Defence Spending

Deidre Brock Excerpts

Wednesday 24th April 2024 Commons Chamber

[Grant Shapps]

I warmly join my right hon. Friend in sending exactly that message. As he says, just last week I was looking at the first prototypes of the Challenger 3 coming off the production line in his patch. My only regret was that I was not able to see him at the same time.

[Deidre Brock (Edinburgh North and Leith) (SNP)]

My written questions this week have uncovered another worrying increase in nuclear safety events at nuclear weapons sites in 2023, with the first category A safety breach in 15 years at Faslane and the highest number of category B incidents since 2006. Category A incidents are defined as those that have an actual or high potential for radioactive release to the environment in breach of safety limits. A former chief adviser to a Prime Minister has described our existing nuclear stock as “rotting” and “a dangerous disaster”. Can the Secretary of State tell us how much of this extra spend will go towards ensuring that, at the very least, existing nuclear sites do not deteriorate further, threatening the health and safety of armed forces staff and surrounding populations?

[Grant Shapps]

I am pleased to report to the hon. Lady that our defence standards, particularly when it comes to our nuclear estate, are extremely high. Whenever an issue is found, it is properly and thoroughly investigated. She is right to say that it is important that we continue to invest in that. This money is good news: every bit helps and we want to ensure that it is spent appropriately. As it happens, we fund the nuclear estate appropriately, but this money will help to ensure that is put well beyond doubt.

Nuclear Defence Infrastructure: Parliamentary Scrutiny

Deidre Brock Excerpts

Wednesday 24th January 2024 Commons Chamber

[Martin Docherty-Hughes]

My answer to the hon. Gentleman is that he might as well stay for the rest of the debate to hear my view on that.

I have to say that Mr Cummings’s former role, and the nature of the allegations he has made, are such that it is bizarre, frankly, at least from my perspective, that the only attempt to scrutinise them is taking place not in a parliamentary Committee but in what, I have to say, is usually the graveyard spot of parliamentary business. Parliament is sovereign in everything, I guess, apart from the nuclear enterprise.

I will, I am afraid, quote from Mr Cummings’s blog quite extensively. I hope the Minister has already read it, but it is important for it to be read into the record of the House. There are two principal aspects to which I would like the Government to respond: first, the state of the defence nuclear infrastructure across these islands; and secondly, the decision-making process in the civil service and how it relates to democratic oversight. I should also say, before the Minister uses up some of the time for his response to say it, that I am not expecting him to comment, in any shape or form, on operational matters. I understand that much that is to do with the nuclear enterprise cannot be discussed publicly.

So let us begin. Unfortunately, I cannot leave out all the internal machinations of the Conservative party’s psychodrama, as some of it is quite pertinent. Cummings begins:

“I did have two conversations with the PM, the first in 2022 just after he became PM.

The PM wanted an actual plan including how to grip power and get things done, a political strategy and a political machine to change the political landscape and beat Labour.

In 2022 I said I might do it but my conditions were the ability to ensure that urgent action is proceeding on a range of fundamentally critical issues including:

the scandal of nuclear weapons infrastructure which is a dangerous disaster and a budget nightmare of hard-to-believe and highly classified proportions, and which has forced large secret cannibalisation of other national security budgets,

building defences for natural and engineered pandemics,

the scandal of MOD procurement, ignored despite (even because of) the biggest war in Europe since 1945,

AI and other technological capabilities,

the broken core government institutions including the dumpster fire of the Cabinet Office.”

Cummings ends this section by saying:

“In all of these areas I started crucial work in 2019-20. Most of this has stopped, slowed, or reversed.”

Not all of that is pertinent and, particularly in that last line, we see Cummings’s own agenda coming through. None the less, I would say that points 1, 3 and 5 are of the most interest to us here. Let us start with points 1 and 3, and return to point 5 later.

