Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse

Chris Murray Excerpts

Thursday 16th January 2025 Commons Chamber

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Ms Nusrat Ghani)]

I appreciate that this is a very sensitive subject, but if the questions are long and the answers are just as long, we will get very few people in. Chris Murray, show us how it is done.

[Chris Murray (Edinburgh East and Musselburgh) (Lab)]

Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker. In her report, Alexis Jay notes that one in 20 boys and one in six girls in the United Kingdom is estimated to be a victim of sexual abuse. We have had scandal after scandal of grooming in care homes, councils, schools and churches for decades. I welcome the appointment of Baroness Casey on the rapid review into grooming, and welcome that it will be rapid, because these victims deserve justice.

It is unbelievable to my mind that grooming is not an aggravating factor in the sentencing of child sexual offenders. Will the Home Secretary restate her commitment to making it an aggravating factor, and commit to that being done quickly and by force, so that child sexual offenders are properly punished by the law?

[Yvette Cooper]

My hon. Friend is right. The inquiry identified that half a million children are victims of sexual abuse every year. The majority of cases are, sadly, within the family—a betrayal by those from whom children should be able to expect protection. However, as he said, there have also been huge betrayals in residential homes and other institutions, including faith institutions—the Church of England and the Catholic Church—as well as wider grooming online and on the streets as part of these terrible crimes. So yes, we will change the law, strengthen sentencing and make grooming an aggravating factor, because the punishment should fit this terrible crime.

Oral Answers to Questions

Chris Murray Excerpts

Monday 13th January 2025 Commons Chamber

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Because of the size of the backlog we inherited from the Conservative party and an asylum system in chaos, with tens of thousands of people in limbo and very little processing happening, the problem cannot be solved overnight. However, we are working very hard to close hotels. I just gave the hon. Gentleman the figures: nine more hotels are scheduled to close by the end of March, and there has been a net increase of six, so by the end March there will be fewer.

[Chris Murray (Edinburgh East and Musselburgh) (Lab)]

The previous Government wasted a scandalous amount of public money on asylum accommodation. For example, in Northeye, they paid double what the previous owners had paid, without checking that the building did not have asbestos and contaminated ground, and it could not be used. Will the Minister commit to being more effective in providing value for public money, to ensure that taxpayers’ money is not wasted as we fix the asylum backlog?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I certainly will. We should also remember the £60 million the Conservative party wasted on RAF Scampton and the £15 million on a derelict, asbestos-ridden former prison in Bexhill. We will not take any lessons from Conservative Members about value for money in Government expenditure.

Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse

Chris Murray Excerpts

Monday 6th January 2025 Commons Chamber

[Chris Murray (Edinburgh East and Musselburgh) (Lab)]

The focus of this debate should not be on the politics, on what is in the newspapers or on what is on social media; it should be on the children themselves. For four years before coming to the House, I worked on preventing trafficking, especially the trafficking of child victims around the country for sex. The stories that I heard would chill your bones, especially the stories of those who sought protection from the authorities but ended up back in the hands of their traffickers.

There is so much more that we could do for those children. I know that not just from my own experience but because it is there in black and white, in the findings of the inquiries. We have 2 million pages of evidence and 700 witnesses, and zero recommendations have been implemented. Will the Home Secretary commit to putting safeguarding first rather than putting politics first, as people are so transparently trying to do, and implement the findings as quickly as possible?

[Yvette Cooper]

I welcome the work my hon. Friend has done in this policy area. He is right to talk about young people and children being trafficked around the country. There is some concerning evidence that, for example, although work has been done to identify people being trafficked through county lines—often boys and young men—it has not sufficiently identified the young women and teenage girls who are being trafficked around for sexual exploitation. We need to ensure that improvements are made in that regard.

United Front Work Department

Chris Murray Excerpts

Monday 16th December 2024 Commons Chamber

[Dan Jarvis]

Let me first come to the point the right hon. Gentleman made about FIRS. Upon our arrival in government, we found that FIRS was not ready to be implemented, as has been claimed. Since coming into office, we have ensured that more people than ever are now working on FIRS implementation, and the case management team have been recruited and are now in place. As I said in my opening remarks, we plan to lay the regulations that underpin the scheme in the new year, ahead of the scheme going live in the summer. As we have previously committed, we will provide three months’ notice of the scheme’s go-live date to give all those who will be affected by it adequate time to prepare.

