Ukraine

Bernard Jenkin Excerpts

Tuesday 10th February 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hammond]

Yes, I assure the hon. Gentleman that they do make representations to the Foreign Office, and of course we take them into account. I should be clear, however, that we have excellent communications with the Ukrainian authorities. I met the President and the Foreign Minister of Ukraine the week before last at the Auschwitz commemorations. We have regular dialogue with them, and they are hugely active in their engagement with the EU and hugely appreciative of how we collectively have responded to their plight.

[Mr Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

Will my right hon. Friend describe what he thinks a successful outcome to the French and German-led talks with Russia would look like? Would it involve the de facto partition of Ukraine, and how would that be anything else than a permanent reward for Russian aggression?

[Mr Hammond]

No, a good outcome would not look like that. It would look like an agreement to a ceasefire and a withdrawal from the current lines of contact, along the lines already suggested, and not just an agreement to its happening tomorrow, but evidence by the end of the week that Russian forces were pulling back; it would look like an agreement on the effective policing of the Russian-Ukrainian border so that once Russian equipment had moved back across the border into Russia, there was an effective, transparent regime for monitoring further equipment crossing the border; and it would look like an explicit withdrawal of Russian support for and endorsement of the separatist forces.

European Union (Referendum) Bill

Bernard Jenkin Excerpts

Friday 17th October 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

As a Member of Parliament who represents a port, I thank the hon. Lady for giving way. This is an example of how the single market is used as an all-enveloping pretext for Community action at Community level, whatever is the case, even though it is very difficult to argue that there is a single market between the ports of Harwich and Felixstowe and those of Marseilles or Piraeus, which is the basic premise of the argument behind the directive.

[Kate Hoey]

I am sure that all hon. Members could come up with different scenarios, but the fundamental principle is that we are losing control of our own country and of what we want to do in our own country. It is very simple and I genuinely cannot understand why people cannot see that we are losing control of what we want to do here. Of course, we want to co-operate with other European countries. I want to co-operate with all sorts of countries. I would like to see our Commonwealth countries much more involved in what we are doing, as we have treated them scandalously over the years. That is why, if there were a referendum and if we chose to leave the European Union, I would feel quite confident about this country. I want to get our confidence back. I do not want this doom-ridden approach that suggests we have to be part of the European Union because we are only a country and we need it desperately. It needs us, too, and I have confidence that if we were to leave the European Union we would be quite capable of having a prosperous future.

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[Mr Hammond]

The hon. Gentleman makes a perfectly legitimate point. Many countries in the European Union are concerned about treaty change because of the implications for their domestic politics, but the EU may have to embrace treaty change anyway. The EU has to deal with the ongoing crisis in the eurozone, which will require structural change to resolve it. He wants to believe that there cannot be treaty change, but given the structural flaws in the eurozone and what will be needed to resolve them, the European Union may get treaty change sooner than it thinks and whether it likes it or not.

[Mr Jenkin]

My right hon. Friend is being very generous to Her Majesty’s official Opposition in saying that they do not believe that treaty change is obtainable. I think he is misinterpreting their motives. I think they like the European Union the way it is and the way it is going. Funnily enough, that is creating high unemployment and global financial instability, but they have no intention of changing it because they do not want to change it.

Ukraine, Middle East, North Africa and Security

Bernard Jenkin Excerpts

Wednesday 10th September 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

Listening to the right hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd (Mr Llwyd) has underlined for me that we are in danger of having quite a serious debate in this House for a change. There have been a great many very thoughtful speeches, despite their enforced brevity, which I will seek to match.

My Committee, the Public Administration Committee, produced two reports about strategy early in this Parliament. I may be flattering myself, but strategy—and the word “strategy”—seem by osmosis to have got more into the currency of our thinking.

Before I talk about strategy, let me briefly address the question of the role of the House of Commons in the decision to go to war. It is an interesting debate, and I am intrigued that a former Lord Chancellor, my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke), should describe the royal prerogative as some kind of out-of-date relic given that most of the powers that Ministers continue to exercise—including the power to go to war, whether or not there has been a vote in this House—are in fact royal prerogative powers.

