Ukraine

Bernard Jenkin Excerpts

Monday 17th January 2022 Commons Chamber

[Mr Wallace]

First of all, I am not sure that the right hon. Gentleman will accept my invitation; I have made it, and I hope he does. Of course we will start the process of establishing a dialogue on a whole range of issues, which hopefully will involve security, confidence in each other and transparency, to make sure that there is no miscalculation going forward.

British troops who are orbital have been based in Ukraine for years. They are not NATO bases, as President Putin alleges: no one is setting up NATO bases in Ukraine and no one is positioning strategic weapons in Ukraine. This is unarmed orbital: we train people in all sorts of methods. As I said, the trainers that come over on these systems will leave once the training is done. All I can say is that this is not new—we have had people there for years. But of course we are there at the invitation of the sovereign nation of Ukraine.

[Sir Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

I thank the Secretary of State for his statement. It is hard to fathom the seriousness of the situation as it is developing. Can he shed any light on unconfirmed reports that Russia is now moving armed forces into Belarus—on to the road to Kiev in Belarus, and now threatening from the north of the country? If those reports are confirmed, will the Secretary of State undertake to return to the House to make a further statement?

[Mr Wallace]

My right hon. Friend makes the point about this very worrying build-up that we have seen and is growing; the latest is that there has been very sizeable movement of aircraft and aviation capabilities in the last few days. Significant numbers have been moving to key areas.

I will go back and look at the details around Belarus as well. I absolutely commit to Members that I will come to the House and keep them updated periodically—not only about the build-up, if that does continue, but about every next step.

Strength of the UK’s Armed Forces

Bernard Jenkin Excerpts

Wednesday 14th April 2021 Commons Chamber

[John Healey (Wentworth and Dearne) (Lab)]

I beg to move,

That this House notes the Prime Minister’s 2019 election pledge that his Government would not cut the Armed Services in any form; further notes with concern the threat assessment in the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy, that threats from other states to the UK and its allies are growing and diversifying; calls on the Government to rethink its plan set out in the Defence Command Paper, published in March 2021, CP411, to reduce key defence capabilities and reduce the strength of the Armed Forces, including a further reduction in the size of the Army by 2025; and calls on the Prime Minister to make an oral statement to Parliament by June 30 2021 on the Government’s plans to reduce the capability and strength of the Armed Forces.

Our thoughts across the House today are with the Queen and the royal family as they prepare for the Duke of Edinburgh’s funeral on Saturday. His distinguished wartime career in the Navy was followed for decades by that same dedication to serving his country at the side of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth.

We have called this Opposition debate for Members from all parts of the House to debate the Government’s defence and security plans as set out last month in the integrated review, the Defence Command Paper and the defence and security industrial strategy. Our starting point is the Prime Minister. He said at the launch of his 2019 election manifesto on behalf of all Conservative Members here:

“We will not be cutting our armed forces in any form. We will be maintaining the size of our armed forces”.

He may take the pledges that he makes to our armed forces and the public lightly; we do not. The integrated review confirms:

“State threats to the UK…are growing and diversifying”,

yet the defence review is a plan for fewer troops, fewer ships and fewer planes over the next three to four years.

I am disappointed that the Defence Secretary cannot be here to answer the growing chorus of concerns about his defence plans, but for today we entirely accept his attendance at the NATO special meeting on Ukraine. That in itself reinforces the warnings in the Defence Command Paper, which said:

“Russia continues to pose the greatest nuclear, conventional military and sub-threshold threat to European security.”

That heightens the widening concerns about cutting the strength of the UK’s armed forces in the face of growing global threats, instabilities and uncertainties.

There are so many serious flaws in the defence review and the industrial strategy. There is no assessment of current or future capability, no strategic principles or assumptions and nothing about how the Ministry of Defence should be structured or staffed in order to best provide national security. There is no recognition that the UK’s research capacity has been run down over the last decade by deep cuts to defence research and development, and no plan to absorb the £6.6 billion now pledged over the next four years.