The scheme will be underpinned by an IT solution consisting of a registration platform, a case management system and an online public register. The IT programme developed under the previous Government was not ready for the scheme to go live, and plans were not sufficiently robust. This Government have progressed at pace with the work to ensure that we are in a position to launch FIRS, with the laying of the regulations in the new year with a view to the scheme going live in the summer. Work is also under way to identify which foreign powers will be placed on the enhanced tier. That will be based on robust security and intelligence analysis. The Home Secretary and I plan to begin setting out the Government’s approach for the use of the enhanced tier in due course.

[Chris Murray (Edinburgh East and Musselburgh) (Lab)]

The first duty of Government is national security, and the threat that the country faces is the most complex and evolving we have ever seen. Given the range of threats we face from hostile state actors, it is important that the Government take action to protect our critical national infrastructure from cyber-attacks and ransomware attacks. Can the Minister update us on the plans announced in the King’s Speech for a new Bill on cyber-resilience and other actions to improve protections in this area?

[Dan Jarvis]

My hon. Friend makes an important point. We are working at pace with colleagues across Government, including in the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, to progress these matters. There is a lot of work going on across Government to ensure that we are as resilient as we can possibly be to the threats we face from a range of actors. He can be assured, as can the House, that this Government will use all necessary measures to protect our security and ensure that our critical national infrastructure is as resilient as it possibly can be.

Border Security: Collaboration

Chris Murray Excerpts

Wednesday 11th December 2024 Commons Chamber

[Yvette Cooper]

The hon. Member raised asylum claims from Syria. This is something we discussed in the Calais group, and all five countries are taking the same approach of recognising that we cannot currently take decisions. We clearly want to be able to do so as swiftly as possible, but we need to monitor the situation in Syria in the meantime.

The hon. Member raised the importance of other partnership working, including with Europol and Eurojust, and I agree with her on the importance of that. One of the things we agreed, first with Germany and then as part of the Calais group discussions at which Europol was also present, is that we were keen either to establish a new Europol taskforce or to expand one of the existing taskforces to look at the end-to-end smuggler route and its supply chains, and particularly to work with the Kurdish authorities and the Iraqi Government on the end-to-end route involving the Iraqi Kurdish criminal smuggler gangs. All those involved, including the Iraqi Government, are keen to work with us on that, but we need that Europol taskforce in place in order to be able to do that.

On asylum decision making, we are increasing the caseworkers in post and we have substantially increased the pace of decisions. Decision making had plummeted by about 70% just before the election, but we now have the extra caseworkers in place and we have got decisions back up to where they were. That allows us to clear the backlog on initial decisions. Finally, I agree with the hon. Member that we need to continue to work on the source issues, and we are working closely with the Foreign Office on that.

[Chris Murray (Edinburgh East and Musselburgh) (Lab)]

I spent 15 years working on migration before I came into this House, including three years as the home affairs attaché in Paris, where I saw at first hand how the kind of instruments and data sharing the Home Secretary is describing can make a concrete difference in the fight against immigration crime. I also saw that, as the previous Government pulled the UK out of these instruments, it made our job as officials harder. I could not welcome the Home Secretary’s statement more. Immigration is an international phenomenon and, by definition, tackling immigration crime requires international co-operation. Can she tell us a bit more about the steps she has taken to build the relationships with these key European allies? Will she also commit to keeping her foot to the floor on this issue? In my experience, these relationships can so easily be cut, and but to bear fruit they take time and political will.

[Yvette Cooper]

My hon. Friend has considerable experience in these issues, and I thank him for all his work on this. He is right to say that, with something as basic as the right kind of information and intelligence sharing, if the systems are removed and no new systems are put in place, basic operational actions simply do not happen, whether they involve going after the criminal gangs or preventing dangerous boat crossings and criminal activities. This is as basic as making sure that we now have much stronger systems, including using the Europol secure information exchange network application—SIENA—system, so that when the German police get information from the National Crime Agency, it is in a form that they can swiftly use to pursue investigations and prosecutions. My hon. Friend is right. We have to make sure that the detail works, which has often not been taken seriously for far too long.

Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill

Chris Murray Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 9th December 2024 Commons Chamber

[Chris Murray (Edinburgh East and Musselburgh) (Lab)]

The Bill’s provisions are appropriate for venues below the enhanced tier. They are proportionate, low-cost and not onerous. They are prompts to encourage organisations to do the kind of thinking that they should do anyway to prevent terrorism or any kinds of attack. The measures are not disproportionate at all, and the legislation is appropriate in that respect.

[Matt Vickers]

I understand where the hon. Gentleman is coming from. An existing regulatory body is being given an additional job; there is no harm in coming back after 18 months to review whether the provisions are working and are fit for purpose. Similarly, there is logic in the House having a say on the fees and penalties that might be applied, rather than that being delegated to the Secretary of State. Those logical changes could relieve some of the anxiety in the sector. Everyone wants the Bill to go forward and fulfil its objective of making our communities safer, but some of the anxieties in the sector about unexpected and unintended consequences for community venues and small businesses are real, so let us relieve some of them by agreeing the amendments.

--- Later in debate ---

[Paul Holmes]

I would like to say that I have given that great thought, but as hon. Members across the House will know, after we came back in July, my tenure as a shadow Home Affairs Minister was rather short—[Interruption.] I thank the Minister, who said, “Shame”. That was after being shadow Northern Ireland Minister, shadow Foreign Affairs Minister and other Ministers, too. But I took this piece of legislation very seriously. The Government should make that decision, but I hope that the SIA is properly resourced and that it conducts its duties in the right way. That is why I think new clause 1 should be accepted this evening.

I do not want to overstay my welcome, but I will speak briefly about one of the concerns that I raised on Second Reading about the responsible person element of the Bill. I remain seriously concerned about this, and it was also mentioned by my hon. Friend the Member for Bridgwater (Sir Ashley Fox). Although I accept the scope of the Bill and the impact that it will have on the statute book, many organisations, particularly during cost of living crises and at this time of year, rely on their volunteers, and if we place undue and burdensome regulations on them, volunteers will simply not come forward and be in the voluntary sector. Charities are going through a difficult time. I remain concerned that if we tip slightly too much towards being overburdensome on those very small organisations, we will see a dearth of people in the voluntary sector. No one wants to discourage people from volunteering—we do not, and I know the shadow Minister and the Minister do not—but I worry that the thresholds set out in the Bill will have unintended consequences. I ask the Minister to look seriously at new clause 1 and amendments 25 and 26, which were tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Rutland and Stamford.

Many will be happy to know that I am drawing my comments to a close. However, I am personally delighted that this Bill is before the House in record time, five months after the Government came into office. I hope that the Minister will see that the Opposition are working, and will continue to work, in a constructive way to get this on to the statute book. It is sad that, in order to have a relatively major piece of legislation changed so rapidly, we had to go through the atrocities that we saw in Manchester and terrorist attacks around the United Kingdom. However, I know that the legacy that Martyn leaves is one that his family will be greatly proud of, as this country should be. This is a mainstream, major piece of legislation, and I hope that by working together, we will ensure that people who go to venues for many years to come will be protected, and they will be protected in Martyn’s name.

[Chris Murray]

I welcome the fact that the discussion in the House today shows real cross-party support for the aims, principles and objectives of the Bill, and that the amendments focus only on nuances and more technical aspects. That shows that we are all united in trying to achieve this goal and in preventing tragedies such as that which happened in Manchester from happening again.

In trying to understand those nuances and where the more technical sides should be drawn, it is useful to reflect on the legislation’s key dimensions and advantages. First, obviously, it makes terrorist attacks less likely. The terrorist threat is substantial and we know that it is changing. It has gone from large-scale infrastructure and iconic sites to much more workaday, normal locations.

The most recent terrorist attack that we tragically saw in this country was an attack on a children’s dance class. It is clear that the terror threat is evolving and we must evolve with it, which is why the Bill is important, but it is also important because it minimises the death and destruction that result from a terrorist attack. Terrorist attacks may still happen despite our best efforts, and it is important for us to plan for that eventuality and make the right decisions in order to be ready when they do happen.

