Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Lawlor Excerpts

2nd reading
Thursday 16th October 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

My Lords, I welcome the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, to the Front Bench to supplement the efforts of the indefatigable Home Office team on the Front Bench in the Lords.

I wish to speak about Clause 191, which decriminalises abortions for women ending their pregnancy at any stage to birth. The clause does not change the existing time limit of 24 weeks, after which an abortion will be a criminal offence, except under special circumstances, for medical professionals and for those who provide an abortion or assist a woman to procure one for herself. What will change is that the woman herself, who takes the steps to end her pregnancy at any stage up to birth, will not face criminal charges.

I am against such a change on three grounds—one procedural and two substantive. First, a private Member’s conscience amendment has been used to amend a government Bill, bringing the weight of the Executive to a matter of conscience. Moreover, by this procedure, a matter of great significance may be allowed to slip through, tagged on to the Crime and Policing Bill, avoiding the full national and parliamentary scrutiny that such major changes in a law require.

Secondly, it is selective in the application of the law in a way that goes against the very principle of law. It is bad in principle and practice to count some action as a crime for some people but not for others. In Clause 191, it is accepted that aborting a baby over 24 weeks old is normally a crime and that those involved should be punished, except for one—the pregnant woman who is the instigator of the action. Part of the very principle of what it is to be a law is that it is applied universally. There can be special factors, such as coercion, which relieve someone of criminal responsibility in particular circumstances, but not a blanket exception.

Moreover, there could be no greater denigration of pregnant women, and indeed all women, than to deny them the most basic right of all: to be judged morally and, when they have committed a crime, judged criminally. Abortion over 28 weeks is accepted as a crime by all. To say that pregnant women can commit it so long as they do so against their own children or own child—but nevertheless they are not criminals—is to treat them as less than fully human adults.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Lawlor Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 17th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I of course wish the Committee a very happy Christmas when that moment comes, but it was not just in seasonal spirit that I signed the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough. As he indicated, free expression is a two-way street, and I suggest that it is a two-way street in at least two ways: first, because all democrats, of whichever side of the aisle, ought to guard it jealously, and, secondly, because it must be applied with an even hand, even to people, ideas and causes with which we seriously disagree.

Before entering your Lordships’ House, I worked for 15 years at Liberty, the National Council for Civil Liberties. In that time, I saw the concept of behaviour causing or even just likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress used and abused to arrest and even prosecute people in a way that I believe all Members of the Committee would consider abusive, certainly when applied to people like us or causes with which we agree.

“Alarm” and arguably even “distress”, as opposed to a reasonable fear of a threat or of harm, are very broad. Harassment is a course of conduct and therefore a bit more objective and less broad. Sections 4A and 5 of the Public Order Act 1986 obviously create two specific criminal offences, but the rubric of “harassment, alarm or distress” also now forms the linchpin of anti-social behaviour, with its quasi-civil and criminal orders and the even broader approach that police guidance and police websites take to the concept of anti-social behaviour. However, that matter was discussed earlier in Committee.

The two offences that the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, has identified have, in my direct experience over many years, been applied broadly, indiscriminately and, ironically, in a discriminatory way to, for example, peaceful protesters and to anti-monarchists for wearing republican slogans on their T-shirts when a member of the Royal Family is in town. The noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, gave other examples of words that can offend or cause alarm and distress, as opposed to fear or the threat of real harm. I gave the example of the anti-monarchist who was not just arrested but, I believe, charged for the T-shirt in question, but there are also cases of youngsters being charged, certainly being arrested, for being cheeky with the police. I think this cannot just be blamed on the police when these concepts on the public order statute book are just too vague and too broad.

To attempt to leaven the spirit yet again the week before Christmas, I am reminded that today at PMQs, and not for the first time, the leader of the Opposition made reference, if euphemistically, to the Prime Minister’s private parts. Of course, that sort of thing would never happen in your Lordships’ House, but whatever noble Lords think of that approach to parliamentary debate, people on our streets, ordinary people, have been arrested and charged for less. Can that really be right? I think not.

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

My Lords, I will say a few words in support of the amendment. I agree with the difficulty of categorising alarm in the same manner as harassment and distress. Harassment and distress can be objectively measured or distress objectively assessed, but when it comes to alarm, I think what noble Lords have said so far is that it may cause a shock to hear somebody in your group saying something so different to anything you could imagine being said.

