Offensive Weapons Bill

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

2nd reading (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 7th January 2019 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, returning to the Offensive Weapons Bill, I do not think I have ever had quite so much enthusiasm and encouragement for a speech as I received before the Statement. I hope I do not disappoint.

I start by declaring an interest as a board member for the charity Safer London, which works with young people to prevent entry into crime and assist exit from crime. I agree with much of what has been said this afternoon, including thanks to the Library for its excellent briefing.

A month or so ago, we had a debate in this House on serious violence, which followed seamlessly from a debate on schools: the issue of school exclusions—one of the results of a focus on attainment, one might say—was one of the issues that cropped up again in the serious violence debate. The ideas that we shared during that debate on cross-cutting issues, a cross-sectoral approach and a public health approach are in my view more likely to be fruitful than much of what will come out of the debate over the weeks and months—who knows?—on this legislation. The witnesses to the Public Bill Committee in the Commons also applied the language of health to addressing violence. Rob Owen of the St Giles Trust talked about intensive care and similar points have been made during this debate. The noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, referred to early intervention; others have made the same point.

I could sum up the position of these Benches, as set out in the speech by my noble friend Lord Paddick, as “underwhelmed”. Yet again, we are in danger of thinking that legislation is the answer, even when we have adequate legislation in place and—as pointed out by the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, and my noble friend Lord Storey—of not addressing the symptoms of the problem. I am one of those who has my keys in my hand when feeling insecure at night.

I start, as the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, did, at the end, as it were—on sentencing, especially the sentencing of children and young people and on short sentences. I say “at the end”, but for many offenders a sentence of imprisonment is actually the end of the beginning; it amounts to an induction course in crime. The House will be well aware of the opposition of these Benches to mandatory sentences—an issue that we addressed during the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill running concurrently with this Bill.

Anne Longfield, the Children’s Commissioner, was one of those who made that point as a witness to the Public Bill Committee. She said:

“I know that when we criminalise children there is one path. We know that over the last two or three years, there has been a doubling of children, under 18, who are in prison because of knife crime. Once they are in there, we know that 68% reoffend, so there is one route. My position is firmly on preventing that from happening, and using that as a trigger”.—[Official Report, Commons, Offensive Weapons Bill Committee, 19/7/18; col. 86.]

Indeed.

We might take a slightly different view if mandatory sentences, as they currently apply and are proposed in the Bill, were not custodial. I do not apologise for repeating the observation of the Chief Inspector of Prisons that there is not a single custodial establishment in England and Wales that is safe to hold children and young people. I had taken heart from the Justice Secretary’s apparent opposition to short prison sentences but, as so often, the quiet, thoughtful approach is drowned out by a more simplistic knee-jerk reaction so that it can be said, “The Government are doing something. They’re sending a message”.

I am grateful for the briefings from the Prison Reform Trust and the Standing Committee for Youth Justice. We are reminded that by removing judicial discretion, the proposals work against the guidelines of the Sentencing Council. They acknowledge the importance of considering the individual child and his circumstances in a way that legislation inevitably cannot.

Does a custodial sentence act as a deterrent? There does not seem to be evidence of that, given the rising numbers of children convicted of relevant offences, many of whom feel the need to provide their own protection—or what they see as protection. I was horrified to read of children now carrying acid for protection as well as knives.

I would have thought that the chances of being caught were more in a potential offender’s mind, so it is inevitable that we should refer to police resources, as the noble Lord, Lord Bilimoria, did. I myself would much rather see taxpayers’ money spent on local policing and diverting children—both under-18s and those who are a few years older, a point made by the noble Earl, Lord Listowel—away from the formal youth justice system rather than on expensive custody, which is ineffective in terms of diversion from crime but too effective in consolidation towards crime.

The Bill extends the legislation on knives and introduces provisions on corrosive products or substances—we might be debating those terms—although, as my noble friend tells the House, this may not be new after all. I am of an age where my tendency is to hark back to the old days, and I include the Prevention of Crime Act 1953 in that. I am sure we will be reminded that the police and the CPS will apply both common sense and the well-known tests to, “My mum asked me to take the drain cleaner down to my auntie because she’s desperate and she’s got a houseful for Christmas”, but we should not be having to think about going there.

I have to say that there is much more to consider in these clauses than I had expected. The psychology of the choice of a weapon is interesting: we learn that there are more male victims of acid attacks in London than female. However, what is not in the Bill? How do we take advantage of the teachable or reachable moment that is at the heart of the public health approach? On corrosive substances, the House will benefit from the experience of noble Lords, including the noble Lord, Lord Bethell, and the noble Baroness, Lady Eaton.

Retailers are central to the Bill, and I look forward to hearing from the Minister about the progress of the discussions to which USDAW has alerted us. It tells us that it has met the Minister and described that as a major step towards dealing with outstanding issues, but I am not clear quite what progress has been made. Perhaps she can assist the House.

Local authorities too are central, as are trading standards, which are a part of local authorities, although more needs to be done. We have heard from the noble Baroness, Lady Couttie, in that connection. That raises issues of resources and specific investigatory powers for trading standards officers.

At this point I have one simple question. As I read it, there has been quite a discussion in the House of Commons of barcodes. Has there been any consideration of labelling of the products in question? That would give information to the purchaser as well as to the seller. Has the Home Office actually met local authorities and trading standards to discuss their practice and the day-to-day issues raised by the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, who I suspect is going to have a lot of amendments at the next stage of the Bill? I would also be interested to know what the position is in the development of roadside test kits, which have been mentioned.

My noble friend Lord Paddick raised the issue of whether the reasonable excuse should be a defence or whether it should preclude an offence in the first place—I think few of us had heard of Section 118 until recently, but it has become a sort of go-to provision. The Joint Committee on Human Rights, of which I am a member, has had correspondence with the Minister for Crime, Safeguarding and Vulnerability about the use of persuasive and evidential burdens, and I suspect we will want to follow that up in Committee. The explanation by the Minister that acids are simply being put on all fours with knives as a weapon is not one that I find wholly persuasive.

On firearms, I admit to having to resist bias in myself against anything that in any way normalises guns and does not tighten gun control. The noble Earl, Lord Shrewsbury, and the noble Duke, the Duke of Montrose, will not be surprised at that rather urban outlook. I have to say that I have often found it quite hard to square the Government’s support for rights defenders when the issues are the ownership or use of firearms; it is not quite the same when the rights in question are those of privacy.

In connection with rights, the noble Lord, Lord Singh, rightly reminded us of the cultural and religious issues that are in play here.

The noble Lord, Lord Robertson, asked what to me were rather necessary and important questions about the paradox at the heart of the removal of provisions advised by the services without including the safeguards suggested by those who have an interest in shooting. I too could not get Dunblane, Hungerford and other events out of my mind in thinking about this.

What is the timetable for the consultation about firearms safety? Why can we not do something now that could be rescinded—I do not know whether there would be a disproportionate cost to individuals and the Government—given the shortage of parliamentary time, of which we are all aware? As urged by the noble Lord, Lord Robathan, we must be objective; I will certainly keep on telling myself that.

Lastly, I turn to victims. However, I am uncomfortable about referring to them in my last paragraph, as it were. I do not want to indicate that support for victims is of the least importance—not only in the context of offensive weapons, of course. One lens through which we should keep looking at the Bill is how it will be perceived by individuals who have been victims. Concern for perpetrators, as mentioned at the start of the debate, and for victims, and sometimes for individuals who are both, are not matters that are mutually exclusive.

Offensive Weapons Bill

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 28th January 2019 Grand Committee

[The Earl of Erroll]

Can I add something on that subject? I was not suggesting that the Secretary of State should specify specific company schemes, or whatever. However, I agree entirely that there should be a certification process so that people know whether they are okay or not. If there is not, there will be a massive test case in the courts, which will be very expensive for someone, to test what is adequate. The Secretary of State could avoid this by giving some direction on the regulations which reflects where you can change them, with changing technology, and which would satisfactorily protect the seller from vexatious things and awkward situations. The Government should look at this again.

[Baroness Hamwee]

I mentioned that, not long before coming into this debate, I—and no doubt other noble Lords—had a note from the British Retail Consortium. It also makes the point about how helpful it would be to have guidance—“possibly through guidance”, it says. Different situations may be different, but we are all concerned about not just protecting the seller but making sure that purchasers are able to purchase when it is reasonable to do so. I think it was my noble friend who mentioned John Lewis’s current policy on sending cutlery through the post.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

The noble Earl, Lord Erroll, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, essentially come back to the point that the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, made. Sellers want to make sure they are abiding by the law but, as the noble Baroness said, buyers want to make sure they are abiding by the law as well. On the systems that the noble Earl raised, I hope I did not suggest that he was trying to imply a specific system. I made the point that it would be wrong to specify a system in the legislation, given that systems are developing all the time.

To answer the point from the noble Earl, Lord Erroll, about age-restricted products, I have already mentioned knives, alcohol and tobacco, but lottery tickets are age-restricted as well, of course. Retailers are very used to operating in these systems, without a specific approved system in place.

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[Lord Lucas]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for saying that there will be guidance. Perhaps we might drop that into the Bill on Report, just to make sure. I think that guidance would be enough, but we should recognise that we have chosen to put into the Bill the words “all due diligence” and “all reasonable precautions”. That is a very high test. If we had meant the current systems to apply, we should have left out the word “all”. Nobody gets killed by being sold a lottery ticket—or at least not just one—but we are looking here at things that might quite quickly turn into serious criminal incidents. If in court someone says, “I looked at his passport”, but the police prove that the person in question has no passport, the poor delivery driver or shop worker is sunk. Noble Lords might remember a rather amusing TV ad from when we watched such things, “We’re with the Woolwich”, where somebody showed their Woolwich passbook to get out of East Germany. This passport or driving licence can presumably be of any nationality. How is a relatively untrained shop worker or delivery driver supposed to know that this is a Polish passport, not a Polish bankbook? We are asking people for whom there is no structured training to act as if they are trained. Under such circumstances we have to—

[Baroness Hamwee]

The noble Lord has made a very interesting point about the phrase “all reasonable precautions” and “all due diligence”. I do not know whether the noble and learned Lord can help the Committee, but that looks like a normal phrase. I did not read it in quite the same way as having to take every possible step that might be a reasonable precaution. I wonder whether the officials might help us as to the provenance of the phrase before Report.

[Lord Judge]

If I might say so, “all” means “every”. Without “all”, you have just to take reasonable precautions and show due diligence. Once you put “all” in, you fall foul of any particular point you could have but did not look at and did not do.

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Moved by

[Baroness Hamwee]

4: Clause 1, page 2, line 9, leave out “imprisonment for a term not exceeding 51 weeks” and insert “a community sentence”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would replace the custodial sentences for the new offence in Clause 1 (sale of corrosive products to persons under 18) with community sentences.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 4 I will speak to Amendments 5, 6, 7, 20 and 21. This is not the first time that the Liberal Democrats has made clear our opposition to short custodial sentences, which, in our view, tend not to do good and too often cause harm. We are grateful to the Standing Committee for Youth Justice and the Prison Reform Trust in particular, as well as other organisations for helping me to articulate this. These amendments and some later ones repeat amendments that my right honourable friend Sir Ed Davey tabled in the House of Commons. We have thrown in some additional references because this is the scrutinising House. I heard a noise of agreement from behind me and it is clear that the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, is on the same page on this.