The former President Obama’s Under-Secretary of State for Homeland Security, the Harvard professor Juliette Kayyem, has talked of the “boom” of a terror moment or crisis, and divides planning into “pre-boom” and “post-boom”. Pre-boom is what must be done to prevent an event from taking place, but it is equally important to plan for the post-boom moment. We must ensure that even those running small venues have done some thinking in advance of an attack. What are the escape routes? Who needs to have the keys? What happens if they send people in this direction rather than that direction?

The Bill incorporates a distinction between enhanced and non-enhanced tiers, and that too is important. In my constituency we put on some of the biggest and best events in the world. I am utterly confident that those in the football and rugby stadiums and theatres who are in charge of security planning do all this thinking anyway, but there are many smaller venues where it has not occurred to people that that is necessarily their role, but which are now in the line of fire. It is important for people to recognise that responsibility, because the public have a right to expect it. The Bill codifies what should be happening anyway. We must bear that in mind as we decide where to set the thresholds, who falls in or outside scope, and what level of burden we expect organisations and venues to face.

In Committee, it was reassuring to hear several of my concerns being allayed. One of them has already been discussed, namely the impact on business and the potential for a burden. There is no denying that something of a burden will be placed on some organisations where no one has done any thinking or preparation for a potential terrorist or other attack, but the Bill contains very proportionate elements that do not impose much of an extra burden. Its requirements are intuitive, they are not onerous, they are straightforward and they are commonsensical. As I said in an intervention earlier, they are essentially prompts for organisations to do the kind of thinking that we would hope they were doing already to avoid an attack. That not only avoids attacks, but mitigates their impact.

[Linsey Farnsworth (Amber Valley) (Lab)]

I entirely agree with my hon. Friend about the proportionality of the Bill, which we discussed in Committee. The word “burden” has been used a great deal this afternoon. In his evidence to the Committee, Andy Burnham said:

“I just think that we cannot talk ourselves into a sort of thing where it is all too big a burden. I can tell you from experience: a terrorist attack is a massive burden on a city and what it does challenges everybody at every level—and that is ongoing. Like Figen said, Manchester will never be the same again after what happened. It has changed us but it has strengthened us and made us more united, and as I say, I do not want any other city to go through that.”––[Official Report, Terrorism (Protection of Premises Public Bill Committee, 29 October 2024; c. 16, Q11.]

Does my hon. Friend agree that this is a proportionate Bill, and that the burden of a terrorist attack far outweighs any burden caused by its provisions?

[Chris Murray]

Absolutely. There is a small element of burden in the Bill, but it is light-touch and proportionate, and the alternative scenario is significantly more burdensome. In my own city of Edinburgh, the impact of a terrorist attack and of people not feeling secure in the aftermath could be destructive not just to the lives affected by the attack, but to the whole economy on which our city is based, which is event-focused. It is right for us to draw that distinction, and to seek to get the balance exactly right.

[Nick Timothy]

The hon. Gentleman is making an eloquent speech about the “protect” element of the counter-terrorism strategy. It is clear from the Manchester attack inquiry report that the asylum system is a big part of the story.

Salman Abedi and his brother Hashem—who planned the attack and prepared the explosives, and was as guilty of the attack as Salman—were born in Britain to Libyan asylum seeker parents. Their father, Ramadan Abedi, was a member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, an Islamist militia. He was granted asylum in this country, but travelled back and forth between Britain and Libya throughout that time, which is a story that we often hear about people who are granted asylum here. Given the number of people who come here illegally and across the channel, whom we have no ability to investigate and on whom we cannot make checks, how does the hon. Gentleman think we might reform the asylum system to prevent such things from happening again?

[Chris Murray]

I am struggling to understand quite how that falls within the scope of this debate, but it is important to discuss the issue of how we deal with terrorism. As we have seen in the history of this country, terrorist attacks can be both foreign and domestic. They can be homegrown, or they can come from overseas. I have talked about the need to prepare for an attack before it happens, so that mitigations can be introduced. They can be long term, which means looking at where the threat is emanating from, or they can be immediately in advance of an attack, which means introducing security measures. My argument, however, is that the benefit of the Bill relates to what happens after the attack has taken place. We need to help the smaller venues that now find themselves within the scope of terrorist attacks to prepare for those attacks. It is not a question of who committed the offence, but a question of how they are prepared to deal with that event.

