Eurozone Financial Assistance

Bernard Jenkin Excerpts

Tuesday 24th May 2011 Commons Chamber

That this House notes with concern that UK taxpayers are potentially being made liable for bail-outs of Eurozone countries when the UK opted to remain outside the Euro and, despite agreement in May 2010 that the EU-wide European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM) of €60 billion would represent only 12 per cent. of the non-IMF contribution with the remaining €440 billion being borne by the Eurozone through the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), that the EFSM for which the UK may be held liable is in fact being drawn upon to the same or a greater extent than the EFSF; further notes that the European Scrutiny Committee has stated its view that the EFSM is legally unsound; urges the Government to raise the issue of the EFSM at the next meeting of the Council of Ministers or the European Council; and supports any measures which would lead to an agreement for a Eurozone-only arrangement.

[Mr Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

On a point of order, Mr Deputy Speaker. May I put it to you that the Backbench Business Committee is in fact not being allowed to operate as was clearly originally intended when it was established? Because the motion was amended, the Committee was unable to allow the House to vote on the motion that it had selected for debate. What advice can you give to the House on how that matter might be rectified so that in future, as on Opposition days, the motion is voted on before the amendment is taken? What advice can you give to enable that to happen in future?

[Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Lindsay Hoyle)]

I recognise that there is a lot of frustration at the way the motion was dealt with today. However, things have been carried out in order. I am sure that the Leader of the House will reflect on the hon. Gentleman’s comments and think about them, but I am also sure that he will speak to the Committee to see whether there is a way forward for everybody. Hopefully, some amiable agreement can be reached in future, if that is the desire of the Committee.

Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base

Bernard Jenkin Excerpts

Wednesday 11th May 2011 Commons Chamber

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

Indeed; thank you so much for that sedentary intervention.

It is very interesting that, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Wokingham (Mr Redwood) was saying, between 1688 and 1972, taxation could not be levied without the permission of the House. Since 1972, tax rates have been changed at the whim of the European Union. What is more, it happens to use duties levied on imports in exactly the way that James II would have been familiar with—it takes the same anti-parliamentary approach. James II called them tonnage and poundage; the European Union calls them anti-dumping measures but it changes them with arrogance as it sees fit.

I want to talk about the legal aspects of this issue, because they are the absolute crux of it. I raise this point with my hon. Friend the Minister because there is no point in negotiating for months if there is no legal basis in the first place. The Government should be very clear and rigorous about this and should take it, if necessary, all the way through to the European Court of Justice. That might be a Court in which many of us do not have a great deal of confidence and it might be a Court that is in principle a federalist Court, but none the less it is there and its procedures should be used.

Let me read out paragraph 2.12 of the European Scrutiny Committee’s conclusion on this issue:

“The draft Directive is concerned with direct taxation. The legal base cited for it is Article 115 TFEU. This article allows EU legislation to approximate national legislation which directly affects the operation of the single market, but”—

this is the key point—

“this provision is expressly ‘without prejudice to Article 114’. Article 114(2) TFEU provides that Article 114(1) TFEU ‘shall not apply to fiscal provisions’. Article 113 TFEU, the only provision referring to the harmonisation of taxation, is limited in its scope to ‘turnover taxes, excise duties and other forms of indirect taxation’. There is therefore no express provision in the Treaty for the harmonisation of direct taxation.”

[Mr Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

In that quote, my hon. Friend used the word “approximate”. What is the legal import of the meaning of “approximate”?

[Jacob Rees-Mogg]

My hon. Friend leads me away from the essential point, which is that the EU does not have any authority over direct taxation, whether it is approximating it or not, so the approximation is irrelevant in relation to direct taxation because the treaties do not provide for that. If the treaties do not provide for it, then the EU cannot provide for enhanced co-operation without a specific treaty amendment, which would of course be a separate veto-able activity under the treaties as they exist.

We often complain about European law, and I do not like the fact that laws made by this Parliament can be overturned by the European Court, but as that is the world in which we live, when European law is on our side we ought to use it. So I reiterate my plea to the Minister in the European Councils to say that we are uncertain of the legal base and that we would like a clear legal judgment from the European Court of Justice before we proceed with further negotiations.

Now there is also a fall-back position, as my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash) said. If the European Court of Justice were, as a federalising court, to invent a legal base, we could then come back to the point of subsidiarity, where this debate is so relevant and important. We are putting the argument to Europe and saying, “You have put these fine protections into the treaties. You have used these grand-sounding words—not as clear as the 10th amendment to the United States constitution, but none the less words that are supposed to protect the rights of sovereign member states. Let’s now see if you mean it. Let’s now see if you, the Commission, will accept the argument for subsidiarity, and if you won’t, whether the court will back it up and whether the proposals will fall on that basis.”

