Ukraine, Middle East, North Africa and Security

John Baron Excerpts

Wednesday 10th September 2014 Commons Chamber

[The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr Philip Hammond)]

I beg to move,

That this House has considered Ukraine, Middle East, North Africa and security.

This summer has seen a range and scale of threats to international, and particularly European, stability. If they are not unprecedented, they certainly represent a highly unwelcome escalation from the post-cold war norm. Alongside them, there has been a sharp escalation in the level of homeland security threat. The Prime Minister has made two statements in the past nine days covering those, but the Government believe it is right and proper that Parliament has a fuller opportunity to debate those events, and that the Government have the opportunity to take the pulse of parliamentary opinion on Britain’s response to the challenges we face.

In Syria and Iraq, the advance of the barbaric Islamist terrorist organisation Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant represents not only a severe threat to the stability of the middle east but, through the presence of foreign fighters, some of them British, and the threat of a terror attack against the west, a threat to British national security. In the wider middle east, the recent eruption of violence in Gaza between Israel and Hamas, and the tragic loss of many hundreds of civilian lives, has underlined the need for a lasting settlement to that decades-long source of conflict and human suffering. In eastern Ukraine, the instability and violence fuelled initially by covert Russian sponsorship of illegal armed separatists, and more recently by the active operation of formed military units of the Russian armed forces on sovereign Ukraine territory, have underlined Russia’s rejection of the rules-based international order. In Libya, there has been a sharp deterioration of the security situation. Those multiple challenges reflect an arc of instability, extending from north Africa, through the middle east and along Europe’s eastern border to the Arctic.

Perhaps the most alarming of those developments, because of the clear and immediate risk it poses to UK homeland security, is the rise of the Islamist terror organisation ISIL in Syria and Iraq. In Syria, Assad’s brutal war against his own people has created the conditions for a Sunni extremist group to flourish, and in Iraq, the systematic sectarianism of the previous Government has created a permissive environment in the Sunni heartlands for ISIL to expand. In both countries, ISIL has seized the opportunity to impose its twisted ideology.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

Does the Foreign Secretary agree that supporting air strikes in Syria is a higher-risk strategy than supporting air strikes in Iraq?

[Mr Hammond]

I agree with my hon. Friend. There is a qualitative difference between any proposition of air strikes in Syria and such an activity in Iraq. The legal, technical and military differences make the proposition of air strikes an order of magnitude more complicated in Syria.

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[Mr Alexander]

Again, I think that the question is revealing. It is not for us in the House of Commons or in the west to persuade those people; it is for the politics of Iraq to move in the direction that we on both sides of the House wish it to move in. That places a premium on domestic, political leadership. It is deeply regrettable that Prime Minister Maliki succumbed to the forces of division, rather than showing the kind of leadership that we all wanted to see and creating unity. However, that is not a test for the Opposition or even for our Government; it is primarily a test for the Government in Baghdad. I sincerely hope that they will show themselves capable of rising to that test in the months ahead.

On Syria, no one would deny that there were differences of opinion across the House on the proposed military action to target President Assad’s chemical weapons facilities 12 months ago. However, even those who supported military action accept that the decision that was before the House a year ago in August was not a choice between ending or prolonging the conflict. It is the continuation of the conflict, rather than the form it has taken, that has allowed Syrian territory to be used as a training and recruiting base for ISIL. That is why the Opposition have argued that the priority for the international community must be to refocus attention on achieving a transitional agreement in Syria of the type that was anticipated in the Geneva II process. That is the only way to facilitate a more co-ordinated Syrian front that is dedicated to combating the threat of ISIL within the sovereign territory of Syria.

Humanitarian support for the countries affected by the turmoil in Iraq and Syria is vital. I hope that the Minister who winds up the debate will address the Opposition’s calls for a more comprehensive package of support for Jordan—a country that has one of the longest land borders with Iraqi ISIL-held territory and an even longer border with Syria in the north.

[Mr Baron]

I think all of us in the House agree that when it comes to ISIS and Iraq, the solution has to be political. On the military options, does the shadow Foreign Secretary accept that airstrikes alone will not defeat ISIS? Ground troops are required, but they should not be western troops. They should be local forces, and the elephant in the room is the Iraqi army itself.

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[Mr Jenkin]

I must remind the hon. Gentleman, who has sat in Committee with me for many hours listening to evidence about this, that strategy is not the same as having a plan. Yes, a plan may be knocked off course by events, but that does not mean that we should relinquish all the means or methods of reformulating the plan. That is what strategic thinking is about, and I shall apply further thought to that in my speech.

Let us face it: if we sweat about whether to take military action and that dominates our entire debate, we are missing the point. I agree with my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe on that. Our debate should be about the context in which we are making that decision. The decision should flow out of that context, not be the subject of the debate itself.