The debate threatens to be sterile, however, because it has never been the case in modern times that any Prime Minister would consider going to war unless they felt that they could command the confidence of the House of Commons, whether they took the decision before or after consulting it. Nothing has changed: whether there should be a debate is not a matter of religious or constitutional doctrine. The responsibility for taking such a decision and for providing leadership on whether to take the country to war and commit our armed forces to military action goes with the seals of office as Prime Minister. The idea that that can be subcontracted to the House of Commons, where all the armchair generals—well, we do not sit in armchairs—and amateur strategists can add their pennyworth and then decide the issue, is a great mistake. We do not want to lose sight of the fact that the Government propose; the House of Commons disposes.

[Paul Flynn (Newport West) (Lab)]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Mr Jenkin]

I give way to my Select Committee colleague.

[Paul Flynn]

Was the hon. Gentleman’s faith in the value of a grand strategy not dented by the right hon. and learned Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke), who said that his experience of the National Security Council was of astonishing events that nobody expected and nobody had planned for? A grand strategy carved in stone would be useless.

[Mr Jenkin]

I must remind the hon. Gentleman, who has sat in Committee with me for many hours listening to evidence about this, that strategy is not the same as having a plan. Yes, a plan may be knocked off course by events, but that does not mean that we should relinquish all the means or methods of reformulating the plan. That is what strategic thinking is about, and I shall apply further thought to that in my speech.

Let us face it: if we sweat about whether to take military action and that dominates our entire debate, we are missing the point. I agree with my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe on that. Our debate should be about the context in which we are making that decision. The decision should flow out of that context, not be the subject of the debate itself.

The Foreign Secretary demonstrated a laudable strategic perspective after a period of reactive and short-term initiatives, such as the reversal of the policy on Syria after the vote last year, which have left our policy in disarray and, one might even say, paralysis. The period of complete neglect of the Syrian situation has resulted in the ISIS situation that we face. That has not been helped by perhaps the greatest and most silent strategic shock to hit the western world—the almost complete absence of the United States from an active role on the world stage.

The Foreign Secretary still gave us a lot of conflicts. We will consider air strikes in Iraq, but not in Syria, which is the home base of ISIS. We said that we would not provide arms to the Kurds, but now we are. We continue to expect President Assad to stand down, but we will not do anything to make that happen. That has brought about the situation that we are in. The Government’s approach is over-precious about who our friends should be and careless of the consequences of the restraints that that places on our policy. We have to treat President Putin as a pariah, but we might need to use him as an ally to defeat ISIS and stabilise the middle east.

[Mr Baron]

I am listening intently to my hon. Friend’s comments, some of which I agree with. I suggest to him that perhaps caution is the right course of action for the Government. We must not forget that only recently, in the past 10 years or so, we have been to war in the middle east on a false premise and supported the morphing of the Afghanistan mission from defeating al-Qaeda into the much wider and disastrous mission of nation building. Many would also argue that Libya is turning into a basket case. Surely caution is not a bad thing, given our past errors.

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[Mr Jenkin]

Of course we should exercise caution. I have learned my bitter lessons, having been on the Opposition Front Bench during the vote on Iraq. The decision to go to war blinded us to the wider strategic considerations that should have been at the forefront of our minds. We obsessed about the wrong things. Incidentally, the opponents of war obsessed about the wrong things too. They obsessed about legality, instead of effect. We also sleepwalked into Helmand. I did not have responsibilities at that stage, but it was extraordinary that we did so.

The National Security Council needs a template—a doctrine of thinking—in approaching such matters. That is what I want to discuss in the last few minutes that I have. I agree with my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe that the greatest immediate threat is not what is happening in Ukraine, the situation in Gaza, Israel and the middle east, however much that preoccupies us, or what is happening in Libya, which is a sideshow, but ISIS. The Prime Minister is right to lay that out as the big threat.

