Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill

Baroness Sherlock Excerpts

2nd reading
Thursday 15th May 2025 Lords Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Work and Pensions (Baroness Sherlock) (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to today’s thoughtful and decidedly not-at-all dull debate. Committee will be some fun indeed. It was a particular pleasure to hear the maiden speech of the noble Baroness, Lady Spielman, whom I welcome to the spreadsheet fan club. Frankly, I could have done with one of her spreadsheets to keep track of all the questions that I have been asked today. In the absence of that I am bound to miss some, for which I apologise in advance, but I will do my best. It is good to have her among our number, and I look forward to hearing more from her in future.

Perhaps we should start briefly with the challenge that the Bill is designed to address. As my noble friend Lady Anderson made clear at the start, public fraud is simply not acceptable—as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, said, fraud is not acceptable generally, but public sector fraud is also not acceptable. Fraud does not become a victimless crime because it is directed at the state: it will cheat the public purse of money that could be spent on public services, which could help this Government deliver an NHS fit for the future or invest in our children to give them the best start in life.

Listening to some of the examples given by my noble friends Lord Rook and Lady Alexander, it is so shocking that, during Covid, when people and charities were out there breaking their backs trying to serve people who were in desperate need, others were out there lining their pockets. It is a disgrace. It was very moving to hear from my noble friend Lady Alexander about what is happening when people are doing all that they have had to do in the British Council to pay that back when others do not want to pay back the money that they should be paying back to the state. That cannot be right.

I also think that fraud in our social security system is damaging in a different way, whether it is undertaken by individuals or organised criminals. I think the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, asked what the breakdown of that was. I can tell her that, in 2023-24, of the £7.3 billion lost in fraud in social security, 6% was taken by organised gangs and the rest was taken by individuals.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, is that the number of cases that were identified because there was enough evidence and people were arrested, or does she believe that that is an estimate of the total amount of organised fraud in the system?

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

It is a percentage of the amount of fraud that was recognised. Clearly, we do not have figures for the amount of fraud of any kind that has not been identified or recognised. That was the figure for the amount we have on our books as organised fraud.

The reality is that, whether it is done by organised criminals or by individuals, this is not okay. It is not fair to taxpayers who fund social security, nor to the vast majority of people who claim only the benefits to which they are entitled. In my job, when money is as tight as it is now, I want every penny available for social security to go to the people who need it most.

This Government are determined to tackle the issue head-on with a Bill that will provide the right tools to protect public money and fight modern fraud, coupled with the right safeguards. The Bill is tough on those who commit fraud against our public services or our welfare state. In doing so, it gives reassurance to taxpayers. One of the side effects is that it will be helpful to DWP claimants who make genuine mistakes, by helping to spot errors earlier so they can avoid getting into lots of debt.

I thought the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Spielman, about reciprocity was there. If people do not have confidence in our welfare state and the underpinning mutual shared obligations, that challenges our ability to maintain confidence and carry on supporting people in the future. We need to get this right, but we do not need to demonise people to do that. We just need to make it clear that people should get what they are entitled to, and, if they are not getting that, we should address it.

We believe this Bill strikes the right balance, giving the Government new powers proportionate to the problem we are tackling while ensuring that those powers are wrapped around with effective safeguards and protections to give confidence to Parliament and the country. Having said that, and having listened to the debate, I recognise that it is just possible that not everybody agrees with us—or, at least, not yet. We have some way to go. I have every confidence that, once I have fully explained this, there will be unanimity across the House—or near-unanimity at least, being a realist.

Having listened to the debate, it seems to me that there are a number of challenges. First, I offer a couple of truisms. There is no silver bullet to fraud. If there were one single thing to do, the previous Government would have tackled this, or some other Government would have done it. Tackling fraud is an accretion of a series of small decisions which, between them, add up to make a difference. Therefore, this Bill does what it does and does not do other things: it does not tackle bank robbers or tax evasion. It is a contribution, and I think it is an appropriate one.

Secondly, we have to be a bit careful that the best is not the enemy of the good. What is in front of us is action that this Government will take that has not been done before, and I commend it to the House. The challenges that we have seem to come in three broad categories: we are not going far enough, we are going too far, or there are some challenges in the way that we are doing this. I will briefly look at each in turn.

I start with the challenges that we are not going far enough, which have come from a number of noble Lords. The noble Baroness, Lady Stedman-Scott, and I have great respect for one another, but I say very gently that some of the critiques she has made of the Bill strike me as a little ironic, given that the last Government were in for 14 years and had all that time to take action. What did we get? We got one predecessor of one of these measures, which was put in at the fag end of the last Government and dropped into the other place after Committee, with none of the information that the noble Baroness is demanding from me—nothing at all, not even a requirement to produce a code of practice, never mind actually producing one, and absolutely none of the safeguards or protections. Now she is in opposition, I fully respect that it is the job of the Opposition to demand things of the Government, and she does a fine job of doing that. She also will not mind if, in turn, I occasionally throw back at her what her own Government failed to do. In this area, I think we are doing rather better.

Having got that off my chest, let us move on. It is worth saying that this Government are actually doing something. We committed to the biggest-ever savings package on fraud, error and debt at the Autumn Budget. Along with the Spring Statement, DWP fraud and error measures are estimated to achieve £9.6 billion of savings by 2029-30, of which up to £1.5 billion will be generated by this Bill. So this Bill is not all that we are doing, but it is an important thing that we are doing.

The noble Baroness, Lady Stedman-Scott, asked about cost. In the end, the costs of DWP working through these measures will be dependent on the munificence of the Treasury at the spending review, which I am not allowed to pre-empt. The impact assessment sets out our estimate and shows that around four times the benefit of every pound of our departmental spending will come back on scored measures to 2029-30.

On not doing enough, the noble Baroness asked about “sickfluencers”. She is right—it is the view of this department that we have the powers to deal with these crimes at the moment. We think the Bill will help the PSFA to do that at the same time. But, if she has ideas about other ways in which that could happen, I look forward to hearing them, along with her many other ideas for tackling fraud, which I have no doubt Committee will give us every opportunity to discuss.

While I am on the point, the noble Baronesses, Lady Kramer and Lady Stedman-Scott raised the question of whistleblowing. We absolutely agree; we want people to pass on information about fraudsters who are taking from our public services. We are open to keep looking at the best way to do that. We are working with partners such as Action Fraud to make it simple and easy for the public.

In the case of DWP, benefit fraud can be reported by the public online, by phone or by post—and, trust me, it is. But also, DWP staff have clear channels to report. On top of that, the PSFA will look into the possibility of being listed by the Department for Business and Trade as a body with which individuals can raise concerns around public sector fraud. That will help on that side.

While we are on the PSFA, concerns were raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, and others about whether it is doing enough and about the scale. The PSFA’s enforcement unit is relatively new in what it does. The noble Baroness, Lady Finn, was a little a little bit harsh on test and learn. When the enforcement unit is as new as it is and will only with the passage of the Bill get the powers it needs to do any of these things, surely testing and learning is the right thing to do. If it can demonstrate clearly that results come from that, the possibility for scaling will be significant. I promise I am not making any assumptions of the Treasury.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, asked whether the Government audit the work of the PSFA and whether the powers in the Bill will add anything. The PSFA publishes annual reports and has benefits audited by the Government Internal Audit Agency. Examples were given in my noble friend’s opening speech of where the PSFA currently cannot make the desired progress because it has not got the powers it needs. The Bill will give them to it.

That is, briefly, the case for not going far enough. Let us now do the going too far case. A number of noble Lords, including the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, to a degree, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, my noble friends Lord Davies and Lord Sikka, and the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, are concerned about possible infringements on the right to privacy or other aspects of the reach of the Bill. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, for acknowledging the improvements made by the Bill. I raised a number of reservations when the last Government introduced their third-party data measure, because I felt that the powers were simply not proportionate and that there were not enough safeguards around them.

While I am here, I say to my noble friend Lord Davies that the fact that that we provide safeguards does not mean the powers are wrong. That is what safeguards are for. There are safeguards in all aspects of life. I will come back to that. It means that we want to be transparent and show people that powers the state is taking are used appropriately. That is what they are for. The noble Lord explained the limitations.

We are now limiting the benefits in scope. For all the measures there will be clear limits about what information can be requested, for what purpose, and how the PSFA and DWP will use it. That is all new, and the Bill introduces considerable oversight and reporting requirements.

I believe the Bill strikes the right balance and, in answer to my noble friend Lord Sikka, I am confident that it is complying with the Government’s duties under the ECHR. The Government’s detailed analysis on compatibility is set out in the published ECHR memorandum.

I need to take on a couple of noble Lords who have suggested that this is a sort of broad trawling expedition. It has been described as DWP going out there and trying to have access to everybody’s bank accounts—suspicion-snooping. That is a simple misunderstanding of the nature of the powers. Let me try to explain why. DWP will not be given access to people’s bank accounts by this measure, which is about banks being asked to examine their own data, which they already have and can already look at. They have been asked to provide DWP with the minimum amount of information necessary to highlight whether there is a possibility that someone may not be meeting a specific eligibility rule for a specific benefit. At the point the information is shared with DWP, no one is suspected of having done anything wrong. The presumption of innocence is still there.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

It is clear that the DWP does not want to see that data, but it will be telling the banks to trawl for the data. The Minister says that they already have the data, and that they would not be trawling for a government-mandated outcome before the DWP told them to do it. As the Minister was about to say, and I have stressed this before, it is true that there is no suspicion of anyone. The only reason the bank would be doing it is that a person is in receipt of a particular benefit. The bank therefore has to check whether the person is in receipt of that benefit—because it does not necessarily know that—by going through its databases on the eligibility criteria the Government are going to give it. So no one is saying that the Government are spying, but the banks are being asked to “spy”—it is a phrase, just a slogan. We understand the point; we just do not think you are satisfying us.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

I have heard accounts of people saying that disabled people will worry that DWP will know that they go to Pret and therefore cannot really need the money, et cetera, so it is important to make it clear that DWP will not have access to their bank accounts through this EVM.

DWP knows the bank accounts into which benefits are paid, so DWP will tell the banks to look specifically at the bank accounts into which those benefits are paid. It will tell them specifically the criteria they are looking for, and all they are being asked to provide is enough information to identify accounts which may, on the face of it, be in breach. Then, that information will be used along with other information that DWP holds, and it will be examined by—to reassure the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Lichfield—a human being, who will make a decision on whether to investigate. There could be a number of outcomes. The outcome could be that the person may have had, for example, more money in their account than the benefit allows, but for one of the many acceptable reasons. There could be a perfectly good reason. The person may have made a genuine error, and that will be dealt with in a different way, or in some cases there may be evidence of fraud, and that might move into a fraud investigation.

I accept that some noble Lords may not think this proportionate. We believe it is proportionate, with those safeguards wrapped around it, but I want to be clear that we are arguing about the same thing, not about different understandings of what is going on at the time.

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

My noble friend referred to an acceptable reason. Who ultimately decides what constitutes acceptability?

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

This may be a matter that we might more usefully explore in Committee, but I shall give my noble friend a simple example. There are certain compensation payments that are not taken into account in terms of eligibility for benefits. They are excluded from the capital limits. So it may be that somebody has received a compensation payment. There is guidance about circumstances in which people may have money in their account. The point is that cases will be looked at individually before they are pursued. There is a requirement on fraud investigators to look at all information and chase down all avenues of information, so they will do that and make an appropriate decision.

Just to be clear, on benefits in scope, the initial use of the power is focused on three benefits: universal credit, employment support allowance and pension credit. The reason why is that that is where the highest levels of fraud are at the moment. The noble Lord, Lord Palmer, will have noticed that carer’s allowance is not on the list for the EVM. The two types of fraud and error we are targeting initially—breaches of capital and the living abroad rules—are significant drivers of fraud and error in those benefits. For universal credit, nearly £1 billion was overpaid last year as a result of capital-related fraud. Once fully rolled out, that measure alone will save £500 million a year. The state pension is expressly out of scope and cannot be added even by regulations, and that is sensible given that the rate of state pension overpayment is just 0.1%.

Somebody asked me whether we plan to add any other benefits. The answer is no. We cannot rule them out because fraud may change in the future and different benefits may be subject to different levels of fraud.

A number of noble Lords, including the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Lichfield and the noble Baroness, Lady Stedman-Scott, raised the use of AI and automated decision-making. To be clear, we are not introducing any new use of automated-decision making in the Bill, so no such new use will happen as a result of it. The DWP and the PSFA will always look at all available information before making key decisions about the next steps in fraud investigations or inquiries into error. Fraud and error decisions that affect benefit entitlement will be taken by a DWP colleague, and any signals of potential fraud or error will be looked at comprehensively.

Given the arguments made by those who think we are not going far enough, and by those who think we are going too far, we appear to be Goldilocks in this. I think we have got the balance right now. Goldilocks is not always right, I accept that, but I think we have landed in the right place because of the safeguards the Bill includes to ensure that its measures are effective and proportionate. Those safeguards provide protection but also accountability and transparency.

I will not go back over all the different kinds of oversight, but on the appointment process, I assure the House that the process for the independent people who will oversee EVM and the PSFA’s measures will be carried out under the guidance of the Commissioner for Public Appointments and will abide by the Governance Code on Public Appointments throughout.

I am grateful for my noble friend Lady Alexander’s compliments. I would suggest that she herself apply, but she might not qualify for the independence threshold entirely, as one might hope.

I shall say a brief word on safeguards. The Bill includes new rights of review and appeal. The DWP will still provide routes for mandatory reconsideration of decisions relating to overpayment investigations, followed by the opportunity to appeal to the First-tier Tribunal. For direct deduction orders, again, there are new routes for representation and review, followed by appeal to the First-tier Tribunal, while the court’s decision in relation to a disqualification order can be appealed on a point of law.

On driving licences, I take the point made by my noble friend Lord Sikka: why driving licences and not membership of a political party? I hate to break it him, but it is just possible that not being allowed to join a political party does not have the same deterrent effect as losing a driving licence—not for us, obviously, but we are not typical, although it is touch and go. I assure the House that this measure has been used for a long time in the Child Maintenance Service. As the noble Baroness, Lady Stedman-Scott, said, its effectiveness is shown in that it almost never needs to be used.

As a final reminder, this is about debt recovery. It is about people who, by definition, are not on benefits and not in paid employment. The reality is that if you owe DWP money and you are on benefits, the DWP can already deduct it from your benefits, and if you get a wage packet the DWP can deduct it from your wages. However, if you are none of those things—if you are privately wealthy, self-employed or paid through a company—and you owe the DWP money, the department does not have the same ability to go after that money as it does for those who are on benefits or in PAYE. The Bill gives the department the opportunity to use measures such as deduction orders and other tools to try to bring people to the table. If someone comes to the table to have a conversation, we will begin to arrange a payment plan. The other measures are there only if people refuse to engage and simply will not come along and do what they ought to do.

[Lord Sikka (Lab)]

Since my noble friend mentioned me, I think I am honour-bound to ask her a couple of questions. Will she confirm that foreign bank accounts will not be covered by any of the measures in the Bill?

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

I think we should come back to the detail of how bank accounts are dealt with in Committee. I am meant to stop at 20 minutes and the clock is saying 19 minutes and 38 seconds.

[Noble Lords]

Keep going!

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

I will keep going for a bit.

A number of noble Lords asked whether the banks want to engage. We have been engaging very much with the banks. Meetings have been held by the DWP and Cabinet Office Ministers, some of which I have attended, with senior representatives of the finance industry, including UK Finance, individual banks, building societies and the FCA, and we continue to work closely with banks on the design and implementation of the relevant measures. We have set out the expected cost to banks where possible, and an impact assessment of the business costs of the EVM will follow, but that will depend on how the measure is designed and the way in which it will work.

On potential conflict with financial crime duties—this is important—the Government are working closely with UK Finance and the FCA to make sure the measures align appropriately with wider financial crime duties. That includes work on the development of the PSFA’s guidance and the DWP’s codes of practice for debt recovery and the EVM. We will make sure that works appropriately.

I think I am running out of time, but I will just say a word on carers. I absolutely agree with the noble Lords, Lord Vaux and Lord Palmer, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, who mentioned the important contributions of carers. This Government are absolutely behind carers. We introduced the largest ever increase to the earnings limit in carer’s allowance. Crucially, this Government introduced a review. We commissioned Liz Sayce to lead an independent review into earnings-related overpayments of carer’s allowance. The review is expected to reach its conclusions this summer and we are looking forward to learning from that to make sure that any learning can be fed back into the way the department works.

Finally, I will say a word on safeguarding. I am sorry to say I have forgotten which noble Lord mentioned that the DWP Select Committee put a report out on this subject. We will look at it very carefully and, obviously, take close account of its recommendations. Long before that happened, we put out our Green Paper, Pathways to Work. The Secretary of State is very keen to make sure the DWP gets safeguarding right. We committed in that Green Paper to introducing a new department-wide safeguarding approach. It will be a very significant departure from the way things are done. We are going to work with stakeholders and consult to make sure we get that right.

To reassure noble Lords, the DWP looks carefully all the time at how we support vulnerable people. Decisions are taken individually and that is taken into account. Of course mistakes will be made on occasions, but as a department we place a huge store on making sure we understand the circumstances people are in and support then when they need help, and try to find the best way through for each individual.

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

I am annoying the Whip. Does my noble friend have a response to the point I raised on behalf of my noble friend Lady Lister about the position of people who reasonably assume that the money received in error was rightfully theirs?

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

I have a wodge of answers to questions asked by a lot of noble Lords, and I am afraid time has run out. But to be clear, we need to not ally fraud and error. This is just a data pull. If data comes from the banks to the DWP, it will be used with other data to make an individual assessment of someone’s position and appropriate decisions will be made at that point about how to deal with it. It may be an overpayment, a genuine mistake, an act of fraud, or there may be no problem. Cases will be looked at individually.

This Bill delivers on our manifesto commitment. It is expected to save £1.5 billion over the next five years as part of wider action at the DWP to save a total of £9.6 billion. The Bill will bring in new powers for the PSFA to tackle fraud and it will deliver the biggest upgrade to the DWP’s counterfraud powers in over 14 years. We believe it is proportionate and demonstrates that we will take action against those who willingly defraud our public services, providing the right tools so that we can step up to prevent, detect and deter criminal activity. I very much look forward to working with so many noble Lords across the House—it says here—during the passage of this important Bill. I look forward to seeing many of them in Committee. I beg to move.

Bill read a second time and committed to a Grand Committee.

Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill

Baroness Sherlock Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 25th June 2025 Grand Committee

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, Amendment 122D, tabled by the noble Viscount, Lord Younger of Leckie, and moved and spoken to so fully by the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, would permit banks to recover the costs that they incur, as defined in the Bill. The principle behind the amendment is to recognise that, while banks play an essential role in supporting public authorities to identify and recover funds lost through fraud or error, the operational and administrative demands placed on them can be significant. Allowing banks to recover reasonable costs would ensure that the burden of implementing these public service functions does not fall unfairly on private institutions and would support a collaborative approach between the Government and the financial sector.

However, it is important to ensure that any cost-recovery mechanism is transparent, proportionate—how often we keep using that word—and subject to appropriate oversight. Questions remain about how the “reasonable costs” mentioned in the Explanatory Notes for Clause 95 will be defined, who will determine the quantum that can be recovered and what safeguards will be in place to protect individuals from excessive fees. There must be a clear framework to prevent costs from undermining the overall financial benefit to the taxpayer or placing undue hardship on those subject to deduction orders.

As the Bill progresses, it will be vital to clarify these details—I hope the Minister will help do that—ideally through the code of practice and ongoing consultations with stakeholders to maintain fairness, accountability and public confidence in the system. I await the Minister’s response, to fill the gaps that the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, and I have outlined, particularly what “reasonable costs” is meant to mean.

[The Minister of State, Department for Work and Pensions (Baroness Sherlock) (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, for introducing Amendment 122D and the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, for his contribution. It is worth saying at the outset that the noble Baroness’s comments ran quite wide, encompassing some of the broader issues that we discussed in previous debates on the Bill.

New Section 80F, inserted by Clause 95, allows any reasonable costs incurred by DWP in recovering debt to be added to the total debt owed, and therefore for them to be collected through any means of recovery available to DWP. As drafted, the amendment would permit the Secretary of State, but not the bank, to recover any costs incurred by the bank as though it were part of the debt owed to DWP through methods of recovery such as deductions from benefit, et cetera, but without any requirement to pass any money recovered to the bank. I realise how hard it is to draft amendments in opposition—I have been there—so I believe it is possible that the intention of the amendment was to allow a bank only to recover any cost it had incurred when complying with its obligation under Schedule 5, so I shall address the amendment on the assumption that was the intention.

Officials have engaged extensively with key representatives from the finance sector, including UK Finance, and we are seeking to work collaboratively to ensure that the legislation enables banks reasonably to meet their legislative obligations without causing problematic burdens for them or unintended consequences for individuals. Indeed, changes have already been made to the Bill based on that engagement and feedback.

I agree that banks should be able to recover administrative costs associated with implementing a direct deduction order on behalf of DWP. These costs should be reasonable, providing some protection to debtors and consistent with existing legislation. In line with existing Child Maintenance Service recovery regulations, therefore, DWP will set the maximum limits for costs associated with implementing regular and lump sum deduction orders that banks can recover. Paragraph 24 of Schedule 5 further requires DWP to consult persons who represent the interests of the bank and any other appropriate persons in making the regulations.

On safeguards, banks are able to deduct any reasonable costs they incur when complying with a direct deduction order. In practice, that prevents a bank charging the debtor more than its costs. Paragraph 24 of Schedule 5 allows us to make provision about the administrative charges that can be imposed by banks. That power will be used to introduce a cap on the charges that can be imposed under this clause that can be adjusted in line with inflation to ensure that the charges remain reasonable at all times. I think we made that clear.

The code of practice spells out specifically what we will do in this area. I assure the noble Lord that we are discussing with the banks what is reasonable. This works in other areas. The code of practice says that banks may deduct any reasonable costs and that the costs that they can deduct will be limited by legislation and taken into consideration when the terms of the deduction order are done, to ensure that it remains affordable. I hope that, with those reassurances, the noble Baroness will feel able to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Finn (Con)]

I thank the Minister for her response. In closing, I want to reiterate that the Bill asks a great deal of banks, in terms not just of compliance, but of active participation in delivering government policy. That comes with real operational and financial demands, especially for smaller institutions, plus the opportunity cost for the time and resources that banks might be required to dedicate to these non-profit-making activities. I hear what the Minister says about the code of practice, but there is a difference between the code of practice and having something in the Bill. It makes an important change to ensure that banks, like public authorities, can recover the costs they incur when carrying out duties placed on them by legislation. We believe that it reflects a basic principle of fairness and partnership, which is a principle that we have returned to throughout this Committee.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, for his support. He made the important point that oversight must be proportionate and transparent.

If we want this framework to work effectively and sustainably, we must ensure that those we rely on to implement it are not left bearing disproportionate costs. That should be absolutely clear. This is not about profit but about ensuring that compliance is feasible, resourced and built on mutual trust. I hope that the Minister will recognise the value of the amendment and the principle behind it. Those helping to enforce the law must be supported, not just expected to comply, and that should be in the legislation rather than the code of practice.

I appreciate the Minister’s remarks that discussions are ongoing with banks about how the demands will be incorporated and developed operationally. Can she confirm to the Committee whether this matter has been raised in the discussions and what assurances the Government have to date been able to give banks on this important question?

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

I have been talking to the banks about everything but this is one of the less complicated parts. We are simply talking about the cost of making a deduction order. Banks are used to making deduction orders in relation to the Child Maintenance Service. On that, we agreed a fee and the banks can deduct reasonable amounts. We simply put a cap in. If anything has come out of the conversations that is relevant, I am happy to add it to a letter I give the noble Baroness. I should expect the matter we are discussing to work in a way analogous to how it has worked for the CMS, without difficulty.

[Baroness Finn (Con)]

I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

Right now, however, I want to speak with a degree of sympathy for the principle underlying Amendment 123, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, and supported, as she said, by the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Leicester. I realise that the latter two are not in their place, but I understand that there is a good bit of interest in matters being debated in the Chamber at present and it may be that that is the reason.

The amendment raises a fair and important point of principle—namely, that there must be a clear distinction between those who have wilfully defrauded the state and those who have received overpayments through no fault of their own and could not reasonably have known that those payments were made in error. The noble Baroness, Lady Lister, eloquently laid out the arguments. We do not dispute that it is right for the state to recover money where fraud or deception has occurred, nor do we oppose the robust recovery of public funds where a claimant has knowingly continued to receive payments to which they were not entitled.

However, the amendment speaks to the cases where, due to administrative error or system failure, a claimant has been paid more than they were due and where they had no reasonable means of knowing that an error had occurred. In those cases, I believe that we must proceed with care. It is not fair to treat an individual as if they had committed wrongdoing if they were in effect passive recipients of a departmental error.

While we support the spirit of the amendment, though, it is important also to assert that public money, even when paid out in error, does not cease to be public money. It does not become the property of the claimant simply by virtue of its mistaken disbursement. When the state overpays, be that through a clerical oversight, a system issue or human error, we believe that that money is still owed to the public purse. That point is crucial because these funds are not abstract; they are the same funds from which other benefits are paid. They are resources that should be available to support others in need, those who are waiting on payments or who rely on the timely and correct functioning of our welfare system. Every unrecovered overpayment is, in a sense, money that could otherwise have gone to another person in genuine need. I hope that the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, would agree with that.

While I share the concern that individuals should not be penalised for departmental mistakes, I would be cautious about supporting a provision that could be interpreted as writing off the recovery of all such payments. There must be safeguards to ensure that claimants are treated fairly, yes, but also a means to ensure that taxpayers’ money is recovered, albeit in a sensitive and proportionate way. This is where I listened intently and with interest to the remarks made by the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, and the precedent that he said was set by law. I am the first to say that where there is law that has been laid down, it should of course apply.

This is where proportionality becomes key. The Department for Work and Pensions must take steps to distinguish genuine error from deception and it must act reasonably in recovery, offering a choice of, for example, repayment plans or hardship considerations and, where appropriate, writing off small sums, however that is defined, that would cost more to recover than they were worth. However, it is not unreasonable to expect that, where a person receives a payment to which they were not entitled, even by mistake, and is later made aware of that error, the money should be returned.

For fear of being described as naive, I would say that the vast majority of people are honest and fair and would, as I would put it, fess up to receiving money that they were not due or were not expecting and would take steps to return the money in full. It is those very people who should be supported for their citizenship and honesty, rather than turning a blind eye to those who would not have owned up and would definitely have kept the moneys erroneously paid out. It does not matter whether you are poor or not so poor; the moneys are still wrongly paid out. It is fundamentally a matter of honesty. The example given by the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, is a case in point and I listened carefully to what she said. Of course, it has to be handled extremely carefully and sensitively and I am sure that the department is well up to dealing with that. However, we should support those who do the right thing by making sure that those who do the wrong thing do not benefit. That is a strong message.

I suggest that, rather than inserting a hard and fast rule in primary legislation, there may be room for improved guidance and safeguards in the code of practice, or through the incorporation of more effective, independent oversight, to ensure that these cases are dealt with proportionately and fairly. This chimes with questions that have been raised in this very short debate, and by the noble Baroness, Lady Lister.

Can the Minister state what continuing steps the DWP is taking to ensure that moneys are paid out to the correct people at the correct time? If she has the figures to hand, can she enlighten us on the reasons for error? For example, how much error is due to human error and how much to systems breakdowns?

In summary, we support the intent of the amendment—to ensure that the system is not punitive where there has been no wrongdoing—but we hesitate to go so far as to say that such funds should not be recovered at all. So I hope that the Minister will take this opportunity to outline, in her response, how the department will make these distinctions. As she knows, we have also raised this matter on previous days in Committee, so I hope that she will use this chance to speak about what internal corrections or changes have been made—or will need to be made—when payments are made in error. I imagine that this could include a four-eyes principle of oversight of systems; one may already be in place, but I wonder how effective it is.

To conclude, we are faced with two distinct problems: first, how we treat those who have received payments in genuine error, so that they are protected from undue negative effects; and, secondly, how the department will address the mistakes that were made internally.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords for their contributions to this debate.

As my noble friend Lady Lister explained, her Amendment 123 seeks to prevent the recovery of overpayments in universal credit and new-style benefits in instances where the claimant or their representative could not reasonably have been expected to realise that they had been overpaid. This would apply to the recovery of existing and future official-error overpayments. Although I understand my noble friend’s arguments, I regret that I am not able to accept her amendment. However, I will set out how this issue came about, what the department is doing about it and the way that we address it when it arises.

I will first take on the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, which was referenced by the noble Viscount. We all of course obey the law, but, as I think the noble Lord said, common law is displaced by Section 71ZB of the 1992 Act, and, therefore, this is the law that we are currently applying. He suggested that it was a “very blunt instrument”, but it is not intended to be so. He may or may not find the way that I will describe how we deal with problems, when they come up, satisfactory, but I shall attempt to do that.

It is worth saying at the start that, as my noble friend indicated, the background to this is the Welfare Reform Act 2012, which was introduced under the coalition Government. That Act allowed all overpayments of universal credit, new-style JSA and new-style ESA to be recovered, regardless of the cause of the overpayment. The policy was introduced on the basis that money overpaid from the public purse should be recovered, with appropriate support—which I will come back to later—for anyone struggling with repayments.

Universal credit is what I gather is technically called a “dynamic benefit”: it supports people as they move in and out of work, or as their earnings change as they go up and down. I am told that part of the design consideration was therefore to operate in a similar way to the employer/employee relationship, which includes the recovery of overpayments. Having looked in Hansard at the Public Bill Committee debates at the time this was introduced, I saw that it was argued that, in practice, most overpayments of UC and new-style ESA and JSA would be recoverable to protect the public purse, but a decision could be made that part or all of the overpayment did not have to be repaid. It was argued that preventing DWP recovering official-error over- payments, as with old-style benefits, was not appropriate and that the system should allow a common-sense approach to the recoverability of overpayments.

That flexibility to recover overpayments of universal credit is, to some degree, crucial to allow the department to make corrections to an individual’s entitlement between assessment periods, because of the way that universal credit works. For example, if someone has a change of circumstances late in their payment period, they may be overpaid universal credit in that period, and that overpayment would need to be recovered from their payment in the next period. That flexibility clearly has to be retained.

I cannot comment on individual cases, as my noble friend will understand. However, we understand that overpayments, however they arise, can cause anxiety to those faced with repayments. In answer to the noble Viscount, the Government are very focused on improving payment accuracy in the first place and on preventing overpayments occurring through better use of data and continuous improvement activity. We are acting now and using learning from existing programmes; for example, insight from the DWP’s targeted case review of universal credit is already helping to shape continuous improvement and will support future preventive measures. The noble Viscount may recall that from his time in government.

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In closing, I repeat that the spirit of these amendments is one that we support. We need more scrutiny, more learning and a clearer framework for preventing these sorts of issues in future. However, where overpayments are found to have occurred, it is right that the state takes steps to correct that and that these overpayments are paid back. Let us proceed with the review and commit to learning from it, but let us also proceed with the duties that we owe to the public in the here and now. I hope the Minister can address these concerns and outline to the Committee the changes that she anticipates making to the process in the light of the concerns raised this afternoon.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords for their contributions. Before I get stuck in, I say two things. First, I cannot believe that I failed to congratulate both the grandparents of old and the soon-to-be grandparents. I share in the joy that has arrived and is coming. I also take a moment to pay tribute to the millions of unpaid carers across the country—grandparents and many other kinds. This Government value carers very highly and we recognise the vital and valuable contribution that they make every day.

I turn to the carer’s allowance. When we came into government, it became clear that there were far too many cases where hard-working carers, on carer’s allowance, had been left with large overpayments to be repaid—sometimes worth thousands of pounds. As a result, the Secretary of State acted to commission an independent review of earnings-related overpayments of carer’s allowance to understand exactly what had gone wrong and to make the necessary improvements for the future. The review is well under way; in answer to my noble friend, we expect to receive the report from the independent review in the near future, possibly late summer—that is one of those nice, flexible, government seasons. I hope that it will be before we are all shivering in this Room rather than sweltering. We will publish the report and our initial response as soon as is practicable thereafter.

The Government set up the review because we are determined to deal with the problems that the system has created for carers. The Secretary of State is eagerly awaiting the report, and she will give the closest consideration to every recommendation. However, as the noble Viscount pointed out, no Government could commit in advance to implementing every recommendation of an independent review sight unseen. I suspect that, if I had announced today that I would be very happy to commit to every recommendation, the Committee might raise a sceptical eyebrow about the genuine independence of the review. In fact, I do not know what the review will say and therefore I am in no position to say what is going to happen or what the Government will do about it. Having gone to the trouble of commissioning it and picking somebody independent to do it—Liz Sayce—the Secretary of State will manifestly look carefully at what comes out.

To stop the use of the new debt recovery powers on any overpayments of carer’s allowance—as Amendment 124 would do—until each and every recommendation had been accepted and implemented would not be proportionate. Maybe I could reassure the Committee that the Government have not been treading water while waiting for the review; we have already taken steps to address the problems that carers have been experiencing. In response to the noble Viscount, letters are sent out with prominent statements about the need to let the DWP know about changes in circumstances, and we send texts to people following alerts about earnings payments from HMRC, again to encourage them to do that.

We have basically been reviewing all our communications to make it as easy as possible for carers to tell the DWP when there has been a change in their circumstances that might affect their carer’s allowance. Crucially, we introduced the largest increase in the earnings limit since carer’s allowance was introduced in 1976. The earnings limit is now 16 hours’ work at the national living wage, and over 60,000 more people will be able to receive carer’s allowance between 2025-26 and 2029-30.

There are safeguards and protections for those with overpayments, both in existing law and in the Bill, including review and appeal rights, affordable repayment plans and, in exceptional cases, waivers of the debt. Those safeguards ensure that all debtors, not just those with debts from claiming carer’s allowance, are protected.

I remind noble Lords that we are talking specifically about these debt recovery powers. As I have gone on about extensively, these are powers of last resort to be used only with debtors who are not on benefit, including carer’s allowance, and not on PAYE employment. They are to be used only with those who receive income via other means and who can afford to repay, but choose not to do so. This amendment would put people in that category in a better position than those who are on benefits or on PAYE.

Amendment 127, again because I cannot commit in advance to implementing the recommendations of the review, would be even more disproportionate, because it would delay the entire Bill from coming into force until that had happened. Given the benefits that the Bill is expected to deliver, not just in the social security system but in the public sector more widely, that cannot be proportionate. We know that billions of pounds are being lost to public sector fraud; delaying this Act coming into force would put at risk an estimated £1.5 billion of benefits over the next five years, as scored by the OBR. This would place pressure on the Government’s fiscal position and on taxpayers, who deserve to have the confidence that money is being spent by the Government reaching out to those who are entitled to it. The Bill introduces new and important safeguards, including independent oversight and new rights of review and appeal to ensure the proportionate and effective use of the powers. I believe that these protections are sufficient and that we do not need to wait for the outcome of the review simply to proceed with the rest of the Bill.

I also make the point that some of the measures in the Bill are crucial for preventing the types of errors that we found in relation to carer’s allowance. For example, the eligibility verification measure, although we are not proposing to use it in relation to carer’s allowance, will improve DWP’s access to important data to help verify entitlement, ensure that payments of the benefits it covers are correct, and prevent the build-up of large overpayments in those three key benefits. It is important that the DWP is equipped with the right tools.

I will comment on a few questions that were raised. The noble Lord, Lord Vaux, as so often, made an absolutely crucial point: this is a very unusual benefit. It is a cliff-edge benefit and, therefore, if somebody goes over it even slightly, for example on earnings, it can make a very significant overpayment appear. As the Chancellor said at the Budget, we do need to look at the current cliff-edge earnings rules. It might be that a taper, for example, could incentivise unpaid carers to do some work, and reduce the risk of significant overpayments. However, I need to manage expectations. Introducing a taper into carer’s allowance is not without its challenges and could complicate quite a straightforward benefit significantly. It would need a significant technical rebuild. The DWP has begun to do some scoping work to see whether an earnings taper in carer’s allowance might be a feasible option in the longer term. But that could take some years to come through: I ought to be clear about that.

The noble Viscount, Lord Younger, made some important points about understanding that there is a range of types of error that have arisen in relation to carer’s allowance. I remind the Committee that there is no recovery from carer’s allowance of official error: we are not talking about what is classed as official error. These are errors. I will have to look at the record, but it is possible that the figure that the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, mentioned related not just to overpayments about earnings but to all the overpayments in carer’s allowance. Perhaps he could clarify that at the end and, if I am wrong, I apologise and I will clarify that to him.

The reason that is important to clarify is that, looking back, from 2018-19 to 2023-24, there was a fluctuation in the number of overpayments. The values varied. The main cause of carer’s allowance overpayments is a claimant having earnings that exceed the permitted limit. In 2023-24, the causes of new overpayment cases referred to our debt management were as follows: 57% of cases related to earnings, which was a lower proportion than previously, when it was nearly 60%; 23.5% of cases were caused by a claimant who was not providing care any more; 3.1% were caused by breaks in care; 15.8% were for other reasons, which could be that the claimant was in prison, was in full-time education, was getting another benefit or had moved abroad, or the person being cared for had died. There was a range of reasons. So there is a range of reasons why somebody may be overpaid, not all of which are related to earnings.

The job of the Government is to use the benefits of the independent review and the insights it will give us to try to make sure that we make it as easy as possible for claimants to tell us when changes happen, so they do not make those mistakes. Also, we will look carefully at what other recommendations are made and we will do whatever we can that seems reasonable within the powers and resources we have to see how we can make this better. We have also made a number of steps already to try to improve things, including by sending out messages, communicating and raising that ceiling for earnings in the first place. Given all that, I hope that the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, that was a very detailed debate, and a challenging one in some ways. I say to the Minister, from my time in local government, going round to people who were in council or housing association properties, that I often saw behind the clock the unopened envelopes from HMRC or the DWP. There is no excuse for people just ignoring it, but that is the real world. People do not always open envelopes that might have unfortunate things in them. As a chartered accountant, this is anathema to me, but the fact is that that was the reality of my 28 years on a local council. It was the case: people were not getting and opening the communication, even though it was properly given.

The Minister spoke about the taper. I can probably count on one hand how many recipients understand the taper. They know that they have received or not received a certain amount. The idea that everyone understands the taper is ridiculous.

