Economic Activity of Public Bodies (Overseas Matters) Bill

Baroness Noakes Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 14th May 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hendy (Lab)]

My Lords, in the unavoidable absence of my noble friend Lady Blower, and at her request, I beg to move Amendment 30, which is intended to add to paragraph 6 of the schedule.

The paragraph, which we discussed in Committee last week, permits a decision-maker to take into account whether the decision might put the UK in breach of its obligations under international law. In the last debate, we discussed the nature of the international law obligations comprehended in this paragraph and the question of who determines whether there has been a breach of them. I do not seek to reopen that debate; this amendment is not dependent on the outcome of it.

The amendment would make it clear that the decision-maker will be permitted to take into consideration and reject a tender or an investment that the decision-maker reasonably considers might put the UK in breach of its obligations under the genocide convention, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or any UN Security Council resolutions supported by the United Kingdom. The amendment would still stand and have force, whether or not the Government accept amendments along the lines suggested by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, and the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, identifying what entity appropriately determines what amounts to a UK breach of international law. Amendment 30 merely clarifies that the conventions and resolutions mentioned in it are to be regarded as UK obligations.

I find it impossible to see what conceivable objection there could be to identifying matters of such grave importance to a law-abiding nation. The rationale is so obvious that I cannot think of anything more to say in support of my noble friend Lady Blower’s amendment, and I look forward to hearing that the Minister will support it.

I will now speak to Amendment 32. Paragraph 8 of the Schedule permits the potential decision-maker on procurement to take into consideration certain forms of “labour-related misconduct”. The problem is that that is a very limited list. We touched on that in Committee last week. In the last debate, the Minister asked me to provide further details on whether the violations of core labour standards would be covered by the provisions of paragraph 8. I looked at that matter again and did not take up her kind invitation to write to her, because Amendment 32, which was not before us last week, makes clear the distinction between the core labour standards identified in the amendment and the standards set out in paragraph 8.

I will explain. Paragraph 8 is confined only to conduct that would amount to a criminal offence in relation to slavery or human trafficking orders, failure to pay the national minimum wage and labour market orders under the Immigration Act. That list does not currently permit those making procurement and investment decisions to have regard to the fundamental labour standards binding on all countries by virtue of their membership of the ILO. As a matter of convenience, we can take those standards from Articles 399(2) and 399(6) of the trade and co-operation agreement—the Brexit deal—signed by our then Prime Minister in 2020, where they are conveniently summarised.

The provisions commit the UK to respect, promote and effectively implement the ILO Constitution, which includes the Declaration of Philadelphia of 1944, the

“ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-up, adopted at Geneva on 18 June 1998 … the ILO Decent Work Agenda as set out in the 2008 ILO Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization”,

and the fundamental ILO conventions. The fundamental ILO conventions are those identified in those provisions of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement and in the amendment. They protect freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining; the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour; the effective abolition of child labour; the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation; decent working conditions for all with regard to, inter alia, wages and earnings, working hours, maternity leave and other conditions of work; health and safety at work, including the prevention of occupational injury or illness and compensation in cases of such injury or illness; and, finally, non-discrimination in respect of working conditions, including for migrant workers.

The only point in that list which is included in paragraph 8 of the Schedule is the second point that I mentioned: the elimination of all forms of forced and compulsory labour. That is the only point at which my amendment and paragraph 8 coincide, because paragraph 8 of the Schedule deals with slavery and trafficking. However, all the other elements of the fundamental labour standards are outside paragraph 8, even though they are binding on every country which is a member of the ILO by virtue of its membership and, regardless of whether they have ratified these conventions, they are matters of customary international law. These are vitally important standards, as the UK government representatives will doubtless reiterate at the International Labour Conference of the ILO, which takes place in June.

Plainly, paragraph 8 does not go far enough. International labour standards are important for ameliorating the conditions of workers in less developed and authoritarian regimes, and, from a more self-interested perspective, for diminishing the extent to which UK manufacturers and UK suppliers of services and works are undercut by competitors seeking to, as I put it on the last occasion,

“exploit cheap labour, poor conditions, inadequate standards, lack of enforcement, and powerless trade unions”.—[Official Report, 7/5/24; cols. 23-24.]

I refer to the examples I gave on the last occasion, but I will not repeat them.

Reverting to the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, and the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, on the last occasion, identification of whether there has been a breach of a fundamental ILO convention is not here left to the lay opinion of the decision-maker in the public entity. The ILO has extensive and long-established machinery for determining whether each state is in conformity with each of the fundamental conventions and each of the conventions that state has ratified. The UK fully participates in that machinery and those determinations. Why, then, I ask rhetorically, should the minimum standards of the fundamental international labour conventions, which are all ratified by the UK, not be included in the list of legitimate labour-related misconduct which procurement decision-makers can take into account under the Bill? I wait with anticipation to see whether the Minister will seek to justify their exclusion.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, when we debated paragraph 6 of the Schedule in an earlier group, I argued that it was inappropriate to include an international law exception in the Bill. Therefore, it will not surprise the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, to find that I do not support the extension to paragraph 6 that his Amendment 30 seeks to achieve.

The briefing sent by the Palestine Solidarity Campaign asserted that without this amendment, the Bill could compel public bodies to contravene the genocide convention. This extraordinary statement was explained in the context of the much-publicised opinion of a number of UK lawyers, including the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, that the International Court of Justice had ruled that there was a plausible case that Israel has committed genocide. As the then President of the ICJ subsequently made clear, this is a complete misinterpretation of the ICJ’s judgment. Judge Joan Donoghue, the then President of the ICJ, has stated that the court decided that the Palestinians had a plausible right to be protected from genocide and that South Africa had the right to present that claim in court. However, to correct something that is often said in the media, the court did not decide that the claim of genocide was plausible. So the items of international law referred to in the amendment, including the genocide convention, basically have the name “Israel” etched on them. Whether by design or otherwise, this amendment would simply make it easier for public authorities to find excuses to boycott Israel and it would be very damaging if this amendment were accepted into this Bill.

Amendment 32, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, raises rather different issues. I am conscious that I am in dangerous territory because of the acknowledged expertise in labour law of the noble Lord compared with my ignorance of labour law. However, it is my understanding that the ILO conventions do not have direct effect in the UK. I thought that we achieved compliance through our domestic legislation. The noble Lord spoke about ILO matters on the last Committee day and, while he made the point that the UK is bound by the ILO conventions, I do not think that he claimed that they had any direct effect in UK law.

If I am correct, this amendment is a very unwelcome addition to the Bill because it seems to give full legal effect to the ILO conventions directly. These conventions are not drafted as stand-alone laws but in rather broad terms. They lack a lot of definitions and the language is often rather vague. That is why national Governments have to adopt them using their own legislation. I am not speaking against the ILO conventions; I have no views one way or the other on the conventions. My point is that we comply with these conventions through our national law and that law is the foundation of labour-related misconduct, which is covered in paragraph 8. It seems to me that paragraph 8 means that we can hold overseas suppliers to the same standards to which we hold UK suppliers. In particular, it aligns with the provisions of the Procurement Act which was passed last year. That is a wholly proper basis for this Act, rather than some broader concept of principles that cannot be read directly into our law.

[Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I rise to offer a few remarks on these two amendments.

Amendment 30 does not really extend what paragraph 6 already does, because the expression “international law” in paragraph 6 includes everything that Amendment 30 mentions. My criticism of it, aside from the points that were discussed on day 3, is that it is just redundant. “Convention” is just another term for “treaty” and “obligations under international law” will include obligations arising under treaties to which the United Kingdom is a party. They will obviously include the genocide convention. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is not a convention or a treaty but a resolution of the General Assembly, but it is widely believed to reflect customary international law and so is binding on the United Kingdom.

The reference in the amendment to the Security Council resolutions is also unhelpful and confusing. Security Council resolutions will be binding on the United Kingdom provided that they contain decisions under Article 25 of the United Nations charter, because it is the decisions of the Security Council that are binding on member states. Those resolutions will be binding on the United Kingdom, whether we supported them or whether we abstained in those votes.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

I shall follow the line taken by the noble Lord, Lord Beith, who quoted from the Government’s Explanatory Notes. This is the House of Lords wording in the Explanatory Notes: it was supposedly toughened up following discussion in the Public Bill Committee in the House of Commons. So we have this explanation in front of us and I shall just quote again what the noble Lord, Lord Beith, quoted, which is that

“councillors of a local authority are not a public authority and, therefore, are not prohibited from expressing support for or”—

my emphasis—

“voting in favour of a motion supporting a boycott”.

Can the Minister give us an assurance? If councillors vote for a boycott, which they are entitled to do, according to the Explanatory Notes, and if that boycott motion is passed, enforcement action is taken and ultimately a civil penalty can be levied, is there any prospect whatever of those councillors who voted for the boycott motion being surcharged? Because the prospect of that must clearly be a limitation on their ability to speak.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, as a Conservative, I believe absolutely in the right to freedom of speech, but I do not think that the limits on freedom of speech in Clause 4 are as great as some noble Lords have tried to make out. I do not think that Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights is something that affects the rights of individuals, and Clause 4 is fundamentally aimed at public authorities. I completely understand that there is a very small number of public authorities who can be individuals as well, but, as my noble friend the Minister explained at Second Reading and as the Explanatory Notes make very clear, the prohibition on statements is against public authorities and attaches to individuals only to the extent that they are speaking for the public authority. Even if it applies to the statements made by individuals on behalf of the public authority, the ban applies to the public authority and the enforcement action is taken against the public authority. So individuals are not targeted by Clause 4.

We have to remember that this is not an academic issue. We already know that councils are starting to pass BDS motions and they are against this Bill. We know that the student encampments are including demands or public statements on the conflict in the Middle East and on divestment. They may not get all their demands, but that is certainly where they are pushing towards. Without the Bill, I think we can be fairly sure that BDS activities and statements will continue to increase and that will have an impact on social cohesion, and a particular impact on the Jewish communities that are affected by the sorts of statements that are made.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

The noble Baroness said that she is afraid that BDS statements will increase. Is she in favour of preventing such statements in unavoidably lively public debate?

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

Yes, I am against statements being made by public authorities. I am trying to make the distinction at the moment between public authorities and the individuals who are involved in those public authorities, who I think are hardly affected by this, except to the extent that they speak for the public authority. I think there is a case for taking a position against statements by public authorities, because of the impact on social cohesion.

