Media Green Paper

Chris Vince Excerpts

Tuesday 8th September 2026 Westminster Hall

[James Wild]

My right hon. Friend makes a powerful point about the licence fee and the independence that it provides.

Ministers need to focus on consumers and citizens. Platforms are built around personalisation, with individuals determining the sources of content they trust and want to access. User controls and labelling already exist. The Green Paper refers to misinformation and disinformation around the horrific Southport killings, in part to justify these proposals.

However, we should note that the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation said that the information released by authorities after those appalling attacks was inadequate and led to those who wanted to spread disinformation being able to do so. Police forces now share more information as a result. Furthermore, where there are major incidents, people tend to turn to more traditional news outlets, whether that is local papers, radio stations or public service media.

More broadly, Ofcom found that more than three quarters of people think it important to check different sources if they are unsure whether a news story is true. That provides some reassurance.

[Chris Vince (Harlow) (Lab/Co-op)]

I am quite concerned about the increasing use of AI-generated summaries online, which rely on what we call trusted sources. I appreciate the hon. Gentleman’s points about what defines a trusted source, and I am sure the Minister will answer all his important questions, but I am concerned that in future, if people become more reliant on AI summaries rather than on primary sources, those trusted sources might no longer exist. Does he recognise the importance of people not relying on AI summaries to get their news?

[James Wild]

Absolutely. The hon. Gentleman illustrates the point made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Maldon. We should be having more and much longer debates about precisely these issues. I hope the Minister will at least rule out any notion that to qualify for prominence, if such a scheme is put in place, a publisher would need to sign up to a state-approved regulator.

On the proposals for the digital switch-off from either 2034 or 2044, latest Barb data shows that 2.6 million households rely on terrestrial TV because they do not have broadband or internet-connected TV. However, usage is also declining; we have heard about the pressure that that puts on broadcasters using those channels to get to a declining level of households. For many of my constituents, including older people, people in low-income households, and those in rural and remote areas, Freeview remains essential. By 2034, according to the impact assessment in the Green Paper, 1.5 million households could still be reliant on traditional broadcast platforms.

There are serious challenges to be addressed, not least in respect of proper broadband access. The Government must therefore have answers and must have what the Secretary of State referred to as “watertight” plans. Any switch-off date should be treated as conditional, setting out the tests that need to be met and the support for all those who may otherwise be left behind. I call on the Minister to provide clarity on the timeline for the decision on switch-off, and a commitment that vulnerable and rural communities will not be left behind.

On the broader issue of the prominence of public service media content on video platforms, chapter 4 of the Green Paper states that the Government’s preference is that that be subject to “industry-led, voluntary agreements”. That must be the right approach. YouTube is already talking to public service providers on that basis, but there is no attempt in the Green Paper to qualify any legislative costs or impact should the Government go down that route. It is clear that transferring the concept from linear broadcast and prominence to that approach without imposing excessive costs will be challenging. In conclusion, the Green Paper focuses on a changing landscape and poses a series of fundamental questions that we need to spend more time considering.

Online Safety

Chris Vince Excerpts

Tuesday 8th September 2026 Commons Chamber

[Lisa Nandy]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. As a rule, I think this Government have taken that approach; we want to have a much closer relationship with our closest friends and neighbours across Europe and to repair some of the needless damage that was done to that relationship under previous Governments. When it comes to tech and what happens online, it is absolutely essential that we work with other like-minded countries in order to move in step, so I can certainly reassure him on that point.

[Chris Vince (Harlow) (Lab/Co-op)]

I welcome the Secretary of State’s statement. Unfortunately, young people and their parents in my constituency do not believe that the big tech companies are taking their responsibilities seriously. I speak to young people in schools across Harlow who are concerned that it is very easy to flout the age verification rules. In much the same way as it is a shop’s responsibility to ensure that no one under the age of 18 buys alcohol, can we make it very clear to the big tech companies that it is their responsibility to ensure that underage people cannot use their software and sites?

[Lisa Nandy]

I thank my hon. Friend for that point. I think the views of his constituents in Harlow are probably mirrored in every constituency across the country. I want to be really clear about our message today to parents who have been struggling with this matter for so long: you are not on your own. We believe that we are as responsible for keeping their children safe as they are, and we are stepping up to take the necessary action, whether that is through support, advice and training for parents and children, or through the reforms and measures that I have outlined today—we are the first country in the world to do so, and I strongly suspect that we will not be the last.