Cummings continues:

“For example, in 2020 we agreed (via a secret ‘tunnel’ process with the services, HMT and Cabinet Office, chaired by the Cabinet Secretary and me, but kept secret from Wallace) the first agreed-by-everyone-to-be-honest MOD budget numbers since before 2010, agreed how to plug the massive black hole partly created by the nuclear enterprise disaster, agreed a range of disasters that should be stopped immediately (e.g AJAX, Challenger), and agreed a plan for procurement reform and new capabilities to build. (Also NB. the Army did NOT lobby for a bigger army—in the world that seemed possible in 2020 of a serious plan and honest numbers and procurement reform etc, they preferred a smaller army with real capabilities to a ‘bigger’ but increasingly Potemkin army.) Instead, the MoD has been allowed to:

pocket the money for the black hole,

avoid stopping the disasters,

continue pumping more money down the drain of legacy disasters creating a new black hole,

continued to allow critical parts of the nuclear weapons infrastructure to rot creating further massive secret budget nightmares as well as extremely serious physical dangers (cf. the recent near disaster with a submarine),

continue as normal with disastrous procurement policy and practice, instead of taking industrial capacity seriously,

continue sacrificing critical new capabilities to fund legacy failures,

shred the honest budget numbers and return to the fraudulent numbers, and”—

most critically—

“continue lying even more to MPs and media about it all.”

Let me repeat that I do not expect the Minister to comment on operational matters or give away classified information, but can we at least agree that these are serious allegations on both a specific and a more general matter? Specifically, can the Minister comment on the suggestion that the nuclear enterprise is causing the

“large secret cannibalisation of other national security budgets”?

To add a little bit of context, while it would be tempting to pass this off as the ranting of a jilted former senior adviser, this tallies with a lot of what we have heard from recent National Audit Office reports. The latest report, received just in December, revealed not only that the plan was “unaffordable”, that the MOD acknowledged this fact and that the funding gap could range between £7.6 billion and £29.8 billion, but that

“Nuclear and Royal Navy Costs show the greatest increase compared with 2022”—

the Navy of course being the service that is responsible for the continuous at-sea deterrent.

Furthermore, paragraph 16 of the report’s key findings stated clearly:

“The creation of a ring fence around nuclear funding helps protect the MoD’s highest defence priority but puts greater pressure on programmes not included in it.”

Does the Minister acknowledge that the ringfence is putting pressure on the rest of the conventional budget? If so, do they think this is sustainable? Can they also tell the House what plans the Government have to mitigate the dead hand of ringfencing? There is an unfortunate logic to this nuclear ringfence within the Government’s well-intentioned ringfence around defence spending, be it at 2% or 2.5%. At this moment, every penny spent on the nuclear enterprise is a penny less spent on conventional assets, at a time when conventional threats are proliferating —a point I made in this very place only a few hours ago.

Cummings adds a dash of colour to the NAO’s necessarily black and white findings about MOD mismanagement and dysfunction. Taken together, they are a damning indictment of where Defence finds itself, and it is a shame that there is something of a taboo around discussing the contribution of the nuclear enterprise to this predicament. There are undoubtedly massive consequences and contingencies that need to be developed surrounding as large a transition as the one the nuclear enterprise is undertaking just now. We know this because His Majesty’s Government already went through a similar transition from Resolution to Vanguard. Because of “The Silent Deep”, the excellent and definitive official history of the Royal Navy submarine service, written by Peter Hennessy and James Jinks and released in 2015—a book I recommend to Members—we also know that extensive plans were made for worst-case scenarios during that transition, including

“moving a Polaris submarine into Loch Long, where it would dive and remain in a static location on Quick Reaction Alert.”

Again, I am not asking the Minister to comment on operational issues, but a pattern is emerging of events and scenarios that are consistent with reports and papers written by nuclear analysts dealing with the consequences of an ageing platform, against the backdrop of a defence budget put under pressure by an increasingly dire economic situation.

Whether it is the accident involving a Vanguard-class submarine, which we spoke about in November—an accident that Cummings attributes to poor infrastructure —or the pitiful sight of another Vanguard-class boat returning to HMNB Clyde in September, looking rather the worse for wear, only for the MOD to release a statement praising the crew for the longest SSBN patrol, something does not quite add up.