We have to remember that this provision does not come from nowhere: it is rooted in the real, live example of what happened in Leicester Council back in 2014. It passed a BDS motion and then said, “only as far as legal considerations allow”. At that time, that was hugely divisive in the local community. It does cause very real harm and that is why this is so different from the kind of example that the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman, gave at the beginning, about wanting to make a statement about stealing my noble friend’s excellent handbag. This is about social cohesion, at the end of the day; that is why this provision is in here.

[Lord Warner (CB)]

I have listened with interest to the noble Baroness. Can she explain why the rather talented and experienced Constitution Committee took a totally different view from her and was so concerned about Clause 4? Why is she saying that, in effect, it has got this wrong—that it should not be saying that Clause 4 should be removed from the Bill but should welcome it as delivering the requirements of the Bill? I am rather puzzled.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

I have never been a member of the Constitution Committee—I am certainly not a current member—so I simply cannot answer that question. I do not know why it has reached the conclusions that it has, but I believe that they are not in accordance with the impact of Clause 4 as drafted.

When dealing with stopping people doing things and making judgments about whether doing so is right, a balance always needs to be struck. In this case, the Government have tilted the scales in favour of social cohesion. People may think that that is the wrong decision and that allowing elected officials to speak on behalf of an authority in the way that they want to is a price worth paying. I believe that, because of the limited nature of Clause 4 as drafted, it strikes the right sort of balance in this case.

We must remember that this Bill does not stop elected officials speaking in their own capacity, nor does it stop bishops doing so—not that that would ever be an easy thing to do. Individuals in public life can have a big impact on social cohesion, but they are not debarred by this Bill from giving their own views on BDS activities, even though they would have such an impact. In that sense, this Bill is a modest change to the status quo on public statements. It is certainly not as far reaching as people have tried to make out. I would like to get a little balance in this debate.

[Lord Hendy (Lab)]

My Lords, the noble Baroness asserted that Clause 4 does not apply to individuals but only to entities. Clause 4 says:

“A person who is subject to section 1 must not publish”,


and so on. In law, a “person” could be a corporation or an individual, but Clause 1 is quite clear in referring to a “decision-maker”, which can clearly be an individual. One can easily visualise a public entity where the decision is made by one person who has had authority delegated to them, a committee or group of people who have the power to make such a decision or the full council, body or whatever it may be. Clearly, Clause 4 is capable of being directed at individuals.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

I hear what the noble Lord is saying. Clause 1 affects persons who are decision-makers. Decision-makers are defined in Clause 2, which uses the definition of public authority. As I said earlier, there are a very small number of cases where individuals can be decision-makers. It is not a question of people taking delegated authority to be decision-makers; if I were in a council and delegated to the chief executive, they would not thereby become the decision-maker. The decision-maker remains the public authority under the terms of Clause 2.

[Lord Warner (CB)]

I refer the noble Baroness to Clause 1(7)(b), not just Clause 1(7)(a), which says

“any person seeking to persuade the decision-maker to act in a certain way”.

That sounds to me rather like an individual.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

Indeed, but a person who is subject to Clause 1 is a decision-maker. The noble Lord has just referred to the person giving advice or the person seeking to persuade the decision-maker, but that person is not a decision-maker for the purposes of Clause 1, and therefore not for the purposes of Clause 4.

[Lord Warner (CB)]

With all due respect, Clause 4 applies to Clause 1(7)(b), which refers to an individual. We must perhaps ask the Minister to advise us on whether that is true.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

We discussed this very point on our first day in Committee, and I think I have stated the correct position on the interpretation of the Bill.

[Baroness Janke (LD)]

My Lords, to answer some of the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, the idea that individuals are not targeted is certainly not sufficiently reassuring to make local decision-makers feel protected. Most of what is in the Bill seems to be very much targeted at local authorities and their members.

It is perhaps worth while to point out here, in this unelected Chamber, that councils are directly elected and are accountable to their electorate. They are also obliged to report back to their constituents about such things as decisions that they have made. I was a former leader of a council, and I would have wondered, on seeing this Bill, having been asked why I had made a certain decision, whether replying in a certain way would mean that I was prosecuted, or perhaps that I was not able to reply because I am forbidden to speak about this. There is sufficient lack of clarity in the Bill to make people wonder about that. I do not think that it has been demonstrated otherwise. As the noble Lord, Lord Warner, said, the Constitution Committee sees this as a major threat to free speech. We need some more guidance on this.

I take exception to the idea that, somehow, statements from student encampments are equated with statements issued by locally elected authorities and their officials. They are not the same at all. Local authorities have a constitutional role, and they should be respected as such. The contempt that I have heard from some people in this Committee is unwarranted, given the lack of evidence of councils making such decisions as are prohibited in the Bill.

The idea that prohibiting such statements will have a good effect on social cohesion is much more likely to have the opposite effect. If people are told that they are not allowed to make statements, they are much more likely to try to find other ways of getting their messages across. The idea of oppression leading to better social cohesion seems to me to be a false premise.

I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman, that there is a complete failure by many of us in this Chamber to explain why Clause 4 is necessary. We have not really heard any good reason, other than the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, telling us it is for social cohesion.

On the idea that freedom of speech is offended by Clause 4, as the right reverend Prelate said, freedom of speech is a basic right and a cornerstone of democracy. Although we are an unelected House, we fight for democracy—I would hope—and stand by democratic principles, as has the Constitution Committee, as told to us by the noble Lords, Lord Beith and Lord Warner.

The practical issues with the Bill, as to how its provisions are actually enforced, is again something that needs clarity. As the noble Lord, Lord Warner, said at the beginning, we are discovering with the Bill that, the further we go with it, it really lacks clarity. Trying to establish what it is meant to do and how it is meant to do it seems to have defeated us so far.

We need much better clarification about the Human Rights Act. If the Constitution Committee of this House tells us that the Bill contravenes Article 10 of the Human Rights Act, we need to know how it is that Ministers are telling us that it is somehow compliant, as this is clearly not the case.

As the noble Lord, Lord Beith, said, to prevent people talking about issues important enough for them to be calling for a boycott is an outrage. The Explanatory Notes trying to maintain that somehow individual councillors will not be targeted or held responsible is totally inadequate if that is not going to be on the face of the Bill.

The clause deserves to be removed. I very much regret that it disrespects the role and responsibility of directly elected councillors and their officials. It has extreme overreach in trying to gag them and prevent them explaining their decisions, for which they are publicly accountable. I believe that contraventions of the ECHR are matters to be taken very seriously, so I want to hear from the Minister further explanation and further response to the recommendations of the Constitution Committee.

Economic Activity of Public Bodies (Overseas Matters) Bill

Baroness Noakes Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 14th May 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

My Lords, I will make three brief points from the view of a lawyer. An awful lot has been said very ably by previous speakers about the reasons why, particularly in relation to Amendment 27, there seems to be no disagreement. This has nothing to do with the politics of the Bill; it is to do with making certain that we make the lives of those who become members of the pension fund board acceptable. I do not want to say too much about the burdens of being on a board or being a trustee of a pension fund—I do not want to put people off—but we ought to legislate to make their life easier in an age where litigation risk is growing. This Bill adds to that litigation risk, which is the second factor that we should take into account. I will not go into Clause 5 now because we will come to it later, but we must take into account the extraordinary encouragement it gives to litigation.

Everyone seems agreed on the objective, particularly in Amendment 27, that financial risk and impact should be taken into account. It is baffling; it is bad legislation to rely on the words rather than to take two minutes to amend the Bill. I am sure this debate has cost more than the cost of putting the Bill right. It cannot possibly be about the parliamentary draftsmen’s pride. It is incomprehensible to me why we cannot put forward a short amendment to reduce litigation risk, make it more attractive to be a pension fund trustee and enable us all to go home a bit earlier.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, explained her Amendment 27 with great clarity, but I am afraid that I do not agree with her analysis of the problem, nor do I agree with the analysis of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, for reasons which I will now explain.

Financial matters have been my stock in trade for well over half a century, since I left university. I have been trying to work out what these additional words, “risk” and “impact”, would add to the concept of financial value. The term financial value is not a term of art in my world, the accountancy world, but I think that it means something along the lines of the worth of something expressed in money terms. What something is worth can mean what it is realised for in a market transaction, or what it is worth in terms of the financial benefits it is evaluated to or expected to bring. I believe that neither “risk” nor “impact” add anything to the meaning of financial value.

I start with risk. Risk will affect value, so any determination of what something would fetch in a market or what benefits it would bring would of course take account of the risks when doing the calculations of financial value. This is just 101 of calculating things in financial terms. That is effectively why the DWP documents refer to risk. They do not refer to documents about risk as an adjunct to financial value; they are just encouraging the identification of risks, because that is a normal part of a balanced evaluation. While I do not think that the word risk does any particular harm to the concept of financial value, I do not think that the word is necessary.

I have struggled a bit more with working out what financial impact means. The only thing I could come up with was something like the evaluation of the net costs or benefits to be obtained from what is being acquired, but I cannot see what financial impact adds to the meaning of financial value. In this case, it would be positively confusing to add financial impact alongside financial value, because it might encourage somebody to litigate on the basis that there was a difference between financial value and impact, as Parliament clearly meant something other than financial value by the concept of financial impact. That would be a failure on our part to create certainty in our legislation.

I would also like to comment on Amendment 46A, from the noble Lord, Lord Collins, which is in this group. I expect he will be speaking to it a little later. I could not understand why the noble Lord has chosen UN-related documents to refer to when trying to put what he calls “established investment principles” into the Bill. The UK Government have already announced a series of actions that they have implemented in relation to the UN guiding principles on business and human rights, much of it already in legislation and unaffected by the Bill. In response to those principles, the relevant parts of our legal system are already in place, and we do not need to refer to a UN document to get any further on investment principles; they have already been interpreted by the UK Government.

Furthermore, we already have a perfectly good Stewardship Code in the UK, issued by the Financial Reporting Council, which deals with ESG matters. I do not believe the Bill alters that at all, so long as ESG principles do not acquire a territorial dimension.

[Lord Collins of Highbury (Lab)]

There was a little throwaway remark there: that ESG principles will not involve territorial matters. There are many examples where it could be quite a big influence.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

The noble Lord picks me up when I used a bit of shorthand. I really mean the contents of Clause 1 and the moral disapproval in relation to territorial consideration. I was just trying to say that ESG principles are unaffected; they are in the UK system of corporate governance and stewardship, and they are unchanged by this Bill, except where those principles are used in the way described in Clause 1.

