NATO and International Security

Bernard Jenkin Excerpts

Thursday 19th May 2022 Commons Chamber

[John Healey]

My right hon. Friend is right. Clear and consistent communication is part of having an effective deterrent in place. It is not simply about the weaponry at hand.

[Sir Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

Would the right hon. Gentleman dare to go a little further and acknowledge the truth, which is that it is the responsible possession of nuclear weapons by responsible democracies that has kept the peace, and that it would be a mistake ever to get rid of nuclear weapons entirely as that would increase the likelihood of the major state- on-state warfare that we saw before nuclear weapons existed?

[John Healey]

I would agree with the contention that possession has helped to hold the peace, but as my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham (Mr Jones) has just pointed out, possession is a necessary but insufficient component of effective deterrence. The communication that my right hon. Friend has just talked about is part of a picture of effective deterrence, alongside political leadership of countries and alliances.

If the House will allow me, I shall move on to the strategic concept and the weeks ahead. Next month, as the Secretary of State has said, member nations will set NATO’s strategy for the next decade, with all democracies now facing new threats to their security. NATO’s last strategic concept was agreed in 2010. It declared:

“Today, the Euro-Atlantic area is at peace”.

It sought a strategic partnership with Russia, it had limited reference to terrorism and it made no mention at all of China. The proximity and severity of the security threat in Europe now demand a clear break with the principles-based platitudes that have been the hallmark of NATO’s previous public strategic concept. The nature of the threat is both clear and urgent. Russia has attacked Ukraine, overridden the NATO-Russia Founding Act, breached the Geneva conventions, buried the Helsinki Final Act, made unilateral threats of nuclear attack against NATO and stands accused of crimes against humanity and genocide.

The Secretary-General of NATO, Jens Stoltenberg, said:

“Regardless of when, how, the war in Ukraine ends, the war has already had long-term consequences for our security. NATO needs to adapt to that new reality.”

Most importantly, NATO has to adapt its primary task of collective defence.

When the Labour leader and I visited Estonia in February to thank our British troops, they told us about NATO’s tripwire deterrent, which the Secretary of State mentioned, with forward forces giving ground when attacked before retaking it later with reinforcements. The horrific Russian destruction of Ukrainian cities and the brutal shelling of civilians makes it clear that such a strategy of deterrence by reinforcement is no longer conscionable. NATO must instead aim for deterrence by denial, which is the operational consequence of NATO leaders’ commitment to defending every inch of NATO territory.

I am not sure whether that is covered by the combat effectiveness the Defence Secretary spoke about, but it implies a very serious strengthening of military capability, with more advanced systems, more permanent basing, higher force readiness and more intense exercises.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

I will be as quick as I can. It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Glasgow South (Stewart Malcolm McDonald), who made an articulate and thoughtful speech, but I wonder why he said nothing about the SNP’s attitude towards nuclear weapons, because it is now beyond any credibility and devalues everything that he contributed to this debate. By far the greatest contribution that Scotland makes to the defence of Europe is hosting the nuclear deterrent at Faslane. The idea that this would be uprooted by an independent Scotland, and that Scotland would then present itself as a good member of NATO, is utterly ridiculous. What is more, we now know from Iain Macwhirter’s article in The Herald yesterday that this opinion is completely out of step with Scottish public opinion: some 58% of Scots want to retain the nuclear deterrent and only 20% want to get rid of it. When will his party change its policy and adopt the nuclear deterrent as its policy?

[Stewart Malcolm McDonald]

I will be brief, as I have just given a long speech. When we put this matter to Scottish people in elections, they always return a majority of Members, not just from my party but from the Scottish Labour party, who oppose hosting the deterrent in Scotland. On the deterrent being in Scotland and the independence of NATO, is the hon. Gentleman really suggesting that the entirety of the UK’s nuclear capability should be exclusively hosted in a sovereign foreign country, no matter how friendly and neighbouring that country is? It would be unprecedented in world history, and I suspect he does not support it himself.

[Sir Bernard Jenkin]

The answer is that it is one of the policies that encourages Scots to vote to remain in the United Kingdom, which was the outcome of the referendum held on Scottish independence.