If all this fails, then I accept the Minister’s position. I must confess that it is a reassurance to those of us on the Eurosceptic wing of the party that it is the Minister who will be conducting the negotiations, because at least we know that it is not, as some on the Opposition Benches would have said, a woolly Liberal negotiating. It is somebody who wields a handbag in as fine a way as the great lady—[Interruption]—the blessed lady, so we have confidence that the Government’s negotiations will be tough.

It is fair enough to go through a process, if that is where we end up, but ultimately the response must be no, not least because tax competition is a thoroughly healthy thing.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

I am most grateful for the indulgence of the House in allowing me to take part in this debate, despite the fact, which I regret and for which I apologise, that I missed the speeches by the Economic Secretary to the Treasury and the hon. Member for Nottingham East (Chris Leslie), who speaks for the Opposition. I heard my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash) and the subsequent speeches, and I get the tenor of the objections that have been raised to the draft directive and the concerns, which have been very well expressed.

I wish to speak not so much about the substance of the directive as about the matter that is so germane to this debate: the nature of subsidiarity—what it is, and what we mean by it. That is the issue on which the debate hangs: a plea for subsidiarity.

We should remind ourselves what article 5 of the Treaty on the European Union says about subsidiarity:

“Under the principle of subsidiarity…the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level.”

Back in 1992-93, when the Maastricht treaty was being debated, a great deal of Hansard ink was devoted to reporting the discussion of that principle, and I might say that I majored in the topic.

The advisory part of article 5 relates to the objectives of the proposed action, and subsidiarity is a purely relative concept if it relates to the objectives of the proposed action, so what are the objectives in the case before us? They are set out at the start, and this speech is, I am afraid, about the futility of depending on subsidiarity. Subsidiarity is a futile defence of the national interest.

Article 1 of the preamble to the draft directive states:

“Companies which seek to do business across frontiers within the Union encounter serious obstacles and market distortions owing to the existence of 27 diverse corporate tax systems. These obstacles and distortions impede the proper functioning of the internal market.”

The proposed directive refers to “disincentives for investment”, to the complexity in article 3 whereby the

“network of double taxation conventions between Member States does not offer an appropriate solution,”

and to the need for

“a single market for the purpose of corporate tax”.

[Mr Redwood]

I am delighted if a case can be made under subsidiarity, but surely there is a much simpler case: taxation of companies and incomes was never part of the deal for the powers of the European Union. What it is trying to do is quite illegal, and all we need to do is to say so.

[Mr Jenkin]

But that was always the danger with article 5 and the subsidiarity clause. There are some very general objectives set out in the treaties, and subsidiarity is one of those catch-all arrangements that can justify stretching the meaning of other articles, as we have already seen.

How does the European Union justify the bail-out mechanism that the previous Chancellor of the Exchequer approved under article 122 of the Lisbon treaty, which was designed for natural disasters? How can a crisis in the euro possibly be classified as a natural disaster? The mechanism has, however, been allowed to go through by default.

The arrangement before us is another that will go through by default if we do not challenge it. Indeed, article 26 of the draft directive, the penultimate paragraph of the preamble, states:

“The objective of this Directive cannot be sufficiently achieved through individual action undertaken by the Member States because of the lack of coordination among national tax systems.”

It goes on to justify the objective as being

“in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity”—

and in its own terms that is very difficult to argue with.

I appreciate the European Scrutiny Committee’s points about the direct legal base, but the European Union is going for an indirect legal base. That demonstrates that subsidiarity was always a deceit. It was always something that could be a centralising, as opposed to a decentralising, concept, and if we rest our case against the proposal purely on the principle of subsidiarity we will allow the EU, rather than what we want ourselves, to determine what is imposed upon this country. If we rest our case against this proposal purely on the principle of subsidiarity, we are allowing the European Union to decide what shall be imposed on this country rather than deciding what we want for ourselves.

[Mr Cash]

I know that my hon. Friend was able to come in only somewhat late in the debate, but the arguments that we have been presenting show that there are a whole series of weapons that we can employ. Subsidiarity happens to be a procedural device that is available to us by way of a reasoned opinion, which is what the motion is about. We are critical of the Government’s position in that they have not exercised their political will, for all the reasons that my hon. Friend and others have explained. This whole business is an infringement not merely of the word “sovereignty” but of the practical requirements of the people of this country to tax themselves by consent. That is what it is all about.

[Mr Jenkin]

There is absolutely no difference between me and my hon. Friend on that point.

To echo my right hon. Friend the Member for Wokingham (Mr Redwood), the Budget moment in the calendar of this House is the most important political occasion of each year, when the Chancellor comes to this House to deliver his Budget judgment and it is for the House to determine what the levels of expenditure, taxation and borrowing should be. That is absolutely fundamental not only to the mechanics of our democracy but to the culture of our democracy and the culture of this House. This proposal is a very direct challenge to government by national democratic consent.