The UN principles of responsible investment are not even issued by a UN body: it is a private body that issues them. Those principles have no standing whatever in the UK, except to the extent that UK-based signatories sign up to them. In my view, it is a rather odd thing to be putting into the Bill to define investment principles.

The UN Human Rights Council, which owns this territory, is, like most of the UN, including the General Assembly, pretty anti-Israel. I have an underlying concern that using these UN-affiliated principles—to use a shorthand—is just another way of allowing divestment decisions in relation to Israel by the back door. I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Collins, does not intend for that to be the effect of his amendment, but I have a fear that it will be the outcome of it.

[Lord Collins of Highbury (Lab)]

When I speak to my amendment, I will make the case for it. I would actually put the noble Baroness’s arguments on their head: if the purpose of the Bill was to stop BDS campaigns, it should have been about that. Our problem—and my noble friend’s problem—is that it is going to be much broader in scope, and will include things that this Government want to achieve. That is why these amendments are quite important.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

I accept that this goes beyond the narrow BDS campaign that has been focused on Israel. Nevertheless, it is a concern for a number of us that the Bill will be effective as regards its impact on actions by UK public authorities towards dealings with Israel, which is why I raised it.

To finish, my concern on this score was underlined by the action of the UN human rights special rapporteur on the Occupied Palestinian Territories. This person wrote to the Local Government Pension Scheme in 2021 with a “request for action”, which included divestment from companies that are involved in the Occupied Territories. Here we have someone associated with the UN Human Rights Council telling our Local Government Pension Scheme to carry out divestment activities. That is why this whole area is so concerning.

[Lord Collins of Highbury (Lab)]

How does the noble Baroness think that that advice—I have not seen it—compares with the advice of her own Government in relation to the Occupied Territories?

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

I think we discussed this briefly on the previous day of Committee. The Government highlight the risks associated with dealings in relation to the Occupied Territories but do not call for divestment. Very explicitly, that is not the case.

[Lord Collins of Highbury (Lab)]

Is not the noble Baroness making my point? It is a risk which the Government have highlighted in their own policy on the Occupied Territories. They are illegal, and have no legal status, and that investment could be at risk. The noble Baroness should make up her mind about what she is arguing.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

The issue of risk is a separate issue, dealt with in the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Drake. I was talking about later amendments which seek to apply UN principles to local government pension schemes. This is a fairly large group, and I think we have got a little cross-wired on which issues affect which part.

To conclude, I know that the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton, has tabled a stand-part debate on Clause 12, which is in this group. I hope he is not serious about taking local government pension schemes out of the Bill. The actions of the special rapporteur in our domestic affairs are proof enough that we need local government pension schemes firmly within the Bill.

[Baroness Blackstone (Lab)]

My Lords, I strongly support what my noble friend Lady Drake has put forward in her amendment and very much hope that the Government will respond positively to it and accept it.

I listened carefully to what the noble Baronesses, Lady Noakes and Lady Altmann, said. I know that their arguments were made sincerely, but I was surprised that they were somewhat complacent in brushing aside the arguments put by my noble friend. Amendment 45 in my name adds to the important points raised by my noble friend Lady Drake, the noble Lord, Lord Willetts, and other speakers on the fiduciary duties of local government pension funds and their ability to consider risk.

Economic Activity of Public Bodies (Overseas Matters) Bill

Baroness Noakes Excerpts

Tuesday 7th May 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, my noble friend Lord Willetts and others have queried whether there is any evidence of a problem. It may be true that there is not much evidence of actual BDS activities by universities to date, but it is certainly true that there is a problem of anti-Semitism on campuses. It may also be true, as the noble Lord, Lord Mann, said, that it is less acute than in the United States—most things are less acute here than in the United States—but I do not think that means we should ignore it. It is clear that the accelerating protests on campuses are having a deleterious effect on Jewish students on campuses. Indeed, the Union of Jewish Students said only last week:

“Jewish students are angry, they are tired, and they are hurt by the continuous torrent of antisemitic hatred on campus since October 7th”.


I am not sure that gives the Union of Jewish Students a veto on whether the Bill should go through, but it indicates that there is still a very real problem.

The current round of student protests—the encampments and related demands—do seem, as I have seen reported, to include BDS demands on the universities. As far as I am aware, none of the universities has yet succumbed and changed its policies on BDS, but at least one has given in to some other demands, such as renaming buildings and changing some other organisational arrangements, and we cannot be sure what universities will do in the longer run. The Bill would close the option of them ever implementing BDS policies and would therefore be one small step to closing that route off and helping to create an environment for Jewish students, who would be even more oppressed if the universities publicly announced BDS policies against them. I do not think it is a very big item, but I do not agree with the noble Lord, Lord Mann, that the Bill does nothing. I think it does something towards closing off an avenue that universities might be tempted to go down in order to see off the undoubted nuisance of all these student protests.

I would just like to briefly say something about the ONS as well. The ONS reviews all sets of bodies that are on the borderline between the public and private sectors at regular intervals, and it does it in a careful way in accordance with international definitions. These are all careful considerations. It is clear that universities are in a grey area: they are public authorities for the Human Rights Act, are included in the Freedom of Information Act and were included in the Procurement Act that we considered last year. They are already subject to a lot of the public sector laws, and nothing is going to change that. I agree with my noble friend Lord Willetts that this Bill will not be the straw that breaks the camel’s back, but it is always legitimate to ask on which side of the line these bodies that exist half in and half out fall.

Just being classified by the ONS does not of itself lead to other consequences. There may well be further considerations down the line, but we certainly cannot stop the ONS doing the job that it is set up to do, which is to consider classifications in accordance with international guidelines,

[Lord Leigh of Hurley (Con)]

My Lords, it seems to me to be fundamental to this Bill that universities and other relevant bodies are included. We are not talking about individual academics having their right to free speech being affected at all. We are talking about institutional behaviour. Yes, as the noble Lord, Lord Willetts, has pointed out, what happens in universities really matters. I also went on a trade trip to China with the vice-chancellors. I remember, because they were the ones sitting in business class. They are a very important part of the fabric of our society—

Economic Activity of Public Bodies (Overseas Matters) Bill

Baroness Noakes Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 7th May 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I rise to move the first amendment in this group, Amendment 18 in my name, with the support of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton. It must be read together with Amendment 29, which is also in this group. I shall speak to both of them together. These two amendments deal with the problem arising from the international law exception at paragraph 6 of the schedule.

A number of noble Lords highlighted this problem at Second Reading. In my speech, I referred to the opinion on the Bill by the Richard Hermer KC. I disagree with certain aspects of his opinion, but I agree with his analysis of the effect of paragraph 6 of the schedule. As he put it, a breach by the UK of an unincorporated treaty does not normally give rise to a claim under domestic law, but paragraph 6 of the schedule provides a domestic law foothold for such claims on a virtually unlimited basis. Unless the paragraph is amended or removed, the consequence will be that, contrary to the purposes of the Bill, local authorities, for example, will make their own determinations about UK compliance with international law obligations. If there is a dispute about the correctness of the position they have taken, that dispute will be decided by our courts.

We do not normally implement international law obligations on such an unspecified and broad basis. What we generally do is give effect to specific international law obligations in a manner that is clear, and thus consistent with the rule of law requirement of legal certainty and clarity. There are countless examples of this approach, from the Diplomatic Privileges Act 1964 to the Human Rights Act. In essence, what happens is that the implementing legislation identifies specific provisions in a treaty that are to be incorporated in domestic law, and sometimes those provisions will be listed in a schedule to the Act. The legislation will then create special rules or mechanisms that Parliament considers are required to give effect to those international law obligations. Examples include the declarations of incompatibility under the HRA and Foreign Office certificates under Section 4 of the Diplomatic Privileges Act.

Paragraph 6 of the schedule to the Bill does not do any of that. It purports to import the entirety of international law—potentially all treaties, whether incorporated or not—in every rule of customary international law, and invites decision-makers to consider for themselves whether their decisions will be compliant with any such international law. It is an inherently uncertain and unclear provision. Moreover, the international law obligations that might be relevant in this field are contested and unsettled.

This is particularly the case for international legal rules on the duties of third parties vis-à-vis a serious breach of peremptory rules of international law—most notably, Article 41 of the International Law Commission’s articles on state responsibility provides for three very general obligations for states faced with a serious breach of international law by another state. Those obligations are non-recognition, non-assistance and co-operation; but whether this rule entirely reflects customary international law and what it specifically requires of a state are not settled.

Public bodies would also have to determine for themselves whether they can avail themselves of the international law exception. That too requires a complex international law analysis. Whether an entity is a public body under domestic law is, of course, a question of domestic law, but whether the conduct of that body is attributable to the state on the international plain is a question of international law. Universities might be an example of public bodies under domestic law—we have been discussing that in previous debates on this Bill—but it is not the case that the conduct of a university would ordinarily be attributable to the state as a matter of international law.

The amendment that we propose would maintain the international law exception but add clarity to it by ensuring that regulations are adopted to include descriptions of considerations, including disregard thereof, to give effect to the UK’s obligations under international law. There may be a better formulation than the one we propose, but in essence the idea is to replicate the manner in which we have given effect to international law obligations that have not yet come into existence: for example, those that may arise in the future under decisions of the Security Council.

An example of this power is in the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018. It creates the power to make regulations for purposes of compliance with UN obligations and, more generally, for the purpose of compliance with any other international obligation. What happens in practice is that the Foreign Office lawyer, together with the Attorney-General, will consider the specific international law obligations that have arisen and then contribute to the drafting of clear, specific and precise regulations to give effect to those obligations. To be clear, the power that we are proposing will not, of course, replace the power in the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act. It would be in addition to that.

I understand that the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, take the view that that power in paragraph 6 may not be needed and could simply fall away. Our proposal is a compromise that reflects the reality that this is a sensitive area and we thought that embedding in the Act a power to make regulations for purposes of complying with international law may, in this context, be useful. I beg to move.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, I have Amendment 28 in this group and I thank the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for adding his name. I should first say that I am in complete agreement with the thoughts that lie behind Amendments 18 and 29, to which the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, has spoken so eloquently.