I can give an example of a representative image or a representation which may be designed to shock. I was a supporter of Brexit in a very remain constituency, Cambridge. We usually invite people at the end of term, and I had a Vote Leave poster in my window, but as they were coming to a party to celebrate the end of term, I said to my husband that I would take it down because I did not want to upset them. Afterwards, none of them ever could imagine that I might support leave. When I told them, they said, “We had no idea. We couldn’t have imagined we knew anybody in Cambridge who voted leave”. I suppose you could say that I was trying not to spoil their day because people take these matters very seriously, but you could say that alarm could be equated to an instance of thoughtlessness, bad manners or a deliberate intention to shock, as some people will do, but it is not a matter to criminalise. For those reasons, I support removing “alarm” from Sections 4A and 5 but would leave harassment and distress because they can more objectively be measured.

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[Lord Hampton (CB)]

My Lords, I have added my name to Amendments 353 and 355, which were so powerfully introduced by the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg. I express due deference to the thought-provoking input from my noble friend Lady Gohir.

I am a teacher and, before one is accepted as a teacher, one has to do five days of observation in various schools, just to see whether you like the look of it. On my first day of observation at a school in Hackney, we were at the staff briefing at the beginning of the day and we were reminded to be sensitive to the fact that that week was the anniversary of one student’s mother and sister having been killed by their father and brother. That was my first experience of honour-based abuse, and a pretty stark lesson in the responsibilities that school staff shoulder.

Schools are uniquely placed to spot abuse. Dirty collars can be a sign of neglect, expensive trainers can be a sign of grooming and unexpected holidays could be FGM: the list goes on. Schools are often the first place where honour-based abuse is visible, through changes in behaviour, attendance or disclosure. Yet, without a clear definition, warning signs are too often missed.

Because honour-based abuse differs from other safeguarding risks, it is frequently collective, hidden and fast-escalating. Generic safeguarding guidance does not equip schools to recognise or respond safely. Inconsistent understanding creates dangerous inconsistencies in response, leaving children’s safety dependent on where they go to school. Statutory guidance would set a clear national standard. A lack of clarity leads to hesitation and harmful mistakes, including inappropriate family contact or mediation. A statutory framework gives staff confidence to act decisively and safely.

Early identification in schools can prevent serious harm and tragic loss of life, but only if honour-based abuse is properly defined and schools are properly trained, supported and embedded in a clear multi-agency safeguarding and response. It seems logical. I hope the Government agree.

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

My Lords, I support the general aims of these amendments. I am broadly sympathetic to the group and I agree with the need to address the problem of honour-based abuse specifically. I understand that it will be a difficult matter, and not simple, to define it tightly. Some honour-based offences are criminal offences, as we know: they involve murder. We have heard already about the murder of Banaz Mahmod in 2006 in Handsworth, in Birmingham, where she was strangled and her body put in a suitcase. For that crime, the perpetrators were found and convicted.

There is also voter impersonation, which I think we could be stronger on because it involves controlling and coercive behaviour. I have been told by members of one community in particular in an area of London with which I am very familiar that they are not allowed to go to the polls and they are not allowed to vote. The women there will laugh at you and tell you that their husbands vote for them. They are just not allowed to go to the polls. In fact, grown women who are married are not allowed to go out except when accompanied by their husband, an uncle or their husband’s brother. That, to my mind, is pretty specific coercive or controlling behaviour for grown women.

We have the law to deal with clear breaches of the law, but I agree that it is difficult to define abusive and coercive behaviour that is not immediately an offence within the law. I therefore support the desire to define it and the need to recognise that this controlling behaviour does exist. It does not fall within an easily definable way of dealing with it, but we must address it. There are reasons to address it, for instance, with grown-up people past the age of 18 who are obliged to wear a certain sort of dress to conform to community norms that will set them apart from their community, or with women I have spoken to who are not allowed to continue their education. This is not for reasons of finance or because money is needed from a job. They have to stay at home, quite often because there is a coercive husband at home who does not want his wife to go out for any reason, unless or until there are children whom she may take to school or bring to the hospital. Any thought of continuing studies after a certain age is absolutely ruled out.