We sometimes stray too close to specifics, so I will return to another aspect of the Cummings blog—an aspect that, if anything, is more worrying. It brings me to the parliamentary aspect of the title of this evening’s debate:

“Since we left, No. 10 has allowed and even encouraged all this. The cycle of disaster, cheat, lie and classify even more has continued through successive defence reviews (e.g. the infamous ‘Heywood wedge’ overseen by Heywood, Osborne and McPherson in 2015). We drew a line under this systemic lying and delusions in 2020. After I left the line was immediately deleted and business as usual has continued. The system is preparing to give Starmer the same horrific choices on above-STRAP3 yellow paper and continue the cycle of classify, punt, and lie with everything becoming ever more hollow-Potemkin as a result.”

That is a lot, so let us focus on the idea that

“The system is preparing to give Starmer the same…choices”.

It is nothing more than an insinuation that senior members of the civil service and the armed forces, according to Cummings, seem to be planning to manipulate an incoming Prime Minister who, if recent polls are to be believed, will have a significant mandate. Not only that, but it insinuates that they have used the protocols and security around the nuclear enterprise to manipulate the current Prime Minister and his predecessors, and have sought to remove any aspect of Cabinet decision making by excluding the then Defence Secretary from those discussions.

As I said, my party does not agree with this, or with the nuclear weapons policies of this Government and previous Governments. Regardless, this debate is not about that; it is about the way in which His Majesty’s Government implement their own declared policy. It is an unfortunate but inescapable reality of the nuclear enterprise that many of the discussions around it cannot be held in public—[Interruption.] I will come to a conclusion. Do not worry, the Minister will have his 10 minutes—and then his photograph.

The whole number of discussions must therefore be taken in an increasingly tight series of concentric circles. The one fig leaf for our parliamentary democracy has always been that, at the end of it all, there is an element of democratic oversight, with the Prime Minister, the Defence Secretary and, on occasion, the Foreign Secretary having input into the nuclear strategy.

[Deidre Brock (Edinburgh North and Leith) (SNP)]

Will my hon. Friend give way? [Interruption.]

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Eleanor Laing)]

Order. I am sorry to interrupt the hon. Lady, but I must say to other Members present that it is simply rude to talk. If whispering has to be done, then whisper.

[Deidre Brock]

I congratulate my hon. Friend on securing this debate on a crucial issue. He talks about secrecy. Does he know about the MOD’s response to my recent questions on safety at its nuclear bases? The response confirmed an alarming trend, with the number of incidents at Faslane and Coulport jumping by a third in 2022, and the figures for the start of 2023 suggesting further rises. Does he agree that surely we have a right, as Members of Parliament, to know why safety records are not improving, as well as the nature of these incidents and their effect on local residents and the environment?

[Martin Docherty-Hughes]

I could not disagree with my hon. Friend at all.

Of course, if any of the allegations made by Dominic Cummings, crucially those on senior Ministers being manipulated, are without merit, I would be glad to hear it. Alternatively, those civil servants themselves should address them directly.

Let me bring my remarks to a close with a final plea for the Minister—[Interruption.] I know that Members are here to have their picture taken—it might be useful, as it might be the last parliamentary one they ever have. Let me bring my remarks to a close with a final plea for the Minister to stick to the substance of some basic questions I am asking him. We know the opinion about the nuclear enterprise, so let me make this a bit easier and keep to just two questions, if the Government do not want to address anything else that I have said. First, what are the Government doing to ensure that the nuclear enterprise does not continue to exert undue pressure on the rest of the defence budget? Secondly, what safeguards are there to ensure that there remains a robust and genuine democratic oversight of all aspects of that enterprise?