I will concentrate my remarks on a background debate that has been going on, which is whether this 85-day crisis that we are now in is evidence that somehow NATO has failed. I wish to contest that idea. It became axiomatic for decade after decade that war between major powers was unthinkable. It became our ingrained expectation. I was born 21 years after the end of the second world war, and it is now 77 years after the end of the second world war. Generations in this House and in our country have no folk or family memory of one of the defining moments, if not the defining moment, of our national history. Western Europe and the free world has to that extent become a victim of the success of NATO—success being peace in Europe and beyond Europe for decade after decade.

That success was based on two fundamental foundations: nuclear deterrence and NATO. That is not just because it provided collective security in Europe, but because it was binding—and still is binding—the US and Canadian security guarantees into the European security guarantees. It is the joining of transatlantic security that has made NATO so effective. Incidentally, one of the tragedies of the European Union is that it has gone down the path of trying to create a separate autonomous defence alliance outside NATO, which has corroded that automatic assumption that the United States and Europe will always act together.

Some still say that NATO has failed because of Ukraine, but NATO never declared that it would defend Ukraine. NATO is hardly to be accused of failing to deter Russia’s invasion of Ukraine when it never specifically said that it would seek to deter that. There have been political failures by the Governments of NATO members in recent years, individually and collectively, but as the former Defence Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for North Somerset (Dr Fox), said earlier, it was all laid out at the Munich security conference in 2007 by President Putin. Then we had the invasion of Georgia, the cyber-attacks, the Litvinenko murder, the violation of the intermediate-range nuclear forces treaty—incidentally, that was unilateral rearmament by the Russians, rather than disarmament—the invasion of Crimea, the Salisbury poisonings, hybrid warfare, the weaponisation of gas, and the destabilisation of the Balkans. We ignored all those signals—the clearest possible signals—but the failure of the UK, the United States, the German Government and the French Government is a failure of our national strategies, not a failure of NATO.

Moreover, we can now say that NATO conventional forces are rather less inferior to Russian armed forces than we might have feared. The Russian forces, which are much larger and more extensively equipped than ours, have proved catastrophically incapable of delivering their intended effects. They are riven with corruption and have poorly maintained and poorly designed equipment. They are poorly led and incapable of conducting air superiority operations over a neighbouring country with meagre air defence of its own. They cannot defend their ships or run their logistics effectively.

In addition, we are finding that Russia has not dared to attack NATO countries even when they are actively supporting the resistance with arms to Ukraine. The first important lesson to take from the conflict is that we started out feeling much too timid about provoking Russian escalation. Perhaps the timing has been perfect, but I think we could have moved quicker and faster. I am delighted by the scale of the United States’ response to the crisis now, and I wish it had come earlier.

Still, we must be ready to respond to Russian escalation, the possible use of chemical weapons and even the possibility of a tactical nuclear strike in Ukraine. That risk would rise significantly if Russia declared that captured Ukraine territory was now sovereign Russian territory, because that would trigger a whole set of defence doctrines in Russian military doctrine that would legitimise in Russian minds the use of tactical nuclear weapons. I do not expect the Government to comment on this point, but I have every confidence that NATO’s SHAPE—Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe —in Belgium will be war-gaming escalation scenarios and will not be ruling out a vigorous response, as even the shadow Defence Secretary adverted to, involving co-ordinated retaliation to make sure that that escalation would be met with sufficient deterrence.

The second key lesson is that it is evident, if it was not obvious already, that the world is watching this conflict. The global implications of the outcome in Ukraine are profound. President Putin must not be seen to have gained from his illegal aggression, because of all the consequences for every other autocratic regime that is eyeing the neighbouring territory of another sovereign state. If we want to deter China, North Korea and any number of despotic regimes from thinking that they can behave in that way, we have to think in the same way that John Major and President Bush thought about the invasion of Kuwait, and that Margaret Thatcher insisted we had to think about the Falklands. The outcome of the conflict will be not just a watershed moment in European history, but a turning point in the history of the world. We must succeed and ensure that the Ukrainians win their war.

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Nigel Evans)]

Let us say eight minutes, then everyone will get about equal time.

