council of Europe. That is the dilemma the Government face, as did the previous Government: how can we find a way to persuade the Court to respect the views that the legislature may express without having to withdraw from the convention or the Council of Europe entirely, which, I have to say, would not come without cost or consequence for this country?
Claire Perry (Devizes) (Con)
Can the Attorney-General help the House understand by what mechanism the European Court’s judgment and—rather more unpalatably —the award of compensation to a convicted axe murderer could be enforced in this country?
The Attorney-General
There is no mechanism to enforce—[Hon. Members: “Ah!] My hon. Friend must listen carefully. The truth is that enforcing something against a Government who do not wish to have it enforced against them is very difficult, because the Government retain Executive power. If a judge in our High Court said that the Government should do something and the Government said, “We won’t do it,” it would be very difficult to do. Equally, however, it is worth bearing it in mind that the Government would be in rather serious breach of the principles of the rule of law and would, in fact, be behaving tyrannically. One needs to be careful. The principles on which United Kingdom Governments have always operated is that if international obligations confer a power on a court and a court orders compensation, we will honour those international obligations as it is our duty to do so, because without that we diminish our own status, in terms of our respect for international law as much as domestic law. It is therefore a bit of a red herring to suggest that just because something cannot be enforced, that is a justification for ignoring it. It might be a justification for enacting other legislation or taking other steps, but it would be a fairly momentous change in UK practice if we ignored something to which we had indicated by international treaty we subscribe.
Mr Richard Shepherd (Aldridge-Brownhills) (Con)
We of course have confidence, by and large, in our judicial system and our courts. I see this issue as a crisis in the question of whether we have confidence in the workings of another court system. That is the tension that underlines so much of what we are discussing today—whether we are talking about a credible court, with the extension of its remit as a living instrument, and so on. That is the criticism that is now coming from judges too. We respect one court; do we respect the European Court, and therefore the international obligation that my right hon. and learned Friend mentions?
The Attorney-General
There is no doubt that there has been criticism of the Court, just as I have at times heard views expressed in this House applauding judgments made in the European Court of Human Rights—the judgments on stop and search and on DNA databases come to mind. We therefore need to be careful about too much picking and choosing of what we might think is desirable or not. I recognise that there is a fundamental issue in this debate, which the right hon. Member for Blackburn and others touched on, about the extent to which the Court is turning into a micro-manager.
Kate Hoey (Vauxhall) (Lab)
If compensation was awarded, would it not be appropriate for the Government to decide to take it from the legal aid budget of the civil lawyers who will have brought most such cases about?
The Attorney-General
That is an interesting proposal from the hon. Lady, but, if I may say so, I would not seek to answer that question at the Dispatch Box today. It raises a number of ethical and practical issues to which, on the whole, I would want to give further consideration.
Rehman Chishti (Gillingham and Rainham) (Con)
Will my right hon. and learned Friend give way?
The Attorney-General
I must make progress; otherwise I will not be able to do what I principally came here to do.
I want to deal with the point about the Grand Chamber in the Hirst case. The Grand Chamber declined, properly, to provide any detailed guidance on how to make our current regime compatible with the convention. It also made it clear that special weight should be given to the role of the domestic policy maker. Despite the difficulties that the House might face, we have a real opportunity, through debate, to shape the dialogue with the Court if we focus on the key issues.
I will now deal with the main legal issues on prisoner voting. I will set out the main points raised by the main judgments, because it might make the debate more difficult if the House does not have them in mind. I shall first outline the key points in the Hirst judgment, which dates back to October 2005. The Court took the view that it was well established that article 3 of protocol 1 to the convention, to which we are signatories, guarantees individuals the right to vote and to stand for election. The Court considered that to be a right, not a privilege. It also considered that that principle was important in ensuring an effective and meaningful democracy governed by the rule of law. It therefore felt that departure from the principle of universal suffrage risked undermining the democratic validity of the elected legislature and the laws that it promulgates. That might not have exercised us very much here, but in the context of the many east European states that have joined the European convention it is probably right to say that those are really serious, material considerations.