What these amendments seek to do is purely to ensure that the completion of the review is done as soon as possible. I really do mean as soon as possible. If there is a delay in doing the review, I ask for that delay to be given to the claimants as well. Why should they not have a delay in dealing with it, if the Government cannot get their review together? Delays work both ways.

The Minister spoke about the review in the near future. The near future is so nebulous when people are being bullied on overpayments. The Minister asks about the £357 million. I honestly cannot give you the proper answer other than that I was given that figure as the overpayments since 2019. It is not immediate but it builds up like interest on a loan builds up.

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[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, there is a rather gloomy atmosphere here, but I am not quite sure why. My remarks will be relatively short. I find myself in a very unusual position—namely, I offer strong support for Amendment 124A tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle. I do so not only because it incorporates vital safeguards but because it speaks to a principle that these Benches have highlighted and pressed for throughout Committee: that powerful tools must be matched by proper protections. I think we all agree with that.

This amendment could not be timelier. The use of artificial intelligence and automated systems is rapidly expanding across Whitehall, with departments increasingly deploying these tools to assist them in undertaking administrative tasks. There are clear benefits to this: efficiency, consistency and the ability to process large volumes of data quickly. AI can be a force multiplier. It can relieve overstretched teams and streamline basic tasks—I saw that when I was in post in the department—but it can never be a substitute for fair and human decision-making where individuals’ rights, entitlements and welfare are concerned.

The temptation to lean too heavily on automation is very real, particularly in areas such as social security where volumes are high and budgets are stretched. We have sought to highlight several times to the Government the additional workload and expense that we believe the provisions in this Bill will introduce for the department. Once we incorporate the need to consider additional needs, disabilities and those at risk of coercion—important safeguards that noble Lords across the Committee have supported—we start to face a massive workload. It is feasible, in light of this, that AI will increasingly be incorporated as part of this process, but we must ensure that this temptation is tempered by caution, principle and foresight. This amendment does just that; it makes clear that automation can assist, but not replace, the human judgment at the heart of a fair welfare system. Let there be light.

We are not legislating simply for this year, or even this Parliament. We are legislating for a system that must hold up under future Governments, under future pressures and in a future where Al capabilities are likely to expand even further. In just the past couple of years, we have all seen how dramatically these technologies have entered into our lives, often with little warning and even less scrutiny. The safeguards that we write into this Bill now are therefore not merely reactive, they are pre-emptive, and they are essential, a fact that groups such as JUSTICE have recognised and highlighted to us. That is why we have tabled our amendment with the same intent and near-identical wording. It is a proposal that we support wholeheartedly, and I commend the noble Baroness for bringing it forward at this stage.

The amendment would require four simple, yet fundamental things: first, that there is meaningful human involvement in any decision-making process that includes an automated element; secondly, that the individual affected receives an individual explanation, including how automation impacted their case; thirdly, that they are given a clear opportunity to make representations; and, fourthly, that they are provided with accessible information on how to challenge the decision. These are not high bars; they are the basic hallmarks of a just and humane administrative process.

There are also some important questions around accountability here. If there are no controls in the Bill on how AI is used, there is nothing, it seems to me, that would stop the department introducing this further as a matter of operational efficiency. However, this would have massive implications for the review process, which we have rightly discussed at length during Committee. If a decision is even partially informed by AI, who is held accountable? Could the civil servant in question blame AI instead of taking responsibility?

These are serious questions, and without proper safeguards in the Bill, we have no assurance from the Government that we could not, in the very near future, have a situation in which a person is attempting to review a case in which a mistake was made where the fault lies at the feet of a computer program, to put it bluntly. If we have clear human involvement in this process—guaranteed, not just promised—at least there is a person included in determining the final decision who can be held to account. This is a vital safeguard upon which the entire review mechanism would rest.

I can anticipate the response from the Minister: she will say that a human will always be at the end of a decision. However, it is not future-proofed, and I urge her to reflect on the long-term value of this amendment and to recognise that it would strengthen the Bill not only for today, but for the years to come. If the Minister can demonstrate to the Committee that these concerns will be protected against not only now, but in perpetuity—which is, of course, the effect of legislation when passed—I would be most grateful. However, from my perspective, I fear the Minister would struggle to meet this challenge because of how the Bill is drafted. I therefore believe there would be real value in the Government adopting this amendment to make sure that they, and the people they serve, are protected not only now, but into the future.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, I regard that as a challenge. I am confident that I can assure the noble Viscount in the way that he wants to be. As I have said repeatedly—ad nauseum, to be fair—throughout Committee, the Government have a responsibility to tackle fraud and error and ensure that they are minimised. Fraud and error in the social security system were responsible for the overpayment of almost £10 billion in 2023-24. We recognise that there are opportunities for technology and data to help to identify potential fraud and error risks while also understanding the need to ensure their safe and effective use. I remind the Committee that, while the DWP is improving its access to relevant data through this Bill, we are not introducing any new automated decision-making measures in the Bill.

I will explain why this amendment is unnecessary, but I will pause briefly and digress. The noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, was commendably brief in her digression, and I will be commendably brief in mine. The Committee has at different points queried the role of automated decision-making, so I will put this point on the record. I start with the eligibility verification measure, a data-requiring measure to help the DWP identify where claimants do not meet the eligibility criteria for the benefit they are receiving. The DWP will review all information received, and DWP staff will make any decisions about entitlement where potential fraud or error is identified. No decisions will be taken using EVM data alone. Decisions about entitlement will be made only once the DWP has made further inquiries. Similarly, as previously debated, there will be no automated decision-making from the information obtained under the PSFA’s or the DWP’s information-gathering powers when we are investigating specific cases of suspected fraud. Again, decisions on the use of the new debt recovery powers will always be made by a trained member of staff.

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[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

Am I not right in thinking that that is about to change under the new Data (Use and Access) Act?

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

I was just about to get to that point, if the noble Lord will bear with me. Further safeguards, which apply after a relevant decision is taken, are set out in data protection law, to be amended by Section 80 of the Data (Use and Access) Act. These include providing individuals with information about significant decisions made about them and the opportunity to make representations and obtain human intervention on the decision.

The noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, raised international comparisons and Australia. To be clear, the use of machine learning has led to legal action internationally, primarily because there were concerns about automated decision-making. That is not the case here, so I hope that reassures her.

This is not for this Bill and not for now, but the Committee has raised the fact that as, over time, AI will clearly be used a lot across government and the private sector, it is important that the Government make sure that all the right safeguards are in place. The DWP is leading the way on this, and the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology is leading several programmes of work to utilise the opportunities of AI and ensure that it is used safely. For example, the algorithmic transparency recording standard is a standardised way for public sector organisations to publish information about how and why they are using algorithmic tools. It is mandatory across central government for algorithmic tools that have a significant influence on a decision-making process with public effect or directly interact with the general public. The Government Digital Service is currently implementing the mandatory rollout of the ATRS in government departments and arm’s-length bodies.

Work is going on in this broad space, but I hope that I have reassured noble Lords that the current law and the provisions in this Bill give the noble Baroness reason to withdraw her amendment.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

We have had this discussion a few times, but does the Minister accept that most if not all of the safeguards she has talked about exist not in law but in the codes, guidance and internal rules of the DWP? They could be changed at will by a future Government less robust in looking after people’s safeguards. Would it not be sensible to put something into the Bill to future-proof these safeguards? My concern is not what is happening now but what could happen in future.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, I hope I have made the case, in speaking to the amendment that we have been discussing, that the law already provides those protections—or it will do so when the provisions of the data Act are implemented, if those changes have not already been made. For my money, we could not have been clearer that the Bill creates no new automated decision-making powers. DWP and fraud and error decisions are always made by humans. There is a debate to be had, broadly for the future, which is where the work being done by DSIT is really important. That is where protections across government to future-proof things need to be brought in—not in this Bill, which does not introduce any new automated decision-making powers.

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate, in particular the noble Viscount, Lord Younger of Leckie, for his strong support, and the noble Lord, Lord Palmer. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, for his expert contribution, which essentially said what I was about to say in my summing up: we are not necessarily talking about what this Government are doing; we are talking about ensuring that the legislation is there to put controls on what future Governments do.

This is the second time in a week that I have basked in the warm glow of support from everyone except the Government; I could get used to it. It is as the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, said. If the Minister is saying that this will happen, why not put it in the Bill? I will go and have a look at what she said about the data Bill. I suspect that I am probably involved in that one, too—I have so many Bills at the moment that I slightly lose track. We will look at this carefully before Report.

This will be my final contribution in this Committee because I will shortly have to run to the Chamber. We have had very fruitful debates. It is a pity that such an important Bill was not discussed in the Chamber; it will impact on many of the most vulnerable people in our communities. It is crucial that we get the Bill right and that it is seen to have had the full and proper scrutiny it deserves, but I think everyone in this Committee has done their best and we have made a good foundation to take forward to Report. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

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Moved by

[Baroness Sherlock]

125: Clause 98, page 63, leave out lines 23 to 25 and insert—
“(i) the period mentioned in section 71ZK(6)(a) for P to appeal against the outcome of the review has passed without P bringing an appeal, or”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendment to clause 89, page 56, line 31.

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[Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I was not planning to speak, but I thought I would say a couple of words. This is an important amendment and I support the objective that it is pursuing, although I also agree with the comments by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, on being careful about using criminal law to deal with much bigger cultural and social problems.

However, the amendment needs some tightening in the subjective element, because at the moment it punishes a wide range of conduct. At one end of the spectrum, a person would commit an offence if they ought reasonably to know that

“the information or guidance provided … will likely be used to enable or encourage another person to obtain, or attempt to obtain, benefits through deception”.

There seems to me a rather loose connection between the person who would be committing the offence and the actual fraud; it is a bit too remote. At the other end of the spectrum, a person would commit an offence

“if they know … that the information or guidance provided … is intended to facilitate dishonest conduct under the Social Security Administration Act 1992”.

That does not strike me as a remote connection between the person whose conduct we would be criminalising and the actual dishonest conduct, so there needs to be a bit of tightening of the subjective element, making sure that it is more narrowly focused than it currently is.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

Again, I thank noble Lords for an interesting discussion—some of it even on the amendment.

The noble Baroness, Lady Fox, is right that sickfluencers are the Opposition’s favourite topic, but it gives us an opportunity to look at this element of fraud and how the Government deal with it. I will try to take us through it. This also gives me a chance to show the way in which our legislative framework provides a comprehensive basis to enable the DWP and the PSFA to address fraudulent activity against the public sector or the social security system.

In responding to the amendments, there is something that we need to acknowledge. The noble Viscount mentioned a broad spectrum and clearly this is, particularly online. The noble Baroness, Lady Fox, made this point on a previous day in Committee: there is a lot of advice online in all kinds of settings on how to claim disability benefits, and it can range from genuine advocates for disabled people to people in similar circumstances trying to tell other people what their experience has been to friends’ or family’s online content through social media. There is all manner of guidance out there, and we need to be very careful not to drag people who are not doing anything wrong into the debate.

While many people provide advice with good intentions, irrespective of how useful the advice is or how effective it will be, there are clearly some unscrupulous people who actively try to encourage or assist others in committing fraud against the social security system. Where activity can reasonably be countered, such as taking down websites or seeking the removal of posts that are unlawful, the DWP takes relevant action. We already collaborate with a range of government partners, including Action Fraud, the City of London Police and the National Cyber Security Centre to prevent fraudulent activity online.

There are legislative duties under the Online Safety Act for social media companies to remove harmful and illegal content, including content that encourages or assists others to commit offences. The Online Safety Act also allows us to work with Ofcom and its new trusted flagger process, and we have trusted escalation routes to report social media content on certain platforms.

We are committed to demonstrating that such behaviour should not be tolerated, and we encourage anyone who identifies material online—I include the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, in this—to report it through the available channels. These people should face consequences, but there is an existing legal framework to do so. Section 7 of the Fraud Act 2006 and Section 44 of the Serious Crime Act 2007 already make it a criminal offence for individuals to provide information on how to commit fraud. That includes influencers sharing and selling information online, such as fraud instruction manuals.

In addition, we are concerned that Amendment 125A could potentially complicate the legislative landscape. Adding a new offence would create overlap with existing legislation that could lead to confusion in prosecution or sentencing, and that is entirely avoidable. It also happens that, ironically, the amendment would actually shorten the maximum sentence for those convicted of the new offence; it would carry a maximum period of five years in custody but, if the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, does not like that, the current maximum is potentially 10 years under existing legislation.

I know that the noble Viscount acknowledged previously that public sector fraud hurts everyone and that he wants to tackle it and support us in doing that. I was surprised, therefore, to read Amendment 129A, which he tabled. The amendment would prevent the use of the powers in the Bill until we publish a review assessing the impacts of people who enable others to deceive a public authority to obtain social security or welfare benefits that they are not entitled to, or to circumvent eligibility checks. I clearly cannot agree that we should prevent the PSFA or the DWP using these important new powers to tackle fraud and error until we have published such a review. During that time, we could be out there investigating fraud, tackling error and recovering public money.

I encourage the noble Viscount to reflect on what he and his Government focused on when they were in power. This focus on people who share information online or through other means may not be the “silver bullet” as he hopes. We will continue to see determined and hostile actors trying to defraud the system. It is absolutely right that the department takes action to tackle fraudulent online content and has a deterrent, but the crucial thing to remember is that fraud itself cannot take place unless those seeking to defraud the welfare system manage to interact with it. That is why we have put so much effort into protecting the social security system directly. This provides the strongest chance of success, evidenced by looking at the significant value of such activity.

I really enjoyed the contribution by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox. There is so much that I would like to push back on but I do not think that I can keep the Committee here for long enough to get into some of the issues. To take a small one, however, she thinks that this Bill is a sledgehammer to crack a nut—I think it is a pretty big nut, and we want to tackle it. We will just have to agree to disagree on that. On her broader points, this Government recognise that there are too many young people who are genuinely struggling with their mental health and who need support. We want to make sure that they get the help that they need. We also recognise that, for many people, good work is good for good health, both physical and mental. We are now in a situation where one in eight of our young people are not in education, employment or training, and we cannot allow that to carry on.

We want to get out there and support people to get into the kind of work that will be good for them, but we want to make sure that those who genuinely cannot work are able to get support. That is the direction of travel for the Government and what our reforms are meant to be about.

The noble Viscount keep asking how many people the DWP prosecutes. As he will remember, the DWP is not a prosecutor itself. The department’s role is to refer cases to the appropriate prosecuting body, the Crown Prosecution Service, which selects the most appropriate offences to prosecute under. In 2023-24, fraud investigation teams in the DWP referred around 700 prosecution cases to the CPS and Crown Procurator Fiscal in Scotland. The department does not use the term “sickfluencer” and we do not have categories for that, so I cannot tell him how many cases fall under that description. We obviously do not comment on individual cases that we refer to the relevant prosecting body.

However, I understand the points that the noble Viscount is making. We are happy to continue to work in this space but, in terms of these amendments, just proposing what is in effect a complication of the landscape and a shorter prison sentence, while preventing the DWP and PSFA from using powers in this Bill to tackle fraud and error, will not deter those criminals; it will simply enable them to keep on going. I therefore urge him to withdraw his amendment.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all those who have taken part in this short debate. As I said in my opening speech, this amendment reflects the reality that the vector of fraud is increasingly digital, but it also reflects something more fundamental: that our law must evolve to meet emerging threats, especially when those threats strike at the heart of public trust. We know that public confidence in welfare systems hinges on fairness, integrity and robust enforcement. We cannot let that confidence be eroded by silence in the face of digital abuse.

I say again—though I will not go into too much detail as I gave a long speech in opening this group—that we believe that this amendment is modest, measured and necessary. If the Government feel that the drafting can be improved, we stand ready to work with them. Judging from the Minister’s comments, that may not be the case. The principle must be accepted, however, because the damage being done is real—to public funds, to vulnerable claimants and to the credibility of the benefit system itself. As the Minister herself said, it is a nut; it is in fact quite a big nut. I believe it needs a sledgehammer or at least a reasonably big hammer.

On that note, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, for her comments. I listened carefully to her rather unexpected views on my amendments and, as she will guess, I did not agree with much of what she said. She came from an unusual and different angle. I will read Hansard to try to understand where she was coming from, but I agree with her and the noble Baroness that there are many other measures that must be taken to ensure that benefits, that is, universal credit or health top-up benefits, are given to the right people. The right amounts should be given to the right people. That is at the crux of the huge debate that is going on nationally at the moment and in the other place as we speak.

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[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, I support Amendment 126, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Palmer of Childs Hill, which would require an independent assessment of the impact of this Bill on those at risk of financial exclusion and, crucially, ensure that the findings of that assessment are made public and laid before Parliament.

The principle behind this amendment is very important. We have heard throughout the Committee’s deliberations from me, my noble friend Lady Finn and the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, about the real and pressing risk that some of the measures in this Bill could unintentionally deepen financial exclusion. As we have said several times, there is a risk that banks are made to feel concerned about their customers if they are subject to an EVN, or, as the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, has powerfully expressed previously and now, that banks could be deterred from taking on customers who are in receipt of benefits in the first place as a pre-emptive measure against the additional workload that this could demand.

As we do not yet have clarity from the Government about when and how often notices and demands will be made of banks, everyone is currently in the dark about how much of an additional workload this will mean for financial institutions. It is therefore entirely feasible that these institutions, which are, as we always need to remember, designed and operated to make money, could simply choose not to take the risks, impacting people who have not necessarily done anything wrong in the process. If we empower government to work more closely with banks to verify eligibility, recover funds and issue deductions, we must be equally mindful of the unintended consequences for those who sit at the margins of our financial system.

We appreciate that this amendment does not seek to obstruct or weaken the Bill. Quite the opposite—it offers the Government a constructive, concrete mechanism for assessing whether our enforcement framework is functioning in a way that is fair, proportionate and inclusive. This is an important measure, and I am sure that noble Lords across the Committee who have raised concerns about this issue will be somewhat reassured if the Government commit to undertaking a review as set out in this amendment.

We have heard Ministers reassure us that these powers will be used carefully and that the risk of harm is low. This amendment provides an opportunity to put those assurances to the test—not through speculation, but through evidence. Twelve months after this Bill is enacted, the independent reviewer would be tasked with producing a report examining the extent to which the measures we have passed are having an adverse impact on those already struggling to access or maintain financial stability.

In conclusion, this is not a burdensome ask; it is a safeguard. It would ensure that, as we work to strengthen our systems against fraud, we do not inadvertently erect new barriers for those who are financially vulnerable already. It would give the House and the other place the opportunity to revisit and respond to those findings, if and when action is needed. I therefore urge the Minister to consider this proposal seriously and to work with colleagues to ensure that the fight against fraud does not come at the cost of fairness or financial exclusion.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, Amendment 126 would require the independent person, who will be appointed by the Minister for the Cabinet Office to review the PSFA powers under Part 1 of the Act, to carry out an additional assessment of the impact of the whole Act on the number of people facing financial exclusion. I hope that that clears up the question raised by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux. The reviewer is the one for the PSFA bit, and the impact would be for the whole Act, as the amendment is currently drafted.

I recognise the intent behind the amendment put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Palmer. I assure stakeholders in the financial sector—should they be watching—that we have heard the concerns that they have raised with us on these matters. I am confident, however, that this reporting on potential financial exclusion will not be necessary.

First, I want to talk a little wider and acknowledge that the Government recognise the place of financial services in the lives of millions of people and businesses across the UK. That is why we have already taken steps to give people greater protection against their bank accounts being closed, as part of our plan for change. To do so, the Government introduced rules under the Payment Services and Payment Accounts (Contract Termination) (Amendment) Regulations 2025 that require banks to give customers at least 90 days’ notice before closing accounts. The rules stipulate that, when doing so, the bank must provide a clear explanation in writing as to why they intend to close someone’s account. That gives people clarity on why the decision has been taken and, crucially, more time to challenge such decisions through bodies such as the Financial Ombudsman Service. These changes have been made off the back of consultation with industry and will take effect from April 2026.

Moreover, there are statutory protections to protect individuals most in need. The nine largest UK providers of personal current accounts are required by law to offer basic bank accounts to individual customers legally resident in the UK who do not have a bank account or who are not eligible for banks’ other accounts. Banks are prohibited by law from discriminating against UK consumers by reason of a range of protected characteristics, such as sex, ethnicity, disability and belief, when individuals apply for access to an account. So, while firms rightly have strict obligations to ensure the legitimacy of a business and to protect against financial crime, the Government have focused on account closures as a priority, given the material impact that a loss of banking services has on a business already in operation. That is the broader context.

Secondly, our approach on this Bill fits with that wider Government agenda on tackling financial exclusion. The DWP and the PSFA are working closely with stakeholders from the finance industry, including UK Finance and the Financial Conduct Authority, to ensure that no one is inadvertently or unintentionally excluded from access to financial services. As such, we have made provision in the legislation, where appropriate, to try to ensure that this is the case. For example, the DWP’s eligibility verification measure amends the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 to make clear to financial institutions that they are exempt from returning a suspicious activity report in certain circumstances, if the information they have is only as a result of a data match from EVM. UK Finance agrees that this is an important exemption.

Thirdly, where appropriate, the codes of practice seek to provide further detail about banks’ duties in this space. For example, the code of practice for the EVN also clarifies that eligibility verification notices and the data returned in compliance with them are not intended to indicate that the DWP has any suspicion of fraud or financial wrongdoing, or that an error has occurred. The determination of any subsequent wrongdoing will be made following a further review of this evidence alongside other evidence, and is for DWP to determine, not the banks. We continue to engage with the financial industry and across government on drafting this to ensure that we get the wording right in our codes of practice.

For the PSFA, while the code of practice for Part 1 of the Bill is focused more on the new civil penalties, the PSFA will, in due course, publish guidance on the other powers in Part 1. This will consider these issues from the PSFA’s perspective and in more detail. For respective debt recovery measures, the PSFA and the DWP will align with the government debt policy, as well as abide by the standards set out by the government debt management function and the debt management vulnerability toolkit to handle those at potential risk of financial exclusion.

The Government acknowledge that financial exclusion is a serious problem, which is why we are taking steps to provide people with additional protections and to clarify duties in the Bill. I am confident that we have the necessary protections for individuals from financial exclusion in the Bill and therefore do not think that the amendment is needed. I therefore ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

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[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Viscount for introducing Amendment 130. It would require the Secretary of State to publish a report on the mechanism used to request and return information under the information-gathering powers and the eligibility verification measure contained in the Bill.

The Bill and the codes of practice clearly lay out the type of information that will be requested under these powers and the expectations on financial institutions required to respond. It provides an appropriate level of detail for Parliament to scrutinise the proposed process while the technical details are under development in close partnership with industry. I should add that I will not be in a position to provide a level of technical detail that could enable those intent on committing fraud to circumvent the system or that could put the DWP’s systems at risk.

The DWP has already published an impact assessment that considers both these measures. It sets out the department’s latest estimates of the regulatory burdens they might place on businesses in Great Britain. The additional annual costs to new businesses compelled to respond to information notices issued under the information-gathering power in the Bill have been estimated to be less than £100,000 per year in total across all information holders. For the eligibility verification measure, initial estimates are that the set-up costs are anticipated to be around £40 million across the sector. We also expect that there will be some limited ongoing compliance costs for data holders. Further information on these estimates can be found in the published impact assessments.

We know there is more work to do with industry to consider these costs further. That is why the DWP has also committed to publishing a further updated impact assessment for EVM within 12 months of Royal Assent, to provide a more robust and detailed estimate of the impact on industry, which will take into account the ongoing work with industry. This will ensure that there is transparency on the costs as we move forward.

I reassure the Committee that burdens on businesses resulting from the measures in this Bill are a matter that this Government take seriously. We are committed to keeping requirements and costs proportionate and to a minimum. That key aim has been at the forefront of our close and regular engagement with the finance sector. We continue to work closely with UK Finance, the finance sector and other relevant stakeholders, including business representative organisations, on the delivery of these measures, to ensure that any digital solutions are workable and to minimise costs where possible.

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[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for giving some answers to my questions, particularly those that I raised about the letter—there is greater clarity now. Some of the answers I probably should have known.

I appreciate her comments regarding the plethora of questions that I have raised. I am choosing my words quite carefully, and I totally understand that I was on the other side of the fence on this, but I hope that I might speak on behalf of others who have spoken in this Committee and say that it is quite a challenge for us, when we are challenging the Government, when we cannot get answers. I understand why the Minister cannot give us the answers, and I speak on behalf of my noble friend Lady Finn from the Public Sector Fraud Authority angle and the DWP angle. This goes back to June and July 2024 when, clearly, we were not able to give too much information out because there was test and learn. I of course understand that we cannot put too much into the public domain for fear of aiding those who might be keen to perpetrate fraud.

What I am really trying to say is that this amendment was deliberate in trying to draw out some further answers. I understand where the Minister is coming from in saying that she cannot give precise answers to many of the questions that we have put. Perhaps we should leave it, on this last day in Committee, with a request to the Minister to look again at the questions that I have raised on this group to see what further answers might be possible before Report. At the end of the day, we have to be sure that the Bill is workable and can be understood by all, and that any loopholes are filled. That is probably my only wish.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Viscount for his understanding. Just to be clear, the questions that we are not able to answer are primarily operational ones. What I am therefore trying to do is to make it possible for Parliament to scrutinise the legislation and to answer everything that seems to be legitimate and appropriate, which Parliament can look at, at this stage. Perhaps it would be useful if we were to organise another session for Peers between now and Report, so that the questions can be put to us and we can go through them. That might allow me to answer questions in a less constrained manner than I can at the Dispatch Box. I will commit to looking through all the questions that have been raised by noble Lords in Committee to see what we have and have not been able to answer. We can try to regroup before Report and see where we get to, if that would be acceptable.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

I thank the Minister for those comments. Others who have taken part in Committee may also be able to add value—I am sure that they would.

I have a final comment before I sit down and indeed withdraw my amendment. I know that the department set out to produce a code of practice at least a year ago, and I am pleased to know that the code is being built up and improved upon as part of test and learn—so I just clarify that I am aware of that. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

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It is an interesting way in which to approach this issue, and I commend the Opposition for putting the amendment forward. I would be interested in seeing this, or a version of it, on Report that we could look at. The Government do not have anything to hide, if what they say is going to happen, will happen—then good. If not, the amendment is a responsible way in which to treat public money and public power: namely, if it is not working, scrap it.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Viscount for introducing his amendment and welcome the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, back to the debate.

I thank all noble Lords who have contributed. I hope that those who were not here will read it on the record. Notwithstanding the comments about our being in Grand Committee rather than in the Chamber, this has been a very good and interesting Committee. It has been the House of Lords doing its job: testing through the details, sifting through things and being able to make sure that I have answers to questions. I am very grateful for the way in which noble Lords have engaged, and I also speak for my noble friend Lady Anderson. I thank everyone for that and all those involved in supporting it.

While I understand that the noble Viscount rightly wants to hold the Government to account, I am afraid that this, in practice, is a wrecking amendment, and I will explain why for two clear reasons. Therefore, I obviously must oppose it. We have said repeatedly—although I recognise that we have not yet convinced the noble Baroness, Lady Fox—that the measures in the Bill are strong and proportionate. We have made clear that, to ensure that they are implemented safely, they will be rolled out gradually through a test-and-learn approach.

When we are scaling up these powers, there will be a period when the powers will not be fully rolled out and delivering the level of savings that they are expected to in the future. That means that we will not deliver the same savings profile at the start, compared to when the measures are fully rolled out. Setting an arbitrary requirement that we must see net recoveries of £500 million a year—or any other rigid financial threshold—undermines that approach and risks either our prematurely withdrawing measures before they are fully rolled out, or requiring the Government to roll out the Bill more quickly, which would give industry less time to adjust and risk the powers being implemented less effectively and less safely.

As noble Lords know, the Bill is estimated to deliver benefits of £1.5 billion by 2029-30, as certified by the Office for Budget Responsibility. That is made up of £940 million in savings related to fraud and error overpayments through the eligibility verification measure, and £565 million in additional debt recoveries from the debt measure. Our impact assessment clearly outlines how we will scale up our rollout to deliver these savings.

I highlight to the noble Viscount that that delivery profile has been certified by the OBR. Looking at that delivery profile, he will clearly see that we would not meet the £500 million in net recoveries benefits in 2026-27, and, under his amendment, the powers would cease to be available in five years’ time because of the failure to meet that threshold. That would simply undermine the Government’s efforts after year one and remove any incentive to invest in the delivery of these measures, knowing they would be gone in five years. Given those figures, it is not clear how the noble Viscount can have anticipated the Bill achieving net recoveries of £500 million each year, as is set out in his amendment, without also wrecking the Bill.

Secondly, by extension, this amendment overlooks the wider benefits the Bill could bring. For example, the Bill contains preventive aspects, and some measures may change attitudes towards fraud, error and debt by providing an important deterrent effect. I believe this amendment would remove the potential for positive prevention and deterrent effects.

I know that the noble Viscount thinks this matters. When we discussed our debt recovery measures in this Room last week, he said that it was

“about ensuring that there is an effective deterrent against repeated and deliberate non-compliance with efforts to recover public money”.—[Official Report, 18/6/25; col. GC 482.]

I agree with him; we need these powers to remain for exactly that reason. But, if the noble Viscount believes this, he must also accept that, by their very nature, where overpayments are prevented or deterred, they will, by definition, reduce the size of the pool and the amount of money we can recover over time. While I accept that we are a way off that reality, this may mean there will come a time when we cannot recover a net of £500 million a year thanks to the success of our detection and prevention efforts. But that does not mean that our counter fraud and error activity—or the Bill, for that matter—should just cease. Indeed, it would mean that the activity is working and should continue, to keep levels of fraud and error down.

Unfortunately, we cannot easily quantify all these effects, as they are complex, so although savings from measures such as EVM account for detecting the overpayment and preventing it continuing into the future, this would not contribute towards a recovery figure, as the amendment specifies. It is instead taken account of by the OBR in the AME savings for the Bill.

I know the noble Viscount does not want fraudsters to be able to get away with attacking our public services or the state to be unable to properly verify benefit eligibility, or to let it continue to be the case that debtors will be able to refuse to repay money belonging to the taxpayer. So I ask him to consider a different approach to hold the Government’s delivery to account.

To close, I assure the Committee that we are not complacent; we are committed to delivering the Bill and its savings. Moreover, we want to scale measures where they prove successful to, I hope, save more in the future. But, given that we are introducing new powers and requirements, we must also deliver safely, as I know we all want to. If noble Lords want to see more detail about when we expect to make the savings or to see the anticipated costs of the measure, these can be found in the published impact assessment, in which we have committed to monitoring and evaluation in the Bill to ensure that the new powers are delivering as intended. For the reasons I have set out, I ask the noble Viscount to withdraw his final amendment.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, in winding up on Amendment 131, I say that, as I laid out in my opening remarks, we believe that the amendment would introduce a clear, common-sense standard: that the powers in the Bill should continue only if they deliver real, measurable value—a net benefit of at least £500 million per year. I appreciate the support of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, in this respect.

Although we do not see this as a wrecking amendment, I listened carefully to the arguments put by the Minister, which I will read in Hansard, and I have to say that I see some merit in her responses. However, it is still the case—she alluded to this—that there needs to be accountability. Our aim is not to obstruct the Bill—we do not see the amendment as being wrecking—but the message has been put across that there needs to be a form of accountability. We have heard often during our deliberations that the Bill is part of a test-and-learn approach. If that is the case, there must be a test and a measure of success. Without them, we risk creating a framework that operates indefinitely without delivering the intended returns.

In closing, I leave a question—perhaps hanging in the air—for the Minister to answer. Will she consider bringing forward some further ideas for how success can be measured? That is what we are all about and I think we are probably on the same side of the argument as to how we can measure success. Whether it is £500 million or a sunset clause is not for me to say—it is part of the amendment that I have put forward—but there needs to be something. To that extent, I suspect that we will press this aspect on Report. With that, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill

Baroness Sherlock Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 11th June 2025 Grand Committee

Moved by

[Baroness Sherlock]

63: Clause 49, page 28, line 18, leave out from “appeal” to end of line 20 and insert “may not be brought after the end of—
(a) the period of 28 days beginning with the day after the day on which the liable person was notified of the outcome of the review, or(b) such longer period (if any) as the Tribunal considers reasonable in all the circumstances.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment means that the tribunal can extend the time limit for bringing an appeal in relation to a deduction from earnings order.

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Moved by

[Baroness Sherlock]

64: Clause 60, page 32, line 25, leave out from “appeal” to end of line 26 and insert “may not be brought after the end of—
(a) the period of 28 days beginning with the day after the day on which the person is given the penalty notice, or(b) such longer period (if any) as the appropriate court considers reasonable in all the circumstances.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment means that the tribunal or court hearing an appeal against a penalty imposed by the Minister for the Cabinet Office under Chapter 5 of the Bill (penalty relating to fraud or penalty for failing to comply with requirements) can extend the time limit for the bringing of that appeal.

Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill

Baroness Sherlock Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 16th June 2025 Grand Committee

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, I offer my support for most of the proposals in this group of amendments, which strike me as largely thoughtful, proportionate and consistent with the principles that we have returned to time and again throughout this Committee stage: clarity in law; accountability in process; and fairness in the exercise of power. As we know, we have spent three days carefully scrutinising the powers set out in this Bill—powers that are, by any measure, significant. In that context, it is right that we continue to ask whether the safeguards accompanying these powers are sufficient and, where they are not, how they could be strengthened in a practical, proportionate and legally coherent way. We believe that these amendments are consistent in furthering that principle.

First, I have taken note of the cautionary tale arising from the Australian experience, as raised by the noble Lord, Lord Sikka. Amendments 76 and 78, which seek to clarify liability for errors or omissions in information provided under Clause 72, are rooted in a basic but essential legal principle: parties need to know where responsibility lies. If someone is being compelled to provide information under threat of penalty, it must be clear whether they or a third party acting on their behalf will be held liable for any inaccuracies. Without clear statutory guidance, we risk confusion and, worse still, unjust outcomes where individuals may be penalised for honest mistakes or information errors outside their control. These amendments would address that problem in a measured way by introducing transparency and clarity into the process.

Amendment 77 addresses a slightly different but equally important concern. As the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, outlined so eloquently, we are focusing on proportionality and reasonableness in the exercise of investigatory powers. The amendment would insert a reasonableness test requiring that an authorised officer must reasonably consider the request for information to be necessary and proportionate. To my mind, this is simply good law. It reflects what is already expected in broader public law standards, but writing it clearly into the legislation would give both officials and the public confidence that such powers are bound by objective legal norms. It would strengthen decision-making, improve accountability and, perhaps most important, provide a clearer basis for redress if powers are exercised in an overly broad or inappropriate manner. However, I note from the remarks made by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, that we cannot—or should not—say, “Oh, joy of joys”, in respect of the guidance provided.

With clarity established as to where responsibility lies, by necessity a process will have to be put in place and be tested to make sure that there is oversight and sign-off. If the Minister is not minded to accept Amendments 76 and 77, can she outline in detail what the process is? If she cannot do so, I ask her to write to me and to copy in all those noble Lords who are involved in today’s Committee. The Minister may say that this is all part of the as-yet-unfinished “test and learn”, but a full answer is requested. I think I have picked up that she may be able to enlighten us in this respect at the beginning of this fourth day in Committee. I hope so.

However, I must express my concerns and ultimately oppose Amendment 79 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, on the grounds that it risks undermining the effectiveness of the very system that we are seeking to strengthen—although I note the example given, the sad story of Ms Green, highlighted by the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett. The amendment would require that a copy of every information notice issued under Clause 72 be sent to all parties affected by that notice, including, crucially, the individual who is the subject of the investigation.

Fraud investigations, particularly in the social security context covered by Clause 72, often rely on timely access to accurate information before the subject of the investigation is made aware. This is not a matter of secrecy for secrecy’s sake; it is a matter of preserving the integrity of the evidence and preventing interference with the process. If a person suspected of fraud is notified that they are under investigation or even that information about them is being requested from a third party, there is a very real risk that they may destroy or tamper with evidence, close accounts, alter records or otherwise act to frustrate the inquiry before it has a chance to develop properly. This is not speculative; it is a well-established principle in law enforcement and regulatory practice. It is not clear when this notice would be sent, but there is an assumption in the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, that it would be sent immediately—perhaps he could clarify that when he winds up—in which case, I rest my case.

There is a reason why investigators, whether in HMRC, the police or other regulatory bodies, are often permitted to conduct inquiries without giving advance notice to those under scrutiny. To do otherwise, as I said, would be to tip off the very individuals whose conduct is in question and, in doing so, jeopardise the ability of investigators to properly undertake their duties. Investigators would be hampered at the outset, fraudsters would have an early warning and those operating within the system in good faith, including civil servants, local authorities and partner organisations, would find it significantly harder to detect and prevent abuse. This is particularly true in cases of organised or sophisticated fraud, where timely access to third-party data may be the only way to build a case before the trail goes cold. It is also true in cases where vulnerable individuals, perhaps manipulated by others, may be at risk of harm if alerted prematurely. I will return to that theme later today.

Of course, we must always strive for fairness and accountability, but there is a distinction between eventual transparency and instant notification. There are appropriate points in the process when the subject is made aware of action against them and can engage in a process of review, but to mandate notification at the earliest investigative stage before facts are even established would, I believe, give potential wrongdoers an unearned advantage. Therefore, I respectfully suggest that the practical consequences of this amendment would be counterproductive and potentially damaging to the very goals of the Bill. We need a fraud enforcement system that is lawful, proportionate and fair but also capable of operating effectively in the face of growing and increasingly complex threats to public finances. That is why I cannot support this amendment.

To conclude, a balance must always be struck between individual rights and the broader public interest. In this case, that balance lies in ensuring that information requests are reasonable, that liability is clear and that powers are used with restraint and purpose but not in mandating disclosures that could derail legitimate investigations. I therefore welcome Amendments 76 to 78, but I am afraid that I urge caution about and ultimately oppose Amendment 79.

[The Minister of State, Department for Work and Pensions (Baroness Sherlock) (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this short debate and I welcome the Committee to Part 2 of the PAFER Bill. We are on to the DWP and it will be a joy to travel in this ship together with my happy fellow travellers. Before answering the specifics of the amendment, I want to reflect on some of the comments made by my noble friend Lord Sikka, because he helpfully highlighted a couple of the confusions that have permeated some of the discussion around the Bill.

The Bill contains a number of different measures and, in most cases, they apply to different people. In his speech, my noble friend spoke as though these information-gathering powers applied to all those people to whom, for example, an eligibility verification notice will be sent. In fact, that is not the case at all. A number of the amendments coming up next are about the eligibility verification measure, so I will return to any comments about it then. These information-gathering powers are quite different. They are specifically aimed at people of whom there is a reasonable suspicion of fraud by a named individual. This is a particular category of person.