The only, rather lame and late, point that I might be adding to the debate is a very simple one, and I do so for the same reason as that which led my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr Cash) to lambast the concept of subsidiarity when it was first proposed in the treaty on the European Union back in 1992—the Maastricht treaty. It is, very simply, that subsidiarity is not sovereignty. Subsidiarity is subservience; it is submitting to the jurisdiction of the European institutions instead of the sovereign judgment of the British people as expressed in this House. Subsidiarity is no substitute for Government saying no, particularly where the veto is in their hands. I urge my hon. Friend the Minister to exercise that veto, knowing that she will have the confidence of the British people behind her, because they do not want her to say yes in this case.

European Summit

Bernard Jenkin Excerpts

Thursday 24th March 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hoban]

The hon. Gentleman makes an important point. It is vital that there is stability in the eurozone and that agreement is reached on the ESM. My understanding is that the issues raised by the German Government and German Chancellor are not about the fundamental design of the mechanism, but about its detailed terms. We will discuss that at this weekend’s European Council, on which the Prime Minister will report to the House on Monday, as is customary.

The hon. Gentleman asked about the UK economy’s exposure to Portugal. Our exposure is relatively small—smaller than that of a number of other European countries. Our bilateral trade in 2010 was about £4 billion, so we do not have a significant exposure, although Portugal is of course an important trading partner.

[Mr Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

Can we just have a reality check? There will be no stability in the euro area until at least some of the countries currently in it leave. There seems to be little doubt about that.

May I remind my hon. Friend that we have just had an austerity Budget—another one? In my constituency, people are talking about having to make NHS savings of £84 million over the current planning period. Can he imagine how absolutely furious British voters will be if it turns out that the British taxpayer must continue to contribute to the bail-out of euro countries even though we are not a member? Why does he not take the opportunity—before agreeing to the new stability mechanism—to get our European partners to agree that we shall be released from any obligation to the temporary stability mechanism for which we are currently liable?

Loans to Ireland Bill

Bernard Jenkin Excerpts

Wednesday 15th December 2010 Commons Chamber

[Alan Johnson]

I am coming to exactly that point.

Some Conservative Members think that the root cause is the single currency. I do not share that view. The euro had nothing to do with the property boom and bust, and a failed euro would be an economic and political disaster with repercussions well beyond our continent. Ireland needs a healthy eurozone, or it will end up with years of deflation and unemployment, and we will be less likely to have our loan repaid.

As the loan that we are being asked to approve is equal to the amount of money that we would have contributed had we been a member of the eurozone, surely that gives us the right to influence the necessary debate on what action is needed to address the underlying causes of this recurring crisis. This bail-out buys time, but there is no sign that Europe’s leaders know how to put it to good use. In May, we had the Greek bail-out; six months later, we have to deal with Ireland. In neither case is there much sign that these countries have resolved the core dilemma, which is solvency.

Collective austerity across Europe offers countries with high debt burdens no way out. Cutting demand in Germany is the last thing that Ireland needs at the moment. What we are seeing in Europe bears out the IMF’s conclusion that fiscal austerity does not boost short-term growth and that deficit cuts are more painful if they occur simultaneously across many countries. Ireland needs a healthy eurozone with markets such as Germany consuming Irish goods, or it will end up with years of deflation and unemployment. Having engaged in repeated rounds of austerity, with VAT rises, welfare cuts and redundancies, Ireland still finds growth elusive: it has been consistently poor for the past three years. Indeed, the economy has shrunk in 11 of the 14 quarters since the beginning of 2007, and sluggish growth has made getting the deficit down much harder.

[Mr Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

When a country becomes over-indebted, it can either enslave itself to the debt or inflate and devalue. Is it not clear that the fundamental problem is that none of the countries in the euro can inflate and devalue to get out of their problems? That is why some Conservative Members are saying that it is only a matter of time before some of these countries fall out of the euro, and that we would be better off planning on that basis than pretending that we can hold back an unstoppable tide.

[Alan Johnson]

The hon. Gentleman is right that the single currency gives Ireland no mechanism to devalue its currency, and that that causes it a problem. However, there are two extremes to that argument. The first says that the eurozone is unfinished business; what started as a currency harmonisation needs to move to the next stage. I heard the president of the European Central Bank say on the radio last night that the next stage should be political integration. My party does not agree with that; nor I am sure does the hon. Gentleman’s. Further integration is one extreme that we should not go to.

The second extreme says that if Ireland simply withdrew from the euro or the eurozone, its problems would be solved. I do not believe that to be the case. The eurozone has to recognise the problem that its countries cannot devalue and must find a mechanism that ensures that this problem does not keep happening to country after country. The hon. Member for Harwich and North Essex (Mr Jenkin) has a view, as do many of his colleagues, on the answer to this ongoing problem. I do not agree with him, but I believe that it is central to stop this happening to other countries, and to stop it being a regular event. The fragility of the recovery, especially in Europe, emphasises the need for decisive action to resolve the underlying difficulties faced by eurozone countries.