We need a doctrine of counter-insurgency on a global scale. That is not new thinking. There are a few rules that should guide our thinking. We have to secure our home base. The security element of this debate, which has been rather neglected, is the most important thing. How will we protect ourselves from this insurgency? We need to deny the enemy a secure base. I ask Ministers: how can we deny the enemy a secure base if we will not do anything about Syria? We need to starve the enemy of resources. How will we prevent the international money laundering that has been mentioned in this debate? We need to base all activity on the best human intelligence. We cannot plan any sort of campaign if we are guessing or we do not know what is happening on the ground. However, we have cut the resources for that vital part of our capability. We must do our best to remove the underlying political grievances. That is why the middle east peace process is important. It is a tactical consideration in the main strategic objective of containing ISIS.

We need to co-ordinate all actions to a strategic plan, otherwise there will be chaos. We also need to remember that it is, in the end, a battle for hearts and minds and that conflict is about will-power, not physical force. Military action is not necessarily an indication of determination—it can be an indication of despair or weakness. We need to remember that the smallest actions, such as Guantanamo Bay, the development of technology such as mobile phones or apparently innocuous words used in a speech, such as “axis of evil”, can have enormous strategic effects. We need to stay within the law, because if we are trying to defend law it is important that we uphold the law ourselves, and we should use force only as a last resort. I agree with my right hon. Friend the Member for Wokingham (Mr Redwood) that we have tended to resort to force as an expression of our will-power without applying our will-power to all the other means at our disposal first.

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[Sir Menzies Campbell (North East Fife) (LD)]

I must begin by apologising for not being present at the outset of the debate; I had a parliamentary obligation outside the House of Commons. However, at least I turned up, which is not something that can be said of Scottish National party Members, who, even as we conduct this debate, are going round Scotland saying that we should have a different and better foreign policy, but have declined the opportunity to come today and to take us, and perhaps the British public in general, into their confidence.

I had the good fortune to hear the speeches of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke) and my hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border (Rory Stewart), who has now left us. I recall, as my right hon. and learned Friend will, that he and I went through the No Lobby together when it came to the question of military action against Iraq. Although it was suggested a moment or two ago that legality was perhaps too much in the minds of those who took that course of action, the truth is that unless we are able to persuade the House of Commons that what we are about to do is legal, we will have very little chance of persuading the public outside the House of Commons that what we are proposing to do is in the best interests of the public.

[Mr Jenkin]

The point was not to criticise any legitimate discussion about legality, although I do not think there was any question about that legality. The problem was that we spent all our time discussing that and talking through the United Nations—it is all that Tony Blair talked to the President of the United States about—instead of asking, “What are we going to do when we get there?” We thought that that discussion had gone on between Tony Blair and the President, but it just had not. That was the real tragedy of that situation.

[Sir Menzies Campbell]

My recollection is that the discussion was mainly about illegality, and I think the hon. Gentleman does himself and his party a little less well than he could have, because the Conservative spokesman, translated to the House of Lords as Lord Ancram, was among those who were arguing very strongly that there was a complete absence of a plan about what needed to be done after the military action had been successfully concluded. That attitude and those matters were under active consideration by the hon. Gentleman’s own party, even though it had voted to go to war anyway.

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[Mr Jenkin]

rose—

[Sir Menzies Campbell]

I must make some progress, if my hon. Friend will excuse me.

The second speech by which I was considerably influenced was that of the hon. Member for Penrith and The Border, who talked in realistic terms about resources, in particular the resources available to the Foreign Office. I would like to say a few words about the resources available to the three security services, which as it happens are giving evidence to the Intelligence and Security Committee today.

If the threat is increasing and if the analysis is that there is a greater risk of terrorist activity in this country as a result of returning jihadists, one way to begin to seek to meet that threat is by ensuring that those who are on the front line of seeking to disturb or prevent such actions from taking place are properly resourced. That means investing money—and, yes, it means taking money away from other things. We should never forget that the primary duty of any Government is the defence and the security of their own citizens.