A good deal was said at Second Reading on the complexity of what lies behind the carrying and use of weapons, and the context of that. Many noble Lords took what we regard as a necessarily broad view of the issues, expressly or implicitly criticising the use of legislation to send a rather broader message than the message to the police, to which my noble friend Lord Paddick referred. The Government recognise this, but not consistently. At Second Reading, I mentioned the Justice Secretary’s apparent opposition to short custodial sentences and his support for community sentences, which the Ministry of Justice’s own research shows are more effective at reducing offending. Surely that view counts. It is not so very long ago that home affairs and justice were in a single department, which was very unwieldly, but I hope that attitudes and values have not diverged to any extent.

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[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I am happy to look at that point. Of course, every case is different, so I cannot give a pronouncement here in Committee this afternoon. I have visited Styal prison, an all-female prison near to where I live. I would imagine that Styal is an example of best in class, as it tries to support the family as opposed to just dealing with the woman in custody. I recommend any noble Lords who get the chance to visit that prison, which is an example of a very supportive environment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, we have ranged widely and it is tempting to respond to some of the points that have been made, continuing that wider debate, as opposed to focusing on Clauses 1 and 3, but I will try to resist that.

I think that we all agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, that this is about the quality of sentences. I would regard it as rather despairing to accept that there should be imprisonment because community sentences are inadequate—not fit for purpose, in the jargon. I referred to comments made in April last year, I think, by the Secretary of State for Justice, David Gauke, in response to evidence published by the MoJ showing that, for people with matched offending backgrounds, community orders were more effective than a short prison sentence at reducing offending.

I should make it clear that we are not in favour of selling corrosives that may be misused—I do not want that to come out of this debate. Clause 6 includes the offence of possession, and it is this clause that prompts me to ask whether the Minister can confirm that the offences under Clauses 1 and 3 are summary only offences. Clause 6 refers to conviction on indictment, which would allow imprisonment for up to four years. One always learns something, and I did not expect to learn about the 2003 Act. There are two ways of looking at that: either our amendments are fatally flawed or we have material to come back to at Report. That is neither a threat nor a promise, but perhaps the Minister can answer my question about summary only offences.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I can confirm that to the noble Baroness.

[Baroness Hamwee]

We have all shared a lot more of our views on this Bill than I thought likely to be the case when I tabled these two amendments. I beg leave to withdraw.

Amendment 4 withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Baroness Hamwee]

12: Clause 2, page 3, line 19, leave out from “products” to “were” in line 20
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is to probe and clarify why the seller needs to show the method of purchase employed.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, in moving this amendment on behalf of my noble friend I will speak also to Amendment 16. These are nothing like as technical as the matters raised in the previous group. Indeed they are probing, as all amendments are at this stage in Grand Committee.

The first probe concerns condition A, one of the defences in Clause 2, to which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, has already referred. The Explanatory Notes very straightforwardly state of condition A that,

“at the time of any alleged offence being committed, a seller had a system in place for checking the age of anyone purchasing corrosive products that was likely to prevent anyone under the age of 18 from purchasing that product”.

That seems quite straightforward. What is important, as I read it, is that there is a system in place to check that purchasers are not under the age of 18. The amendment would delete the words,

“by the same or a similar method of purchase to that used by the buyer”.

I am not entirely clear to what those words refer. I do not understand them and I apologise to the Committee if they are perfectly obvious to other Members. The purpose of my amendment is to obtain an explanation of what the words add to those in the Explanatory Notes.

Amendment 16 relates to Clause 2(10) and queries the term “supply”. We have a buyer and a seller, a reference to sale and a reference to delivery, which is to be read as its “supply” to the buyer or someone acting on the behalf of the buyer. The offence in Clause 1 is that of sale. That is not the same as delivery. I would be grateful if the Minister could explain the choice of terminology here. I beg to move.

[Lord Tunnicliffe]

My Lords, if I can give some comfort to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, I did not understand it either.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I am sure that the noble Baroness is very much comforted. I hope I can clarify the meaning.

Amendment 12 seeks to test why it is necessary to include in Clause 2(6)(a) the words,

“by the same or a similar method of purchase to that used by the buyer”.

There are many different ways to make purchases online or in response to an advertisement by post or telephone. The simple purpose of the condition set out in Clause 2(6)(a) is to ensure that, at the time of making the sale, the seller had the required arrangements in place to verify the age of the buyer. This would assist in proving that an offence had been committed.

Amendment 16 seeks to clarify why Clause 2(10) uses the term “supply” instead of “delivery”, given the terms of the Clause 1 offence. The use of “supply” is correct in this context because it is about the actual handing over of the product to a person or their representative at the collection point, rather than its delivery to the address from where the buyer ordered the product. I hope that provides clarification, although the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, is looking even more puzzled than she initially was.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I am afraid I remain a bit puzzled. I do not find all of this Bill entirely easy. My prejudice was confirmed this morning when, ironically, I got a rather painful paper cut from the Offensive Weapons Bill. On the second point, “supply” has all sorts of other connotations, particularly with the drug trade. That perhaps diverted me, but “delivery to a person” is not the same as delivery to premises. I remain puzzled by that. I will have to read what the Minister said about Amendment 12, but I thought she more or less said what I said I thought it should mean without the rather difficult words. I will go back and read that.

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[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

Would it be helpful if I wrote to noble Lords giving examples?

[Baroness Hamwee]

I think that would be an excellent idea. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 12 withdrawn.

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[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

You can buy it from either, but the mechanisms for age verification are slightly different.

[Baroness Hamwee]

We have referred quite a lot to Amazon. I do not use it very much, but the few times I have, I have ordered from Amazon but got my items from the producer or seller, which was often in the UK. Is the seller overseas or in the UK in that situation?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

If the seller is in the UK, the seller is in the UK. If the seller is overseas there is a slightly different mechanism. As I said, that is because of our ability to enforce sales in the UK as opposed to online sales abroad. The two are very different, but we are banning the delivery of corrosive substances to under-18s when ordered from an overseas seller, just as we are banning that here.

[Baroness Hamwee]

But if I order from Amazon, am I buying from Amazon or from the manufacturer in the UK?

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Moved by

[Baroness Hamwee]

22: Clause 4, page 5, line 12, leave out “before the sale, the seller” and insert “the seller has”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is to clarify why delivery arranged after the sale is concluded (as a matter of contract) does not fall within the Clause.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment 22 but I wonder whether, with the indulgence of the Committee, I can go back to Amendment 12. As it has puzzled at least three noble Lords—three of us have confessed to it—I urge the Minister, as well as writing, to consider whether the wording might be clearer. We would be happy to look at a government amendment on Report because, if it confuses people who are used to reading legislation, there is a good argument for making it clearer to others who will also read it.

Amendment 22 again concerns some detailed wording. Clause 4(1)(c) provides that the clause applies if before the sale the seller has entered into an arrangement for delivery. Why before the sale? Does this apply only if the seller already has delivery arrangements in place? Often that will be the case but I am puzzled as to whether those words might, in a few situations, limit the application of the clause. I beg to move.

[Lord Tunnicliffe]

May I join the noble Baroness and say that I too am confused?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, I fear that I am about to confuse people further—I hope not—because the noble Baroness is effectively asking why Clause 4 is drafted on the basis that the delivery arrangements for an online sale made to a vendor based overseas will have been made at the point of contract and not subsequently. It therefore might be helpful if I explain how we have drafted the clause in this way.

The purpose of Clause 4(1)(c) is to avoid criminalising a delivery company in instances where an overseas seller has simply placed a package containing a corrosive product in the international mail. By doing this, it then places an obligation on the delivery company, and potentially the Royal Mail, to deliver the item without having entered into a contract or necessarily knowing that the package contains a corrosive product. If we did not have the provision in place and in combination with the provisions of Clause 4(1)(d), which makes it clear that the company was aware that the delivery arrangements with the overseas seller covered the delivery of the corrosive product, then delivery companies such as the Royal Mail would be committing an offence.

We want to mitigate this, which is why we have constructed the offence in this way so that it requires the delivery company to have entered into specific arrangements to deliver corrosive products on behalf of an overseas seller.

The noble Baroness looks far less confused than she did in my previous explanation and I hope I have provided the explanation she seeks.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, that is perfectly clear and I am grateful. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 22 withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Baroness Hamwee]

29: Clause 6, page 7, line 6, leave out “or lawful authority”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, along with the amendment to page 7, line 14, is to probe what “lawful authority” is and how it is obtained.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendments 30 and 31. These amendments are in my name and that of my noble friend. Amendments 29 and 30 seek to understand what is meant by “lawful authority”. In Clause 6(2)—I am not making any concessions about the points made on the first group of amendments this afternoon—it is a defence to prove that a person had “good reason” or “lawful authority” for having the corrosive substance with them in a public place. Obviously, lawful authority is not the same as good reason, otherwise it would not have to be provided for—although one would have thought that lawful authority would be good reason. But what is lawful authority? Where does the authority come from? Who gives it? How does one apply for it? Is it a consequence of some other arrangement that is in place? Amendment 29 applies to England, Wales and Northern Ireland and Amendment 30 to Scotland, but they make the same point.

Amendment 31 makes a very small point, but I have discovered over the years that sometimes small points are worth making. Under Clause 6(3) one can show that one had the corrosive substance for “use at work”. My amendment would substitute for those words “the purposes of work”, thereby distinguishing in my mind the purpose and the place. These days “work” is very often used to designate the place. Technically, that might be a bit lax, but it is what people say: “I’m going to work”. They do not mean, “I’m going to put in a good day’s effort”; they mean, “I’m going to my place of work”. The Minister may say that “for use at work” implies “purpose”, but one might take something to use at a place where there is no legitimate reason for using it. I beg to move—and I wish Hansard could record the look on the Minister’s face.

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, as the noble Baroness explained, these amendments address the defences available if someone is charged with an offence of possessing a corrosive substance in a public place. As I understand her, these amendments are intended to probe what would constitute lawful authority to be in possession of a corrosive substance in a public place. She then went on to comment on the phrase “for use at work”.

On the lawful authority issue, let me give your Lordships one example. Under the Poisons Act 1972 there is a licensing regime for regulated substances such that a Home Office licence is required to import, acquire, possess or use a regulated substance. Both nitric acid at above 3% concentration and sulfuric acid at above 15% concentration are regulated substances. Therefore, there may be circumstances where a Home Office licence holder has purchased a corrosive product containing one of these substances and is transporting it from A to B. This would be a scenario where the defence of lawful authority might come into play.

However, for the majority of cases, a person would need to rely on the defence of having good reason—unless, of course, they were a tradesperson and had purchased the corrosive for use at work. This brings me to Amendment 31, about how we have framed the defence for tradespeople and businesses. The reference to “for use at work” replicates the terminology used in existing knife legislation. The existing defences in relation to the possession of an offensive weapon in a public place are well understood by the police and various trades and businesses, and we are not aware of any issues in the operation of them in relation to the possession of knives.