[Dr Luke Evans]

I was fortunate enough to listen to the hon. Gentleman’s Westminster Hall debate on the Edinburgh fringe and its success around the world. That is a prime example of where the Bill might be helpful. Has the hon. Gentleman given any thought to how those small venues can work together? If they share best practice, that can create an environment of security. I wonder whether the fringe organisations themselves have thought about this, given that they are, by their very nature, likely to be a target. Sharing best practice may help to strengthen the entire environment when people visit it.

[Chris Murray]

That intervention was slightly more in scope and was also about Edinburgh, so I was happier to take it.

The hon. Gentleman is right. Indeed, in advance of the Bill Committee debate and the debate that we are having now, I spoke to Edinburgh city council and to some of the event organisers, who told me that it is exactly because Edinburgh has become a place where fringe events take place regularly that these considerations have been normalised. Our city has put a lot of the necessary infrastructure in place, along with the thinking and the organisational requirements—and there is also a corporate memory between the small venues—to cope with terrorist events. As Andy Burnham pointed out in his evidence, Edinburgh is one of the national leaders on this front. However, I recognise that not every community has that advantage, which is why the Bill will extend to other communities the measures that already benefit mine.

[Sammy Wilson]

The hon. Member said earlier that these were “prompts”, and that what we should consider was what happened after an attack. What is worrying is that the Bill goes beyond that. It talks about occasions on which it is suspected that a terrorist offence might take place or is taking place. That is not an “after”. The Bill creates an obligation for those who are in charge of the event in question to prevent individuals from entering. Before an event or while it is happening, there is a security obligation on some of these small groups to prevent people from entering the premises. That is not a prompt; it is a huge burden on the organisers.

[Chris Murray]

The right hon. Gentleman makes a really important point. Again, having been on the Public Bill Committee, my argument is that the Bill is proportionate.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sammy Wilson]

I fully understand the reasoning and the demand for a Bill such as this when it became known that, after a terrorist event, lives were lost because of bad organisation. If it is possible to introduce legislation that helps to avoid a situation that we have seen develop in the past, then of course we should do it. However, we have to be cognisant that when we introduce legislation, it has consequences for the people to whom it applies.

As we have heard time and again during the debate, Members believe that this legislation is both proportionate and practical. If Members genuinely believe that that is the case, there is absolutely no reason why new clause 1 should not be supported. We are entering a new field and imposing new regulations on bodies that were not regulated in relation to terrorism before, so surely it is important that we find out whether or not the objective and the intention is actually fulfilled. One way to do that is to monitor the effect over a period of time.

I have some concerns about the legislation, which people have already raised. In many cases, I do not think that the measures are practical. Secondly, I do not believe that they will not have an impact. That is not what Members expected and it is not what they want. Members across the House have said that they think the legislation may put people off engaging in activities that they would have undertaken in the absence of the regulations—activities that make a valuable contribution to their communities.

There is always a danger that people interpret the legislation that comes before the House, and sometimes our own rhetoric encourages them to do so. They may think a result of this legislation will be that it reduces the danger of people suffering a terrorist attack. To be clear, that is not and cannot be the purpose of the Bill. Terrorist attacks can be stopped only if we have intelligence, the security forces can act on that intelligence and we act in time. As the hon. Member for Edinburgh East and Musselburgh (Chris Murray) pointed out, the legislation is more about what happens after the event. However, it is not only about what happens after the event. The legislation puts obligations on people before they make a decision to undertake an event. Some of the wording in the Bill raises concerns.

[Chris Murray]

To clarify, I was not saying the legislation was only of value after an event. I said that part of its value was the impact it had on planning for the period after an event. On the burden the right hon. Gentleman talks about on people making preparations, does he accept that it is important that they consider the potential impact of events and think in advance about that in taking those decisions? That is how we will avoid the kind of atrocities we have seen.

[Sammy Wilson]

Let us look at some of the language and the requirements in the Bill that are totally reasonable. For example, the Bill sets out that people who are organising events should have plans

“for evacuating individuals from the premises”.