[The Minister for Defence Procurement (James Cartlidge)]

I congratulate the hon. Member for West Dunbartonshire (Martin Docherty-Hughes) on securing this important debate. It is true that we differ fundamentally on the issue of the deterrent. Indeed, there is such passion and commitment to it among Conservative Members that we have a fantastic turnout this evening. The key theme of his speech was parliamentary scrutiny. He said that Parliament is sovereign everywhere, except in the nuclear deterrent. So let me remind him that when my right hon. Friend the Member for Maidenhead (Mrs May) became Prime Minister in 2016, one of the first key votes in this House was on the renewal of Trident, and the majority was 355 in favour.

To be clear, the UK’s independent nuclear deterrent is a matter of the highest priority for the Government, as is borne out by the support on our Back Benches today. I welcome the opportunity to set out our approach and policies in this area. Our continuous at-sea nuclear deterrent is the cornerstone of our national defence, and it is central to the Government’s national security strategy. We place the utmost importance on the upkeep of all our nuclear defence infrastructure and its upgrades. His Majesty’s naval base in Clyde has an establishment management plan with a 40-year horizon that covers both the Faslane and Coulport sites. The Government seek to be as transparent as possible about our nuclear defence infrastructure, within obvious national security constraints.

[Deidre Brock]

rose—

[James Cartlidge]

I will take one intervention from the hon. Lady.

[Deidre Brock]

The Minister talks about transparency, but in 2017 the publication of the annual reports of the Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator, the Ministry of Defence’s internal watchdog, were stopped under his Government. Why was that?

[James Cartlidge]

I have enjoyed the fact that the hon. Lady has tabled a number of written questions on these matters. I have always answered them as transparently as possible, setting out the full facts, and will continue to do so. Indeed, the very point of being here is that we are transparent in Parliament about our deterrent. We engage fully with Parliament, including the Defence and Scottish Affairs Committees, and we will continue to do so. We publish transparency data for all major defence programmes annually, including nuclear infrastructure, and, in line with industry good practice, our nuclear sites have well-established and transparent systems for raising what are known in the industry as nuclear site event reports, about which the hon. Lady has asked a number of written questions. This open documentation of human error, procedural or documentation failings, and equipment issues provides the strongest illustration of our commitment to transparency. More importantly, it fosters a culture of continual improvement and enhances the rigour of our collective approach to safety.

The safety of our nuclear defence infrastructure is paramount. Our nuclear establishments fully adhere to current—

Loss of Secret Documents

Deidre Brock Excerpts

Monday 28th June 2021 Commons Chamber

[Jeremy Quin]

I would not, as a matter of course, comment on the discussions we hold with our friends and allies overseas, but my hon. Friend is absolutely right to refer to the agreement struck last week. It was an important agreement for British shipbuilding and for Babcock, and I look forward to that enhancing the Ukrainian navy in due course.

[Deidre Brock (Edinburgh North and Leith) (SNP)]

This is not the first time such a thing has happened, and I am sure it will not be the last. It is so serious an issue that the BBC chose not to report on various details in the bundle, because it could have endangered the security of service personnel in Afghanistan. What steps have the Government taken to secure the safety of service personnel in Afghanistan and in the Carrier Strike Group?

[Jeremy Quin]

The hon. Lady refers to the BBC choosing not to report, and I think that was right. One would have preferred the BBC to have handed the documents straight over, but it acted responsibly by not relaying information that could have caused problems. We are going through the investigation. We are ensuring that all those documents have been returned, and we will be ensuring that any mitigating actions that need to be taken are put in place.

Oral Answers to Questions

Deidre Brock Excerpts

Monday 16th March 2020 Commons Chamber

[Jeremy Quin]

That is a perfectly reasonable question, but it will become familiar to my hon. Friend that we do not comment on CASD in this place. I thank him for his interest.

[Deidre Brock (Edinburgh North and Leith) (SNP)]

Ciaran Martin, head of the UK’s National Cyber Security Centre, confirmed recently that Russian hackers attacked British media, telecoms and energy companies. The Royal United Services Institute has confirmed that the UK will not be able to replicate many of the security benefits of EU membership. Will the Minister give the House an assessment of the capacity we are losing by leaving the EU and outline the Government’s costed proposals for how the UK can unilaterally develop that capacity?