There is no system for identifying and supporting the small companies that produce so much of our invention. There is nothing about what defence can get from greater advances in civil industry or what it can provide to civil industry and civil society. There is no explanation of how we will sustain the forward-deployed, front-footed, persistently globally deployed and engaged armed forces with so few ships and transport aircraft. There are no evident contingency plans to replace the losses of key equipment in conflict. There is nothing about mothballing equipment retired from service, like so many other countries do, rather than disposing of it on the narrow grounds that it saves money. I could go on, and I will on other occasions, but for today, our debate and our motion focus on the central concern about decisions to cut the strength of our armed forces in the face of growing threats and in breach of the Prime Minister’s personal pledge at the election.

In view of the interest—I am delighted to see that Members from all sides want to contribute to this debate —I want to make four main arguments and then look forward to what colleagues have to say. First, on numbers, with the threats to the UK growing and diversifying, there is a strong case against, not for, further cuts to the size of our armed forces. The Defence Secretary has announced that the Army’s established strength will be cut by 10,000 to just 72,500 over the next four years. That will be the smallest British Army for 300 years. Ministers can only promise no redundancies because all three forces are already well below the strength that the Government set out was required in the 2015 defence review.

Of course we must develop new technologies in domains such as cyber-space and artificial intelligence, but the British infantry—as the Minister knows better than anyone—has been the foundation on which the defence of the UK has relied for over 350 years. New technologies have always been harnessed to strengthen its capabilities, but they have never replaced entirely the need for boots on the ground.

[Sir Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

I have some sympathy for the right hon. Gentleman’s position, because when I was the shadow Secretary of State for Defence, I spent a lot of time criticising the then Labour Government for cutting the size of the infantry and the Army. The clear implication is that the next Labour Government would be spending more than the present Government, so how much more money would a future Labour Government be putting into defence compared to what we are spending, which, of course, has increased already?

[John Healey]

Sadly we are nowhere near another election at this point. We are at this stage in the parliamentary cycle with these plans on the table, and our interest is in the Government getting this right. The decisions taken now will set the shape of our defence forces for the next 10 years. The decisions taken now will be the framework with which a future Labour Government, after the next election, will have to live.

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[Sir Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

I very much share the concerns expressed by the right hon. Member for Warley (John Spellar), but I very much hope that we maintain minimum recoverable capability in all these fields, because the new capabilities that have been brought in by the integrated review are equally or more important than the reductions in the overall size of the armed forces that we have seen. The big surprise in the review was the announcement of the increase in the warhead cap.

I want to reply very directly to the right hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn). May I remind him that, on 18 July 2016, when he was leader of the Labour party, the Government got through the House the maingate of the renewal of the Trident submarines on a vote of 472 to 117? There is no doubt, therefore, that the strength of consensus in this House does not reflect the views of the then leader of the Labour party.

[John Spellar]

The hon. Gentleman will recall that that vote was taken about five years later than it should have been because of dithering by his own Government.

[Sir Bernard Jenkin]

I think the coalition had something to do with that. I warned David Cameron about that before we even went into that coalition.

The right hon. Member for Islington North accuses his own country of proliferating weapons of mass destruction, and suggests that we are somehow escalating our numbers, but he does not even mention the fact that, as my right hon. Friend the Member for North Somerset (Dr Fox) said, Russia has—what was it?—6,800 nuclear warheads. They are modernising every single weapons system that they have got. They are in breach of the intermediate-range nuclear forces treaty. That is escalation, and the right hon. Member for Islington North has nothing to say about that whatsoever.

We all know that the British people will support the United Kingdom’s continuous at-sea deterrent for as long as other nuclear weapons states are keeping their weapons and there are other proliferators around. We just need to remind ourselves what extraordinarily good value the continuous at-sea deterrent system actually is. The Library produced a report last month, pointing out that the annual cost of our continuous at-sea deterrent is just 1% of the cost of social security and tax credits—just 1%. So the idea that this is a Rolls-Royce system that we cannot afford is mythical. Nothing could buy us the security and influence that the continuous at-sea deterrent gives us.