The situation in Ireland is a huge embarrassment for the Chancellor, exposing as it does his poor judgment and rich hyperbole. At the time of the comprehensive spending review, he claimed that our country was on the brink of bankruptcy. He now proposes a loan of an amount that is well over half the cumulative debt interest savings that he claimed he would make over the spending review period. There is also the paradox of his support for Ireland’s banks, but his opposition to the previous Government’s successful measures to protect British banks.

Finally, there is the Chancellor’s frequently expressed belief that Britain should look to Ireland for inspiration, which he expressed both before the banking crisis, when he urged us to emulate the “Irish miracle”, and since the crisis, with his desire to copy some of Ireland’s painful austerity measures. His gloriously misjudged 2006 article in The Times is now well known:

“Ireland stands as a shining example of the art of the possible in long-term economic policymaking”.

He is in good company. I shall quote from the Prime Minister in the Belfast Telegraph on 26 October 2006.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Tyrie]

I appreciate that. The Chancellor has referred to 2013 on a number of occasions, and my hon. Friend has referred to the possible unlawfulness of the mechanism on a number of occasions, including in private discussions.

This is a crisis of the eurozone, for which UK taxpayers are footing part of the bill. The UK will have to engage with members of the eurozone to limit the damage now and to construct something better for the future. I will touch on a few of those points in the moments that remain. I recognise that the problems to which I refer may be intractable. First, as the Chancellor has said, the senior creditors have been exempted from a haircut. The Chancellor told us that this was because of the risk of contagion. He is probably right, but the resulting moral hazard is large and will have to be addressed.

The second issue that I wish to raise, which naturally none of the authorities wants to talk about, is the fact that even the measures for Ireland and for Greece may not prevent default. The crisis may be one of solvency, not liquidity. That has a bearing on the lender of last resort provisions for the eurozone. It is possible that a sovereign default could trigger a banking crisis and even failure in parts of the eurozone, because banks hold a large amount of sovereign debt on their balance sheets. Such a bank failure could be highly toxic.

It is worth bearing in mind that the great depression of the 1930s was triggered as much by bank failures after 1931 as it was by the stock market collapse of 1929. I do not want to play the role of Cassandra, but I plead that contingency planning at European level be done now for the risk of such a bank failure. On the basis of the eurozone’s responses to the crisis so far, I am not optimistic that that planning is being done. The eurozone is fearful of leaks, and those doing the work would be terrified of that possibility. I have no doubt that that would inhibit their work. In addition, pessimism on such issues in European circles does not exactly make such work a career-enhancing prospect for the eurocrats who would have to do it. Let us just hope that they are doing that work.

The third problem that I wish to refer to—I shall leave it at that given the time available—is the long-term future of the eurozone itself in a world in which the bond markets have discovered that the no bail-out clause is toothless. I should say at this point that I have never opposed the eurozone on ideological grounds or on grounds of principle, but I have been wary on practical grounds, particularly the ground that the no bail-out clause may turn out to have no clothes. That is exactly what has happened.

[Mr Jenkin]

Does my hon. Friend share the concern that because we are taking part in the Irish bail-out on equal terms with the euro members, we are setting a precedent that will put political pressure on the Government to take part in other bail-outs? Does he believe that the Government will be in a position to resist that pressure?

[Mr Tyrie]

I have no doubt that the Government are listening to my hon. Friend and others, who will put pressure on them to resist the pressure from other quarters. I agree with his point.

It seems to me that very little work is being done on the possibility of the euro crisis leading to more general examples of the no bail-out clause’s bluff being called. I would be surprised if there had been any such work. I cannot be sure, but it strikes me as highly unlikely. It is the Ark of the Covenant that the eurozone will continue indefinitely.

When the Chancellor came before the Treasury Committee, he assured us that eurozone members were

“having a discussion about the permanent eurozone bail-out mechanism.”

Loans to Ireland Bill (Allocation of Time)

Bernard Jenkin Excerpts

Wednesday 15th December 2010 Commons Chamber

[The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Mr Mark Hoban)]

I beg to move,

That the following provisions shall apply to the proceedings on the Loans to Ireland Bill:

Timetable

1.–(1) Proceedings on Second Reading, in Committee, on consideration and on Third Reading shall be completed at today’s sitting in accordance with the following provisions of this paragraph.

(2) Proceedings on Second Reading shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion three and a half hours after the commencement of proceedings on the Motion for this Order.

(3) Proceedings in Committee, on consideration and on Third Reading shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at the moment of interruption or six hours after the commencement of proceedings on the Motion for this Order, whichever is the later.

