Voting by Prisoners

John Baron Excerpts

Thursday 10th February 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Davis]

My hon. Friend makes an interesting point. It would be quite interesting to see how many prisoners have ever voted, let alone how many voted at every election in the run-up to their incarceration.

The Court also argues that the penalty is not proportionate, but again that is plainly wrong. We are not one of those countries where, when someone is convicted of a criminal offence and sentenced to prison, they lose the right to vote for ever. Such places do exist. Indeed, in one state of the United States, people lose their right to vote de facto for ever, but we are not one of those places. When someone is in prison, they cannot vote; when they are released, all their civic rights are completely reinstated, meaning that that denial is an absolutely proportionate response to the seriousness of the crime. If the sentence reflects the crime, the denial of the vote also reflects the crime.

Let me be clear. In my view, convicted prisoners should not have the vote: robbery, rape, drug dealing—frankly, the crime does not matter, given its seriousness. But, despite what the Justice Secretary said the other day, violent criminals, sex offenders and drug dealers will get the vote if we accept the compromises that have been aired so far. The Government talk about a less than four-year rule, but 28,000 people convicted of serious violent crimes, sex crimes and crimes against children would be incorporated in that. Even a one-year rule would include thousands of people, many of whom will have committed serious crimes from which we would recoil.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

I completely agree with my right hon. Friend. The right to vote underpins our democracy, but that right is a qualified right, not an absolute one. Does he agree that these qualifications should therefore be established by this Parliament, not by unelected European institutions that wish to bypass our established laws?

[Mr Davis]

My hon. Friend takes me ahead of myself. As he well knows, the simple truth is that these are politically appointed judges, many of whom do not have enormous experience in court. Indeed, some of them have no experience in court, even in their own countries, let alone ours.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Attorney-General]

I must make progress; otherwise I will not be able to do what I principally came here to do.

I want to deal with the point about the Grand Chamber in the Hirst case. The Grand Chamber declined, properly, to provide any detailed guidance on how to make our current regime compatible with the convention. It also made it clear that special weight should be given to the role of the domestic policy maker. Despite the difficulties that the House might face, we have a real opportunity, through debate, to shape the dialogue with the Court if we focus on the key issues.

I will now deal with the main legal issues on prisoner voting. I will set out the main points raised by the main judgments, because it might make the debate more difficult if the House does not have them in mind. I shall first outline the key points in the Hirst judgment, which dates back to October 2005. The Court took the view that it was well established that article 3 of protocol 1 to the convention, to which we are signatories, guarantees individuals the right to vote and to stand for election. The Court considered that to be a right, not a privilege. It also considered that that principle was important in ensuring an effective and meaningful democracy governed by the rule of law. It therefore felt that departure from the principle of universal suffrage risked undermining the democratic validity of the elected legislature and the laws that it promulgates. That might not have exercised us very much here, but in the context of the many east European states that have joined the European convention it is probably right to say that those are really serious, material considerations.

In the view of the Court, prisoners continue to enjoy all the fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed by the convention. I do not think that either my right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden or the right hon. Member for Blackburn disagree with that. The Court’s reasoning, with which I appreciate many hon. Members disagree, is that, in view of the fact that the convention does not allow prisoners to be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment or to have restrictions placed on their freedom of expression or freedom to practise their religion, a restriction on their right to vote should have the aim only of

“preventing crime by sanctioning the conduct of convicted prisoners, and enhancing civic responsibility and respect for the rule of law”.

The Court also recognised that the participating states had a wide margin of appreciation in deciding on such restrictions, but that that was not an unlimited discretion. It felt that the restriction should be proportionate and—this is the nub of the issue—that section 3 of the Representation of the People Act 1983 imposed a blanket ban, which was seen as being so indiscriminate as to fall outside the acceptable margin of appreciation.

[Mr Baron]

The central questions are whether the interpretation of the treaty that we signed has gone beyond what the original treaty contained, and who, thereafter, has the right to make a decision on the matter. Should it be this Parliament or an unelected European institution that makes such decisions? The clear evidence is that it should be this House, and that the interpretation has gone beyond the terms of the original treaty. That is what this vote is about today.

[The Attorney-General]

I appreciate that that is what my hon. Friend and many others believe the issue for debate to be. I recognise that it is going to be a major topic for debate this afternoon, but, if he will forgive me, I will suggest that hon. Members might also wish to focus on why they consider the current ban, or some variant of it, to be reasonable and proportionate in our own national context. It was the absence of debate on that issue that appeared to make the Court take the view that our ban was indiscriminate—