National Youth Strategy

Chris Vince Excerpts

Wednesday 8th July 2026 Westminster Hall

[Chris Vince (Harlow) (Lab/Co-op)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms McVey. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Huddersfield (Harpreet Uppal) for securing this really important debate. I also thank my two work experience students, Nicoleta and Lyra. They are both from Harlow and are in the Public Gallery today. They have prepared me a very thorough and informative briefing ahead of this debate, so my contribution might be slightly more informed than usual.

When I met with Nicoleta and Lyra before this debate, they spoke about their experiences of taking part in the Duke of Edinburgh’s scheme, which obviously celebrates its 70th anniversary this year. I want to read out some of their thoughts on the scheme and the difference that it made to them and their friends and peers. Nicoleta completed the Duke of Edinburgh’s bronze award while she was studying at Burnt Mill academy. She said:

“I would describe it as very insightful and gave me an opportunity to give back to community by mentoring primary school children as part of the volunteering section.”

Lyra completed the Duke of Edinburgh’s bronze award while she was at Stewards academy, which is also in Harlow. She said that

“taking part in a local theatre production as part of the skills section, was very insightful and ignited a new passion. As part of the volunteering being able to volunteer at Harlow Youth Council improved political interest and involvement with the town.”

I think we can all agree that that is admirable and fantastic.

I have a few points with regard to the national youth strategy. I welcome the publication of the first long-term youth strategy that we have had in over two decades. Following a lot of lobbying from me and others, I am really pleased that young carers were included in that strategy, because it is hugely important that groups like that are listened to and their voices are heard.

I emphasise to the Minister the huge importance of prevention rather than intervention, and of ensuring that every young person, regardless of their postcode, has the opportunity to be involved in the schemes that have been mentioned. We can all appreciate, as Members across the Chamber have commented, the huge difference that taking part in schemes like the Duke of Edinburgh’s scheme can make to young people’s confidence and their ability to be part of the community.

Finally—I know I am running out of time—I am really delighted that Harlow will be the home of a Young Futures hub funded by this Labour Government. I am also delighted that this Labour Government have an ambition to halve the enrichment participation gap between disadvantaged young people and their peers.

Media Green Paper

Chris Vince Excerpts

Wednesday 24th June 2026 Commons Chamber

[Mr Speaker]

We come to the birthday boy himself, Chris Vince.

[Chris Vince (Harlow) (Lab/Co-op)]

Thank you, Mr Speaker—21 again. I thank the Secretary of State for her response to this urgent question, and particularly for her emphasis on the importance online literacy, which, as a former teacher—Chris Vince bingo in full force today—I know to be really important. I pay tribute to Michael Casey, editor of Your Harlow, an online newspaper that prints tens of thousands of articles every year, and that filled the hole left by Harlow Star when it closed down.

I would like to build on the question from my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow South (Gordon McKee), who said that more and more people are using AI summaries to get their news, and are not relying on trusted sources. Is there not a danger that if we, and the AI companies, do not provide support to trusted sources, they will not be able to continue?

Oral Answers to Questions

Chris Vince Excerpts

Thursday 18th June 2026 Commons Chamber

[Lisa Nandy]

I am very happy to confirm that the bursaries will continue in the 2026-27 academic year, and we have been able to increase the amount of funding available, which is a recognition of the cost pressures that families face. I very much agree with the hon. Member that bursaries are absolutely essential, which is why we have protected them even in these difficult financial circumstances. However, she will recognise the difficult circumstances we inherited from the previous Government. We have done our best to protect such things, and in the case of music and dance, we have been able to uplift the funding available.

[Chris Vince (Harlow) (Lab/Co-op)]

Will the Secretary of State join me in congratulating Sam Ashford and the Livewire theatre in Harlow on 25 years of supporting young people into music, dance and the theatre with its hard-hitting shows? I pay particular tribute to the work it did to support young people remotely during covid.

[Lisa Nandy]

Of course, I will. I appreciate the efforts that my hon. Friend puts in not just to ensure that Harlow is referenced in this Chamber at every opportunity, but, sincerely, to change the lives of young people in Harlow and across the whole country. He really is one of the best champions for young people in this House.