Timing of proceedings and Questions to be put

2. When the Bill has been read a second time—

(a) it shall (despite Standing Order No. 63 (Committal of bills not subject to a programme order)) stand committed to a Committee of the whole House without any Question being put;

(b) proceedings on the Bill shall stand postponed while the Question is put, in accordance with paragraph (1) of Standing Order No. 52 (Money resolutions and ways and means resolutions in connection with bills), on any financial resolution relating to the Bill;

(c) on the conclusion of proceedings on any financial resolution relating to the Bill, proceedings on the Bill shall be resumed and the Speaker shall leave the Chair whether or not notice of an Instruction has been given.

3.–(1) On the conclusion of proceedings in Committee, the Chair shall report the Bill to the House without putting any Question.

(2) If the Bill is reported with amendments, the House shall proceed to consider the Bill as amended without any Question being put.

4. For the purpose of bringing any proceedings to a conclusion in accordance with paragraph 1, the Speaker or Chair shall forthwith put the following Questions (but no others)—

(a) any Question already proposed from the Chair;

(b) any Question necessary to bring to a decision a Question so proposed;

(c) the Question on any amendment moved or Motion made by a Minister of the Crown;

(d) any other Question necessary for the disposal of the business to be concluded.

5. On a Motion so made for a new Clause or a new Schedule, the Chair or Speaker shall put only the Question that the Clause or Schedule be added to the Bill.

6. If two or more Questions would fall to be put under paragraph 4(c) on successive amendments moved or Motions made by a Minister of the Crown, the Chair shall instead put a single question in relation to those amendments or Motions.

7. If two or more Questions would fall to be put under paragraph 4(d) in relation to successive provisions of the Bill, the Chair shall instead put a single question in relation to those provisions.

Miscellaneous

8. Paragraph (1) of Standing Order No. 15 (Exempted business) shall apply so far as necessary for the purposes of this Order.

9.–(1) The proceedings on any Motion made by a Minister of the Crown for varying or supplementing the provisions of this Order shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion one hour after their commencement.

(2) Paragraph (1) of Standing Order No. 15 (Exempted business) shall apply to those proceedings.

10. Standing Order No. 82 (Business Committee) shall not apply in relation to any proceedings to which this Order applies.

11.–(1) No Motion shall be made, except by a Minister of the Crown, to alter the order in which any proceedings on the Bill are taken or to re-commit the Bill.

(2) The Question on any such Motion shall be put forthwith.

12.–(1) No dilatory Motion shall be made in relation to proceedings to which this Order applies except by a Minister of the Crown.

(2) The Question on any such Motion shall be put forthwith.

13. The Speaker may not arrange for a debate to be held in accordance with Standing Order No. 24 (Emergency debates) at today’s sitting before the conclusion of any proceedings to which this Order applies.

14.–(1) Sub-paragraph (2) applies if the House is adjourned, or the sitting is suspended, before the conclusion of any proceedings to which this Order applies.

(2) No notice shall be required of a Motion made at the next sitting by a Minister of the Crown for varying or supplementing the provisions of this Order.

15. Proceedings to which this Order applies shall not be interrupted under any Standing Order relating to the sittings of the House.

16.–(1) Any private business which has been set down for consideration at 4 pm at today’s sitting shall, instead of being considered as provided by Standing Orders, be considered at the conclusion of the proceedings on the Bill today.

(2) Paragraph (1) of Standing Order No. 15 (Exempted business) shall apply to the private business for a period of three hours from the conclusion of the proceedings on the Bill or, if those proceedings are concluded before the moment of interruption, for a period equal to the time elapsing between 4 pm and the conclusion of those proceedings.

I do not wish to detain the House too long in moving the motion. It seeks the approval of the House to consider all stages of this important Bill in a single day. With the co-operation of the House, the Bill will make a major contribution to the United Kingdom’s declared international commitments.

Why do we need to expedite the Bill? The loan to Ireland is novel and large, and the Bill is needed to give the Treasury the necessary authority to advance funds to Ireland. The loan agreement will require the Government to obtain all necessary authorisations before the first draw-down on the loan can be made. The international package is to be discussed at the International Monetary Fund tomorrow, and it is important that the Government, the IMF and the other lenders can be sure that legislation will be passed so that they can assess the adequacy of the total support package, hence the desire to proceed as quickly as possible today. Passing the Bill will also provide certainty to financial markets that the UK’s funding package will be in place. It is in no one’s interest to create further instability.

[Mr Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

I do not think that anybody wants to waste time on the timetable motion unless necessary, but if my hon. Friend were to provide an assurance that the Bill can and will be used only for a single bilateral loan to Ireland, and that it will not be used for any other purpose, that might help it on its way.

[Mr Hoban]

I do not wish to pre-empt the remarks that my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer will make on Second Reading, but I can provide that assurance to my hon. Friend.