The doctrine of deterrence is just as valid as it ever was. Has the right hon. Member for Islington North ever asked himself why major state-on-state warfare stopped in 1945? Well, I can tell him why: it was because nuclear weapons were invented and that kind of warfare became too costly, too destructive, to contemplate. Does he want to go back to that world by getting rid of nuclear weapons altogether? I hope not.

We just need to remind ourselves that our continuous at-sea deterrent can attack any target at any time, so it is always ready to respond to threats. Its location is unknown so it cannot be pre-empted. It does not require to be deployed at a time of international tension and crisis. The technology is tried and tested. It is not in breach of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty; it is completely compliant. It is a sovereign capability, which, if we had to use it, we would. No alternative system could possibly provide all these benefits at such good value, and that is why we should reaffirm our commitment to our nuclear deterrent.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Eleanor Laing)]

We now go by video link to Marie Rimmer, with a time limit of three minutes.

Integrated Review: Defence Command Paper

Bernard Jenkin Excerpts

Monday 22nd March 2021 Commons Chamber

[Mr Wallace]

Madam Deputy Speaker, you will know, having been in the House for many years, that Governments do not publish the Attorney General’s advice. We do not believe in any way that we are breaking the nuclear proliferation treaty, and what we really need to do is make sure that we maintain a credible deterrent.

[Sir Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con) [V]]

I thank my right hon. Friend for his Defence Command Paper, which I broadly welcome, in particular the integrated review, which looks forward to the modern threats we face and embraces the capabilities we need to develop to meet those threats. When it comes to the nuclear deterrent, we must remember that this is a bipartisan policy that has been supported by both sides of the House until now and that we want to maintain that consensus. May I echo what has been said about the need for discussion and exploration of why we need to increase the cap on the number of warheads? I am convinced that we need to maintain a credible deterrent, and I am sure that the Government would not be doing this unless there were very strong arguments for doing it to maintain the credibility of the deterrent.

[Mr Wallace]

Obviously, detail around development, use and, indeed, deployment of nuclear warheads is a very sensitive subject. However, I will see what I can do to provide further briefing to Members and to specific Committees, if that is a better way to furnish more detail in a secure environment.

Covid-19 Response: Defence Support

Bernard Jenkin Excerpts

Tuesday 12th January 2021 Commons Chamber

[Mr Wallace]

From a defence point of view—indeed, I know this from my own background as the Minister for Security—resilience was key to the integrated review. I felt it was important that the integrated view should be used to enhance the use of reserves. Reserves will be part of the long-term future of this nation’s resilience—whether they are civilian reserves in an NHS environment or, indeed, from the armed forces, they are going to be very important. We need to look at how we employ our people to make sure that there is a flow between regulars and reserves and that they are used in a much better way.

In addition to that, we have seen the threat of silent or sub-threshold enemies—disinformation. We have already seen Russia deploy smears, innuendos and disinformation against our Oxford-AstraZeneca vaccine, at the same time as elements trying to steal secrets through cyber. That is an important example of how we have to be on our guard when our adversaries take advantage of natural disasters or natural phenomena. We have deployed and used the 77th Brigade throughout this process to challenge disinformation, which is obviously an appropriate use of that brigade. When a foreign country makes something up, spreads a rumour and tries to undermine us, we should challenge that.

All those policies are being proved in this pandemic. Members will see front and centre in the integrated review that resilience is one of the main things on which we must always focus if we are to defend the nation.

[Sir Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con) [V]]

This is undoubtedly the greatest national emergency of my lifetime, yet only a small fraction of the available military capacity has been called upon by the rest of the Government—and that is despite the fact that the test and trace operations have been indifferent in performance and the vaccine programme seems to be to be almost entirely dependent on civilian capability that is tested every winter in the best of circumstances. Why does my right hon. Friend think that the Government, or perhaps the rest of the Government, are so confident that civilian organisations are capable of delivering these incredible tasks of such scale, magnitude, importance and urgency without significantly more military capacity, particularly in respect of four-star military capability at the top of these organisations, rather than just one-star?

[Mr Wallace]

I assure my hon. Friend that the four-stars and three-stars are equally busy. I just came from a meeting with a three-star and a four-star on the vaccines and the need to make sure that we are leaning in as much as possible. I understand what my hon. Friend says but, fundamentally, the armed forces have been making a difference. If there was more demand or, indeed, an easy way to deliver the solution to this pandemic, we would have been doing that.