My Amendment 28 is simply a more direct way of dealing with the same problem. It deletes paragraph 6 of the schedule in its entirety, so that public authorities cannot use international law considerations as a means of avoiding the effect of Section 1 of the Bill. Public authorities are not experts in international law but might well seek to use ill-founded concerns about the UK’s adherence to international law as a smokescreen behind which they believe that they can hide their boycott activities. Put simply, it creates a huge loophole in the Bill.

I tried to compare the Bill with last year’s Procurement Act to see whether the exclusions in the schedule to this Bill are the same as the mandatory and discretionary grounds for exclusion in the Procurement Act. This was not easy, because it is clear that two completely different sets of draftsmen have been involved in the two Bills. However, the one thing that I am pretty sure of is that the Procurement Act did not have an international law exclusion ground, so the inclusion of paragraph 6 in the schedule to this Bill is somewhat puzzling.

I shall comment briefly on Amendment 31 in this group, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, and the noble Baroness, Lady Blower, because that would extend the range of things that public authorities could look at to breaches of international law outside the UK. Not only is this way beyond the Procurement Act exclusions as well, but it adds yet another loophole, making the loophole as big as it could possibly be in order to allow public authorities to justify boycotts. For that reason, I cannot support it. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s rationale for the inclusion of paragraph 6 in the schedule.

[Lord Hendy (Lab)]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 31 in my name and that of the noble Baroness, Lady Blower. I have no observations on the amendments that have just been spoken to.

Paragraph 6 of Schedule 1 disapplies the bar in Clause 1 of the Bill on a public entity, for want of a more precise definition, from taking into account political or moral disapproval of a foreign state’s conduct in making procurement or investment decisions in one particular situation. A procurement decision is defined in Clause 2(2) as

“a decision about a contract for the supply of goods, services or works to the decision-maker”.

Paragraph 6 applies where the decision-maker reasonably considers that its political or moral disapproval of a foreign state’s conduct is relevant to whether the procurement or investment decision would place the UK in breach of its international law obligations. I have no problem with that at all.

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[Lord Deben (Con)]

My Lords, I remind the House of my declaration of interests. It is exactly from that position that I wish to ask a fundamental question of my noble friend. We spend an awful lot of time trying to get companies not to be complicit with the Government of Myanmar, for example, because of their actions. We are proud that there is a whole series of decent private and public companies that make decisions on those grounds. Are we sure that we should be in a position in which we will encourage public and private companies to make decisions on those grounds but specifically exclude the right of elected bodies—and some non-elected bodies, because they have been designated as public bodies—to make those decisions? I find that a very difficult position to support.

Part of the problem is that we are now in a complex and extremely uncertain area, which is why all the amendments before us are of considerable importance. They say that we are putting public bodies—we are not quite sure what they are—in a position where they do not know quite how they should behave, and we are opening them up to the opportunity of people taking them to court because the decision they have made has not been in conformity with what the plaintiffs suggest should have been their decision in relation to international law. At the same time, we are saying to them that they should not take into account the same things most of us would try to get private companies—and public companies, in that sense—to take into account.

We are getting into a real mess here, and I do not see that this is a carefully written Bill. Indeed, my last point is simply that this is a terribly badly written Bill. I do not know who thought it through. We have now had a series of people taking rather different views—as a matter of fact, I am unhappy about the particular way in which Israel is treated in the Bill. We are all taking different views, but we are all saying that the Bill is so badly written that people will not know how to deal with it.

This is a central concern for this House; we need legislation through which we can explain to people what is happening. If I may say to the noble Lords who put the amendments forward, it took a bit of listening to understand what their problem was, to put it bluntly. How on earth are we going to have public bodies coming to decisions when they have to read that to start with to understand what mess they might be in? I hope my noble friend will help me to understand how this Bill will be simple enough for it, first, to be enforced and, secondly, to be proper. At the moment, I feel it is improper, because it is so badly drafted.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, we should get this into perspective. I say to my noble friend Lord Deben and indeed to the noble Lord, Lord Hain, that this Bill is handling one particular aspect: fundamentally, boycotts and divestment decisions. There is a whole range of law in the Procurement Act, which we passed last year, which sets out the UK’s version of the procurement rules we used to take from the EU—they have been modernised for our own purposes, but they are still hugely complicated.

For a very long time, the Government’s own procurement advice to public bodies was that:

“Public procurement should never be used as a tool to boycott tenders from suppliers based in other countries, except where formal legal sanctions, embargoes and restrictions have been put in place by the UK Government”.


In many ways, this Bill provides a more liberal approach to that blanket proposition, which was in a government procurement policy note and which has been governing procurement for a long time. We need to see this Bill in context and in the light of the rather narrow area it is trying to deal with.

[Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)]

My Lords, unlike the noble Lord, Lord Hain, I think this is a rather good Bill, although I agree respectfully with him that these amendments, particularly those on international law, merit careful consideration by the Minister and the Government. I say that essentially for three reasons, and I can be brief.

First, the general approach in this country is that public bodies do not have their own interpretation of international law. It is the Government who assess international law obligations, because they are binding on the United Kingdom as a state.

That leads me to the second point, which might in part answer that made by my noble friend Lord Deben. The effect of the Bill as drafted is to introduce, by the back door, potentially vast swathes of international law into our domestic legislation. As I never tire of saying in this House, we have a dualist system: international law is not part of domestic law unless and until it is incorporated. So the answer to my noble friend’s point may well be this: if somebody were to say in a domestic court that a public authority was in breach of “the law” because it had not complied with some international law obligation that was not part of our domestic law, the public body’s obvious retort would be to say that it is not subject to that obligation.

The third point is a practical rather than legal one. My concern is that, in the real world, if the Bill is left as drafted it will in practice drive a coach and horses through what it really seeks to achieve, because the courts will be clogged up with arguments, even if they are entirely unmeritorious, as to the scope of international law. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, about Richard Hermer KC’s opinion: it is something of a curate’s egg, and I will perhaps come back to that in a later group. But I agree that, on this point, he is absolutely right to sound a note of warning and to highlight that the Bill as drafted risks undermining the Government’s ambitions for it.

I gently invite my noble friend the Minister to reconsider the Government’s approach to this international law question, which we can perhaps come back to at a future opportunity.

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[Lord Warner (CB)]

My Lords, I support Amendment 19, to which I have added my name, and I will speak to Amendment 48 in my name. Amendment 48 is focused on a simple question: does the statement of compatibility by the Minister on the face of the Bill comply with the terms of Clause 19(1)(a) of the Human Rights Act 1998, or would the Minister have been wiser to make a statement under the terms of Clause 19(1)(b) of that Act?

Just to remind the Committee, the Minister states on the face of the Bill that its provisions

“are compatible with the Convention rights”.

It is, of course, possible for Parliament to pass legislation that is not compliant with convention provisions. That is indeed provided for in Section 19(1)(b) of the 1998 Act. But if we adopt that course, we have to fess up to the fact that although Ministers are

“unable to make a statement of compatibility the government nevertheless wishes the House to proceed with the Bill”.

I recognise that some members of the Conservative Party would find it a badge of honour to flourish a statement of non-compatibility with the Human Rights Act, but I would not have placed the Minister in that group, so I am curious to find out what is going on.

First, however, I must own up to my personal involvement with and attachment to Section 19 provisions in the 1998 Act, when I was a senior policy adviser to the then Home Secretary. At that time, there was a robust debate about whether, despite the sovereignty of Parliament, legislation could be stopped if it breached ECHR provisions. Quite naturally, parliamentary sovereignty inevitably triumphed, but there was concern in the Labour Government at the time that they wanted proper consideration to be given to the ECHR when Bills came to Parliament. With my good friend the late and much-missed Lord Gareth Williams, a distinguished lawyer, Home Office Minister and later Leader of this House, we came up with the idea of a ministerial statement of ECHR compliance on the face of the Bill. That led to the drafting of what became Section 19 of the 1998 Act. This provision was intended to make Ministers stop and think carefully about human rights convention compliance before they introduced a Bill to Parliament.

It is quite difficult to see that this has happened with this Bill. Clause 4 as drafted is a straightforward gagging provision. It stops people openly discussing a full range of possible actions they might take to express their disapproval of an Israeli Government’s continued breaching of international law in Gaza and the Occupied Territories. This places the Bill in breach of Article 10 of the convention—the right to freedom of expression—and therefore in breach of Section 6 of the 1998 Act.

That is not just my view—it is the clear view of Liberty, Amnesty International and many others, including many parliamentarians. People cannot see how Clause 4 can be squared with Article 10 of the ECHR. Liberty has also argued that the Bill constitutes an interference with the rights of freedom of conscience under Article 9 of the ECHR, a view that I think is shared by Quakers, given their beliefs.

In these circumstances, I am at a loss to see how the Minister can make the statement on the face of the Bill that it is compliant with Section 19(1)(a) of the Human Rights Act. When I consulted the clerk about framing an amendment to delete the statement on the face of the Bill, I was told I could not do that. However, they helpfully suggested that I could insert a provision that after the passage of the Bill, there should be a review of its compliance with the Human Rights Act 1998 within a given period. That is exactly what Amendment 48 would do, with particular attention paid to compliance with Article 10 of the ECHR, the right to freedom of expression. If that review found that the Act was not compliant, the Government of the day would then have to decide whether they would go forward and implement the Act, in contravention of the 1998 Act.

I return to the question I posed at the beginning of my remarks. If the Minister still believes that she has placed the correct statement of compliance on the face of the Bill, I respectfully ask her to share with the House the source of the legal advice that convinced her it was the right thing to do.

I turn briefly to Amendment 19, to which I have added my name and strongly support. I will not repeat the persuasive arguments of the noble Lord, Lord Collins. This amendment is an important step towards making the Bill more compliant with the Human Rights Act 1998, but I fear that the Minister’s statement on the Bill’s compliance will not pass muster.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Collins, helpfully explained in his opening remarks the extent to which he agrees with the aims of the Bill but not the means chosen. However, his amendment could open a huge back door to councils and devolved authorities doing what they want in relation to BDS activities, because they would only have to dress up what they want to do as a statement of human rights policy. That statement is not even fully defined as regards what is meant by human rights. This could be a massive loophole. At the end of the day, it would still involve public authorities, including the devolved Administrations, in ignoring foreign policy as set by the UK Government. We must not allow ourselves to get away from the fact that that is crucial. We cannot have public authorities setting foreign policy.