--- Later in debate ---

[Marsha De Cordova]

I thank my hon. Friend for his question and note all his work in this area; he is a true champion for disabled people, especially since coming to this place. The opening of the Changing Places toilet in St Paul’s is incredibly welcome and, as he points out, it will open up access to that historic space for many people to enjoy. I am pleased to say that places like Blackburn cathedral already have such a facility, and Lambeth Palace, just over the river, is also soon to open a new space. I encourage all hon. Members to contact their local churches to encourage them to look into the disability project and to apply for the parish accessibility fund, so that they can improve their welcome to all their communities.

[Chris Vince (Harlow) (Lab/Co-op)]

4. What steps the Church of England is taking to help support families with the cost of living.

[Marsha De Cordova]

The Church delivers community projects across the country to support individuals and families with the cost of living. These programmes offer practical support, companionship and advice to those facing hardship, demonstrating the Church’s ongoing commitment to serving and standing with all our communities nationwide.

[Chris Vince]

I want to pay tribute to three fantastic women in Harlow: Caroline Hatton, Alison Taylor and, in particular, the Rev. Jokey Poyntz at my local church, St Mary’s in Little Parndon, who for many years has run a church furniture fund—she has got me to move the odd sofa—providing furniture to those in need across our town. What work are the Church Commissioners doing to recognise the work of local churches, like St Mary’s in Little Parndon, and to learn from that good practice?

[Marsha De Cordova]

I join my hon. Friend in noting the incredible work in his constituency and the work of Rev. Jokey at both St Paul’s and St Mary’s churches. I believe that St Paul’s runs the Bounty café, in association with the Harlow food bank.

[Chris Vince]

indicated assent.

[Marsha De Cordova]

Wonderful! That café offers low-cost refreshments and light lunches at an affordable cost. My hon. Friend’s constituency really is a fantastic example of community support in the Church, and I know what a champion of that work he is. I encourage Members across the House, if they have not already done so, to make contact with their local churches to see the work they are doing in their community and their huge impact locally.

Sir David Attenborough: Permanent National Monument

Chris Vince Excerpts

Tuesday 9th June 2026 Westminster Hall

[Chris Vince (Harlow) (Lab/Co-op)]

My hon. Friend will be aware that David Attenborough’s brother Richard sadly passed away in 2014. I just wanted to share the last tweet that Lord Richard Attenborough put out on Twitter. He said he was very proud of his little brother, after David Attenborough received his BAFTA. I am sure that Richard Attenborough would have been very proud that my hon. Friend is having a debate about his little brother today.

[Johanna Baxter]

I thank my hon. Friend for his kind words.

Sir David is not just an incredible broadcaster with a passion for nature; he is an architect who shaped the landscape of British broadcasting. As the controller of BBC Two, he oversaw the introduction of colour television to the UK, beating continental Europe to the airwaves.

His eye for innovation even changed global sport. It was Sir David who noticed that traditional white tennis balls were nearly impossible for viewers to track on early colour television screens during broadcasts from Wimbledon. He personally intervened and championed the introduction of the optic yellow tennis balls that are used worldwide today. His embrace of technological advances led to him being the only person ever to win BAFTA awards for programmes across black and white, colour, high-definition, 3D and 4K television. From “The Blue Planet” and “Life on Earth” to “Galapagos” and “Frozen Planet”—I am sure everybody here today could name their favourite—each landmark production pushed human ingenuity forward.

Within the scientific community, one of the greatest compliments a person can receive is to have a species named after them. It is extraordinary, then, to think that Sir David has had over 50 species named in his honour, reflecting a staggering range of biodiversity. They range from the Euptychia attenboroughi, a black-eyed satyr butterfly found in the tropical Amazon, to the Platysaurus attenboroughi, a flat lizard native to southern Africa. Sir David is also one of very few people to have been knighted twice.

UK Biobank Data

Chris Vince Excerpts

Thursday 23rd April 2026 Commons Chamber

[Ian Murray]

Yes, I can give that assurance. This Government are giving UK Biobank all the support that it requires to resolve the immediate issue and in the short term to get the system back up and running in as secure a way as possible. Let me echo that participants in UK Biobank have done a great service to the people of this country and around the world. We owe it to them to be transparent and secure, and to ensure that their data is not only safe but advancing UK and worldwide medical research for the benefit of everyone.