These are not easy things to deal with. They fall within that difficult area of family arrangements and the rightful place we award the family in arranging its affairs internally. But unless we are going to become a society where different groups of people remain segregated socially, educationally and in terms of the very law, and we allow borderline abuse to continue in the family setting because we do not have a definition of it, which denies basic freedoms to certain groups of girls and, indeed, young women, and can often lead to far worse things, we should try to tackle it. I support these amendments for that reason. We need some definition and some guidance, and we need to cover them within the abuse framework.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Lawlor Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 27th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I too support both amendments. I support Amendment 449 because proscription is a huge power. The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, used the word “awesome”, and it is indeed an awesome power: it can turn ordinary behaviour into crime. Parliament should not be asked to rubber-stamp those decisions without proper scrutiny. Proscription can criminalise membership, association and even everyday activity, yet at present these decisions are made almost entirely within the Executive, with very limited parliamentary oversight, and that concentration of power carries risks. It leaves decisions open to mistakes or overreach and of course it can also undermine public confidence in counterterrorism law.

Parliament and the public need assurance that proscription is based on sound reasoning, reviewed independently and grounded in evidence. One thing we did not really have when we were asked to proscribe Palestine Action was evidence. Since then, we have had hints of various kinds, telling us that we will see when the evidence comes out and we will understand why that proscription was justified. But so far, I would argue, it has not been justified. Independent scrutiny is particularly important when the intelligence underpinning a proscription is classified and supposedly cannot be shared widely. Where decisions are urgent or complex, having a committee report afterwards helps Parliament and the public understand the reasoning and reinforces the legitimacy of the action taken.

I would have also supported this going further to address the recommendation of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, David Anderson KC—the noble Lord, Lord Anderson—that proscriptions should be time-limited and expire after a set period, such as two years, unless Parliament is asked to proscribe yet again. As we know, once proscription has happened, in effect it lasts forever. Decisions this serious should not be made in private and left to drift. Parliament deserves a proper look at the evidence, so I hope that the Minister is going to bring us the evidence, as he keeps hinting in various speeches.

Amendment 454 is an excellent amendment, I have to say, because, when we proscribed Palestine Action, it was bracketed with two groups. I cannot even remember their names. They were right-wing, fascist organisations, and we had absolutely no choice about that. Had we dealt with each of those individually, we could have made a much better decision, I would argue. It seems that we just have to trust the Government—and who trusts the Government any more? Certainly not me, and many of the general public agree with me. Asking us to trust the Government is not the way it should be. It really should have better oversight.

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

My Lords, I shall say a few words in support of Amendment 449 from the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, and Amendment 454 from the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. I do so on the grounds, really, that—

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)]

Apologies, I did not mean to put the noble Baroness off, I was just trying to recall whether she was here for the start of the group.

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

I came in just as the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, got up.

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

Apologies: please continue.

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

I was simply going to say that I agree with the reasons given by noble Lords, but in particular I want to stress the importance of having checks and balances in the constitution. We need, particularly where our constitution is unwritten, to pay particular attention to the ability of Parliament to scrutinise the Executive. It is so simple for the Executive to bring in proscription, but it must be equally simple for Parliament to be able to scrutinise it and afford a proper check.

It is really for that reason that I support these amendments, at a time when constitutional liberty is under threat, on both sides of the Atlantic, from executive power, whatever the Government in power. We heard earlier this evening from a US Supreme Court judge who spoke of this happening under recent Presidents, going back some time, and it has happened under Governments of all complexions here. Therefore, I commend these important amendments because of the centrality of the separation of powers.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Lawlor Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 2nd February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

Of course Parliament should place a value on human life, but it should also, should it not, place a value on the interests of the unfortunate women who have, in the most distressing of circumstances, lost the child they are carrying. Therefore, to talk about the value of human life does not answer the profound dilemma which Parliament faces in addressing Clause 191. There are two evils here and the question is how we best address the problem.