[Lord Hain (Lab)]

My Lords, I follow on from the noble Baroness’s diktat position whereby central Government decide the policy and nobody else can have a view. That would undermine the position. It was the thrust of the noble Baroness’s earlier speech that the Minister indicated that it is for the UK Government to set foreign policy on boycotts and sanctions, and nobody else can do anything about it. As I pointed out at Second Reading, that would have made illegal the decision by many local authorities, universities and student unions to boycott products from apartheid South Africa, and I quoted a KC’s legal opinion confirming that.

How can the noble Baroness possibly justify her position, given the history of the downfall of apartheid, which is contrary to what she tried to suggest? The noble Baroness, Lady Deech, in a very unfortunate speech, tried to suggest that sanctions played no role. No serious student of the history of South Africa agrees with that position. Sanctions certainly played a part. But the boycott decision taken by many local councils, universities and student unions, in particular, among the public bodies covered by the Bill to refuse to source products from South Africa—and indeed, to impose sanctions and boycotts and to support Nelson Mandela’s being freed from 27 years of imprisonment—would have been illegal under the Bill. Why? Because the Government of the day in the 1980s, under Margaret Thatcher, did not support that boycott and sanctions policy. So all those local authorities and churches, including many archbishops, bishops and vicars, supporting those boycott campaigns would have all been acting illegally under the Bill if speaking for public bodies.

I want to speak especially to Amendment 19 and to notify your Lordships’ House that I do not wish to move my Amendment 49, in the sixth group, not least to spare Members hearing a further similar speech from me.

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[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

I merely said that it was not defined in Amendment 19.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

It does not need to be defined in Amendment 19 because it would adopt the normal practice of human rights, as defined in the definitions at the front of the Government’s annual report on human rights—which I am sure the noble Baroness reads on an annual basis, as I do.

As the noble Lord, Lord Hain, indicated, those human rights reports refer to a separate category of countries, the priority countries, and he named them: the A to Z is Afghanistan to Zimbabwe. The thrust of the Bill seems to suggest that, unless the Government, through legislation, put sanctions to limit trade with certain countries, any decision-makers would not be able to make any decisions about investing in that country. That is contrary to current practice with countries from A to Z on the priority list.

For example, other than the sanctions that exist against certain elements of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, the Bill would prohibit a decision-maker in the United Kingdom deciding not to invest in a Taliban state-owned enterprise. That is extraordinary. Under this legislation, a decision-maker would be prohibited from making a decision about investing in a mining or a gold company in Zimbabwe, which has had many concerns over human trafficking and other human rights concerns. That is also extraordinary, because unless the Government have put in trade sanctions, the Bill will prohibit any other decision-making.

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[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I am most grateful to the noble Lord as that leads on to my next question. It relates to those who are democratic figures in those countries and, indeed, our country.

As regards this country, my reading of this legislation is that, if I, in Parliament, call on the Government to sanction, let us say, a foreign Government’s Minister, or an enterprise or a body operating in another country—as I have done regularly in relation to the Wagner Group, by calling on British enterprises not to trade with those enterprises owned by the Wagner Group —I would be a person under this Bill whom a body would have to disregard. Not only are the Government seeking the nonsense that decision-makers should set aside due diligence on human rights, they are seeking to neuter parliamentarians raising the very concerns that we have raised on a regular basis.

I remind the Minister why this is so important: on 12 occasions, I had called for the proscription of the Wagner Group, and called on any British enterprises to desist from having any relationship with it, before the Government made the decision to proscribe it. Up until the point that the Government made the decision to proscribe the group, which I supported, I was in contravention of this Bill. I was in contravention of it on all the occasions that I called on the Government to do what I asked them to do, which they then did.

The nonsense of this legislation gets serious when it comes to Parliament raising human rights concerns about other countries. One country on the list is the DRC. A country not on the list is Rwanda. I have raised human rights concerns about the March 23 group in the conflict between Rwanda and the DRC. I am prohibited from calling on any British bodies not to trade with a group that is not currently proscribed by the British Government.

I refuse to be neutered in this Chamber, by this Bill, on raising human rights concerns. The Leader of the House is shaking his head from a sedentary position as to how I might be neutered by this Bill. I am sure that he has read the Bill. I am allowing him to intervene on me to explain why I am wrong in my interpretation of this Bill.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

I—

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I am talking about not the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, but the Leader. No, the Leader prefers to shake his head and not to intervene. In his absence, I can think of no better deputy than the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

I will answer the noble Lord’s question: he is not a “decision-maker” for the purpose of this Bill.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I am not a decision-maker for the purpose of this Bill but, under Clause 1(7)(b) of this Bill, I am considered to be a “person”. A decision- maker making a decision based on what I asked them to do would be prohibited. Now the noble Baroness is shaking her head. Why would I not be considered a “person” under Clause 1(7)(b)?

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[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, I am not going to waste the time of the House getting into these nitpicking debates. The noble Lord is not covered by this Bill.

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

I do not think that it is nitpicking. I would be considered a person when a body was making a decision based on what I called them to do. I know that I am not a decision-maker, nor am I a Minister of the Crown, nor am I an exempted officeholder, but I would be considered a person calling on bodies to act. If bodies choose to act on what I say, they are currently prohibited under this from acting.

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[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, I support the amendment introduced by my noble friend Lord Warner. It is conceivable that the Government’s objective of exempting the State of Israel—I say that carefully, the State of Israel—from the imposition of BDS, which I do not support, could be achieved with different drafting. However, to have introduced it in the way that it is introduced in Clause 3(7) is a mistake, and the mistake is compounded by mixing up completely different things: the State of Israel and the Occupied Territories, which certainly include the West Bank, east Jerusalem and the Golan Heights. They should not be treated in the same way. They are not part of the State of Israel in the view of the British Government, though they are in the view of the present Israeli Government. I repeat, they are not in the view of the British Government part of the State of Israel. Within those Occupied Territories—Golan, east Jerusalem and the West Bank—there are internationally illegal settlements. Illegality is another category on which the British Government’s policy is quite clear—just read the Security Council resolution, which has been quoted. Mixing these things up together is, frankly, a solution of disaster. It will just doom this legislation by including it.

I am not trying to suggest that it would not be possible to do something, though I doubt very much whether specifically mentioning Israel is a wise thing in the first place. I agree with the Government that public bodies should not be making foreign policy, but I am not sure that specifying one country out of 194 where they particularly should not be making foreign policy is a very clever way of setting about that. If you took that away and tried to sort out these unhelpfully mixed-up elements, there might be a better chance of this Bill making progress. So long as they are all mixed up together, we will have a cat’s cradle of contradictions.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Warner, said that this Bill will increase anti-Semitism. That is one view. I prefer to observe what is actually happening. We only have to look at what is happening in universities at the moment; we will come on to universities in a later group.

If we look at what has been happening with the encampments that have been springing up in the UK following what has been happening in the US, they are vocally calling for boycott and divestment in relation to Israel—and, indeed, quite a lot worse. This is a very live issue. It is causing much harm on campuses for Jewish students, who are clear that there has been a significant increase in anti-Semitism since this has started. This is not theory; it is actually happening.

Israel is always the focal point for BDS campaigns. The BDS movement itself came into being to attack Israel. I am glad that we are aligned with the noble Lord, Lord Collins, on the need to protect Israel from those activities. From my perspective, if the Bill does nothing else, it should try to protect Israel from boycott and divestment activities. That is why we need Clause 3(7): it underlines the importance of Israel and the particular attacks on Israel.

I accept that the Occupied Territories raise much more difficult issues. In line with the international community, the UK recognises the settlements as illegal, but the practicalities are that this will not be settled conclusively until there is a two-state solution. This is something that cannot be imposed; it will have to be agreed, but that is unlikely to happen very soon. Anyone who has been to Israel or has been in touch with people in Israel will know that the attacks by Hamas on 7 October have left a traumatised Israeli people, for whom the possibility of discussing a two-state solution seems almost unthinkable at this point in time. That is not to deny that that is the right solution in the long term but simply to say that it does not appear to be an immediate, practical problem.

The reality on the ground is that, in the meantime, the unsatisfactory nature of the Occupied Territories is likely to continue. Even if we thought that boycotts and divestments in relation to the Occupied Territories would punish Israel, this ignores the simple fact that there is economic activity in those settlements. Anything that harms that will almost certainly harm Palestinians as much as it harms the people of Israel. We only have to look at what happened when SodaStream, an Israeli company, was forced to withdraw from its activities in the occupied West Bank. The people who really lost out were the Palestinians who lost good, well-paid jobs when that facility had to close.

On our last day in Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Collins, pointed me to the FCDO guidance, which I duly went and read; he has read much of it into the record today. The important thing about that guidance is that, although it highlights the risks involved, it does not prohibit anyone in the UK from investing or dealing with those who are active in the Occupied Territories. I believe that this Bill reflects that pragmatic position—that the Occupied Territories are a fact of life—and that, until there is a two-state solution, trying to eliminate it from the Bill does not reflect the practical politics we are facing.

[Lord Collins of Highbury (Lab)]

I did indeed read it into the record. Although it did not prohibit investment, it was saying, “Don’t do it. The risks are great. Be aware of those risks and seek legal opinion on them”. We are now debating a Bill that will say that you cannot make a decision based on the advice that the Government have issued.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

The noble Lord is right that the FCDO highlighted the risks and said that businesses involved should seek their own legal advice but it absolutely did not say, “and you mustn’t do it”. It is a fact of life that there will be economic activity in the Occupied Territories and that that may or may not involve businesses from Britain.

The only point I am trying to make is that the Occupied Territories are a fact of life at the moment; there is no easy solution and it is probably not a near-term solution. At the point when it is settled via a two-state solution, they will cease to be Occupied Territories, so that bit of the Bill will cease to have any relevance—but, for the moment, it has relevance. The other point I am trying to make is that anything that deliberately harms that is just as likely to harm Palestinians as it is Israeli citizens.

[Baroness Blackstone (Lab)]

My Lords, I am puzzled by the speech that the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, has just made. First of all, I do not know why she feels that she can speak up on behalf of the Palestinians or how much time she has spent on the West Bank. I do not think that most of them would agree for one moment with anything she said about the proposal that we should stop, or that including Israel and the Occupied Territories in the Bill would damage the Palestinians. The Palestinians are concerned about their basic rights both to have their own state and to be able to live in what is now occupied by the Israeli Government and the Israeli Defence Forces in the completely different way that that occupation has created.