[Chris Vince (Harlow) (Lab/Co-op)]

I will not mention Harlow Town, I promise. [Laughter.]

May I thank the Minister for his statement? I agree with others that UK Biobank is an excellent resource, and I have no doubt that its research has made a huge difference to the health of my constituents. Although this issue is not specifically a cyber-security breach, as he correctly said, will he join me in welcoming the Government’s Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill? Along with the hon. and gallant Member for Spelthorne (Lincoln Jopp), I had the pleasure of serving on the Bill Committee. Will the Minister add to the work that this Government are doing to ensure that our data across all industries, including the charity sector and Government, is safe under this Government?

[Ian Murray]

In a previous question, my hon. Friend said that Harlow Town were the Man City of non-league football. May I simply suggest that he is the Man City of speaking in this Chamber in terms of the quality and regularity of his contributions? That may be challenged by the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon)—let us look at the data.

I echo what my hon. Friend said in his question, because it is really important for us to impress on the public that data is secure and safe. This Government take that incredibly seriously, not just in the legislation being passed, which he has been a part of, but in the cyber-security tools available for free from this Government to businesses, organisations and institutions right across the country. We wrote to those organisations last week to inform them that those tools were available, and I continue to echo to all businesses, institutions and organisations that they should get involved in ensuring that they are as cyber-secure as possible. We are only as secure as the weakest, and we all have to be as secure as we possibly can be.

Oral Answers to Questions

Chris Vince Excerpts

Thursday 15th January 2026 Commons Chamber

[Stephanie Peacock]

We are working with sporting bodies to make sure they get this right.

[Chris Vince (Harlow) (Lab/Co-op)]

8. What steps she is taking with Cabinet colleagues to help improve outcomes for young people.

[The Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport (Lisa Nandy)]

Last month, we published our ground- breaking youth strategy, “Youth Matters”, the first cross-Government strategy for young people in England for over 15 years, to ensure that every young person has somewhere to go, someone who cares and something to do. We are determined, as we breathe life into that strategy, to ensure it continues to be driven by young people across the country. I look forward to working with him to ensure that becomes a reality.

[Chris Vince]

I am in my usual place, you may notice, Madam Deputy Speaker.

I thank the Secretary of State for her work on this really important youth strategy. How can young people in my constituency of Harlow be empowered to take part in the youth strategy? She will be aware that I am the chair of the all-party parliamentary group for young carers and young adult carers. Specifically, how has she worked to engage hard-to-reach groups, such as young carers, to be part of the strategy?

[Lisa Nandy]

From the outset, we were absolutely determined that the strategy would reflect all young people. It was a delight to do a workshop with young carers as part of the development of the youth strategy to ensure that their needs and concerns were met. I really do look forward to working with my hon. Friend to help ensure we empower young people. The key way in which we are doing that as a Department, as we roll out the national youth strategy, is to ensure we only fund organisations that put young people in the driving seat of decisions about how that money is spent.

Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill

Chris Vince Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 6th January 2026 Commons Chamber

[The Minister for Digital Government and Data (Ian Murray)]

I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time.

A happy new year to you, Mr Speaker, and to all the House staff. This is the first opportunity I have had to say that to you.

On 3 June 2024, a busy Monday morning in south-east London, criminals attacked Synnovis, an organisation that processes blood tests on behalf of our national health service. They did not turn up physically, but logged on to computers thousands of miles away and set off ransomware—malicious software that encrypts files from afar, making them unusable. The attack had a ripple effect across London hospitals. It delayed 11,000 appointments, blood transfusions had to be suspended and the company lost tens of millions of pounds.

This was not an isolated case. In the year leading up to September 2025, the National Cyber Security Centre dealt with 204 “nationally significant” incidents, meaning that they seriously disrupted central Government or our critical public services. That is more than double the 89 incidents in 2024. No one disputes that we must do everything we can to protect the UK from these attacks. The UK is the most targeted country by cyber-attacks in Europe, and it was the fifth most targeted nation in 2024 by nation state-affiliated threat actors. In 2024, it is estimated that UK businesses experienced over 8.5 million cyber-crimes in the 12 months preceding the survey, and that in that year more than four in 10, or 43%, of UK businesses were subject to a cyber-attack, affecting more than 600,000 businesses in total.