While I can see the intention behind the amendment, I will need to think about what the noble Baroness has said—but I am not convinced that it is necessary or in practice achieves any significantly different result. I am also concerned that having a different defence in place for possession of corrosives, compared with that for knives, would or could cause confusion and unnecessarily complicate the law. So I hope that, at least for now, I have been able to provide sufficient clarification to persuade the noble Baroness to withdraw these amendments—although, as I have said, I promise that I will read carefully in Hansard what she said.

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[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I am grateful for that. The approach to the wording of legislation has been updated quite a lot recently. That was partly in my mind when I raised the point about “at work”—that one wants legislation to be read as easily as possible, using words as they are normally understood. I understand, of course, a resistance to distinctions between offences relating to corrosives and offences relating to knives. That is not how it was dealt with in the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, and in our amendment to it on shop workers. That does not mean that you cannot amend the earlier legislation.

Regarding licensing under the Poisons Act, it seems that one would have a good reason and would not have to rely on the lawful authority defence. I believe that we are going to look at the Poisons Act again—it has been brought up several times. Certainly for the moment I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 29 withdrawn.

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[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Brougham and Vaux) (Con)]

I advise the Committee that if this amendment is agreed to, I cannot call Amendment 33.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, is in the same territory as my noble friend and I. Like him, we seek to know how one objectively defines “corrosive substance”. His amendment asks what happens if the skin is particularly sensitive. I am not sure that there is such a thing as the “average human hand”, which he refers to in his amendment. I suspect that sensitivity may depend on age—whether one is young or old could affect vulnerability—as well as all sorts of other matters.

Our amendment proposes two points. The first refers to the testing method. That would not help the point, with which I have a great deal of sympathy, about knowing whether a substance falls within the definition but it enables us to ask about the status of the testing kits. The noble Earl has said that work on them is well under way. Can he tell us any more about them? Are they intended to work—as I understand it—like a breathalyser? It is enough to get you taken off for a second and different test, but does it start with a roadside test? As with a breathalyser, it may look as if you have failed it. Again, this is as I understand it; I do not have personal experience of going down to a police station and giving a blood test or a mouth-breath test. The point is about the process.

My second question is about the definition of the substance as one capable of burning human skin. Our amendment refers to eyes, since a lot of awful acid attacks have involved throwing acid into someone’s eyes. Are eyes “skin” for this purpose? We simply want to be sure that we have covered the ground here.

[Lord Tunnicliffe]

My Lords, perhaps I may speak briefly on this rather macabre amendment. First, I am not sure who the testing is to be done on. I cannot see many volunteers being willing to be corroded. My second and more substantive point is that I cannot see why the definition is required because, as I read the Bill—not an easy Bill to read, as we have discovered today—a corrosive substance is de facto defined by Schedule 1. I would have thought it much more satisfactory to retain the concept of a schedule, which can be altered by order, than to have this rather frightening test.

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I turn to the issue of testing kits. The Home Office, together with the National Police Chiefs’ Council, is on the case, as I have described. We are in the process of establishing an appropriate approvals process for these testing kits. Naturally, we want assurance that the kits are capable of detecting and identifying corrosive substances, but I am not persuaded that we need to build into the Bill a statutory approvals process. Various options for these testing kits are currently being looked at by the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory. I am afraid it is too soon for me to say what form the kits will take; there is still further work to do on that. Given where we are—I understand we are at a reasonably advanced stage with these testing kits—I hope my arguments have persuaded my noble friend and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, to withdraw, or not to move, their amendments, at least for the time being.

[Baroness Hamwee]

Before the noble Lord responds, first, will there be an opportunity for Parliament to consider the arrangements for testing when they are pretty much complete? I am sure it will be of interest. Secondly, are skin and eyes similarly sensitive? Or do we risk not outlawing a substance that might damage the eyes but would not damage the skin?

[Earl Howe]

In answer to the second question, my understanding—on advice—is no. A substance capable of burning the skin by corrosion would also be capable of doing severe damage to the eye, and the other way round. We do not think we are excluding any substance by accident in defining corrosive substances in this way. On the noble Baroness’s first question, as I understand it, the approval of the testing kit will not be subject to any formal parliamentary procedure, but I am sure the noble Baroness is capable of finding ways to tease out relevant information from the Home Office at the appropriate time.

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In general terms, we must have clear evidence that everything has been tried, and has failed, before any child is sent to custody. That would, not least, honour the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, which says that custody should be used only as a last resort. In tabling this amendment, I add that no child should be ordered into custody for a mandatory short sentence.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, my noble friend and I support the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, particularly on the question of the clause standing part. I am conscious of progress in the Chamber, so I will not say as much as I might otherwise have done. It looks like some negotiations are going on. We have a number of other amendments to these clauses as well. In addition to supporting what the noble Lord has said, I want to make clear our implacable opposition to mandatory sentences—in this case custodial ones. Judicial discretion is very important and precious in our system.

Clause 8(4) is a get-out clause, referring to having regard to the duty under the 1933 Act to have regard for the welfare of the child. I do not think this works. It was obviously a response to representations, but it applies only to children, not young adults, and seems to be a nod to that well-established provision without changing anything that surrounds it. I also have a question about the particular circumstances in Clause 8(2). I had a look at the sentencing guidelines yesterday. If that phrase originates from those guidelines then subsection (2) is actually an inversion of them. They require the court to look at the particular circumstances, but Clause 8(2) is the reverse: it is an “unless” provision. Finally, Amendment 37 deals with the appeals subsection. We have added a reference to the criteria in Clause 8(2). I am not sure whether this is appropriate technically, but perhaps we could have an explanation as to how the appeal takes into account the points made in that subsection.

[Baroness Meacher (CB)]

My Lords, I support these amendments tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Ramsbotham and Lord Paddick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the clause stand part Motion spoken to so ably by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. The noble Lords made the case very strongly against short-term prison sentences. I want to add my voice to emphasise very strongly just how unhelpful these short-term sentences are, particularly to the very vulnerable young people who are most likely to be caught up in these offensive weapons allegations or crimes. Apart from doing nothing for those individuals, short-term sentences do absolutely nothing for society as a whole. If we do not prevent these young people committing crimes in the future, our society will be all the worse off.

Scotland has shown the way. The removal of judgment in Scotland has been proven to be more cost effective and positive when responding to people with drug and alcohol addiction and other problems often associated with the carrying of knives or corrosive substances. I believe huge proportions of these young people have drug problems. As others have mentioned, the Ministry of Justice has already produced its own evidence of the ineffectiveness of short-term imprisonment. Perhaps the Minister can explain why we are adding to these short-term sentences in this Bill.

I want to draw the Minister’s attention to the radical Checkpoint deferred prosecution scheme in Durham, run by Chief Constable Mike Barton, and very much supported by his police and crime commissioner, Ron Hogg. Checkpoint is a multi-agency initiative which aims to reduce the number of victims of crime by reducing reoffending. This is what this should all be about. The scheme targets low and medium-level offenders—it is not just for people right at the bottom—at the earliest stage of the criminal justice process and offers them a suspended prosecution. It encourages them to engage in services designed to address their problems instead of receiving a caution or going to court, which does not seem to have anything to do with where these kids or young people are coming from. Checkpoint is evaluated by Cambridge University. This is very important because the evidence on this is really very thorough and reliable.

If this amendment were to be accepted by the Government, the objective would be for the Checkpoint policy, or something like it, to be applied to children and young people who are found in possession of an offensive weapon. I know very well how utterly appalling these corrosive substances are. I happen to know a young, beautiful girl whose face has been utterly destroyed by an acid attack. The poor girl has had endless operations and she will not be the beautiful person that she was, although she will be a beautiful person inside and that is what really matters. Nevertheless, I want people to know that I really understand that these are shocking and horrible crimes. The most important thing that we can do is to cut them down, reduce them and, ideally, eliminate them. Anything that somehow does not achieve that is an utter failure, so I feel very strongly about it because we have to do something that is effective.

Checkpoint shows that it is the threat of punishment, rather than the severity of a punishment, that is cost-effective and, most importantly, effective. It argues in favour of taking a whole-person-centred approach to understand the causes of their offending and ensure that those people receive appropriate interventions to address the problems of drug dependence, debt issues or homelessness—a whole range of problems that these young, very vulnerable people face. Indeed, its figures from a random control trial—and I emphasise that it is a random control trial, not just any old tin-pot kind of study—show that reoffending is reduced by 13% if we do not send these people to custody but instead try to get them involved in help for their problems.

Its study of young offenders who have committed crimes on more than five occasions within a year is very important. You might think that these are hopeless cases and that there is no point in doing anything. This study looks at the traumatic experiences during childhood that so many of those repeat offenders have experienced. Almost all have been exposed to violence, physical harm or danger, parental offending or admissions to A&E due to physical harm or trauma. They have frequently exhibited violent behaviour or problems in school and have been excluded.

We have to ask ourselves about the effect of putting those young, very vulnerable, damaged children into custody for just another dose of punishment. They obviously need a great deal of therapeutic help and support to begin to recover from their childhood experiences. Durham Constabulary, West Midlands Police and other police services are, in my view, leading the way in exploring policies which will benefit not only the vulnerable but society as a whole by reducing reoffending and will also save vast police and prison resources, but that is not the point. This is about reducing these terrible crimes and helping the vulnerable.

I hope this legislation can be amended to ensure that it works with the grain of new, evidence-based criminal justice policy. It is interesting that police services are taking the lead in this crucial field. Of course, the police have their street-level experience; I always have great regard for the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for this reason—he knows what goes on on the street. They are saying we should not send these people to prison because they see them coming round again and again. I take this very seriously; I think we all should. I hope the Minister will discuss with us how best to amend this Bill. I very much look forward to the Minister’s reply.

Offensive Weapons Bill

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 30th January 2019 Grand Committee

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)]

My Lords, the purpose of the amendments in this group is to remove loopholes in the law relating to the sale of offensive weapons to persons under the age of 18. Amendment 40 amends Section 141A of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, which prohibits the sale to a person under 18 of knives, knife blades, razor blades, axes and other articles with a blade or sharp point made or adapted for causing injury.

The prohibition does not apply to weapons covered by Section 141 of the 1988 Act. Section 141 prohibits the supply of certain offensive weapons that are set out in secondary legislation. These include knuckle-dusters, push daggers and zombie knives, which are excluded from Section 141A on the basis that their supply, including their sale, is already prohibited and therefore the prohibitions on their sale to a person under 18 and their dispatch to a residential premise or locker is not relevant.

However, a significant number of exclusions and defences apply to the supply of weapons covered by Section 141. These include an exemption for antique weapons and defences for swords with a curved blade of 50 centimetres or more made before 1954 or by traditional methods and for sporting, re-enactment purposes and religious reasons. Given these defences and exemptions, it is possible that offensive weapons covered by Section 141 could be sold to a person under the age of 18. Amendment 40 therefore removes the exclusion of offensive weapons covered by Section 141 from Section 141A of the 1988 Act. Amendments 48 to 53 to Clause 19 are directed to the same end.

Clause 19 defines a “bladed product” for the purposes of the new offence of arranging delivery of a bladed product to a residential premise or locker under Clause 17. “Bladed product” excludes any weapons in an order made under Section 141 of the 1988 Act. It is therefore possible that offensive weapons covered by Section 141 could be dispatched to a residential premise or locker on the basis that they were covered by one of the exemptions or defences available to Section 141 articles—for example, if they were an antique or intended to be used for sporting purposes. Amendments 48 to 53 therefore remove the exclusion of Section 141 from Clause 19.