I am also very puzzled by what she said about anti-Semitism, which is in complete conflict with what was said by Margaret Hodge MP, who has thought about this very deeply—that the Bill is damaging from the point of view of creating anti-Semitism rather than alleviating it. The noble Baroness does not really respond to that point but has made points about what is happening in universities at the moment, which does not seem terribly relevant to this.

However, the point I really want to make is not to address the rather odd speech by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes. I want to ask the Minister: what legal advice have the Government taken about including the Occupied Territories in the Bill in the way that they are? I draw the Committee’s attention to what the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, said: under international law, which we have accepted, this occupation is illegal and the settlements, which have grown and grown, are also illegal. So how can it be that the Government bring to Parliament a Bill that includes the Occupied Territories and does not differentiate them from the state of Israel? The counsel’s advice that I have seen says that to distinguish them is absolutely essential; it is pure sophistry to say that a distinction is made in the Bill and is an untenable view without any legal merit. I wonder whether the Minister would like to comment on that.

Economic Activity of Public Bodies (Overseas Matters) Bill

Baroness Noakes Excerpts

Wednesday 17th April 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Randerson (LD)]

My Lords, I rise to speak specifically to Amendment 20A, to which I have added my name. I did so because the Bill is yet another intrusion on devolution. It is part of a pattern by which Bill after Bill in this House, Act after Act produced by this Government, raids the powers of devolved Governments and the devolved Assemblies. The Internal Market Act started that, along with the Procurement Act—and there are others. It is a complete pattern by this Government; an intention to reduce devolution in stature and in practice.

As a Wales Office Minister between 2012 and 2015, I recall that it was unthinkable that we, as a UK Government, would ignore the need for an LCM on something like this. We have now got to the point where it is routine for this Government to do that. In addition, in the case of this Bill, the unpredictability of Henry VIII powers will give the opportunity to the Secretary of State to make regulations that could have additional, profound implications for both Wales and Scotland, and throughout the UK.

The Government seem to forget the history of devolution. In 1999, when devolution was established, the Scottish Parliament had a much more comprehensive settlement than that provided for Wales. That proved to be a mistake. It was not just that Wales had fewer powers. The lack of a proper pattern to those powers and a comprehensive picture of them made it very difficult to make devolution work. I am conscious that I have signed an amendment led by the noble Lord, Lord Hain, and that I am criticising the Government of whom he was a part. I am sure he would agree that Labour First Ministers led campaigns to increase the powers of the Welsh Assembly, now the Welsh Senedd, specifically because it just did not work with much more limited powers. We now have something much more workmanlike, effective and constitutionally coherent. This Government have set about dismantling it again.

Added to that, the Bill is unnecessary. In the Senedd, the Minister made it clear that the Welsh Government are of the view that the UK Government have sufficient powers in place within the World Trade Organization Agreement on Government Procurement, enshrined in the Public Contracts Regulations 2015, and that those powers enable fair and equal treatment of overseas bidders where there is a relevant trade agreement. They do not believe that there is any need for additional powers. The UK Government already have the power to set sanctions for trade. All these arguments and discussions that we are having are irrelevant because those powers already exist. The Welsh Government fundamentally believe that the powers in this Bill would have a significant impact on the freedom of public bodies and democratic institutions in Wales. They have the majority support of Members of the Senedd on this. The impact would be on their freedom to decide not to purchase or procure in a way that impacts on their existing legal obligations in relation to human rights, abuse of workers’ rights and the environment. In practice, these powers are not going to fit comfortably with the structure of our legislation as it currently exists.

The fundamental reason why I signed this amendment on behalf of the Liberal Democrat Benches is that this is yet another impact on devolution and the coherence and effectiveness of the way in which the Governments of the United Kingdom should work together in a positive and effective manner.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, I think that noble Lords who have spoken have misrepresented the devolution settlement. It is clear that foreign policy is a reserved matter. When we come to this Bill, the question of the political or moral disapproval of the conduct of foreign states is a matter of foreign policy that can be determined only by the UK Government.

Noble Lords have been trying to describe devolution as they would like it to exist but the plain fact is that foreign policy is a reserved matter, and that is what is driving this. I do not think that the other matters that the noble Baroness, Lady Randerson, just referred to prevent action by the devolved authorities because of the quite extensive exemptions, which align with the procurement legislation, that are set out in the Schedule. We are talking about political or moral disapproval of state conduct, very specifically, and that is a matter reserved to the UK Government.

We have to remember that the devolved Administrations have form here in relation to Israel. To take the Scottish Government, back in 2014, they issued a Scottish procurement policy note which, in effect, encouraged Scottish bodies to boycott operations in the Occupied Territories. That note, which is quite difficult to find on the internet nowadays, because it seems to have disappeared into a black hole of an archive, was reconfirmed by current Scottish Ministers only a couple of years ago, so it remains the Scottish Government’s policy, which they cannot effectively implement because of the reserved nature of foreign policy.

To take the Welsh Government, in 2020 they informed the Welsh Parliament that they intended to issue advice to all Welsh authorities

“that they may exclude from tendering any company that conducts business with occupied territories either directly or via third parties”.

It was only after intervention from an organisation called UK Lawyers for Israel that the Welsh Government deferred their decision. So we have the Scottish Government and the Welsh Labour Government itching to boycott Israel, and to use that as a reason—

[Lord Hain (Lab)]

The noble Baroness accurately quoted the Welsh Government’s position as referring to occupied territories which are illegally occupied, including those determined by the British Government, not as boycotting Israel.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

Whether that is relevant is another matter, because the boycotting of the Occupied Territories would also cause a problem under this Bill if Wales and Scotland were allowed to, in effect, opt out of the Bill.

[Lord Collins of Highbury (Lab)]

I am sorry to interrupt again, but has the noble Baroness had the opportunity to read the FCDO’s advice on the Occupied Territories?

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

The noble Lord has the advantage of me, because the straight answer to that is no. However, if he points me to it, I shall certainly read it before we consider that again. I believe that trying to boycott the Occupied Territories is the same as trying to boycott Israel. Certainly, the intent is the same, and they are covered by the Foreign Office.

[Lord Collins of Highbury (Lab)]

I am sorry to labour the point. The noble Baroness keeps using the word “boycott”. We are also talking about decisions on procurement and investment, and there is advice from the FCDO about investing in occupied territories.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

I was referring largely to procurement because those were the decisions that were made by the two devolved Administrations that I cited. I would be very surprised if the FCDO had advice that boycotting procurement decisions relating to the Occupied Territories was something that it approved of, and therefore it was something that it thought the devolved Administrations could do. However, in any event, that is for the Foreign Office, not the devolved Administrations, to determine. I do not think we can get away from the fact that the current devolution settlements give foreign policy autonomy to the UK Government.

[Lord Warner (CB)]

My Lords, I have listened to this debate with some astonishment. I will not raise the issue of the ECHR; we will come to that when we get to my Amendment 48. However, to keep chanting the view that it is for the national Government to make foreign policy seems to be ducking out of a fundamental democratic issue.

Economic Activity of Public Bodies (Overseas Matters) Bill

Baroness Noakes Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 17th April 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, I share many of the concerns explained by the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire. That is why I tabled Amendments 11 and 12, which are in this group. Like the noble Lord, I thought this Bill was about public bodies, because that is what appears in the title. He read out the definition that we are invited to use in Clause 2, which is the definition in Section 6(3) of the Human Rights Act. It is clear from that that it can capture private sector bodies, which is why I first got interested in this topic. I tabled Amendment 12 in order to probe the extent to which private sector bodies are going to be dragged within the ambit of the Bill.

I have done more research on that since Second Reading. Like the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, I have been ploughing through some of the legal cases on the definition in the Human Rights Act. It is clear that private sector bodies can be captured, but it is also probably fair to say that the courts have been tending to give a fairly narrow interpretation of that, so that private sector companies have been caught only in relation to where they are very clearly involved in delivering or exercising public functions.

Amendment 14, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Collins, seeks to ensure that bodies caught within the definition in respect of public functions are captured only for the extent of public functions. It seems to me that that is unnecessary because of Section 6(5) of the Human Rights Act, which says much the same thing in a slightly different way. I would go further and suggest that private sector bodies, and private sector companies in particular, should not be within the ambit of the Bill.

When I was carrying out some research, the one thing that I did learn was that the definition of public authority is not clear. In fact, probably the only clear thing is that if any body is in doubt, it has to take its own legal advice. The noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, referred to this problem in her Second Reading speech, as did the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Southwark. I shall make a plea on behalf of SMEs, which I know are very close to the heart of my noble friend the Minister: they find uncertainty very hard to bear, so having a definition which is uncertain seems to be a problem.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, on the previous group of amendments I explained that I was concerned about the lack of certainty involved in the definitions. However, I feel the debate on this group has engineered more uncertainty than in fact exists.

My noble friend the Minister explained that the Government used the Human Rights Act definition because there is 25 years of jurisprudence, and the noble Lord, Lord Stevens, helpfully suggested that the Government update their understanding of what that definition means. I believe that most of the bodies know whether or not they are subject to the public sector duty involved in the Human Rights Act—not all of them, and there are certainly issues at the margin, but we need to get this in proportion. For example, I suspect that most of the bodies that the right reverend Prelate referred to already know whether or not they are subject to the human rights duty in Section 6 of the Human Rights Act. So although I continue to believe that clarity is important and that we need to find ways of achieving that clarity, we should not overstate the difficulties of establishing who is within the terms of the Bill and who is not.