Clause 72 makes provision for expanded information-gathering powers. There are existing powers in the Social Security Administration Act 1992, but they enable DWP to compel information only from a set list of organisations. That approach is restrictive and can delay or prevent the gathering of information that is relevant to proving or disproving a criminal benefit fraud investigation. So new Section 109BZB, inserted into the 1992 Act by this Bill, will update those powers to enable DWP to obtain relevant information from any information holder in respect of a DWP criminal investigation. That kind of information can be vital in proving or disproving an allegation of fraud.

Amendments 76 and 78, tabled by my noble friend Lord Sikka, concern liability for incorrect or incomplete information provided by an information holder in response to an information notice. The Bill is clear that information providers must comply with the information notice and should also be aware of their own data protection obligations in doing so. Information about those obligations will be included in the code of practice, and the information notice must specify the potential consequences for failing to comply.

Section 111 of the Social Security Administration Act 1992 sets out offences for intentionally failing to provide required information, as well as delaying or obstructing an authorised officer. In those circumstances, DWP can take action. So introducing a separate statutory liability for all errors is not necessary and would, in my view, actually place an unfair burden on information holders, particularly when mistakes are unintentional or minor.

Amendment 77, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, would insert “reasonably” into subsection (1)(b) of new Section 109BZB. I hope to persuade the noble Lord that we in fact have a very good case here. I think that it will be easier to write. There may be some disagreement about his comments about JOYS—this will be another theme, I think; I suspect that “Ode to Joy” jokes and other joy jokes will abound. But I will write, because I want to talk specifically about the amendment that he has tabled today and how that affects the DWP parts of the Bill.

The current drafting of subsections (1)(a) and (1)(b) of new Section 109BZB in Clause 72 sets out that, prior to issuing an information notice, an authorised officer must have “reasonable grounds to suspect” that a DWP offence has been committed and must consider it “necessary and proportionate” to require the information. Both those steps have to happen, so I would argue that the drafting already captures the intent of the amendment. We have been doing this for some time. The department already has these information-gathering powers, with well-established training and guidance in place to ensure that they are used appropriately and in line with the existing law.

Authorised officers are trained and accredited before they can use those powers and they have to adhere to the code of practice. The existing guidance makes it clear that they have to consider all the facts, justify their decisions and record their reasoning. That will apply in the same way to the new expanded powers as it does to the current powers. For those reasons, we are confident that the principle of reasonableness is clear in the drafting of Clause 72 and we further support it. I can see that the noble Lord is itching to get to his feet.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

I understand the noble Baroness’s point. It was because it said “reasonable grounds” in the first half that the fact that it was missing in the second half—paragraph (b)—stuck out: you have to have reasonable grounds, but then you just have to consider. But my point is more than that. Let us imagine the worst-case scenario, where a future Government decide to go for an all-out DOGE approach to whatever. I have no doubt, as I said, that the noble Baroness and the department at the moment will follow the guidance, et cetera, that she laid out, but that is just guidance and it can be torn up on a whim. If a new Government decide to go all out, there is no reasonableness safeguard; they can just say, “We consider it necessary”, and there does not need to be any reasonableness attached to that. That is the concern. It is not about now; it is about where we might be in a year or five years’ time that worries me.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

I see where the noble Lord is going with this and I am happy to pick up the conversation outside. I do not think that the distinction is big enough for it to be a problem, because the reality is that a reasonable suspicion is not just a hunch: it has to be based on an objective test, it requires up-to-date and accurate information and it must be something that an ordinary reasonable person would consider a legitimate cause for suspicion given the same information. So, for information gathering to be legal and justified, the intrusion into a person’s privacy must be necessary, proportionate and in accordance with the legislation. We think that that is belt and braces, but I am happy to pick that up with the noble Lord because I think that we want the same thing. The only question is: do we need any more ways of saying it?

Finally, Amendment 79, in the name of my noble friend Lord Sikka, would require DWP to copy the information notice to all parties, including the subject of the information request. The noble Viscount, Lord Younger, has explained the obvious reason why this is the case: since these powers apply only to named individuals about whom there is a reasonable suspicion of fraud, telling somebody at the outset could clearly prejudice the investigation and potentially enable them to conceal or destroy evidence.

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[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

Obviously, I am not going to comment on individual cases. As the noble Baroness will be aware, there is an inquiry going on into the carer’s allowance on which we hope to report in the near future, so we will learn more from that.

Let me be clear here: this is the question of whether somebody should be told in good time that they are being investigated. Clearly, that would be a problem. There is a reason why that precise problem is recognised in data protection legislation, which sets out the circumstances in which the DWP and other government departments can process data for law enforcement purposes without notifying the relevant data subject.

To pick up the noble Baroness’s point, it is not as though somebody would never know because, if a fraud investigation uncovered reasonable suspicion of fraud, at some point, for a case to go anywhere, there would have to be an interview under caution with the person suspected of it. The conversation about what had happened would take place at that point, so it is not as though they are never going to know about it; they would have to know about it. We are talking about how they are told, including in what way and at what time. Although I understand where my noble friend Lord Sikka is coming from, the reality is that his proposal would make it impossible to investigate fraud effectively and would allow those who wish to avoid appropriate action on their problems the opportunity to get away with it.

The final comment from the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, was about oversight. As with the review of investigations, the oversight of these measures will be carried out by His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services. I hope that that reassures him.

I hope that all that has helped to assure the noble Lords and that, on that basis, they will withdraw or not press their amendments.

[Lord Sikka (Lab)]

I am very grateful to everyone for their contributions to this debate. I want to come back on a couple of issues.

I fully understand the arguments made against Amendment 79, but at the moment the individual becomes aware that something is afoot only much later in the day. Individuals rarely have time to seek legal advice. They often cannot afford legal advice. Early notification that they are subject to scrutiny, especially when they have never committed a crime and are just under suspicion, would mean that they may be able to save the DWP some time, effort and money on needless investigations. They may even be able to go to the local citizens advice bureau or somewhere else to get some advice. Leaving it until a much later stage inevitably means that there will be a lot of psychological stress for people. They will probably throw in the towel, a bit like the sub-postmasters, and think, “I’ve got to get off this merry-go-round. I will plead guilty even though I am not, because I cannot really contest anything with the Government”. So, I understand the arguments made, but I think that the current position of not telling the benefit claimants much earlier on really will lead to problems.

The Minister referred to the information provider’s duty for data protection and so on, but I have a concern, given that the DWP will make errors. It has a history of making thousands of them. Given that banks make errors in providing information, once DWP officials have received the information from the bank, they have to interpret that information and make sense of it. There will be misinterpretations, which will have serious consequences for the people affected.

The question to which I still have not heard an effective answer is: who will be liable? Who will pay the compensation? Will it be the public purse? Will it be the banks? The DWP will have a statutory relationship with the bank and hence can demand information, but banks are normally required to preserve confidentiality or financial information, and a bank will not ask anything from the individual concerned. It cannot at that point be said to owe a duty of care to somebody with whom it does not actually communicate, especially when that duty of care is eroded by the Bill. So the question remains: who will foot the bill, which could run into billions of pounds, if we end up with a similar situation to the one in Australia? I hope that the Minister can clarify that situation about who will foot the bill.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

Before the noble Lord sits down, I want to raise something, which is more of a question to the Minister and the team behind her. When I was in post, I became perhaps infamous, particularly when I did not understand something, for asking for a flow chart, and I wonder whether this is such a case where a flow chart would be extremely helpful. By that I mean that, when a process starts, what happens? One answers yes or no to questions and then it follows through with the safeguards included. I would find that incredibly helpful, and I suspect the team has one already. If there is one, I would find it helpful to see how the system works and where the safeguards are.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

I have never seen a flow chart, but some of these powers are not necessarily part of the same process, so they would not necessarily appear on the same piece of paper. But if I have any other way of explaining it, I would be very happy to do that.

Since I am on my feet, I reiterate that if the DWP is asking for information about an individual and it gathers information, it will most likely be doing so from a number of sources. An authorised officer will then review the information, and if there is felt to be a case for fraud, they will then interview the suspect under caution, who will be given the opportunity to get appropriate advice. There will be a process of engaging and discussion, but even before it gets to that stage, it is entirely possible that somebody will have reached out to find out the reason why an overpayment has been made. So, there are plenty of opportunities, and this specific amendment relates specifically to the extension of an existing power, which is used only when there is reasonable suspicion of fraud by a named individual. So, I do not think this amendment would help achieve the kind of things that have been discussed, and I urge the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.

[Lord Sikka (Lab)]

I am very grateful to the Minister for that reply, which gives us plenty to think about—and perhaps a flow chart would be helpful in due course. For the time being, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

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[Baroness Finn (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to speak to this group of amendments, beginning with the Clause 74 stand part notice in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, which was moved by the noble Lord, Lord Palmer. In our view, Clause 74 is not only necessary but foundational. It establishes the power to issue eligibility verification notices, which enable authorised officers to request information relevant to verifying a person’s entitlement to public funds or services. This is not an ancillary function; it is a mechanism that enables the Bill to work.

We broadly support Amendment 79B, which proposes the addition of a reasonableness test to the Secretary of State’s power to issue eligibility verification notices under Schedule 3. Throughout this Committee stage, we on these Benches have consistently returned to a set of core principles that should underpin the powers granted by this Bill: proportionality, accountability and clarity in the exercise of discretion. This amendment is very much in keeping with those principles. It would not constrain the function of the powers in question; instead, it would help to ensure that they are used lawfully, wisely and in a way that retains the confidence of both the public and those institutions asked to assist in their implementation.

Specifically, this amendment would require that the Secretary of State be “reasonably satisfied” that issuing an eligibility verification notice is both necessary and proportionate to the objective of identifying incorrect benefit payments. That is, by definition, not an unreasonable bar. It is not designed to frustrate the aims of the Bill or delay the work of the Government. On the contrary, it would simply formalise the expectation that the powers conferred under Schedule 3 should be exercised with care and justification.

This point is particularly relevant when we consider the position of banks and other financial institutions, which may be required under this provision to provide customer information. For those institutions, it is critical that the system is seen to be operating within a clear and lawful framework. They are being asked to co-operate in a sensitive and complex process. Ensuring that the Secretary of State is “reasonably satisfied”, and that this standard is explicitly in the Bill, would help to provide clarity, legitimacy and protection for all parties involved. As the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, made clear on the previous group of amendments, legislation needs to be made for the future and, as such, reasonableness safeguards must be on the face of the Bill.

Moreover, this amendment would reinforce public confidence in the system. When members of the public know that strong powers, such as those that allow government access to eligibility-related data, are being exercised only after a specific, documented and reasonable assessment of necessity and proportionality, they are far more likely to view those powers as legitimate. Trust, as we know, is a critical currency in any enforcement regime.

This amendment would not obstruct the use of eligibility verification notices. It would simply require that they be issued on the basis of reasonable grounds, with a clear and proportionate purpose. It would bring consistency to the Bill, reassurance to the institutions involved and greater credibility to the broader anti-fraud effort that we all wish to support.

We oppose Amendment 80, which would substantially limit the exercise of eligibility verification notices under Schedule 3 to the Bill by requiring that they may be issued only where the welfare recipient is already suspected of committing a DWP offence. I suggest that this amendment risks undermining the core function of eligibility verification and, in so doing, would weaken the entire framework that the Government are proposing to put in place to detect and prevent fraud. Let us be clear about the purpose of the eligibility verification power: it is not primarily an enforcement power but rather a tool of assurance and risk management, designed to help to identify cases where payments are being made incorrectly.

The core problem with this amendment is that it conflates suspicion with verification. It assumes that an authorised officer must already suspect a DWP offence before reviewing financial data. In practice, however, it is often the financial data itself—the information provided in an account—that gives rise to that suspicion in the first place.

I turn to Amendment 89. We support the principle behind this amendment, which seeks to ensure that the powers contained in this Bill—substantial powers, we must all acknowledge—are exercised only in relation to the specific benefits explicitly listed in the Bill. This is not a wrecking amendment, nor one that seeks to undermine the Government’s legitimate goal of strengthening our response to fraud and error. Rather, it is about ensuring that when we legislate new powers, they are accompanied by a clear, democratic mandate and appropriate parliamentary scrutiny. The provision that this amendment seeks to remove would grant Ministers the ability, by regulation, to extend the application of these powers to further benefits beyond those originally listed. I submit that such an extension should not be done by regulation alone but rather with the explicit consent of Parliament through primary legislation or a tightly scrutinised process.

The powers outlined in Schedule 3, including access to personal financial information, the issuance of eligibility verification notices and the ability to act on suspicion of fraud, are not minor administrative tools. They represent a significant expansion of state capacity to inquire into private affairs in the name of public interest. That may well be justified in many cases, but it is only right that Parliament retains control over when and how these powers are extended to new areas of social security.

Supporting this amendment means drawing a line in the sand that the list of benefits to which these powers apply is not open-ended and that any extension should come back before Parliament for proper consideration. If, in future, a compelling case is made to include additional benefits, let that case be made here, in public, with scrutiny and accountability. That is how we ensure confidence in the law, in enforcement and in our broader welfare system.

This is not about resisting action on fraud but about ensuring that the tools we use to combat fraud are clearly grounded in public consent, which gives the system legitimacy. It is about protecting the balance of power between executive action and legislative oversight.

We have made the argument throughout Committee that clarity, transparency and accountability must be woven into the fabric of the Bill. This amendment speaks directly to those principles. It ensures that the powers in this legislation are not allowed to expand by stealth but only by clear, deliberate parliamentary decision.

I hope that the Minister will see this not as a restriction but as an opportunity: to reinforce the legitimacy of the powers the Government seek and to show that we are committed not only to effective fraud prevention but to the principled governance of that process. For that reason, we support this amendment.

Finally, in addressing the stand-part notice of the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, on Schedule 3, we understand that this is an area of concern for many noble Lords across the Committee, but we do not feel that removing the schedule from the Bill is necessarily the most constructive way to go about this in Committee.

I appreciate that this is probing, and we therefore hope that the Government will use this opportunity, in responding to the stand-part notice of the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, to address the concerns that we and many other noble Lords have raised in Committee, even if we do not support the noble Baroness’s stand-part notice.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords who spoke on this. I promise not to speak for long on this but, since it is the first time we have discussed the eligibility verification measure, I will, for the record, try to explain how it works, and, I hope, help the noble Baroness, Lady Fox—I apologise for my failure to explain it to her hitherto. I will have a go at doing that, and I will talk to the amendments as we go.

Clause 74 introduces new Section 121DB and Schedule 3B to the 1992 Act. They contain the provisions for the eligibility verification measure, which enables the Secretary of State to issue a bank or other financial institution with an eligibility verification notice, or EVN, which will help the DWP identify incorrect payments in the social security system. Ensuring that the right person is paid the right amount at the right time will help prevent both fraud and genuine errors, meaning that people do not accidentally build up debts, with all the concern that that causes.

As I set out at Second Reading, this is a data-requiring measure. It will enable the DWP to ask for data from banks to help identify incorrect payments and verify eligibility for specific benefits. It is about requiring banks to look within their own data and provide limited, relevant information on the accounts they have identified that match the eligibility indicators provided by the DWP. Just to clarify, we will ask the banks to look at accounts into which we make benefit payments, and we will give them the criteria, which clearly can only be things related to eligibility for the benefits under question.

That limited information will help the DWP to identify where claimants do not meet eligibility criteria for the benefits they are receiving. Getting access to information is key to addressing the whole fraud and error challenge. But if your Lordships think about other areas, we have seen how the DWP getting access to data such as earnings information from HMRC has massively reduced income-related overpayments. In fact, if you look at people on PAYE and universal credit, earnings-related fraud and error have pretty much been wiped out by getting access to earnings data directly from HMRC.

I will speak to Schedule 3 in a few moments. Let me look first at Amendment 79B from the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, which seeks to ensure that an EVN may be issued only when the Secretary of State is satisfied that it is necessary and proportionate to do so to achieve the aim of identifying incorrect benefit payments. This is the nub of it. Clearly, I agree that the power must be proportionate and necessary before we use it. We are bringing forward the legislation because we believe it is necessary, and we have already taken enormous steps to ensure that it will be used proportionately.

The reason it is necessary is that taxpayers deserve to know that every pound of their money is being spent wisely, and that benefits are being paid to those who need them and are legally entitled to them. This measure will improve the DWP’s access to important data to help verify entitlements, to ensure payments are correct, and to stop overpayments building up and debt accruing.

The National Audit Office made a telling point in the Commons at the evidence stage, basically saying, “If you want to enforce the eligibility criteria that Parliament has set, such as capital limits, you have to provide the DWP with a tool that goes a bit further than just asking people”. We do not know of other ways to get the necessary information to be able to pursue the kind of overpayments and fraud that are out there. However, I just remind the Committee that the measure has been designed with hugely strict safeguards, most of which are in the Bill, and they are supported with further detail in the code of practice, of which noble Lords have seen a draft, to ensure that the power is being used fairly and proportionately. The legislation sets out the benefits in scope, of which more later, and the type of information that can and cannot be shared under the power, and includes provisions to bar financial institutions from sharing transaction information or special category data.

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[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

My Lords, the Minister made a powerful point about the position of the current Opposition. As she identified, the old-age pension being covered in the former iteration of the Bill caused an enormous amount of concern. Obviously, all the groups we are talking about are potentially vulnerable, but old-age pensioners are particularly vulnerable and prone to be stressed and worried about this situation. Can the Minister assure me that the Government will not put the old-age state pension underneath the Bill?

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness for giving me the opportunity to recover my voice and to say that not only will we not do it but the Bill says explicitly that the measure cannot be used on the state pension, so there is no question of it being used for that.

The case load is really straightforward. Fraud in the state pension is so low that it is the one area where the NAO does not qualify the accounts. We have to have a rationale. The reason we have chosen these three benefits initially is specifically because they are the areas where fraud is significant, and we know the information is out there that could make a difference. I can absolutely reassure the noble Baroness on that point: without amending primary legislation, this measure cannot be used on the state pension, and the Government will not do that. Any subsequent Government would have to change the law to be able to do it. I am grateful to the noble Baroness.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, I intervene briefly to add a little history on the reason we included pensions. As the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, may know, there is some fraud in the pensions area, to the tune of £100 million. This, I admit, is not as much as the £9.5 billion in welfare fraud that the Minister cited, but I just wanted to put the record straight; there was a reason for including pensions.

Secondly, you can have it one way or the other. We thought it would be good to put all benefits in scope in primary legislation, but I accept that another way of doing it is to limit it to the three benefits, as this Government have done, with a view to having secondary legislation for including others. I understand that.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

I am grateful. The noble Viscount is quite right: there is some fraud in the state pension. It was a judgment about proportion, having compared the size and value of the case load. It is very small. The fact that the affirmative procedure is used means that there will have to be a debate. The Government cannot simply on their own start investigating new benefits without anyone knowing about it, so that makes a difference.

The Bill is clear that, to help make this measure proportionate, only the minimum amount of information necessary is shared with DWP by the banks. That can include only details about the account, such as an account number and sort code; details to identify the individuals, such as names and dates of birth; and details about how the individuals appear to be breaching the eligibility criteria for their benefit. But still at that point, no one is suspected of having done anything wrong; the presumption of innocence remains, because further inquiries are needed to establish whether a benefit has been incorrectly paid.

Some people may have disregards in place that mean they are allowed to have more money than is normally used in the benefit rules. For example, normally you are allowed to have only £16,000 maximum in capital to be entitled to universal credit, but there are reasons why you might have more than that. Some forms of compensation payments are disregarded, for example. There may be a perfectly good reason, which will be investigated at that point—and that will be that. Others may have made a genuine mistake that has led to an overpayment of benefits, which it is important to correct as quickly as possible for the individual and the organisation.

However, there will be some cases, especially in the early stages, that ultimately lead to fraud being identified; that conclusion will never be drawn from these data alone. As is the case now, any claim where a suspicion of fraud arises is referred to our specialist investigation team, which has to undertake a thorough investigation, following all reasonable lines of inquiry before any determination can be drawn.

Just to reassure my noble friend, whether he accepts it or not, in fraud and error cases, decisions on entitlement will be made by a DWP staff member.

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

It is clear that we are talking about two different stages here. The first intervention into the bank accounts of individuals will be done algorithmically. The DWP will provide the banks or whoever with the set of criteria that they should apply, and the banks will run it through their computers and that will throw up cases. No individual will be involved at that stage. Cases that are highlighted then referred to the DWP are the ones where human intervention will start. But there are the two stages, and the human intervention is at the second stage, not the first.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

I think that we are going to repeat ourselves at each other. This is essentially a data-requiring measure—it is a data push. The data is coming across to DWP, and that data will be used with other data, and where there is an indication that there may be an overpayment, it will be dealt with either by reaching out to the individual or, if there is a possibility that it is fraud, it will be referred for a fraud investigation. Any decision on benefit entitlement and fraud and error is made by a DWP staff member.

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

I hope that the Minister will forgive me for making the point, but it is crucial. The bank will send a data file with cases that it has flagged. Will cases from that data file be identified by humans or by the DWP algorithmically?

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

I think that we are talking at cross-purposes here. The information will be sent across to DWP, and DWP will take information on an individual and, if there is a signal that an individual may have a breach in eligibility criteria and may have more money in their bank account than is permitted, that information will be looked at and taken together with other information and a DWP staff member will make a judgment about what to do about that. I do not think that I can be any clearer than that.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

I am standing up to be helpful to the Minister. For fear of being rather like a long-playing record, I think that a flow chart would be incredibly helpful—so I am pressing my case for a flow chart. That is all that I shall say.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, I am not a flow chart gal, but if anyone is capable of turning this into a useful flow chart, I shall have a look into it.

I fully accept, being an observant person, that not everybody in the Committee agrees with these measures. It is clear that they can make a difference to tackling fraud and error. We think that they are proportionate, but I accept that some Members do not think that, and that is obviously completely legitimate. We simply take a different view.

In the next few groups of amendments, we get to look at different aspects of how that would work, but it is the Government’s view that the scale of fraud is such that it needs to be tackled. If there were other, simpler ways in which to do it, we would have used them by now. This is a source of data that will help us to tackle fraud and error in overpayments, which we do not have at the moment. We do not see any other suitable ways in which to do it, so we think that it is proportionate. We have wrapped it around in safeguards as much as possible.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

The Minister has been very helpful. There are obviously disagreements philosophically, but what is confusing is that the financial service representatives have suggested that this is a trawling exercise—the quote given was of a “fishing exercise”. The Minister has stressed, “Don’t worry: when we go to the banks and ask for this information, it is suspicionless. We are not treating people as though they have done anything wrong; we are simply finding out”. That is a huge admission that the state—the Government—is going to the banks and demanding that they provide information for no other reason than that these people are on benefits.

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[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

I will jump in quickly before the Minister continues. She has been very helpful in explaining how this is going to work. I should say, as I have before, that I think this is infinitely better than it was when we saw it a year or so ago—I just put that on the record again. However, there are two questions about how it works on which I would like clarification.

First, I think the Minister indicated that the banks would not have to trawl all bank accounts, but I do not think that that is right. The logic must be that the DWP provides the criteria that it wants to look at, which is whether someone is in receipt of benefits and, secondly, whether there is a flag. In order to identify whether they are on benefits, the banks will have to trawl through all the accounts to find that out. That seems a necessary step—they have to spot the indicators in the accounts.

More importantly, though, this is not a one-off exercise under the Bill. They do not just send it once and then go away. The Bill allows for these things to be periodic within 12 months, and they can then be extended. I am interested to understand what the Government intend by “periodic”. Under the way that it is currently written, they could be saying, “I want you send us this data every day—or indeed every hour or minute—for the next 12 months”, and they could then extend it. What is the plan in terms of the periodicity of this?

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

Let me deal with the noble Lord first, because that will be quick and I am conscious of the time—I have already gone over the 20 minutes. The DWP will tell the banks, “We have a reference number and these are the accounts at your bank into which we pay benefits; please look only at those accounts, not those of anyone else”. I have been saying this all the way along the line, but I have clearly failed to get this across. The noble Lord may recall the previous discussions when we were asked why you could not look at every bank account, and the reason is—

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

I am still not convinced that that is correct. I think that what happens is that there is an indicator that goes with the payment of the benefit, and we are then asking the banks, first, to identify all accounts where that indicator exists—so they have to look at all accounts to identify which those are—and, secondly, for those accounts, whether there are any with an eligibility indicator that is flagged. My reading is that it is in fact quite clear, and it is also clear in the code of conduct and the other stuff.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

In as much as we will say to the banks that we would like them to look at the accounts into which we pay benefits and will give them the reference numbers. Clearly, it is up to the banks how they identify those. I think it unlikely that they will take each bank account, look at it individually and make a decision, but it is up to them. We simply want them to look at those bank accounts and to tell us whether, within those bank accounts, they believe that the particular eligibility indicator that we have given them is correct.

Regarding frequency, we will negotiate that with the banks. The previous Government looked at an earlier iteration of this and ran two proofs of concept to establish that it would work and be effective. We now have to take the powers in order to be able to start doing this. So, we have agreed that we will work with a small number of banks and work out bit-by-bit how this works, bring over information as we can manage it, make sure that the system works, and build up as we go. We will determine from that how often we will need to do that and how it works. That has to be determined; we could not determine that in advance because we need the powers in the Bill to be able to start the process.

In response to the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, it is a question of proportionality. Clearly, we already ask the Revenue to tell us how much people earn in order to determine whether or not they meet the earnings criteria for, for example, universal credit. We could simply allow people to tell us, but when we did that, some of them got it wrong; many of them made mistakes; sometimes it changed, and sometimes they deliberately did not tell us. So now, we simply get information directly from the Revenue.

We think that the power is proportionate. Whenever someone compares it to something that feels disproportionate, such as spying or putting bugs in everyone’s houses, I think that we can either claim that this is a mass surveillance power like China would use and then wonder why people are getting paranoid about it, or, while I do my best to be specific about what we are trying to do, we can all try to have a measured conversation about whether or not it is reasonable, while fully accepting that for some people the line will be in a different place than for others for reasons of both philosophy and proportionality. I fully accept that.

I have done the best I can in 25 minutes. On that basis, I urge noble Lords to agree that the clause stand part.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for that tour de force. I am afraid the problem is that we all have different ideas about what is proportionate. From what I have heard, I do not think what the Government are suggesting is proportionate, and that is where the problem arises. I come from the feeling that there is a presumption of innocence, and this seems to me almost a presumption of guilt.

The Minister has not taken the point about the nervousness of banks. If a bank gets even a modest inquiry—anyone who has a bank account knows that this happens if there is a certain inquiry on your bank account—signs go up in the algorithm used by the bank saying, “We’ve got to look at this”. Anyone who is a Peer or an MP knows that their affairs can be looked at more closely just for that very reason. I hope that, on Report, we can deal in greater detail with how nervous the banks will be about what is proposed. I hope the Minister can come back and give us reassurance from real banks—joint-stock banks—that have said how they view this. I think they will view it wanting to be on the safe side.

However, at this stage, I will not press my noble friend Lady Kramer’s clause stand part notice.

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To conclude, clarity in law is not a luxury; it is a duty. If we are to demand co-operation from financial institutions and to ensure fairness for those caught up in fraud investigations, we must ensure that the legal framework we are creating does not give rise to unintended and disproportionate consequences. For all these reasons, I strongly support Amendment 89C and urge the Government to do the same.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken on this group of amendments.

Amendments 81 and 91 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, speak to the costs that banks may incur as a result of this measure and asks whether they are proportionate to the savings achieved. Let me say, first, that we acknowledge that, clearly, there will be new requirements on banks as a result of this proposed legislation. It is right that additional asks on banks are scrutinised, and I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving the Committee the opportunity to do that. I can assure the Committee, first, that we are bringing the legislation forward precisely because we believe that it is necessary; and, secondly, that we have taken steps to make it proportionate. We have already been through why we think that it is necessary, in our debate on the previous group, so I will not dwell on that again; let me just say that, given the scale of the savings and the lack of alternatives, we think that this legislation is necessary and that the safeguards make it proportionate.

Various noble Lords asked about the cost. We have estimated, based on initial consultation with industry sources, that the set-up cost will be around £40 million across the sector and that there will be some limited ongoing compliance costs for data holders; further information on that estimate can be found in the published impact assessment. We recognise that there is more work to do with industry to consider the costs further. That is why we committed to publishing a further, updated impact assessment within 12 months of Royal Assent: to update the estimate, taking into account the ongoing work with industry, and to ensure that there is transparency on the costs as we move forward. I assure the Committee that the Government take burdens on business seriously. We are committed to keeping requirements and costs proportionate and to a minimum; this has been a key aim at the forefront of our close and regular engagement with the finance sector.

We are not starting from scratch here. As we have discussed, the previous Government tested this approach through two proofs of concept. We know that it works. We continue to work closely with UK Finance and the finance sector on the delivery of a policy to minimise costs; I can reassure my noble friend Lord Davies both that there have been a number of meetings and Bill forums with UK Finance in recent weeks and that it will carry on working closely with us.

A few banks—a small group of them—are already working closely with us on the design and build of the digital solution that will be used to facilitate the transfer of information, in order to ensure that it is developed in a way that works for the sector. I just want to put on the record our appreciation to those banks for their valued input.

Let me say, however, that the Government can be held to account. The independent reviewer must consider whether the measure has been effective at helping to identify incorrect payments. The independent reviewer could also report on the burdens and costs that financial institutions might experience as part of that assessment. If financial institutions believe that Government are overreaching, they also have the right of review and appeal. Financial institutions can use the reviews and/or formal appeals processes to dispute an EVN, including if they determine that complying with an EVN would be unduly onerous. This is set out clearly in Parts 3 and 4 of new Schedule 3B, as inserted by the Bill. For those reasons, we believe that the amendment is not necessary.

Amendment 83 would require financial institutions, when asked to provide data to the DWP under this provision, not to provide it if they reasonably consider that doing so would conflict with their duty of care towards their customers. My concern is that this amendment assumes that we are asking banks and other financial institutions to look into the individual data that they provide to the DWP. That is absolutely not the policy intent. Let me again remind the Committee that information shared by financial institutions is done so without suspicion or presumption of any wrongdoing on the part of the claimant.

This type of data-sharing is not new to government. The Government already have similar powers to request data from financial institutions or third parties. Noble Lords will be aware, I am sure, that HMRC has the power to obtain data at scale from banks on interest-bearing accounts to support its work in gathering up taxes from all of us. For financial institutions, the duty of care owed to their customers includes obligations on a range of matters, including treating their customers fairly, taking reasonable steps to protect their customers against fraud and scams and providing fair-value services. There is nothing within the eligibility verification measure that would affect or impede these duties from being fulfilled.

This amendment would also have a practical impact: it would put greater burdens on financial institutions. The EVM is simply a data-requiring power; it does not ask financial institutions to make any assessments about the data shared. Asking them to do that would fundamentally change the basis of the policy and increase the burdens on them. I have already said that we have been working closely with the finance industry, and I can assure the Committee that we will carry on doing so.

I speak finally to Amendment 89C, which seeks to remove the risk that information that arises only as a result of complying with an EVN could by itself cause a bank to have to take specific reporting action against the account holder under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, for raising this, and I hope to persuade him that the current provision already addresses this issue.

As I have said, the EVM is a data-requiring measure; it is not decision-making power. Information is shared by financial institutions without suspicion or presumption of any wrongdoing on the part of the claimant or account holder. EVM information will be used by the DWP to support our normal processes to help verify a claimant’s eligibility for the benefit that they are receiving. However, to give certainty on this point, we have already created an exemption in Schedule 3 that amends the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 to make it clear that failure to disclose offences will not be committed if the information that the individual or institution has is only as a result of an EVN. To be clear: if the only reason that the institution has the information is as a result of an EVN, they will not be guilty of a failure to disclose offence under POCA. We have reflected this point in the EVM code of practice. This recognises that, while EVNs are not intended to indicate any wrongdoing, the DWP cannot legislate categorically for whether a person knows that there is other information a financial institution may be aware of.

We are not in a position to dictate to someone else whether they must or must not know or suspect something. This amendment seeks to prevent a person from knowing or suspecting that an offence is being committed if the information that leads them to that conclusion has arisen solely as a result of EVM. In other words, it seeks to legislate for a person’s state of mind—whether they know or suspect something—which we do not think is the way to do it. Our provision maintains the focus on the information available and aligns with the existing POCA exemption for information obtained, for example, as a result of carrying out specific immigration checks.

I always try to explain things in language that I would understand. My understanding is that, as currently drafted, the clause says that you cannot be guilty of a specific offence if you do not report somebody under SARS where the information comes only from an EVN. This amendment would fully exclude someone’s ability to suspect someone who may be acting suspiciously, and that cannot be possible. I hope that that makes sense to the noble Lord, Lord Vaux. He may want to reflect on it and come back to me, but that is the reason why we think that this is not the way forward and why what have done is the right way. I therefore believe that the current exemption, as drafted, is sufficient and aligns with the DWP’s intent that data returned by financial institutions does not in itself suggest any suspicion of fraud.

I will address some of the other comments made, starting with those of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox. I accept that there is a question about what is appropriate out there, but banks already have to do a range of things, including, as I said, HMRC having to report on interest-bearing accounts. We believe that the burdens are proportionate. After the set-up costs, we will see the details to be worked through with them, but once the systems are set up, we do not believe that this will be an extensive burden. Therefore, we hope that that will not be too much of a problem.

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[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, I wish to speak broadly in support of Amendment 82 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley. This amendment goes to the heart of something that we should all be able to agree on: that the public have a right to know the rules by which they may be judged and that those tasked with making assessments, such as banks, should not be left to act on unclear or unpublished guidance.

This amendment would require the Secretary of State to publish the eligibility indicators that banks are expected to use when checking their customers’ accounts under the new regime. In plain terms, it asks the Government to set out clearly, before these provisions are enforced, what criteria are being used to determine eligibility. This chimes with the opening remarks made by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox. It is difficult to see how a system of such potential consequence to individuals and to financial institutions alike can be implemented fairly, if the basis on which it operates is not published and understood in advance.

We have heard throughout the debates on this Bill about the need to balance effective fraud prevention with the protection of individual rights, proper due process, and clarity for institutions involved. Amendment 82 speaks directly to that balance. If banks are to play a front-line role in identifying accounts or individuals under suspicion, they must be given unambiguous and publicly available guidance to avoid the risk of overreach, error or unjustified intrusion. We cannot have a system where accounts are flagged or actions taken on the basis of indicators that are withheld from public view. That would be both untransparent and unjust.

We should not legislate for a regime that affects people’s access to their financial resources or that places duties on banks to act in quasi-investigative ways, without knowing exactly how those judgments are to be made. This is not a wrecking amendment—it does not oppose the broader framework of the Bill. It merely insists that, before new powers are exercised, the public and partners involved in delivery know the criteria. That is not too much to ask. In fact, it is the very least we should expect in a system rooted in fairness and good governance. Again, this echoes the remarks made by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox.

To pick up on remarks made by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, there is a balance to be struck between not giving too much away in the interest of transparency so that fraudsters are given fuel to manipulate the system. Can the Minister say where that balance should be struck, as balance there must be?

Similarly, I speak in support of Amendment 88, also in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox. I believe it represents a sensible and timely addition to the schedule. As we have discussed throughout the passage of this Bill, the use of data and automated decision-making, particularly through algorithms, is becoming an increasingly central feature of fraud detection and eligibility verification. That in itself is not a problem; it is a reflection of the complexity and scale of modern fraud threats. But it also means that we need clear and consistent standards for how these tools are developed, deployed and scrutinised. The cautionary tale from the Netherlands, highlighted by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, is very much noted. I am sure that the Committee has noted it.

This amendment goes to the heart of the need for standards. By requiring the code of practice to include mechanisms for the scrutiny of algorithms used by those in receipt of eligibility verification notices, typically banks, it creates a shared framework for oversight. This is particularly important when algorithms are applied across several discrete institutions, each of which may have slightly different internal systems, standards or even risk profiles. Without a common baseline, we risk inconsistency, a lack of accountability and potential harm to individuals through opaque or poorly calibrated processes.

Moreover, new sub-paragraph (g) proposed in this amendment rightly extends that principle of scrutiny to the powers themselves, and we must also be willing to assess whether they are effective and 100% secure in their specified and sole objective. We must also be willing to assess whether they are proportionate to the outcomes that they set out to deliver. In short, this is a practical amendment rooted in the principles of clarity, consistency and continuous improvement—perhaps part of the test and learn. It does not obstruct the Government’s goals; it helps to make them more credible and accountable, we believe.

I express my support for Amendment 89ZA in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden, which I believe strikes a careful and important balance between transparency, accountability and the effective operation of the powers contained in this schedule. At its core, this amendment does something quite simple but significant: it ensures that individuals applying for or receiving relevant benefits are clearly informed—that is, in writing—that information relating to their bank accounts may, under certain circumstances, be shared with the Secretary of State. This is a matter of basic transparency and fairness. I note that this is being proposed at the time the benefit is applied for, and I might describe it—perhaps putting words into the mouth of the noble Lord, Lord Vaux—as part of an induction process when one applies for any benefit in scope. In other words, fair warning is given that a benefit that comes from the taxpayers’ pocket has responsibilities attached to it. Perhaps this should also be placed in the code of practice, and I ask that question of the Minister.

If we are to entrust public authorities with powers of this magnitude—which allow for sensitive financial data to be accessed without the individual’s active consent—surely it is right that we also commit to informing individuals of the possibility that those powers might be used. This is not about compromising investigations or alerting fraudsters in advance; it is about ensuring that people understand the system that they are entering and can act responsibly and lawfully within it. Providing this information up front reinforces personal responsibility. As I said earlier, it says clearly to the individual, “If you are claiming public money, there is a legitimate expectation that your eligibility may be subject to verification”. It allows claimants to know the rules of engagement in advance, and it ensures that they cannot claim later to have been caught unawares.