Oral Answers to Questions

Deidre Brock Excerpts

Monday 3rd February 2020 Commons Chamber

[Deidre Brock (Edinburgh North and Leith) (SNP)]

T7. Will the Minister publish the environmental impact assessment of the MOD’s operations at Cape Wrath?

[Johnny Mercer]

I will write to the hon. Member.

Christmas Island Nuclear Testing: Compensation

Deidre Brock Excerpts

Tuesday 21st May 2019 Commons Chamber

[Carol Monaghan]

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his intervention, and I am happy to look into that and ask questions about it.

Veterans’ numbers are dwindling, but there are thought to be about 130,000 descendants, who report 10 times the normal level of birth defects, organ malformations and leukaemia. William’s children all suffer from bone or spinal problems, and his granddaughter’s hips were back to front when she was born. However, the MOD continues to deny liability. In 2007, research from New Zealand proved that genetic damage in veterans was three times worse than in survivors of the Chernobyl disaster. Despite Britain agreeing to pay Australia £20 million to settle claims arising from nuclear contamination, the Government fight such compensation claims at home.

In response to a parliamentary question from the hon. Member for Hendon (Dr Offord) last year, the Minister set out the eligibility for claims. He said:

“Any veteran who believes they have suffered ill health due to Service is eligible to claim no-fault compensation under the War Pensions Scheme. War Pensions are payable in respect of illness or injury due to Service in Her Majesty’s Armed Forces before 6 April 2005, with the benefit of reasonable doubt always given to the claimant. Decisions are medically certified and follow consideration of Service and medical evidence and carry full rights of appeal to an independent tribunal. Where the evidence supports a causal link to Service, entitlement will be given.”

[Deidre Brock (Edinburgh North and Leith) (SNP)]

My hon. Friend mentioned Australia and the compensation that was paid to veterans and indigenous Australians as a result of tests there. Is she aware that the amount offered—£20 million—is considered pathetically inadequate?

[Carol Monaghan]

That is of course the point I was making, and I do not for a moment suggest that that comes anywhere near what would be required properly to compensate people there. The point I am making is that there is an admission of guilt within that.

It is difficult enough to prove the causal link between service and illness for nuclear test veterans, but for a merchant seaman on board a Royal Fleet Auxiliary Service vessel, supporting the military operation, there is not even the ability to access a war pension. Lord Mackay of Ardbrecknish addressed that issue during his time as Minister for war pensions. He wrote to Mr McGinley of the British Nuclear Test Veterans Association, stating that anyone who was present at the tests, even in a support capacity, would be considered, for the purpose of war pensions, a veteran. However, that classification has never been recognised.

William was told by the Navy that he was not in hostile waters and therefore could not be considered a veteran. The civil service has said that because he was not on board for more than two years— which, due to his unrelated injury, could not happen—he could not be considered for a civil service pension. My predecessor, John Robertson, was also involved in William’s case, and through his intervention William did receive his veteran’s pin; but that is no compensation for the decades where the state has simply ignored his contribution.

Canadian servicemen were ordered to lie in trenches while the tests were carried out; they have secured compensation. American servicemen who witnessed explosions over land were compensated in Reagan’s famous scheme, but it appears that Britain is the last nuclear power on earth to deny that its own nuclear weapons are capable of causing its service personnel any harm.

Following a long campaign by the British Nuclear Test Veterans Association, £25 million was allocated from LIBOR funds to finance an aged veterans fund to alleviate suffering and increase wellbeing. The aged veterans fund went live in April 2016 and the British Nuclear Test Veterans Association, through its nuclear community charity fund, received approval to launch an initial portfolio of five projects benefiting the nuclear community. That has been welcomed by the community, but it is a million miles from the compensation that those veterans and their families deserve. Men were deliberately used as guinea pigs in a macabre scientific experiment, and their health was sacrificed simply to prove our worth to America.