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

My Lords, is the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, suggesting that where sensitive matters are investigated, we should change the law? Let me refer to the case of a coroner investigating a death at home. I can cite an example only last Saturday of a friend of mine who died at home of natural causes, but his wife and family had an investigation and understood it was par for the course. They were very upset at the death of their father and their husband; none the less, the law is required to investigate suspicious deaths even in the most sensitive circumstances.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I take the noble Baroness’s point, and I very much sympathise with those who have been bereaved and who face such an investigation. However, there is a profound difference in what we are considering here, which is an investigation of a woman who has just lost the child she is carrying and who is being investigated with a view to the real possibility of a criminal prosecution of her. We have to recognise that a woman in those circumstances is particularly vulnerable and sensitive. We have to weigh that interest against what I accept is the real concern that there will be women who have acted improperly and unlawfully who will get away with their criminality.

--- Later in debate ---

Clause 191 is a simple and principled stance, which I think reflects the strong position in the House of Commons. This affects women, in particular young women. I look around the Committee, and I do not want to be accused of age discrimination in any way but the people debating this, particularly the older gentlemen, are very far removed from the lived reality of women, in particular young women, who find themselves here. I feel very strongly about this.

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

I have great respect for the noble Baroness, and I was delighted to see her come to the House. However, I think it would be in keeping to withdraw a comment that could be misinterpreted as ageist and genderist.

[Baroness Hazarika (Lab)]

I hear the noble Baroness’s point, but I think this is really important. The outside world will look at some of the comments that have been made in this Chamber and will look at the age profile of those making them. That is okay; it is the truth. I am just looking around at who we are. We have many wonderful people with great wisdom and expertise, but we are currently talking about a group of women who are not adequately represented in this House. That is the point I was trying to make.

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

Would the noble Baroness agree that we are all part of the same human race? Here in this House, we must legislate on behalf of everybody, not as if we were gender-blind about who we are as legislators but in the interests of society at large. I know the noble Baroness would agree that we must always consider the most vulnerable, and this debate is partly about who is the most vulnerable in this matter.

[Baroness Hazarika (Lab)]

I absolutely agree that we must think about who is the most vulnerable, but the point is that we have heard a lot of language about the rights of the unborn child. As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said, however, what about the rights of the living woman—often a younger woman—who has found herself in the most distressing of circumstances? As I said, she may have been raped, or part of a terrible domestic violence situation where she does not feel like she has much support, and she feels very alone. I really think this is an important point: so few women take joy from having an abortion, particularly a late-term abortion. I do not think women do it lightly, with a skip in their step, to try to go on a holiday or anything like that. It is a very visceral, emotional, physical experience. We have heard from eminent members of the medical profession about the physical toll that it takes on a woman’s body.

We must understand how vulnerable a lot of these women are. We heard an example earlier from a colleague about a woman who went into premature labour at home. Seven police officers searched her bins before the paramedics arrived. She was not allowed home for a week because her house was considered a crime scene, and she was not allowed contact with her partner. Her forensic samples eventually showed no trace of abortion drugs, but she remained under police investigation for a year. She was allowed only limited supervision with her baby, who had survived the birth despite the very traumatic circumstances.

There is another case study that I want to raise, because the human stories are very important here. Laura was at university, and she was the mother of a toddler when she pled guilty to ending her pregnancy using illegal drugs. She was also in a very abusive relationship and her partner told her not to go to a doctor under any circumstances, so she was very much left to her own devices. She ended up being sentenced to two years in prison. The abusive partner was never investigated. Let that sink in: an abused mother of a toddler is sent to jail while her abusive partner gets off scot free. This is not Kabul, by the way; this is here in the United Kingdom.

I do not know about you, but I want my rather overstretched police services to be investigating crimes such as domestic violence or other serious crimes, instead of rifling through the bins of a traumatised woman who has just given birth. I would like our rather overcrowded prisons to be housing serious offenders, not abused women who have small children. I feel that it is simply morally wrong, an utter waste of police and criminal justice time, and a waste of taxpayers’ money to go after these kinds of distressed and vulnerable women. They need psychological and medical help, not a costly investigation. I think most of us in this House are coming to a consensus that the police have been wasting their time on things such as non-crime hate incidents, so surely common sense would dictate that going after these women is misguided. The police should be catching criminals.

There has been a lot of heated debate around the question “what is a woman?” I know what a woman is, and I believe in her right to choose what is best for her reproductive health. I believe in protecting women when they need help the most, not hounding them like a criminal. That might be okay in some repressive regimes far away, but I know we are better than that.