Significantly, cyber-attacks are estimated to cost UK businesses almost £15 billion each year, equivalent to 0.5% of the UK’s annual GDP, notwithstanding the wider economic effects of intellectual property theft or the experience of patients, as in the first example. The average cost of a significant cyber-attack for an individual business in the United Kingdom is estimated to be just over £190,000. There has been a 200% increase in global cyber-attacks on rail systems in the past five years, increasing the likelihood of severe disruption to the economy and to people’s daily lives.

[Chris Vince (Harlow) (Lab/Co-op)]

Does the Minister agree that, as we become more and more reliant on IT systems—I am thinking in particular about the new patient registration system at the Princess Alexandra hospital in my constituency—it is more and more important that we combat potential cyber-attacks, particularly from foreign powers and enemies of this country? That is why the Bill is so crucial.

[Ian Murray]

I could not agree more. I gave the example of the Synnovis incident that brought blood transfusions in London to a halt, affecting thousands of patients. Our everyday lives are affected by this. As we modernise and digitise our economy and our Government, we have to ensure that our systems are as secure as possible, and cyber-security is right at the heart of that. This is not just a defensive issue; it is very much an economic growth issue as well, as we can see from the impact it has on our economy, our public services and the day-to-day lives of people, as in the example of our train systems that I just mentioned.

--- Later in debate ---

[Ian Murray]

This is about making sure that we extend the scope of the 2018 regulations into other parts of the economy, and I will come on to that later in my contribution. It is about reporting things more quickly to ensure that the attacks can be seen and action can be taken more quickly. It is also about reporting to the regulators to give the regulators confidence and powers across a wider scope of sectors in the economy, and to give businesses the confidence that those sectors have to report to the regulators when things are going wrong so that swifter action can be taken. We can see from the host of recent high-profile issues, including at Hackney council, that it is important to ensure that this legislation goes through quickly and does the job that it is intended to do.

[Chris Vince]

I thank the Minister for giving way; I apologise for intervening again. Is there a piece of work we need to do on culture? When businesses or the public sector are victims of cyber-crime, there is a danger that employees may feel embarrassed or nervous about reporting their concerns. We need to encourage people if they are victims of cyber-crime to come forward quicker and to recognise the challenges, rather than trying to hide them away and the issue becoming worse.

[Ian Murray]

While physical security and national security are issues for all of us, so is cyber-security. The Bill builds on the 2018 regulations to widen the scope into other areas of the economy where such issues have become much more prevalent—for example, data centres. I hope that doing so will give industries and sectors, including their employees, the confidence to report things to the regulators. Giving powers to the regulators will give businesses the confidence that they can report stuff; it is not a regulatory heavy hand dampening businesses. I hope that I can assure my hon. Friend and the rest of the House on that.

Before that significant number of interventions, I was talking about why this issue matters and gave statistics for recent cyber-security activity in the United Kingdom. As a result of all that, one of the very first things we did as a new Government after the election was announce this new cyber-security Bill, just 10 working days in. Since then, the Department has been talking to cyber experts, businesses and regulators to turn these proposals into the comprehensive, serious and proportionate piece of legislation that we present for Second Reading today—one that protects the public and strengthens national security without placing undue burdens on businesses. I appreciate that that is a fine balance, but I think that this Bill finds that balance, so I am confident that the whole House will support it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Julia Lopez (Hornchurch and Upminster) (Con)]

Happy new year, Mr Speaker, and thank you for putting the heating on. I am grateful to the Minister for setting out the Government’s rationale for this legislation in the Secretary of State’s stead. I do not know why the Minister was demoted either, but I want him to know that we appreciate him.

The official Opposition recognise the scale of the cyber-security challenge that the country faces. If the pandemic accelerated the adoption of digital technology at a pace we had never before seen, then the advent of artificial intelligence will embed that technology into our economy in wholly new ways that bring not only opportunity but unprecedented risk. AI and automation will not only transform productivity but equip hostile states, criminal gangs and opportunists alike with tools capable of eroding our national defences at speed and at scale. It is right that Parliament legislates to raise the collective security bar. We on the Conservative Benches support that principle. However, legislation of this kind does not come around often. Cyber law takes time to develop, and once the Bill passes, it is unlikely that Parliament will return to this territory for some years. That means that we must ask two simple but very serious questions today: will this law work and is it enough?