At the same time, I recognise, and I think the noble Lord does as well—I hope he does—that this amendment must not inadvertently encourage more sophisticated methods of deception. It is a fine line to walk, and this chimes with my earlier question to the Minister. We must not turn transparency into a user manual for fraud, but I believe that this amendment is framed carefully enough to avoid that risk. It does not disclose when, how or under what criteria information will be requested—only that it may be. That is, I believe, a proportionate step. Ultimately, this amendment supports the legitimacy of the wider regime, and I therefore support it and hope that the Government will see it as a constructive addition to the schedule.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all the noble Lords for their comments. Amendment 82, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, would require the Secretary of State to make public the eligibility indicators, as set out in EVNs. Although I understand the point that she is making, I am firmly of the view that making public the eligibility indicators will be counterproductive, for reasons alluded to by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux. It is set out very clearly in the Bill that all eligibility indicators have to link to the eligibility criteria for those benefits that are within the scope of the EVN measure: universal credit, pension credit and ESA. Those eligibility criteria are widely available for anyone to see, including on the GOV.UK website. The DWP does its utmost to ensure that customers who claim benefits are clear on the relevant criteria, and they are reminded many times throughout their claim of the need to report changes of circumstances against these key criteria. This is important because there are people out there who are not fraudsters but who make genuine errors, and we do all we can to help people understand the eligibility rules and ensure that changes of circumstances are reported.

As the noble Viscount alluded to, there is a fine line between transparency and making things easier for fraudsters, but I do not want to publish the specific eligibility indicators that we will set out in an EVN, because to do so would actually help those who want to commit fraud to circumvent the measure. We know from all kinds of sources that there are people out there who study every single rule and piece of information we put out to try to work out how to get around them and get money to which they are not entitled. The Committee would obviously want us to do everything we can to avoid that. So, to protect the effectiveness of this measure and to help stop fraud, we do not think it appropriate that we publish the eligibility indicators.

Turning to Amendment 88, also from the noble Baroness, Lady Fox—

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

Before the Minister moves on to Amendment 88, I asked about the cross-comparison with datasets from different banks; this goes to the point that the Minister has just been making about it being easy to commit fraud. To what extent will data from bank A be amalgamated with data from bank B to discover whether, when combined, there is an eligibility indicator flag?

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

An EVN can be used only in relation to the bank account into which the benefit is paid. Therefore, that would be a specific bank account in a specific bank. Of course, the DWP’s authorised investigators have and use a range of sources where they have a suspicion of fraud, and there is a range of mechanisms out there to look at what other information can be gathered in order to make that judgment. I can see that I have not hit on what the noble Lord was asking for.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

In the situation where there would be a suspicion of fraud, you have bank A—actually, I suppose it would not have provided the information, would it?

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

Exactly.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

I have just answered my own question.

[Lord Sikka (Lab)]

Related to that, as far as I understand it, some benefits can be paid into foreign bank accounts but they are totally beyond the scope of the Bill, so, presumably, if there is fraud there, it will never really be tackled. Secondly, is it permissible for a UK-resident benefit recipient to request that the benefit be paid into a bank account in the Cayman Islands, the Bahamas, Cyprus or somewhere else?

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

Just to be clear, this measure is attacking both fraud and error. It looks at overpayments, whatever the source. It is simply one tool among many that is available to the DWP and which will help produce a source of information, which will help to identify incorrect overpayments. Having got that information, the DWP will use the full range of powers and the information available to it. If any fraudsters are sitting down on a quiet Monday afternoon and watching this Committee, they should be warned: the DWP has lots of sources of information; it will investigate them; and it successfully prosecutes many people for fraud. The DWP will use this and other powers to pursue what is there. However, this measure alone has been scored by the OBR to save up to £940 million over the next five years. No single measure will be foolproof alone; it will play its part alongside a range of measures and processes to help root out fraud.

I will have to write to my noble friend Lord Sikka on the Cayman Islands. I do not have them at the back of my mind at the moment, I am afraid, but I will let him know if there is an issue over there.

I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, that I fully accept that there is a line between giving all details in public and tackling fraud. We have given out a lot of information and a lot of protections here, and we have found ways of making sure that there is oversight. One reason for having oversight is that there are things that we will never be able to put out in public; it is important that somebody has scrutiny and can report to Parliament, independent of the department, on how these powers are being used. We would hope that that picks up the remaining areas of concern.

I turn to Amendment 88, also in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox. I will address in turn the two points that it raises. The first is the requirement for the code of practice to include information about the ways in which scrutiny can be applied to the methods that a financial institution may use to identify relevant accounts, for the purposes of the eligibility verification measure. This is not a matter for a code of practice. The criteria that financial institutions must use to identify relevant accounts are described in paragraph 1(2)(b) of new Schedule 3B to the Social Security Administration Act 1992. Accounts must simply meet two tests in order for information to be shared by the financial institution with the DWP: first, the account must receive a relevant benefit payment or be linked to that account; and, secondly, the account in question must meet the criteria that the DWP sets out in the eligibility verification notice. Financial institutions operate in many ways. It must be for each individual financial institution to determine how it identifies relevant accounts.

The key point here is that the EVM asks banks to return specified data only where those two tests have been met. It is a data-requiring power; we are not asking banks to do anything more than that. Again, I remind the Committee that it is the DWP that will review all the information received and DWP staff who will make any decisions about entitlement where potential fraud or error is identified. No decisions will be taken using EVM data alone; decisions about entitlement will be made only once the DWP has made further inquiries.

On that point, the Bill does not introduce any new use of automated decision-making. The DWP will examine data received from banks under the new power, alongside other data received, to determine whether there has been an incorrect overpayment. As is set out in our personal information charter, which is publicly available, the DWP uses automated processing in some decision-making to help us deliver efficient services. The DWP will not make any decision that has significant effect based solely on automated processing unless the law allows this, and claimants will be informed if we make any such decision.

I turn to the second issue in this amendment. It would require the code of practice to contain information about measures that would enable scrutiny of the effectiveness of the EVM. This is, again, an important issue but not one for the code of practice. However, I completely agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, that we must assess how effective the EVM is; that is why, under Clause 75, the independent overseer of the measure must consider the extent to which the exercise of the power has been effective in helping to identify incorrect payments of relevant benefits.

Finally, I turn to Amendment 89ZA, which raises the issue of informing claimants that the EVM may be used to require the sharing of information about their relevant accounts with the DWP. Let me take a moment to update the Committee on the ways in which the DWP will inform claimants and relevant account holders about the measure; I hope that this will reassure the noble Lord, Lord Vaux. The DWP has a personal information charter that sets out how it uses and stores personal information. It is publicly available, and claimants are explicitly directed to it at all times when the DWP requests their personal data. We will update the DWP personal information charter to make it clear that the EVM may be used to require the sharing of their personal information; that commitment is made clear in the draft code of practice, which noble Lords have seen.

This amendment suggests that we should inform claimants either at the start of their claim or within three months of the EVM becoming operational. Our approach of updating the personal information charter means that customers are much more regularly informed about the EVM; this is because claimants are regularly directed to the document throughout their claim. For the benefit of the Committee, I can confirm that claimants are explicitly directed to it in all DWP claim forms; in change of circumstance and uprating letters; in recorded telephone messages; in DWP agents’ telephony scripts; on digital online services; and in other products where the DWP collects personal data. As noble Lords will know, the draft code of practice, which will be publicly consulted on, makes clear that all those who hold a personal account into which a relevant benefit is paid should be aware that information about them and their relevant accounts may be shared by a financial institution with the DWP if the eligibility indicators specified in an EVN are met.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

There is a big difference between pointing someone towards a data protection statement—let us be brutally honest: how many of us have ever read one?—and telling people that their bank account details can be provided to the DWP as a result of having this particular benefit. Nobody has ever read a data protection statement, and I do not suppose that they ever will.

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[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

To be clear, their bank details cannot be accessed by the DWP under this measure; their bank details can be accessed by the DWP under its other powers. I know that the noble Lord knows this but I want it to be clear for the record because there is a lot of misunderstanding out there; I hope that he will let me finish my sentence. The DWP cannot access people’s bank accounts using this measure or look at transaction data. It does not see what they spend their money on or any of that. It can simply ask banks to let it know whether a particular criterion is met. I take the noble Lord’s point; we think that this is adequate, but he does not, so I am afraid that we may just have to agree to disagree on this one.

Regarding the noble Lord’s other point, on how much data and how many different banks will be involved—and when—we had two choices in doing this: test and learn, which is the subject of much comment; or the alternative, which is a big bang involving all the banks going out together at once, getting their data, bringing it in and going through it. We decided not to do that, as we thought that it would be irresponsible. Test and learn means that, for the first 12 months of the rollout, we will initially work closely with a smaller number of banks and financial institutions, identifying any possible areas for concern, allowing them to be addressed and sorting out teething problems. The measure will then gradually be rolled out with all the relevant financial institutions. The impact assessment says that, in the first year—2026-27—we expect a rollout rate of around 2%, going up to 25% in 2027-28. The idea is that you start very small, make sure that it works, iron out the problems and then grow it as it goes on.

I think it was the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, who mentioned that the data could be slowed down. We do not want to bring in data that we cannot process; we want to bring in data that is appropriate. We will bring it in and manage it, as we are able and resourced to do. I hope that that reassures noble Lords; I encourage the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, to withdraw her amendment.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

I want a bit of clarity on test and learn. We have had two exercises, which have reached proof of concept. I am confused now because the Minister is, I think, indicating that there are test and learn exercises still to begin. How many are ongoing and how many are due to begin?

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

Clearly, I am expressing this really badly, because I have said it about 17 times and still have not explained it clearly.

When the noble Viscount was a Minister—perhaps it was his predecessor—under the previous Government, they were working with banks to find out whether the proof of concept worked. The answer is that, yes, it does. Test and learn is about saying, “We’re now going to build this up and operate it at scale. How do we do it? What does it look like?” Bit by bit, we will work with a small number of banks; try it out; make sure that the processes, the data pushes and so on work properly; and work with a small number of people who also understand how the sector works as a whole. Then, when it is working, we will roll it out to a wider number.

I am sorry if I have not been explaining that clearly, but that is the difference. The proof of concept asks: can it be made to work? The answer is yes. The test and learn asks: what is the best way to set this up so that the systems will work and so that we get the right information at the right time—a time when we are able to work it properly? I hope that that has helped.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

I give many thanks to noble Lords for their contributions to this debate. In some ways, it has clarified quite a lot for me; in some ways, I am completely confused. I will go off and read the debate, reflect on it then work out how to bring this issue forward on Report.

I thank the noble Viscount, Lord Younger of Leckie, for his supportive remarks in general and the insights that he brought; they are much appreciated. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, for drawing attention to my dilemmas around transparency. I want there to be more transparency but, as I said, I do not want to be associated with being an idiot—well, that ship might have sailed—in relation to giving the game away. Transparency is important in politics and in terms of trust in a new Bill that will bring about a huge change in the way the state is viewed, in terms of how it relates to citizens on benefits and so on. One of the reasons for this confusion and difficulty is that this Bill insists on treating fraud and error indistinguishably. That is one of the dangers with it. Fraud is one thing, but people who are inadvertently overpaid when errors are made are treated with the same piece of legislation. That is why it was helpful of the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, to remind us earlier that there are people who will play the system—that is one thing—while there are other people who could inadvertently be treated like criminals.

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To conclude, this Bill rightly equips the state to recover public money and respond to fraud, but our job in this Committee is to ensure that those powers are not just powerful but proportionate; that they are not only swift but fair; and that those affected by them, especially the most vulnerable, can have confidence that decisions are made with care, with oversight and with due regard to context and consequence. That is what I believe these amendments seek to achieve, so I commend the noble Lord on bringing them forward and urge the Government to consider them very seriously. They would improve the Bill; uphold the principles that we have championed in Committee; and strengthen the legitimacy of the enforcement regime that this legislation clearly seeks to build.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

I am grateful to all noble Lords. The noble Viscount just described these amendments as thoughtful and necessary. I think that they are characteristically thoughtful, but I hope now to persuade the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, that they are not in fact necessary. This is a good one, so I offer the noble Lord this.

First, to be clear, Amendment 84 would require an authorised person to need more evidence than just that provided through the EVM before carrying out an investigation under new Section 109BZB, which is to be inserted into the Social Security Administration Act 1992 by this Bill. I agree that the fact that an account meets an eligibility indicator set out in an EVN does not on its own constitute reasonable grounds for suspicion and cannot on its own be used as grounds for exercising fraud investigation powers under new Section 109BZB of the Act. The meeting of an eligibility indicator does not mean that a benefit has necessarily being overpaid. As I have made clear before, the EVM information does not come with a tag of suspicion attached.

The fact that an account meets an eligibility indicator does not mean that there are any grounds for suspicion of fraud or other offences; it does not even mean that a benefit has necessarily been overpaid. Paragraph 3(1) of the EVM legislation makes it clear that eligibility indicators indicate only that a benefit may have been, or may be, incorrectly paid. Whenever the DWP reviews a claim following the receipt of EVM information, it will initially look into its own systems to cross-reference between the data received via the EVM and the information that the customer has previously provided to the department. The DWP’s existing powers under Section 109 of the Social Security Administration Act 1992 can be used only where there is a reasonable suspicion of fraud, and only DWP-authorised officers will be able to request information under new Section 109BZB.

The requirement for reasonable suspicion before exercising powers under new Section 109BZB is set out in that section. This means that, before a case is referred to an authorised officer for a criminal investigation and these information-gathering powers are used, certain criteria must be considered: there must always be a reasonable suspicion of fraud, and all information requested must be necessary and proportionate for the investigation.

Amendment 85 would require information received following an EVN to be reviewed by an appropriately senior person before a person’s benefits can be amended or suspended, or before further investigatory powers can be used. Again, I hope to persuade the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, that this is not necessary. First, as I said, the eligibility verification measure is a data-requiring power, not a decision-making power. We have been clear that the limited data shared by financial institutions does not suggest any wrongdoing on its own. Data will be used, if appropriate, by DWP officials to make further inquiry and to ensure that the benefits being received are correct in line with the claimant’s circumstances and the relevant benefit eligibility criteria.

Obviously, the noble Lord does not specify what “an appropriately senior person” is. Let me assure him that these DWP officials are already trained to make these decisions, and they do so every day as part of the DWP’s business-as-usual activity. Decisions on claims and applications are made by trained officials on the Secretary of State’s behalf every day. This applies across many of the DWP’s processes with claims and applications; those decision-makers are usually administrative or executive officer grade.

When fraud is suspected and DWP wishes to use the power under new Section 109BZB of the Social Security Administration Act 1992, this can be used only by a DWP authorised officer of executive officer grade who has been trained and accredited. Only these authorised officers are able to request information under these powers, and they must always have reasonable grounds to suspect a DWP offence and consider it necessary and proportionate to require the specified information.

In all cases, before any decision is made, officials will look at any indications of fraud and error comprehensively. For example, DWP will look within its own systems to check for any inconsistencies between the data received via EVM and the information the customer has provided to DWP. There could, for example, be a disregard in place, which means that a claimant can have more money than normally allowed under the benefit rules. Alternatively, a DWP staff member may reach out to the claimant to request further information. In such cases, an appropriately trained and skilled staff member will make any decisions that affect benefit entitlement or changes to a claim. The suspension of a claim would be used only as a last resort and only after repeated attempts to contact the claimant and checking for any known vulnerabilities. I hope that, in the light of that, the noble Lord is reassured and will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

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Moved by

[Baroness Sherlock]

86: Schedule 3, page 85, line 27, leave out from “(1)” to end of line 33 and insert “may not be brought after the end of—
(a) the period of 14 days beginning with—(i) the day on which the eligibility verification notice was given, or(ii) if the person seeks a review of the notice under paragraph 13, the day on which the person is notified of the outcome of the review, or(b) such longer period (if any) as the Tribunal considers reasonable in all the circumstances.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment means that the tribunal can extend the time limit for appealing against an eligibility verification notice.

--- Later in debate ---

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, I shall speak briefly to this group. For once I shall be helpful to the Government, as I rise to speak in opposition to Amendments 89A and 89B in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Sikka.

These amendments would limit the scope of Department for Work and Pensions eligibility verification powers, as we see it, so that they apply only to bank accounts held solely in the name of the benefit recipient, including joint accounts from scrutiny. I recognise the intention behind this proposal, which is to protect privacy and the financial autonomy of those sharing bank accounts with benefit claimants—the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, very eloquently set out his stall—but I respectfully argue that the amendments would create a significant and problematic loophole in the integrity of the fraud and error detection system.

Let us be clear: if these amendments were adopted, a person under investigation for suspected misrepresentation of assets or income could very easily shield those resources simply by transferring them into a joint account, potentially with a spouse, relative, or even a third party. Under the proposed wording, such an account would then fall outside the reach of the DWP’s verification powers, regardless of whether the claimant retained full control over the funds or continued to benefit from them. Perhaps the Minister can help me and the Committee in understanding how the DWP test-and-learn mechanism might have highlighted such an issue, and how it might have provided such a solution.

This is not a theoretical risk. We know from operational experience that individuals engaged in fraudulent activity will often use exactly such mechanisms to conceal income or capital. The ability to move money to a joint account is a clear weakness that could be exploited by those who—we must remember—are believed to have stolen money from the taxpayer.

Under the current drafting of the Bill, the Government rightly allow verification of accounts held by or accessible to the claimant, including joint accounts. This does not mean that third parties will have their data or finances indiscriminately accessed. There are safeguards in place. The department will not be able to view or interfere with every joint account at will, only those, as the Minister indicated earlier, where eligibility indicators suggest a relevant connection, and only where necessary to verify benefit entitlement. These powers are proportionate and targeted.

The amendments, however, would tie the hands of investigators, even where there is a clear and compelling reason to examine whether the claimant has access to or control over funds that affect their entitlement. In so doing, they would introduce a gaping loophole in the very process that is meant to protect taxpayer money and ensure fairness across the system. Let us not forget the public interest at stake here. We are talking about a welfare system that supports millions of people, but also one that must command public confidence and demonstrate that it is both compassionate and resilient to abuse. Creating a known and easily exploited blind spot, as these amendments would, risks undermining that confidence and inviting avoidable losses to fraud or error.

Moreover, this is not a question of criminalising or persecuting people who live with others or hold joint accounts for legitimate reasons. It is about ensuring that where state funds are being claimed on the basis of need, the system has a fair and proportionate—to use that word again—ability to verify the facts, including the assets and income to which the claimant may have access.

No one benefits from a system where loopholes are left open, least of all the people whom the welfare state exists to support. These amendments may be well intentioned, as I said earlier, but they would weaken the ability of the department to carry out its responsibilities effectively, and in doing so would undermine both the fairness and sustainability of the benefits system. I therefore urge noble Lords not to support these amendments. Let us uphold the principle that verification powers should be robust, proportionate and resistant to manipulation—and not inadvertently create a rule that the dishonest can use to their advantage.

Finally, I feel that I might have written a speech for the Minister, but I am sure that she will tell me that I am completely wrong and, perhaps, rebut some of my points.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords, especially the noble Viscount, for doing some of my work for me; I am very grateful. I cannot support my noble friend’s amendments, but I am grateful to him because he has raised a point that people need to understand, and this Committee is exactly the right place to understand the issue.

It might be worth taking a step back. There will be two ways of getting information. We could either go to banks and say, “Here is Mr John Smith, please give us everything you know about him”, but then we would have to give personal information about the individual to the banks, which they do not have. Or we could do what we have decided to do, which is to say: “This is the account into which we pay the money. Please give us the information from that account according to these criteria”. We have gone with the second, because we will not be giving out personal information to financial institutions. However, that does have some consequences, which I will go through one at a time.

First, DWP benefits can be—indeed, are—paid into joint accounts held by one or more individuals. It is therefore essential for financial institutions to share information about joint accounts and any linked accounts that include a relevant benefit payment. Perhaps the most critical reason why we need joint accounts to be in scope of the EVM is that both pension credit and universal credit are household benefits; by that, I mean that eligibility for these benefits will depend on the circumstances of those in the household, including incomes and savings held by both account holders, not just by one individual. It is therefore vital to receive information on joint accounts.

In cases where the relevant benefit is paid into a joint account, information about both account holders and other linked accounts may be shared by the financial institution with the DWP. Again, I have explained why: it is because we cannot give out personal information about them. Once the information is shared, the DWP will then identify the benefit claimant and delete any information that is not relevant to the claim. That is made clear in the code of practice, which noble Lords have had a chance to see; this will be relevant in a moment to the points that the noble Lord made about landlords.

It is worth pausing here. Unlike previous iterations—it may be that the noble Lord is thinking back to some of those—this measure specifically excludes certain accounts from its scope: business accounts, credit card accounts, mortgage accounts, and a lot of other accounts that were previously in scope but are not anymore.

On landlords, if a benefit is paid into a landlord’s account then, yes, that will come back, but, basically, the test will then be: is the account or person a benefit claimant? If not, the information will be discarded and destroyed. Although it is possible, for the reasons I have explained, that a landlord’s account could be identified by a bank if it matches the eligibility indicators and is not a business account, the DWP can easily identify landlords having a housing benefit paid directly to them once we have received the data from a bank. The DWP will screen out these cases and disregard their data. I hope that that assures the noble Lord and that he can in turn assure those who were concerned.

The question of appointees is something that I raised under a previous iteration of this; I simply have not been able to find a way around it. Corporate appointees and businesses are excluded, but, for personal appointees, we simply have not been able to do that. Of course, the appointee’s account will have the benefit paid into it, if the benefit is relevant. The only thing you could do is exclude anyone you knew was an appointee, but then many appointees are claimants in their own right, so you simply could not do that either.

All I can say is that, by receiving from institutions, we will filter out any information that is not relevant; I hope that that will reassure the noble Lord. We are interested only in information on benefits paid by the DWP to benefit claimants; that is for them. If the appointee is holding the benefit for that individual, that is in scope—of course it is—but not if it is for other purposes; likewise goes for landlords. Those with powers of attorney will be treated in the same way as appointees. Again, if the money is for the benefit claimant and it is about that, we can look at it; if it is not, we cannot. I hope that that will reassure my noble friend and that he can withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Sikka (Lab)]

I thank the Minister and the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, for their illumination of, and contribution to, this issue. I am not really that convinced by their replies, to be honest. The reason is that a landlord can simply say, “I just won’t rent a property to anyone on benefits”. That way, the whole bank account—into which not just the benefit claimant’s benefit but other things go—is outside the scope of any DWP inquiry.

In time, we would notice that the amount of accommodation, especially for disabled people, had shrunk because of this piece of legislation. I think that many people would be dissuaded from becoming joint bank account holders with somebody who receives benefits for the same reason: they value financial privacy. We have to remember that this Bill is removing financial privacy only from people who are generally old, sick, disabled or unfortunate—everybody else can enjoy financial privacy. That would be the response.

So, in due course, there would be very heavy and negative social consequences. As I said earlier, the Minister can alleviate some of these by ordering banks or by creating legislation that says that the banks cannot refuse anyone a bank account. That way, many more people can have a bank account and the landlords, family members and friends may well be less likely to be subject to surveillance. This is something I will mull over for the next stage, but, for the time being, I beg leave to withdraw this amendment.

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[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, my noble friend Lord Sikka’s Amendment 90 would require the independent oversight of the EVM to be carried out by a panel of people, at least half of whom would be elected by recipients of benefits in the scope of the measure.

First, I can clarify for the benefit of the Committee that the independent person in the Bill could be an individual, a group of persons or a panel. However, in appointing the person, we want to be clear that the Government will follow the direction of the Governance Code on Public Appointments throughout the process. In accordance with that code, it is for the Secretary of State to appoint an appropriate person or persons to the role of independent overseer, as set out in Clause 75, because, as the code says:

“The ultimate responsibility for appointments and thus the selection of those appointed rests with Ministers who are accountable to Parliament for their decisions and actions”.


However, the process will be overseen by the Commissioner for Public Appointments to ensure that it is robust and fair; this is in line with precedent.

My noble friend accused us of allowing some forms of politics to invade these decisions. I must say that the Secretary of State has a track record of appointing well-respected and experienced people to review the DWP’s work, even when that kind of oversight is not required. For example, in December she appointed Liz Sayce, the former chief executive of Disability Rights UK and formerly chair of the Social Security Advisory Committee, to lead the independent review into overpayment of the carer’s allowance; she also wanted Charlie Mayfield to lead a joint DWP and Department for Business and Trade review into the factors behind the growing levels of inactivity. I can assure the Committee that we will similarly look for relevant and independent expertise in this area. Clearly, the independent reviewer will have the discretion to engage with not only benefit claimants but any other key stakeholders whom they may consider appropriate, and we do not need to legislate for them to exercise that discretion.

The review must consider the extent to which the Secretary of State has complied with the legislation and the code of practice. The independent overseer will then consider the extent to which the Government have complied with the many safeguards outlined in the legislation and the code. So, the independent review is in the interests of all those who receive a payment for a relevant benefit and will help ensure that their rights are protected.

Amendment 91A in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, would require the independent reviewer to include in their annual report any impact that the EVM may have on vulnerable persons. Although I obviously agree that the DWP needs to consider carefully the vulnerabilities that our customers may have, I do not think that this amendment is necessary given the nature of the measure and the existing safeguards, including the oversight and reporting provisions. Again, I remind the Committee that this measure will actually help some of our customers, including those who are vulnerable. We know that people make genuine mistakes; access to this important data will help us find those mistakes sooner and enable us to correct them. Detecting overpayments earlier will help prevent claimants accruing large debts to the department in cases where an overpayment is recoverable.

The key issue is that this is just a data-requiring power. It will simply require a bank to share limited information where benefit-receiving accounts meet the eligibility criteria specified in a DWP notice. The process of a bank sharing data through this measure will have no direct impact on the person’s claim of vulnerabilities. The measure is not about targeting anyone; it is about ensuring that claimants are paid the correct amount of benefit. It is only then that, under the DWP’s long-standing business-as-usual processes, people may experience changes to their benefit award—for example, where, following further inquiries, it is determined that the payment is not correct or that they do not meet the eligibility rules for the payment.

A major aspect underpinning the issues raised by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, is a broader question as to how the DWP supports vulnerable people in those processes. Layers of support already exist in the DWP to ensure that customers who are vulnerable or have complex needs have the right support put in place. DWP staff regularly conduct vulnerability checks and are proactive on this; when we do identify vulnerable individuals, we ensure that they receive the necessary support and adjustment. We have specially trained staff to support our most vulnerable customers, and they have access to a wide range of guidance to support them. Across our various benefits and services, colleagues record any support needs provided by the customer to ensure that, whenever a claimant speaks to the DWP, it is aware of how best to help them. As I have already set out, in cases of fraud and error, a DWP staff member will be the one making decisions affecting benefit entitlement.

Finally, I remind the Committee that the independent reviewer will report annually on how the powers have been exercised in line with the legislation and how effective they have been at identifying incorrect payments. They will be able to cover any issues they deem relevant, including the impacts the measure is having and what that means for DWP customers. Asking the independent reviewer to assess impacts on vulnerability would, by necessity, take the scope of the review far broader than the EVM, as it would need to focus on wider parts of DWP business. To accept this amendment would therefore fundamentally change the scope of the annual review.

Lastly, I understand what the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, is trying to achieve with Amendment 91B, but I do not believe it is necessary. The legislation already allows the Secretary of State to disclose information to the independent reviewer for the purpose of the reviews under new Section 121DD, and I assure the noble Lord that the DWP will of course work openly and collaboratively with the independent reviewer. We will provide them with the information requested and work with them to help identify the information they need to complete their review, sharing this under the existing provisions.

Should any incentive be needed, if the independent reviewer did not consider that they had received all the information they needed, the report they published and laid before Parliament would no doubt reflect this. It would be clear for Parliament to see and scrutinise it and hold the Government to account on it. However, I am confident that that situation will not arise because our deterrent will be quite enough. Nevertheless, to provide further assurance to the Committee that the Secretary of State will provide everything relevant, I am happy to commit to make this clear in the code of practice for the measure, but I would rather not legislate unnecessarily.

To close, I know that the noble Lord knows that the inclusion of this oversight matters to the whole Committee; it matters to me as much as it matters to him. The Government have not resisted calls for transparency and have a strong track record of working openly with independent reviewers, such as the independent review of carer’s allowance overpayments.

Since the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, mentioned that Amendment 91B is his final amendment, I want to say that I very much take his amendments in the constructive spirit in which they are intended. This is what the House of Lords Committee is for—to make sure that we pursue the aims of the Bill and that we do so in the most constructive and appropriate way possible. I look forward to carrying on engaging with him. For now, I hope that my noble friend Lord Sikka, whom I am sure I will see in future, will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Sikka (Lab)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister and the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, for their contributions. The argument that something is costly and timely has been made for centuries against universal suffrage, but somehow we overcome that objection and recognise that people can be elected on to all sorts of bodies. In the rest of Europe, workers are elected on to company boards; nobody said that is costly and time-consuming. Perhaps we are yet to catch up with that kind of democratic revolution.

Regarding the cost, I understand the point made, but what has not been asked is: what is the cost of not doing it? There is also a cost associated with not doing something—in this case, not bringing the direct experience of those impacted by this legislation: those whose lives may be ruined, who may be named and shamed in the neighbourhood, who may perhaps end up losing somewhere to live or who cannot buy food or anything. There is a huge social cost that is basically being ignored. The cost of not doing it is more injustice and more exclusion.

Of course, if the Government want to reach a halfway solution, they could bring the NGOs and civil society organisations representing the disabled, poor, old and sick into this review, but that is not what I think I heard from the Minister—although I hope that, in time, that will be thought through again. Nevertheless, I wanted to fly the flag for democracy and public accountability. For the time being, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill

Baroness Sherlock Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 18th June 2025 Grand Committee

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, I also wish to be brief and will cut down my notes, but this is a good opportunity to raise a number of points. I am very pleased that the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, has spoken to Amendments 92 and 93, as supported, or added to, by the noble Lord, Lord Palmer.

I share the principle that underpins Amendment 92 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Sikka—that the powers of entry, search and seizure provided for in Clause 76 must be exercised responsibly and proportionately, with proper regard for the rights of individuals. However, my main point here is that, while the amendment aims to provide a safeguard by requiring investigators to be accompanied by a police officer when exercising these powers, I suggest that we need to balance that safeguard with a degree of practicality. If the use of these powers is deemed serious enough to require a police presence, one might reasonably ask an obvious question: why would the police not simply carry out the action themselves, under existing powers—I think that was the point that the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, made—rather than acting in an accompanying or supporting role? If these powers are to be used more routinely—for example, to support the investigation of lower-level but still costly fraud—do we risk placing a significant administrative and resource burden on our already overstretched police forces? I could say more on this, but I will not.

Amendment 93, also in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, seeks to insert an additional layer of judicial oversight into the appointment of authorised investigators by requiring that their authorisation is subject to court approval, rather than left solely to the discretion of the Secretary of State. Without going into the detail, I support the principle behind this amendment.

I will conclude by asking some questions of the Minister on process, which has been a consistent theme on this side in our previous four days in Committee. I am not expecting answers now; it is really to put down the questions along the themes that I have just spoken to. We have had some verbal reassurance from the Government that these powers will be used against property and not people. I am not quite sure how reasonable force can be applied against property but, more than this, it is clear from the text of the Bill that this is not legally guaranteed. Reasonable force could be wielded against people by DWP officers; I hope that the Government can provide more clarity on the balance of that. Can the Minister confirm that these powers could in fact be used against people, as well as property? That is quite an important point. Again, the argument is about whether the police or the DWP may be required. In addition, can she give us some more information as to why she believes these powers need to be granted to civil servants in the DWP?

I say again that the police are the recognised authority, who have legitimacy, in the eyes of the public, to exercise and apply PACE powers. I feel that the Government have a duty to defend, quite strongly, why they want to grant these sweeping powers to members of a government department such as the DWP. We have a police service for a reason: officers are trained, regulated and experienced in using these powers appropriately. If fraud is suspected, particularly at a serious level, is it not right that it should be investigated by the police and not delegated to civil servants?

My concluding comment is that we should be cautious about expanding investigatory powers without a clear and compelling case. My final question to the Minister is: what justification is there for bypassing the police? That plays into my main question, which is: whither the police and whither the DWP?

[The Minister of State, Department for Work and Pensions (Baroness Sherlock) (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their comments and questions. I will speak first to Amendment 92. The amendment would undermine the policy intent of this part of the Bill, so we cannot accept it. The DWP leads investigations into social security matters and, as a result, our staff are better positioned to search for items relevant to these investigations—the things that they deal with, such as benefit claim packs or documents related to fraudulent identities. Requiring the police to be present for all DWP search and seizure activity, including investigative tasks related to securing criminal evidence, would erode the anticipated obvious benefits of the measure to both the DWP and the police. Crucially, it would divert the police away from focusing on the crime within our communities that only they can deal with and dealing with the human victims of those crimes.

These powers allow the DWP to apply to a court for warrants to enter a premises, conduct search and seizure and apply for and exercise production orders, with or without the police present. That clarifies the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux. They provide the DWP with greater control over its own operations and ensure that police time is not spent undertaking administrative tasks on the DWP’s behalf.

However, I reassure the Committee that safeguards are in place to govern the use of these powers. First and foremost, court approval must be granted for all warrants. The requirements for a DWP warrant application will be as strict as those for a police warrant application. Furthermore, the DWP intends to exercise these powers exclusively in cases involving serious and organised crime. This is not novel. Similar powers are already being used by HMRC, the Food Standards Agency and the Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority, which can undertake search and seizure activity without needing to be accompanied by the police.

Amendment 93 would impose unique obligations on the courts that they do not face in respect of other government departments with similar powers. PACE powers do not require the individual exercising them to be appointed by the court and there is no clear reason for the DWP to be any different. DWP-authorised investigators, like others who exercise PACE powers, will be subject to the PACE code of practice relating to search and seizure activity and will be required to follow the same procedures and processes as the police when submitting a warrant application to the court. These are not standards set by the DWP; they are set out in PACE, which all bodies exercising these kinds of law enforcement powers must adhere to. Specialist training must be successfully completed before authorisation is given and only then can an authorised investigator exercise these powers on behalf of the Secretary of State. That approach ensures that the correct responsibilities are attributed to the Secretary of State and the courts.

On the question relating to the PSFA, I am advised that it is not that a constable necessarily has to be present, but somebody with those powers, who may not be a police officer but could be from the National Crime Agency, the Serious Fraud Office, et cetera. As I said, the police do not always have to be there, if it is not necessary. There will be occasions when it will be necessary. For example, the previous Government published a fraud plan in which they recommended that powers of not only search and seizure but arrest be taken. We have decided not to take those powers, so if there needed to be an arrest, we would need to have police officers with us. If there were a risk of serious violence, again, the police would need to be present, but not otherwise.

On the question of force, the provisions set out in Clause 76 provide powers under PACE to enable DWP serious and organised crime investigators to apply for a search warrant to enter a premises, search it and seize items, with or without police involvement in England and Wales. The clause also enables authorised investigators to apply to a judge for an order requiring an individual suspected of social security fraud to provide certain types of sensitive information when relevant to the criminal investigation. It also provides for the use of reasonable force to conduct a search, such as breaking open a locked filing cabinet to search for materials. The clause provides that these powers can be used by an authorised investigator who is authorised by the Secretary of State.

To be clear, a warrant provides for the powers that can be deployed when that warrant is exercised. Our authorised investigators in DWP will not use reasonable force against people, although they may use it against property, such as breaking open a locked filing cabinet to retrieve a laptop or other evidence. However, the reason it has to be here is that, when the DWP applies for a warrant, that warrant must cover any activities that may need to be undertaken by either the DWP or the police, so although our investigators will not use reasonable force against people, it may be necessary for the police to do so when they are accompanying the DWP. That is why the legislation is drafted that way. If it were not, police out there on our warrant would not be able to use reasonable force and there may be occasions on which they need to do so. I hope that that clarifies matters for the noble Lord.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

Can the Minister explain why the DWP needs that power but the PSFA does not? The two clauses in the Bill are otherwise identical and differ only in respect of the reasonable force element. If the PSFA does not need it, I do not understand why the DWP does.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

The expectation is that we will be dealing with different kinds of crime. We are talking about serious and organised crime, where we will go out looking for evidence. We believe we do need these powers. If there is another argument behind that I am happy to write to the noble Lord. I have explained why the DWP needs them, and we clearly do need them in these circumstances because without them we could not conduct this work. The DWP has lots of experience because we already do this work; the police just have to go out with us, to be there and to do the searching. So we know what we need and therefore we know that we need these powers. If there is anything else I can add on the PSFA, I will write to the noble Lord.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

The Minister may have just answered my question, which is a slightly opaque one, perhaps. Is it a good assumption that in any search of a property by the DWP when it suspects fraud, members of the DWP will always go prepared with the necessary back-up, including the police or members of the NCA, if they suspect it is going to be a challenging search—or is that wrong?

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

As I said, the police might need to be present if we felt there was a risk of any serious violence. If it was felt there might be a need for arrests or, as the noble Viscount has suggested, there was a possible risk of violence, the police would be asked to accompany DWP officers. I have given those assurances, so I hope the noble Lord will withdraw the amendment.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I thank everyone who has taken part in this short but, I hope, illuminating debate. I have concerns about these police powers being given to civil servants and I do not think I am alone in that respect. I am comforted, to some extent, by the fact that these will be used only in the cases of serious and organised crime. I wonder whether the solution, therefore, is to put that in the Bill and put that safeguard in place, because I think that would comfort most people who have the concerns that we have. Perhaps that is something that the Minister might be willing to discuss between now and Report. That said, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Baroness Sherlock]

94: Schedule 4, page 95, line 8, leave out “items subject to legal privilege,”
Member’s explanatory statement
See the explanatory statement for my amendment to Schedule 4, page 101, line 15.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, government Amendments 94 to 97 are minor and technical in nature. In England and Wales, the common law does not permit access to material protected by legal professional privilege under any circumstances. However, relying on this common-law exclusion would not extend to Scotland. In addition, a different definition of legal privilege applies in Scotland. To ensure that the original intent is maintained, this position is now set out in a single provision within new Schedule 3ZD.

These amendments make it explicit that if the information being sought relates to personal records which involve confidentiality of communications that could be maintained in legal proceedings in Scotland, it cannot be seized, copied or obtained, et cetera. This ensures that the same protections for information of this type apply in Scotland as they would in England and Wales. I hope that these amendments are clear and I beg to move.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, as we turn to government Amendments 94 to 97, I wonder, as I always do when there are lots of government amendments to their own Bill, whether enough thought has gone into it in the other place.

I know that these proposals are primarily technical, with the key aim of simplifying the drafting of new Schedule 3ZD to the Social Security Administration Act 1992. Government Amendment 96 introduces a single clear prohibition on the seizure or examination of information of legal privilege. This streamlining could help to clarify the legal position for both investigators and those subject to investigation, ensuring that the Bill’s provisions are easier to interpret and apply in practice.