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[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

My Lords—

[Noble Lords]

Minister!

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

I want to speak to the three amendments which I have tabled in this group. I urge noble Lords to show the normal courtesies that we extend when a Peer is speaking to an amendment that he or she has tabled.

I will start with my Amendments 456B, 461H and 461K. Amendment 456B is the third amendment in this group. As matters stand, the law allows for abortions only under certain clearly defined conditions after 24 weeks. Amendment 456B aims to ensure that women follow these conditions after 24 weeks. I suppose it is the most important of my three amendments, which is why I am speaking to it first, bearing in mind the problems and consequences to which other noble Lords have already pointed.

Clause 191 leaves abortion over 24 weeks as unlawful, but in practice it also leaves open the possibility for a woman to have such an abortion without consequences. My Amendment 456B would help to ensure that present-day legislation is observed by stipulating that criminal culpability is removed from the woman only if the abortion takes place before 24 weeks. As the law stands at present, there is a big difference between before and after 24 weeks. The law is clear that before 24 weeks there is a procedure and regulations to be complied with, and it is a relatively straightforward procedure. In practice, abortions before 24 weeks are allowed to go ahead once the paperwork has been done. By contrast, after 24 weeks abortions are allowed to go ahead only under a defined, limited process and subject to stringent conditions, such as that the mother’s life would be endangered or that the child would be born with serious defects.

These matters have been raised as if they do not exist. These stipulations have been raised in the Chamber as if they were not already part of the law. When a woman procures an abortion outside the legal procedure before 24 weeks, she almost certainly would have had the abortion lawfully. The fault is one of failing to go through the proper procedures. However, for abortions performed outside the law after 24 weeks, the position is completely different. These are abortions which may not have been permitted under the law had the woman sought permission. To put it bluntly, in these cases, the woman kills her own baby when she has not been legally permitted to do so and might have been denied the permission. Remember that, in cases post 24 weeks, the babies concerned may well be viable.

The new clause removes criminal culpability from women for abortions at any time. It is hard to see how a reasonable distinction can be made between a baby who is ready to be born and one who has just been. I was very impressed by the speeches of my noble friend Lord Hailsham and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, on these points.

I will conclude on this one, which will be the longest. It has been pointed out that the next stage in these matters is to decriminalise infanticide. What do we think of a society which kills babies a day before being born—indeed, as they are ready to exit the womb? Although the act remains a crime, the law excuses the main perpetrator. This would leave us with an act that remains a crime but the law excusing the main perpetrator of any blame. Is this the sort of society we want to create?

I move on to my Amendments 461K and 461H.

[Baroness Coffey (Con)]

While the noble Baroness finds her notes, I will say that I think Amendment 461K is a really interesting one. How are the Government going to make sure that providers of a variety of abortions actually operate within the law and make those checks? This is something I will be discussing regarding my amendment shortly as the debate continues.

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, but I will go on to Amendment 461H on in-person consultations. We have already heard from the proposers of Amendment 460, which would require that this consultation be in person. My amendment would require this, but it would also add that the gestational age of the baby should be ascertained by a medical scan or other equivalent means. Usually this means an ultrasound scan, which can be given at seven weeks onwards. First-trimester scans are generally safe, non-invasive and commonly used to confirm pregnancy, identify the due date of the baby and—

[Lord Patel (CB)]

May I just, for information, correct that? First-trimester ultrasound scans are carried out with a vaginal probe, so they are invasive.

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

I thank the Lord for that. But I think one of the American learned societies of obstetricians, gynaecologists and other kinds of medicine that indicates—as do other sites—that there is technology that is successful from seven weeks on, and certainly from nine or 10 weeks. There are differences. These differences are the subject of debate among medical professionals. I can see the noble Lord shaking his head.

[Lord Winston (Lab)]

I thank the noble Baroness for giving way. Just as a matter of information, I must tell the noble Baroness that in a clinic I have run for over 40 years which does ultrasound on every patient with a high degree of expertise, these measurements are not that accurate; they really are not. There is a real risk that you get the wrong stage of the foetus completely—at least a month out, if not more.