I hope that, with that explanation, noble Lords will agree that these amendments sensibly close a gap in the existing law and the provisions in Clause 19. I beg to move.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I am glad as always to have the Government’s explanation for their amendments, and my comments are not about substance. Earlier in the Bill as well as on this clause, I found that I spent quite a lot of time going to and fro between Section 141, the order, Section 141A and so on. That is okay for us—it is our job—but one would not like to think of members of the public having to scour through all this to find out what sort of offensive weapon they might have. Will the Home Office give some thought as to how they can produce a Keeling schedule for the public?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I can utterly appreciate the noble Baroness’s point. When I look at legislation, I have to refer to other legislation, and it can be a minefield, but such is the nature of legislation built up over time. The guidance will help people in that endeavour and, as I said on Monday with reference to another issue, it will be very helpful to members of the public in knowing exactly where the offences are and what aspects of the Bill strike out other aspects of legislation.

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Moved by

[Baroness Hamwee]

43A: Clause 17, page 17, line 37, after “solely” insert “or principally”
Member’s explanatory statement
The purpose of this amendment, along with the amendments to page 17, lines 38 and 41, is to probe the extent to which the offence in Clause 17(2) covers delivery to a person who works from home.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, in moving this amendment I will speak also to Amendments 43B and 43C. We are still on the issue of residential premises, and I will not go down the route of customs declarations or indeed of the Immigration Bill as it might apply to New Zealand sheep-clippers and so on. There are a lot of aspects that could be raised.

On Monday, the noble Earl, Lord Erroll, asked about farm-houses. The noble Lord, Lord Lucas, and my noble friend Lord Paddick asked how you know about residential premises. My noble friend, referring to UPS and Royal Mail, quoted comments made by a company in this sector about unworkability in the real world. The Minister convinced me on Monday about not wanting to criminalise Royal Mail through my amendment. She mentioned then that Clause 17(6) was there to satisfy concerns about small traders—individual craftspeople and those running relatively small businesses from home. I would like to raise aspects of that in this group of amendments.

The first of my amendments would provide that residential premises are premises used solely or principally for residential purposes. We have gone round in so many circles on this, but it seems to me that the amendment would be of reassurance to individual craftspeople, to take just one group, who use a shed at the back of their house or a room in the home for their business.

Amendment 43B is a drafting point, and not a very good one. I am afraid that Amendment 43C would create a double negative, but, again, it deals with the owner or occupier who resides in the premises. It probes whether the premises can be residential for somebody other than the resident carrying on a business in it, even if the residential area is only a small part of the whole of the premises.

I have been trying to apply the terminology of the clause to what one knows goes on in all sorts of different types of premises, because we are causing—certainly for me—a good deal of confusion. As I have said before, one wants to get it right, and, as my noble friend and the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, said, we are trying to make this Bill workable and fair. I beg to move.

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[Baroness Barran]

There is no restriction on delivering to a business premises.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, the Official Report has already recorded my response, as noted by the noble Baroness.

I think we will all want to spend some time after this stage of the Bill looking at the various provisions that together make up what can and cannot be done. I would add to the mix the point raised on Monday which arises under Clause 18—it is not only my noble friend’s campaign about offences and defences—about the terms “all reasonable precautions” and “all due diligence” and how “all” applies in this situation. I want to spend quite a lot of time understanding what we have been told, how it is reflected in the Bill and what we should pursue at the next stage. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 43A withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Baroness Hamwee]

43D: Clause 17, page 18, line 2, leave out “imprisonment for a term not exceeding 51 weeks” and insert “a community sentence”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, and the other to page 18, line 5, would replace the short-term custodial sentences in Clause 17 with community sentences.

[Baroness Hamwee]

I shall speak also to Amendments 43E, 63A, 63B, 64A, 65A, 65B, 65C, 65D, 65E and 65F. This takes us back to community sentences. We debated their value and the problems associated with short custodial sentences extensively on Monday. I do not want to rerun all the same points today on Clauses 17, 22, 23 and 24, although I have noticed that Clause 23 brings in the possibility of an indictment where the term would be much longer. To the extent that that is relevant to this discussion, it strengthens my view that seriousness can be reflected by the prosecution being sent up to the Crown Court. The Minister directed the Committee to Section 150A of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 reminding us—or in my case, informing me—that a community sentence can be imposed only if the offence might attract a custodial sentence. I would say that was game and set—or some other sporting analogy—but I am not sure it is quite yet match, at least not until I am convinced that this is a good way of going about sentencing as there is a much wider issue behind this.

Section 150A does not apply if Section 151(2), which confers power to make a community order, does apply. Section 151 is about community orders for persistent offenders previously fined. Am I right in thinking that this is not yet in force? Has it been shelved? Is there an intention to review it? More widely, does the Minister accept that, given the potential value of community orders, the generally acknowledged problems with short custodial sentences and the state of our prisons, it would be a good move to review Section 150A as she explained it on Monday? I beg to move.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, this group of amendments echoes one of our debates on Monday; namely, whether it is appropriate to provide for custodial penalties of less than six months’ duration for certain new offences in the Bill. It will not come as a surprise to the noble Baroness to learn that I remain unpersuaded of the case for replacing custodial sentences of up to six months with community sentences for the knife-related offences in the Bill. As we have already discussed in Committee, we all know that the impact of knife crime on society is devastating. Young people getting hold of knives by using remote sales can have tragic consequences if they go on to use the weapon for a crime. The possession of prohibited weapons is and should be a serious offence. The Government believe it is proportionate and fair that those committing these offences should expect robust sentences.

The noble Baroness will recall that I explained on Monday that community sentences cannot be set as a maximum penalty for an offence as, under the Criminal Justice Act 2003, community sentences are available only for offences which are imprisonable. In providing this maximum custodial penalty, we are providing the courts with a range of penalties. This gives courts the option to impose a custodial sentence, a community sentence, and/or a fine as they deem appropriate, having regard to all the circumstances of the offence and the offender. I know that the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, welcomes this flexibility and the range of sentencing options which we considered earlier in the week.

As I mentioned on Monday, there is also the requirement under the Criminal Justice Act 2003 that the court has to be satisfied that the offence is so serious that only a custodial sentence can be justified. I therefore remain confident that the courts will sentence offenders appropriately, taking into account the circumstances of the offence and the offender. Where a custodial sentence is justified, they will impose it, but where a community order would be better for punishment and rehabilitation, while protecting the public, then nothing in our provisions prevents that.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, is not in his place, but he said on Monday that,

“some short sentences do some good because they punish the offender”.—[Official Report, 28/1/19; col. GC 169.]

I wholeheartedly agree with that sentiment, and we should not now be depriving the courts of the full range of sentencing options.

The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, asked whether the provisions of the Criminal Justice Act she referred to are in force. I will have to write to her on that specific question, if she is amenable to that. On that note, I ask that she withdraw the amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

I would expect the Minister to answer no less. She started by saying that I would not be surprised by the Government’s response, and she will not be surprised to hear that we are not persuaded either.

I accepted what she said about Section 150, which is why I looked it up and spent the usual frustrating few minutes trying to work out whether something that applied to it was in force or not. I think it is not, which is why I took the opportunity to ask the question. My overall question is whether it would be a good move to review Section 150A and bring that part of our attitude to sentencing up to date. But we clearly cannot pursue this any further today and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment. I will, however, ask the Minister to accept that I have fulfilled my undertaking to be very quick—the clock had not even reached one minute by the time I had finished.

Amendment 43D withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Baroness Hamwee]

43G: Clause 18, page 18, line 21, leave out from “buyer” to end of line 23
Member’s explanatory statement
The purpose of this amendment is to seek clarity as to how the seller can necessarily know the purpose for which the buyer intends to use the knife; and why adaptations are not dealt with in the same way as design.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, Clause 18 sets out defences to an offence under the previous clause. One defence, in subsection (3), is if the person charged proves that,

“the bladed product was adapted for the buyer before its delivery in accordance with”,

the buyer’s specifications and that,

“the adaptations were made to enable or facilitate the use of the product by the buyer or its use for a particular purpose”.

My amendment would take out the latter part of that provision.

I wrote down “designer knife” as a heading for my notes and then thought that it has a very different and much more sinister connotation than referring to a chef’s knife, which is the sort of thing that I understand this provision is aimed not to block, especially when we talk about adaptations in the context of designer knives. No doubt the proof— there has to be proof here—would in the event be a matter for the jury. But in view of the wording I referred to a few moments ago about the defence of taking all reasonable precautions and exercising all due diligence, it is important that the person who may commit an offence knows what precautions to take.

Proof that the product was designed in accordance with specifications that the buyer provided seems likely to be easier. They would be unlikely to make an order which does not set out the specifications but that may not be the same with adaptations, because they might have a conversation on the phone about their requirements. I want to pursue that issue, and why the activities which amount to the defence are to be undertaken “before its delivery” when those words are not in Clause 18(2). I do not see the distinction there nor the distinction between the two subsections, given the words “for a particular purpose”. How does the person who may be charged know the purpose? I beg to move.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for setting out the amendment in the name of her noble friend Lord Paddick. As we have seen from earlier debates, these are complicated provisions but unavoidably so, I am afraid. She wants to know two things: first, how the buyer can know what purpose the bladed product will be used for and, secondly, why the provision relating to the adaptation under Clause 18(3) differs from that for design and manufacture under Clause 18(2). I hope to be able to provide some clarity but perhaps I may first summarise what we are talking about.

The defences at subsections (2) and (3) of Clause 18 are aimed at allowing the dispatch of bespoke, handmade knives to a person’s home address. One issue that came out clearly from the consultation is that there is a significant number of makers of handmade knives. These are often individual tradespersons who make specialist knives for individual buyers. The most commonly cited example, which the noble Baroness gave today, is chef’s knives, which are made or adapted to specifications provided by the chef—for example, on the length or shape of the blade, or the weight of the handle. Such handmade bespoke knives are very expensive and, in most cases, there is a relationship between the seller and the buyer, which means there is no risk of these knives being sold to a young person. We therefore wanted to allow such knives to continue to be sent to the buyer’s home address.

Clause 18(2) covers where a buyer asks a seller, who in such cases is also likely to be the manufacturer, to design or make specific knives to specifications that they have provided. This would cover where a chef, for example, asks the seller to make them a set of knives to very specific specifications. The seller in these cases will often have a relationship with the buyer and it should be easy for the seller to prove that they are making the knife to specifications, because they will have correspondence with the buyer setting out the requirements.

Clause 18(3) covers where the buyer wants an existing knife adapted to meet specific specifications—for example, where a chef wants a blade shortened or changed in shape or where they want the handle changed, or where a disabled person wants changes to a knife so that they can use it—and these changes are to enable the knife to be used for a particular purpose, such as catering, outdoor pursuits or other activities. Again, in these cases the seller will often have a relationship with the buyer and they will easily be able to evidence that the bladed product was adapted in accordance with specifications of the buyer and the purpose for which it was going to be used, because this would be part of the conversation or communication on which adaptations to make. For example, the maker would know that the knife was needed for gutting fish—that issue was raised the other day—or because the buyer had one hand and needed it for sawing branches, as that would be part of the decision on what changes needed to be made. The purpose of Clause 18(3)(b) is to exclude the etching of a person’s name on a bladed product, as we did not want to provide a defence for bladed products where the only adaptation to the product was the engraving of words on, or similar superficial adaptation to, the product.