Clarity in legislation is always desirable, especially in complex areas such as fraud investigation, where the rights of individuals and the needs of public authorities must be carefully balanced. At the same time, it is important to consider how these amendments interact with the Bill’s wider objectives of safeguarding public money and equipping authorities with the tools needed to tackle fraud and error effectively. Ensuring that information which is subject to legal privilege is properly protected is a long-standing principle within our legal system. These amendments appear to reaffirm that commitment without substantially altering the Bill’s intent. I have no problem in agreeing with what should have been in the Bill at the beginning.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, my remarks largely chime with those made by the noble Lord, Lord Palmer. The Committee will be relieved to know that this is my shortest speech. I offer some measured support for these amendments. They address the important principle of the protection of legally privileged material, and in a way that simplifies and clarifies the drafting of this part of the Bill.

The right to legal professional privilege is, of course, a cornerstone of our justice system. That principle should be unambiguous in legislation of this kind. These amendments seek to express that safeguard more clearly through a single consolidated position. There is certainly merit in that. A simplified and consolidated statement of the limitation on investigatory powers in respect of privileged material is likely to be easier to apply in practice and could reduce the risk of inadvertent overreach.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful for the support and take the chiding in the spirit in which noble Lords intended it.

Government amendments are a key part of the legislative process. Noble Lords will have seen them from time to time, allowing for the refinement and improvement of Bills as they move through Parliament. It is critical that the Bill’s provisions comply with the distinct legal jurisdiction of Scotland. Every effort has been made to ensure that this is the case. We have worked closely with the Office of the Advocate-General for Scotland and with officials in the Scottish Government.

Following an additional review of the Bill prior to Committee, the Office of the Advocate-General for Scotland identified the need for a minor amendment to ensure that the powers would operate in Scotland as intended. We felt it was important to make the law clear in the Bill. I am grateful for noble Lords’ grace on this.

Amendment 94 agreed.

Moved by

[Baroness Sherlock]

95: Schedule 4, page 96, line 18, leave out “an item subject to legal privilege,”
Member’s explanatory statement
See the explanatory statement for my amendment to Schedule 4, page 101, line 15.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Baroness Sherlock]

98: Clause 85, page 51, line 27, leave out “, payment, credit”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment and my other amendment to clause 85 remove unnecessary references to a payment or credit, both of which are within the relevant definition of “benefit” already as a result of section 121DA(5) of the Social Security Administration Act 1992.

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[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, as we consider Amendments 99A, 99B and 99C, spoken to by the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, it is clear that these proposals are focused on the mechanisms of independent review and oversight within the Bill. Amendment 99A would ensure that the Secretary of State cannot limit the independent person’s review to only certain timeframes, thereby supporting the principle of comprehensive and impartial scrutiny. Amendment 99B would require the Secretary of State to provide information to the independent person for the purposes of a review, which could strengthen the independence and effectiveness of the review process. Amendment 99C would compel the Secretary of State to appoint independent reviewers not just in England but also in Wales and Scotland, ensuring a degree of consistency and regional representation in oversight arrangements.

These amendments appear to reinforce the Bill’s commitment to robust oversight and transparency, aligning with the existing provisions for independent inspection and review already outlined in the legislation. At the same time, it will be important to consider whether these changes might introduce additional administrative complexity or affect the flexibility of the Secretary of State to respond to evolving circumstances. As ever, the challenge is to strike the right balance between effective oversight and operational efficiency. I look forward to hearing the views of the noble Baroness, Lady Sherlock, on whether these proposals best serve the aims of accountability and good governance within the framework of this Bill. It is amazing what changing the word from “may” to “must” can do, but it can make a big difference and I wait to hear the Minister’s reply.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful for the contributions to this short debate. I hope that I can answer the questions that have been raised.

The first and most important piece of information is to remind the Committee that in the Commons my honourable friend the Minister for Transformation made it clear that His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services will be commissioned to inspect the DWP’s criminal investigation powers for England and Wales and HMICS for Scotland. I hope that that is helpful. I can reassure the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, that the reason why we chose HMIC is that for more than 160 years it has been carrying out independent scrutiny of law enforcement in England and Wales, including the police. There is no danger whatever that it will be any kind of box-ticking exercise, if HMIC is doing it. I am sure that she can be reassured on that front.

I hope that that shows the level of commitment that we have to the level of scrutiny. If we want to do it properly, HMIC is the body to scrutinise powers of this seriousness. But we have worked closely with HMICFRS and HMICS. We intend to operate in the same way as other law enforcement agencies that are subject to inspections by those bodies. What will happen is that, prior to each inspection, the DWP and the inspectorate body will mutually agree the period that the inspection will cover. That is to make sure that the inspection can cover all necessary activity that has been undertaken, which is a common way of operating. We have no reason to believe that it will not operate well in this case.

We understand that sharing information is essential and will obviously not seek to misrepresent or hold back any relevant information. The legislation as drafted allows us to share all relevant information. But it is essential that the Secretary of State retains discretion—for example, being able to choose not to provide information that may be particularly sensitive and where sharing it could have a detrimental impact, such as on the outcome of an active case. The DWP will fully support and co-operate with the inspection bodies and its reports will make clear if we did not do that. But we want to do so, to make sure that we can deliver on these powers to the right standard.

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, for answering one question for me. There will indeed be inspectorates. HMICFRS will cover England and Wales and HMIC will cover Scotland to enable us to have a different reviewer in the two places. I hope that, given those reassurances, the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, will not press her amendments.

[Baroness Finn (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for her reply. As we draw this debate to a close, I return to the fact that these amendments are rooted in the core values of fairness, transparency, independence and accountability. I thank the noble Lords, Lord Vaux and Lord Palmer, for their support, although I know that the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, has not supported Amendment 99C.

The independent review mechanism outlined in Clause 88 should be one of the central safeguards of the Bill. It should ensure that the powers conferred are used proportionately, effectively and in the public interest. As it currently stands, that mechanism risks being weakened by loopholes and discretionary clauses that leave too much power in ministerial hands. I note the response about HMIC, but it still goes to the core that we want this Bill as a standalone and that those loopholes are necessarily closed.

Amendment 99A speaks to a fundamental concern: the right of the Government to define the terms of their own scrutiny. That is not a mark of confident democracy. A review that can only examine certain timeframes selected by the very people being reviewed is not a genuine safeguard; it is a managed narrative. True independence means giving the reviewer the authority to follow the evidence wherever it leads, not wherever the Secretary of State allows.

Amendment 99B is in many ways even more foundational. What is the value of appointing an independent person if that individual can be denied access to the very information that they need to do their job? We cannot have effective oversight if it depends on the good will of the department being examined. I take note of what the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, said. There is a huge difference, as I know well from my own time in government, between the words “may” and “must”. “Must” is a minimal expectation if we are to uphold the principles of openness and integrity. Anything less risks turning independence into theatre and accountability into a form without substance.

Amendment 99C is about consistency. I appreciate that the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, considers it unnecessary. However, if fraud knows no borders between England, Wales and Scotland, neither should scrutiny. We cannot rely only on the Secretary of State’s discretion to decide whether an independent review happens in one nation but not another, because that creates potential confusion and disparity and the appearance, if not the reality, of selective transparency. This is a probing amendment and I appreciate what has been said, which I will pick up on later. What we are aiming for is a duty to appoint independent reviewers across the devolved nations so that trust is not patchy but uniform across the United Kingdom.

When taken together, these amendments must represent a clear and coherent vision that government power must be matched by government accountability. That review must be more than just process. It must be meaningful, showing that we do not fear scrutiny but welcome it, because it is through scrutiny that public trust is earned and retained. The Government have rightly set out to tackle fraud and protect public money, but if the public are to believe that this effort is both rigorous and fair, the checks that we place on those powers must be equally robust. These amendments deliver that balance, not to obstruct but to uphold the values that any confident, responsible Government should share. I urge the Minister to consider the purpose and principle that these amendments seek to preserve. Let us not pass up the opportunity to make this legislation stronger, fairer and more trustworthy. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, I am pleased in this instance to express my strong support for Amendments 99D and Amendment 109ZA, tabled by the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, and the noble Baroness, Lady Finn. I have not been quite so firm in my support for others, but Amendment 99D would ensure that, before any deduction is applied to recover debt overpayment, due regard is given to the wider circumstances and vulnerabilities of the liable person. There would be a requirement for this assessment to be documented and available to the claimant on request.

This is a vital safeguard that would place fairness and compassion at the heart of the debt recovery process, ensuring that individuals are not pushed into hardship without a proper understanding of their personal situation. It aligns with my and my party’s commitment to a welfare system that is both effective and humane, recognising that people’s circumstances can be complex—gosh, they certainly can be—and that a one-size-fits-all approach to debt recovery is neither just nor practical.

Amendment 109ZA—we have a wonderful numbering system—would further strengthen these protections by requiring the Minister to consider the additional costs of living with a disability before making a direct deduction order. This would be an essential step in ensuring that disabled people, who often face higher living expenses, are not disproportionately affected by debt recovery measures. Both amendments reflect the principles of proportionality and sensitivity that should underpin all government action in this area. They represent a significant improvement to the Bill’s framework for tackling fraud and error while safeguarding the dignity and well-being of the most vulnerable.

Unlike the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, who said she was a bit hesitant on this, I urge the Committee and the Minister to support these amendments, which would ensure that the pursuit of public funds is always balanced with compassion and respect for individual circumstances. At this stage of the Bill, as mentioned by the noble Viscount, these measures need to be introduced so that we can perhaps on Report include them in the Bill.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Viscount for his amendments and to all noble Lords who have spoken. We all want to ensure that, when someone who is subject to these debt recovery powers is vulnerable, we are aware of that and take appropriate steps to treat them as we should. Before I turn to the individual amendments, I shall recap on how direct deduction orders will operate and what safeguards are there, as this is relevant to the debate.

These powers are vital to recovering funds that are owed by debtors who are—just to remind the Committee—by definition not on benefits or PAYE. If they were, we would have other ways to deal with them. These are people who have some other source of income, owe the DWP money and have simply refused to engage with us at all, at any stage. That does not mean that none of them is vulnerable—of course, they may be—but this is the category of people that we are talking about. The department has long-standing powers to recover public money that has been wrongly paid in excess of entitlement, through deductions from benefits or earnings, but not for those in that category.

There are important new safeguards for these powers. They are there only as a last resort. First, before they can be used, multiple attempts at contact must be made, of different types. We must make at least four attempts to contact someone, at least twice by letter. We not simply trying once and giving up. We must have really tried to engage with people who simply do not engage with us all.

Secondly, when a direct deduction order is necessary, the DWP must be satisfied that any deduction, whether a lump sum or a regular deduction, will not cause the debtor, other account holder or their dependants hardship in meeting ordinary living expenses. That means that, legally, the DWP must ensure that there is enough money remaining in an account after a lump sum deduction to allow the debtor to meet their essential living needs.

In response to the noble Viscount, deductions must be fair in all the circumstances. This would include consideration of any vulnerabilities or additional costs related to living with a disability. The noble Viscount helpfully outlined what some of those will be. The point is that they must be particular to the individual. Each individual’s circumstances will be different. As the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, pointed out, not everybody who is poor is vulnerable, not everybody who is on benefits is vulnerable and not everybody who is disabled is vulnerable, necessarily. We need to understand their circumstances to know what is fair and ensure that they will not be pushed into hardship by a deduction.

Thirdly, to ensure that the deduction is made in that way, the amounts will be decided following an affordability assessment based on information shared by the debtor’s bank and any subsequent representations made by the individual or their representative if they need someone to speak for them. Legislation sets out the maximum amounts that can be deducted for regular deduction orders.

Fourthly, the Secretary of State can vary or revoke direct deduction orders in the light of a change of circumstances—for example, if the debtor had a change of income, made a new claim to benefit or something else of significance happened. Fifthly, when a direct deduction order is made, notice must be given to the bank and all holders of the account in question. If an order is still upheld after a review, or after considering information that has been presented, an individual who is not happy with that has a right of appeal to the First-tier Tribunal.

Finally, I remind the Committee that a code of practice for the new powers has been made available for noble Lords to review. This sets out revised guidance on ways to identify and support those who are vulnerable. Ahead of public consultation, our team continues to work on the code collaboratively with key stakeholders, including charities such as Surviving Economic Abuse and the Money and Pensions Service. These are important safeguards which I hope will alleviate noble Lords’ concerns.

On Amendments 99D and 109ZA, it is worth looking at what these amendments would do in practice. While we all share the desire to protect vulnerable groups, these amendments would place additional legal duties on the DWP to consider the impact of any vulnerabilities that a debtor may have, even when it could not be reasonably possible for the DWP to know. These requirements would be imposed without providing any new ways for the DWP to obtain that information.

As I have said, the direct deduction order power is one of last resort, aimed at those who are not on benefits or in PAYE employment, where all reasonable attempts to engage with the individual have failed. These are individuals who have not responded to repeated contact from the DWP’s debt management officials about their debt. In the absence of meaningful engagement from the debtor or their representative, the DWP will not be aware of their current personal circumstances. This puts the DWP in a difficult, if not impossible position, regarding the obligations that the proposed amendments would impose.

However, we need safeguards. The new safeguards that are introduced in this Bill, which I outlined at the start of my speech, alongside the existing safeguards and departmental processes for supporting those who are vulnerable, reflect a better approach to protecting vulnerable people. I shall now set out some of those existing safeguards and processes that are outside of this Bill, for the record.

Layers of support already exist within the DWP to support those who are vulnerable or have complex needs. They include proactive vulnerability checks at different points in the customer journey, and where vulnerable individuals are identified, to ensure that the necessary support and adjustments are put in place. Where any additional support or adjustments are identified by a DWP official or are disclosed by the individual, they are recorded on DWP systems to ensure that all officials know how best to support them.

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Moved by

[Baroness Sherlock]

100: Clause 89, page 56, leave out lines 6 and 7 and insert—
“(i) the period mentioned in section 71ZK(6)(a) for P to appeal against the outcome of the review has passed without P bringing an appeal, or”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendment to clause 89, page 56, line 31.

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[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, I have a degree of sympathy for the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, and the noble Lord, Lord Palmer of Childs Hill. It touches on a value that I know many of us across this House instinctively support: namely, that powers which interfere with the person’s finances should be subject to proper oversight and scrutiny—in other words, by a court and not by a politician. Let us start with that.

The principle underpinning the amendment is sound. When the state seeks to impose a direct deduction from an individual’s account, that is no small matter. It affects not just policy outcomes but people’s daily lives, and we should never lose sight of that. Much was spoken about that in earlier groups. I am sure that the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, and the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, have suggested introducing a requirement for the court to authorise such a deduction because it reflects the gravity of that particular action.

However—there is a however—although I support the sentiment, I have reservations about the practicality, and I am afraid that the remarks from the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, have increased my concerns. Requiring every direct deduction order to go through the courts will prove burdensome to the judicial system and may risk making this part of the regime so slow and administratively heavy that it becomes inoperable in practice. That would not only undermine the Government’s legitimate aim of tackling fraud effectively and speedily, but could also result in delays and uncertainty for claimants and public authorities alike. Just to be helpful to the Minister, can she enlighten us on the current state of the backlog in the courts—which is a message she might expect me to give—and how, therefore, Amendment 102, for example, might not be helpful to the process?

I have another question about an appeals process. Everyone, I believe, has the right to an appeal, but how would this work, given the status of the courts? That is a question for the Minister to ponder over. We are, after all, talking about a mechanism intended to recover public money in a targeted and efficient way. If every deduction, regardless of scale or complexity, must first pass through court proceedings, we risk erecting a barrier that stifles the entire process. There must surely be a way of reconciling the desire for oversight with the need for operational efficiency—a challenge that I lay down to the noble Baroness, the Minister.

So, while I cannot support the amendment as currently drafted, I agree that the principle of independent oversight should not be overlooked. There may be better ways of embedding that principle in the system through enhanced safeguards; clearer audit mechanisms; greater efficiency and speed—that is, in expediting the DDOs; and improving transparency around how deduction decisions are made and reviewed.

I recognise this from all who have spoken, and I have listened carefully to all the speeches. I believe that these amendments, and particularly Amendment 102, starts a valuable conversation; even if its solution is not quite the right one, its motivation certainly is. I hope that the Minister can reassure the Committee that the Government recognise the need for these powers to be exercised responsibly but also sensibly so that they can operate effectively, and that they are open to exploring proportionate mechanisms of accountability that simply do not grind the system to a halt, and if so—a very simple question to end on: what could this system be?

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful for some really good questions. These are exactly the kind of questions the Lords Committee should be asking on these sorts of issues, and I hope to give decent answers.

Should I ever get round to writing a book, somewhere in the credits it will say “Definitely not a malign person”. I am very grateful to the noble Baroness for that. It is the best compliment I am going to have today —you have to take them where you can find them in this business—so I thank her very much.

Amendments 102 and 122, as we have heard, want to restrict the use of the direct deduction power to circumstances where a court has determined it necessary and appropriate. I thought the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, made her argument very clearly; I hope to try and persuade her that she does not need to press these amendments because I think we have a good case on this.

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[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

I apologise; I forgot to answer that. No, it does not. These measures apply to any kind of overpayment but, as I described, they are only matters of last resort. We have to have gone through all the other possibilities and people must simply have failed to engage. So this really will happen only if somebody is absolutely not engaged with us at all. As is the case with deductions from benefits or deductions from earnings, they are available as a tool for overpayments, whether or not they will be used.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

I thank the noble Lords who spoke on these amendments for appreciating—even if they did not support—the spirit of what they are trying to do. Despite that, I do actually want to do this rather than just wanting the spirit. But I know that the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, feels that it will not work practically. But we have had a slightly contradictory answer there, because they are either absolutely the last resort and will hardly ever be used—in which case they will not clog up the court system, to be fair—or they will be used a lot more, which means that there is all the more reason for them to go through the courts, if they will be used liberally from the point of view of a safeguard. So I did get confused about that.

Some thoughtful points were made. The noble Lord, Lord Vaux, usefully probed the Minister—in a way that I was not able to—on exactly when and in what circumstances. These questions about the distinction between error and where the overpayment came from matter in relation to the powers that have been created.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

Will the noble Baroness give way?

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

Yes, of course.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

I am sorry to interrupt—I never get to say that anymore. I thought it might be helpful for the Committee if I clarified. The noble Lord, Lord Vaux, referred to Clause 89; that actually refers to administrative penalties and recovery for non-benefit payments, not for benefit payments. I should have made that clear. I am sorry to interrupt the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, in full flow—please carry on.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

It is very helpful for these things to be clarified. As noble Lords can see every time we are in Committee, I have so many pieces of paper, so I appreciate that and am not saying that I am on top of all the detail.

However, I think it is important, in the spirit of the way that the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, was motivated to support these amendments, that this is not just about the detail; there is an important principle here. I really liked the viral film mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, because people do care about this Bill and what its impact will be, and we have to be able to answer all the questions as the legislators who are debating it. People know that we are involved in this, and I sometimes feel that it is unclear exactly what will be acquired by all these powers.

The problem with saying that these powers will hardly ever be used is that these powers are going in the statute book, so they can be used. I am not going to talk about bank statements again, but the reason I raised them on this group is because, before a DDO can be introduced, you have to check bank statements through the mechanism of the affordability checks that we will go on to discuss, and that is a breach of privacy. If we are giving the DWP the power to do this, we need to have a check. The way we have done that historically is to rely on the courts to take money. As this is related, I am trying to see whether this could be a useful check to make sure that these powers are not exploited.

We have plenty of time to go, so I think some of us may come back with a version of this amendment—potentially better worded—when we get to Report. It is not just to fly the flag for civil liberties but, as I think the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, said, a need to have trust in the system. If the Bill is to be taken seriously by people who do not just think that it is draconian and who do not do the caricatures that the Minister wants, it must be watertight in its safeguards and protections, as well as in the powers that it creates. Those two things have to live together; otherwise, it will be discredited before it even hits the statute book.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

I just want to pick up on something quite interesting that the noble Baroness said, which leads me to ask a question of the Minister. I am not expecting an answer now. It is to do with the capacity or number of cases. I have no idea how many DDO cases could end up going to the courts, but it may be more than the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, thinks. I am just reminded of my experience of the Child Maintenance Service: it looks at those people who we know can pay and who are not paying, and they go all the way to the courts. There are many thousands. I rest my case by saying that there is a danger that the courts could be clogged up, but it would help the Committee to have some idea, perhaps in writing, of the number of cases that would or could go to court as a consequence of these amendments.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

I will write to the noble Viscount. As he knows from his experience with the Child Maintenance Service, as each form of enforcement comes into view, more and more people simply pay without it being necessary, so a sort of funnel comes down. If we have any information about scale, I would be happy to write.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

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[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Kramer and Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, for tabling this amendment. I recognise the spirit in which this proposal is made—a desire to ensure that the use of direct deduction powers is subject to proper scrutiny and does not override individual rights without appropriate justification.

However, I must express some serious reservations about the effect that this amendment would have. By removing the ability of the DWP to request relevant bank statement information from financial institutions before issuing a DDO, we risk undermining the very evidential foundation that should underpin the use of this power in the first place. If we are to give Ministers and their departments powers to recover money owed to the public purse—a legitimate policy objective that is supported on all sides of this Committee—we must also ensure that those powers are exercised responsibly and on the basis of proper evidence. Access to account information, under strictly controlled conditions, is part of what makes that possible. Without it, the risk is not simply inefficiency or delay. The greater danger is that deduction decisions could be made with incomplete or inaccurate information, leading to inappropriate enforcement action or simply to missed opportunities to recover legitimately owed funds. Neither outcome would serve the interests of fairness, nor would they deliver good value for public money.

We have heard throughout Committee about the importance of a system that is not only robust but proportionate and just. I entirely agree—as our amendments and interventions thus far have made clear. However, for a system to be proportionate, it must be informed, which requires access to evidence. I reiterate the concerns that we raised on these Benches at Second Reading. Schedule 3B (1)(2) (b)(i) makes it clear that an eligibility verification notice, which would serve to identify or help to identify fraud, can be applied only to the bank account

“into which a specified relevant benefit has been paid”.

As my noble friend Lady Stedman-Scott set out at Second Reading, we are concerned that this creates a substantial loophole which could be exploited by fraudsters who are, as the government amendments have suggested, able to find out whether they are being pursued by the DWP through an information request. This is a real issue. It seems a likely and obvious outcome that such a person could move money between the relevant account and another, held with different bank, to avoid scrutiny.

We submit that for this to be an enforcement regime, there cannot be any loopholes or workarounds which may permit a fraudster to hang on to the money that they have stolen from the taxpayer. As we stated at Second Reading, the Bill as set out suggests that the Government will be tied up in a legal bind, ensuring in statute that they cannot verify or ultimately pursue the recovery of funds that are not held within the account specified. However, with the right safeguards and with responsible communication of information, there is surely a way in which this regime can be constructed that is responsible and fit for purpose.

We believe that the Government must expand their capacity and ability to access further bank accounts held in the name of the relevant person to prevent them simply opening another account and moving money around, which, as the Bill is currently drafted, seems to be a clear and easy way for them to avoid both proper scrutiny and will prevent the money being recovered. Perhaps the Minister will say whether parallels can be drawn with the current system set out between HMRC and the banks for the recovery of tax resulting either from overpayments or tax fraud, which I am sure she will say works. That may be helpful.

Finally, I want to respond briefly to the concerns raised about whether these provisions amount to a snoopers’ charter—a charge that has been raised throughout the passage of the Bill. It is right that we scrutinise the scope of these powers carefully, but it is also important to be clear about what the Bill does and does not do. In our view, the Bill sets out defined and limited circumstances under which verification measures may be used. It cannot be doubted that an informed and fair decision on deduction orders can be reached only if it is grounded in accurate and up-to-date information. I believe that it is for the Government to make it absolutely clear in Committee how these safeguards on process will function in practice and how transparency and accountability will be maintained. I understand the sensitivities involved in accessing bank data. That is why these safeguards and oversight mechanisms are important.

With that, I hope that noble Lords will reflect on whether the amendment achieves that balance, and I look forward to the Minister’s response on how the very valid concerns that it speaks to can be addressed.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords for their contributions. As we have heard, this amendment would remove the requirement for banks to provide information to the department in response to notices, including bank statements, for the purposes of making a direct deduction order. However, getting this information from banks, including relevant bank statements, is not only instrumental to the effectiveness of the direct deduction power—it is crucial as a necessary and important safeguard to ensure the affordability of deductions, which is why we cannot accept this amendment.

I remind the Committee that the recovery powers proposed under the Bill are ones of last resort. They are for those not in receipt of benefit or in PAYE employment who have other income streams or capital and who repeatedly refuse to engage with the DWP to agree an affordable repayment plan. Without the information shared by the bank, the DWP would have no means to consider the debtor’s financial circumstances and would therefore be prevented from meeting other obligations and vital safeguards in the Bill, such as establishing an affordable deduction rate and avoiding causing hardship.

Put simply, if we do not know how much money someone has, we risk taking more than they can afford to repay at that time. The DWP is working collaboratively with the Money and Pensions Service on “ability to pay” checks, using bank statements and, where possible, the standard financial statement principles, to prevent financial hardship. These checks will consider the debtor’s essential living expenses, such as housing and utilities, and the Bill provides that direct deduction orders must not cause the debtor hardship in meeting these expenses.

Using bank statements in this way allows the deduction to be affordable and fair based on the individual circumstances, rather than a blanket approach of leaving a set amount in the account which, if not set high enough, could prevent the debtor from meeting those essential costs. The information gathered through these notices is proportionate and other provisions in the Bill restrict the use of bank statements obtained under this power. They are solely for the purposes of recovering the money that is owed. I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, that it is a legal requirement not to use the information for any purpose other than debt recovery. That is spelled out in paragraph 3(10) of new Schedule 3ZA, inserted by Schedule 5 of the Bill.

I also remind the noble Baroness that all this can be avoided, including obtaining information from a debtor’s bank, if the individual agrees to get in touch to discuss and agree an appropriate repayment plan. In that case, we will not need bank statements because we can talk to them and ask for appropriate evidence, and they can provide evidence of other kinds, if that is sensible.

I will just pick up on a number of things. We are not interested in looking at what people spend their money on. It is worth reminding the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, and the Committee that we have said different things at different times because there are different measures in the Bill. For the EVM over here, there is no transaction data—absolutely not, under any circumstances—and I say to the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, that we are looking only at the bank account into which we pay benefits. Fresh sentence: over here, the DWP’s debt recovery powers are aimed at different people, who are not on benefits as, by definition, the EVM is only for those on benefits. It is aimed at people who are not in PAYE employment, who owe the department money and who will not engage. If at least four attempts have been made to contact them but they simply have not got in touch, we can start to use the powers. In that case, we do have the power under our debt recovery powers to go to any bank account that they have; we are not limited to the bank account into which we pay benefits. As I have just said, we are not interested in looking at what people spend their money on. The power can be used to recover debt only in cases where somebody is not in receipt of benefits, as I have described.

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[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

I thank the Minister very much for responding in that manner, but it is rather like a court case where they say that the jury should disregard what happened. Once the information is out there, human nature makes it very hard to avoid it. If you are the DWP and you look at a bank account and see something that you should not, it is hard then to ignore it. The nature of man and woman is not to ignore things that they see. I am afraid that that just came to my mind: it is like these television dramas where the barrister or lawyer raises points, and the judge says, “The jury should disregard that”. You cannot disregard what you see in a bank statement even if you decide that you should not really have seen it. This is a very dangerous precedent, and I do not think the Minister is living in the real world.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

I just remind the noble Lord that these DWP staff are authorised fraud investigators and they work on our fraud teams. In the nature of their work, as it is for anybody who works in fraud or law enforcement, they will end up seeing information, in the course of an investigation, that is not relevant. If he thinks that that means that that information will necessarily get into the outside world, then I ask him to rethink that. Our staff are professionally trained. They are professionals who operate under professional standards, authorisations and accreditation. They know what their job is. If staff come across information and the law quite clearly says that it may be used for only one purpose, it will be used for only that purpose.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

I am sorry, but this does not take account of rogue members of the DWP. I am sure that 99.99% are exactly as the Minister says, but the idea that everyone will observe those rules is—I say again—not the real world. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment in the name of my noble friend Lady Kramer.

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Moved by

[Baroness Sherlock]

106: Schedule 5, page 107, line 12, at end insert “the bank where the account in question is held,”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, together with my amendments to Schedule 5, page 108, line 1 and Schedule 5, page 108, line 5, requires a notice under paragraph 5(1) of new Schedule 3ZA to be given to the bank in question.

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[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, I offer my strong support for Amendment 109, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Palmer. It proposes a vital and compassionate safeguard that ensures that, before any direct deduction order is made, proper consideration is given to whether the individual involved is a victim of domestic abuse—or certainly at risk of it.

We know that domestic abuse too often includes economic and financial control. Perpetrators may take over access to bank accounts, manage benefit claims in their partner’s name or use coercion to extract money. For victims in these circumstances, a deduction order made against a joint or controlled account is not just a technical enforcement step but can be catastrophic and expose them to further harm, deepen their financial insecurity and reinforce the very cycle of abuse that they are trying to escape. The amendment puts in place an essential duty that, before such a deduction is imposed, the Secretary of State must ask a basic question: is this person safe? Are they vulnerable specifically to domestic abuse? Could such action cause caused further harm? I am sure the Committee will realise that these comments are not new. This is not about creating loopholes but about making sure that we do not inadvertently punish the very people who most need our protection. If our system is to be just, it must distinguish between those who are deliberately defrauding the system and those who are themselves being defrauded, manipulated or coerced in private and invisible ways.

I fully recognise—others may raise this point—that this kind of information is not always easy to obtain. As we know, domestic abuse is often hidden, and victims may be reluctant or unable to disclose it. But that is not a reason to avoid the responsibility. On the contrary, it is precisely why we must build protective considerations into the decision-making process. So, if a red flag is raised—whether through third-party evidence, existing support services or patterns in the account—the system must be capable of pausing, asking the right and necessary questions and adjusting course. That is surely not an undue burden; it is what we should expect of a responsible, modern enforcement regime.

Of course, I also note that the Government already have duties under the Domestic Abuse Act 2021—I expect we will hear this from the Minister—and under the wider Equality Act to consider how their decisions impact vulnerable groups. But this amendment gives practical effect to those duties in the specific context of direct deduction orders. It does not create new rights out of thin air; it reinforces and operationalises obligations that the state already carries.

So I ask the noble Baroness two questions. In the system and process designed, and having reached proof of concept with the banks—at least on two occasions; I refer back to previous comments—who is responsible for recognising these issues in respect of account holders? Is it the banks? To what extent do they know such detail about their account holders? Or is it the DWP? Is it more likely to know of such matters? Obviously, in the discussions leading up to and beyond the decision to give out benefits, such issues surely would have emerged. Perhaps the Minister can enlighten us on the precise responsibilities here.

Perhaps the Minister can also confirm that the banks would not see the analysis of vulnerability as a key part of their responsibility—that is linked to my previous point—but that their role is simply to raise a red flag with deliberately limited data, as has been outlined, where there is that match of an account holder in receipt of benefits who also has £16,000 or more in an account.

The final question, which chimes with questions asked on perhaps day 4 of Committee, is: how often are such checks carried out by banks, as requested by the DWP? Or—I need to be put right again; forgive me—is the algorithm such that a flag is raised on a 24/7 basis by an algorithm that does a match? Then a report is given to the bank’s responsible person—let us call him the banking manager.

There is a thread running through this debate about how to balance power and protection. Indeed, it is an issue on which noble Lords across the Committee agree; therefore I warmly welcome this amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, as it provides us with another opportunity to test out the Government and raise our concerns. This amendment is principled, proportionate and practical. I hope the Government will take it seriously, in the spirit it is meant, and reflect carefully on the values it enshrines. I believe it gets to the very essence of what the Bill is about. With that, I look forward to the answers from the Minister.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful, as ever. The subject of Amendment 109, put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, is very much as it was in the fourth group, with the earlier amendments in the name of the noble Viscount, Lord Younger. The Committee agrees on the objective in that area and we are simply going to talk about the best way to achieve that.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, for raising this issue but again, for reasons not dissimilar to those articulated earlier, his amendment is not the best way to achieve this. However, I hope I can give him the assurance that he is looking for.

The DWP very much understands the importance of this issue. The noble Viscount is right that we have statutory obligations, but it is also embedded in the department. All our front-line staff are trained in addressing the issue of domestic violence, the training is regularly refreshed and we engage with stakeholders: the department take it very seriously.

We are committed to continuing to support victims and survivors of domestic abuse whenever they interact with the department. We have experience in this area, as well as existing guidance and processes for supporting victims of domestic abuse. As I say, the training our front-line management staff receive includes assessing affordability and identifying and dealing with vulnerable customers.

My officials have been looking in detail, specifically at how victim survivors could be impacted by the measures in the Bill, and working closely with key stakeholders, including the charity Surviving Economic Abuse, to ensure that the code of practice sets out the right approach to mitigating risks for victim survivors of domestic abuse. The current draft of the code of practice includes steps officials will take to identify signs of domestic abuse, where possible, to identify risks and to support the individual.

However, although I recognise the important intent behind this amendment, the fact is that it would apply to anyone affected by a direct deduction order, including debtors and non-debtors. Similarly to the earlier Amendments 99D and 109ZA from the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, it does not require or enable the DWP to take any action to identify possible impacted individuals or provide any new means by which the DWP could do so.

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[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My remarks will be brief. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton, for tabling Amendments 109A and 109B, which seek to introduce further safeguards into the process by which direct deduction orders are applied. These amendments are clearly driven by a legitimate concern. I am sure it is one that we all share; no one should be pushed into destitution—note that word—because of enforcement action taken by the state. We on these Benches broadly support the intention behind these amendments. As we expand the state’s ability to recover funds lost through fraud, we must do so in a way that is measured, proportionate and fair. We agree that the person on the receiving end of a direct deduction order must be treated with dignity and that the enforcement should never push a person below the threshold of subsistence.

However, while we agree on the principle, the Bill as currently drafted already contains sufficient protections to give effect to that principle. These amendments propose going further. As the noble Lord, Lord Davies, set out, they would hard-wire specific mechanisms into the legislation itself with a mandatory affordability assessment and a fixed, safeguarded amount of £1,000 to be left in a person’s account. While we understand the motivation behind these proposals, we are not persuaded that they strike the right balance.

First, on the affordability assessment, the key question is not whether such considerations should be made—they absolutely should be—but whether placing a rigid requirement in the Bill is the best way to achieve it. Secondly, regarding the safeguarded sum, the proposal to set a fixed floor of £1,000 may be well intentioned but risks creating unintended consequences. For some individuals, that figure may be appropriate, but for others with significantly higher levels of debt or multiple fraudulent claims—of which there are a few, I am afraid—it may act as an unjustified barrier to recovery. A blanket threshold does not easily accommodate the complexity of individual circumstances.

We must not forget what this system is designed to do. We are talking about the recovery of public funds that were obtained unlawfully. These are not arbitrary deductions, but actions taken in response to fraud—in some cases, large-scale fraud—committed against the public purse. These funds belong not to the state in the abstract but to the taxpayers, the public and the people who rely on our public services. I remind the Committee of our duty to recover them on their behalf. We must exercise this power responsibly and we believe the Bill enables that. We must also ensure that we do not design a system that is so laden with friction that it fails to deliver on its core purpose of upholding the rule of law and restoring funds to the public where fraud has occurred.

These amendments raise important points, and we welcome the values that underpin them. We are committed to ensuring that the system is fair, proportionate and humane. We are confident that the existing provisions in the Bill, supported by robust guidance and operational safeguards, provide a sufficient framework to achieve those goals without introducing additional complexity that may compromise the system’s effectiveness.

Before the Minister thinks that I am writing yet another speech for her, I have some questions for her, which may also be helpful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies. Take the case of someone who has taken money fraudulently but finds himself destitute through his own actions and might otherwise be on the streets, homeless —or worse, hungry. What help can the state give to him? What options are there? As a basic, I presume that he will still be eligible for universal credit, albeit, as the noble Lord, Lord Davies, said, it would be subject to an agreed deduction for his misdemeanours. He would therefore still get support, assuming that he is not allowed to keep the £1,000 in his account. As the noble Lord said, the money and advisory services are there, and Citizens Advice is there. They are there to offer advice, but what support is there for such people in extremis? The Minister may say that the household support fund is also there and could be called upon, but that fund is subject to local help and is in the gift of local authorities to give out. Would destitute people come into that?

In conclusion, we do not support these amendments, but I thank the noble Lord, Lord Davies, for prompting this important and short debate. We look forward to working together to ensure that the final system strikes the right balance between fairness and firm recovery of debt.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Davies for raising this, and to the noble Viscount for his observations. I agree with my noble friend that affordability assessments should be conducted—he has made that clear, and we certainly want to do that as we think it is important—before a direct deduction order is issued, but we regard this amendment as unnecessary and duplicating existing provisions.

Paragraph 6 of new Schedule 3ZA, inserted by Schedule 5 of the Bill, provides that recovery must not cause hardship to the debtor, any joint account holder or dependant, and must be fair. Paragraph 3 requires the DWP to obtain, via an account information notice, bank statements covering at least the most recent three months in order to help make that assessment.

Further detail on how affordability will be assessed will be set out in the code of practice, a draft of which is available to Members; I am sure that my noble friend has had the opportunity to see it. It sets out the principles that will apply when affordability is assessed. They include ensuring that essential living expenses and other reasonable financial commitments are identified and protected. Officials are working closely with organisations such as the Money and Pensions Service to develop the code and, as required by Clause 93, a formal public consultation will be conducted on the draft before it is first issued.

As I have already outlined, affordability assessments must and will take place prior to enforcing a deduction order. These checks use banks statements, allowing DWP officials to consider expenses such as housing and utilities, enabling the deduction to be affordable, fair and based on individual circumstances, rather than a blanket approach of leaving a set amount in the account which could, if not set high enough, prevent the debtor from meeting those essential costs, as the amounts will vary from person to person.

For regular direct deduction orders, paragraph 6(3) of new Schedule 3ZA requires that any regular deductions made by the DWP each month must not exceed 40% of the monthly average amount credited to the account during the last period in which statements were assessed. Regulations will be made under paragraph 24(2)(d) to further set a maximum rate of 20% for all cases that have not arisen due to fraud.

These figures are maximums, rather than fixed deduction rates. Deduction rates will vary as officials take any affordability, hardship factors or other relevant circumstances into consideration. This approach mirrors that already used effectively in the DWP’s existing powers of deduction from earnings or benefits, and it is not obvious why it should be different in these circumstances. Given the safeguards outlined, requiring that £1,000 be left in one or more of the liable person’s bank accounts in every case where a DDO was sought is unnecessary, as the safeguards will already achieve the outcome intended by this amendment.