As far as I know, that already happens. At many of the events I attend, before the event even starts, somebody stands up and says, “Here are some house rules: in the event of a fire, the exits are here, here and here. Leave in an orderly way. When you get outside, meet at a certain point, so we can check everybody is out of the area.” There are measures in the Bill that are reasonable and that I would assume people are already doing. If they are not doing them, then it is not onerous on them to start saying that at the beginning of an event.

However, the Bill applies to retail as well. It is easy to communicate that kind of information to people if they are in a theatre or at some kind of concert, but it is a bit more difficult to communicate that to individuals when they are moving in and out of retail premises. We have to be careful about the practicalities of what we ask people to do.

Let me set out some of the things I have concerns about, which I believe are unreasonable to require of organisations. First, “public protection procedures” have to be

“followed by individuals working on the premises or at the event if there is reason to suspect that an act of terrorism is occurring, or is about to occur, on the premises”.

I suppose it is fairly obvious if something is “occurring” —we know if something is happening—but what if it is likely or “about to occur”? Are organisers meant to liaise with the police and get intelligence from them—intelligence that the police may not be able to divulge, or may not even have? What onus does it put on individuals in terms of preparation, given the random nature of terrorism? We have seen somebody go into a pre-school class with a knife. Nobody could have anticipated that.

Furthermore, when an event is occurring, or might be about to occur, the organiser has to prevent individuals from entering the premises. If I were organising an event, I would want to know what kind of security requirement that puts on me as the organiser. Am I meant to ensure that a security presence is there? What kind of security presence? We have talked quite a lot tonight about the fact that many events of 200 people could be organised by ordinary community groups. I think of theatre groups in my constituency. The only interest that people who organise such events have is acting. They do not have any of the skills that might be required to prevent people from entering the premises, so do they need to have security apparatus, such as security people?

The next measure about which there is a degree of ambiguity is the requirement that organisers do not divulge security information relating to the premises or event. I understand that they should not send out plans of the building in which they will be operating, showing the doors through which people can come in and get out, and the easy and hard ways into the premises. However, the Bill goes further than that. The organisers cannot give information about the event. The whole purpose of an event is to publicise it. Where will it be held? At what time will it be held? How many people can be facilitated? How do people get tickets? The point that I am trying to make is that there is language in the Bill about which I would have a lot of questions, were I an individual who was subject to it, because if I did not get it right, there would be a fine of up to £5,000 or £10,000.

Asylum Seekers: Hotel Accommodation

Chris Murray Excerpts

Wednesday 20th November 2024 Commons Chamber

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I do not agree that allowing asylum seekers to work while their claim is being considered will not be a pull factor. The way to deal with this issue is to have a fast, fair and efficient asylum system. We are looking at how we can redesign it, and at what we can do to deal with the huge backlogs that we inherited, not least in the tribunal system when there are appeals. We need a much better end-to-end system that is fair and efficient. That will mitigate any of the issues that the hon. Lady raises with respect to asylum seekers not being allowed to work. Were that restriction to be lifted, I believe that it would be a huge pull factor, which would have potentially serious consequences.

[Chris Murray (Edinburgh East and Musselburgh) (Lab)]

I congratulate the right hon. Member for Stone, Great Wyrley and Penkridge (Sir Gavin Williamson) on securing this urgent question on a matter that the Home Affairs Committee is looking at, but I am astonished that he wants to draw attention to the Conservatives’ legacy in this area. In 2019-20, the Home Office was spending £17,000 per asylum seeker per year on accommodation; by 2023-24, it was spending £47,000 per asylum seeker per year. At that point, it stopped taking decisions, so the number could only grow as the UK taxpayer paid for asylum seekers to stay in hotel accommodation. Does the Minister agree that the correct way to deal with the issue is to seriously address the systemic problems in the immigration system, such as the lack of any decisions being taken, and not ridiculous gimmicks such as wave machines and deterrents for four people?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I agree that it is about doing the day job effectively and efficiently, and if it cannot be done effectively and efficiently, redesigning it so that it can be, rather than having huge rows with the international community, threatening to leave the European convention on human rights, and setting up a parallel scheme that was not agreed by anybody, which spent vast amounts of money and ground the system to a halt. That is not the way to achieve success in this area. Considering the use of a wave machine to somehow send boats back to France just about sums up the reality of the Conservatives’ attitude to what is a difficult situation.