Ukraine

Bernard Jenkin Excerpts

Monday 17th January 2022 Commons Chamber

[Mr Wallace]

First of all, I am not sure that the right hon. Gentleman will accept my invitation; I have made it, and I hope he does. Of course we will start the process of establishing a dialogue on a whole range of issues, which hopefully will involve security, confidence in each other and transparency, to make sure that there is no miscalculation going forward.

British troops who are orbital have been based in Ukraine for years. They are not NATO bases, as President Putin alleges: no one is setting up NATO bases in Ukraine and no one is positioning strategic weapons in Ukraine. This is unarmed orbital: we train people in all sorts of methods. As I said, the trainers that come over on these systems will leave once the training is done. All I can say is that this is not new—we have had people there for years. But of course we are there at the invitation of the sovereign nation of Ukraine.

[Sir Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

I thank the Secretary of State for his statement. It is hard to fathom the seriousness of the situation as it is developing. Can he shed any light on unconfirmed reports that Russia is now moving armed forces into Belarus—on to the road to Kiev in Belarus, and now threatening from the north of the country? If those reports are confirmed, will the Secretary of State undertake to return to the House to make a further statement?

[Mr Wallace]

My right hon. Friend makes the point about this very worrying build-up that we have seen and is growing; the latest is that there has been very sizeable movement of aircraft and aviation capabilities in the last few days. Significant numbers have been moving to key areas.

I will go back and look at the details around Belarus as well. I absolutely commit to Members that I will come to the House and keep them updated periodically—not only about the build-up, if that does continue, but about every next step.

Strength of the UK’s Armed Forces

Bernard Jenkin Excerpts

Wednesday 14th April 2021 Commons Chamber

[John Healey (Wentworth and Dearne) (Lab)]

I beg to move,

That this House notes the Prime Minister’s 2019 election pledge that his Government would not cut the Armed Services in any form; further notes with concern the threat assessment in the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy, that threats from other states to the UK and its allies are growing and diversifying; calls on the Government to rethink its plan set out in the Defence Command Paper, published in March 2021, CP411, to reduce key defence capabilities and reduce the strength of the Armed Forces, including a further reduction in the size of the Army by 2025; and calls on the Prime Minister to make an oral statement to Parliament by June 30 2021 on the Government’s plans to reduce the capability and strength of the Armed Forces.

Our thoughts across the House today are with the Queen and the royal family as they prepare for the Duke of Edinburgh’s funeral on Saturday. His distinguished wartime career in the Navy was followed for decades by that same dedication to serving his country at the side of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth.

We have called this Opposition debate for Members from all parts of the House to debate the Government’s defence and security plans as set out last month in the integrated review, the Defence Command Paper and the defence and security industrial strategy. Our starting point is the Prime Minister. He said at the launch of his 2019 election manifesto on behalf of all Conservative Members here:

“We will not be cutting our armed forces in any form. We will be maintaining the size of our armed forces”.

He may take the pledges that he makes to our armed forces and the public lightly; we do not. The integrated review confirms:

“State threats to the UK…are growing and diversifying”,

yet the defence review is a plan for fewer troops, fewer ships and fewer planes over the next three to four years.

I am disappointed that the Defence Secretary cannot be here to answer the growing chorus of concerns about his defence plans, but for today we entirely accept his attendance at the NATO special meeting on Ukraine. That in itself reinforces the warnings in the Defence Command Paper, which said:

“Russia continues to pose the greatest nuclear, conventional military and sub-threshold threat to European security.”

That heightens the widening concerns about cutting the strength of the UK’s armed forces in the face of growing global threats, instabilities and uncertainties.

There are so many serious flaws in the defence review and the industrial strategy. There is no assessment of current or future capability, no strategic principles or assumptions and nothing about how the Ministry of Defence should be structured or staffed in order to best provide national security. There is no recognition that the UK’s research capacity has been run down over the last decade by deep cuts to defence research and development, and no plan to absorb the £6.6 billion now pledged over the next four years.