In the view of the Court, prisoners continue to enjoy all the fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed by the convention. I do not think that either my right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden or the right hon. Member for Blackburn disagree with that. The Court’s reasoning, with which I appreciate many hon. Members disagree, is that, in view of the fact that the convention does not allow prisoners to be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment or to have restrictions placed on their freedom of expression or freedom to practise their religion, a restriction on their right to vote should have the aim only of
“preventing crime by sanctioning the conduct of convicted prisoners, and enhancing civic responsibility and respect for the rule of law”.
The Court also recognised that the participating states had a wide margin of appreciation in deciding on such restrictions, but that that was not an unlimited discretion. It felt that the restriction should be proportionate and—this is the nub of the issue—that section 3 of the Representation of the People Act 1983 imposed a blanket ban, which was seen as being so indiscriminate as to fall outside the acceptable margin of appreciation.
Mr Baron
The central questions are whether the interpretation of the treaty that we signed has gone beyond what the original treaty contained, and who, thereafter, has the right to make a decision on the matter. Should it be this Parliament or an unelected European institution that makes such decisions? The clear evidence is that it should be this House, and that the interpretation has gone beyond the terms of the original treaty. That is what this vote is about today.
The Attorney-General
I appreciate that that is what my hon. Friend and many others believe the issue for debate to be. I recognise that it is going to be a major topic for debate this afternoon, but, if he will forgive me, I will suggest that hon. Members might also wish to focus on why they consider the current ban, or some variant of it, to be reasonable and proportionate in our own national context. It was the absence of debate on that issue that appeared to make the Court take the view that our ban was indiscriminate—
Mr Andrew Turner (Isle of Wight) (Con)
Does my right hon. and learned Friend accept that we do not want a discriminatory rule on what we took a view on, but that they want an absolute rule?
The Attorney-General
I hope that I have understood my hon. Friend correctly. I do not think that the Court has suggested that there should be an absolute rule. In fact, it has made it quite clear in that and later judgments that there could be substantial flexibility for national legislatures to set their own criteria, which could be variable. For example, leaving a blanket prohibition to one side, it might be desired that a prohibition could be imposed after a particular period, so that someone could be banned from voting if sentenced to one, two, three or four years. The criteria could be different if the judiciary were given complete discretion over whether people should be banned and when such a ban should be applied. So there is a whole range of possible variants available to a legislature, if it were minded to consider them, that might well satisfy the Court’s concerns.
I am mindful of the strong views held in the House on this matter. On the maintenance of a blanket prohibition on all sentenced prisoners, the House should note that the Hirst case was followed by two other cases. This was the cause of my criticism of Labour’s dilatoriness on this matter. The first was Frodl v. Austria, in which the Court found that a ban on voting imposed on people sentenced to more than 12 months was wrong. The second case was Greens and M.T., in which the Court appeared to make it clear that it wanted the United Kingdom to enact some form of legislation.
Mr Leigh
It seems that everyone who has spoken so far is trying to have their cake and eat it. They all say that they want this incorporated into our law, but they do not like this particular judgment. They think that a debate will solve the problem. If the vote goes against us this afternoon, will the Attorney-General do the right thing and withdraw us from our incorporation in the convention?
The Attorney-General
My hon. Friend takes a very absolutist stance, although I have heard him utter such a view before. That is not Government policy, however.
Jeremy Corbyn (Islington North) (Lab)
Is not the fundamental issue that the European convention on human rights applies to everyone, including those who are in prison, and that when people are convicted they do not lose their convention rights? They have to suffer a penalty following conviction, but losing their right to vote is outwith the terms of the convention.
The Attorney-General
The hon. Gentleman makes a perfectly reasonable point. Indeed, in some countries, the removal of the right to vote effectively forms part of the sentencing exercise. However, that has not been part of our national tradition in this country. I will be interested to hear hon. Members’ reasoning in the debate. I assume that the underlying principle behind the ban—given that many people are convicted and not sent to prison—was that a person who was sent to prison had done something so antisocial towards the civil order that it was justified to remove their right to vote. Speaking personally, I have never thought that there was anything unreasonable about that approach, although I appreciate that some hold other views, including non-governmental organisations such as the Prison Reform Trust, which has argued powerfully in favour of giving prisoners the right to vote.