Small Boat Crossings

Chris Murray Excerpts

Wednesday 6th November 2024 Commons Chamber

[Dame Angela Eagle]

It is my first chance to congratulate the right hon. Lady on her election as Chair of the Select Committee. I look forward to coming before her Committee whenever she wishes to talk to me. The Department certainly wishes to keep her informed about what is going on.

There has been a significant shift in international co-operation, what with the G7 collaboration on smuggling and the dialogues of the European Political Community, of which there is a meeting tomorrow, at which we hope there will be some announcements. The Government have also been working on bilateral memorandums of understanding and action plans across Europe to achieve a step change in cross-border co-operation, which is the key to beginning to tackle the awful criminal smuggling activity.

[Chris Murray (Edinburgh East and Musselburgh) (Lab)]

In the five years before the election, I worked on preventing human trafficking in Scotland, including with many of the victims who came on small boat crossings. They have gone through the most appalling abuse that chills the soul. Does the Minister agree that public money is far better spent on smashing the gangs and freeing the victims than on a Rwanda plan that was never going to work?

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Yes, I agree profoundly with my hon. Friend, which is why the new Government have changed tack in this area. I am sure that we will see the results in due course.

Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill (Third sitting)

Chris Murray Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 31st October 2024 Public Bill Committees

Clause 5 sets out that the Secretary of State may, through affirmative regulations, amend the types of procedures that should be in place. This power is carefully constrained. First, further procedures can be added only if they are considered to reduce the risk of physical harm to individuals. Secondly, procedures can be removed or changed only if doing so is not considered to increase the risk of physical harm.

[Chris Murray (Edinburgh East and Musselburgh) (Lab)]

I wanted to speak on this clause because it is arguably the most important component of this legislation and could have the biggest impact. Obviously we all hope that terrorist events do not happen, but we must be alert to the possibility that they can, and to what we collectively need to do to prepare for that situation.

Enhanced-tier organisations, particularly those at the upper end such as stadiums, will already have many operations in place to prepare for that. They will do table-top exercises; they will do war games; they will designate staff; they will have protocols. But for the standard tier, in particular, will not automatically be doing that. As we see the terror threat evolving to target those smaller standard-tier institutions, it is important that we prompt them, through this legislation, to do that thinking.

The former US Under-Secretary of State for Homeland Security, Juliette Kayyem, talks about the distinction between “pre-boom” and “boom” with terrorist events. Pre-boom, we can do a lot of work to stop terrorists—put in checks and do things—but we have to think about what we do in the moment when the terrorist attack has already begun. That is not the time for institutions, particularly small institutions, to be thinking, “What is the exit route? What do we need to do? Who’s in charge here?” In reference to American school shootings, Juliette Kayyem says that the least useful person, once a school shooting has started, is the person who says, “We should have banned guns.” It is too late to be having that conversation, and the gun is already in the school. People need to be prepared for that situation.

The four requirements under subsection (3) are small, and quite intuitive, prompts that we are asking of standard-tier institutions; but in giving those prompts we could be encouraging them to take the small steps that will, when the terrorist event happens, affect the outcome and could really save lives. This is a really important clause.

The Opposition have made the point that the clause presents a burden on business, and it is true that it is bringing into scope organisations that probably have not had this burden placed upon them before. Admittedly, there is a component of burden being placed here—but actually it is not the legislation that is doing that; it is the evolving terror threat, which we are responding to. That is why it is important to note that the proposals made here—those four requirements—are straightforward. As I say, they are almost intuitive and commonsensical. They are not onerous and they are low-cost.

My constituency, the city centre of Edinburgh, is event central. We have hundreds of events there every week, and in August we host the third-biggest ticketed event in the world—double the number of people go to events in that month as go to the Olympics. But they are not all in one place. It is not one big stadium; they are spread throughout the city.

Some of those events, such as the Tattoo, would qualify for the enhanced tier, but many of them would be standard tier. If we can prompt them to make these changes, we really could make a huge impact. If we do not do that and there is a chilling effect because people feel insecure, the burden on organisations will significant; we need to take that seriously. That is why the distinction between standard and enhanced is appropriate, and I think the requirements being made of the standard tier are the right ones.