There is no system for identifying and supporting the small companies that produce so much of our invention. There is nothing about what defence can get from greater advances in civil industry or what it can provide to civil industry and civil society. There is no explanation of how we will sustain the forward-deployed, front-footed, persistently globally deployed and engaged armed forces with so few ships and transport aircraft. There are no evident contingency plans to replace the losses of key equipment in conflict. There is nothing about mothballing equipment retired from service, like so many other countries do, rather than disposing of it on the narrow grounds that it saves money. I could go on, and I will on other occasions, but for today, our debate and our motion focus on the central concern about decisions to cut the strength of our armed forces in the face of growing threats and in breach of the Prime Minister’s personal pledge at the election.

In view of the interest—I am delighted to see that Members from all sides want to contribute to this debate —I want to make four main arguments and then look forward to what colleagues have to say. First, on numbers, with the threats to the UK growing and diversifying, there is a strong case against, not for, further cuts to the size of our armed forces. The Defence Secretary has announced that the Army’s established strength will be cut by 10,000 to just 72,500 over the next four years. That will be the smallest British Army for 300 years. Ministers can only promise no redundancies because all three forces are already well below the strength that the Government set out was required in the 2015 defence review.

Of course we must develop new technologies in domains such as cyber-space and artificial intelligence, but the British infantry—as the Minister knows better than anyone—has been the foundation on which the defence of the UK has relied for over 350 years. New technologies have always been harnessed to strengthen its capabilities, but they have never replaced entirely the need for boots on the ground.

[Sir Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

I have some sympathy for the right hon. Gentleman’s position, because when I was the shadow Secretary of State for Defence, I spent a lot of time criticising the then Labour Government for cutting the size of the infantry and the Army. The clear implication is that the next Labour Government would be spending more than the present Government, so how much more money would a future Labour Government be putting into defence compared to what we are spending, which, of course, has increased already?

[John Healey]

Sadly we are nowhere near another election at this point. We are at this stage in the parliamentary cycle with these plans on the table, and our interest is in the Government getting this right. The decisions taken now will set the shape of our defence forces for the next 10 years. The decisions taken now will be the framework with which a future Labour Government, after the next election, will have to live.

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[Sir Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

I very much share the concerns expressed by the right hon. Member for Warley (John Spellar), but I very much hope that we maintain minimum recoverable capability in all these fields, because the new capabilities that have been brought in by the integrated review are equally or more important than the reductions in the overall size of the armed forces that we have seen. The big surprise in the review was the announcement of the increase in the warhead cap.

I want to reply very directly to the right hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn). May I remind him that, on 18 July 2016, when he was leader of the Labour party, the Government got through the House the maingate of the renewal of the Trident submarines on a vote of 472 to 117? There is no doubt, therefore, that the strength of consensus in this House does not reflect the views of the then leader of the Labour party.

[John Spellar]

The hon. Gentleman will recall that that vote was taken about five years later than it should have been because of dithering by his own Government.

[Sir Bernard Jenkin]

I think the coalition had something to do with that. I warned David Cameron about that before we even went into that coalition.

The right hon. Member for Islington North accuses his own country of proliferating weapons of mass destruction, and suggests that we are somehow escalating our numbers, but he does not even mention the fact that, as my right hon. Friend the Member for North Somerset (Dr Fox) said, Russia has—what was it?—6,800 nuclear warheads. They are modernising every single weapons system that they have got. They are in breach of the intermediate-range nuclear forces treaty. That is escalation, and the right hon. Member for Islington North has nothing to say about that whatsoever.

We all know that the British people will support the United Kingdom’s continuous at-sea deterrent for as long as other nuclear weapons states are keeping their weapons and there are other proliferators around. We just need to remind ourselves what extraordinarily good value the continuous at-sea deterrent system actually is. The Library produced a report last month, pointing out that the annual cost of our continuous at-sea deterrent is just 1% of the cost of social security and tax credits—just 1%. So the idea that this is a Rolls-Royce system that we cannot afford is mythical. Nothing could buy us the security and influence that the continuous at-sea deterrent gives us.

The doctrine of deterrence is just as valid as it ever was. Has the right hon. Member for Islington North ever asked himself why major state-on-state warfare stopped in 1945? Well, I can tell him why: it was because nuclear weapons were invented and that kind of warfare became too costly, too destructive, to contemplate. Does he want to go back to that world by getting rid of nuclear weapons altogether? I hope not.