I hope that, in light of that explanation, the noble Baroness will be content to withdraw the amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, the Minister’s last point about engraving a name had not occurred to me, although I do not quite see how it is distinct from the situation under subsection (2), where you might ask for a product to be manufactured with the specification of adding your name. I will go through what the Minister said, but for the moment, at any rate, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 43G withdrawn.

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[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

In terms of better regulation, I do not think that it has but I will double-check before Report. It probably has not.

The noble Earl, Lord Listowel, asked about the position in other countries and the approach we have taken. Of course we always learn from other jurisdictions, and I hope that they learn from us, but we must legislate as we consider it appropriate to address the position as we find it in this country. Regarding the problems underlying drug addiction, we will come on to that when we reach Amendment 63 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, who I do not think is in her place at this point.

I want to make one final point about articles with a blade or point: we do not want to capture items such as screwdrivers and crochet needles because they are not usually used for harm—that is not to say they are not used for harm, but not usually. Hence we are referring to “blade” and not “sharp point”. I hope that, with those explanations, the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

Before we get to that point, the Minister has mentioned guidance, which will certainly be very welcome. Can we be assured that the practitioners—I do not mean those with real knives, but those in the criminal justice sector, prosecution, the Bar Council, police and so on—are consulted about how the guidance is presented? I can see a nod at that. That will be very helpful.

I cannot help observing that whoever gave the Minister the note about crochet needles is not someone who uses them, because they have a curved end.

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Moved by

[Baroness Hamwee]

57A: Clause 20, page 20, line 7, leave out subsection (3)
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is to probe why this exemption exists.

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[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I did not move Amendment 55A because there was an equivalent that we debated on Monday. Amendment 57A would have had an equivalent amendment, but I missed it—nobody is perfect. However, this allows us to return yet again to the distinction between sellers outside the UK and sellers carrying on the,

“business of selling articles of any kind from premises in any part of the United Kingdom”,

at the time of the sale.

I was curious about that distinction, and have one or two points I would like to check. Am I right to think that “carrying on business” does not mean that the business has to be based or domiciled to fulfil that description? I assume that the seller does not have to have his own premises and can operate, for instance, from a contractor’s premises; and that the description “selling articles of any kind” will be met if the seller sells teddy bears, for instance, rather than knives from within the UK.

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[Lord Lucas]

Well, my Lords, perhaps we could enter into some correspondence about that. What Amazon does in this country is the fulfilment; the selling is done from Ireland or Liechtenstein, but certainly not from within this country. We need to be clear that these activities can get split, particularly in the case of big companies. The whole action of selling the knife, preparing it for delivery and delivering it is what should be considered as selling it, not just the technical act of selling.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, that is why I asked some of my questions, as the activities can be split—although I do not want to promote Amazon. These issues may not be far from the taxation points that arise in connection with some of these organisations. As it happens, I do not quite agree with the noble Lord about who is selling. Last night, I looked up an item that I have only been able to find to buy through Amazon and the website said, “This is dispatched from and sold by” somebody else. However, a lot of questions remain.

[Lord Lucas]

That is an Amazon Marketplace thing and not an Amazon own product.

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[Lord Deben (Con)]

I was here at our last meeting, when this issue was discussed. It has obviously caused us a great deal of misunderstanding and we have found it quite difficult to undo. I am concerned about the customers; I am not sure that they would understand it at all. Therefore, I hope that the Minister will agree to try to work this out in a way that the public can understand. Part of what we are trying to do is to make suitable controls. I was not able to be here earlier, but I have been here for this discussion. Even so, I am in the same position as I was when we talked about this before: I do not understand it wholly and I am not sure that the noble Baroness does, although she is very clever and often understands things when I do not. Clearly, we do not understand it, so is it possible for us to look at it again? If it means that it is better to be a seller from abroad than to be a seller at home, frankly I would not like to have to explain that on a platform to the public. I would find that difficult. In the end, we ought not to help people who are domiciled abroad in order to avoid paying taxes and who undermine people who are here paying taxes. I am not terribly keen on that and, again, I would not like to explain it on a platform. I always think this about the small “p” political things: if I were standing on a platform and someone asked me the question, could I give them an answer that would not mean that the hall threw rotten apples? I am afraid that this is rotten-apple time.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I am grateful for that. I do not think that I would manage even to get as far as the rotten apples, because I would have bored the audience. It is not just the buyer who needs to be clear about this; it is the seller and everybody in the chain. There needs to be more clarity than I have obtained and I look forward to the meeting when we will discuss this further. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 57A withdrawn.

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[Lord Tunnicliffe]

Amendments 59, 60 and 86 in this group, which are tabled in my name, seek to give trading standards powers to enforce the relevant provisions of the Bill and a power to investigate alleged breaches of the relevant provisions contained in the Bill. There are excellent examples of good work already going on, which this amendment seeks to build on. Croydon Borough Council has worked with local retailers to improve their understanding of the law around knife sales through training and to encourage them to go further than required by law through responsible retail agreements and has caught traders willing to break the law on underage sales by using test purchasers in person and online. Croydon trading standards now has 145 retailers signed up to its responsible retailer agreements. It ran eight “Do you pass?” training sessions with retailers over the past year, encouraging additional measures, such as Challenge 25 and the responsible display of knives in stores. The training sessions are a good indicator of which retailers are keen to work responsibly and which might not be. Finally, 61 test purchases of knives have been carried out in the past year to identify those retailers which are not complying with the law. We have also seen excellent work done in this regard by the police in Greenwich through test purchases by cadets.

These additional responsibilities will create a resource issue as this will be an additional power and an additional requirement, but one that I think is needed. I recognise that the Serious Violence Strategy released by the Home Office contained the promise of a prosecution fund for trading standards for two years to support targeted prosecution activity against online and instore retailers in breach of the law on the sale of knives to underage people. The strategy is not clear about how much funding will be made available and gives no clarity to trading standards about support two years down the line. Perhaps the Minister can update the Grand Committee on this.

In putting these amendments forward, I am aware that the budget for trading standards has been cut by half since 2010, from more than £200 million to barely £100 million, while the number of trading standards officers has fallen by 56% in the same period. The cuts I refer to have led to the downgrading of the protections that consumers depend on. In many cases, they have been reduced to a system based on consumer complaints. Relying on such a system is not an effective way to enforce laws, particularly when we talk about the purchase of knives or corrosive substances. I hope to get a positive response and that the Minister will speak to her amendments in this group. I beg to move.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I am not sure whether the Minister wants to introduce the government’s amendments now, so perhaps I should just ask some questions. At Second Reading, I raised the role of trading standards so it is obviously welcome that it is being addressed.

There are some obvious questions about the Government’s amendments. First, why weights and measures authorities? I confess that I have not looked up the statutory definition of a weights and measures authority, but there must be one. Why is it that rather than local authorities? The Chartered Trading Standards Institute makes the point that if the obligation was placed on local authorities as a whole, they might have more flexibility in how they dealt with the issue. Secondly, why is it not a statutory duty? On that point, the institute says that, in its experience, local authorities are less likely to provide the resources to deal with a problem, let alone with the training and recruitment of staff. The issue of resources is huge, and it is the elephant in the room in this context. We are all aware of the constraints on local authorities. It is a while since I was a local councillor, and I used to think that we had problems then. I do not know how local authorities manage now to juggle the calls on their resources, so I must make that obvious point as well as asking these few questions. It is right that the role of trading standards is recognised here, as is their role with offensive weapons as a whole, given their understanding of how the communities where they work actually operate.

[Lord Harris of Haringey]

My Lords, I apologise for missing the first few words of my noble friend’s introductory remarks on this amendment. I echo what the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, said because I wonder whether the wording in the government amendment is as precise as it is intended to be. The Chartered Trading Standards Institute—I refer to my interests in terms of trading standards—says that a correct definition, if you mean just weights and measures authorities, would be,

“a local weights and measures authority”,

in Great Britain,

“within the meaning set out in section 69 of the Weights and Measures Act 1985”.

The Department for the Economy in Northern Ireland may enforce within its area, rather than simply talking in those terms. I wonder whether a broader definition would not make sense, given that in many local authorities now the trading standards function, which is so diminished, is often spread with other responsibilities. That may be something the Government want to take away and look at to make sure that what they are trying to achieve meets the obligation.

The second point about whether this should be made a duty is important as well. People I know very well in the Chartered Trading Standards Institute try to get this both ways: they complain constantly about all the statutory duties placed on local authorities, and therefore the inability of local authorities to take them seriously, but they also say, “Here is something which ought to be a statutory duty”. The psychological effect of making it clear that the Government wish to place a responsibility on local authorities to pursue their role in this matter would be extremely helpful and valuable. If the Government were to find some way of making the resources available, so that, rather than just placing the duty, they could also ensure that local authorities had the wherewithal to take effective action, that would be extremely helpful.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hamwee]

When that is done, could examples —not a whole list of the grain to which the Minister refers—be given to us?

[Baroness Barran]

We will gladly do that.

The noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, asked for more detail about the prosecution fund that was announced in the Government’s Serious Violence Strategy. The Government committed £500,000 in 2018-19 and another £500,000 in 2019-20 to support local authorities to bring prosecutions, where appropriate, in relation to age-restricted sales of knives. The prosecution fund is managed by National Trading Standards, which is the body that brings together trading standards representatives in England and Wales. The fund will be used by 11 local areas identified as having a knife crime problem to test compliance with sale of knives legislation. I think the noble Lord will be pleased to hear that Croydon is among the 11 areas since he referred to the good work that is going on there.

Amendment 86 would enable local authorities and companies to establish partnerships with the purpose of complying with the provisions in the Bill. The noble Lord will correct me if I am wrong, but I suspect that this amendment is aimed at extending the benefits of the primary authority scheme. The primary authority scheme was created in response to recommendations in the Hampton report published in 2005, which noted widespread inconsistencies of regulatory interpretation between different local authorities. It was introduced in April 2009. The Enterprise Act 2016 included measures to amend the Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008 to enable many more small businesses and pre-start-up enterprises to participate in primary authority.

The primary authority scheme provides greater regulatory consistency for businesses operating across a number of local authority areas. This is expected to improve compliance with the legislation. The scheme is based on the creation of a statutory partnership between a business and its primary authority. The primary authority acts as a key point of contact for a business that it partners with, in relation to the business’s interaction with local authorities that regulate it, known as enforcing authorities. The primary authority acts as co-ordinator of other local authority inspections of that business. The primary authority supports businesses in meeting their obligations by helping them to understand what needs to be done to achieve or maintain compliance: setting out a way of doing so, or providing information that the method of compliance chosen by the business is acceptable. For the benefit of noble Lords, I will mention that all the major supermarkets, Amazon and the Association of Convenience Stores—given that your Lordships have mentioned the importance of smaller retailers several times—are all part of the primary authority scheme. The scheme has been received positively and has had widespread uptake and support from businesses, professional bodies and local authorities. Government Amendment 82 therefore extends the scheme to the sale of bladed articles and corrosive products. Amendments 88 and 90 are consequential on the earlier amendments.