This very important clause codifies something that society should be doing anyway, given the evolving terror threat. The way we will know it has had an impact is that we will never hear about it again, because the prompts will mean that further action is not required and tragedies do not happen.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 5 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 6

Public protection measures for enhanced duty premises and qualifying event

[Tom Tugendhat]

I beg to move amendment 25, in clause 6, page 5, line 1, leave out paragraph (a).

This amendment prevents the Secretary of State from creating further requirements for enhanced duty premises by regulations.

Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill (Fourth sitting)

Chris Murray Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 31st October 2024 Public Bill Committees

[Dan Jarvis]

As I have already said, the Bill gives the SIA powers to take a range of enforcement action, including issuing monetary penalties, to enable it to deal with non-compliance. Such action is anticipated to be the primary method of enforcement, allowing swifter resolution without resorting to criminalisation. However, where civil enforcement is not enough, the public will expect criminal consequences for cases of non-compliance, such as persistent and egregious failures.

Clause 24 makes it a criminal offence to fail to comply with a compliance or restriction notice that has been given in relation to enhanced duty premises or a qualifying event. It will be a defence for the accused in subsequent criminal proceedings to show that they took all reasonable steps to comply with the relevant compliance or restriction notice. The offences are triable either way and, if convicted on indictment, a person will be liable to a sentence of up to 2 years’ imprisonment and/or a fine.

Turning to clause 25, receipt of accurate information will be vital to the effective functioning of the SIA and to ensure that any public safety risks arising from non-compliance can be addressed. Although we expect information to be provided in good faith in the majority of cases, clause 25 makes it a criminal offence to provide false or misleading information where the person either knows that the information they are providing is false or misleading, or is reckless as to whether it is.

That might happen where the responsible person notifies the SIA that they are responsible for qualifying premises but knowingly misleads the SIA as to whether their premises are in the standard or enhanced tier. A person in receipt of an information notice might also give false information to the SIA in responding to that notice. The offence does not criminalise genuine or honest mistakes, such as where a person provides information that proves to be inaccurate but did so in good faith. The offence is triable either way and, if convicted, a person may be liable to a sentence of imprisonment for no more than 2 years and/or a fine. The offence will provide a deterrent and an appropriate punishment for those who purposely provide false or misleading information to the SIA to avoid complying with the requirements or to evade enforcement action.

Clause 26 provides that a person other than the body may also be liable in some cases for a criminal offence committed by the body. The person must be a relevant person in the body or a person purporting to act in that capacity for the body. A relevant person is involved in the management or control of the entity, such as a company director or partner. That ensures that those involved in senior management can be liable for offences committed by the body. Those offences relate to serious misconduct and persistent, egregious non-compliance by the body.

Specifically, a relevant person may be liable alongside the body for the offences of failing to comply with a compliance, restriction or information notice if the body committed the offence with their consent or connivance or as a result of their neglect. They may also be liable where they have consented to, or connived in, the body committing the offences of providing false or misleading information, obstructing an authorised inspector or pretending to be an inspector. The provision is necessary to deter serious non-compliance by ensuring managerial responsibility within bodies. Members of the Committee will no doubt have seen the importance of similar measures in other legislation.

[Chris Murray (Edinburgh East and Musselburgh) (Lab)]

I want to make a few points on offences, following our evidence sessions on Tuesday.

Obviously, the situation in the aftermath of a terrorist attack can be very febrile: emotions run high, and media attention can be high. It is human psychology, sadly, to look for someone to blame, and we might have imagined, before we scrutinised the Bill, someone guilty of this offence finding themselves in the eye of that storm. When we questioned Shropshire council representatives on Tuesday, they spoke about the obligations that would be on them if they were the people affected. I was reassured to hear them say that they already felt that burden of responsibility and that this legislation did not impose any further such burden on them.

The legislation refers to non-compliance in general, not non-compliance in the aftermath—that is really important. I thought it would be good to put on record the reassurances we heard on Tuesday on these measures.

Clause 24 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 25 and 26 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 27

Guidance

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.