We just need to remind ourselves that our continuous at-sea deterrent can attack any target at any time, so it is always ready to respond to threats. Its location is unknown so it cannot be pre-empted. It does not require to be deployed at a time of international tension and crisis. The technology is tried and tested. It is not in breach of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty; it is completely compliant. It is a sovereign capability, which, if we had to use it, we would. No alternative system could possibly provide all these benefits at such good value, and that is why we should reaffirm our commitment to our nuclear deterrent.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Eleanor Laing)]

We now go by video link to Marie Rimmer, with a time limit of three minutes.

Integrated Review: Defence Command Paper

Bernard Jenkin Excerpts

Monday 22nd March 2021 Commons Chamber

[Mr Wallace]

Madam Deputy Speaker, you will know, having been in the House for many years, that Governments do not publish the Attorney General’s advice. We do not believe in any way that we are breaking the nuclear proliferation treaty, and what we really need to do is make sure that we maintain a credible deterrent.

[Sir Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con) [V]]

I thank my right hon. Friend for his Defence Command Paper, which I broadly welcome, in particular the integrated review, which looks forward to the modern threats we face and embraces the capabilities we need to develop to meet those threats. When it comes to the nuclear deterrent, we must remember that this is a bipartisan policy that has been supported by both sides of the House until now and that we want to maintain that consensus. May I echo what has been said about the need for discussion and exploration of why we need to increase the cap on the number of warheads? I am convinced that we need to maintain a credible deterrent, and I am sure that the Government would not be doing this unless there were very strong arguments for doing it to maintain the credibility of the deterrent.

[Mr Wallace]

Obviously, detail around development, use and, indeed, deployment of nuclear warheads is a very sensitive subject. However, I will see what I can do to provide further briefing to Members and to specific Committees, if that is a better way to furnish more detail in a secure environment.

Covid-19 Response: Defence Support

Bernard Jenkin Excerpts

Tuesday 12th January 2021 Commons Chamber

[Mr Wallace]

From a defence point of view—indeed, I know this from my own background as the Minister for Security—resilience was key to the integrated review. I felt it was important that the integrated view should be used to enhance the use of reserves. Reserves will be part of the long-term future of this nation’s resilience—whether they are civilian reserves in an NHS environment or, indeed, from the armed forces, they are going to be very important. We need to look at how we employ our people to make sure that there is a flow between regulars and reserves and that they are used in a much better way.

In addition to that, we have seen the threat of silent or sub-threshold enemies—disinformation. We have already seen Russia deploy smears, innuendos and disinformation against our Oxford-AstraZeneca vaccine, at the same time as elements trying to steal secrets through cyber. That is an important example of how we have to be on our guard when our adversaries take advantage of natural disasters or natural phenomena. We have deployed and used the 77th Brigade throughout this process to challenge disinformation, which is obviously an appropriate use of that brigade. When a foreign country makes something up, spreads a rumour and tries to undermine us, we should challenge that.

All those policies are being proved in this pandemic. Members will see front and centre in the integrated review that resilience is one of the main things on which we must always focus if we are to defend the nation.

[Sir Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con) [V]]

This is undoubtedly the greatest national emergency of my lifetime, yet only a small fraction of the available military capacity has been called upon by the rest of the Government—and that is despite the fact that the test and trace operations have been indifferent in performance and the vaccine programme seems to be to be almost entirely dependent on civilian capability that is tested every winter in the best of circumstances. Why does my right hon. Friend think that the Government, or perhaps the rest of the Government, are so confident that civilian organisations are capable of delivering these incredible tasks of such scale, magnitude, importance and urgency without significantly more military capacity, particularly in respect of four-star military capability at the top of these organisations, rather than just one-star?

[Mr Wallace]

I assure my hon. Friend that the four-stars and three-stars are equally busy. I just came from a meeting with a three-star and a four-star on the vaccines and the need to make sure that we are leaning in as much as possible. I understand what my hon. Friend says but, fundamentally, the armed forces have been making a difference. If there was more demand or, indeed, an easy way to deliver the solution to this pandemic, we would have been doing that.