The Foreign Secretary demonstrated a laudable strategic perspective after a period of reactive and short-term initiatives, such as the reversal of the policy on Syria after the vote last year, which have left our policy in disarray and, one might even say, paralysis. The period of complete neglect of the Syrian situation has resulted in the ISIS situation that we face. That has not been helped by perhaps the greatest and most silent strategic shock to hit the western world—the almost complete absence of the United States from an active role on the world stage.

The Foreign Secretary still gave us a lot of conflicts. We will consider air strikes in Iraq, but not in Syria, which is the home base of ISIS. We said that we would not provide arms to the Kurds, but now we are. We continue to expect President Assad to stand down, but we will not do anything to make that happen. That has brought about the situation that we are in. The Government’s approach is over-precious about who our friends should be and careless of the consequences of the restraints that that places on our policy. We have to treat President Putin as a pariah, but we might need to use him as an ally to defeat ISIS and stabilise the middle east.

[Mr Baron]

I am listening intently to my hon. Friend’s comments, some of which I agree with. I suggest to him that perhaps caution is the right course of action for the Government. We must not forget that only recently, in the past 10 years or so, we have been to war in the middle east on a false premise and supported the morphing of the Afghanistan mission from defeating al-Qaeda into the much wider and disastrous mission of nation building. Many would also argue that Libya is turning into a basket case. Surely caution is not a bad thing, given our past errors.

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[Paul Flynn (Newport West) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Isle of Wight (Mr Turner). We sit together on the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, which produced an interesting document recently on Magna Carta. One of our proposals was that this country should never go to war without a vote in both Houses of Parliament. That is an interesting proposal. Now that it is a convention, I hope that it will be accepted in statute.

The hon. Gentleman referred to the Iraq war, and of course we do not know the truth of why we went into that war. We know that we were fed lies and all kinds of scares, such as that Britain could be attacked within 45 minutes using weapons of mass destruction that did not in fact exist. We still have yet to get the Chilcot report, which the Public Administration Committee discussed with Jeremy Heywood this week. We asked whether he was the blockage, because the Prime Minister has said that he is not stopping the report. All these years later, we do not know whether Tony Blair made an agreement with Bush that committed us to war, after which the House was forced into war based on a series of untruths. Some 179 British soldiers died in Iraq, and there were huge costs and uncounted Iraqi lives were lost.

I believe that we need to carry out another inquiry into our decision to go into Helmand province, which is arguably the worst military decision that we have taken since the charge of the Light Brigade. At the time, in 2006, we had lost only two British soldiers in combat in Afghanistan. We went into Helmand in the hope that not a shot would be fired, and we ended up with 453 soldiers lost in combat. Why did we do it?

[Mr Baron]

May I suggest that a key reason was mission creep? We allowed the mission to morph, disastrously, from one of taking on and getting rid of al-Qaeda to one of nation building, which was a completely different ball game. That was the fundamental error that we made in Afghanistan.

[Paul Flynn]

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. I wrote to Tony Blair in 2003—the letter was on my blog and has been there ever since—saying, “If we go to war in Iraq without attempting to solve the Israel-Palestine problem, we will give a sense of injustice to Muslim communities from my local mosque to the far corners of the world.” At that time, we would not have thought it conceivable that young men and women educated and born here would go to the far east and take part in mediaeval barbarism. How did that happen? It is not about the imams, who have lost touch with the young people. It is about the internet and the flow of information that young people have. The sense of injustice has deepened since 2003. There was not the same division at that time. There were a few fanatics, and al-Qaeda existed, but there was minute support for it. Now it takes support from a huge percentage of the young Muslim population. That is deeply worrying, and we have to see the reason for it.

How we take decisions is an important issue. The most important decision that we have taken recently, of course, was on 29 August last year. Having watched how we go to war, I suggest that we must stop trusting the wisdom of Prime Ministers. They do not behave in a normal fashion on such matters. They are overwhelmed with hubris and talk in a different way, digging out the Churchillian rhetoric. They walk in a different way—they strut like Napoleon. I have seen it here time and again. They are not dealing with petty issues about taxes; here is their great moment. They are writing their page in history, and it is usually a bloody page. They are not rational, as Anthony Eden was not rational when he went into the Suez war. We are far better trusting the pooled wisdom of 650 MPs than listening to and following a hubristic Prime Minister.

We have had an interesting debate, and the two speeches that I have warmed to more than any others were those of the right hon. Member for Wokingham (Mr Redwood) and the right hon. and learned Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke). We know that, incredibly, there is a fairly even spread in the House between the peace party and the “give war a chance” party. Even Labour Members have said that we should not be imprisoned by history. Of course we should be imprisoned by history—we should learn from it, because we have nothing else to go on from which to learn lessons.

I am grateful to the Government for holding the NATO summit in Newport, in my constituency. It was possible a grudging and belated acknowledgment of the wisdom of the local MP on foreign affairs matters. It was a great occasion, and I was particularly pleased by the decisions on the Baltic states. In ’89, ’90 and ’91 I had the pleasure of going to the three Baltic states and watching their struggle for independence. It was a great campaign: intelligent, courageous and restrained. It was difficult to win that independence, and they are frightened now—particularly Latvia and Estonia—because they have a large percentage of mother-tongue Russians. We owe it to them to be behind them and guarantee their independence.