Regarding the specific questions, I reassure my noble friend that we are alive to the concerns of UK Finance, which we meet regularly. We are working with MaPS and relevant debt sector organisations on this. He mentioned a comparison with HMRC. HMRC has confirmed that its power is a one-off deduction of a tax debt, not a regular deduction. As a result, it does not assess customers’ affordability as part of the process. Its safeguard instead requires it to leave a minimum of £5,000 across the customer’s accounts to stop taxpayers being left with insufficient funds to cover basic needs. We are taking a different approach: we are assessing affordability, and we will have clear sight via bank statements of the debtor’s ability to repay.

In addition to the work we are doing with MaPS, we are working with relevant stakeholder organisations to make sure that our communications with debtors are clear, to help them understand what we are doing and to engage in the best possible way.

I remind the Committee that before any deductions are taken, account holders will be notified and given the chance to make representations. They can provide relevant information about their financial position and evidence relevant to affordability. Even at that stage, the department’s preference is to reach an agreed position with the debtor. If reasonable payment terms can be agreed and they are maintained by the debtor, the DWP will not make a deduction order.

My noble friend and I clearly want the same thing: to make sure that any recovery is affordable. We have taken different routes, but I hope that what I have said today will help him to accept that our route is doing the job and, in the light of that, he will withdraw his amendment.

I am sorry, I forgot to respond to the noble Viscount about destitution. I may have to come back to him on that, because it would depend very much on somebody’s circumstances. Although the household support fund is locally determined, some directions, steers and guidance are given by the centre by the DWP to local authorities. But the fund is significantly there to help with the cost of living. In relation to someone who is destitute and has committed fraud, people may still, if they have an ongoing entitlement to benefit, have been subject to a loss of benefit penalty as part of a process. So it would very much depend on the circumstances. But if I can find anything else useful, I should be happy to put that in writing to the noble Viscount.

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

I thank the noble Viscount and my noble friend the Minister for comments on my amendments. It has been useful to receive a coherent assessment and description of how this process will work. I will read carefully what was said and consider whether it is an issue that needs to be pursued at a later stage. I thank those who have spoken. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

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Moved by

[Baroness Sherlock]

110: Schedule 5, page 108, line 39, leave out “, or a method for calculating the amounts,”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment means that a regular direct deduction order given by the Secretary of State must specify the amounts to be deducted.

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[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords and thank the noble Viscount for doing some of my job for me, for which I am always grateful.

I want to try to explain why the Government are doing this. Clause 92 inserts new Section 80C into the Social Security Administration Act 1992 to enact the “disqualification from driving” power. Schedule 6 inserts new Schedule 3ZB into the 1992 Act, containing the substantive provisions of the “disqualification from driving” power introduced in Clause 92. The introduction of this allows the DWP to apply to a court to disqualify a person temporarily from driving if they persistently and deliberately fail to repay their debt. It is therefore essential to boost the DWP’s ability to recover public money.

However, it is worth being clear that this is a power to deal with a small subset of debtors who are persistently frustrating the recovery practice—I will come back to that in a moment. Preventing an evasive debtor from driving unless they repay is within the Government’s control in a way that they cannot circumvent. While it will be used as a last resort, it is an additional and effective tool in cases where debtors simply refuse and evade repayment. As I think I said at Second Reading, the latest results from the UK transport survey showed that 74% of adults have a driving licence. Debtors are unlikely to want to be inconvenienced by being unable to drive. They can avoid disqualification and any other enforcement action by making voluntary repayments.

Schedule 6 sets out when the power may be used and how it will operate, including rules on the operation of suspended and immediate disqualification orders, variation and revocation of orders, as well as the grounds on which an order may be appealed. Appeals may be made to the appropriate court on points of law, including the terms of an order or the court’s decision to make, not make, vary or revoke an order. In accordance with Clause 90, this power will be used as a last resort and, as outlined in Schedule 6, only for the most serious cases for debts with at least £1,000 outstanding. The aim is to deter debtors from deliberately choosing to evade repayment, such as by moving their capital out of reach when they have the means to pay.

Only when all other attempts at recovery have failed, including the new direct deduction order, will DWP be able to apply to the court for a suspended disqualification order. If the court agrees that the debtor had the means to pay but did not repay without a reasonable excuse, it will order the debtor to make what it assesses to be affordable repayments. The debtor can avoid being disqualified by making these repayments set by the court. Only if the debtor does not comply with the court’s repayment terms can the DWP apply for an immediate DWP disqualification order. It is at that point—again, only if the court agrees—that the debtor can be disqualified from holding a licence for up to two years.

Before either a suspended or immediate order can be made, the debtor will have an opportunity to be heard by the court. It is important to note that the court cannot make either a suspended or an immediate order if it considers that the debtor has an essential need for their licence, such as that they need to drive as part of their job or to care for a dependant.

The role of the court throughout this process is an important safeguard, which we have included to ensure a balance between taking robust action against those who deliberately evade recovery and preventing undue hardship. We recognise that stopping someone from driving is a serious step, so my department has built in several other safeguards to give debtors every opportunity to avoid that. For example, missing a single instalment will not normally result in an immediate disqualification order and, even where someone becomes disqualified, they can get the right to drive back when they start making their repayments and the court considers that repayments are likely to continue. But persistent evaders who have the means to pay their debts will no longer be able to evade paying.

In response to my noble friend, I think he is challenging me as to why this is a good and effective means of doing it. I accept that it is unusual, but there is a small subset of the most evasive debtors: people who could pay and just will not. They might be, for example, debtors who transferred their money into cryptocurrency, or fraudsters who moved their capital to offshore accounts that the DWP cannot easily get at because they are outside our jurisdictions. It simply does not seem appropriate. If we cannot do anything else, there is one thing the state can do: suspend or remove their driving licence to pull them to the table. There may be some people for whom this is the only thing that works, so we want to keep it there in our armoury.

The power has been used effectively by the Child Maintenance Service. I do not know whether we can go into enough detail in the CMS debt management data to find out whether I can answer the questions that the noble Viscount is asking, but I will have a look at that. But certainly the Child Maintenance Service believes that this is an effective tool for bringing people to the table when nothing else works.

The Bill includes strong safeguards. The power will not and cannot be used where someone cannot afford to pay. The Bill is clear in paragraph 1(4) of new Schedule 3ZB, in Schedule 6, that the court must be satisfied that the person failed to pay “without reasonable excuse”. That clearly excludes cases where they do not have the means to pay the debt. Of course, the debt must also be of a certain value. Clause 90 says that it must not be “reasonably possible” to recover via other methods, including direct deduction orders, and that this can be used only after they have been given reasonable opportunities to pay.

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[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

I appreciate the noble Baroness’s very full response. This is more of a probing question. We have obviously been debating and talking about driving licences. The ultimate punishment or sanction is prison, but we obviously do not want to exercise that if possible, both for the individual and because we do not want to clog up prisons. But what other sanctions could there be? We have been talking about driving licences, but I know that, in the Child Maintenance Service, taking away passports was raised as a possible sanction. What thoughts does the noble Baroness have on that front?

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

We are not proposing removal of passports on this occasion.

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

I thank noble Lords who took part in the debate. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, for her support. I am disappointed that the Conservatives, the party of individual freedom, did not see fit to support my argument.

There are a couple of issues that could be helpful to the debate which is likely to take place on Report. If it is possible to get further statistics from the Child Maintenance Service about people who were threatened and then gave in—I cannot totally see how that is possible—that would be good.

There is also the issue of the discriminatory nature of the punishment between different groups of people. As I have made clear, that is a practical objection, which is not why I am against this measure at heart. It would be useful in debate to know more of that practical question. As I have read the paper so far, it is about people who require a driving licence to carry out the functions of their job. However, my noble friend the Minister said that it would cover people who need to drive to work. Perhaps she could interrupt me if she is able to clarify.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

It is up to the court to determine if someone has an essential need for a licence. We have deliberately drawn it broadly so that the court can make that determination. Examples were given of somebody who needed a car to go to work or maybe had essential caring responsibilities. In response to the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, I raised the possibility of somebody who lived somewhere so remote that there was no public transport. Again, that would be a case that they would make to the court. The position is deliberately drawn broadly to allow the court to make that determination.

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

Thank you; that is helpful. I withdraw my objection to Clause 92 standing part of the Bill.

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[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, we now turn to what I believe is the last group for today. I will speak to Amendments 122A, 122B and 122C, which largely concern the code of practice and matters relating to the codes of practice as set out in Clause 93.

These amendments are not only sensible but vital if we are to ensure that the framework for exercising these powers is both transparent and democratically accountable. Fundamentally, our amendments recognise that the code of practice is not a peripheral procedural matter; it is a foundational document. It will guide how sensitive and powerful enforcement powers are exercised. It will shape the expectations placed upon investigators, the protections afforded to individuals and the standards against which public officials will be held. In short, it will govern the operational culture of the entire system.

Amendment 122A would ensure that the final version of the code is laid before Parliament before these new provisions in the Bill can come into force. I feel it is important at this stage to reiterate that we are being asked to grant significant new powers, including powers of entry, search, seizure and direct deduction, and it is therefore wholly appropriate that Parliament sees, and has the opportunity to scrutinise, the final version of the rules that will help determine how those powers are used. We welcome that, and thank the Minister—I perhaps should have said this earlier—for making good on her promise to release draft versions of the code to noble Lords ahead of Committee, although we feel that it is even more important that we have a binding assurance from the Government that a final version of these documents will be made available to Members of both Houses ahead of the Act coming into force.

Amendment 122B would further strengthen this by requiring a public consultation on the draft code before it is issued. I have a feeling that the Minister may have confirmed this earlier; nevertheless, I raise it now and await her reply. Consultation is not just a box-ticking exercise, it is a vital part of democratic policy-making, especially in areas where the state will be interacting with vulnerable people, seizing property or accessing private data. Consultation allows front-line practitioners, civil society groups and those with lived experience to offer their perspective and to flag where guidance may be unclear, safeguards may be weak and unintended consequences might arise. We must not underestimate the value of that input.

We have said many times that our primary goal and function throughout Committee is ensuring that the Government come out with a Bill that is ready to go. We want a public authorities Act that combats fraud effectively and deters criminality in the future but also works for the people who will undertake and be subject to its provisions. It really is important that we get all these balances right and that we incorporate these review mechanisms now, so that the Bill is ready to go once it becomes law.

Finally, Amendment 122C would ensure that any subsequent change to the code is not only laid before Parliament but subject to parliamentary review. This is a particularly important point, because it speaks to the danger of incremental change, where guidance can be revised behind closed doors, without scrutiny or proper debate. These codes are not trivial; they are the operational blueprint of this entire regime. If we in this House and the other place are to fulfil our role as scrutineers and custodians of civil liberties, we must retain the ability to oversee how these powers evolve.

If the Government’s position is that these powers will be used proportionately, lawfully and with care, they should have no difficulty in agreeing that the rules that govern them should be open to parliamentary oversight, public consultation and full transparency. That is not a constraint; it is a safeguard for both the public and the state.

As I have said before, we are of course all agreed on the need to tackle fraud, but we must also agree on the need to exercise these new powers with clarity, accountability and respect for the values that underpin our legal and constitutional system. We believe that these amendments would help to ensure that. I urge the Minister to accept them, or, at the very least, to recognise their merit and return with similar provisions that enshrine the same principle.

Parliament broadly supports what the Government are doing, and if the Government intend to exercise these powers responsibly, with adequate safeguards, consideration and the principle of proportionality that I and my noble friend Lady Finn have returned to several times in Committee, I assume and hope that Parliament will have no problem supporting what the Government do in their code of practice. However, parliamentary oversight, to ensure that the Government are tied to these important principles not just now but in the future, is an important safeguard which we feel must be made explicit in the Bill.

In conclusion, these are reasonable, proportionate and constructive proposals. They would not hinder the Bill’s effectiveness; rather, they would make the Bill more effective once it comes into force. I see that, miraculously, there is no one else wishing to support—I am sure it is no reflection on my remarks—but I genuinely look forward to the Minister’s closing remarks. I beg to move.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, in the absence of a crowd of supporters, I thank the noble Viscount for setting out his amendment so clearly. I hope that my remarks will reassure him and give him the confidence that he does not need to press ahead with these amendments.

Amendments 122A, 122B, 122C and 129 seek to compel the Secretary of State to conduct a public consultation on the DWP’s code of practice for the debt recovery powers, to lay a final code before Parliament before the powers in this Bill come into force and to subject any changes to the code to parliamentary review. Amendment 128 would require the Minister for the Cabinet Office to lay a code of practice before Parliament on the administration of penalties before the PSFA’s powers under Part 1 can come into force.

The provision made for a code of practice in Clause 93 is important for the DWP’s debt recovery measures, providing transparency and reassurance on how the debt recovery powers will be operationalised. However, we think these amendments duplicate existing provisions in the Bill and therefore are not necessary.

The DWP’s code of practice on debt recovery powers will complement the provisions in the Bill, setting out guidance and key principles, including how and when the new recovery powers will be used. Extensive collaboration continues to take place with a wide range of stakeholders, including the Money and Pension Service, the charity Surviving Economic Abuse and the finance sector, to develop this code of practice. The purpose of this engagement is to ensure the code provides relevant operational guidance on matters such as vulnerability and to give clarity for debtors subject to the powers and their representatives. We are grateful to all organisations for their helpful collaboration and guidance.

Drafts of all the DWP codes of practice have been made available for review by noble Lords upon request. While there is no requirement on us to provide drafts of these codes alongside the legislation or even to legislate to produce one, we understand their importance and want to be transparent with Parliament. This is also why new Section 80D(6), as inserted by Clause 93, already requires us to carry out a formal public consultation before the first code is published and to lay each issued version before Parliament. In response to the noble Viscount’s questions, the Government are consulting on all codes. Both the DWP and the PSFA will publish them before first use.

We have already said in terms of the debt, this will be done before the new debt powers in Part 2 of this Bill are used. However, I should note that Amendment 129 as drafted would prevent all the other provisions in the Bill that are not subject to the debt code of practice coming into force until the debt code was issued. I am not sure if that was the intention of the noble Viscount, but it would obviously be disproportionate and unnecessary.

It is also not clear from the amendment what parliamentary review of future changes to the code would entail but I am going to assume the noble Viscount would like Parliament to have the opportunity to challenge or scrutinise the code each time it is updated. If so, that would not be necessary or proportionate. The code will be revised periodically to keep it up to date with operational considerations and processes, and the Bill makes provision for each issued revision to be laid before Parliament.

The noble Viscount mentioned the importance of Parliament seeing the rules. It is worth understanding that the debt code of practice does not contain statutory provisions, nor does it place obligations on others. Rather, it sets out how the department will operationalise the new recovery powers. The Bill clearly sets out in considerable detail the legal obligations introduced. Other substantive provisions set out in regulations will, of course, be subject to normal opportunities for parliamentary scrutiny. I am also unaware of any precedent for revisions to a code of this nature to be considered by Parliament or subject to its approval.

Amendment 128 takes us back to the PSFA in Part 1 of the Bill. Noble Lords will recall that we have already discussed Clause 62, which makes provision for the PSFA to produce a code of practice that will explain how and why civil penalties will be calculated and imposed to ensure the powers are used transparently and reasonably. This clause stands part of the Bill.

A draft of the PSFA code of practice has also been provided to noble Lords, as was promised in Committee in the other place. As I mentioned, the PSFA intends to consult widely on the code of practice prior to the publication of the finalised draft, which will be before the first use of the penalty powers. Indeed, Clause 62(4) states:

“The Minister must lay the code of practice, or any reissued code of practice, before Parliament”.


I have outlined that the provisions already in the Bill go above and beyond what is required for legislation of this kind because we recognise the importance of the code of practice and have done so in the spirit of transparency. With those assurances, I urge the noble Viscount to withdraw his amendment.

Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill

Baroness Sherlock Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 15th October 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Sherlock]

7: Clause 9, page 7, leave out lines 38 and 39
Member's explanatory statement
See the explanatory statement for my amendment to clause 9, page 7, lines 32 to 34.

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Moved by

[Baroness Sherlock]

8: Clause 19, page 12, line 25, at beginning insert “Subject to subsection (9A),”
Member's explanatory statement
See the explanatory statement for my amendment to clause 19, page 12, line 32.

[The Minister of State, Department of Work and Pensions (Baroness Sherlock) (Lab)]

My Lords, I cannot help thinking that if one of us was in Santorini and the other one was here tabling amendments, I may have got the raw end of the deal—although it is possible that my noble friend’s husband might not agree with that.

The government amendments in this group contain a series of further safeguards for individuals who are subject to the new debt recovery powers in Parts 1 and 2 of the Bill, specifically in relation to direct deduction orders to recover from bank accounts and deductions from earnings orders to deduct from PAYE salaries in Part 1. Before I address them, I add my thanks to noble Lords from around the House for what has been a constructive consideration of the Bill so far. I hope that these government amendments will help to add to that sentiment.

Government Amendments 8, 9, 93 and 94 seek to clarify the obligations of financial institutions not to disclose that they have received an information notice under the new power enabling direct deduction orders—DDOs. Under the debt recovery provisions in Parts 1 and 2, financial institutions are prohibited from informing account holders that the PSFA or the DWP has requested account information. This is to militate against attempts to avoid the powers—for example, by moving money out of the account before a DDO is issued.

These amendments clarify that the prohibition ends three months after the notice is given to the bank, or sooner if a pre-deduction notice is subsequently given. Three months is long enough for the DWP or the PSFA to have assessed a debtor’s ability to repay and the affordability of repayments, and to issue a first notice as appropriate. These amendments remove any doubt as to how long the prohibition lasts, ensuring the requirement is proportionate and not overly burdensome.

It is only during the time that account information is being considered that the prohibition applies. Once the information has been properly assessed and any pre-deduction notice given to the bank, account holders can be told that the information was requested. Where a DDO is proposed, the account holder, and a joint account holder if applicable, will be notified in writing by the PSFA or the DWP of their right to make representations regarding the proposed deductions before any are taken.

Government Amendments 12, 13, 98 and 100 are in response to our further engagement with the financial services sector. They seek to clarify the responsibilities of the PSFA, the DWP and financial institutions with specific regard to legal deputies who might be managing the affairs of a debtor subject to a DDO. Since Committee, we have continued to benefit from the insight provided by the financial services sector, and we want to provide as much clarity as possible on respective roles and responsibilities. These amendments will help ensure that the implementation of these measures is straightforward and that the Government can recoup money lost to fraud and error in an efficient and effective manner. Government Amendments 12 and 13 simplify the drafting of Clause 37 and remove redundant provisions. Amendments 97 and 98 do the same thing for Schedule 5.

Government Amendments 14 and 99 are consequential to Amendments 11 and 96, limiting the suspension of DDOs, which I will come to in a moment. They mean that, where an order has been suspended for two years and is revoked, the PSFA and the DWP will now have an obligation to inform a deputy, if there is one in place.

Government Amendments 15 and 100 create a requirement for a bank to provide the PSFA and the DWP with the details of any deputy acting on behalf of an account holder, where these are known to the bank, when certain notices or orders are issued to them. This was implicit before but, at the request of the banks, we are making it explicit that this includes the name and address of the deputy.

Collectively, these amendments are important to ensure that roles and responsibilities are clear for the minority of cases where there is a legal deputy in place when the PSFA or the DWP uses DDOs.

Government Amendments 11, 18, 96 and 99 address an issue raised at Second Reading by lots of noble Lords. I am happy to be able to respond to those comments here. The Government are committed to being fair and transparent in the use of these new powers, and it is completely reasonable that, where an individual has an order in place and it is suspended, it should not be suspended indefinitely. We are therefore introducing new provisions under government Amendments 11, 18, 96 and 99 to remove that uncertainty for those individuals so that they know exactly where they stand and to ensure that an order cannot be restarted if the suspension goes on for more than two years. I am grateful to noble Lords for having raised this.

It was never the Government’s intention for a suspension to be indefinite, but it is right to offer greater clarity and certainty in the law itself. The PSFA or the DWP will inform debtors of any changes to their payment arrangements. If an order is suspended, the debtor will be notified. In cases where a DDO is revoked, both the account holder and the relevant bank will receive written confirmation from the PSFA or the DWP. That reflects our continued commitment to supporting individuals in managing their debt and introduces important safeguards to ensure transparency and fairness.

I turn to the final government amendments in this group, Amendments 10 and 95. I again thank those in the financial services sector who have worked closely with us in the development of this Bill. We are committed to working collaboratively with the sector to ensure that the Bill enables banks to meet their legislative obligations while minimising burdens where possible.

The cost of meeting obligations under the Bill has been an area of interest to the House, and noble Lords have made the point in earlier debates that those helping to enforce the law must be supported. I agree with them on this. Therefore, these government amendments remove from Clause 26 and Schedule 5 the requirements on financial institutions to prevent account holders closing their accounts upon receipt of a pre-deduction notice or DDO from the PSFA or the DWP.

The original policy intent was to reduce opportunities for debtors to frustrate the DDO process, and that remains our objective. However, this requirement would not stop debtors who are persistent in evading repayment simply redirecting their funds to another account. We know from our engagement with the financial sector that complying with the requirement to prevent account closures risks creating a significant burden for some banks.

We reflected on that feedback and the fact that both parts of the Bill already contain further safeguards against bad actors who might wish to take action to frustrate a DDO. In Part 1, Clause 27 places a restriction on the account holder not to do anything that might frustrate the effect of the pre-deduction notice or the order. If they do, they become liable to pay a civil penalty. In Part 2, Schedule 6 contains provisions for the DWP to apply to the court for a suspended disqualification from driving order in the most serious cases where, for example, someone persistently fails to pay by frustrating a DDO.

Removing the requirement for financial institutions to prevent account closure upon receipt of a pre-deduction notice or DDO avoids placing new, costly burdens on some banks while still enabling the DWP and the PSFA to address effectively the small number of debtors who deliberately and persistently evade repaying taxpayers’ money. I beg to move.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, obviously we are pleased to see these amendments. We want to look much more closely to understand how far they go to meet some of the concerns expressed by my noble friend Lord Palmer earlier in the process of the Bill. I have an amendment in a future group that reflects our deep concern, particularly at the absence of transparency. The very thought that the original legislation essentially meant that people would have no idea that account statements had been handed over to the investigators—not only during the period when the investigation might be active but they would be permanently kept uninformed that their information had been handed over—felt to us like a complete breach of the rights of the individual, fundamentally breaking the bond of trust between a banking institution and its account holders.

We will want to look closely at these amendments and their implications. We may return to this issue at a later stage, but at this point we are glad that the Government are taking steps to deal with some of the features that most concerned us.

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[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, for that constructive response, and to other noble Lords for giving us the benefit of the doubt here. I can assure my noble friend Lord Davies that the government amendments were tabled a week ago, as is the requirement. If it gives him any encouragement, they have been seen by UK Finance, which welcomed them. We were seeking to respond to concerns that were raised.

I will pick up on a couple of points made by noble Lords. I can tell the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, that we are talking here specifically about action in relation to the recovering of debt from debtors. I want to reassure the House that this does not mean that a DWP debtor will not be aware that action might be taken. Clause 91 of the Bill requires the debtor to be told in advance, in writing, that bank statements may be obtained without further warning to assess whether money can be taken directly from their bank account via a DDO if they do not contact DWP to discuss repayment.

In response to other queries, these measures do not stop a bank telling a debtor if no action is proposed. In response to the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, we believe that three months is enough notice for DWP and PSFA to reach a conclusion, either that we issue a pre-deduction notice or a DDO, if we need it. We believe that that is sufficient, which is why that number is there.

Somebody—and I am afraid I have already forgotten who; do not be my age—asked what happens if an order has been suspended for two years. It cannot be restarted: it will be legally revoked. Where appropriate, the process can be started again from the beginning. For direct deduction orders, that would mean fresh bank statements had to be obtained to carry out a current affordability assessment rather than relying on ones from the beginning, and all relevant correspondence would have to be sent out again.

Where a suspended order is subsequently revoked by DWP or PSFA, a notice will be sent to the debtor and any other relevant parties, informing them that this has happened. If an order were revoked and DWP or PSFA were no longer pursuing an action, in the case of a DDO, DWP or PSFA would notify the account holder and the bank in writing, setting out that the order has been revoked. Debtors will also be told if their order has been suspended and an equivalent process applies to PSFA in respect of deduction from earnings orders.

The noble Baroness, Lady Finn, made an important point about deputies being in place. That is absolutely right. I can reassure her that DWP has clear processes for flagging vulnerability and making sure that that is taken into account. But obviously, in a sense, once the deputy is in place they have the obligations that would originally have been there for the debtor, so the debt has to be pursued in the appropriate way.

I hope that has answered the questions noble Lords have raised. Again, I hope it shows the Government’s willingness to engage and to be constructive in amending the Bill where possible. I hope that those clarifications will reassure noble Lords that the protections in the Bill operate as intended and that we will work effectively with our banking partners. As such, I hope noble Lords will support these amendments.

Amendment 8 agreed.

Moved by

[Baroness Sherlock]

9: Clause 19, page 12, line 32, at end insert—
“(9A) The prohibition in subsection (9) ceases to apply—(a) at the end of the period of 3 months beginning with the day on which the account information notice or general information notice is given to the bank, or(b) if earlier, when the bank is given a notice under section 21(1).”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would limit how long the prohibition on a bank telling an account holder that it had received an information notice in respect of the holder’s account has effect.

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Moved by

[Baroness Sherlock]

10: Clause 26, page 16, line 14, leave out from second “notice” to end of line 26 and insert “relating to a proposed lump sum direct deduction order, or a lump sum direct deduction order under section 17, is given to a bank in relation to a liable person’s account, the bank must—
(a) secure that no transaction takes place (except for any deduction under the order) which would result in the amount in the account falling below the specified amount, or, if the amount in the account is already below that amount, falling any further, or(b) take the action set out in subsection (2).”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would remove the requirement for banks to prevent the closure of an account when given a notice under clause 21(1) in relation to a proposed direct deduction order, or a direct deduction order under section 17.

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Moved by

[Baroness Sherlock]

11: Clause 32, page 19, line 31, at end insert—
“(3) Where the requirement is suspended for a continuous period of two years the regular direct deduction order in question is to be treated as having been revoked at the end of that period.(4) Where a regular direct deduction order is treated as having been revoked by virtue of subsection (3), the Minister must give notice to that effect to—(a) the bank to which the order was given,(b) the liable person, and(c) in the case of a joint account, each of the other account holders. (5) Subsection (3) does not prevent the Minister making a further regular direct deduction order in respect of the same liable person and account.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment means that where the requirement to make deductions and payments under a regular direct deduction order made by the Minister is suspended for a continuous period of two years it may not be re-started.

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Moved by

[Baroness Sherlock]

12: Clause 37, page 22, leave out line 17
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendment to clause 37, page 22, line 30.

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Moved by

[Baroness Sherlock]

18: Clause 44, page 26, line 30, at end insert—
“(3) Where the requirement is suspended for a continuous period of two years the deduction from earnings order in question is to be treated as having been revoked at the end of that period.(4) Where a deduction from earnings order is treated as having been revoked by virtue of subsection (3), the Minister must give notice to that effect to—(a) the liable person, and(b) the employer to which the order was given.(5) Subsection (3) does not prevent the Minister making a further deduction from earnings order in respect of the same liable person.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment means that where the requirement to make deductions and payments under a deduction from earnings order is suspended for a continuous period of 2 years it may not be re-started.

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Moved by

[Baroness Sherlock]

24: Clause 66, page 35, line 30, after “person,” insert “where the information is reasonably required”
Member’s explanatory statement
See the explanatory statement for my amendment to clause 66, page 35, line 29.

Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill

Baroness Sherlock Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 21st October 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Sherlock]

29: Clause 68, page 36, line 25, leave out “processing” and insert “disclosure or obtaining”
Member's explanatory statement
See my explanatory statement for my amendment to clause 68, page 36, line 29.

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Moved by

[Baroness Sherlock]

36: Schedule 2, page 70, line 18, at end insert—
“Part A1Powers to establish the PSFA and transfer functionsMain powers
A1 (1) The Minister may by regulations—(a) provide that a body corporate called the Public Sector Fraud Authority (and referred to in this Schedule as “the PSFA”) is established;(b) provide for the transfer to the PSFA of all or any of the functions to which this paragraph applies.(2) The Minister may by regulations provide for the transfer to a public authority other than the PSFA of all or any of the functions to which this paragraph applies.(3) This paragraph applies to the functions initially conferred on the Minister by Chapters 1 to 5 of Part 1 of this Act (including functions conferred by an amendment of another enactment), except any function of making regulations or issuing a code of practice.(4) A function transferred under sub-paragraph (2) may subsequently be transferred to the PSFA under sub-paragraph (1)(b).(5) But a function transferred to the PSFA under sub-paragraph (1)(b) may not subsequently be transferred to another public authority under sub-paragraph (2).Authorised officers
B1 (1) The reference in paragraph A1(3) to functions initially conferred on the Minister includes functions initially conferred on authorised officers.(2) In relation to a function initially conferred on an authorised officer, references in this Part of this Schedule to the transfer of the function to another body are to be read as references to the transfer of the function to an authorised officer of that body.(3) Where—(a) a function initially conferred on an authorised officer is transferred by regulations under paragraph A1, and(b) as a result of any provision of Chapters 1 to 5 of Part 1 of this Act, that function could be exercised only by an authorised officer of a particular rank, grade or description,the regulations must provide for the function to be exercised by an authorised officer of the transferee of a corresponding grade, rank or description.Associated modifications
C1 (1) Where functions are transferred to the PSFA or another public authority under paragraph A1, the Minister may by regulations—(a) make provision about the application, with any necessary modifications, of Part 1 of this Act in relation to the PSFA or other authority;(b) provide for the Minister to give the PSFA or other authority (or its authorised officers) general or specific directions about the exercise of the transferred functions.(2) Where functions are transferred to or from a public authority, other than the Minister or the PSFA, under paragraph A1, the Minister may by regulations— (a) make any modifications that the Minister considers appropriate in connection with the transfer to the constitutional arrangements, funding arrangements or the functions of the authority;(b) make provision in relation to the authority corresponding to that enabled by paragraph 15 (transfer schemes) in relation to—(i) the PSFA, where functions are being transferred to the authority, or(ii) a “relevant person”, where functions are being transferred from the authority.(3) In sub-paragraph (2)(a), “constitutional arrangements” includes the matters referred to in section 3(2) of the Public Bodies Act 2011.(4) Regulations under paragraph A1 or this paragraph may amend—(a) Part 1 of this Act, except this Schedule, and(b) any provision amended by Part 1 of this Act.Procedure
D1 Regulations under this Part of this Schedule are subject to the affirmative procedure.”Member's explanatory statement
See the explanatory statement for my amendment to clause 70, page 37, line 28.

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Moved by

[Baroness Sherlock]

41: Leave out Clause 73 and insert the following new Clause—
“Information notices(1) The Social Security Administration Act 1992 is amended as follows.(2) After section 109B insert—“109BZA Power to require information about suspected fraud etc(1) An authorised officer may give a person (“P”) a written notice (an “information notice”) requiring P to give an authorised officer specified information where the officer— (a) has reasonable grounds to suspect that a person has committed, is committing or intends to commit a DWP offence, and(b) considers that it is necessary and proportionate to require the specified information for a purpose mentioned in section 109A(2)(c) or (d) (investigating compliance with the relevant social security legislation etc).(2) Information may be specified in an information notice only if it relates to a person who is identified (by name or description) in the information notice as—(a) the person suspected as mentioned in subsection (1)(a), or(b) a member of that person’s family (within the meaning of Part 7 of the Contributions and Benefits Act).(3) An authorised officer may require P to give specified information only if the officer has reasonable grounds to suspect that P has or is able to access the information.(4) An information notice must set out—(a) the identity (by name or description) of the person to whom the information requested relates;(b) how, where and the period within which the information must be given;(c) information about the consequences of not complying with the notice.(5) The power under this section to require P to give information includes power to—(a) take copies of or extracts from information;(b) require P to provide information in a specified form;(c) if any specified information is not given to an authorised officer, require P to state, to the best of P’s knowledge and belief, both where that information is and why it has not been given to an authorised officer.(6) Subsection (2E) of section 109B (communications data) applies to an information notice under this section as it applies to a notice under that section.(7) In this section—“information” means information in the form of a document or in any other form;“specified” means—(a) specified, or described, in the information notice, or(b) falling within a category that is specified or described in the information notice.(8) Nothing in this section limits the powers conferred on the Secretary of State by Schedule 3B.”(3) In section 109A (authorisations for investigators)—(a) in subsection (1), for “109B and 109C below” substitute “109B to 109C”;(b) in subsection (2)(d), at the end insert “or other DWP offences”;(c) in subsection (8), for “109B and 109C below” substitute “109B to 109C”.(4) In section 109B (power to require information)—(a) in the heading, at the end insert “about entitlement etc”;(b) in subsection (1)(a) omit “or (2A)”;(c) in subsection (1)(b), for “any one or more of the purposes mentioned in section 109A(2) above” substitute “a purpose mentioned in section 109A(2)(a) or (b)”;(d) omit the following provisions—(i) subsection (2A);(ii) subsection (2B);(iii) subsection (2C); (iv) subsection (2D);(v) subsection (5);(vi) subsection (6);(vii) subsection (7A);(e) in subsection (7) omit the definitions of—(i) “bank”;(ii) “credit”;(iii) “insurer”;(iv) “residential premises”.(5) In section 109BA (power of the Secretary of State to require electronic access to information)—(a) in subsection (1)—(i) in paragraph (a) omit “falling within section 109B(2A)”;(ii) in paragraph (b), for “109A(2)” substitute “109A(2)(c) or (d)”;(b) in subsection (2)(b), for “109B above” substitute “109BZA”;(c) in subsection (4), for “109B” substitute “109BZA”.(6) In section 109C (powers of entry), in subsection (6), for “Subsections (2E) and (5) of section 109B apply for the purposes of this section as they apply” substitute “Subsection (2E) of section 109B applies for the purposes of this section as it applies”.(7) In section 190 (Parliamentary control of orders and regulations), in subsection (1) omit paragraph (aza).”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment, together with my amendments to clause 74, my amendment replacing clause 101 and my amendment to Schedule 3, page 91, line 3, reverses changes made in the House of Commons, in response to confirmation from the Scottish Ministers that they would like the changes to the Secretary of State’s functions in respect of information notices to apply to them as well.

[The Minister of State, Department for Work and Pensions (Baroness Sherlock) (Lab)]

My Lords, in moving government Amendment 41, I will speak also to government Amendments 42, 43, 64, 80, 90 and 111.

Under current devolution arrangements, DWP administers certain devolved benefits on behalf of the Scottish Government through agency agreements. These amendments will ensure that the expanded information gathering powers introduced in this Bill will be available to Scottish Ministers, should they require them in the future. This follows confirmation from the Scottish Government that they would like the updates to these powers to apply to them too.

These amendments will ensure necessary changes are made to the DWP debt recovery powers in the Bill. As drafted in Clause 91, the UK Government are seeking powers to apply new recovery methods to debts of certain devolved benefits delivered under agency agreements. However, the Scottish Government have confirmed that they do not wish these new recovery methods to be applied to devolved benefits administered by DWP through agency arrangements.

Taking the amendments in turn, government Amendment 41 simplifies Clause 73, reflecting how it was originally introduced, with new Section 109BZA now containing the expanded power to issue information notices to any information holder as part of a DWP criminal fraud investigation and ensuring that Scottish Ministers will have access to these equivalent expanded powers in the event that Scottish Ministers deliver any benefits covered by the 1992 Act.

Government Amendments 42 and 43, made to Clause 74, update the Social Security Fraud Act 2001, aligning it with the new powers and ensuring that the requirement to issue a code of practice and the ability to make payments for information also apply properly to Scottish Ministers.

Government Amendment 90 to Clause 91 reflects the position of the Scottish Government on the DWP debt recovery powers. It ensures that the Scottish Government retain control over how debts relating to their devolved benefits are recovered. Once these agency agreements come to an end, it will be for the Scottish Government to determine their own approach to debt recovery, including establishing new powers if necessary.

Finally, government Amendment 111 to Clause 101 confirms that Clauses 73 and 74 are treated as pre-commencement enactments for the purposes of the Scotland Act 1998, enabling Scottish Ministers to use these updated powers for fraud investigations in relation to devolved benefits. It confirms that the provisions in Clauses 96 and 97 relating to cost recovery and data protection apply to Scottish Ministers’ existing debt recovery powers. Amendments 80 and 64 update the clause references in Clause 85 and Schedule 3 as a consequence of these changes.

Having outlined the case for these amendments, I hope noble Lords will accept them so that we can fulfil our agreements with the Scottish Government. I beg to move.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, on these Benches, we welcome the agreement reached with the devolved Administrations—may this be a lesson to people around the world on how to deal with them, at least in this case.

The amendments in this group relate to how the powers in the Bill refer to Scotland specifically. Amendment 41, together with related amendments to Clause 74, and the replacement of Clause 101 and others, reverses—I stress that—the changes made in the House of Commons. I gather that this follows confirmation from Scottish Ministers that they wish the changes to the Secretary of State’s functions regarding information notices to apply to them as well. This seems to me a positive movement of Administrations working together—long may it continue.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, as it is my first appearance at the opposition Dispatch Box on Report, I echo remarks made by my noble friend Lady Finn on the first day of Report, because I also appreciate the constructive approach that the Government have taken following Committee.

It is perhaps appropriate that, as a Scot, my first brief contribution relates to matters north of the border. It is our understanding that this amendment has been brought forward by the Government in order to apply to Scotland those provisions of the Bill which we have already debated in earlier clauses, in particular those concerning the new powers to issue information notices under the Social Security Administration Act 1992, and to clarify that the new methods of recovery introduced under the Bill will not apply to devolved benefits.

In that sense, these amendments are essentially technical in nature, as the Minister said, ensuring consistency across the United Kingdom and confirming that the devolved benefits system in Scotland remains outside the scope of the new recovery powers. We appreciate and support the clarification. However, while the amendments themselves are straightforward, they raise some wider questions about the relationship between the UK and the devolved Administrations in this area.

It is somewhat surprising that these changes have had to come forward as government amendments at this relatively late stage of the Bill, when one might have expected such matters to have been settled at the drafting stage through earlier consultation and agreement with Scottish Ministers. The Government have placed great store over the past year in stating that they seek to improve communications and trust between the UK Government and the devolved nations, so can the Minister give us an update on how they view progress on these changes and what has changed in the past year?