In short, the government amendments in this group achieve much the same end as the amendments in the name of the noble Lords, Lord Tunnicliffe and Lord Kennedy. On that basis I hope that the noble Lord will be content to withdraw Amendment 59.

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[Lord Lucas]

In moving Amendment 61, I shall speak also to Amendment 62. Amendment 61 is intended to remove or make it clear that certain knives do not fall under the prohibition in Clause 21. There are a number of occupations and trades where it is very important to be able to have a knife that can be opened with one hand. This is often a safety-critical feature—if you are a climber, an at-sea fisherman, a parachutist or in various other trades that involve the use of ropes, you need to be able to cut and at the same time use your other hand to hold on to something. The way that is generally achieved is to have a small button looking something like a wart on the blade that you can push using the pressure of your thumb to open it; sometimes the alternative is a large opening in the blade.

I want to make sure that the Government are clear that those sorts of knives are not intended to be caught by this clause, because—coming on to the history behind Amendment 62—when Clause 139 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 was promulgated, allowing folding knives with blades shorter than three and a half inches, it was widely assumed that that would allow blades that locked, because nobody who is going to use a knife wants a blade that does not lock. A folding knife with a blade that does not lock is a toy—you can use it to sharpen a pencil and nothing much else safely. If you have any use for it in hobbies or business, you need a blade that will lock open. The locking requirement was introduced as a result of case law.

If the Government wish to maintain that, I would like my noble friend to make it absolutely clear that “good reason” is understood to be really quite wide. A tradesman will generally have among his tools a knife with a blade that locks, because that is all that is safe to use. You can therefore expect to find it in and about their vehicle, when their vehicle is in a public place, or when they are moving between, or might be going to, places where they will need to employ their knife.

At present, people who use knives in such ways tell me that the police are understanding, but if we reach the point of being much harder on the carrying of knives, I want to be sure that it really is understood that a locking knife is an essential tool of the trade, that people who have a trade or hobby that requires it will often have it in their possession and that the police take an understanding attitude to that at a time of heightened tension. I beg to move.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My noble friend and I have given notice that we oppose Clause 21 standing part of the Bill. Our concern was that expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, about people who need to be able to open a knife with one hand because their other hand is otherwise engaged in the same operation. We wanted also to know how the needs of disabled people who may have the use of only one hand are to be dealt with. A button, spring or other device that the noble Lord has described seems to be exactly the sort of knife that would fall within this clause. I see a problem there, and I am glad that he has identified it more specifically than we have done. I could not quite see the way to deal with it, so I took the rather wider approach of opposing the clause standing part, but we have to pin it down in a way that satisfies everyone—and not just by the police being understanding.

[Viscount Goschen]

My Lords, I draw to the Committee’s attention that that this type of knife is often contained in a multi-tool type product, for which there are numerous applications. Motorists, hobbyists, farmers and all sorts of people regularly carry them. They often have small blades which, because of the multiplicity of functions within the product, are accessed by a knob or protuberance of metal. It would be regrettable if such products were caught by accident within the clause.

Perhaps I may ask the Minister a question to which I would be happy for her to reply in writing—it refers to something that we have recently passed. If an individual were to steal a knife from a shop, would they be considered to be guilty also of being in possession of that knife, of carrying it? If not, I suggest that it might be looked at in regulations and that the law should consider it a more serious offence than stealing something of the equivalent value of a Mars bar or some other food item, but it is a technical point.

--- Later in debate ---

I can only support what my noble friends Lady Meacher and Lord Ramsbotham have said: that their approach offers a much more humane and effective way of tackling this part of the problem. I support it strongly and hope that the Minister will give a sympathetic response.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, the Minister will expect us to support the principle of what is encompassed in this amendment. I do not need to repeat what has been said about the importance of diverting—in every sense of the word, with or without a capital “D”—people away from the criminal justice system and towards something that can help them to deal with the problem in all its manifestations. I am not quite sure about some of the wording of the clause—about the need to look at whether there has been a charge or certification by the police force—but those points do not detract from our general support for the approach.

[Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen (Con)]

I agree with a lot of what the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, has been saying. In fact, I am involved with a charity in Gloucestershire which deals with women who would otherwise go to prison; instead, the criminal justice system sends them to us. We have three houses in Swindon, Gloucester and Somerset. Most of the women who come to us have been drug addicts and we find that in most cases their problems started when they were teenagers. We have had terrific success in treating them in our houses, giving them the chance of a much better life and of moving on. I ask the Government to think seriously about this amendment.

Offensive Weapons Bill

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 6th February 2019 Grand Committee

[Baroness Barran]

My Lords, we need to ensure that the police have appropriate powers to deal with threats on school or further education premises involving corrosive substances. Given the significant harm that corrosive attacks can cause and the fear that they can instil, it is important that we ensure that the police have sufficient powers to be able to take swift and preventive action.

We know that there are around 800 attacks per year in England and Wales, and we need to ensure that action can be taken not just to deal with actual attacks but with threats to use a corrosive substance. Clause 31 is designed to ensure that the police can effectively enforce the offence of threatening with a corrosive substance in a private place as it applies to schools and further education establishments.

The noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, has explained his concerns that this new power will be disproportionately used against black, Asian and minority ethnic pupils and students. I appreciate and understand the noble Lord’s concern, which should be taken seriously. It is, however, important to recognise that this power can be used only in circumstances where a police officer has reasonable grounds for suspecting that someone has been threatened by another person with a corrosive substance. Reasonable grounds might include a report from a teacher, a parent or a pupil.

It is also important that we ensure there are sufficient protections in place for our schools and further education premises to deal with any situations where a pupil or student may threaten to throw or squirt a corrosive substance over another student or a teacher. The police need to be able to enter and search a school or further education premises and any person on them to prevent an actual attack. That said, I have indicated that the noble Lord has raised a perfectly proper concern.

While I do not consider this amendment to be necessary, I can give your Lordships an undertaking that we will consult relevant school and further education bodies, including teaching unions, local authorities and other associations, on the implementation of this power before we bring the clause into force. With that assurance, I hope the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, before the noble Lord replies, I had read this clause as primarily directed to the power to enter and search premises—in fact you have to do that—as well as a person. Can the Minister assure the Committee that, as well as the consultation she has mentioned, information and statistics will be kept that show the BAME profiles? I should not use the word “profile”, but the Minister will understand what I am saying. This is an issue we have brought up at other points in the Bill.

[Baroness Barran]

I am glad to be able to reassure the noble Baroness that that will be the case.

Offensive Weapons Bill

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Report: 1st sitting: House of Lords
Tuesday 26th February 2019 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Hamwee]

1: Clause 1, page 1, line 9, leave out first “all”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, along with similar amendments to this Clause, amends the defence for the offence in this section to set a less demanding standard than all reasonable precautions / all due diligence.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, Amendment 1 is in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Paddick, as are all the other amendments in this group—Amendments 2, 15, 16, 25, 26, 64, 65, 67, 68, 70 to 73, 78 and 79—16 amendments, each deleting a three-letter word. The word is “all”, as in taking “all reasonable precautions” and exercising “all due diligence” in connection with the sale of corrosive products to someone under 18, in Clause 1; the sale of bladed articles to someone under 18, in Clause 15; and the delivery of bladed articles to residential premises, in Clause 18. These are defences to the offences contained in those clauses, so it is no minor matter.

The meaning of “all reasonable precautions” and “all due diligence” emerged in Committee. The noble Lord, Lord Lucas, raised it, others followed it up, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, said:

“If I might say so, ‘all’ means ‘every’. Without ‘all’, you have just to take reasonable precautions and show due diligence. Once you put ‘all’ in, you fall foul of any particular point you could have but did not look at and did not do”.


Clearly, this is a very high bar, and it took a number of noble Lords somewhat by surprise, I think. I am unclear about what it might mean, particularly when coupled with “reasonableness”, because it is not just about doing the reasonable thing; it is about doing every reasonable thing. The Minister said in that debate:

“All roads are leading back to the guidance”,—[Official Report, 28/1/19; col. GC 163.]


having told the Committee that the Government want to produce guidance—we will debate that later—to ensure that retailers and sellers know what steps they could take, with regard to Clause 1, to ensure that they comply with the law. On the wording, is it about steps that they can take or steps that they must take? It seems to me that the wording used throughout the Bill does not allow for common-sense alternatives or even minor omissions. Of course, guidance is produced by the Executive, not by Parliament. Indeed, to end with a question, will one necessarily have complied with the law, even if one follows guidance to the letter, if all reasonable precautions and all due diligence have to be applied? I beg to move.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)]

My Lords, as the noble Baroness explained, these amendments relate to the level of burden of proof required for retailers and delivery companies if they want to avail themselves of the defences available to them if charged with an offence of selling or delivering a corrosive product or a bladed article to an under-18 or the offence of delivering a corrosive product or bladed article to a residential address. Under these amendments, retailers and delivery companies would need to prove just that they had taken reasonable precautions and exercised due diligence to avoid the commission of the relevant offence, rather than, as the Bill provides, that they took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence, as the noble Baroness explained.

I am not persuaded, despite the noble Baroness’s words, that it is unjust to require a person to prove that they have taken all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid selling or delivering corrosive products or bladed articles to under-18s or to avoid delivering such products or articles to residential premises. Retailers have had to operate to this standard under existing law and to lower the burden of proof would leave us with a burden of proof in the Bill that was out of sync with existing legislation. I will give some examples.

Under Section 141A(4) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, it is a defence for someone charged with the offence of selling a knife to an under-18 if they can prove that they,

“took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid the commission of the offence”.

The Licensing Act 2003 requires a defendant to prove that,

“he had taken all reasonable steps to establish the individual’s age”,

in regard to the selling of alcohol to an under-18. Under Section 7 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933, which prohibits the sale of tobacco to under-18s, the defence is in similar terms. Part 4 of the Gambling Act 2005 includes various offences in relation to children; under Section 63, it is a defence to show that the defendant “took all reasonable steps”.

As a result of these examples in law, I urge that the higher burden of proof is an established defence, and one which has been in place for a significant amount of time without issue. Retailers now know what is required of them by way of proof if they wish to make use of the defence if charged with the offence of selling a knife or bladed article to an under-18. It is understood by retailers, Trading Standards and the police. Having two different burdens of proof in place would, I think, be confusing to all concerned. I do not think it would help the police, Trading Standards officers, prosecutors or the courts. Noble Lords are always calling for consistency, and I think there is a strong argument for consistency here. I hope that, on reflection, the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, would agree and be happy to withdraw the amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, it is certainly a burden in the sense of the weight of it rather than the balance of it, which is how we normally consider the burden of proof. The Minister says that retailers now know. My question was whether they will know from the guidance that is to be produced. I shall have to leave that hanging, as this is the point that we are at. Maybe the Minister will be able to answer that when we come to the next group and talk about guidance. Perhaps we will also have to wait for an answer on whether guidance across all the offences—not just those within this Bill but others that the Minister mentioned—will be consistent. Clearly, we are not going to be of the same mind here but I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 1 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Baroness Hamwee]

3: Clause 1, page 1, line 10, at end insert—
“( ) The Secretary of State must, within one month of the coming into force of this section, publish guidance as to how the requirements of the defence under subsection (2) may be fulfilled.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, following the Minister's remarks at Committee stage (28 January, HL Deb, col 160GC), is intended to ensure that guidance will be issued, so that those responsible for designing and carrying out checking procedures will be able to judge their adequacy.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, is unable to be here but has asked me to move this amendment on his behalf so that we may get the matter on the record. However, I will not speak to Amendment 81, which is in this group and also in his name, because he will get the opportunity to do so if we leave it to be discussed in sequence on the next day of Report.