[Baroness Blackstone (Lab)]

My Lords, could the Minister comment on the actual functions of some of these so-called public bodies? I assume that secondary schools will be regarded as public bodies. They have a wide range of functions focusing on educating the children who are pupils there, but they are also responsible for the development and improvement of their school buildings. Let us take the example of a school that has an extremely rich alumnus who wishes to reward it for the excellent job it did in educating him, and allocates to it a very large sum of money to put up a completely new building: will that be caught by the Bill’s scope, so that the school has to decide whether it will be found to be breaking the law because it takes into account moral and ethical considerations in its purchase of goods for providing a very large new school building? These are the sorts of questions that people will face, and I am not sure that the governors of most state secondary schools will be terribly familiar with Section 6 of the Human Rights Act; nor will they find it that easy to get advice about it. Perhaps the Minister could comment on that sort of situation.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Boateng (Lab)]

I think the Minister, or those who advise her, has misunderstood the point I raised in relation to the orchestra. The orchestra is putting on a concert version of “The Rite of Spring” as part of a Stravinsky festival. That festival is being held in a number of cities throughout the world. It is booked to appear at the new opera house in Dubai. It puts out a tender for ballet companies to provide the dance section of “The Rite of Spring” for this concert version. It specifically precludes in its procurement—so perhaps those who advise the Minister can reflect on this—the national ballet company of a country that has recently invaded a sovereign nation because it does not wish reputationally to be linked with that national ballet company. That is quite clearly a procurement. Is the Minister saying that that would not be covered by the Act and that the fact that the orchestra concerned receives a proportion of its funding from the public purse does not make it fall within the ambit of the Act? It is to that question specifically that an answer would be helpful. If she cannot give that answer, it demonstrates very clearly the concern about ambiguity that all contributors to this debate have articulated.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

The noble Lord, Lord Boateng, has concentrated on the procurement decision, but before you get to decide whether a procurement decision is relevant, you have to decide whether it is a public authority—so it will come back to whether the orchestra is a public authority before getting to any issue about whether a procurement is covered.

[Lord Boateng (Lab)]

That is what we want an answer to: is it a public authority for that purpose because it receives public funding?

Economic Activity of Public Bodies (Overseas Matters) Bill

Baroness Noakes Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 20th March 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Leigh of Hurley (Con)]

My Lords, I apologise for my not being able to speak at Second Reading, although if I had, I would have agreed with my noble friend Lord Wolfson on much of what he had to say. I also apologise for slightly jumping the gun on the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, particularly as what he said was so interesting and informative.

I just wanted to question Amendment 1. If one is seeking clarity and certainty, introducing the idea of having a

“primary or sole factor in the decision”

seems extremely difficult to prove, whereas showing that the decision was “influenced” is much easier and, as I understand it, a recognised legal term.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, I have problems with all the amendments in this group. Amendment 1 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, would elevate “political or moral disapproval” to be the sole or main factor, and the noble Lord, Lord Palmer of Childs Hill, wants to introduce the concept of materiality into influence. Both these would just create huge loopholes, which would allow public bodies to conceal their boycott activities within other factors. Clever lawyers would find ways of writing papers which support decision-making in, say, local authorities or other bodies affected by the Bill, by reference to a whole load of other factors, to support the claim that they were not “materially” influenced by their disapproval of a foreign state, or that it was not the sole or main factor. I genuinely have a problem with the watering-down implied by Amendments 1 and 2.

I listened very carefully to what the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, said about his amendments. I understand that he is trying to find a way through by removing the reference to “political or moral disapproval”, but I am not convinced that his amendments work either. In particular, I am not sure what the restriction to “that territory” in his Amendment 4 will do. Let us suppose that the territorial consideration is Ukraine, because it has to relate to a particular foreign territory by virtue of subsection (3). Does that mean that the decision-maker must have no regard to what is happening in Ukraine itself? It seems to me that “that territory” can be related only to the territorial consideration referenced in subsection (2). In that case, it would be Ukraine. If, say, Russia is the foreign state you have a problem with, it seems that you can take account of its activities only in Ukraine. You could not take account of activities that were not in Ukraine—for example, attacks from other places, such as the Black Sea, or whether it takes children from Ukraine back to Russia. If you thought that Russia was the territory—still restricting it to one territory—you have the problem the other way around; you could take activities only in Russia, but not in Ukraine, which is the fundamental problem. That creates an interpretive problem.

While these distinctions might not matter if we are talking about Russia and Ukraine, if you try and then relate it to a council or other public body trying to boycott Israel, and relate that to the complexities of the different parts of the territory around the State of Israel, you may end up finding some odd conclusions on how the reformulation might work in practice. I am aware that the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, is a very clever lawyer and I am not, and I may well have completely misunderstood how his amendment is intended to work.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, because this is the first group, I again state that I think that a lot of these amendments are trying to establish what is intended by the Bill, in a probing way. In that sense, they are very helpful for clarification on the language used. It was clear from Second Reading that most of the people who have since tabled these amendments and are speaking now are not in any way defending BDS; it was clear to me anyway. These boycott schemes are censorious and illiberal, and very often, as was stated at the time, the seeding ground for anti-Semitism in public life. In that sense, I oppose them; I am just not clear how the Bill will actually tackle them.

As we speak, just to use an example, the Rio Cinema in London has just cancelled its Eurovision party on the basis that it will not hold it while Israel still has somebody in the Eurovision Song Contest. I do not know whether this is self-declared BDS; it is a charity, and I am not quite sure how the Bill would apply. The point I kept trying to make at Second Reading was that, so often, I feel that the Bill will miss where a lot of the anti-Semitic censorship is occurring, around the periphery, rather than just in terms of divestment and investment, and so on.

I say that because those of us who are interested in tackling those issues need to have as much free speech as possible. I particularly support Amendment 6 from the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire—although both his amendments are interesting—which makes the point about

“any person seeking to persuade the decision-maker”.

That is what politics is, is it not? Trying to persuade a decision-maker—lobbying and trying to have an influence on politics—is surely the job we are all in, even if we disapprove of, in this instance, what someone is trying to persuade about. I just get anxious about this being in a Bill; it sets a dangerous precedent.

Points have been made well by other noble Lords about the use of the language of political and moral disapproval; I want there to be far more political and moral disapproval in politics today than there is. It is an entirely good thing to make that clear. I wish there was a bit more “political and moral disapproval” leadership in general, even though many of us arguing that would disagree over what it should be. That is fair, but it is far better than a kind of technocratic approach. Also, if we are to win the hearts and minds of many of the young people who go along with BDS campaigns, we will have to show our political and moral disapproval, and win them over and seek to persuade them. Noble Lords get the point, but it is not clear how the language in the section to which these amendments refer will help us to tackle the problem that the Bill seeks to address.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Johnson of Marylebone (Con)]

My Lords, I would also like to probe a little more on the meaning of “decision-maker” in a higher education context, following on from the excellent speech by the noble Lord, Lord Wallace.

Universities are often very decentralised in their structures, and power can be distributed quite far and wide. It is not always concentrated in the vice-chancellor’s office; nor is the governance of universities often as clear- cut as it might be. I would appreciate some clarity as the Bill proceeds on who exactly is going to be identified as the decision-maker in particular situations. Do we mean specifically decisions taken by the executive management team of an institution, principally the vice-chancellor? Do we mean, for example, student unions?

I noted that in my noble friend the Minister’s response to the noble Lord, Lord Mann, that student unions were—if I heard her correctly—out of scope, because they are private bodies. This confuses me a little, because I thought the whole purpose of the Bill, from a political point of view, was to address precisely this issue: student unions getting on their soapboxes and making statements about BDS, and all the rest of it. If they are out of scope of the Bill, I really wonder why universities as a whole are still in scope. It is not the vice-chancellors, academics or heads of department who are making these kinds of noises; it is the student unions. If I understood my noble friend the Minister correctly, they are not even covered. I really question why universities are still in scope at all, but that is a question we will come to later in Committee.

The final point on which I would like some clarity from my noble friend the Minister is whether a decision-maker will also be deemed to be an individual academic, who may manage a research budget. Will the use of that research budget by the individual academic be part of the decision-making process captured by the Bill? If so, how will that be squared with the legal duties on the OfS, among others, to promote academic freedom and freedom of speech in our higher education institutions?

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, it seems to me that there is a bit of confusion going on. Amendment 7, which takes out the words in Clause 1(7), relates only to who is carrying out the disapproval. It is just amplifying those people whose disapproval is taken into account, to see whether or not the clause is engaged. It is not trying to add different categories of decision-maker, because the reference to decision-maker is clear in Clause 2, which we will come on to in another group. It is that definition that then drives enforcement, et cetera.

I was interested in Amendment 55 of the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman—although I think it is actually the wrong amendment asking for regulations—because it highlights that decision-makers might be individuals under the Bill, which they can be. As I understand it, the definition of “decision-maker” in Clause 2 encompasses some individuals being the decision-maker from whom all these consequences might flow. That was a complete surprise to me because the Bill is titled the Economic Activity of Public Bodies (Overseas Matters) Bill—a manifesto commitment related to public bodies. I was completely amazed to find that individuals might be public authorities within the terms of Clause 2, and therefore decision-makers.

I was interested in the noble Baroness’s probing amendment, because I hoped that she would be using that to ask the Minister what kinds of individuals could be decision-makers under the definition that we are using—the Human Rights Act definition. The limited research I have done produced the example of a doctor. When a doctor is carrying out his NHS work, he could be a public authority for that purpose, but when carrying out his private work, he could not be. I did not find much more than that, and I am rather hoping that the Minister will be able to explain to us in rather more detail precisely which individuals are decision-makers within Clause 2.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, I, too, will speak to this amendment and do so, like the noble Lords, Lord Wallace and Lord Johnson, in relation to universities and higher education. I had some experience of that: I was on two university councils—those of Birmingham and Kent—and I chaired the Birmingham council for five or six years in the early part of this century.

I have to say to the Minister that, as a result of a lot of extremely desirable reforms, the decision-making at universities was concentrated quite heavily on the council. The council did not micromanage every decision, but it was responsible for every decision taken at the university. That responsibility was clearly focused on a much-reduced size of council, down from the 30s or 40s to the 20s, and it meant that a quite a lot of responsibility came on to its members, who were a combination of academics and lay persons—with a majority, on the whole, of lay persons. The lay persons on the council were volunteers and were not paid a penny. Now, if the vagueness in this bit of the legislation is retained, I would not like to be out there trying to recruit new members to university councils, if they thought they were going to be liable for any of the sorts of problems that could arise under this legislation.

I suspect that this is just one of many pieces of this legislation that reinforce the case for simply taking higher education and universities completely out of it. I think that is what we will come to when we get to Report. This is just the first illustration that it will have a remarkably chilling effect on the conduct of councils and the way in which people are prepared to serve—for nothing and as volunteers—on university councils, giving up many hundreds of hours of their lives to making sure that the university is properly administered and decisions properly taken.

Economic Activity of Public Bodies (Overseas Matters) Bill

Baroness Noakes Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 20th February 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, I welcome this Bill. The Government are right to legislate to stop public bodies engaging in boycotts of foreign countries or making equivalent investment decisions. It was a manifesto commitment in 2019 and I hope the Benches opposite will remember that as the Bill progresses. I am only sorry that it has taken over four years to get within sight of the statute book.