The Bill is needed to provide statutory authority for the Treasury to pay out the funds involved. Any loan agreement is contingent on obtaining that necessary authority. In improving the overall package of financial assistance to Ireland, our international partners need to be sure that the UK will have the necessary legislation in place to allow it to fulfil its part.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

I wanted to intervene on my hon. Friend the Financial Secretary to ask for a further assurance. I am minded to support my hon. Friend the Member for Wellingborough (Mr Bone) by voting against this motion in the Lobby if there is a Division. However, I might refrain from doing so if my hon. Friend the Financial Secretary were to rise to his feet and assure me that the measures in the Bill could not be used to lend to Ireland through another international institution, such as the European Union. I would be grateful for that assurance.

[Mr Speaker]

No further Members are standing to show that they wish to speak.

Question put.

Financial Assistance (Ireland)

Bernard Jenkin Excerpts

Monday 22nd November 2010 Commons Chamber

[Mr Osborne]

As I said earlier, the conditions attached to our loan will be similar to those attached to the overall international assistance package; of course, we are part of the discussions when it comes to shaping that package. I would make two specific points. First, we have set very high store by sorting out the banking problem. In other words, using this financial assistance to sort out the banking problem has been the primary thing that I have been calling for in the private discussions we have had leading up to this point.

Secondly, on the rate of corporation tax, I would make this observation to the hon. Lady, and I hope that she has some sympathy with me. Ireland should be in charge of its own tax rates. How the terms of the financial assistance are met has to be a decision ultimately for the Irish Government and the Irish Parliament. It is the thin end of the wedge if we allow other countries and other international organisations to start determining what corporate tax rates should or should not be. It is in everyone’s interests that Ireland grows, and it would not be particularly in our interests if the Irish undertook measures that might, for example, lead to an immediate flight of international business.

[Mr Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

I recognise that my right hon. Friend is dealing with some very serious and potentially disastrous economic circumstances, but when I say, “I told you so,” it is not just about staying out of the euro; I am saying, “I told you we shouldn’t have ratified the Maastricht treaty.” [Laughter.] They are guilty over on the Opposition Benches, too. Will my right hon. Friend be a little clearer? Is he saying that unless we are fully extricated from any potential liability for other eurozone members through the European Union, there will be no treaty change?

[Mr Osborne]

I am not proposing to take Britain out of the Maastricht treaty, despite my hon. Friend’s request. I know that will come as a bit of a disappointment. I would like the balance of payments mechanism to remain—it has existed for many years—but of course the situation in the eurozone is not a balance of payments issue. That mechanism is for countries, particularly accession countries, to draw upon. I would like the mechanism set up under article 122 to be used for what it was designed to be used for, which was natural disasters and the like, and I would like the permanent bail-out mechanism for the eurozone not to include the United Kingdom.

European Union Economic Governance

Bernard Jenkin Excerpts

Wednesday 10th November 2010 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hoban]

The hon. Gentleman makes an important point, and I am about to come to that, so his intervention is timely. Given the degree of integration of the European economy, it is in our national interest to support work that looks at the causes of instability and to have in place action to help to tackle them. Over the summer, there have been two parallel processes in Europe. The Commission has its own work stream, which is summarised in the documents before us. However, member states have participated in a separate strand of work on the co-ordination of economic policies under the chairmanship of Herman Van Rompuy. Many of the issues covered are the same, but there are essential differences between the two streams. The Commission’s documents detail solutions, and the Van Rompuy work reflects the political agreements reached between member states. The next step is to bring the Commission’s proposals into line with the taskforce’s recommendations.

I shall deal in more detail with three aspects of the taskforce’s work.

[Mr Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

Is my hon. Friend giving an assurance that not only are there no sanctions—we understand that—but there is absolutely no increase in EU jurisdiction over the British Budget-making process?

[Mr Hoban]

No, there is not, and I shall come to that in more detail. As far as I am aware, there is no difference in the power that the House has to set the Budget for the United Kingdom.

[Mr Jenkin]

I am sorry, but I must insist on the Minister giving way again. Is there any increase in EU jurisdiction over the British Budget-making process as a result of these arrangements? Yes or no?

[Mr Hoban]

I do not believe that there is.

Let me deal with the three aspects. In every international economic debate, the issue of increased co-operation and co-ordination arises. At last month’s G20 Finance Ministers conference, the focus was on exchange rates and current account surpluses. At the IMF annual meeting in early October, there was considerable debate about tackling deficits. Those discussions of macro-economic policy are not a new feature of the crisis. For example, since its inception, the IMF has undertaken regular reviews under article 4 of macro-economic policies and made recommendations on policy response, but they are not binding. The EU has had similar procedures in place for a decade. It is in all our interests for there to be economic stability in Europe, and the process needs to be strengthened. What we are doing is simply renewing the existing framework in the light of the economic crisis and updating the tools that we have, to ensure that we can do what we need to do. The measure will broaden the scope of surveillance, but, as far as the UK is concerned, it will not weaken the sovereignty of this Parliament.