Before we answer those questions, it is worth reminding ourselves of the real-world consequences of failure. Cyber risk is neither abstract nor theoretical. Last year, the UK experienced what is widely regarded as our most economically damaging cyber-incident to date when Jaguar Land Rover suffered a major attack. That was not a sophisticated act of cyber-warfare against the state—although such acts are happening with increasing regularity—but was carried out by a band of hackers. The consequences were enormous, however. For five weeks, Jaguar Land Rover was unable to operate its automated manufacturing lines, cyber-related costs mounted to nearly £200 million, and national economic output was visibly affected in that month alone. The real damage did not stop at the factory gates: hundreds of small and medium-sized enterprises in the supply chain—many of them operating on thin margins—were pushed to the brink, workers faced uncertainty and contractors had their work paused.

Ultimately, the Government had to step in with a £1.5 billion loan guarantee to prevent wider economic fallout. When we consider the Bill, we must ask whether it would do anything to strengthen our collective resilience. That is one of the tests that this legislation ought to meet, and it is not yet clear that it does. Indeed, the attack on JLR would not have been stopped, as the Minister himself has made clear, because it would not have been in scope.

The cyber-threat landscape is evolving at an extraordinary pace. New research shows that cyber-attacks now cost our economy nearly £15 billion every year. High-profile breaches of businesses such as Marks and Spencer and the Co-op have demonstrated how quickly consumer confidence, jobs and supply chains can be put at risk. Last year alone, insurers paid out £197 million to help businesses recover from cyber-incidents. In fact, the collective cyber insurance bill of the FTSE 100 is now larger than the defence research and development budget. The Bill seeks to respond to one aspect of that reality by expanding the scope of regulation. Data centres, managed service providers, load controllers and designated critical suppliers will now fall within its ambit. That is a welcome acknowledgment that digitisation has introduced systemic risks that the original NIS regulations of 2018 did not adequately cover.

The Bill also strengthens the powers of regulators, introduces cost recovery mechanisms and tightens incident reporting requirements. Those measures are intended to modernise our cyber framework and address clear shortcomings identified in reviews of the NIS regime in 2020 and 2022. On paper, that all sounds sensible, but intent alone is not enough, which brings me back to our central concern: whether this law will work in practice in raising the standard of our collective resilience. The uncomfortable truth is that, in some of the most high-profile cases of cyber-attack, the penetration of systems was carried out by attackers using valid credentials. That means systems behaved normally. The breaches looked like legitimate access until it was too late. Human frailties were exploited: help desks were persuaded to reset passwords, and staff and contractors were impersonated. This Bill would help mainly after an attack—not before—by mandating reporting, improving intelligence sharing and increasing accountability.

[Chris Vince]

This is a friendly intervention, as I always like to get a bit of cross-party agreement where possible. I mentioned to the Minister the importance of changing the culture among employees to ensure that they feel confident about reporting cyber-attacks. Does the shadow Secretary of State agree with that?

[Julia Lopez]

Absolutely. The hon. Gentleman is correct: this is fundamentally about culture—that is the point that I am making. We can pass as many regulations as we like, but a lot of the holes in our cyber-security systems come down to human frailties. That means this challenge is not just about new laws but about changing a number of things to make us more resilient.

It is right not to dictate technical standards in primary law that will soon be outdated in the fast-moving world of technology, so the question is whether this law has the right mix of carrot and stick to make affected firms act in a way that raises the security bar—there are several areas where we fear it may not.

First, there is potentially an enforcement paradox. The Bill expands regulatory powers and increases the scale of potential fines, but the evidence from the existing regime does not suggest definitively that fines and new regulations deliver us greater cyber-resilience. Under the current NIS regulations, enforcement has been slow, inconsistent and often toothless. Very few significant penalties have been issued. Where they have been issued, the delay between incident and sanction has sometimes stretched beyond two years. That delay matters, because it actively undermines deterrence and disconnects accountability from operational reality. Simply widening the scope of regulation without ensuring that regulators are properly resourced, empowered and required to act quickly risks creating obligations that exist on paper but lack any real-world bite.