It is not the case, when we talk about numbers in the armed forces, that they are sitting around not doing anything until they are called. My hon. Friend recently called for more assistance for the NHS in Essex. I looked at a number of requests that came in last week and the week before, and it was quite sobering to realise that of the 1,600 clinicians, senior nurses and nurses in the armed forces as regulars, they are all deployed—they are all working in hospitals in Middlesbrough, in the south-west, in Birmingham and in the south-east. They are all there, because even in peacetime—even when we are not fighting a pandemic—instead of having them sitting around, we make sure that they are working in the NHS and augmenting that time. In respect of some of the requests, we are in danger of robbing Peter to pay Paul: I would simply be taking clinicians out of one hospital trust to move them to another one. That is not going to solve the challenge that we have.

I understand what my hon. Friend says and can give him the assurance that I gave to the Labour defence spokesman, the right hon. Member for Wentworth and Dearne (John Healey): we stand ready to do it. It is not like we sit and wait in our rooms waiting for a phone call; we push and, sometimes to the annoyance of some of my colleagues, I push and push and agitate—I am quite a good agitator—to make sure that we try and deliver wherever we can. The Prime Minister is absolutely open to all ideas and we deliver on many occasions.

Armed Forces: Covid-19 Deployment

Bernard Jenkin Excerpts

Tuesday 10th November 2020 Commons Chamber

[Jeremy Quin]

I think the hon. Gentleman is aware that Defence has been involved from the outset on planning and logistics. At an early stage, Defence was called on, as it is regularly; we have had, on average, about 130 MACA requests a year for the past few years, and we are well used to working at a local level and a national level with partners across Government. There is a role for the military and a role they can pass on. For example, the military did a fantastic job on working with our partners in Health to provide the mobile testing units, but it is appropriate at some stage, when others get up to speed, that we hand over that task in order to be ready to undertake the next role, which in this case includes the whole-city pilot in Liverpool.

[Sir Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

NHS Test and Trace has grown from literally zero to being the size of Asda in little more than six months, and it would be difficult to imagine an organisation that has grown so quickly that would not be organisationally challenged. May I suggest that if the MOD has not been asked for headquarters capability, it should offer headquarters capability to NHS Test and Trace, as I am sure it would be welcomed with open arms?

Modernising Defence Programme

Bernard Jenkin Excerpts

Thursday 25th January 2018 Commons Chamber

[Gavin Williamson]

It is too early in the process for me to be able to comment on that, but I will look into the issue and come back to the hon. Gentleman. Obviously, the whole point of the programme is to look at things afresh. However, we have commented fairly regularly on the increasing threat that we face in the north Atlantic, which has been raised by Members. We must ensure that we have submarines that are able to operate in and defend the north Atlantic.

[Mr Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

I thank my right hon. Friend for delivering good news to the House, and congratulate him on leveraging the somewhat unexpected and sudden nature of his appointment to the advantage of Her Majesty’s armed forces and the Ministry of Defence. Leveraging control over the defence review back to the Department for the first time since 2010 represents a return of sanity, because the current defence review is proving undeliverable, which shows what happens if policy is divorced from the Department that has to deliver it.

[Gavin Williamson]

My hon. Friend makes an important point about this programme being led by the Ministry of Defence. Our armed forces should be leading the programme, because they have the greatest understanding of what is needed, and what support they will require to be most effective going forward.

Defence Capability

Bernard Jenkin Excerpts

Thursday 19th October 2017 Westminster Hall

[Mr Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

I shall be brief, Mr Bone. There is a realism that we need to bring to this debate. A capability review starts with what sort of country we want to be, what sort of role we want to play in the world, and the strategic situation that we face; and the only thing that is changing is the strategic situation that we face, which is getting worse. The Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre puts state-on-state warfare as a major threat; it is slight now, but growing and will be becoming severe in the next 20 or 30 years. That is the context in which this debate should be seen. We keep hearing, peppered throughout the debate, the noises from colleagues who are complaining that capability is being cut on an arbitrary basis because there is not enough money in the budget. These are not strategic decisions; they are decisions taken to match a year-on-year target, so the impression being given is that the defence budget is really being planned only one year ahead, with the consequences of these cuts.