Risks to stability often flow from imbalances in the economy, and it is important to look at factors such as current account balances, labour market flexibility and competitiveness across the European Union and to be able to identify problems that could undermine stability. Macro-economic surveillance has an important role to play as an early-warning system.

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[Mr Jenkin]

Is the hon. Gentleman arguing that somehow these arrangements will give us more influence and more control over the economies of other member states? On that basis, should we therefore not be seeking to enter into arrangements of the same sort with, say, the United States, so that we can control its deficit? The US deficit will have far more effect on our economy than any individual deficit in any individual member state of the EU.

[Chris Leslie]

Those of us in opposition are merely asking questions and scrutinising what is on the table, but we are trying to find out what will be the impact on the UK. Ministers are arguing, “Don’t worry, absolutely nothing changes and there is no impact whatever.” As far as I can see, there are strands and suggestions that there will be an impact, both direct and indirect. In that respect, although we might have different views, there might be a point on which we can agree.

If the eurozone deflation and the shrinkage of European economic markets affect our exports, that matters, because the Treasury has depended on them so greatly. The June Budget and the spending review were predicated on a return to strong economic growth here in the UK, based principally on higher business investment and strong export growth. The Office for Budget Responsibility analysis shows that the cuts imposed because of the Chancellor’s austerity programme and his overly speedy deficit reduction strategy will see private consumption shrink rapidly and Government consumption doing the same.

Cuts in domestic expenditure will hit growth—that much is clear—but the Chancellor has bet the shop on the countervailing growth in trade and business investment. The Treasury states clearly that it needs £100 billion of growth in exports and business investment, yet the last time we saw such a massive rate of growth for exports was in 1974 and we achieved that rate of improvement in business investment only in 2005, but the Chancellor’s sums depend on the UK achieving both those record levels in each of the next three years—a very tall order indeed, equivalent to tripling our exports to the US and seeing our exports to China grow 20 times or to India 40 times.

Clearly, our reliance on the eurozone’s appetite for our exports is central to the Chancellor’s strategy, so there are implications for British fiscal policy here.

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[Michael Connarty (Linlithgow and East Falkirk) (Lab)]

First, I wish to put on record what we are supposed to be debating, because Members have wandered all over the place. We are debating a series of six documents sent to the Government by the European Scrutiny Committee, on which the Government have now taken a position. Four are about the stability and growth pact—our Committee reference numbers for them are 32036, 32043, 32044 and 32047. The other two relate to the excessive imbalances procedure—documents 32045 and 32046.

In the main, those documents make no difference whatever to procedures that the UK has to carry out. However, a lot of heat has been made about the fact that they affect other countries, and that if the conspiracy theory of the hon. Member for Hertsmere (Mr Clappison) is borne out, they may affect our Government, who will have to give up their fiscal veto. The same was said in the exchanges on the recent urgent question asked by the hon. Member for Stone (Mr Cash). However, we are quite clearly protected in the Lisbon treaty and do not have to go down that road.

The documents will not have any effect on us, because we are not a member of the eurozone. They can be read in detail, and Members will find that the coercive measures set out in them do not relate to anyone outside the eurozone. The Government’s position is therefore to note the documents.

On 27 October, the Government made their position clear in response to the hon. Gentleman’s urgent question. The Financial Secretary quoted the report of the taskforce on strengthening economic governance in the EU, which has been referred to today as though it were a conspiracy document. It states that

“strengthened enforcement measures need to be implemented for all EU Member States, except the UK as a consequence of protocol 15 of the Treaty”.

That is quite clear. The hon. Gentleman reiterated that

“we will not agree to any changes to EU treaties that move more powers from this country to the EU. The UK’s exemption from the sanctions proposal will be explicit, and there will be no shift of sovereignty from Westminster to Brussels.”—[Official Report, 27 October 2010; Vol. 517, c. 319.]

It is important that we are clear about what we are trying to do.

We should be sensible in our debates, and I say to Members to whom the EU is anathema, or who are Eurosceptic to a great degree, that they should not diminish what they have to say about important matters relating to the Government’s position on the EU by arguing that somehow we are selling out if we do what is asked in document 32047, which is about the surveillance mechanism in the reporting regime. If we do not know what 26 of the 27 countries are doing in their budgets, we must agree on a proposal for everyone to put in information, so that both we and the Commission know what other Governments are doing. If we had done that we would have known how badly Greece’s economy was faring when it was suddenly found not to be putting accurate figures in to the European Commission.

[Mr Jenkin]

Just for the convenience of the House, will the hon. Gentleman explain why the numbers of the documents that he has read out do not correspond with the numbers in the Government’s motion, because those are the documents that we are scrutinising?

Comprehensive Spending Review

Bernard Jenkin Excerpts

Thursday 28th October 2010 Commons Chamber

[Danny Alexander]

I do not accept that. We have to control the welfare bill, which has risen dramatically over the past few years. I will come to that later in my speech.