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord, and I respect his expertise, but I think there is a debate about how successful scans are and from what stage. We can debate that on another occasion, but there is evidence that scans can be used successfully. I will not take any more interventions, because my time is running out and I have one more amendment to go through after this.

There is evidence that first-trimester scans are generally safe, non-invasive and commonly used to confirm pregnancy, identifying due date et cetera. At the moment, the requirement is that the medical practitioner believes in good faith that the pregnancy will not exceed 10 weeks when the medicine or the first dose of a course is administered. I contend that the condition stretches the idea of belief and good faith unreasonably widely, so the medical practitioner simply accepts what they are told, perhaps by the pregnant woman who may be speaking in perfectly good faith—we have seen tragic cases of this—but is mistaken, or else that it is only after the gestational age of the baby has been reliably ascertained that the medical practitioner is in a position to believe in good faith that the pregnancy meets the conditions stated. My amendment would not change the Act.

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

Would the noble Baroness come to her concluding remarks?

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

I will certainly bring my remarks to a conclusion. I will just briefly introduce my last amendment to Clause 191 if I may because of those interventions and, I have to confess, my loss of notes. Amendment 461K, my last amendment, proposes to—

[Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)]

I will make an intervention in general about this rather lengthy debate. I draw your Lordships’ attention to paragraph 4.46 on page 63 of the Companion, entitled “Reading of Speeches”. I will read it out very clearly so that everybody can understand what it says:

“The House has resolved that the reading of speeches is ‘alien to the custom of this House, and injurious to the traditional conduct of its debates.’ It is acknowledged, however, that on some occasions, for example ministerial statements”—


or statements from Front Bench speakers—

“it is necessary to read from a prepared text. In practice, some speakers may wish to have ‘extended notes’ from which to speak, but it is not in the interests of good debate that they should follow them closely”.

I also point out that the advisory time limits are made to include interventions. If there are interventions, that does not mean that you go over time. The reason that ministerial statements at the end of a debate are given 20 minutes is that that allows for interventions.

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[Lord Katz (Lab)]

Order. We need to return to the debate. I suggest that the noble Baroness concludes her remarks imminently so that we can carry on with the debate.

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

My Lords, my Amendment 461K agrees that the people who support this clause say that they are not trying to legalise abortions that would otherwise be illegal. If that were to happen, it would be extremely important to ensure that proper mechanisms exist for prosecuting the party culpable—that is to say, the abortion provider—so that they are not above the law or beyond the reach of the law. We should not forget that, for the most part, it is non-medical clinics that provide around 80% of abortions, with taxpayers funding the bill. Like all service providers—

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

The noble Baroness has had a lot of the Committee’s indulgence. We will take that as her finishing.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Lawlor Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 9th March 2026 Lords Chamber

The Government often cite minimal discrepancies at specific technical settings. However, in operational use, police forces frequently lower the similarity threshold to increase the number of matches, which exponentially increases the risk of misidentification for women and minority groups. For all these reasons, we need to introduce the controls set out in Amendments 374 and 430.

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

My Lords, I support these amendments because it is very important that live facial recognition should be subject to legal oversight and judicial oversight; there should be a law. We should see such amendments in the context of an overall parliamentary democracy which believes in lawful freedom of expression, whether it is in Parliament, the newspapers or public places. Live facial recognition without a proper legal framework could be used in an undemocratic fashion. Police, sadly, will find evidence very often for whomever they wish to convict. I know that is not necessarily the case, but if you are under pressure as a police officer to make your case stick, you will trawl whatever evidence you can to get it through to the stage of being investigated. I urge your Lordships to support these amendments because they will strengthen our democracy, and it is important that people should feel that they live in a free country, not in one subject to the sort of powers we see exercised in other countries, such as China.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, this group of amendments returns us to an issue debated at some length in Committee: the use of live facial recognition technology in policing. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for tabling these amendments on this important topic.

As set out in Committee, we on these Benches cannot support proposals that would severely restrict or pre-empt the operational use of live facial recognition by law enforcement. Live facial recognition is an increasingly important tool in modern policing. Used lawfully and proportionately, it has already demonstrated its value in identifying serious offenders, locating wanted individuals and preventing violent crime before it occurs. It has been deployed particularly effectively in high-risk environments such as transport hubs and major public events, where rapid identification can make a decisive difference in protecting the public.