While we do not oppose these amendments—indeed, we welcome the fact that the necessary legislative consent has now been secured—they prompt reflection on the importance of ensuring that such engagement happens promptly and systematically in future. The relationship between the UK and the devolved Governments works best when issues of competence and application are identified and agreed well in advance, rather than being corrected through amendments on Report.

That said, I would be grateful if the Minister could take this opportunity to update the House on the Government’s current assessment of the risk of fraud in relation to devolved benefits and on what engagement has taken place with the devolved Administrations to address that risk. Can she tell us what steps she is aware of in those authorities to tackle fraud within their systems and how information sharing and co-ordination between the UK Government and the devolved Governments is being managed to ensure that fraud risks are tackled effectively across all jurisdictions?

We are content to support these amendments that bring Scotland into line with the rest of the UK where appropriate while respecting the devolution settlement and maintaining clarity over responsibilities in the fight against fraud.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Viscount for his kind words. I, too, have enjoyed the engagement we have had across the House. It shows how the Lords can make a constructive contribution to the scrutiny of legislation.

The noble Lord, Lord Palmer, is quite right that we have a developed and developing devolution situation in the UK, and are showing that it is possible for different jurisdictions to make different judgments and to find ways of coexisting peacefully. We are very glad to be able to do that, and I thank him for flagging that up.

On the timing, I am advised that it is routine for these matters to be resolved at this point in the process. I reassure the House that our officials have engaged with their Scottish counterparts throughout the policy development stage and the passage of the Bill. It was during Lords Committee that we received formal confirmation from the Scottish Government that they wished the updates to the information gathering powers in the Bill to apply to them too, hence we have brought forward appropriate amendments.

In response to the questions from the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, fundamentally—this stems from the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Palmer—tackling fraud and error in devolved benefits must be the responsibility of the relevant devolved Government. That is the nature of devolution. However, we have engaged extensively with the devolved Governments throughout the passage of the Bill, and these amendments reflect that engagement. I reassure him that we routinely work closely with the Scottish Government to share information and good practice to support each other’s efforts to tackle fraud and error. That includes data-sharing agreements so that we can share information where necessary, which I suspect is the kind of assurance that he was hoping for.

I am grateful for those questions, and I hope that with those assurances noble Lords can accept these amendments.

Amendment 41 agreed.

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Moved by

[Baroness Sherlock]

42: Clause 74, page 42, line 38, leave out subsections (2), (3) and (4) and insert—
“(2) In section 3 (code of practice about use of information powers), in subsection (1)—(a) in the words before paragraph (a), after the second “of” insert “the powers that are exercisable by an authorised officer under section 109BZA of the Administration Act.”, and(b) omit paragraphs (a) and (b).”Member’s explanatory statement
See the explanatory statement for my amendment replacing clause 73.

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Moved by

[Baroness Sherlock]

45: Clause 75, page 43, line 31, after “of” insert “assisting in”
Member’s explanatory statement
See the explanatory statement for my amendment to Schedule 3, page 77, line 12.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, since we are moving on to discuss the eligibility verification measure, about which we had extensive discussions in Committee, I want to say a few words about the need for it and the intent behind it. This enables the Secretary of State to issue a bank or other financial institution with an eligibility verification notice—EVN—that will help the DWP identify incorrect payments in the social security system.

This measure has been misunderstood and occasionally misrepresented throughout the Bill’s passage. It is simply a measure that enables the DWP to ask for limited data from financial institutions that will help the department to identify incorrect payments and verify eligibility for specific benefits. It requires financial institutions to look within their own data and provide limited, relevant information on the accounts which match the specific eligibility indicators provided by the DWP. This limited information will help the DWP to identify where claimants do not meet the eligibility criteria for the benefit that they are receiving.

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[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, there are a number of amendments in this group, each touching on different principles relating to the operation of and limits to the eligibility verification measure. I will address them all briefly. I appreciate the Minister’s full reminder of the intent of this and of some of the operational details behind the EVM, which was very helpful.

I am afraid that we cannot support Amendments 45A, 65 and 74A in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, as she may expect. As the noble Baroness herself iterated, these amendments would in practice remove one of the Bill’s core operational mechanisms: the framework that enables the detection and investigation of fraud and error in the welfare system. Taking out Clauses 75 and 76 and Schedule 3 would not simply adjust how the powers are used; it would dismantle the machinery that allows the system to function. We on these Benches support the principles behind the Bill and, broadly speaking, how it seeks to counter fraud and deter wrongdoing. As the Minister reminded us, it was a Conservative Government, up until the general election last year, who initiated the approach for the DWP to ask banks and financial institutions for their help in tackling welfare fraud. I also acknowledge that some improvements have been made in the past year.

Removing these clauses would, in effect, as the noble Baroness has admitted, be a wrecking amendment, denying the Department for Work and Pensions the tools it needs to identify and evidence cases of fraud. The real debate, which this House has been having constructively throughout Committee and again on Report, is about how those powers are exercised—proportionately, cost-effectively and with due regard to rights, safeguards and well-being. That is the discussion we should be having, not one that seeks to strike out the core of the Bill.

We broadly welcome the government amendments, which make sensible, constructive improvements to the operation of EVNs. The first, set out in Amendment 48, is the insertion of the “necessary and proportionate” test, which is a welcome safeguard that raises the standard for how these powers are applied. The second clarification, that EVNs may be used only for assisting in identifying incorrect payments, provides welcome precision and helps prevent any risk of mission creep.

Talking of precision, I thank the Minister and her team for producing a series of flow charts. As she knows, I was pressing for these in Committee because there is considerable complexity, including work in progress—I am not quite sure whether we now call it “test and learn” instead of proof of concept—for all those involved in understanding the processes and operations between the banks and the DWP, with the checks, balances and timeframes set out. I hope the Minister acknowledges that this is a help for the department and that it will be continuously updated and improved as the system evolves.

We believe, however, that there remains scope for further clarification, which is why I was glad to add my name to the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden. This additional clarification through the language of his amendment is important. It would make it explicit that the exercise of this power is anchored to the purposes of the Bill rather than to any broader or more flexible administrative interpretation that might develop over time. In practical terms, it would ensure that the Secretary of State’s use of these powers cannot be varied or expanded except by returning to Parliament to amend the primary legislation; for example, were the Government at some future point to seek to extend these powers to cover other forms of welfare support.

We believe that this is an important safeguard. It ties the scope of the eligibility verification regime firmly to the text of the Bill, providing Parliament and the public with confidence that its use will remain confined to the limited, proportionate purposes that we have debated. For that reason, we consider this a sensible and necessary amendment and we are glad to support the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, in bringing it forward.

We are sorry to say that we cannot support Amendment 50, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, although we entirely appreciate her engagement with us on this point and the spirit in which it was brought forward. The aim of improving transparency is understandable but requiring banks to inform account holders that they have been flagged following an eligibility verification notice risks undermining the integrity of ongoing investigations.

I listened carefully to the noble Baroness’s speech, and despite her explanation and the safeguard that she outlined, we remain worried that notifying a potentially liable person too early could allow them to conceal or move funds, frustrating the process. While the intention is fair, it could cause or create a serious loophole. Therefore, I am afraid we cannot support it.

However, one of the points on which I agree with the Government is that some of those seeking to defraud the state—after all, it is taxpayers’ money we are talking about—will stop at nothing to get their way to make money for themselves. There is a line to be drawn to ensure that transparency does not provide an open goal for fraudsters.

It appears that the drafting of Amendment 60, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, may not achieve what is intended. As it stands, it would seem, having read it, to place a duty on banks or institutions, rather than individuals, to receive legal advice before complying with a notice. The DWP, in any case, has access to legal advice intradepartmental, so it would be up to the department’s discretion to use this on a case-by-case basis and should not be statutory.

If, however, the noble Lord’s intent, which became clearer in his remarks, is to ensure that individuals affected by DWP actions can access advice or support, that is a broader and legitimate issue. However, this amendment does not appear to address it; therefore, we do not and cannot support it. Individuals might choose to consult a lawyer, but this would be up to them. Can the Minister confirm that no taxpayers’ funds would be used to fund this, if this was indeed the intention?

We welcome the Government’s change in Amendment 61 to extend the review period from seven to 14 days. This responds directly to concerns raised by these Benches and by other noble Lords in Committee that the original timeframe was too short for financial institutions to act upon. It is a practical and welcome step that reflects the realities of compliance, and we are glad that the Government have listened.

Finally, we have some sympathy with Amendment 62, also tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox. I remember that the noble Baroness spoke to this in Committee. It is right that individuals should be able to understand, at least in part, the role of algorithms used in decisions that affect them, and being able to have sight of this as part of a review makes sense. However, transparency must not come at the cost of investigatory integrity. As I stated earlier, there is a delicate balance between fairness to individuals and protecting methods that could be exploited if disclosed.

The noble Baroness, Lady Fox, asked many questions, which I will certainly not repeat. I simply ask the Minister to clarify how these concerns might be addressed in practice, perhaps through the review or the appeal mechanism, while maintaining that balance.

Finally, we welcome that the amendments in this group provide us with an opportunity to have a further discussion on this important part of the Bill, the essence of its prime aim. We are grateful to the Government for listening to the concerns that were raised in Committee, as well as to other noble Lords for identifying areas about which they are concerned and offering the Government the chance to comment. We shall be listening with interest to the Minister’s response.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their contributions today and, indeed, throughout Committee. We have a better Bill as a result, and I am grateful for that. I am grateful to the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, for his support for the principle we are discussing here and for his gracious acknowledgement of the improvements to the Bill. I thank him for that; it was a kind and gracious comment, and I appreciate it.

In response to the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, I will not dwell on this matter, but I am grateful to him for accepting that, even if he came at the issue from a slightly different angle, he is happy with where we have ended up. I thank him again for pushing us, throughout the stages of the Bill, in various ways, and I am grateful that he has accepted where we have ended up with our amendment.

The noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, is absolutely right that her amendment is not nuanced; it lands firmly in the court of whatever the opposite of nuance is. In a sense, it is straightforward: her party does not support these measures at all. I have no doubt that, were her party to form a Government, it would locate another place to find £1 billion to make up for this. However, our party is determined that, if we are to spend money on social security, it should go to the people who are entitled to it and the people who need it—it should not go to other people. We will take the necessary measures to make sure that that happens, and we are doing that in this Bill. We also want to make sure that it is done appropriately and with enough safeguards, and I hope that I have shown to the House my willingness to bend over backwards to provide those safeguards. The principle is that people should not get money to which they are not entitled; it should go to those who are entitled to it and who need it—and that is what we are doing here.

The noble Viscount, Lord Younger, is right that my noble friend Lord Sikka’s Amendment 60 applies to the section that covers penalties that may be issued to financial institutions that fail to comply with an EVN. Therefore, the effect of the amendment would be that the DWP would be required to ensure financial institutions had taken legal advice before issuing a penalty for failing to comply with an EVN. I think we would all agree that, if they need legal advice, they could probably afford it—and so we are okay on that front. However, I fully understand that it is very hard to table amendments outside government, so I take it that the intention of the amendment is as my noble friend made clear: that the DWP is required to ensure that claimants receive legal advice before the DWP can make any adjustments to a person’s claim. However, we do not regard that as either practical or necessary.

There are already existing protections for claimants whenever an overpayment is calculated, including the ability to request a mandatory reconsideration and/or appeal to tribunal. Where an individual is investigated on a suspicion of fraud, they may be interviewed under caution. In that situation, they will always be notified of their right to seek legal advice and provided information about applying for financial assistance with legal costs through legal aid. In response to the question from the noble Viscount, legal aid is funded from the public purse, so if somebody were to qualify for legal aid, it would be funded by the taxpayer in the appropriate way. I confess that that is about as much as I can offer on that front.

My noble friend Lord Sikka mentioned a range of difficult circumstances. A lot of the debate here tends to mix up fraud, error and all the other reasons for overpayments. There are different reasons why somebody may have been overpaid: it may have been a genuine error; they may have been careless; they may have forgotten or deliberately failed to tell us about some change to their circumstance that affects their entitlement; it may be fraud; or there may have been an error on the part of the state. Gathering data early minimises the extent of the build-up of any overpayment, whatever the reason. That has to be a good thing; it is what we found out elsewhere. I hope that my noble friend appreciates that that is at least part of our approach.

I turn to the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox. As she said, Amendment 50 would require account holders to be informed. Even though I know that she does not intend the amendment to do this, the reality is that it could compromise the DWP’s ability to tackle fraud. In most cases where it is just an error that has been made, the DWP will contact claimants to give them the opportunity to explain potential incorrect payments, in which case the amendment would not be needed. However, in the cases where there is a suspicion of fraud, it would clearly undermine any criminal investigation to inform potential fraudsters that their information had been identified using an EVM or what the financial institution had identified. It might also cause unnecessary distress for those who are not guilty of fraud, such as account holders and claimants who, for example, may have a disregarded compensation payment and who otherwise would have been quite rightly left alone because they had not done anything wrong—there is no need to try to scare people into thinking that an issue will be coming down track. It would also impose further burdens on financial institutions, which would have to inform their customers about this.

Amendment 62 from the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, seeks scrutiny of the methods that a financial institution may use to identify relevant accounts. At the risk of boring the House, I note that the EVM asks banks to return specified data only where criteria, set out in the Bill, have been met. Financial institutions operate in many ways, and it is for each individual financial institution to work out how it identifies relevant accounts, rather than for the Government to set out potentially cumbersome processes.

Just to pick up on a couple of things that the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, said, I want to make this really clear: we will not be asking banks, for example, to work out whether somebody is entitled to a health benefit, such as ESA. We may ask them to identify an account into which ESA is being paid. Health data will be special data and will therefore be expressly prohibited from being returned. The intention is very simple: to ask them to identify the kind of things I described earlier. In response to the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, I was giving an example. There are many examples, but that was the one I chose.

To sum up, I have set out a clear case for the EVM and how our government amendments today and other changes that have been made address many of the areas of concern. I recognise that I have not persuaded the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, but I hope other noble Lords can see the point of this measure, can see the difference it would make and can understand that with the safeguards around, it is the right thing to do. The EVM will save an estimated £940 million by 2029-30. It will be a vital tool to help the DWP spot and detect errors quickly, while also assisting us in identifying fraud. I urge noble Lords to support this measure.

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Moved by

[Baroness Sherlock]

46: Schedule 3, page 77, line 12, leave out “identifying, or”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, together with my amendments to clause 75, page 43, line 31, clause 76, page 44, line 30 and Schedule 3, page 80, line 23, means that eligibility verification notices can be used only for assisting in identifying incorrect payments of a relevant benefit.

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Moved by

[Baroness Sherlock]

51: Schedule 3, page 80, line 23, leave out “identify, or”
Member’s explanatory statement
See the explanatory statement for my amendment to Schedule 3, page 77, line 12.

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[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, I speak in support of these amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden, and I am pleased to have added my name to them, because both amendments make valuable and necessary clarifications to the operation and oversight of the eligibility verification mechanism—EVM—and they do so in a way that strengthens, rather than weakens, the Government’s objectives under this Bill.

Amendment 52 makes a particularly important clarification. As the Government have repeatedly described their approach to the EVM as a test and learn process, it is vital that we make clear in the Bill that the mere existence of an eligibility indicator does not in itself constitute reasonable grounds for suspicion. That may sound like a technical point, but it has real-world implications. When a system is still developing, when its data sources are still being refined and when human understanding of how it operates is still evolving, there is a very real risk of false positives and unintended consequences.

The Government have said that there is some clarification within the process of an investigation that would help to clarify that persons subject to an EVM are not guilty, and that there are not, therefore, necessarily reasonable grounds for suspicion. However, putting this clarification in the Bill would be a really valuable step in making this absolutely clear, in black and white, to everyone involved. This amendment removes ambiguity and ensures that this point is not in question.

We have already discussed throughout this Bill the importance of safeguards and clarity when new investigative systems are created, particularly where multiple third parties are involved in data sharing and enforcement, which is paramount. This amendment provides exactly that and sets out this lack of reasonable suspicion in the Bill so that we avoid the potentially harmful ambiguity.

Moreover, this amendment ensures that, before any intrusive action is taken—in other words, before any benefit is amended, suspended or investigated—a person of appropriate seniority and experience must review the information and confirm that there are genuine reasonable grounds for suspicion. This aspect of the amendment places human oversight where it belongs: between the algorithm and the citizen. This matters all the more because, as many noble Lords will have seen, the Government themselves are moving rapidly to expand the use of AI in fraud detection and enforcement. Only a couple of weeks ago, civil servants across Whitehall received an internal update about the significant expansion of AI use within the Public Sector Fraud Authority in an article titled:

“Behind the Scenes: Building the AI Tool that is Revolutionising Fraud Prevention”.


I listened very carefully to the passionate speech from the noble Lord, Lord Deben, added to by the noble Lord, Lord Palmer. We believe that this makes these safeguards an urgent necessity. As we rightly modernise our defences against fraud, we must also modernise our protections against error, bias and overreach. Ensuring human involvement in that process in the way it has been set out in this Bill is fundamentally important, and this amendment provides that assurance.

Amendment 67 complements the first one by broadening the remit of the independent review of the EVM powers. The noble Lord, Lord Vaux, eloquently laid out his reasoning here. It makes sure that the reviewer looks at not just operational effectiveness but proportionality, costs, unintended consequences and how these powers affect vulnerable people and those interacting with the banking system. These are precisely the areas where well-intentioned powers can have unintended harm if they are not closely monitored.

We on these Benches raised these concerns in Committee and do so again on Report. There is the potential for disproportionate costs on financial institutions, the potential chilling effect on access to basic banking services for those already on the margins and, above all, the potential for harm to vulnerable people who find themselves caught up in complex enforcement processes. It is right that the independent reviewer should have these matters placed explicitly within their remit. I am therefore glad that the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, has framed his amendment to achieve exactly that. We need to recover public money which has been overpaid—we are in no doubt on that point—but doing so in a way that causes more harm than good benefits no one. The reviewer must have regard to this, not as a suggested area of review but as a statutory duty.

These are measured, practical amendments that I believe carry broad support across the House. They are not about blocking the Bill or frustrating its purpose: they are about ensuring that the new systems it creates are used wisely, fairly and proportionately. We therefore hope that the Government will listen and take these proposals seriously, recognise their constructive intent and accept them as a genuine improvement to the Bill. If the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, decides to test the opinion of the House, we on these Benches will be supporting him.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords for their contributions. My response to these amendments builds on the arguments I made at greater length in the last group.

Amendment 52, from the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, states that the existence of an eligibility indicator alone does not constitute reasonable grounds for the suspicion of fraud under Section 109BZB of the Social Security Administration Act. I have sought to assure noble Lords already today that a conclusion will never be drawn from EVM information. At the point the information is shared, no one is suspected of having done anything wrong and therefore, by definition, no action could be taken to correct the thing that could have been done wrong because no one is suspected of having done anything wrong. I could not be clearer on that.

I think it is worth reminding the House that there are two different things happening here. This measure allows DWP to ask banks to flag up accounts that may on the face of it have received a benefit to which someone is not entitled. That is a piece of information that comes into the department. Along with other pieces of information, it will be sifted and examined, and decisions will be made through the usual processes. DWP does this all the time, with all kinds of information. Those decisions are made. Pursuing fraud is something that is done day to day. Whenever DWP receives data in response to an EVM, the data will be matched with information that DWP holds, so it can identify the claimant and any inconsistencies between the information received from the financial institution and the information provided by the claimant over the life of their claim. It will also look at any possible disregards and any other relevant information, as I explained on the last group.

It is only then, as with our current practice, when a possible inconsistency is identified, that steps will be taken to determine how or even whether a claim needs to be reviewed. In some cases, it will be clear that no further action is required and the data from the EVM will be used no further. In cases of potential error, DWP may contact the customer to discuss the claim or ask for further information. In cases where potential fraud is then suspected, the case may be passed to an authorised officer, who will consider all relevant information to determine whether there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a DWP offence has been committed.

The noble Lord, Lord Deben, made a passionate speech, and he is someone for whom I have a great deal of respect. If what he suspected was happening, his passion would be justified, but I want to persuade him that it is misplaced. The decision to judge that someone has been guilty of fraud and to take action is not an automatic process. It is also not a determination that can be made by just anyone. It can be made only by an authorised officer in the DWP. If there are no reasonable grounds to suspect that a DWP offence has been committed, the case is passed back to the relevant benefit team or compliance team. At all times during that process, as is the case now, DWP will ensure that any next steps are reasonable and proportionate. There are no immediate suspensions of benefits during the process and, where appropriate, DWP will always endeavour to work with the customer to establish the facts around a benefit claim and identify any possible vulnerabilities. I hope that my position on that is clear and is made even clearer by the government amendments—

[Lord Deben (Con)]

If that is so, what is wrong with making it statutory? The issue is that what the Minister says is what now happens. We are concerned about what could happen if it is not in the Bill.

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[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, it is in the Bill. The requirement for reasonable suspicion for exercising powers under Clause 109BZB is set out in that clause. The fact that an account meets an eligibility indicator does not necessarily mean that there are any grounds for suspicion of fraud or other offences. It does not even necessarily mean that a benefit has been overpaid. Paragraph 3(1) of Schedule 3B on eligibility verification makes clear that eligibility indicators only indicate that a benefit

“may have been, or may be, incorrectly paid”.

The eligibility indicators in an eligibility verification notice must be criteria which indicate that the specified relevant benefit may have been or may be incorrectly paid.

The legislation therefore clearly reflects that EVM information will have to be considered alongside all other relevant information before further steps are taken. As I have said, DWP is required to consider all relevant information to determine whether there are reasonable grounds to suspect an offence. This is about not just this but about existing legislation and powers. I hope that my position on that is clear and that the government amendments in the previous group have helped to make it clearer.

Amendment 52 also requires that the information be reviewed by an appropriately senior person. We do not know exactly what the definition is of a senior person. However, it is an established legal principle that the Secretary of State must be satisfied that officials are suitably trained and experienced to take decisions on their behalf. The amendment is therefore unnecessary. I hope that the noble Lord will not feel the need to press it.

Amendment 67 would add three additional requirements to the role that the EVM independent reviewer will be required to undertake. Government Amendments 68 and 69, spoken to in an early group by my noble friend Lady Anderson, addressed paragraph (f) of that requirement by requiring the Secretary of State to provide information to the independent reviewer where it is “reasonably required”. In case there are any concerns about that, we foresee a close working relationship between DWP and the independent EVM reviewer, where DWP gives the reviewer the information that it needs.

However, the government amendment makes it even clearer that we are committed to providing necessary information. If necessary, DWP could ask the reviewer to demonstrate why a certain piece of information is necessary for the purposes of their review, by reference to the scope of the review and the matter that it has to cover, as set out in legislation. If the independent reviewer then demonstrates that the information is necessary for them to carry out their review, the legislation is clear that DWP must provide it.

On paragraph (d) of this amendment regarding costs incurred by business, this is a matter the Government take seriously. We are committed to keeping costs associated with this measure proportionate and to a minimum. As the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, is well aware, over the passage of the Bill we have worked very closely with UK Finance to improve the Bill and our draft codes of practice. At a recent meeting with Ministers, UK Finance welcomed this extensive engagement, which it feels has significantly strengthened the Bill. It indicated that it was not calling for further legislative change.

Crucially, I do not regard this amendment as necessary because the independent reviewer must already assess the measure’s effectiveness. Financial institutions receiving an EVN have the right to appeal a notice that is unduly onerous. We have committed to provide a further impact assessment 12 months after Royal Assent.

Paragraph (e) of the amendment would require the independent reviewer to include within their annual report any adverse effect that the EVN may have on vulnerable persons’ or benefit claimants’ access to banking services. I assure the noble Lord and the House that protecting DWP customers, especially those who are vulnerable, is very much a priority for this Government. However, we do not believe that this amendment is necessary.

First, there is no reason for individuals to lose access to banking services solely because of information shared under EVM. We have been clear that information does not imply any wrongdoing. The Bill makes provision to exempt financial institutions from returning suspicious activity reports in certain circumstances if the information that they have is only the result of an EVM match. We are working with the FCA to prevent any unintended consequences. Secondly, as I have indicated, this measure simply provides a source of data that feeds into the long-standing processes in DWP, where layers of support and specialist staff already exist to ensure that those who are vulnerable or have complex needs get the right support. Thirdly, this measure will help our customers, including those who are vulnerable. It will help us to spot genuine errors in claims early, help us to take steps to correct these and prevent large overpayments and debts building up that are recoverable.

I hope that the arguments which I have put out there have been enough to persuade the House on why we should move ahead. I beg the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I thank every noble Lord who has taken part in this debate. I particularly thank the noble Lord, Lord Deben, for his generous words, and the Minister for her fulsome response. On the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, about allowing people to get away with fraud, I want to make it really clear that I do not want people to get away with fraud. I am as keen as anyone to make sure that fraud and error are reduced. Please do not take away from this that I am soft on fraud. I hope my track record on fraud is well known within this House.

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Moved by

[Baroness Sherlock]

53: Schedule 3, page 80, line 27, leave out “processing and data protection” and insert “disclosure”
Member's explanatory statement
See the explanatory statement for my amendment to Schedule 3, page 80, line 30.

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Moved by

[Baroness Sherlock]

61: Schedule 3, page 84, line 35, leave out “7” and insert “14”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment extends the period of time within which a person given an eligibility verification notice can apply for a review of the decision to give the notice.

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Moved by

[Baroness Sherlock]

63: Schedule 3, page 89, leave out lines 34 and 35
Member's explanatory statement
See the explanatory statement for my amendment to Schedule 3, page 80, line 30.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Baroness Sherlock]

66: Clause 76, page 44, line 30, leave out “identifying, or”
Member's explanatory statement
See the explanatory statement for my amendment to Schedule 3, page 77, line 12.

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Moved by

[Baroness Sherlock]

68: Clause 76, page 44, line 36, leave out “may” and insert “must”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, together with my amendment to clause 76, page 44, line 38, would mean that the Secretary of State must provide information where the information is reasonably required for the purposes of independent reviews carried out under new section 121DC of the Social Security Administration Act 1992.

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[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, a lot of questions have been asked and I will do my best to answer them all. I will start by making clear what we are seeking to do. These powers would give authorised and trained DWP officers the ability to use reasonable force. We want them to be able to use that against property, not against people. Making a distinction in the way that the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, does in one of his amendments is not straightforward, despite the wishes of the noble Viscount, Lord Younger.

A number of noble Lords have said that they would be horrified to see civil servants using powers meant for the police. I am sure that members of the previous Government will be aware that HMRC, Border Force and the Gangmasters Licensing Authority already have these powers. This is not unprecedented.

[Lord Harper (Con)]

My Lords, I have not spoken on this Bill before, and I was genuinely trying to be helpful to the Minister. She has just said that you cannot make an easy distinction between the use of force against things and people. That is exactly the point. If you give powers to be used against things, you will get drawn into using them against people. I am well aware that Border Force has these powers, but if she talks to her noble friend sitting next to her she will find out that, as a result of the independent inquiry we had, there is extensive training for Border Force and for immigration enforcement officers before they are allowed use that force. That is my counsel; I urge her to be cautious.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, I will come on to answer all the noble Lord’s questions if he will give me a moment to do so. I have not got there. That was my opening paragraph. I will answer the points one by one, so I hope he will be patient with me.

I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, did not mean to do this, but the impression he and some other speakers gave is that the DWP will seek to use these powers against an average benefit claimant who has accidentally overclaimed by £20. I make it clear that this power cannot be used in those circumstances. It will be used where the DWP has a reasonable belief that someone has intentionally committed sophisticated, often high-value fraud against the DWP. These operations seek to find evidence of criminality that is not obtainable through the DWP’s other criminal investigation powers, such as its information-gathering powers, which would be the normal route for obtaining evidence in investigations. To use these powers, we have to seek a warrant from the court. The warrant application will go to the court, which will be the ultimate arbiter of whether a warrant is approved, based on a relevant justification. Those warrants have to be used for investigating serious organised criminality, and those offences tend to be high-value and complex. For that to happen, there would need to be reasonable suspicion related to indictable offences. We are not talking about individuals who have accidentally been overpaid a small amount of money.

I will go through the specifics that have been raised. I understand what the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, wants to do with his amendments and his desire to limit the use of reasonable force to property and not people. However, the use of reasonable force is set out in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 198, which, as he pointed out, does not distinguish between the use of force on items and persons. There is no precedent for breaking down the PACE power of reasonable force to restrict it to people or items. As I will go on to explain in a moment, to do so could result in unintended consequences.

The DWP has been clear from the outset that its intention is that reasonable force will be used only against things, not people. That will be made clear in guidance and training. The power will enable DWP-authorised investigators to use reasonable force to access locked cabinets and digital devices once they are lawfully on a premises. Without that ability to secure evidence, the DWP would have to continue to be reliant on the police, who would need to remain on the premises for the duration of the search activity. Imagine a situation where, for example, a significant universal credit fraud has taken place. There are potentially a lot of papers, either in filing cabinets in a premises or on devices. The police effect entry to a premises and secure them. The police stay there, and we ask them to carry on picking up every single file so that DWP officials can tell them if it is right or not. The police could be out on the streets tackling real crime and protecting people or they could spend that time in the premises while the DWP searches devices.

I understand the intention behind the amendments—

[Lord Harper (Con)]

My Lords—

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

I remind the noble Lord that this is Report.

[Lord Harper (Con)]

I know, but I am trying to ask some sensible questions. The noble Lord, Lord Vaux, will have to decide whether to press Amendment 76. I encourage him to press Amendment 75 and take this out completely. The Minister just talked about the police having to stay there to pick up files and devices. Why would they need to use force to do that? That is an administrative exercise. She is in danger of defending the indefensible in an unnecessarily complicated way. We are trying to be helpful.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for his help but I will try to manage for now. To open a filing cabinet or to open a device without the consent of the owner requires using reasonable force. I fully accept that he does not think that the DWP should have any of those powers. I hope he will bear with me and allow me to move through the arguments to make a case as to why I think it is necessary. If I cannot persuade him then I accept that, and he will go into the other Division Lobby, but I hope he will allow me to explain why I think this is necessary and proportionate.

One of the risks of the approach that has been taken to try to limit the use of reasonable force as set out by PACE is that it could have the unintended consequence of removing an authorised investigator’s common-law right to self-defence—for example, if they were physically threatened during a search and seizure activity. Clearly, the safety of our authorised investigators is paramount and they, like anyone else, must have the right to defend themselves if threatened. We will of course take a number of steps to ensure staff members’ safety. That includes conducting risk assessments on application for the warrant and during the search and seizure activity itself, and equipping staff with critical safety equipment and protective clothing.

The noble Lord, Lord Harper, asked about training. All DWP-authorised investigators will be required to complete training to the equivalent standard of the police before they can use these PACE powers. I assure the noble Lord, Lord Deben, that money will be made available to pay for that. We will not expect people to use these powers if they have not had appropriate training. That was a good question and I am pleased to answer it. In addition, DWP criminal investigators undertake investigative training as part of the Government Counter Fraud Profession. All staff must have training to industry standards before they can be considered even for authorised investigator status. That will ensure that staff are benchmarked to the same standard.

The DWP will not have the power of arrest. I remind the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, that the previous Government’s fraud plan, including the version put out in 2024, when he was standing where I am, proposed not only the powers we have here but that DWP staff should have the powers of arrest. We decided that was not appropriate but, as I have said, we do think that the power to have reasonable force against property is reasonable. We have taken what I think is a proportionate view. In the situation described, where the DWP arrives at premises but the police are not there and its staff find their entry is obstructed, the policy will be that they should remove themselves from any potential danger and request police presence.

The noble Lord, Lord Vaux, also mentioned oversight. We will be commissioning His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services to inspect the use and effectiveness of these powers in England and Wales and His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary in Scotland to do so there. These inspections can focus on any part of the end-to-end criminal investigation and their reports will be published by the Secretary of State. In addition, the Independent Office for Police Conduct will be responsible for reviewing any serious incidents or complaints in relation to these powers in England and Wales, with the Police Investigations & Review Commissioner responsible in Scotland.

While I am here, two other questions were asked on the IOPC. In one, I think the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, said that the IOPC regs were a Henry VIII power. I am advised that they are not, because they do not seek to amend or repeal primary legislation. The proposed amendments to Part 2 of the Police Reform Act are contained in the Bill itself. On the question of funding, the DWP has secured the necessary agreements with the IOPC and will continue to work closely and in partnership with it to ensure that its needs are considered, including financial arrangements. The regulations will make provision as to payment for this service and permit the lawful disclosure of sensitive files and information relating to the exercise of the functions and powers. I hope that reassures the noble Lord on that point.

On the other questions that have been mentioned, just to be clear, the drafting in Schedule 4 for Scotland is intended to clarify that force cannot be used to compel individuals to provide information when required to do so by a court protection order. This mirrors PACE as it applies in England and Wales. On the exercise of reasonable force when executing search warrants, the provisions in the Bill both in Scotland and in England and Wales are comparable. I hope that reassures noble Lords who think that we think that people in Scotland are less dangerous than people in England and Wales. I can assure them that is not the case.

Noble Lords asked about the difference between the PSFA and the DWP. Primarily, this is a matter of scale. A tailored approach has been adopted by the DWP and the PSFA. The PSFA is likely to do a smaller number of investigations; the scale at which the DWP operates would be a very different use of police resource than it would be in the case of the PSFA. Therefore, we think it is appropriate.

Finally, I think somebody—I am sorry, I have forgotten which noble Lord this was—asked whether we would use this provision against vulnerable people, benefit claimants being vulnerable. Again, another form of reassurance is that the law requires any warrant application to include information about any vulnerable individuals who may be present on the premises. As a result, the DWP has to conduct risk assessments before even applying to the court.

I understand the comments that have been made. I hope that I have been able to reassure noble Lords that our proposals are proportionate. On that basis, I urge the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate. In particular, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Harper, for giving us the benefit of his real-life experience on this and the very powerful example of how this can go wrong.

I confess that I am not persuaded of the need for DWP officers to have the ability to use reasonable force and I am tempted to go down the route the noble Lord, Lord Harper, suggests of removing it altogether. However, I want to be constructive. I do not want to ruin the Bill, so I think I can live with a situation where the Bill tries to mirror what the Minister has said the powers will be used for and limit it to that. If she thinks there are unintended consequences from that, those can be fixed at a later stage, at Third Reading. I make the point now that it is outrageous that Third Reading is in less than two days’ time from now, on Thursday. That is not the way we do things in this House. It does not give us time to sit down and try to work things out. I put it on record that it is just wrong.

I was slightly confused by one thing the Minister said. She described a situation where the police are there throughout as a waste of police time, when they could be off dealing with real crime, but just the sentence before she told us that this will be used only in cases of sophisticated high-value fraud. Is that not real crime? I confess that I am a bit confused by that.

Anyway, nothing I have heard has changed my view about the ability to use reasonable force against people being appropriate for DWP officials, particularly if the police are likely to be there all along anyway. I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 75, but I will, when the time comes, test the opinion of the House on Amendment 76.

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Moved by

[Baroness Sherlock]

78: Clause 83, page 50, leave out lines 19 to 21
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment, and my amendment to clause 83, page 50, lines 25 and 26, would remove provision that is no longer needed because of the general data protection override in section 183A of the Data Protection Act 2018, which was inserted by section 106(2) of the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025 and came into force on 20 August 2025

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Moved by

[Baroness Sherlock]

80: Clause 85, page 51, leave out lines 37 and 38
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendment replacing clause 101.

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Moved by

[Baroness Sherlock]

81: Clause 87, page 52, line 18, leave out “processing” and insert “disclosure or obtaining”
Member's explanatory statement
See the explanatory statement for my amendment to clause 87, page 52, line 24.

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[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Viscount for explaining his amendment. I will start by gently reminding him of something. He said that we should not avoid oversight because it is inconvenient. Does he remember that when his Government, led and represented by him, introduced equivalent powers to many of these in the DPDI Bill, there was literally no independent oversight at all anywhere in that Bill? So, I am very happy to respond on the way we are putting it in, but I hope the House will give us credit for having actually put in significant independent oversight, and I would encourage him to remember that.

Having said that, while I understand the rationale for Amendments 86 to 88, we do not believe that they are appropriate or necessary. DWP’s intention for Clause 89 is to appoint an independent, external inspectorate body to inspect DWP’s end-to-end criminal investigations. His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services has provided this function for public services for over 160 years. DWP has committed to commissioning HMICFRS as the body best placed to provide an independent inspection role in England and Wales and, similarly, His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary in Scotland, for Scotland. I can assure the House that DWP are committed to ensuring the right level of scrutiny for these powers and will follow existing HMICFRS and HMIC Scotland’s processes and guidance, which requires transparency and accountability.

These inspectorate bodies bring huge experience of working in this area, providing robust inspections to other similar bodies. That is why DWP will work with them to agree mutually that each inspection takes place over a suitable period, so that they are assessing and reporting on a period which realistically reflects DWP’s use of search and seizure powers. DWP has worked closely with both HMICFRS and HMIC Scotland, and we understand that sharing information is an integral part of the inspection process. That is why the department is committed to providing all relevant information, so that meaningful inspections can be carried out.

It is important to highlight the unnecessary risk Amendments 86 and 87 create. These amendments could result in sharing information with the inspectorate that could then become disclosable material in a live investigation, potentially jeopardising the outcome. Because of the range of investigatory techniques used during DWP criminal investigations, it is important that the Secretary of State retains discretion not to provide information when the consequences of sharing that information outweigh the benefit to an inspection—for instance, to protect customers or prevent compromising future prosecutions. Depending on the circumstances, examples of such sensitive material not suitable for sharing might include material given in confidence, details about witnesses or other persons who may be in danger if their identities are revealed, material revealing the location of any premises or other place used for surveillance, and material relating to the private life of a witness. I hope that explains why I cannot accept these amendments.

Amendment 88 seeks to extend the remit and scope of an independent person appointed under Clause 89. We have already confirmed that this will be HMICFRS and HMIC Scotland. They will provide an additional safeguard to ensure that the DWP is using these powers proportionally and in line with their intended purpose. However, although the inspectorates are very impressive in their fields, it is clearly not within their remit to assess expenditure or amounts recovered and conduct cost-benefit assessments of the various measures in the Bill. But the Office for Budget Responsibility has certified the estimated £1.5 billion of benefits contained in this Bill and, separately, our impact assessment clearly outlines the estimated costs and how we will scale up our rollout to deliver the savings and commits to monitoring and evaluation of Part 2 of the Bill.