Ukraine

Bernard Jenkin Excerpts

Tuesday 18th March 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Douglas Alexander (Paisley and Renfrewshire South) (Lab)]

I welcome the motion and this debate on the ongoing crisis in Ukraine and the British Government’s response. At the outset, let me make it clear that the Government have our support in seeking an urgent de-escalation of the crisis and in their efforts to date to secure a sustainable diplomatic resolution that respects and upholds the international law of which the Foreign Secretary has just spoken.

The crisis in Crimea represents perhaps the most significant security threat on the European continent in decades, and it poses a real threat to Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity. Russia’s recent actions have also reaffirmed the existence of a geopolitical fault line that the west ignores at its peril. Given the events still unfolding on the ground and the speech made by President Putin in the past couple of hours, few would claim that the international community’s response to date has been effective in securing a change of approach from Russia. Since the issue was last debated in the House, an illegal referendum has taken place in Crimea in the shadow of Russian guns, President Putin has signed an order recognising Crimean independence and approved a draft Bill on its accession, and Ukraine’s Parliament in Kiev only yesterday authorised a partial mobilisation of volunteers for the armed forces’ new reserve. The potential for further escalation of the crisis, therefore, remains real and deeply troubling. The international community must do more to encourage Russia to engage in constructive dialogue, while simultaneously applying greater pressure if President Putin refuses to change course.

I want to focus on three key issues. First, I will assess the international community’s response to date and why it is has so far not achieved the desired outcome. Secondly, I will outline the possible mechanisms by which the west can now engage Russia more effectively. Finally, I will look at a series of proposed steps that should be considered for raising the costs and consequences for Russia if the crisis is not swiftly resolved.

[Mr Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

What, in the right hon. Gentleman’s view, does Russia need to do to bring about a de-escalation of the situation?

Ukraine, Syria and Iran

Bernard Jenkin Excerpts

Monday 24th February 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hague]

That is a possibility, as I said in reply to the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland (Helen Goodman). It is for the Westminster Foundation for Democracy to decide its own dispositions. My job is to maintain the funding for that, which I have done, so that it can make those decisions. We will need a fresh look altogether at how we can support that democratic development under the right conditions.

[Mr Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

I very much welcome my right hon. Friend’s commitment to working with Russia to secure a stable and democratic future for Ukraine and to resolve the problems in Syria and Iran. However, will he make it clear that no nation in today’s world is entitled to establish or to seek to maintain spheres of influence? In this year, of all centenary years, we should remember that that is the politics that leads to war.

[Mr Hague]

I agree very much with my hon. Friend about working with Russia, and that in the 21st century we live in a world of global networks in which the power of ideas has become more important than spheres of influence. Democracy, accountability and human rights are ideas that cannot be suppressed, and should not be suppressed. We look at international diplomacy in that way. I agree that the age of spheres of influence is now over.

European Council

Bernard Jenkin Excerpts

Wednesday 15th January 2014 Ministerial Corrections

The following is an extract from exchanges on the Urgent Question on the December European Council on 7 January 2014.

[Mr Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

If EU defence is really just harmless intergovernmentalism, why do we have directives that have the force of law in the field of defence? Why do these conclusions include invitation after invitation for the Commission, which is not an intergovernmental institution, to lead on initiatives? Why are we still in the European Defence Agency, which contains expensive provision for qualified majority voting on defence? Is not my right hon. Friend becoming somewhat blind to the fact that we are moving towards a federal defence policy and a European army? He is in denial.

European Council

Bernard Jenkin Excerpts

Tuesday 7th January 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Lidington]

I think the appropriate Minister will have to write to the hon. Gentleman about the particular issue he mentions about posted workers. The key point about the conclusion on tax is that it is part of taking forward the G8 agenda on tax transparency that the Prime Minister led at the Enniskillen summit last year.

[Mr Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

If EU defence is really just harmless intergovernmentalism, why do we have directives that have the force of law in the field of defence? Why do these conclusions include invitation after invitation for the Commission, which is not an intergovernmental institution, to lead on initiatives? Why are we still in the European Defence Agency, which contains expensive provision for qualified majority voting on defence? Is not my right hon. Friend becoming somewhat blind to the fact that we are moving towards a federal defence policy and a European army? He is in denial.