Let us look back over the last seven years. The coalition Government inherited a black hole in the defence budget of £35 billion. Coupled with George Osborne’s 8% defence cash cut to the headline figure, that meant that we reached 2015 already having suffered a real-terms cut of 17% in the defence budget, regardless of the ongoing pressure of defence cost inflation. Recently, we have suffered the collapse in the value of the pound against the dollar, as has been said; and looking five and 10 years ahead, we are facing another black hole in the defence budget, which will have severe consequences, because the big equipment programmes that tend to dominate defence expenditure are crowding out investment in technology and people. Always it is manpower that takes the cut to protect the big equipment programmes.

We need to concentrate not just on how we are to strategically improve the defence budget to protect the existing programmes. If we are to have such a limited defence budget, we need to learn how to spend more on people, technology and industrial capacity, to be able to build the equipment that we need for the campaign that we are in, rather than finding ourselves with the equipment that we ordered 10 years ago, which is inappropriate for the campaign that we now face. We need to invest more in the people, who are, in the end, the absolute force multiplier in any crisis that we face. It is a big challenge, but if we continue on the present trajectory, the situation will just get worse.

Trident: Test Firing

Bernard Jenkin Excerpts

Monday 23rd January 2017 Commons Chamber

[Sir Michael Fallon]

I do not accept that. Previous Governments that the hon. Gentleman supported have not given operational details of previous demonstration and shakedown operations, which comprise the major tests of the systems and sub-systems that we have been dealing with today.

[Mr Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

May I commend my right hon. Friend for his reticence about getting drawn into this, and may I also commend the Prime Minister for her reticence, which was entirely appropriate given the subject at issue? Is it not rather ironic to hear right hon. and hon. Members complaining about the possible lack of credibility of the deterrent when some of them do not actually believe in the doctrine of deterrence at all? It would be unwise of the Russians or any other potential adversary to suggest that they could take the risk of invading this or that country on the basis that we might have a misfire of one of our missiles.

[Sir Michael Fallon]

Again, I agree with my hon. Friend. We should not forget that there were many in that particular debate who took the opposite view—the view that we no longer need the deterrent. I am particularly pleased that the overwhelming majority of Members of this House, on both sides of this House, voted in favour of renewing the deterrent that has kept us safe for so long.

Royal Naval Deployment: Mediterranean

Bernard Jenkin Excerpts

Monday 7th March 2016 Commons Chamber

[Michael Fallon]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his comments. Let me reciprocate by sending our good wishes to Captain Taylor and the crew of Mounts Bay, the 200 Royal Marines embarked on her and the helicopter squadron accompanying her.

So far as sufficiency is concerned, there are five NATO ships on station at the moment—a German ship, which is the flagship of the group, a Greek ship, a Canadian ship, an Italian ship and a Turkish ship—and ours makes that six ships spread out across the Aegean. Of course, there are 22 other members of NATO, and I hope that they will consider what contribution they can make. Mounts Bay is a substantial ship and, with a helicopter platform, it can contribute significantly to the surveillance, particularly of the middle part of the Aegean. We envisage that Mounts Bay will operate mainly in waters just west of Chios.

In so far as the shipbuilding strategy is relevant, we are developing the strategy in the light of the SDSR, as the hon. Gentleman knows, and we hope to complete it later this year. On his attempt to bring NATO and European Union membership into this, let me make this clear to him: the mission in the sea between Libya and Italy is a European Union mission, because in dealing with the new Libyan Government, it may need the legal authorities that the European Union can add; the group deployed in the Aegean is a NATO mission, because it of course involves a ship of the Turkish navy and is largely dealing with migrants from Turkey, which is a member of NATO. That perfectly illustrates that we need to be members of both NATO and the European Union, and that being members of both gives us the best of both worlds.