The amendment seeks guidance. We have government amendments in this group, and no doubt the answer to Amendment 3 is Amendment 106. In the Government’s amendment, the guidance is about a large number of offences relating to various sections in legislation, including Clause 1 of this Bill, and therefore it covers a wide area. Guidance can be very helpful—it sounds as though it will be essential here—but, as I have said before, it should not take the place of clear primary legislation. It is executive, not legislative. I beg to move.

[Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab Co-op)]

My Lords, Amendment 3 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, and moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord’s Amendment 81, which he will speak to himself when we come to that point in the Bill, ask the Secretary of State to issue guidance. We are placing burdens on shop workers and delivery drivers, and it is incumbent on the Government to issue proper guidance. I know that we have the government amendments and I look forward to the Minister setting them out, as we have a situation where people can be prosecuted and end up in prison, so we need to make sure that they understand their responsibilities. I look forward to the Minister setting that out for the House.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I thank noble Lords for their comments. I agree that, as the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, and the noble Earl, Lord Erroll, pointed out, people have to understand their responsibilities. In Committee there was much debate about the need for guidance, particularly for retailers, manufacturers, delivery companies and the like, about the operation of the provisions in the Bill relating to the sale and delivery of corrosive products and offensive weapons.

In response to the debate in Committee, I said that it was our intention to issue appropriate guidance. A number of noble Lords, including my noble friend Lord Lucas, wanted to see that commitment reflected in the Bill, and government Amendment 106 does just that. It enables the Home Secretary, Scottish Ministers and the Northern Ireland Department of Justice, as the case may be, to issue guidance about the provisions in the Bill, and the existing law as amended by the Bill, relating to corrosives and offensive weapons.

Importantly, the amendment also sets out that, before guidance is published, the relevant national authority must consult,

“such persons likely to be affected by it as the authority considers appropriate”.

We would, for example, expect to consult organisations representing both small and large retailers of knives and corrosive products. This would ensure that those directly impacted by these measures have a hand in developing the guidance that is most useful to them. That is an important part of the Bill.

Were he in his place, I hope that my noble friend Lord Lucas would agree that government Amendment 106 covers similar ground to his Amendments 3 and 81 and, indeed, provides a more comprehensive list of the provisions where it might be appropriate to issue guidance. Government Amendments 108, 112 and 113 are consequential to Amendment 106. I hope that on that basis the noble Baroness will be content to withdraw Amendment 3 and support the government amendments.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I am indeed. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 3 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Baroness Hamwee]

5: Clause 1, page 2, line 15, leave out from “Wales,” to end of line 16 and insert “to a fine”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, along with other amendments to this Clause, would remove the short term prison sentences from the offence in this section.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 5 in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Paddick, I shall speak also to Amendments 6, 7, 20, 21, 22, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32 and 34.

For most of us in society, the idea of going to prison for even a short amount of time, with the loss of liberty that that entails, is a real deterrent. But that thinking fails to get into the mindset of many of today’s criminals, who may be reckless or who may not fear prison because they have friends and family who have done time. Perhaps their lives are so chaotic that, in the scheme of things, prison does not seem so bad. That is true of no group more than those serving the shortest sentences. It was recently said:

“In the last five years, just over a quarter of a million custodial sentences have been given to offenders for six months or less; over 300,000 sentences were for 12 months or less. But nearly two thirds of those offenders go on to commit a further crime within a year of being released. 27% of all reoffending is committed by people who have served short sentences of 12 months or less. For the offenders completing these short sentences whose lives are destabilised, and for society which incurs a heavy financial and social cost, prison simply isn’t working”.

By now noble Lords may have recognised the source of this quotation. The speaker went on to say that,

“there is a very strong case to abolish sentences of six months or less altogether, with some closely defined exceptions, and put in their place a robust community order regime. Let’s be honest. The public will always want to prioritise schools or hospitals over the criminal justice system when it comes to public spending. But where we do spend on the criminal justice system, we must spend on what works. Why would we spend taxpayers’ money doing what we know doesn’t work, and indeed, makes us less safe? We shouldn’t”.

Thank you, Justice Secretary, for putting the case so well.

I commented at the last stage of this Bill that, not so long ago, the Home Office and the MoJ were a single department. It was too big, but it is a great pity that thinking has moved so far apart that one department is now legislating for a sanction which the other considers unproductive.

These amendments would remove the sanction of short-term imprisonment for up to 51 weeks—the same points apply as those made by Mr Gauke in his speech a few days ago. We are dealing with various offences: the sale of corrosives to under-18s, the delivery of corrosives to residential premises and having the corrosive in a public place. We would have preferred to focus on robust community sentences, but we learned during the last stage that they can be applied only as an alternative to a custodial sentence. In my view, that needs updating—but that is for another day. I hope that the Government might address this: otherwise, we will do so at a suitable opportunity.

In Committee, it was said, understandably, that victims feel let down because community sentences do not have the same weight and are ineffective. That is an important issue, which should be addressed by the robustness of community sentences. I have heard over the years that a tough community sentence is much harder than custody.

The offences in question are rather difficult. The first two that I mentioned are likely to be committed by adults. Being found to have committed a criminal offence and being fined, which is what our amendments would achieve, would have a serious impact on the offender as an employee—or possibly, in the circumstances, as an ex-employee. The third offence may be committed by an adult but also by a child. The arguments about custodial sentences being rather good at fitting someone for a life of crime particularly apply.

The Minister in Committee talked about the significant harm that corrosive products can cause if misused. The offences in question, which are the subject of these amendments, are not about the use of corrosives as a weapon. We are not seeking to minimise or make light of the harm that corrosives can cause; that is not the point. The Minister will also say that the court has discretion as to disposal, which is of course true up to a point.

That takes me to Clauses 8 and 9—the subject of the last two amendments in this group—which we would leave out. They require particular, mandatory sentences. Clause 8 applies to, among others, children over 16 who have one previous relevant conviction. We are concerned about the age threshold, for reasons that we went into fairly extensively at the last stage and which, I suspect, other noble Lords may raise today. I say in advance that I will probably agree with them. We have an in-principle objection to mandatory sentences. The Minister described them as providing the appropriate custodial sentence. But is not “appropriate” something that the court should determine? We may have criticisms of pre-sentence reports and so on, but the court is looking at both the offence and the offender; those taken together will lead the court to take a view on what is appropriate.

In Committee, we explained our opposition to the application to under-18s—I felt then, and still feel, that Clause 8(4) is inadequate. It is, if I may put it this way, the legislative equivalent of lip service that,

“the court must have regard to its duty under section 44 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933”.

The text refers back to Clause 8(2), which tells the court that if it is,

“of the opinion that there are particular circumstances”,

it can take a different course. But the circumstances here are that the person is under 18. So how does having regard to the welfare of the child or young person actually work? Does it mean that one child is more resilient than another, that one offence is less serious than another, or that the circumstances make custody “unjust”? This is what discretion in sentencing is about, and these Benches prefer judicial discretion to executive sentencing. I beg to move.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, I am going to say some contradictory things on this amendment—I have spent a career doing that, so it is perhaps not that unusual. Fundamentally, I think we probably need fewer people in prison. We could probably manage with half the number we have now. The question might be how we get there. As the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, mentioned, the Government have said that they would like to have less use—if not no use—of short sentences, so this seems a little contradictory. I would not do that myself; I would find other measures to reduce the prison population. That would probably mean releasing people at the end of their sentence rather than not putting them in there in the first place should it be deemed that they have committed a serious offence.

Here we should come back to the idea that prison is needed as a sanction in these cases; I think that it is relevant. There is no doubt that prison is not helpful for recidivism. All the evidence shows that, when people go to prison, some 80% reoffend within two years of their release. The most effective mechanism for reducing recidivism is called a police caution: broadly, 70% of those who offend never reoffend when they have received a police caution. So prison on the whole will not help with recidivism, but of course while offenders are in there, they will not attack members of the public—although they might attack each other.

The offences here are serious enough for prison at least to be considered. There would obviously then be a debate on how long the sentences should be. If the Government do decide to exclude short sentences, either on this occasion or as a general policy, that would also exclude things like weekend sentences, which would help reduce the prison population. They can be a very constructive way of reintegrating someone after a long sentence, or they can be an alternative to a short sentence.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

The prosecution may well fall on a director, because the director is seen to have fallen short in some of the processes to comply with the law. However, yes, it is usually the corporate body rather than the director, but I see the noble Lord’s point.

We have heard that there is evidence that short sentences are ineffectual regarding rehabilitation. The Justice Secretary and Prisons Minister are looking at the question of short sentences and the use of prison in the round. A number of noble Lords have raised that; the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, quoted the Justice Secretary in a speech on this very subject.

We have already been clear that custodial sentences should be seen as a last resort, and that offenders with complex needs—including female offenders—should be dealt with in the community wherever possible. However, we must ensure that sentencing matches the severity of a crime, and prison must always be available for the most serious offenders. I am concerned that we do not send out the wrong message that the use of corrosives as a weapon is somehow less serious than the use of knives.

Amendments 32 and 34 seek to strike out the provisions in respect of mandatory minimum sentences in Clauses 8 and 9. Again, the effect would be to treat carrying corrosive substances in a public place less seriously than carrying a knife. These clauses mirror existing knife legislation, and ensure that anyone aged 16 or over who is convicted of a second possession offence or a similar offence—such as an offence relating to a knife—will receive a custodial sentence unless the court determines that there are appropriate circumstances not to do so. The use of minimum custodial sentences will make it clear to individuals that we will not tolerate people carrying corrosives on our streets and other public places with the intention to harm or commit other crimes, such as robbery.

We are talking about serious offences here, where someone is carrying a corrosive substance which could result in someone being attacked and left with terrible injuries, as well as the fear that this can instil into communities. We should bear in mind that the requirement to impose the minimum sentence is not absolute; there is judicial discretion. The court must consider the circumstances of the case, and if there are relevant factors that would make it unjust to impose the minimum sentence, the court has the latitude not to do so.

I recognise that there is a wider debate to be had about our sentencing framework, but this Bill is not the place for it. We are dealing here with particular offences and seeking to ensure consistency between how the criminal law deals with the sale, delivery and possession of corrosive products and substances on one hand, and of knives and offensive weapons on the other. On that basis, I hope that I have been able to persuade the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment. If not, I invite the House to agree that for these offences, short custodial sentences and minimum custodial sentences continue to have a place, and that noble Lords will accordingly reject the amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

I am grateful to all noble Lords who have contributed. The noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, may not expect me to be grateful, but I am. His raising the issue of weekend sentences was very interesting, and confirms what has come from a number of noble Lords—that the legislation around sentencing generally needs a good look at and some updating to how it operates. Even if you take a firm position one way or the other regarding short sentences, the way that the provisions in legislation interact is clearly troubling a number of noble Lords.