That does not mean that safeguards are unnecessary. There must always be a careful balance between the protection of civil liberties and the need to equip police with effective tools to tackle serious crime. The use of new technologies must be proportionate and subject to appropriate oversight, but the amendments before us would go significantly further than that. In different ways, they would either prohibit particular uses of the technology, place rigid statutory barriers in its way or create restrictions that would unnecessarily impede the ability of the police to deploy it where it may be most needed. Amendment 374 would prohibit the deployment of live facial recognition in the context of public assemblies or impose extensive prior authorisation requirements. It risks tying the hands of the police at precisely the moments when rapid and flexible operational decision-making may be required.

We must recognise the points raised in Committee that the Government are currently consulting on the future regulatory framework for live facial recognition. To attempt to settle these questions piecemeal through amendments to this Bill would risk creating an incomplete or inconsistent framework. While the concerns raised by noble Lords are legitimate and deserve careful consideration, we should not default to restricting a technology that has already shown its potential to disrupt serious criminality and protect the public. The challenge is not to prohibit its use but to ensure that it is deployed responsibly, lawfully and proportionately. For those reasons, we cannot support the amendments in this group. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Lawlor Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 18th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness D’Souza (CB)]

My Lords, I strongly support abortion on demand but, as we have heard, the danger continues to exist that an almost full-term foetus could be aborted by means of a pill ordered by telephone and delivered by post. I am struck by the extraordinary efforts that this House has gone to in order to provide safeguards for those who are terminally ill and who demand assisted dying, yet we do not afford the unborn foetus or near-term foetus any kind of safeguard at all. The amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, would introduce some kind of safeguard, which perhaps we all owe to that unborn child.

The experience of other countries suggests that late-term abortions are uncommon, and an in-person consultation to determine the stage of pregnancy would ensure that they remain so. We know, too, that women who abort at later stages of pregnancy are more likely to have birthing complications. This, surely, is a further reason for some medical oversight.

As I said, I strongly support abortion on demand. I think that introducing a safeguard such as this to avoid the actual death of a near-term foetus is acceptable, and I hope very much that the noble Baroness will put this to the House.

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

My Lords, my Amendment 423ZA would limit the application of Clause 208 to those deemed not to have capacity. I have also added my name to Amendment 426C in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Wolf.

Under the present law, it is an offence for a woman to procure an abortion to end her pregnancy after 24 weeks —the stage when the baby is deemed to be a viable child. Causing the death of the child is a crime, other than in exceptional circumstances. It is also an offence to procure drugs or devices with the intent of an abortion.

Clause 208 is a bad clause. It is constitutionally wrong. It has no manifesto pledge behind it, and no prior consultation has been done on it with the people of this country. No evidence exists that people want abortion up to birth. The clause undermines the constitutional arrangement by which the Government legislate: on the basis of consent by the governed for an announced programme, given freely at the ballot box.

Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Lawlor Excerpts

3rd reading
Wednesday 25th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness O'Loan (CB)]

My Lords, the effect of Clause 246 of this Bill is to decriminalise abortion at any stage of the baby’s gestation where the baby’s life is terminated by the mother, but in no other circumstances. It is a matter of concern that we find ourselves today passing a Bill which contains Clause 246, given the dearth of information upon which noble Lords were asked to make a decision—hence my regret amendment.

The Cabinet Office Guide to Making Legislation states that an impact assessment is a vital tool to help Parliament understand the

“consequences of a proposed intervention

and to identify the

“associated risks of a proposal that might have an impact on the public … and wider society”.

Undeniably, Clause 246 required an impact assessment to identify the consequences and risks. That did not happen.

It is possible to be both neutral and objective and to respect conscience while considering policy implications and outcomes. This clause originated as a late Back-Bench amendment. As others have said, there was not enough scrutiny in the other place, or indeed here. Last week, many Peers were denied the opportunity to speak to amendments which they had signed or supported on this most fundamental and important of issues—the life and death of the baby and the danger to its mother.