I would ask the Minister, first, if William was a civilian, how was it that he ended up in Christmas Island without any say in his deployment? Secondly, what plans do the Government have to admit their responsibility in this episode and compensate all those affected—military and support crew? Finally, when can we expect the Government to honour Lord Mackay’s classification of RFA personnel as veterans?

Sadly, William Caldwell died last year, but his son Robert continues to fight for what his family are owed—an admission of guilt, an apology from the Government and financial recompense for the years of suffering this family have experienced, and continue to experience. But Robert takes some small comfort in knowing that his father is now at peace from the nightmares.

Continuous At-Sea Deterrent

Deidre Brock Excerpts

Wednesday 10th April 2019 Commons Chamber

[Gavin Williamson]

I have given the hon. Lady the opportunity to speak.

We remain committed to reducing our stockpile to no more than 180 warheads by the mid-2020s, but the reality is that other nations have not taken the hint from the lead that the United Kingdom has shown. Even as we have cut back, others are creating new systems to get around treaty obligations or are simply ignoring the commitments that they have made. I have already spoken about Russia’s breach of the INF treaty. The truth is that the only way to create the global security conditions necessary for nuclear disarmament is by working multilaterally. Our commitment to the deterrent is cast-iron.

We are spending around £4 billion every year to ensure the ultimate guarantee of our safety for the next 50 years, not least by investing in the next generation of ballistic missile submarines—the Dreadnought class. We have made significant progress.  We have already named three of the state-of-the-art submarines—Dreadnought, Valiant and Warspite. Construction has already started in Barrow on HMS Dreadnought. Those names recall some of the greatest ships of our naval history. We are investing millions of pounds in state-of-the-art facilities and complex nuclear propulsion systems, and we are ensuring every day counts by utilising our Dreadnought contingency, with access to up to £1 billion, to fund more in the early years to drive out cost and risk later in the programme.

[Deidre Brock (Edinburgh North and Leith) (SNP)]

The Secretary of State speaks of getting around obligations. Can he clarify why the MOD stopped publishing the official safety ratings report from Trident’s watchdog, the Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator, for the past two years? Is it trying to cover up the rise in safety incidents instead of taking proper action to fix them now?

[Gavin Williamson]

Safety is at the core and at the very heart of everything we do at the Ministry of Defence and through all three of our services and with our industrial partners. That is very much the focus that we will always have going into the future.

--- Later in debate ---

[Caroline Lucas]

That is why one needs international processes such as the UN treaty that I have described, which is supported by 122 countries, to make that happen. Although I am personally in favour of unilateral nuclear disarmament, that is not the case that I am making this afternoon. I am moving one step towards people such as hon. Members like himself—or right hon. Members like himself, perhaps, I cannot really remember—who I completely understand are never going to be persuaded by unilateral nuclear disarmament, but who I hope might be willing to engage in a serious argument about multilateral nuclear disarmament.

So far there has been very little recognition in this debate of the fact that nuclear weapons systems are themselves fallible. According to a shocking report by Chatham House, there have been 13 incidents since 1962 in which nuclear weapons have very nearly been launched. One of the most dramatic, in 1983, was when Stanislav Petrov, the duty officer in a Soviet nuclear war early-warning centre, found his system warning of the launch of five US missiles. After a few moments of agonising, he judged it, thankfully and correctly, to be a false alarm. If he had reached a different conclusion and passed the information up the control chain, that could have triggered the firing of nuclear missiles from Russia.

[Deidre Brock]

Parliamentary questions I have asked uncovered the shocking fact that since 2006 there have been 789 nuclear safety incidents at Coulport and Faslane, and half of the incidents at Faslane have taken place in just the past four years. Does the hon. Lady agree that it is a very serious worry that nuclear safety incidents are on the rise under the watch of a Government who should not have control of a TV remote, let alone the most dangerous weapons on the planet?

[Caroline Lucas]

I thank the hon. Lady for her intervention. She rightly shines a spotlight on issues that far too rarely get covered in the media or even in debates such as this one.