We also have concerns about the Bill’s cost recovery model. Funding regulators through levies on the organisations that they oversee risks unintended consequences in terms of improving our resilience. For large firms, the cost burden may be manageable, but for smaller enterprises it amounts to an additional operational tax that could divert scarce capital away from cyber-defence, staff training and innovation.

There is also a structural risk here. Regulators that are reliant on fee income might face incentives to expand scope and complexity unnecessarily, creating bureaucratic drag that crowds out voluntary, market-led initiatives, which often raise standards more effectively than prescriptive regulation.

More generally, I worry that this Bill will play into tech monopolies. The companies that thrive in this kind of environment are those with big compliance and legal departments. That concentrates risk and makes our tech economy less diverse, with serious implications that I shall come on to.

There may be reporting challenges too. A two-stage reporting process within 24 and 72 hours may be achievable for large, well-resourced organisations with in-house cyber teams, but for smaller operators it risks creating a compliance culture focused on speed, not substance.

There is also the danger of duplication. Many organisations already face overlapping reporting obligations under UK GDPR, sectoral rules and existing legislation. Without simplification and proportionality, the administrative load could be significant, once again diverting attention and resource from the very cyber-threat management that the Bill seeks to improve. We need to avoid this legislation becoming a “something must be done” Bill that totally misses the mark.

The Bill also fails to grapple properly with the human factor in cyber-security, which has already been talked about by the hon. Member for Harlow (Chris Vince). Technology alone does not keep organisations safe; governance matters. Yet board-level ownership of cyber-risk is moving in the wrong direction. Only 27% of businesses now have a board member explicitly responsible for cyber-security, down from 38% just three years ago. Without mechanisms to ensure senior accountability, fines risk becoming little more than a cost of doing business. Directors remain insulated while operational teams are left to carry the can. National cyber-resilience depends not just on systems and software, but on leadership, culture and accountability at the very top.

For those reasons, ahead of Committee consideration, we on the Opposition Benches are examining how the legislation can be strengthened, while continuing to support its core objectives. In the meantime, regulators must be properly equipped with the right powers, resources and clarity from Parliament on the intent of the law. Sanctions must be applied swiftly and consistently, and guidance must be clear, so that enforcement is credible and deterrence is real.

The Government should also look at how reporting obligations are calibrated. A one-size-fits-all approach might place disproportionate burdens on smaller firms, and it might be better to ensure that reporting thresholds reflect the size, complexity and risk profile of an organisation.

Equally, the funding of regulators must be transparent and predictable. There have to be safeguards against regulatory expansion for its own sake and firm assurances that funds raised are reinvested directly into improving national cyber-resilience, not absorbed by administrative overheads. While the Bill rightly prioritises critical national infrastructure, it cannot afford to ignore high-risk sectors that sit beyond its immediate scope.

There is also a major role for market-based solutions. Cyber insurance, sector-wide intelligence sharing and collaborative resilience initiatives can all complement regulation. These tools can reduce risk and improve preparedness without adding unnecessary legislative complexity.

The review cycle set out in the Bill may be too slow for the threat landscape we face and the pace of technological change. Annual or biannual reviews might allow Parliament to scrutinise effectiveness, respond to emerging threats and ensure that the legislation remains fit for purpose.

Let me make some more general points about the Government’s approach to cyber-security and resilience, and issues about the risk of dependence and threat from adversaries. I see no evidence from this Government that they are thinking with any clarity about the risks of long-term technological dependency and lock-in—quite the opposite, in fact. Large parts of our economy now depend on secure, high-quality digital infrastructure, and that reliance will only increase as AI advances. Whoever provides that infrastructure will wield huge future leverage. It was that reality that ultimately drove the change of heart over Chinese tech sitting at the core of our 5G telecom networks a few years ago.

However, the Government are seemingly betting every chip on US hyper-scalers. They provide our data centres, supply the platforms on which Government Departments are run and, more often than not, are the ones winning all the Government contracts. These investments will provide our companies with things that they need, from compute power to increasingly sophisticated AI platforms, but the UK is doing little simultaneously to mitigate our increased technological dependency. When I say “technological”, we need to understand that technology is what we now run our defence systems, factories, energy networks and communications on. Technology is the plumbing of our nation.