I also remind the House of the existing reporting mechanisms for the DWP’s fraud and error activities that make this amendment unnecessary. In the DWP’s annual report and accounts, the department reports on the savings made from our fraud and error activities, including savings made from activity across our counterfraud and targeted case review teams. In addition, we also report on our debt recovery totals and debt stock. The departmental annual report and accounts are reviewed and scrutinised by the National Audit Office, which publishes a report on the accounts and provides independent assurance to Parliament on the proper use of public funds.

Finally, a question was asked about what is different between the DWP and the PSFA. The type and nature of DWP and PSFA criminal investigations are likely to be very different. That means the risks and decisions involved in disclosing sensitive material are different for each organisation. Due to the function it plays, the DWP is likely to have significantly more individuals who may be vulnerable, and it considers that disclosing sensitive material relating to those persons is not an appropriate approach for it to adopt. For that reason, the DWP must be able to withhold material in such cases to ensure that there is no detriment or risk to vulnerable persons who may be placed at risk.

To conclude, the DWP is committed to transparency and to delivering this Bill and its savings, but I do not think it is helpful or necessary to ask the inspectorates to step outside their existing remit given the routes already in place. I therefore urge the noble Viscount not to press his amendments.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for her response, but I am afraid we are still not persuaded on the point we raised around the powers of the independent reviewer to be provided with information. I certainly do not want to repeat what I said in opening but, in response to her earlier remarks, I want her to be clear that we recognise that some progress has been made on the Bill after a year. Without further ado, I have listened very carefully and heard her responses to Amendments 86 to 88, and I will test the opinion of the House on Amendment 87. I beg leave to withdraw.

Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill

Baroness Sherlock Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 21st October 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Sherlock]

89: Clause 91, page 57, line 25, at end insert—
“(aa) section 80AA (restrictions on use of further methods),”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential to my other amendment to clause 91.

[The Minister of State, Department for Work and Pensions (Baroness Sherlock) (Lab)]

My Lords, I shall speak to government Amendments 89, 91, 101 and 102; I start with Amendments 89 and 91. I tabled these amendments because it has been clear that, despite all my attempts to reassure noble Lords at earlier stages, concerns continue to be raised as though DWP’s new recovery powers could be applied to debtors who are in receipt of benefits. Indeed, I think that may be the concern of the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, as the explanatory statement on her Amendment 92 in this group relates to the use of these powers on benefit claimants. To be clear, this is not the case.

The DWP’s new debt recovery measures can be applied only to debtors who are no longer receiving DWP benefits and where we cannot recover from PAYE. However, to further reassure noble Lords and everybody else, we are making it even clearer in the legislation, through new Section 80AA, that the new powers cannot be applied to those receiving benefits from my department. This provides further clarification that a direct deduction order or immediate disqualification from driving order must always be suspended or revoked if the debtor subsequently receives a benefit payment from the DWP while that order is ongoing. I hope that provides further assurance to the House.

Amendment 101 is a procedural amendment regarding the technical mechanisms for DWP to make applications to the court for disqualification orders. The Bill already allows DWP to make an application to the magistrates’ court for a suspended or immediate DWP disqualification order. The purpose of this amendment is to introduce a regulation-making power enabling DWP to set out at a later stage any practical steps necessary for those applications to be made and considered. This engages commonplace procedure rules, dealing with practical matters to ensure cases are progressed fairly and efficiently for all parties involved, such as the type of form used or how notices and orders are served on parties.

Amendment 102 is a technical amendment which ensures that the term “processing” is correctly understood in new Section 80D, which establishes the DWP debt code of practice. It is a small change to provide clarity by linking the term “processing” to the definition already set out in Section 3(4) of the Data Protection Act 2018. This helps avoid any ambiguity in interpretation and ensures consistency with existing data protection legislation.

None of these government amendments changes the existing policy intent for how the powers will be used or the safeguards that are set out in the Bill. These will continue to be powers of last resort, to be used only after DWP has made all reasonable attempts to negotiate an affordable and sustainable repayment plan. These amendments support the policy intent and delivery of the Bill, and I urge noble Lords to accept them. I beg to move.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I will be very brief. I laid Amendment 92 in the same spirit as the amendments that I laid in an earlier group. The part of paragraph 3 of Schedule 5 that I find most difficult is a subset of the requirement for banks to provide information. The overarching requirement instructs banks to hand over to the Government, on request, three months of account statements for them to examine. The schedule says that the information must be used only to help determine whether or not to make a deduction under the Bill. I was trying to find out from the Minister what assurances there are that the use will be that narrow. It may be that I have misread it, but I cannot see any form of transparency or accountability that would provide that kind of assurance. It all seems to be completely internal to the DWP. My first question to the Minister is therefore this: how will the scheme verify that the information is not used for other purposes, because detailed account statements undoubtedly have information that could interest all kinds of people? Most importantly, will that information be destroyed after an investigation is closed?

The part of paragraph 3 that exercised me the most, in the original language of the Bill that came from the Commons, is that which prohibited banks from ever notifying the account holder that their information has been handed over to the state and for what purpose. To the Minister’s credit, that now seems to have been amended to say that the account holder can be told after three months. I am unclear whether that is an automatic notification, notification at the bank’s choice, or notification that requires a request from the account holder. To me, this matters, because I suspect that transparency is the only way to ensure that the information in the account is not used for purposes other than those stated in the Bill.

I am generally exceedingly uncomfortable with the idea that the original version basically required a sort of covert process, in which the information held on an individual by the state was not disclosed to that individual. The Minister has often suggested that the monitoring of accounts is to start a dialogue to see if a person has made a mistake in overclaiming rather than committing fraud. If somebody is not told that their information has been taken, read through, examined and dealt with in detail, I cannot see how they can possibly enter into a constructive discussion to explain what is happening.

I want to draw the attention of the Minister to an underlying principle. Jonathan Fisher KC has published part 1 of an independent review of disclosure and fraud offences, which was commissioned by the Government. I want to quote his words on transparency, because it seems that transparency was not built into the original Bill and is still limited in the revised version. He said that:

“A modern disclosure regime must require the prosecution”—


he is talking about the courts—

“to be honest concerning the reasonable lines of inquiry that have been pursued and how investigative material has been gathered, handled, and interrogated”.

I would very much like to see those principles embedded in this part of the Bill. I think we need assurances from the Minister that if we cannot find the language then they will in practice be embedded in this part of the Bill, because transparency is fundamental.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, the amendments in this group tabled by the Government contain a mixture of substantive safeguards and some technical improvements designed to tidy up and clarify the Bill.

The main amendment, government Amendment 91, introduces further restrictions and procedural safeguards around the use of the new recovery methods created by Schedules 5 and 6. It requires that liable persons are properly notified and given an opportunity to settle their liability before enforcement action is taken, and that alternative routes of recovery, such as deductions from earnings or benefits, are considered before more intrusive powers are used. These are sensible and welcome provisions that strengthen procedural fairness and ensure that the new powers are exercised proportionately.

We do, however, note that these changes have come rather late in the passage of the Bill. They are substantive clarifications, going to the heart of how these powers will operate in practice. However, I listened to the explanations from the Minister on an earlier point I made about this and I now understand her position—while not necessarily agreeing with it, I understand it.

The group includes two largely technical amendments. The first, to Schedule 6, allows the Secretary of State to make regulations relating to applications to or appeals from magistrates’ courts in England and Wales, ensuring clarity and consistency in procedure. The second, to Clause 94, aligns the Bill with the Data Protection Act 2018 by confirming that “processing” has the same meaning as in the Act. This is a straight- forward but important clarification. It is my view that these amendments strengthen the fairness and clarity of the Bill, ensuring that it operates in a way that is proportionate, consistent and aligned with existing law. We therefore support them.

On Amendment 92, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, she may not be surprised that we do not support this amendment. It would remove a key part of the machinery that underpins the operation of this Bill—specifically, the ability of the Department for Work and Pensions to obtain limited, relevant bank information to determine whether a direct deduction order should be made. I realise that this chimes with the noble Baroness’s earlier Amendment 45A, so I will not repeat the comments I made then, save to say that this is a considerable change and would strike at the heart of the framework that enables the recovery of money lost to fraud and error.

The Government must have the legal capacity to verify whether an individual is eligible for the payments they are receiving and whether further action is required to prevent overpayment or recover funds that are owed to the state and, by extension, to the taxpayer. If a person receives money from the state, the state has both the right and the duty to ensure that this money is not being misused—and certainly is not ending up in the pockets of fraudsters or criminals. The Minister has already made clear that individuals in receipt of benefits will be informed that the Government may access certain account information for the purposes of investigating suspected fraud or error.

We are satisfied with the Government’s assurance that the information obtained under these provisions will be high level, proportionate and strictly limited to what is necessary for the purpose of recovering money lost to fraud and overpayment. Far from being excessive, the powers set out in this part of the schedule are a necessary and measured tool to protect public funds. For those reasons, we oppose Amendment 92.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Viscount for his support on these matters. Amendment 92 from the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, seeks to remove the requirement for banks to provide information to the DWP for the purposes of making a direct deduction order from benefit recipients. I am not sure whether that was her intention or whether she intended to remove it from all, but that is the effect. I therefore need to clarify for the record that these powers cannot be used for those in receipt of benefit, and Amendments 89 and 91 make that even clearer.

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Moved by

[Baroness Sherlock]

90: Clause 91, page 58, line 2, leave out from “2016” to end of line 12
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment prevents the new methods of recovery from being available in relation to a recoverable amount or a penalty relating to a devolved benefit.

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Moved by

[Baroness Sherlock]

93: Schedule 5, page 106, line 21, at beginning insert “Subject to sub-paragraph (9A),”
Member’s explanatory statement
See the explanatory statement for my amendment to Schedule 5, page 106, line 28.

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Moved by

[Baroness Sherlock]

101: Schedule 6, page 123, line 23, at end insert “, or
(b) about procedure relating to applications to, or appeals from, a magistrates’ court in England and Wales under this Schedule.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would allow the Secretary of State to make regulations containing supplementary provision about procedure relating to applications to, or appeals from, a magistrates’ court in England and Wales under new Schedule 3ZB to the Social Security Administration Act 1992 .

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Moved by

[Baroness Sherlock]

102: Clause 94, page 60, line 37, after “processing” insert “(within the meaning of section 3(4) of the Data Protection Act 2018)”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment provides that “processing”, in new section 80D of the Social Security Administration Act 1992, has the meaning given by section 3(4) of the Data Protection Act 2018.

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[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, I am afraid that we must oppose Amendments 103 and 113 set out by the noble Lord, Lord Palmer of Childs Hill, for the same reasons that we gave in Committee.

The independent review to which I believe the noble Lord refers has a clear and limited purpose. As set out in the Government’s own guidance, it is designed to establish three things: first, how overpayments of carer’s allowance linked to earnings have occurred; secondly, what can best be done to support those who have accrued them; and, thirdly, how to reduce the risk of such problems arising in the future.

Nowhere in that remit does it question whether the overpayments were made. That point is already settled. The individuals in question have received government funds—taxpayer funds—to which they were not entitled. To put this in context, since 2019 over £357 million has been overpaid to carers for various reasons, such as where claimants breached the earnings limit, where claimants ceased to provide care, and where the claimant was also in receipt of an overlapping benefit. Often, I have to say, there have been innocent reasons.

The review will rightly examine how the system can be improved and how claimants can be better supported, but it will not, and cannot, rewrite the fact that money was misallocated and must therefore be returned. We think it would make no sense to halt all recovery activity pending the outcome of a review that does not address the underlying question of entitlement. The amendment would effectively suspend the recovery of public money that we already know has been wrongly paid out. We believe this cannot be justified, whether fiscally or morally.

I appreciate that the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, who is in her place, set out to us outside the Chamber her concerns about a cliff edge. I welcome that input—her doing that and saying that—and the Government may want to comment on that. But it is also worth remembering that, even according to charities in support of those who have caring responsibilities, overpayments have been made to people who have not correctly reported that their caring responsibilities have ceased, that the person they are caring for has died, or that they are in receipt of an overlapping benefit. The person in question has a duty to report these changes, and it is clearly wrong that the person has not fulfilled their obligation to the taxpayer to report when these events happen.

Moreover, this amendment goes even further by requiring the Government not only to await the completion of the review and the laying of its report before Parliament but to implement its recommendations in full—I must emphasise that—before recovery can resume. We believe that this is quite extraordinary. We have no idea what those recommendations will be, and it would be deeply irresponsible to commit the Government in advance to implementing them wholesale without the ability to assess, modify or reject them as appropriate.

Public funds must be safeguarded and the Government must retain the flexibility to act responsibly in response to the review’s findings. This amendment would tie their hands and delay indefinitely the recovery of money that should never have been paid in the first place. In his summing up, the noble Lord might suggest how long the wait would be; the noble Baroness might also hazard a guess. Will it be many months, if not possibly a year or two? We really do not know, but I am sure it will be many months. It will become increasingly difficult to recover the money when so much time has gone by. Individuals may have experienced substantial changes in their lives or gone abroad. At worst, the individuals may, very sadly, have died.

For whatever reason, and bearing in mind people’s circumstances or vulnerabilities, we believe in principle that overpayments—a reminder that this is taxpayers’ money—are just that. They have been made to individuals in error—please note that—and should be repaid as soon as possible. I have an iota of sympathy with the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, on the principle behind the amendment—namely, ensuring fairness and learning lessons from what has gone wrong—but its practical effect would be short-sighted, costly and contrary to the basic duty of government to protect the public purse. For those reasons, we cannot and will not support it.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, for explaining his amendments. Before we discuss the detail, I pay tribute to the millions of unpaid carers across the country. The Government value carers highly and recognise the vital contribution they make every day. I assure the noble Lord that my new Secretary of State feels just as strongly about this as the rest of us.

However, the reality is that, when we came into government, we realised we faced a flawed system where too many hard-working carers were left with often large overpayments to be repaid, sometimes worth thousands of pounds. I say clearly that I recognise the concerns of the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, and others on the whole issue of carer’s allowance. It is precisely because this Government take the issue so seriously that we commissioned an independent review of earnings-related overpayments of carer’s allowance to understand exactly what had gone wrong and to make any necessary improvements.

We have received the report from the independent reviewer, and I thank Liz Sayce OBE who led the review for her work. We are currently finalising our response to the report, following careful and detailed consideration of its findings and recommendations. I am pleased to confirm that we will publish both the report produced by Liz Sayce and the Government’s response to it before the end of this year. My ministerial colleague has written to the chair of the Commons Work and Pensions Select Committee to notify her of this.

This Government set up the review because we are determined to deal with the problems the system has created for carers. I hope the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, will be reassured by today’s commitment. Once the report and government response are published, and he and his colleagues in the other place, if he wishes, have had the opportunity to consider both, the ministerial team and the DWP will be happy to meet them to discuss this important issue and the Government’s next steps in detail.

I also remind the noble Lord and the House that this review is not all the Government have done to put things right for carers. We have been reviewing our communications to make it as easy as possible for carers to tell the DWP when there has been a change in their circumstances that may affect their carer’s allowance payment. We have been improving guidance and processes for our staff on the treatment of earnings and putting in extra resources to process the earnings information we receive from HMRC.

I think the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, mentioned the cliff edge, which the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, is interested in. We have begun scoping work on introducing an earnings taper in carer’s allowance in the long run. This was mentioned by the Chancellor in the Budget. It is not straightforward, but a taper might be a way to further incentivise unpaid carers to do some work and could reduce the risk of significant overpayments. However, introducing a taper in carer’s allowance is not without its challenges. It could complicate the benefit as it currently stands and mean a significant rebuild of the system. The DWP has begun some scoping work to see whether an earnings taper might be an option in the longer term, but any taper, if introduced, will be several years away. I do not want to underplay the significance of trying to make changes such as that.

We have also introduced the largest increase in the earnings limit since carer’s allowance was introduced in 1976. That limit is now 16 hours of work at national living wage levels and over 60,000 additional people will be able to receive carer’s allowance between 2025-26 and 2029-30. I hope the noble Lord recognises this progress. He asked whether we would meet Carers UK. I can reassure him that Ministers and officials regularly meet Carers UK and other organisations which represent unpaid carers, as well as unpaid carers themselves. There have been meetings specifically on earnings-related overpayments in the past, and we expect further meetings in the future.

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Moved by

[Baroness Sherlock]

104: Clause 97, page 62, line 5, leave out “processing” and insert “disclosure or obtaining”
Member's explanatory statement
See the explanatory statement for my amendment to clause 97, page 62, line 9.

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[Baroness Finn (Con)]

My Lords, I speak in strong support of this amendment, so ably tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, and supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Leicester, and to which I am pleased to have added my name.

The amendment speaks across so many of the principles that have underpinned our debates and the position that we on these Benches have adopted throughout Committee and Report—fairness, proportionality, transparency and responsibility. This amendment is about finding this balance and ensuring that the recovery of overpaid public funds is carried out in a way that is both effective and humane.

We have been clear from the outset that we support the core objectives of this Bill. Public money that has been wrongly paid out, whether through error or fraud, must be recovered. We owe that duty to the taxpayer and the integrity of our public finances. Equally, it is a duty of government to ensure that such recovery is done in a way that is fair, measured and responsible, does not impose unnecessary hardship, recognises the realities of individual circumstances and upholds confidence in the system.

This amendment embodies precisely that balance. It would establish clear and necessary safeguards before deductions are made from a person’s benefits. It would require that the liable person be notified of the rate and the basis of deduction, and, crucially, that they be given the opportunity to make representations about affordability. It would insist that deductions should proceed only where the Secretary of State is satisfied that recovery will not cause hardship in meeting essential living expenses and that the process is fair in all circumstances, including where the overpayment may have arisen through official delay or error. Sensibly, it seeks to sets a six-year limit for recovery, in line with the limitation period that applies through the courts. In other words, this amendment would ensure that the state exercises its right to recover the money in a way that is just, proportionate and accountable, and would align the recovery of overpayments through benefit deductions with the very same principles of fairness and restraint that we have already built into Schedule 5 in relation to deductions from bank accounts.

Throughout our scrutiny of this legislation, we have repeatedly emphasised that good governance is not simply about having the power to act but about exercising that power responsibly. This amendment reflects that philosophy perfectly. It strikes the right equilibrium between fiscal responsibility and social justice and between protecting the taxpayer and those who may already be in vulnerable situations. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, for bringing forward this thoughtful and well-crafted proposal. It would strengthen the Bill, give legislative effect to the principles of transparency, fairness and proportionality, and ensure that, in pursuing the legitimate goal of recovering public funds, we do so in a manner that remains worthy of public trust. This is a measured, sensible and responsible amendment and we are very pleased to support it. I hope the Minister will give welcome assurances on it.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, and my noble friend Lady Lister for their early and constructive engagement on this topic. I understand that the intent of Amendment 109 is to replicate some of the safeguards introduced in Schedule 5 for direct deduction orders for the recovery of universal credit and new-style overpayments by deduction from benefit. Although I understand clearly what the proposers of this amendment want to do, I cannot accept it. However, I hope I can provide some assurances along the way.

The DWP is committed to improving payment accuracy to prevent overpayments occurring through continuous improvement activity. Where overpayments do arise, the Secretary of State has an obligation to protect public funds and ensure that, wherever possible, money owed to DWP is repaid. But within that objective, we are clear that our aim is to secure affordable and sustainable repayment plans and ensure that safeguards are in place to protect vulnerable debtors.

As the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, said, Amendment 109 applies not just to official error but to all universal credit and new-style benefit overpayments recovered from benefits, including debts arising from fraud. The DWP already sets out that fraud overpayments are subject to stricter recovery rules due to their nature and seriousness. To treat all debts the same would not be right; it would be unfair on those who obtained a DWP benefit in good faith. This amendment also applies only to debts being recovered by deductions from benefits. A key driver for the new debt recovery measures is to bring greater fairness to debt recovery, giving DWP the tools to recover debts from those debtors who are not on benefits and have the means to repay but choose not to. This amendment could undermine that important objective.

Taking each part of Amendment 109 in turn, proposed new subsection 8(a)(i) would require DWP to give an individual notice on the basis of the deduction amounts. Individuals receive a notification about the overpayment; setting out the deduction rate and basis for this would present significant challenges. Benefit awards can fluctuate month to month, and deductions for repayment of debt are calculated accordingly. The deduction rate will also depend on other deductions being taken. Therefore, a legal requirement to issue a fixed notice setting out a single rate of recovery may risk being inaccurate, confusing or even misleading.

However, noble Lords are making an important point, and while I cannot accept the amendment, I commit to the House that in response I will explore how we might notify individuals more clearly about forthcoming deductions within the existing legal framework. I intend to do this as a part of the commitments I have made to review our communications to those with debts.

Proposed new subsection (8)(a)(ii) seeks to replicate the representation stage for direct deduction orders where recovery takes place by deduction from benefits. These processes are intentionally different because when deductions are made from benefits, DWP already holds accurate information about benefit payments, existing deductions and in some cases income from other sources. Crucially, there is also no ambiguity about ownership of the funds. Notifications already make it clear that at any time, the individual can contact DWP to discuss the affordability of the deduction.

By contrast, for the DDO process, DWP may know little or nothing about a person’s financial circumstances because they are not on benefits or in PAYE and they have refused to engage with us. This is why the Bill makes provision for DWP to obtain bank statements as an important safeguard. However, we recognise this may not give DWP as complete a picture as we have for benefit claimants. It is therefore right that individuals and any joint account holders can make representations about information that may not be apparent from statements alone before a deduction is taken from a bank account.

Nevertheless, in line with my previous commitment, I will commit to look at what more we can do to make our communications as clear as possible on how claimants can contact the department at any time to discuss repayment. I will also look at the timing of these communications.

Turning to proposed new subsection (8)(b), I agree that deductions from benefit should not cause unintended hardship and should be fair. This Government are committed to the principle of debt repayment being affordable; that is why processes exist to achieve this. Protections are in place to prevent excessive deductions. Regulations set out the maximum rates of recovery from benefits for fraud and non-fraud debts. For those in receipt of universal credit, as my noble friend Lady Lister mentioned, the fair repayment rate policy, which this Government introduced on 30 April, reduced the total amount that can be deducted from universal credit from 25% to 15% of the standard allowance in most cases, and I am grateful to her for acknowledging that. Crucially, there is also a priority order for deductions taken from universal credit to ensure that debts such as housing arrears are taken first to prevent people facing eviction and thus causing hardship. Recovery of overpayments is a long way down the list of priority order.

Moreover, there are robust processes in place to support the vulnerable and those struggling with debts, such as referrals to the Money Adviser Network for free and independent and impartial money and debt advice. I again stress that individuals can and should contact DWP at any time to discuss repayment terms. Where individuals make contact, DWP can reduce or temporarily suspend recovery depending on the circumstances. In exceptional cases, DWP can consider waiving recovery of the debt entirely.

I turn now to the question of fairness in this amendment. The extension of whether the act of recovery itself is fair differs from the provision in Schedule 5, which is limited to consideration of the deduction being fair in the circumstances as known to DWP. Every overpayment decision has existing mandatory reconsideration and appeal rights, and these are the right routes to challenge whether the overpayment should be recovered.

Although Amendment 109 is specific to recovery by deduction from benefits, it risks creating uncertainty as to whether it was fair to recover by other methods too, such as by deductions from earnings, or voluntary repayment plans.

Finally, proposed new subsection (8)(c) would limit the commencement of recovery of any overpayment of UC or new-style benefits from deductions from benefits to six years. The existing framework under Managing Public Money provides enough flexibility to forgo the recovery of historic debt where appropriate. Imposing a statutory time limit on commencing recovery would have consequences that may not be intended; for example, DWP could be prevented from recovering money obtained through benefit fraud where we could not reasonably identify the fraud until six years after the payment was made.

It is important to distinguish DWP recoveries from those by other creditors through court orders, for which a limitation period might otherwise apply, as the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, indicated. DWP recovers benefit overpayment debts one at a time, beginning with the oldest. Due to the protections that I outlined earlier, we recover by deductions from benefit at a much lower rate than other creditors typically would, and we rightly prioritise deductions for certain debts, such as housing or utilities arrears, over benefit overpayments to prevent hardship. That means that recovery of a UC or new-style benefit overpayment could rightly take place some time after the initial overpayment has been notified to the individual. A blanket limitation would risk undermining the integrity of the process, could create hardship for individuals and could significantly reduce the amount of taxpayers’ money returned to the public purse.

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[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, I share the interest of the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, in the important issue of fraudulent activity in the digital age, especially where it affects our social security system. I start by recognising that online activity in this space is wide-ranging. There are people who offer advice on social media or elsewhere online because they genuinely want to help others, often disabled people, to understand the benefits system better so that they can access the support they need. That is understandable and perfectly legal. However, there are others who deliberately use online platforms to encourage or facilitate benefit fraud by sharing information or organising fraud themselves. This kind of behaviour is calculated, harmful and must be taken seriously, but we do not need new legislation to deal with it.

Those individuals can and should face consequences under existing law. Section 7 of the Fraud Act 2006 and Section 44 of the Serious Crime Act 2007 already make it a criminal offence to assist or promote fraud. This amendment would not strengthen that existing legislation. In fact, as I pointed out in Committee, it would be softer than existing offences. It would reduce the maximum sentence for the proposed offence to just five years, compared to the 10 years already available under existing legislation. That is a weaker deterrent. Moreover, introducing a new offence risks duplicating the powers that the Government already have. This would create unnecessary overlap and a more confusing legal landscape, and could create a disparity in how cases are prosecuted and sentenced. There is no need to complicate the legal framework when legislation is already in place.

Where there is online activity which provides information on how to commit fraud, and where this activity can be reasonably countered, we think we have the right tools and networks in place beyond the legislation that I have already outlined. The department actively collaborates with a range of government partners, including Action Fraud, the City of London Police and the National Cyber Security Centre, to identify malicious sites that impersonate the department, enable fraudulent activity or target DWP customers.

For example, in partnership with Action Fraud, we have recently been raising awareness of winter fuel payment scams across Facebook and X—formerly known as Twitter. This has taken place alongside the DWP’s continued work with trusted partners and charities such as Independent Age to ensure that accurate and timely information is available. The DWP has also developed a recorded message for our telephone lines and issued a press release via GOV.UK to raise awareness of such scams.

Secondly, social media companies also have clear responsibilities under the Online Safety Act. They are required to remove harmful and illegal content, including anything that encourages or helps others to commit offences. The Act enables us to work with Ofcom through its new trusted flagger process. This builds on established relationships and escalation routes that we have with individual companies to report suspicious content on certain platforms quickly and effectively.

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Moved by

[Baroness Sherlock]

111: Leave out Clause 101 and insert the following new Clause—
“Powers of Scottish Ministers(1) The following provisions of this Act have effect as if they were pre-commencement enactments for the purposes of section 53 of the Scotland Act 1998, read with section 32 of the Scotland Act 2016—(a) sections 73 and 74;(b) section 96, so far as relating to an amount that is recoverable by the Scottish Ministers under Part 3 of the Social Security Administration Act 1992;(c) section 97.(2) Accordingly, an individual who for the time being has the Scottish Ministers’ authorisation for the purposes of Part 6 of the Social Security Administration Act 1992, in accordance with section 109A of that Act as amended by section 73 of this Act, has the functions conferred by sections 109B to 109C of that Act, as amended or, in the case of section 109BZA, as inserted, by section 73 of this Act.” Member’s explanatory statement
See the explanatory statement for my amendment replacing clause 73.

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Moved by

[Baroness Sherlock]

114: Clause 106, page 67, line 21, at end insert “or different areas”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would allow commencement regulations to provide for provisions to commence on different days in relation to different areas.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, government Amendment 114 ensures flexibility in the commencement of certain provisions of the Bill across the different nations of the United Kingdom. This approach is well established in legislation such as the Care Act 2014, the Digital Economy Act 2017 and the Public Order Act 2023. It ensures that implementation is both practical and responsive to the specific circumstances in each jurisdiction. For example, the courts in one part of the UK may be ready to hear certain applications while, in another, staff training and procedural updates may still be under way.

This amendment allows the flexibility to commence later in one area without unnecessarily delaying implementation in an area that is ready. Crucially, the amendment does not alter the substantive provisions contained in the Bill, and nor does it affect how or to whom they apply. It is simply a matter of good governance, ensuring that the legislation is brought into force in a way that is orderly, effective and sensitive to operational realities.

I hope that the House will support this amendment as a sensible and necessary step in delivering the Bill effectively across the UK. I beg to move.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, I will keep my remarks brief. Amendment 114 is, as the Minister has indicated, a technical amendment but one that raises a point of some practical importance in how this legislation will be implemented. The amendment would allow commencement regulations to provide for provisions of the Bill to come into force on different days in relation to different areas. We recognise that this is a standard enabling power and we do not object to it in principle.

However, while we appreciate that this is likely to be a technical and administrative provision, we would welcome a little more clarity from the Minister as to the intended purpose. In particular, can the Minister explain whether the Government currently anticipate that the legislation will, in practice, come into force in a staggered way across different parts of the UK? It would be helpful to know whether any particular regional or administrative reasons have led to this amendment being proposed—for example, to accommodate devolved competencies or pilot schemes, or differences in data infrastructure between public authorities—or whether this is simply a precautionary measure to preserve flexibility.

We would also be grateful if the Minister confirmed whether the Government expect any significant differences in timing or rollout between areas once the Bill is enacted. If such differences are anticipated, what criteria will determine the order of commencement and how will Parliament and the public be kept informed of that process? So while we are content to support this amendment as a sensible technical adjustment, we would appreciate some reassurance that it will not result in confusion or inconsistencies.

Finally, as we come to the end of Report, I want, on a lighter note, to take this opportunity to thank all noble Lords for their engagement throughout these proceedings, and all those who have voted on the amendments upon which we have divided. I look forward to seeing some noble Lords again at Third Reading on Thursday.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Viscount for his questions. First, we have no reason to believe that any area or jurisdiction will not be ready; this is simply a precautionary measure to provide flexibility in case unexpected issues arise down the line. It is a standard legislative approach that provides flexibility to adapt if needed, and avoids holding back implementation in areas that are ready, should there be another area that needs more time. No specific powers have been earmarked or delayed. The amendment is an enabling one, and where readiness exists, powers will be commenced without delay. On how people will know, Parliament and the public will see the commencement regulations, which will make that clear. This amendment is simply to ensure flexibility in the commencement provisions across the different nations of the UK, and I commend it to the House.

Amendment 114 agreed.

Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill

Baroness Sherlock Excerpts

3rd reading
Thursday 23rd October 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Sherlock]

That the Bill do now pass.

[The Minister of State, Department for Work and Pensions (Baroness Sherlock) (Lab)]

My Lords, it has been a privilege for my noble friend Lady Anderson and me to take this important Bill through the House. This Government are committed to safeguarding public money and tackling fraud and waste. Public sector fraud is not a victimless crime; it damages our public services and, ultimately, it is taxpayers who suffer when they pick up the bill. Tens of billions of pounds are being lost to public sector fraud—money desperately needed by our public services. This Bill delivers on that commitment to safeguard public money and reduce fraud and overpayments resulting from errors across the public sector. It will enable the Public Sector Fraud Authority to support public sector bodies in investigating and dealing with fraud, and it will help the DWP better identify, prevent and deter fraud and error in the social security system. In doing so, this Bill will protect the public purse and deliver £1.5 billion of benefits over the next five years.

I thank all noble Lords who have given so generously of their time and wisdom in scrutinising this important legislation. Although we have not always agreed with them, my noble friend Lady Anderson and I have been grateful for the very many thoughtful and considered contributions that have prompted us at various points to improve the Bill or to clarify its provisions. This is what the House of Lords is for, and I am grateful for it.

Before I conclude, I offer some words of thanks, first, to the Opposition Front Bench. The noble Baroness, Lady Finn, and the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, have given robust but constructive challenge throughout the passage of the Bill. I am grateful for their time, both inside the Chamber and beyond. Similarly, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and the noble Lord, Lord Palmer of Childs Hill, from the Liberal Democrat Benches, who have been passionate advocates on issues such as whistleblowing and carers. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, and my noble friend Lady Lister for their careful engagement, both in and beyond the Chamber. I am grateful for the constructive challenge from around House, including from my noble friends Lord Sikka and Lord Davies of Brixton, the noble Baronesses, Lady Bennett and Lady Fox, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Leicester.

Thanks must go to the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, who has maintained a keen interest in both parts of the Bill throughout its passage. The noble Lord has advocated for a number of different issues. We thank him for his constructive engagement and hope he welcomes the progress that has been made.

My noble friend Lady Anderson and I thank our Whips, especially our noble friend Lord Katz for his support throughout the Bill, and put on record our appreciation of all the officials and public servants who provided such dedicated support throughout this legislative process. I thank Georgia, Oliver, Alana and Ewan from our brilliant private offices, Matt, Louise and Tanya from the fabulous Bill team, and all the policy colleagues who stood behind them. Noble Lords who have met them will have been as impressed as I am with their professionalism and knowledge.

Finally, unusually, I thank my noble friend Lady Anderson’s husband for sharing her with us so extensively in the run-up to not just her wedding but her honeymoon. It is a sign of her dedication that she has given so much time to this Bill. She is the only person I know who can, while taking the content incredibly seriously, bring quite so many laughs to the subject of public sector fraud. I am grateful to so many noble Lords, and I beg to move.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for her remarks. I will make a short reflection on our discussions on Report and in Committee. I speak for my noble friend Lady Finn in so doing. Despite the technical title, this is an important Bill, as the noble Baroness said. It addresses one of the most serious problems that public authorities face. Based on the Public Sector Fraud Authority’s methodology, fraud and error cost the taxpayer £55 billion to £81 billion in 2023-24. The Bill has sought to address this problem, at least in part, through the provision of extensive powers to officials in the DWP and the Cabinet Office. It is largely these that we have discussed over the past few months.

I am proud of the work that this House has done in scrutinising the Bill, identifying issues and problems, and working in the genuine spirit of collaboration to make it better, fairer and more effective. I pay particular tribute to the noble Baronesses, Lady Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent and Lady Sherlock, for the way they have engaged with Members from across the House. They have listened to concerns, shown genuine willingness to make improvements and demonstrated what responsible government should look like. I firmly believe that the Bill before us is stronger and more balanced than the one first introduced to this House. There is more to be done and areas for further improvement, but we have reflected this in our amendments. The changes that have been made are indeed welcome, and we look forward to ping-pong when it comes. I am also grateful to the noble Baronesses for following up on commitments swiftly, not least for providing the now famous flow charts, which have been genuinely useful to us and, I hope, their departments.

I thank other noble Lords for their engagement with this Bill and their support of our amendments both in Committee and on Report. We have sought to address what we see to be serious shortcomings in the Bill on questions of oversight, accountability, proportionality and fairness. I am thankful to noble Lords who supported us in the Divisions that we called. The amendments we have passed in this place advocate for greater oversight, clearer lines of accountability and a PSFA that can actively pursue fraud. I believe that these are important changes that make the Bill more effective and fairer.

I particularly thank the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, for their support of our amendments, and I certainly do not forget the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer. I thank them for their support on some of our proposals. I look forward with interest to seeing how the arrangement with the PSFA, the DWP and the banks evolves and becomes effective. We accept that it is test and learn. It is vital that the legislation to seal the agreement becomes effective in combating fraud.

Finally, I thank the officials who have worked so hard from the government side to enable this process to happen. I know from my time as a Minister that we rely on our officials for a great deal; indeed, it is often to them who we turn for advice and support. I also know that their work is often not credited because they are not visible in the way that we are during debates. I therefore thank officials from the DWP, the Cabinet Office, the PSFA and the Ministers’ private offices who have worked hard to support them and, indirectly, all of us in the discussions we have had on the Bill. Noble Lords from across the House should recognise them and their work. I pay particular tribute to and thank my assistant, Oliver Bramley, for his sterling work during this period.

I urge the Government to meet this House on the amendments that it has added to the Bill, given the extensive discussions and strong cross-party support that they command from across the House. The Bill that we return to the Commons is a better one and I urge the Government to use this opportunity to make these changes permanent.

Finally, we all leave the Bill with certain expressions ringing in our ears, such as “test and learn”, which I alluded to earlier, but particularly the tongue-twister “eligibility verification measure”. I think I can just still say that.

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[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill (LD)]

My Lords, I am probably the last person to speak and mull over all that has happened. I thank sincerely the noble Baronesses, Lady Sherlock and Lady Anderson, and their team. They have been very helpful to us in answering our questions, trying to agree with us and offering a meeting to discuss the part of this Bill on carers. We appreciate and look forward to that departmental meeting, together with, I hope, one of our MPs, so that we can have a reasonable view towards ping-pong and what goes forward.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, as everyone has, for many things that we worked closely on and supported. I also thank particularly the Conservative Front Bench, who have not been confrontational but have tried to work to get a better Bill. The Bill has been quite exemplary in the way that people have worked towards improving it in many ways. I obviously also thank my noble friend Lady Kramer, who has worked with me on the Bill, and Adam Bull, our legislative and political adviser, who has been giving me support throughout.

We have among us—the Cross Benches, the Government, the Conservative Benches, this Bench and the Bishops’ Bench—all improved the Bill. I hope that the improvements we have made will last through ping-pong and that we end up with a better Bill—not a confrontational Bill but one that will help public funds, which is obviously its aim, while protecting the vulnerable in society who are not really going to be the paymasters of dealing with errors in the past. Congratulations to all, including the staff in the background of the Government who have made this such an interesting exercise, even though I am surprised that we have got to Third Reading so quickly after Report, and in almost indecent haste. If all legislation could be so quick, it would be a great advantage to this House and the other House. I hope that the Bill passes successfully.

[Baroness Sherlock (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords—in fact, that was so nice that I would like it to carry on, but the Chief Whip will kick me from behind if it goes on any longer. However, I will say a couple of things. In response to the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Leicester, we have already begun to think about how we can look at making things better in the way that I described. I will find the most appropriate way to communicate that, but I assure him that I stand by the assurances that I gave on Report—and I say likewise to the noble Lord, Lord Palmer. In response to the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, I will reflect on what has happened. Having given so much ground, I do not want to spoil the unanimity, but I will not be able to give everything. I am sure he will not be surprised to hear that.

Finally, as we send the Bill down the Corridor, it is now for the elected House to consider and respond to the changes proposed by this House. I am sure I speak for the whole House when I say that we would welcome a swift consideration to make sure that we can move quickly and get on with the important job of addressing fraud and overpayments across the public sector.