Mr David Nuttall (Bury North) (Con)
In answer to the Court’s concerns, may I point out that criminals in this country choose of their own free will to commit serious crimes, and they know that, if they are found guilty and sent to prison, they will lose their right to vote?
The Attorney-General
That is a very good argument, and it might be helpful to me if I ever have to stand up in front of the European Court of Human Rights to explain the reasoning of the United Kingdom Parliament.
I have pointed out that matters were made more difficult following the judgment in Frodl v. Austria, in which it was held that the disfranchisement of a person sentenced to more than one year in prison was a violation of article 3, and in the Greens and M.T. case, although the Court clearly stated at that time that judicial discretion was not a requirement. From that point of view, it is clearly open to the United Kingdom Government to put in place a system that would not involve judicial discretion. I have some hesitation, in any event, about whether the judiciary would wish to have that discretion inflicted on them. As hon. Members might be aware, however, the Government have made it plain that, even on minimal sentences, the power to remove the right to vote—in cases involving electoral fraud, for example—ought to be retained by the judges in any event.
It is for the House to provide a response today. I hope that that response will be useful to the Government in representing the House’s views in what I anticipate will be a rather drawn-out dialogue between ourselves and the Court.
Mrs Anne Main (St Albans) (Con)
I concur that we have already set quite a high bar for getting behind bars in this country. Given that, why is it any more reasonable to pick an arbitrary figure of one, two, three or four years than to set the bar at the point when people pass through the prison gates?
The Attorney-General
My hon. Friend makes a very reasonable point. If she looks around other European countries, she will find a great deal of variety in approach. Some countries do not allow any convicted prisoners to vote, although they might well be in serious difficulty as a result of the Hirst judgment. The Irish Government, for example, changed the law and gave their prisoners the vote. Others lay down differential criteria, and it seems clear that the Court is influenced by the consideration of whether those convicted to very short terms of imprisonment should retain the right to vote and those with longer terms of imprisonment should lose it. Four years, for example, has usually been regarded in our judicial system as the benchmark that separates a long sentence from a medium or short sentence. That is one reason why such benchmarks might play a role, and used to play a role, in providing some definition.
Naomi Long
The Republic of Ireland provides an interesting case. Although the Government have allowed their prisoners to register to vote, they do not necessarily guarantee that they will be able to vote in the sense of attending a polling station to exercise their franchise. I suspect that this is an interesting example of sleight of hand.
The Attorney-General
I would have to check that position. My understanding was—it might be incorrect—that the Irish Government provided a postal voting system.
Chris Bryant
Is it not an irony that prisoners in Britain had the vote for a while, but were unable to register and therefore were unable to exercise their right to vote?
The Attorney-General
I have no doubt that at one time that was correct. Indeed, before 1870, large numbers of people did not have the right to vote in any case, which adds another complicating issue. I think we should look at the here and now.
Ben Gummer (Ipswich) (Con)
I am slightly worried by what my right hon. and learned Friend said earlier about the purpose of this debate. Surely the purpose of this Chamber hitherto has been to form statute law. He suggests that we should now take on the function of influencing the jurisprudential evolution of the European Court of Human Rights. Would it not be helpful to him if this debate also engaged with the realm of the relationship between this House and the European Court?
The Attorney-General
I certainly do not want to prevent my hon. Friend from debating such an important issue. He must forgive me for perhaps being too much of a lawyer, but on the whole I tend to look at the terms of the motion, which are very specific and quite interesting. The motion first emphasises our respect for our international obligations, which I do not believe was included accidentally by the right hon. Member for Blackburn or my right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden. I assume that the motion thus encompasses our international obligations under the European convention on human rights. Secondly, the motion expresses what I take to be a view that we believe that our existing arrangements, which deny sentenced prisoners the right to vote, are fair, reasonable and proper and we wish to continue them. That seems to be the motion that we have to debate, and which we ought to debate, which is why I sought to answer the question in this way, although I accept that some wider issues could also be considered. At the end of the day, as I have also emphasised, the Government are bound by their international obligations. They have to think, sometimes laterally if not horizontally, about how to get themselves out of the conundrum of respecting the views expressed in this House while also wanting to see that the international obligations that this House wants to be respected are respected.