We have been unable to evaluate adequately the operational impact of Clause 246 on policing. We lack clear evidence on how the removal of existing deterrents will affect the investigation of genuine cases of infanticide or the detection of women being coerced by a third party into dangerous late-term abortion. We have not been able properly to assess healthcare implications. There will surely have to be guidance issued to those who respond to a request for help in connection with such an abortion, which may turn out to require investigation as a criminal offence may have been committed by a third party, be that a coercive partner or a family member or other who does not want any child, or in some cases, unfortunately, a girl child, to be born.

During the debate, I asked the question: how is the mother to kill her child at these late stages so that she can abort it? I never received an answer. It seems to me that the Government must be aware that, if a woman decides to abort a baby herself after 24 weeks, she may need help to do so. Do the Government intend to publicise the fact that it will still be an offence to help a mother abort her baby in these circumstances?

Do they intend to highlight the fact that heavy bleeding, infection, damage to the womb and sepsis are all possible consequences of an abortion? What of the risks of prescription or over-the-counter drug overdoses as a woman seeks to abort her baby and to control her pain and that of her unborn child?

Paramedics responding to a 999 call where a woman is haemorrhaging or where a baby is stuck in the birth canal will have to try to save the life of both mother and baby, unless the baby is already dead. But there are a few precious moments when a baby who does not breathe automatically at birth can be encouraged to live and may well do so. What is the paramedic to do? Presumably, if the woman gets to hospital before delivering, it will be incumbent on nurses and doctors to attempt to save not only the mother but the child. Surely the child will not be left to die uncared for, as happens when babies are born alive after abortion. Guidance will be needed. What additional services—medical and mental health services—might need to be provided in these cases?

Finally, do we need some provision on what the mother can do with her little dead baby? Is she able to bury it? Can somebody else bury it? How will the police be able to determine whether a baby was born alive and killed after death if the baby’s body has been disposed of? What if the trauma of delivering the child is such that the mother is unable to bury the child? What if she was subject to coercion and is torn by grief? What can she do? What is to happen?

Today, I am sending an open parliamentary letter to the Home Secretary and the Minister for Health from some 80 Peers and MPs, articulating these and other concerns. These issues should surely concern His Majesty’s Government. Can the Minister say how the Government intend to take these matters forward to address these life and death issues?

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

My Lords, the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, regrets the failure to conduct an impact assessment in relation to Clause 246. Yet, as we have heard, the clause that decriminalises abortion up to birth will have the gravest of consequences for viable babies—now protected in law—for their mothers’ health and for our society. Including it in this Bill will render the Bill notorious.

Constitutionally, it is wrong. Laws, particularly on controversial and grave matters, are subject to two important conditions in Britain’s constitution. First, they must have a popular mandate, a condition that militated against the arbitrary exercise of executive power for hundreds of years, even before the 20th century brought universal adult suffrage, as Parliaments and leaders respected a popular wish. Secondly, they must meet the more formal requirements now in place for pre-election announcements, manifestos and pre-legislative consultation, including an impact assessment, detailed parliamentary scrutiny in both Chambers, revision, modification and, finally, some sort of legislative agreement.

Clause 246 is a highly controversial measure. Arguably, its consequences are the most serious of any legislation that this Government have passed. It has had neither a popular mandate nor parliamentary scrutiny. Clause 246 has been tacked on to a government Bill by a group of militant abortionists determined to manipulate parliamentary rules. It has had only 46 minutes of debate in the House of Commons. I am afraid it plays to the weakness of a Prime Minister orchestrating the factions of a divided Labour Party as he seeks to stay in power and fend off rival challenges.

[Noble Lords]

Oh!

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

It reveals a Government unequal to the great task of governing the nation with which the electorate has entrusted it.

I particularly regret it because it brings disgrace to the Mother of Parliaments and, indirectly, to a country which, although it had no hand in the matter, could always hold its head high when its neighbours suffered instability, revolution and dictatorship. They could take comfort because, as has so often rightly been said, we have a constitutional way of solving our differences.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I know the noble Baronesses, Lady Lawlor and Lady O’Loan, feel very strongly about this matter, and they are perfectly entitled to do so. But we debated this at length in Committee: we had four hours-worth of debate then. We debated it for two hours last week on Report. Both noble Baronesses expressed their views very powerfully and at length, but the House did not agree with them. The House voted for this clause and I respectfully suggest that it is entirely inappropriate for us to debate it again.