During September’s much crowed-about state visit by President Trump, this Government were visibly begging for good economic headlines after the humiliating resignations of the Deputy Prime Minister and the ambassador to the US, not to mention the uncontainable mess of the Chancellor’s first Budget and the threat of her second Budget. The US-UK tech partnership was the result, with a huge amount of smoke and mirrors deployed over what it actually contained. Whatever substance lay within it, we heard just before Christmas that it had been paused, used as leverage by the US while other trade negotiations were under way.

I am not criticising the US Administration for skilfully playing their hand in their national interest; I am asking this Government rapidly to wake up to the reality of a new world in which the post-war settlement is coming to an end—one that has been giving clues to its existence for many years, since long before President Trump came into office. The United States remains a vital ally, but in this new era Britain must be very clear-eyed about risk, the reality of hard power and the need to protect our sovereign interests.

Cyber-risk requires as much thought about the fundamentals of plumbing as it does about the laws that try to manage how humans use or exploit technology. The UK Government have a vast procurement budget for which our own firms ought to be able to make a successful bid, but UK tech tells me consistently that, for all the talk in the Government’s AI strategy of sovereign tech capability, it has not got a look-in since Labour has been in power. I am concerned that this Bill should not introduce new, burdensome regulation for UK firms in a way that benefits non-UK incumbents with giant compliance teams and legal resources in a way that would exacerbate the risk of vendor lock-in.

Let us turn to another risk. The private sector will have noticed that the new obligations in this Bill broadly do not touch the public sector, where cyber-risk remains red-light-flashingly large, notwithstanding the public cyber strategy that was thrown out today in implicit acknowledgment of that gaping hole. Knowing that the public sector holds such enormous cyber-risk, this Labour Government choose not to minimise it, but to create a brand-new one—a hulking great identity system mandated for anyone who wants a job and, we now hear, possibly for new-born babies. It is mandatory identity by stealth, not consent, and with no honesty about it.

It is not to be against the ability of people to verify themselves digitally for banking, to access certain online services or to stop fraud to think that Labour’s mandated digital identity plan is a complete rotter. The Association of Digital Verification Professionals called what Labour inherited on digital identity a

“world-leading model for data sovereignty that digitised liberty rather than diluted it”.

The citizen, not Government, would be in control. This naive Government are crowding out private sector expertise and making everyone have one of these identities by stealth. They have no idea what this system will cost, and they will not be honest about what it will be used for.

What of the cyber-security of this system? The system on which this digital identity will be run was breached during red team testing last year. When I asked the Secretary of State if that system has now met the National Cyber Security Centre’s cyber-security standard, no answers came. Whistleblowers have continued to speak out about the vulnerabilities of the system, and there is no sense whatsoever from Government that the dodgy digital identity plan will be paused until such a point when they are confident about cyber-security.

Oral Answers to Questions

Chris Vince Excerpts

Thursday 3rd July 2025 Commons Chamber

The hon. Member for Battersea, representing the Church Commissioners, was asked—

[Chris Vince (Harlow) (Lab/Co-op)]

2. What steps the Church of England is taking to support people on low incomes in rural communities.

[The Second Church Estates Commissioner (Marsha De Cordova)]

Our most recent figures show that the Church of England was involved in more than 31,000 community projects across the country, including in my hon. Friend’s constituency of Harlow. In addition, funding for churches in the lowest income communities is set to increase from £91 million in the past three years to £133.5 million.

[Chris Vince]

In the local authority of Harlow, 30% of children are living in poverty, according to research by Loughborough University and the End Child Poverty coalition. Poverty also exists in rural areas of my constituency, such as Sheering and Nazeing. Many families turn to their local place of worship for support. Luckily, Harlow has several places of worship of different faiths and denominations offering help. Can my hon. Friend say a little more about what the Church is doing in the area to support families struggling with the cost of living?

[Marsha De Cordova]

My hon. Friend is a good representative for the people of Harlow. In his constituency, St Mary Magdalene church runs a vibrant Sunday school and mothers’ union, with lots of events and activities for all the community. St Stephen’s church runs a parent and toddler group while also supporting local care homes. St Paul’s and St Mary’s churches partner with the local food bank and run a Bounty club with the Michael Roberts Charitable Trust, offering good, healthy food at a low cost.