Rehman Chishti
On that very point of international obligations, Lord Hoffmann has said that
“with support of other European states”
that have also been at odds with the Court,
“we can repatriate our laws on human rights.”
What steps are we taking to work with other European states that have also been badly treated to withdraw from the scope of the Human Rights Act 1998?
The Attorney-General
I am grateful to my hon. Friend, who is absolutely right; I have not had time to develop the point. Quite simply, negotiations have taken place concerning the difficulties facing the Court, in which the different countries making up the Council of Europe are, in many ways, expressing the common view that the Court is not functioning properly. Quite apart from anything else, there is a backlog of 120,000 cases. This matter is therefore not being ignored by the Government; we would like to make some progress to see whether reform can be achieved.
Mr Davidson
Does the Attorney-General accept that, in being a lawyer, he has the problem of over-complicating matters? [Laughter.] Is not the basic issue whether we in this country should decide our line on whether prisoners should be able to vote—or should it be decided by somebody else? Where do the Government stand on that question?
The Attorney-General
The object of lawyers is to take people’s concepts and to try to navigate them to their correct destination, if at all possible. [Interruption.] In this case, there is no specific financial benefit, however pleasant it would be to be able to charge a special fee to my Government colleagues for appearing here this afternoon. I do not think that they would have condescended that to me.
I hope that what I have said has been of assistance to the House. I look forward to hearing the rest of the debate and, above all, to helping the House further if I can during the course of it.
Chris Bryant
My hon. Friend makes a remarkably subtle and nuanced point, which is unusual for him. [Interruption.] I think he knows that I mean that in the kindest way. Following on from his point, I would add that the Court has been wrong to assert that we have a blanket ban in the UK. As has already been said by several speakers, we do not ban those on remand, or those who are in prison by virtue of contempt of court or for fines. It is therefore not a blanket ban, and I think the Court should have taken that into consideration.
I want now to refer briefly to the Government’s record, as they have hardly covered themselves in glory. [Interruption.] I was not going to make these points until the Attorney-General decided to attack the previous Labour Government; I had crossed these remarks out, but I have now decided to reinstate them.
In opposition, one Conservative right hon. and learned Member dismissed the idea of prisoners’ votes as “ludicrous” and said that
“it will bring the law into disrepute and many people will see it as making a mockery of justice”.
I think many people would agree. The right hon. and learned Member who said that was the current Attorney-General. He also said that
“there is no reason why our courts should be bound by Strasbourg Court jurisprudence”
and
“the obligation on the UK to respect Strasbourg Court adverse decisions, in a particular case to which it is a party, is an international treaty obligation and not a legally enforceable matter at all.”
I do not think that is quite what he said this afternoon.
The Attorney-General
I thought I had made the position clear. First, this Parliament is entirely sovereign in both Houses in the enactment of primary legislation and can resolve what it wants. Secondly, the Executive are bound by the ministerial code to observe their international treaty obligations that have been ratified.
Chris Bryant
That is not quite how the right hon. and learned Gentleman expressed it on the radio before the general election, but I just want to check this: is it still the Attorney-General’s legal advice that there is no need for Parliament to adhere to the treaty, the convention and the judgment of the Court? That seemed to be the point that he was making previously—I know the point that he is making about the Government’s requirement.
The Attorney-General
If I may say so, I think the hon. Gentleman has taken my comments slightly out of context in the following sense. The debate that was taking place, and which has often been a problem, is about conflating EU law and the EU with the Council of Europe. EU law, by virtue of the treaty of accession—
The Attorney-General
Yes, the European Communities Act 1972. I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for that. By virtue of the ’72 Act, EU law has direct application in this country, whereas the Council of Europe and European convention on human rights do not, except in so far as we incorporate that in the Human Rights Act 1998. That is the distinction.
Chris Bryant
Fine; I am glad that the Attorney-General has clarified that. Can he clarify one other point, too? The one element on which he has not given us any advice today—and if he has any legal advice, I would be grateful if he published it—is his interpretation of the wriggle room or margin of appreciation that is genuinely available to us. He seems to have suggested today that one area that was insisted on in Frodl v. Austria—namely that judges should have to be able to make an individual decision on each person for that to be valid—is no longer necessary for us, although that was in the ministerial statement issued by the Parliamentary Secretary, Cabinet Office, on the day before we broke for Christmas. [Interruption.] The Attorney-General appears to be disagreeing with that, but it was in that ministerial statement.