[Mr Lidington]

My hon. Friend is mistaken in his analysis of the EDA. The Under-Secretary of State for Defence, my hon. Friend the Member for Ludlow (Mr Dunne), who has responsibility for defence procurement, took a very hard line and successfully won a flat-cash settlement for the EDA this year. We held out and it required unanimity for that budget to be agreed. It is simply not the case that we can be overridden by a QMV vote.[Official Report, 15 January 2014, Vol. 573, c. 11MC.]

The Commission has a role under the treaties with regard to industrial policy and, of course, the operation of the single market. However, the single market as regards defence is qualified in the treaties by articles that make it clear that certain matters are reserved from normal single market arrangements because they are critical to national security. Embodied in the European Council conclusions is a very clear direction from all 28 Heads of State and Government that the Commission should stick to what is given under the treaties, that there should be no attempt at competence creep and that there should be no move towards national European champions or a circumvention of the freedom of member states to strike sensible defence partnerships with countries outside Europe, and instead that the Commission should work on ways to make Europe’s defence industries more competitive and its defence markets more open in a way that, incidentally, would provide great opportunities for the United Kingdom’s first-class defence suppliers. That move towards greater openness in areas of defence procurement is something that United Kingdom companies have been pressing Ministers to achieve.

Iran

Bernard Jenkin Excerpts

Monday 25th November 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hague]

I think that we all hope that there will be movement on those issues, irrespective of anything relating to the nuclear issue. The right hon. Gentleman gives just one example of a truly appalling human rights record. Of course we will wish to discuss human rights with Iran as part of our bilateral discussions, and we will impress on the Iranians not only the importance, in our opinion, of universal human rights, but the positive impression that they would make on the world if they were to deal with those issues as well. Let me stress again, however, that it is much too early to say that we can read from this agreement a change in Iranian policy on other matters.

[Mr Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

May I add my support for the agreement? Given how long it has taken to reach this very limited stage of progress and given that the track record of the Iranian regime makes constructive dialogue with it so difficult, does my right hon. Friend agree that it would be perverse to turn our backs on this agreement and that the operative phrase in his statement is “if Iran implements the deal in good faith”? How confident is he that Iran will implement it in good faith?

[Mr Hague]

I am grateful for my hon. Friend’s support and for his wise words. Only Iran can determine whether it implements the deal in good faith, but I will say that, on the basis of our dealings with Foreign Minister Zarif—who has conducted all the negotiations from the Iranian side—I believe in his sincerity about reaching the deal and about implementing it. I hope that he will continue to have the necessary support in Iran—where there is, to put it mildly, a quite opaque and complex power structure—to ensure that the agreement is fully implemented.

European Union (Referendum) Bill

Bernard Jenkin Excerpts

Friday 8th November 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Bain]

Yes.

[Mr Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. I am reading the amendment very carefully. It talks about the need to consult before the referendum

“on the merits or otherwise of the United Kingdom remaining a member of the European Union”,

but is that a pretext for us now to have a debate about the merits or otherwise of remaining in the European Union, or should we stick to the amendment?

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Mrs Eleanor Laing)]

The hon. Gentleman is correct to suggest that it is not a pretext. I am listening very carefully to the hon. Member for Glasgow North East (Mr Bain), and if he strays into the area that the hon. Gentleman has suggested he might, then he will not be allowed to stray further.

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[Mr Bain]

My hon. Friend is entirely right. As a specialist in the common agricultural policy and the needs of our rural economy, he knows that it is incumbent on the Government to spell out the consequences of leaving the European Union—what a yes vote in the referendum would mean and what a no vote would mean.

It is intriguing that the CBI, having requested more information and explored the potential consequences of a vote to leave the European Union, concluded:

“While the UK could certainly survive outside the EU, none of the alternatives suggested offers a clear path to an improved balance of advantages and disadvantages or greater influence.”

[Mr Jenkin]

On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. It is quite clear that the hon. Gentleman is using this debate as a vehicle to make the CBI’s case in favour of membership of the European Union. That is not the subject of the amendment, which he should be sticking to.