The BDS movement is Palestinian-led and explicitly aimed at Israel. It wants to weaken the State of Israel using economic weapons, but we should be in no doubt that it is part of a wider movement that denies Israel’s right to exist. The Palestinian BDS National Committee is interlinked with proscribed terrorist organisations, including Hamas. We saw on 7 October last year what that murderous organisation is capable of, and its leaders have been clear that Hamas is committed to replicating attacks like that until Israel is completely eradicated.

The BDS movement portrays itself as peaceful, but we should be in no doubt that BDS and Hamas draw from the same well. The BDS movement at its core is anti-Semitic. Anti-Semitism nowadays wears the clothes of being anti-Israel, but it is little different from the anti-Semitism that Jews have suffered down the ages. That is why it is so dangerous and why the Government are right to target it in this Bill. Our studies have shown links between BDS activities and acts of anti-Semitism. Sadly, anti-Semitic incidents have been rising in the UK since the events of 7 October. My noble friend the Minister reminded us of that. Noble Lords have spoken in your Lordships’ House in the past of how many in the Jewish community now are afraid in a way that they have not been in recent memory. This is a particular problem on campuses.

This Bill is a modest but important contribution to reducing the impact that the BDS movement can have on life in our society. It does not outlaw the BDS movement in the UK and it does not stop individuals or private companies exercising their rights not to deal with or invest in Israel. Companies such as Ben & Jerry’s can carry on trying to stop their products being available in Israel and people like me can carry on boycotting Ben & Jerry’s in return. The Bill confines itself to public authorities and is thus a proportionate response to a very real issue.

It is clear and settled policy that the British Government recognise and support the State of Israel. I am proud that we have stood by Israel in its recent actions to defend itself. It cannot be right that public bodies, funded by UK taxpayers’ money, should try to pursue a different foreign policy. Because foreign policy is a reserved matter, it is also right that this Bill extends to the devolved nations. Procurement may well be a devolved matter, but procurement does not exist in a vacuum and has to be set in the context of broader policies set by the Government—including their foreign policy.

I am a committed defender of freedom of speech. Concerns have been raised about Clause 4 and we have heard quite a lot about that this afternoon. I do not believe that fears about this clause are well founded, since the prohibition relates only to public bodies or persons speaking on behalf of public bodies. Even then, it applies only to statements about the contravention of Clause 1. It does not prohibit the expression of more general views and does not apply to statements made by individuals speaking in a personal capacity. I am sure that we can explore this in Committee, but the drafting is already pretty clear.

As we have heard, there are also concerns about Clause 3(7), which hardwires Israel and the Occupied Territories into the Bill. I support this because it is always Israel that is the target of BDS activities and this Bill needs to send a strong message about the unacceptability of that. I know that this raises difficult issues about the Occupied Territories and I am sure that these can be discussed further in Committee.

Another issue for Committee is paragraph 6 of the Schedule. This was described as “constitutionally unique” in evidence sessions in the other place. I was interested in particular in the remarks by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, on that subject and look forward to exploring it in Committee.

I hope that we can work at speed to get this Bill through to Royal Assent, because it has never been more important to ensure that anti-Semitism cannot take root in the activities of our public sector.

Succession to Peerages and Baronetcies Bill [HL]

Baroness Noakes Excerpts

2nd reading
Friday 9th February 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, I would not normally have expected to be in your Lordships’ House on a Friday and would not be if it were a question only of this particular Bill, but I have just been in the House for the debate on the conversion therapy Bill for five hours and I thought, as I was here, it would be worth staying on to discuss my noble friend’s Bill. He is aware that I cannot support it.

I abhor any form of sex discrimination, whether positive or negative, and I believe that, in principle, succession rights should not be confined to male heirs, as is the case with virtually all peerages and baronetcies. However, my noble friend’s Bill treats female offspring as second-class citizens. Under the Bill, daughters can inherit only if they have no brothers, and that is just not right. All that the Bill will do is entrench male dominance within families. It is misogynistic and it is the wrong direction of travel for our society.

Although I believe that, in principle, succession should be gender-neutral, I do not think it is of such great importance that it should take up the precious time allocated in your Lordships’ House for Private Members’ Bills. The issues addressed in the Bill do not affect the vast majority of the UK population, and I would rather this House focused on legislation, whether in Private Members’ Bills or in public Bills, on things that resonate with the public: crime, immigration, security and so on.

I say to my noble friend that it is an abuse of the Private Members’ Bill process to pursue private interests. My noble friend Lord Northbrook explained that he has a personal interest because of the composition of his own family, and he is using Parliament to further that private interest.

I am mystified by the retrospective element of the Bill. I personally am entirely comfortable with hereditary peerages becoming extinct. They serve no useful purpose in society, and their gradual disappearance would be mourned by few. But I would not waste any legislative time seeking to abolish them—as and when they die out, that would be fine. I have no idea why my noble friend has selected 6 February 1952 as the cut-off point—it seems somewhat arbitrary to me—but doubtless we can explore both the need for retrospection and the significance of the chosen date if the Bill proceeds to Committee.

As I have mentioned privately to my noble friend, a Committee would also need to examine what a “group of siblings” is, as mentioned in the offensive Clause 1(4). If a Peer marries several times, are all his children in one group of siblings, even if they have never met one another, or is the question of what constitutes a group of siblings to be determined as a question of fact in relation to each succession? Either way, that does not seem satisfactory.

This is a bad Bill that should not be given time in your Lordships’ House. If my noble friend seeks a Committee stage, I am sure the House will know what to do with it.

[Lord Hacking (Lab)]

Before the noble Baroness sits down, could she tell us how this matter could be remedied except through Parliament?

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

I am suggesting that this issue is of such little importance that we should not waste any parliamentary time on it.

Conversion Therapy Prohibition (Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity) Bill [HL]

Baroness Noakes Excerpts

Friday 9th February 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, I know that there is an advisory time limit of five minutes but this Bill raises very significant issues, so I hope that noble Lords will allow me a little more time than that. I thought that my noble friend the Whip on the Front Bench would like early notice of that.

I believe that we should apply stringent tests to any new legislation, particularly when criminal offences are created. There needs to be clear evidence of a problem, legislation has to be necessary to deal with it, the drafting must be clear and unambiguous, and the new law must avoid other harms. I believe that the Bill does not pass any of these tests, but I will concentrate my remarks on only the first test: namely, the evidence base for the Bill.

The Government have certainly tried to be evidence-based in their LGBT policies. In 2015, they commissioned an evidence review by the National Institute of Economic and Social Research, which said that

“the evidence base for an effective assessment of inequality and relative disadvantage by sexual orientation and gender identity is deficient and has major gaps”.

The Government then organised the National LGBT Survey in 2017, which got a lot of responses. The survey found that a very small proportion, 5%, had been offered conversion therapy and that an even smaller proportion, 2%, had actually undergone it. The respondents were a self-selected sample, which has obvious problems, and the survey did not define what conversion therapy was—a problem that we continue to face with this Bill—nor did it define what constituted being “offered” conversion therapy. The best that we can say about this survey is that it is interesting.

In 2021, the Government published three more studies. One tried to correct for some of the problems with the LGBT survey by weighting some of the data. It could not, of course, correct for the underlying problems of the survey, and so we might conclude that this study too is at best interesting.

The Government commissioned Coventry University to conduct a research review and a qualitative study. It reviewed 46 pieces of research in order to determine what forms conversion therapy takes and who experiences it. The vast majority of these pieces of research were North American studies, and only two came from the UK. If you go into the report’s annexes, you find the problems that Coventry University identified with most of the research that it reviewed. This included a lack of randomised controlled trials, reliance on retrospective self-reporting, self-selecting samples, and the use of a wide variety of conversion therapy methods without differentiating between them.

What did this research survey find? Not very much. The much-trumpeted finding is that there is no evidence that conversion therapy is effective at changing sexual orientation or gender identity. This is not relevant to the Bill. We do not ban something because it does not work unless it is itself harmful—to which I will return. The review found that no studies dealt with effectiveness in the context of gender identity, hence its conclusion—that there is no evidence to show that conversion therapy does not change gender identity—is best ignored.

The report also says that there is

“an increasing amount of quantitative evidence that exposure to conversion therapy is statistically associated with poor mental health outcomes”.

That sounds important, but the report explicitly found no causal connection between the two. This issue of causation is important, because there is considerable evidence that LGBT people in general have poorer than average mental health, and no attempt has been made anywhere to identify the impact of this.

The qualitative study was undertaken to identify the outcomes of conversion therapy. Coventry University interviewed just 30 people, including six who identified as transgender or non-binary, of whom three said that they had been offered conversion therapy. More than two-thirds of this sample said that they were Christians and 93% were white, and so the sample is both tiny and demographically challenged. From this base, the report highlights self-reported harms from conversion therapy. However, the detailed findings contain a somewhat grudging concession that one-third reported benefits from conversion therapy. So there we have it. From a rather flimsy research base, there is no evidence that conversion therapy actually causes harms, and while there are some reported harms from the tiny sample of 30, there are also reports of benefits.

Lastly, the Government Equalities Office produced a report which supplemented the Coventry research and concentrated on the differences between conversion therapies aimed at sexual orientation and those aimed at gender identity. This adds nothing of substance to the other studies. The small print records that there is next to no evidence on gender identity conversion therapy other than in relation to self-reported harms.

I must also refer to the findings of a survey carried out by the Ozanne Foundation in 2020; I anticipate that some noble Lords might refer to it. It reported some startling findings, including that conversion therapies had included beatings and rape, which are of course already criminal offences. Freedom of information requests to police forces have unearthed not a single documented case of violent conversion therapy in the past five years. Like other reports, it suffered from many methodological problems, including self-selection, incomplete reporting and retrospective reporting. It was demographically unrepresentative and quite simply does not constitute robust evidence.

I do not believe that there is a sound evidence base for the existence of a conversion therapy problem, let alone the harms that might be associated with it. The fact that LGBT lobbyists assert that there is a problem does not constitute evidence on which responsible legislators can rely. I know that, if the noble Baroness, Lady Burt, seeks to progress this Bill into Committee, many noble Lords, not all of whom are due to speak today, will want to engage closely in that process.