I also want to know whether the Attorney-General has had legal advice on whether four years is necessary, or whether one could get away with less than that. Those of us who want to be able to do everything we can are keen to know the absolute minimum that the Government would have to do to comply.
The Attorney-General
The hon. Gentleman knows the conventions in government—one of which is that Law Officers’ advice, and whether it has been sought and what they have advised, is not published. I can say two things, however. First, I have sought to explain something of the legal framework. As for the questions about Greens and M.T. and Frodl, read on its own the Frodl judgment would suggest that judicial discretion was required. Subsequently however, Greens and M.T. does not appear to insist on judicial discretion. Judicial discretion appears to have particularly exercised people in this country, because they do not think the judges should necessarily make such a determination. In those circumstances, although the House might wish to look at judicial discretion issues—and it has been suggested that that might be a way of dealing with those who fell below a benchmark for normally being allowed to retain the vote—that is not necessary.
Chris Bryant
Again, I am grateful to the Attorney-General, as I agree with him; my reading of the Greens and M.T. case is wholly consistent with his in relation to judicial oversight. That was one of the questions that we raised in the debate in January, and I received responses from the Minister who took part in that debate only at 8.31 pm yesterday.
I reiterate that the Government have made various statements over the past few months. The Lord Chancellor made one yesterday on the radio, the relevant Minister made one in the House of Lords and the Minister who responded to the Adjournment debate in Westminster Hall made one then. Those statements have not been consistent with each other, but they have adverted to legal advice. It is the tradition of this House that when one relies on evidence, that evidence is published.
So what is the Government’s policy? What is the absolute minimum that they believe the UK has to deliver to meet its treaty obligations?
Chris Bryant
I hope that the hon. Gentleman does not mind if I do not give way, because others want to speak and I ought to be drawing my comments to a close.
Would it be sufficient for the Government to present proposals—[Interruption.] I would be grateful if the Attorney-General would listen, just briefly. Would it be sufficient for the Government to present proposals—introduce legislation—but for Parliament not to agree them? Would that, in some sense, satisfy the Court? What do the Government believe will happen if the House supports the motion this afternoon? How have the Government arrived at the compensation figure? Previously it has been said that £160 million-worth of compensation will be entailed, but I gather that last night the media were briefed that the compensation figure will be £143 million. I understand that that has been arrived at on the basis not of the Attorney-General’s legal advice, but of advice given to the Government by others. Will that be published? Can he explain how the compensation would be enforced, given that all applications for compensation to the county court should surely be struck out by dint of section 6(2) of the Human Rights Act 1998, which reinforces parliamentary sovereignty? Indeed, is there not a claim in the High Court today from the Treasury solicitor to that effect?
The Attorney-General
All I will say on the issue of compensation is that it is very difficult to know how much compensation might or might not have to be paid. Let us suppose that there were two elections in which the entirety of the sentenced population in the prison system were deprived of the right to vote and they were all to bring a claim. On the basis of there being about 73,000 people in the prison system in that category and on the basis that about £1,000 to £1,500 of compensation and costs might have to be paid, the hon. Gentleman will be able to start to work out what sort of total cost might be involved. Of course, lots of prisoners might decide not to bring a claim, so I must accept that all the Government can do is provide a reasonable guide of the potential for the matter to be very costly. The hon. Gentleman will have no difficulty acknowledging that when he does the calculation.
Chris Bryant
I note that the Attorney-General was referring to general elections, but of course it was stated in evidence last week to the Select Committee that the Scottish and Welsh elections in the next few weeks present a real problem. I accept that there are problems, but I wonder how anybody conceives that compensation payments would be enforced.
Chris Bryant
I will, of course, give way, but I am trying to end my speech.
The Attorney-General
I apologise for intervening, and the hon. Gentleman will appreciate that I had to bring my remarks to a close earlier as I did not want to take up too much time. He rightly says that arguments were placed before the Select Committee by lawyers saying that they thought that the matter applied also to voting in devolved legislatures. That is not the Government’s view.