[Madam Deputy Speaker]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his point. I am certain that the hon. Member for Glasgow North East (Mr Bain) will not use the next few minutes to do what the hon. Gentleman has suggested he might. I am sure that he will stick very carefully to discussing those who will be consulted within the strict terms of his amendment and no further.

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[Mr William Cash (Stone) (Con)]

rose—

[Mr Jenkin]

rose—

[Adam Afriyie]

I will not give way any more, because I am conscious that the Opposition want to talk out the Bill, and I do not want to be part of that process.

Arms to Syria

Bernard Jenkin Excerpts

Thursday 11th July 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Baron]

I take on board what my hon. Friend says, but I think it does him no service to try to create the impression that those of us who suggest that we should not arm the rebels are insisting that we do nothing. It is actually quite the opposite. I think there is an awful lot that we could be doing—on the humanitarian front and on the diplomatic front. I will return to the issue in a minute or two, if my hon. Friend will bear with me. I will allow him in again, if he wishes to come back to me.

If I had another concern, it would be that, as has been hinted at already, the civil war in Syria is in many respects a proxy war being fought out at different levels—whether it be Sunni versus Shi’a Muslim; the old Persian gulf rivalry of Iran versus Saudi Arabia; or indeed the west versus Russia and China. The risk of pouring more weapons into this conflict and of pouring more fuel on to the fire is that we not only increase the violence within Syria but extend the conflict beyond Syria’s borders in very large measure. That would be a mistake of historic proportions.

Returning to the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Braintree (Mr Newmark) about doing nothing, I would suggest that there is a lot more that we can do, particularly on the humanitarian and diplomatic fronts.

[Mr Bernard Jenkin (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)]

rose—

[Mr Newmark]

rose—

[Mr Baron]

I give way first to my hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex (Mr Jenkin).

[Mr Jenkin]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend, and I am listening carefully to what he is saying. Has he considered the risk of how this debate and his motion will be interpreted? The arms are pouring into Syria from the Sunni factions in Qatar and Saudi, and the Russians are pouring weapons into Syria, yet we seem to be sending the message that we will do nothing for the other side—the forces of democracy and freedom. Is that the message that my hon. Friend wants to send, because it may inadvertently be the message that the Russians will understand from this debate?

[Mr Baron]

I think my hon. Friend does himself a disservice by misunderstanding the stated intention of this debate. It is not that we should do nothing; it is that we as a Parliament should have a say and that our explicit authorisation should be given before any arming of the rebels. We are not making a decision today about whether we should or should not arm the rebels. The motion is very clear that no decision should be made about arming, or, rather, that no policy should be implemented about arming

“without the explicit prior consent of Parliament”.

That is an important distinction. Let me move on, because the issue has been raised before.

The argument is often made that we are to do nothing. Well, there is an awful lot more we can do. On the humanitarian front, for example, why are many refugee camps desperately short of basic amenities? Britain has done more than its fair share—I do not deny that for one moment—but the bottom line is that there are still desperate shortages, so we could do even more there. On the diplomatic front, most people would accept that there can be no military solution to this problem in the longer term; there has to be a diplomatic solution. Why, then, as is presently the case, is the west trying to exclude Iran, a key player in the region and within the country, from the forthcoming peace talks being arranged by the Russians? Time will tell when those talks take place, but there is no doubt that there is an intention at the moment to exclude the Iranians, which is nonsensical.

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[Mr Peter Hain (Neath) (Lab)]

The hon. Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron) spoke eloquently for the majority view in the House, as does the motion. May I apologise in advance for having to leave the Chamber if the debate runs past 3.15, as I have a long-standing speaking commitment?

I am not a pacifist. I was a Cabinet Minister when the decision was taken to invade Iraq. I was Africa Minister when we sent troops to save Sierra Leone from savagery. But as a former Foreign Office Minister responsible for middle east policy, including Syria, I vehemently oppose British military intervention of any kind in Syria.