It is not the case, when we talk about numbers in the armed forces, that they are sitting around not doing anything until they are called. My hon. Friend recently called for more assistance for the NHS in Essex. I looked at a number of requests that came in last week and the week before, and it was quite sobering to realise that of the 1,600 clinicians, senior nurses and nurses in the armed forces as regulars, they are all deployed—they are all working in hospitals in Middlesbrough, in the south-west, in Birmingham and in the south-east. They are all there, because even in peacetime—even when we are not fighting a pandemic—instead of having them sitting around, we make sure that they are working in the NHS and augmenting that time. In respect of some of the requests, we are in danger of robbing Peter to pay Paul: I would simply be taking clinicians out of one hospital trust to move them to another one. That is not going to solve the challenge that we have.

I understand what my hon. Friend says and can give him the assurance that I gave to the Labour defence spokesman, the right hon. Member for Wentworth and Dearne (John Healey): we stand ready to do it. It is not like we sit and wait in our rooms waiting for a phone call; we push and, sometimes to the annoyance of some of my colleagues, I push and push and agitate—I am quite a good agitator—to make sure that we try and deliver wherever we can. The Prime Minister is absolutely open to all ideas and we deliver on many occasions.

Armed Forces: Covid-19 Deployment

Bernard Jenkin Excerpts

Tuesday 10th November 2020 Commons Chamber

[Jeremy Quin]

I think the hon. Gentleman is aware that Defence has been involved from the outset on planning and logistics. At an early stage, Defence was called on, as it is regularly; we have had, on average, about 130 MACA requests a year for the past few years, and we are well used to working at a local level and a national level with partners across Government. There is a role for the military and a role they can pass on. For example, the military did a fantastic job on working with our partners in Health to provide the mobile testing units, but it is appropriate at some stage, when others get up to speed, that we hand over that task in order to be ready to undertake the next role, which in this case includes the whole-city pilot in Liverpool.

[Sir Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

NHS Test and Trace has grown from literally zero to being the size of Asda in little more than six months, and it would be difficult to imagine an organisation that has grown so quickly that would not be organisationally challenged. May I suggest that if the MOD has not been asked for headquarters capability, it should offer headquarters capability to NHS Test and Trace, as I am sure it would be welcomed with open arms?

Modernising Defence Programme

Bernard Jenkin Excerpts

Thursday 25th January 2018 Commons Chamber

[Gavin Williamson]

It is too early in the process for me to be able to comment on that, but I will look into the issue and come back to the hon. Gentleman. Obviously, the whole point of the programme is to look at things afresh. However, we have commented fairly regularly on the increasing threat that we face in the north Atlantic, which has been raised by Members. We must ensure that we have submarines that are able to operate in and defend the north Atlantic.

[Mr Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

I thank my right hon. Friend for delivering good news to the House, and congratulate him on leveraging the somewhat unexpected and sudden nature of his appointment to the advantage of Her Majesty’s armed forces and the Ministry of Defence. Leveraging control over the defence review back to the Department for the first time since 2010 represents a return of sanity, because the current defence review is proving undeliverable, which shows what happens if policy is divorced from the Department that has to deliver it.

[Gavin Williamson]

My hon. Friend makes an important point about this programme being led by the Ministry of Defence. Our armed forces should be leading the programme, because they have the greatest understanding of what is needed, and what support they will require to be most effective going forward.

Defence Capability

Bernard Jenkin Excerpts

Thursday 19th October 2017 Westminster Hall

[Mr Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

I shall be brief, Mr Bone. There is a realism that we need to bring to this debate. A capability review starts with what sort of country we want to be, what sort of role we want to play in the world, and the strategic situation that we face; and the only thing that is changing is the strategic situation that we face, which is getting worse. The Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre puts state-on-state warfare as a major threat; it is slight now, but growing and will be becoming severe in the next 20 or 30 years. That is the context in which this debate should be seen. We keep hearing, peppered throughout the debate, the noises from colleagues who are complaining that capability is being cut on an arbitrary basis because there is not enough money in the budget. These are not strategic decisions; they are decisions taken to match a year-on-year target, so the impression being given is that the defence budget is really being planned only one year ahead, with the consequences of these cuts.