[Mr Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

I thank my right hon. Friend for his statement and, indeed, the Royal Navy for its commitment to this mission, which demonstrates that we have an important role to play in European defence and security. By making it clear that this is a NATO mission, he underlines the point that NATO provides the security of our continent, not the European Union, as the Government seek to pretend.

[Michael Fallon]

This is a NATO mission—it was proposed by Germany, which is leading this particular standing maritime group—but the equally important mission in the Tyrrhenian sea, between Sicily and Libya, is a European Union mission. There are other examples of European Union missions—in Bosnia, and off the horn of Africa—that have been equally effective in saving lives.

Defence Implementation Road Map

Bernard Jenkin Excerpts

Tuesday 10th November 2015 General Committees

[The Chair]

We now have until 3.35 pm for questions. At my discretion, I will allow supplementary questions.

[Mr Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

It is a pleasure, Mr Hanson, to serve under your chairmanship. May I ask the Minister why we support EU defence industrial policy when we do not have a defence industrial policy of our own?

[Mr Brazier]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his question. We are not supporting EU industrial policy; we are supporting initiatives by the EDA to do what is sometimes called “speed dating” to encourage companies in different European countries to talk about how they can work together to reduce the massive overcapacity in the European defence industry and to get better value for money. To expand that answer slightly, one of our specific contributions has been to persuade countries to look at cross-purchase, or reciprocal purchase, as well as at several nations collaborating, because that is often a cheaper and more effective way of getting good value for defence.

[Mr Jenkin]

I thank my hon. Friend for that answer. May I remind him that in the 2010 Conservative manifesto we were going to pull out of the European Defence Agency? Then, under the coalition, we were told that we could not pull out of the EDA because we were in coalition. Now we are not in coalition, but we are still participating in the EDA. Why have we changed our policy?

[Mr Brazier]

We regularly review our membership of the EDA. The most recent study took place after I became a Minister. It is a relatively small budget and a simple tactical choice. In fact, one EU country chooses not to participate: Denmark. The choice is entirely pragmatic. At the moment, the small budget spent offers value for money, we feel, because in a number of areas we can see that savings are provided. The EU is not a competitor with NATO, at least not as we are formulating it, but having the EU as a forum where we can discuss participation in various collaborative projects—my hon. Friend the Member for North East Somerset mentioned collaboration—intellectual property rights, dual use and so on, provides good value in some areas. We do not have an ideological commitment to remain a member, but an independent study has looked at it in the past 12 months and we believe it offers good value for money.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Brazier]

The EDA is an intergovernmental agreement. Denmark is not a member, although Denmark is a member of the EU. I tried to make it clear from the beginning of my speech that the Government’s policy is to stop the Commission from expanding its competencies. From time to time we review our membership of the EDA; it has a small budget, which is doing useful work in a number of areas. It has saved us money—I mentioned two or three of the areas where it has done so—but we are not allowing the Commission to develop an industrial or a defence industrial policy for Europe. We have no intention of doing so.

[Mr Jenkin]

It is interesting how much assertion and denial has to be done to explain why it is in our interest to be involved with this at all, but I commend my hon. Friend for starving the EDA of the cash that it craves. Other member states would willingly vote for that, but we use our veto to prevent it, which certainly keeps things in check to a degree. However, will he clarify why, when every strategic defence review from 1998 onwards described, as he just did, NATO as the cornerstone of our defence, the 2010 SDSR did not?

[Mr Brazier]

I am most grateful to my hon. Friend for his kind comments on my exercise of the veto last year. My noble Friend Earl Howe is going over to do that next week. The short answer to my hon. Friend’s question is that I do not know. I congratulate him on his observation, and I would be surprised if NATO was not pretty central to the next SDSR.

[Mr Jenkin]

I am most grateful for that assurance. Rather than repeating what the 2010 review said—it referred to

“our status as a permanent member of the UN Security Council and a leading member of NATO, the EU and other international organisations”,

as though NATO and the EU were pari passu with each other—may I suggest to the Minister that we include the words, “NATO is the cornerstone of our defence” in the 2015 SDSR?

[The Chair]

Order. Before the Minister answers, I remind the Committee that we are dealing with European document No. 11358/14, “A New Deal for European Defence”. Although matters relating to 2010 may have relevance to the wider debate, the focus of questions should be on that document.