We all share the Prime Minister’s genuine anger at the humanitarian disaster. We all agree that Bashar al-Assad has become a callous butcher who, instead of responding positively to non-violent protests when the Arab spring reached Syria in March 2011, drove his people into carnage and chaos. Russia and Iran have been culpable in the unfolding horror, and so have the Saudis and Qataris. But Britain, too, is culpable. We should have promoted a negotiated solution from the very beginning. Instead we began by demanding Assad’s unconditional surrender and departure. However, calling for regime change meant chasing an unattainable goal at the cost of yet more bloodshed and destruction, and so did supporting a rebel military victory.

That was fatal. Britain should have offered a practical strategy to end a deepening civil war, because this was never simply a conflict between a brutal regime and the Syrian people. Assad and the ruling Shi’a-aligned Alawite minority form a 10th of the population and were never going to give up power if it meant, as they fear, being oppressed by the Sunni majority. Christians and other minorities are similarly nervous about change. Together those behind Assad amount to nearly a third of the Syrian people; add the Kurds and the total reaches about 40 per cent. Few of them like Assad or his Ba’athist rule, but they fear even more the alternative—becoming victims of genocide, jihadism or sharia extremism.

This is not some simplistic battle between evil and good. Nor is it simply a battle between a barbaric dictator and a repressed people. It is a civil war, and a highly complex one into which Britain treads at its peril. It involves Sunni versus Shi’a, Saudi Arabia versus Iran and, a cold war hangover, the US versus Russia.

[Mr Jenkin]

I do not necessarily demur from a single word of the right hon. Gentleman’s analysis of the complexity of the conflict, but what effect does it have on the efforts to bring those parties to the negotiating table when the International Criminal Court makes it virtually impossible to manage any kind of orderly transition, let alone continuity in the existing regime? He seems to be suggesting that that might be one of the options.

[Mr Hain]

I will address that point in a minute.

Regime change in Damascus could be the outcome of a negotiated solution, but if, as the UK and the US are effectively doing, getting rid of Assad is set as the precondition for talks, the carnage will continue. Surely we should by now have understood from Britain’s long and bitter experience in Northern Ireland that setting preconditions will prevent attempts at negotiation from even getting off the ground.

The Prime Minister’s “good guys versus bad guys” prism is hardly made credible by the presence of al-Qaeda fighters among the west’s favoured rebels, nor is it by the barbarous murders of innocent Syrian citizens by some rebels. Other parties have started to intervene, such as Hezbollah, in turn dragging in Israel, another lethal development. The collateral impact of 1 million Syrian refugees in Jordan is especially dangerous. Iran will not back off because of its key interests.

If the regime were somehow toppled without a settlement in place, the country could descend into even greater chaos. Russia fears that anarchy because, like the US and the UK, it has key strategic military, economic and intelligence interests in the area; for example, Syria provides Russia’s only Mediterranean port in a region where the US is well placed militarily. The only way forward is to broker a settlement, with Russia using its leverage to ensure Assad negotiates seriously. Like it or not, Russia is critical, as is engagement with Iran: otherwise, a Syrian settlement will not happen.

The guidelines for a political transition approved by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council at the Geneva conference a year ago on 30 June 2012 still provide the best road map for a Geneva II, but the US, the UK, Saudi Arabia and their allies must drop their present stance and help to implement that. Preventing Iran and also Assad from attending a peace conference means that it will not even get off the ground. Transitional arrangements that reach the end point of democratisation are crucial, but their pace must be negotiated, not imposed. However unpalatable, Assad and his henchmen may have to be granted immunity to get them to sign up: hardly worse than the continuing barbarity and devastation of ancient heritage. All state employees, including the ranks of the armed forces, must be allowed to keep their posts, to avoid a repeat of the chaos caused by America’s de-Ba’athification in Iraq. The UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s call on 9 October 2012 for both a ceasefire and an embargo on more arms going to the opposition as well as Government forces, should now be heeded. A Yemen-type process may even figure. There a hated president did not actually resign but equally did not stand for re-election.