[Mr Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

It is inevitable, of course, that individual Departments will have to set out the costs of redundancies, and it is right that they should do so in due course. However, will my right hon. Friend set out how much extra interest the Government would have to pay, and therefore how much more public spending would have to be cut in future, if we did not start to make such economies now?

[Danny Alexander]

My hon. Friend asks a very good question. Over the course of the spending review period, our plans will save £5 billion in debt interest, which the Labour party was very happy to pay.

Economic Governance (EU)

Bernard Jenkin Excerpts

Wednesday 27th October 2010 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hoban]

Indeed, that is why we have secured a clear and explicit exclusion in the report from the Van Rompuy taskforce—an exclusion based on the Lisbon treaty, but also based on the opt-out that we secured from the Maastricht treaty—so that the sanctions do not apply to the UK. As I have said, at the moment there are no detailed treaty changes on the table. We will have to wait and see what the French and Germans put forward at the weekend.

[Mr Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

May I remind my hon. Friend that those of us who opposed the formation of the euro in principle warned that it would be a disaster, and that we have been vindicated by events? May I warn him now that the Government’s aspiration somehow to assist in creating a stable and strong euro area will be a vain attempt? The Government had better plan for the continuing disaster of a currency without a state, which is bound to be unstable in the long term.

[Mr Hoban]

My hon. Friend makes an important point. There are many sound arguments against the euro, and that is why we have ruled out joining it. However, it does us no favours to see a weak and unstable eurozone. It is important for eurozone countries to have strong fiscal discipline to ensure stability. The taskforce introduces a mechanism for eurozone countries to try to deliver that.

Equitable Life (Payments) Bill

Bernard Jenkin Excerpts

Tuesday 14th September 2010 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hoban]

As I have tried to make clear, the decision about how much the taxpayer can afford will be taken in the context of the spending review, when we look at this bid for spending alongside other bids.

[Mr Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

My hon. Friend will know that the Public Administration Committee, which I now chair, issued in the previous Parliament two reports on the subject, and unless we make progress discussing the Bill itself, it seems that much of this debate will turn on what exactly the ombudsman meant in her report. May I advise my hon. Friend and, indeed, the House that my Committee intends to hold a further inquiry as soon as the House returns in October in order to elucidate the exact differences between the ombudsman’s recommendations, Sir John Chadwick’s report and what the Government’s view may be at that time? We will issue a report on what we believe the ombudsman actually intended, and I hope that the Government will honour that interpretation.

[Mr Hoban]

I would be delighted to appear in front of the Committee to give the Government’s view. It is important that there should be scrutiny through the Public Administration Committee. My hon. Friend was right to highlight the work done by the previous Committee; I particularly commend the former Chair, Dr Tony Wright, who did a great deal, with other Committee members, to keep the issue in the public debate. They published two reports that were very critical of the previous Government. I am happy to take part in that process.

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[Stephen Timms]

My advice to the hon. Gentleman and the great majority of his hon. Friends is turn his fire on those on his own Front Bench and ask them to deliver the pledge that so many of them signed up to. At the moment, we are heading towards the prospect of that not being delivered.

[Mr Jenkin]

The Public Administration Committee will have to smooth these troubled waters, and I want to be clear about what the right hon. Gentleman is inviting the Government to do. Sir John Chadwick reported that

“the Terms of Reference require me to limit my considerations to those Findings that have been made by the Ombudsman and accepted by the Government”,

so what he could recommend was thereby limited. Is the right hon. Gentleman now inviting the Government to ditch the report that his Government commissioned?

[Stephen Timms]

No, the position we are in now is that there are two quite different ways forward. One was recommended by the ombudsman. The previous Government saw some serious difficulties in that approach, so called on Sir John Chadwick to give advice. The Government now need to choose which of those two options they intend to follow. Their difficulty is that every Treasury Minister—including all those I have mentioned—has pledged to adopt the ombudsman’s approach. The Government are currently saying both that they accept the ombudsman’s recommendation in full, and that Sir John Chadwick’s report is a building block for what is going to happen. Nobody knows what that means, however, as it is trying to ride two horses, when what is required is a decision.

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[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dawn Primarolo)]

Order. I remind hon. Members that Mr Speaker has set a time limit of eight minutes for Back-Bench speakers. There are so many people who want to speak that I ask all hon. Members to help their colleagues wherever possible by speaking for less than eight minutes. We will have to consider progress in the debate later this evening, and whether everyone will get in. I also remind Members who feel that as they might not have a chance to speak they will therefore make an intervention, that the intervention should be brief, not a substitute for the speech that would otherwise have been made. I call Mr Bernard Jenkin.

[Mr Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

indicated dissent.

[Madam Deputy Speaker]

Mr Jenkin does not wish to speak, even though his name is on the list. In that case, I call Mr Alan Reid.