Chris Bryant
I am grateful to the Attorney-General for that. This is a Back-Bench debate and it provides an opportunity for the Government to take the temperature of the House without the intervention of a Whip. We believe that the Committee of Ministers, which is charged with ensuring the execution of the Court’s judgments, should take proper cognisance of a clear, un-whipped majority in this House. The Court should step away from insisting on its most draconian interpretation of the margin of appreciation available, not just to this country, but to others, as there is no one European standard on this matter. Indeed, many countries maintain a complete ban. Finally, any British Court considering compensation or action based on the Hirst judgment should also think twice before “impeaching or questioning” this proceeding in Parliament.
Thomas Docherty
I have a great deal of time for the hon. Lady, but on this occasion she and I will have to disagree, although I hope she will be agreeing with me next Tuesday and Wednesday as we play ping-pong with the other place.
I have been raising the issue of prisoner voting rights for several months, particularly with reference to the Scottish Parliament elections. It is incredibly disappointing that none of the Scottish nationalists saw fit to grace us with their presence today, given that it is their Government in Scotland who have responsibility for the forthcoming parliamentary and local government elections next year. I raised the matter with the Cabinet Secretary for Justice last year. I do not intend to go through all the correspondence that my colleagues and I have had with him and with ministerial teams on this. However, the situation has been confirmed to me and to my colleague, Richard Baker, who is, for now, the shadow Minister but will, I am sure, become Justice Secretary. The SNP Government have not even bothered to write to the Deputy Prime Minister—who, let us be clear, is behind the move to give prisoners the right to vote—to express the Scottish people’s opposition to it.
Thomas Docherty
The Attorney-General shakes his head, but this is a Liberal Democrat policy. I remind him that in 2007 the right hon. Member for Gordon (Malcolm Bruce), who was president of the Scottish Liberal Democrats, urged the then Government to give prisoners voting rights in the Scottish elections. I am delighted that my right hon. Friends resisted that request by Scottish Liberal Democrats, and delighted that today we will again be resisting the pressure from Liberal Democrats to give people who have broken the law the right to vote.
I am deeply concerned by the Government’s attitude towards the ongoing test case involving the devolved Parliaments and Assemblies. It is clear from the 2007 case that the European Court is minded to grant prisoners the right to vote in Scottish Parliament elections, because, as my hon. Friend the Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) has said repeatedly in this debate and elsewhere, the Scottish Parliament is a primary legislative body. It is difficult to envisage how the Attorney-General, as fleet-footed and talented as he is, will persuade the European Court that the Scottish Parliament is exempt. I hope that the Attorney-General, when he is not looking at his BlackBerry, will clarify why he thinks the Scottish Parliament will be exempt from this issue.
My colleague Richard Baker MSP wrote to soft-touch Kenny MacAskill on 10 December last year. As I said, the Scottish Government do not believe that they have any role to play in lobbying the UK Government. That is another stain on the record of the SNP Government, who seem quite happy to pick fights with the UK Government, but will not stand up for what the people of Scotland want.
I think that Members from all parts of the House hold principled views on this issue. Although I fundamentally disagree with the Liberal Democrats on this issue, I respect their stance. I hope that they understand that voting is a right. As a former Prime Minister said, there are rights and there are responsibilities. People who break the law and who commit heinous crimes should not be allowed to vote.
As the Government have yet to clarify what the tariff limit will be if they lose the case, we have to assume that it will still be four years, as was leaked previously. I draw the Attorney-General’s attention to one of the problems in Scotland, which is that the Scottish Parliament has its own sentencing policy, its own judiciary and its own tariffs. Under a tariff system, the limit might be set at one year, six months or four years. Crimes that have a certain sentence in England, Wales and Northern Ireland might not have the same sentence in Scotland. I hope that the Government will reflect carefully on what the impact will be on Scotland if they use a tariff system, rather than using specific crimes. I accept that the Liberal Democrats probably do not intend to give paedophiles the vote. However, if the limit was set at four years or less, the disgusting individuals involved in the shocking case of child abuse in the south of England last year would qualify to vote. I am sure that that is not the intention of any party.
I am conscious that other hon. Members wish to speak, and I have said my piece. I will vote tonight for the motion in the names of my right hon. Friend the Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw) and other hon. Members.