This will all be incredibly, tortuously difficult, and I understand that Foreign Office Ministers are seeking to grapple with this on our behalf, but what is certain is that UK policy was always going to fail. The Prime Minister began with a demand for regime change, which did not work. Then he supplied “communications equipment” and other resources, which failed too. Then he tried to supply British arms and got the EU arms embargo lifted, until cross-party opposition in Parliament made that very difficult, if not impossible, to achieve.

Unless there is a radical change, all the hand wringing and condemnation as atrocity follows atrocity is empty. Two years after the Syrian uprising, it is high time for Britain, France and the United States to change course. They, as well as their allies, including Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, need to recognise that neither side is going to win the civil war now destroying Syria. Instead a political solution has to be the top priority.

Britain needs to work with its friends in the Syrian opposition and persuade them to go to Geneva with a credible plan for a compromise: local ceasefires, access to humanitarian relief, and the names of prospective members of a new Government of national unity, which will include Ministers from the current Syrian Government. Together they can initiate a process of constitutional reform for new parliamentary and presidential elections with UN observers. Only through mutual concessions by both the regime and the opposition can the people of Syria be saved from the current nightmare. All this is going to be incredibly difficult, as I said, but it is the only way forward, I strongly submit. The present policy and past policies have got us into this awful mess.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Brooks Newmark (Braintree) (Con)]

In the land of the blind the one-eyed man is king, and I have probably spent more time in Syria than most Members of this House, including meeting Bashar Assad up to 10 times over a six-year period. My experience of Syria is very different from the Syria we have heard about today. Syria has always been a highly secular country. There is no Salafi tradition in Syria; it has more of a Sufi tradition and a mystical approach to Islam. There was no sense of radicalism there, so how have we got from where we were to where we are today with a highly sectarian divide and the potential for a fragmented Somalia on the Mediterranean?

We must remember how this began, which was when a 13-year-old boy in Daraa had the audacity to urinate on a poster of President Assad. The security forces took him, beat him up, killed him, cut off his penis, and returned him to his parents. That sparked massive outrage among civilians in five different cities and was the beginning of the Arab Spring. Those who point to hardly any complicity of the Assad regime in causing what is happening today should think carefully. It made a very bad situation worse with civil disobedience met by repression. Ultimately, individuals felt that they had to protect their communities, and small militias were set up in various towns. The Free Syrian Army was really a fragmented group of people, and only more recently has it become a little more co-ordinated under General Idris. The Syrian National Council has been equally dysfunctional and has not sought to reach out at all beyond the Sunni community.

In February when I was in Cairo, there was an opportunity and the Russians said that they would try to lead engagement. The regime was feeling insecure, but unfortunately Minister Lavrov dropped the ball. He did not do anything and, in fact, the opposite happened. Iran and Russia provided more arms, and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard bolstered the Assad regime, including his personal bodyguard, which became a member of the IRG. Until then I had always believed in engagement, but Al-Qusayr was a turning point. The regime knew it could not win alone, so Iran and Hezbollah came in and gave it the support to win Al-Qusayr. I changed my mind and believe that one needs to do a little more than simply provide humanitarian aid. From my understanding of Assad, he will have to be pushed, or driven kicking and screaming to the negotiating table.

My solution is fivefold. First, radical diplomatic engagement is absolutely necessary including—I agree with all Members of the House—with Rouhani and the Iranian regime. This is time to press the reset button.

[Mr Jenkin]

Does my hon. Friend agree that if we persist in doing nothing, the situation will continue to deteriorate and the radical Sunni factions will come to dominate the opposition to Assad? They are providing a playground for terrorism, where British citizens are going to train as terrorists and coming back to this country.

[Mr Newmark]

Yes, my hon. Friend is absolutely right. In fact, there are 70 to 80 citizens of the United Kingdom who are today with Jabhat al-Nusra and the more radical groups. However, those groups represent only 5,000 or 6,000 people on the ground, versus the silent majority of 15 million Sunnis.

The second part of the strategy, beyond radical diplomatic engagement, should be containment. We must protect the likes of Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Turkey from becoming infected by this explosion. Thirdly, we must provide more aid, not just to Jordan and Lebanon, but internally.