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[Mr Brazier]

I am grateful to my hon. and gallant Friend, but I can only repeat what I said earlier. The EU provides collective defence capability in a small number of niche areas where NATO has chosen not to. I have mentioned several times, because it is of particular national interest to us as a country that still has a significant merchant fleet, the joint EU action off the horn of Africa, which has been a triumph—piracy there has virtually stopped. It is run from Northwood by the British, although, I am sorry to say, we have not had much in the way of naval vessels in it in the past year or two. The French-led operation in Mali is another such example. I thought that the willingness of EU countries to get together occasionally and tackle issues that NATO, for one reason or another, chooses not to was relatively uncontroversial.

The first half of my hon. and gallant Friend’s quote on Europe’s defence capability is true. The industries are in the individual countries and the policy remains a member state matter. We have made it absolutely clear—I do not think I could have made it clearer—that we have resisted successfully every attempt by the Commission to try to dictate to us in this area.

[Mr Jenkin]

Will my hon. Friend clarify whether section 2 provisions of the treaty on European Union are justiciable by the European Court of Justice inasmuch as they affect defence and the European Defence Agency?

[Mr Brazier]

I will have to wait for official advice on that. I will return to it during the debate.

[The Chair]

We will have an opportunity during the debate to include that should we so wish. Does any other Member want to ask a question?

[Mr Jenkin]

The answer to my question is that I believe they are and that there is no exclusion from the European Court of Justice. The European Defence Agency statute, established by article whatever it is, includes provision for qualified majority voting in a very substantial number of areas, which includes, as I will explain later, permanent structured co-operation and majority voting, from which we could be excluded or subject to qualified majority voting. These are serious potential developments. Does my hon Friend not understand the risk of participating in this at all?

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[Mr Jenkin]

When considering this instrument, it is worth noting first that the document is dated 26 June 2014. That we are dealing with it at such a late stage is an indication of how poor our scrutiny arrangements are and how incapable we are as a Parliament at keeping up with developments in the European Union.

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

[Mr Jenkin]

I am making absolutely no personal criticism of my hon. Friend, and I give way to him on that basis.

[Mr Rees-Mogg]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for giving way. The document was recommended for debate by the European Scrutiny Committee about a year ago. The coalition Government refused to send documents for debate, and a huge backlog built up. Much of that is now being cleared by this Government, and I hope that more work will be done. It was not a failure of our processes; I am afraid it was a failure of Her Majesty’s Government.

[Mr Jenkin]

I am very grateful for that information and I am sure the Committee is, too. I was about to say that this is the first occasion, apart from a Government statement after the 2013 Council of Ministers meeting, that we have debated the 2013 conclusions in any depth. That underlines a serious state of affairs.

[Mr Brazier]

I remind my hon. Friend that I started with an apology for the tardiness of the debate. To answer his earlier question, it is true that the EDA does operate, as he suggested, on a qualified majority vote basis. In matters that are deemed to be important for national sovereignty, however, any member can escalate the matter up to the Council of Ministers, where it must be agreed by unanimity. The practical effect is therefore not as he imagines.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Jenkin]

I appreciate that my hon. Friend has received that reassurance, but, as I will explain, it is not worth very much. The fundamental problem is that our Government like to pretend that the EU’s common security and defence policy is harmless intergovernmental co-operation that has no access to money or legal sanctions and is therefore a federalist paper tiger. The 2013 Council conclusions actually give the lie to that, and any Conservative Prime Minister should have been wholly opposed to them. To sign the UK up to the programme in the document is not just another step towards a Europe army, which has always been a dream of federalist nations such as Germany, but another blow to our already beleaguered defence industries and another nail in the NATO coffin, in order that continental defence industries should not be exposed to US competition.

Much of the 2013 conclusions appears to be the usual verbiage and high-flown rhetoric about the EU being a “global player” in defence and about the

“strong commitment to the further development of a credible and effective CSDP”.