[Mr John Baron (Basildon and Billericay) (Con)]

It is, as ever, a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Newport West (Paul Flynn), and I too welcome this debate. I would like more of these debates—I am sure I am not alone in that—not only because a lot is happening on the international stage that directly affects our interests, global possessions and so forth, but because it is important that those on the Front Benches are in touch with the mood of Back Benchers across the House. It is in their common interest to ensure that we minimise the chances of a vote taking place like the one that happened a year ago. More communication is good; we need more debates of this sort, and that this debate has been so oversubscribed illustrates that point well.

In the brief time available I will confine my remarks to ISIS and perhaps to what I consider to be the dilution of skills within the FCO—something that should concern us all. The Government are right to make a commitment that there will be no air strikes in Iraq unless that has been debated in this House and approved. They were also right to exhibit the cautious approach that they have shown to date, which is to be welcomed. We have heard it said many times that Iraq casts a long shadow, and the bar for military action has been raised. There is no doubt about that in the House, but I contend that it is not a bad thing, given the number of errors we have made in the region over the past 10 to 12 years.

I take issue with those who suggest—we have heard this quite a bit in the Chamber today—that by exhibiting a cautious approach and voting against action in Syria last year, Britain is somehow retreating from the world, or that we wish to bury our heads in the sand and do not want to play any more on the world stage. That is utter tosh. We are a key member of the UN Security Council and of NATO, and a prominent member of the Commonwealth. We are not retreating from the world, but if a slightly more cautious approach is needed, that is surely how it should be in this place, when the most serious decision we can make in this House is whether to send troops to war—a decision that costs lives and can result in great expense in both lives and treasure.

We have only to look back at our recent track record. There can be no denying that we went to war on a false premise in Iraq in 2003. There were no weapons of mass destruction. Fact: we went to war on a false premise. Some may dispute this, but I think that a key error—this was referred to by the hon. Member for Newport West—was in Afghanistan. We all agreed with the initial narrow objective of ridding Afghanistan of al-Qaeda. That was laudable and we supported it. It went wrong when we allowed the mission to morph into one of nation building, which was a much broader aim that we fundamentally under-resourced.

[David Tredinnick (Bosworth) (Con)]

I am listening carefully to my hon. Friend and thinking about the vote last year, when regrettably I was not able to support the Government. Listening to my hon. Friend, I would say that the problem was that chemical weapons could be moved around very easily, and so as a military objective it was not very satisfactory.

[Mr Baron]

I agree. Technically, the motion was about that, but there was also a push last year by the Government to arm rebels fighting Assad. However, because it would have been impossible to track and trace those arms, some of them would have ended up, inadvertently, in the hands of the very extremists we are now taking on in northern Iraq—a bitter irony if ever there was one.

[Dr Julian Lewis]

It was precisely for that reason that my hon. Friend and I made common cause against the folly of that intervention. On Afghanistan, does our policy not tend to be too reactive to the last thing that happened? It was said that as soon as the Soviets left, the west left Afghanistan to stew in its own juices. It was to prevent that from happening again that the west made the bad mistake, as it turned out, of engaging in nation building.

[Mr Baron]

I pay tribute to the work of my hon. Friend and others on both sides of the House in asking those difficult questions a year ago. We were right to do that. He is absolutely right about Afghanistan as well.

The litany of errors does not stop with Afghanistan. We now have the Libyan Government meeting on a Greek ferry off Tobruk; there is civil war; the number of civilian casualties is shooting up; and we have not got a proper policy. I certainly do not think our intervention helped the situation. We have now discussed Syria, and it is clear that the Government’s intentions to arm the rebels were misplaced, given that it would have been impossible to track and trace the arms. Our bigger issue is now taking on in Iraq some of the rebels who confronted Assad.

It is right to be cautious and to ask questions, and it is right that the bar has been set higher. I am pleased that Ministers realise the difference between air strikes in Iraq, which many of us could support, provided certain preconditions were in place, including a request from the Baghdad Government, and air strikes in Syria, which would be a much higher risk policy, not only because of Russian-built air defences, but because of the legalities and the fact that a common feature of the Syrian civil war has been the extremist groups lurking in the shadows and morphing into each other—al-Nusra, linked to al-Qaeda, for example—and would be difficult to say who might take ISIS’s place in Syria.

I welcome the caution. At the end of the day, the politics in Iraq must succeed. The elephant in the room is the Iraqi army. It has to be ground forces that defeat ISIS—air strikes alone will not succeed—but they must not be western. The symbolism of the west defeating this caliphate would be too great. The Iraqi army is the elephant in the room, but the politics must come through and succeed. What fomented the presence of ISIS was the very sectarian politics pursued by Maliki, the predecessor of the current Government. We must have more inclusive politics in Iraq, but at the same time we have to ensure that the army drives out ISIS.