Let us look back over the last seven years. The coalition Government inherited a black hole in the defence budget of £35 billion. Coupled with George Osborne’s 8% defence cash cut to the headline figure, that meant that we reached 2015 already having suffered a real-terms cut of 17% in the defence budget, regardless of the ongoing pressure of defence cost inflation. Recently, we have suffered the collapse in the value of the pound against the dollar, as has been said; and looking five and 10 years ahead, we are facing another black hole in the defence budget, which will have severe consequences, because the big equipment programmes that tend to dominate defence expenditure are crowding out investment in technology and people. Always it is manpower that takes the cut to protect the big equipment programmes.

We need to concentrate not just on how we are to strategically improve the defence budget to protect the existing programmes. If we are to have such a limited defence budget, we need to learn how to spend more on people, technology and industrial capacity, to be able to build the equipment that we need for the campaign that we are in, rather than finding ourselves with the equipment that we ordered 10 years ago, which is inappropriate for the campaign that we now face. We need to invest more in the people, who are, in the end, the absolute force multiplier in any crisis that we face. It is a big challenge, but if we continue on the present trajectory, the situation will just get worse.

Trident: Test Firing

Bernard Jenkin Excerpts

Monday 23rd January 2017 Commons Chamber

[Sir Michael Fallon]

I do not accept that. Previous Governments that the hon. Gentleman supported have not given operational details of previous demonstration and shakedown operations, which comprise the major tests of the systems and sub-systems that we have been dealing with today.

[Mr Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

May I commend my right hon. Friend for his reticence about getting drawn into this, and may I also commend the Prime Minister for her reticence, which was entirely appropriate given the subject at issue? Is it not rather ironic to hear right hon. and hon. Members complaining about the possible lack of credibility of the deterrent when some of them do not actually believe in the doctrine of deterrence at all? It would be unwise of the Russians or any other potential adversary to suggest that they could take the risk of invading this or that country on the basis that we might have a misfire of one of our missiles.

[Sir Michael Fallon]

Again, I agree with my hon. Friend. We should not forget that there were many in that particular debate who took the opposite view—the view that we no longer need the deterrent. I am particularly pleased that the overwhelming majority of Members of this House, on both sides of this House, voted in favour of renewing the deterrent that has kept us safe for so long.

Royal Naval Deployment: Mediterranean

Bernard Jenkin Excerpts

Monday 7th March 2016 Commons Chamber

[Michael Fallon]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his comments. Let me reciprocate by sending our good wishes to Captain Taylor and the crew of Mounts Bay, the 200 Royal Marines embarked on her and the helicopter squadron accompanying her.

So far as sufficiency is concerned, there are five NATO ships on station at the moment—a German ship, which is the flagship of the group, a Greek ship, a Canadian ship, an Italian ship and a Turkish ship—and ours makes that six ships spread out across the Aegean. Of course, there are 22 other members of NATO, and I hope that they will consider what contribution they can make. Mounts Bay is a substantial ship and, with a helicopter platform, it can contribute significantly to the surveillance, particularly of the middle part of the Aegean. We envisage that Mounts Bay will operate mainly in waters just west of Chios.

In so far as the shipbuilding strategy is relevant, we are developing the strategy in the light of the SDSR, as the hon. Gentleman knows, and we hope to complete it later this year. On his attempt to bring NATO and European Union membership into this, let me make this clear to him: the mission in the sea between Libya and Italy is a European Union mission, because in dealing with the new Libyan Government, it may need the legal authorities that the European Union can add; the group deployed in the Aegean is a NATO mission, because it of course involves a ship of the Turkish navy and is largely dealing with migrants from Turkey, which is a member of NATO. That perfectly illustrates that we need to be members of both NATO and the European Union, and that being members of both gives us the best of both worlds.

[Mr Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

I thank my right hon. Friend for his statement and, indeed, the Royal Navy for its commitment to this mission, which demonstrates that we have an important role to play in European defence and security. By making it clear that this is a NATO mission, he underlines the point that NATO provides the security of our continent, not the European Union, as the Government seek to pretend.

[Michael Fallon]

This is a NATO mission—it was proposed by Germany, which is leading this particular standing maritime group—but the equally important mission in the Tyrrhenian sea, between Sicily and Libya, is a European Union mission. There are other examples of European Union missions—in Bosnia, and off the horn of Africa—that have been equally effective in saving lives.