The understatement:

“Defence budgets in Europe are constrained”

is a feeble attempt to mask the reality that member states, including the UK, are all cutting their defence budgets. The oft-repeated plea to “make use of synergies”—a common theme of such documents—to improve capabilities has so far proved a forlorn hope. The invocation of increasing the effectiveness, visibility and impact of CSDP is bound to fail.

It is almost entirely down to France and the United Kingdom that EU defence means anything at all. We work increasingly bilaterally with the French, and other operations are NATO operations under an EU flag. NATO remains far more significant because it has US backing, and its people at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe are practised at planning and generating force for multinational operations. However, NATO gets its first mention only as a “partner” in paragraph 6 of the 2013 conclusions alongside the UN, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the African Union—as though NATO were equivalent to the African Union. There is mention of

“strategic partners and partner countries”,

but it is telling that the EU cannot bring itself to name the United States of America, the one military entity that dominates the world and the sole guarantor of European security. That underlines the squeamishness, futility, parochialism and vanity of CSDP.

The potential to damage UK defence interests is in the detail. The call for an EU cyber-defence policy framework and for an EU maritime security strategy both involve the federalist EU Commission. Remember, the Commission is the EU’s most powerful legislative body, so, if the Commission is involved, that is anything but intergovernmental co-operation.

To agree to that is to agree to a threat to the independence of UK policy in those fields. The fact that the Council will also call for

“increased synergies between CSDP and Freedom/Security/Justice actors”

opens the door to legally binding defence commitments to

“tackle horizontal issues such as organized crime, including trafficking and smuggling of human beings, and terrorism”.

A lot of that is already firmly in in the Commission’s legislative purview. That is another compelling reason for the UK to exercise its Lisbon treaty opt-out from EU home and justice affairs, which unfortunately we spurned last year.

Finally, on military capability development, the EU intends utterly to eclipse NATO, backed by the two legally binding 2009 defence procurement directives that enhance the power of the European Defence Agency, which is becoming an embryo EU defence ministry. The EDA’s statute enables decisions to be taken by majority voting, and, where any single state can threaten a veto, a subset of member states can act unilaterally as a bloc in the name of the whole of the EU—that is what they call structure co-operation.

EU defence is not so much about defence—because, as we see, defence expenditure across the continent is declining—as it is about protectionism of continental defence industrial interests whose technology rather lags behind their US counterparts. The Council proposes support for remotely piloted aircraft systems—a squeamish name for what we call drones or unmanned aerial vehicles—air-to-air refuelling, satellite communication and cyber. In at least two of these areas, air-to-air refuelling and cyber, the UK is already supreme in the EU—we have, for example, GCHQ in Cheltenham—so why should we agree to the EU directing our policy? That is what this amounts to. For all those capabilities, US interoperability is essential for the UK, but there is nothing in these documents about co-operation with our closest ally, because EU defence is about excluding the US wherever possible. That is why NATO is not an acceptable vehicle for those who want European integration.

In the 2013 conclusions, we read that the Council

“invites the Commission (again), the European Investment Bank and the European Defence Agency to develop proposals for a pooled acquisition mechanism”,

which can only mean some kind of EU defence purchasing agency. It may not require much money to develop legal control over member states’ defence procurement programmes. How so? The proposals for

“strengthening Europe's defence industry”

are to be

“in full compliance with EU law”.

This is not intergovernmental. The Commission again is invited

“to set up a Preparatory Action on CSDP-related research”.

Finally,

“The European Defence Agency, in cooperation with the Commission (yet again), will prepare a roadmap for the development of defence industrial standards”

which is what we are looking at today, and

“develop a harmonized European military certification approach”.

Those are the key means by which the EU can obtain control over defence. One of the key purposes of NATO was to ensure transatlantic standards and certification to ensure interoperability. The EU is duplicating that role in order to create its own separate and distinct standards that are not compatible with our US counterparts.

Again, on this question of certification and standards there is no reference whatever to EU-US co-operation, which would make sense. That is because the EU wants standards and certification that will exclude US defence equipment from EU markets wherever possible. That is what EU defence policy is really about.

I am sorry to tell my hon. Friend the Minister that I shall not be voting to take note of this document and will vote against if the opportunity arises.