The UK Government have shamefully refused to participate in the treaty negotiations I have been describing while nevertheless claiming that they share the goal of a nuclear weapons-free world. But it is not too late to make amends. The Government should now engage constructively and work towards signing that treaty and supporting the global moves towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons. That, unlike a willingness to launch nuclear weapons and incinerate millions of innocent people, or to waste billions on a weapon that will never be used and therefore serves no evident purpose, would be the true test of a Prime Minister’s leadership.

Oral Answers to Questions

Deidre Brock Excerpts

Monday 9th July 2018 Commons Chamber

[Mark Lancaster]

My hon. Friend raises an important point. That is precisely why I was honoured to open the new Defence Cyber School at Shrivenham in March. We recognise that basic cyber-skills will be vital in our armed forces. This will become a separate career branch in time, but we hope that every member of the armed forces will have cyber-skills.

[Deidre Brock (Edinburgh North and Leith) (SNP)]

18. What steps the Government are taking to secure shipbuilding contracts from other countries for Scottish yards.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence (Guto Bebb)]

The national shipbuilding strategy seeks the long-term growth of UK shipbuilding, including Scottish yards. The Ministry of Defence works closely with industry and the Department for International Trade on export campaigns for platforms, sub-systems and support. We seek to build on our recent success in the Australian SEA 5000 competition—for example, through our Type 31e frigate programme, which considers exports from the outset.

[Deidre Brock]

Part of BAE Systems’s bid to win the order to build ships for the Australian navy was the promise that workers on the Clyde would have already ironed out any problems with the ships because they were being built for the Royal Navy first. Is it not the case that the expertise and craft of Clyde ship workers allow BAE to make huge profits by building those ships in Adelaide, but there will be no benefit for the Scottish yards at all? Is it not the case that Scotland’s shipbuilders have been sold down the river?

[Guto Bebb]

With supporters such as the hon. Lady, I shudder about the future of the Scottish shipbuilding sector. The yards on the Clyde will benefit immensely from this vote of confidence in their design capability. The supply chain will benefit immensely from opportunities that come from this contract, and other export opportunities are available for both the Type 26 and Type 31, which will be built in the United Kingdom. She speaks ill of her own constituency in Scotland with such a negative attitude.

Trident: Test Firing

Deidre Brock Excerpts

Monday 23rd January 2017 Commons Chamber

[Sir Michael Fallon]

I think that my hon. Friend is broadly correct about the number, but if I am wrong, I hope that he will allow me to write to him with the correct figure. The Government have every confidence in the Trident deterrent system. As I have said, we would not have brought the motion before the House if we had had any doubt about it.

[Deidre Brock (Edinburgh North and Leith) (SNP)]

Despite the Secretary of State’s refusal to clarify, it is commonly understood that the missile went the wrong way. I am no expert, but that strikes me as a major flaw; friendly fire with a nuclear weapon is not exactly what he might be looking for. Will he at least tell us whether the new Trident missiles will have better guidance systems?

[Sir Michael Fallon]

I am not able to confirm the speculation in which the hon. Lady is indulging regarding the route of the missile that was fired.

Oral Answers to Questions

Deidre Brock Excerpts

Monday 27th June 2016 Commons Chamber

[Penny Mordaunt]

My hon. and learned Friend affords me the opportunity to pay tribute to our armed forces who are training the Rwandan defence force as well as the African Union’s Eastern Africa Standby Force. The training that we are providing is there to help security sector reform and enhance their capabilities for peace operations and disaster relief.

[Deidre Brock (Edinburgh North and Leith) (SNP)]

T5. Following the questioning of Ministry of Defence officials at the Public Accounts Committee on infantry management, will the Minister tell us about the current state of the logistics commodities and services’ transformation programme? Is the super shed built, and how confident are the Government that the privatisation of logistics to support our armed services will not result in equipment shortages on the ground?

[The Minister for Defence Procurement (Mr Philip Dunne)]

I can confirm that the new MOD Donnington facility will be completed on schedule before the end of the year.