I do not want to respond to all the points made and repeat what I have already said. I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, and my noble friend Lord Paddick could reel off the offences that might be used in the case of the use of corrosive substances causing injury. That is not the subject of these amendments or of the clauses in question.

I also regret the absence of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, who has made it very clear that he opposes mandatory sentences. I will leave it at that point and beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 5 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Barran]

I apologise to the noble Baroness for my oversight.

[Baroness Hamwee]

I am not irked—I rarely get irked.

Amendment 9 agreed.

--- Later in debate ---

I have just a few more questions to pop out quickly; if the Minister cannot respond this evening, perhaps she could reply in writing. What training is the department creating for police forces to spot forms of criminal exploitation in vulnerable young people? What assessments has the Home Office carried out of previous civil orders and their impact on the crime rate, and what have been the results of those studies? Will the gang matrix be used to target suitable people for a KCPO? I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I am speaking partly as a member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. I am not going to read all the letters that the committee has written to the Minister, and I know that she will respond to the committee, but I thought it appropriate to let the House know that the committee has raised concerns, having identified seven rights that are engaged by these proposals. As one might expect, the concerns are about the possible criminalisation of children who have no previous criminal convictions, for breaching requirements which could be imposed in ways which prevent them conducting a normal life.

The committee also asked whether the regime for gang injunctions, which the noble Baroness has just mentioned, might be applied in a similar fashion. They can be applied only to persons aged 14 and over, and a breach is a civil contempt of court, not a criminal offence. For those under 18, breaches are dealt with by way of a separate statutory scheme, with a maximum length of detention of three months. Therefore, the committee has asked the Government to explain why a similar regime has not been proposed to tackle knife crime. The committee has also asked for early sight of the proposed guidance, so that it can be scrutinised when the Bill returns to the Commons.

The amendments on piloting—which are amendments to government Amendment 52—were tabled before yesterday’s round-table meeting with the Minister for Crime, Safeguarding and Vulnerability, which has been referred to, to probe how the pilot proposed by the Government will operate. What is “purpose” in this context? The pilots are to be for a specified purpose, and one needs to understand “purpose” before one asks about specified purpose. I would have assumed that it is to prevent knife crime, but there must be more than that. In Amendment 56, we take a shot at this issue by listing various categories of order.

We are also seeking to obtain assurances that the objective of the pilot is to evaluate, learn and adjust, so in Amendment 57 we refer to the criteria to be used in evaluating and collecting the data about numbers, including age and ethnicity; data about the conditions applied by the court, since it is important to know in practice what happens; and, of course, data about consultation. We have also raised the issue of areas, although since tabling this amendment I understand that it is not proposed that the pilot—or the first pilot, maybe—will necessarily be a whole-force area; for instance, within the Met it may be two or three boroughs and if we are to have these orders, that seems to be right for the purposes of comparison.

In Amendment 107, the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, has been far more straightforward than my rather convoluted attempt at ensuring that the regulations will be made through an affirmative SI—not just the initial pilot but the full rollout. I hope that the Minister will not analyse my drafting but confirm that that is what is intended.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I rise to speak against the Government’s proposals. I remind the House that I sit as a magistrate in London. In fact, earlier today I was dealing with knife-related offences at Highbury magistrates’ court. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, summarised very fully the case that I was going to put forward so I will try to put forward different points, which were covered earlier in Committee.

The Government’s case is that the KCPO is aimed at filling a gap which is not covered by existing preventive measures, such as gang injunctions and criminal behaviour orders. The Minister has argued forcefully that the potential benefit of preventing knife crime through KCPOs outweighs the potential disbenefit of criminalising children who breach such an order. In essence, that is the argument which we have had a number of times over the last few weeks. She will be aware that many groups have advocated against these KCPOs, for the reasons that we have heard this evening.

Yesterday, I too attended the round-table meeting with the Minister in the Commons, Victoria Atkins. When I asked her for the difference between a KCPO and a conditional caution, I got a better answer than I was expecting because she said that the KCPO would provide a wraparound approach. I was a bit surprised by her words. Earlier this evening we heard from the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, about hoping to replace inadequate parenting with a more caring—I think that was the word—approach, so that parental care may be approached somehow through these KCPOs. That is absolutely great and I would support it as a good thing, but the reality is that there is no new money available. As far as I can see, the only difference between a KCPO and a conditional caution is at the level of entry into either the order or the caution.

As we have heard, the KCPO has a lower requirement. It is a civil standard, based on the suspicion of a police officer. I remind the House what the requirements for a youth conditional caution are. First, there may be a clear admission of guilt. That is one option but there is a second which is not normally remembered and where there does not need to be any admission of guilt. If the officer believes that there is sufficient evidence against the young person, they can choose to place a conditional caution even when there is no admission of guilt. Of course, all the conditions, as far as I can see, can be exactly the same either in the KCPO or the conditional caution. I do not see how the laudable aspiration of providing wraparound care or some form of parental guidance—or however one chooses to phrase it—would be better met with a KCPO than with a conditional caution.

There is the other effect, the one that we have been talking about, of net-widening when having the lower standard of proof. The people who have advised me are confident that that will bring more young people into being criminalised, which I would regret.

The Minister gave a very strong speech earlier this evening, but the reality is that there is no more money available. That is much more important than however many pieces of legislation that this House chooses to pass. I hope that the Minister will say something encouraging about putting more money into youth services for young people, because that is the true answer to this problem.

Offensive Weapons Bill

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 4th March 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lucas]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for substituting for me in my absence on the first day on Report. She obtained for me a very useful answer to the question that underlies this amendment, which is: how is someone going to know? I would be grateful if my noble friend the Minister would make it clear that the Government understand how important it is to get this guidance clear. Big retailers are going to have to decide whether something is a bladed product or not: they need to be able to take that decision with certainty. A reputable UK retailer does not want to find itself on the wrong side of this legislation. It will have to make these decisions every day in relation to items of kitchen equipment which they might ship, and they need to do it properly. It is really up to the Government to get this right. I would be grateful for an assurance that the Government understand this and will use the provisions in Amendment 106 to achieve that effect. I beg to move.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, is not really possible to substitute for the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, but I was happy to introduce some of his amendments, as my noble friend did, on our first day on Report. We have Amendments 82 and 86 in this group. Amendment 86 also requests guidance on articles that are not bladed products for the purposes of the Bill—in other words, a negative approach. Amendment 82 would provide that the term does not,

“include a product intended for domestic use which incorporates a blade if the product does not function without the blade”.

I could go off down a separate avenue about the range of experiences that we draw on in this Chamber: I could not have begun to talk about sheep shearing; the noble Duke, the Duke of Montrose, might want to talk about food processors—I do not know. Clause 20 defines “bladed product” for the purpose of the clauses dealing with delivery to residential premises. Of course, I am not taking issue with the overall approach of my noble friend, but, as the Government have been resisting, this is to look at the detail.

The definition excludes all sorts of things, some of which I have never heard of: flick-knives, gravity knives, knuckle-dusters, death stars and other weapons whose sale and importation is already prohibited, as well as items excluded from the prohibition on the sale of bladed articles to those under 18. I think it is appropriate to pause here, while thanking the Government for providing Keeling schedules, to say that it is really not immediately obvious what is within Clause 18—in other words, what products it will be an offence to deliver to residential premises. There was a degree of confusion when this was debated in the Public Bill Committee in the Commons. We have just heard from the noble Baroness, Lady Barran, about the distinction between a pointed article and an article with a cutting edge, but it seems to me that that must depend on how the items are used. Surely, with something that is pointed, if you pull it down against somebody’s skin it is likely to cut the skin.

In our view, it ought to be clear which items make delivery to residential premises an offence. Apart from its substance, the clause’s complexity and its dependence on orders made under other legislation—more accurately, the exclusion of items that are the subject of such orders—is not in the tradition of well-written Acts of Parliament. One cannot employ the defence of reasonable precautions and all due diligence when there is an issue with the definition.

I have occasionally bought art materials online for delivery at home. Go on to any art materials website and you will find a range of palette knives and craft knives, some of which would fall foul of the definition. Not everyone paints, does craft work or shears sheep—but everybody eats, which is why I picked domestic kitchen items. They are relevant to many people’s lives, as they buy them either for themselves or for others, for instance from a wedding gift list.

Other noble Lords may have received a letter from John Lewis representatives—whom the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, and I met a couple of weeks ago—who expressed concern that the definition would prohibit them selling and delivering to a residential address a wide range of everyday kitchen products containing blades, such as food processors and scissors. They described to us the careful age-verification steps they take in respect of sales in store, but said:

“Online sales at John Lewis and partners are a key part of our business strategy and account for over 40% of our total sales … Around 50% of these online sales are delivered direct to customers’ homes. Any restriction on our ability to continue to sell and deliver products, such as food processors, online would negatively … impact our business. We do not believe this is the intention of the Government”—


nor do I—

“and nor do we believe that this would do anything to help address the issue of knife crime”.

We agree. This amendment is not intended as a plug for John Lewis; rather, it seeks clarity and a common-sense outcome in which businesses do not regard more items than is necessary as outlawed from home delivery.

The British Retail Consortium supports the three amendments in this group. In Committee and earlier on Report, we sought to address the issue through the amendments to which my noble friend referred. I appreciate that Amendment 82 only scrapes the surface of the issue, but I wanted to highlight the point.

As we know, under government amendment 106, the Secretary of State “may”—that is the term used—issue guidance. The amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, says “must”; Amendment 86, in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Paddick, says “shall”. No doubt we will be told that “may” means “will”, or other close synonyms, but guidance cannot override legislation, so it is essential to get that right. Of course, guidance will be produced by the Executive without parliamentary approval and it can be changed without approval. So at least we should hear from the Dispatch Box—I look forward to the Minister’s explanation—what consultation on the guidance the Government intend to undertake. Clearly, it should be thorough. I suspect that the Government have also had a bit of difficulty in pinning down a definition—otherwise we would have one. That simply demonstrates how important this issue is.

[The Earl of Erroll]

My Lords, we having been discussing this issue in the Digital Policy Alliance’s age verification and internet safety working group. Being clear on definitions is absolutely essential.

The Minister said in the previous debate about pointed items that it will be up to the courts to decide. Who can afford that? How can people afford to go that far? That is the trouble. The natural reaction of business will be to be overly cautious. That will close down entire avenues of business and inhibit normal people’s ability to carry on with their normal lives. A lack of clarity will cause so much trouble and you will get an awful lot of flak in the papers. I suggest that this group of amendments be taken together so that we can sort something out and produce absolutely clear guidance. We are trying to legislate for only a few outrageous incidents. The trouble is that regulations never prevent what they seek to prohibit. You cannot stop all of this by regulation. Let us make reasonable regulations, which allow normal people to continue with their normal lives. Given that, clarity in the definitions is absolutely essential.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I stick by the point that people will use the list in the Bill to try to get around the law, and therefore guidance is helpful. It is helpful both to the retailers who will be selling items but also to the courts in interpreting the legislation. Of course, the difficulty in this legislation is that knives have myriad uses, which in many ways is why this has been quite a difficult Bill to take through.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, given the problems with the Bill itself, I make a point so that at least Hansard is accurate on this. The Minister talked about using terminology such as I have used to allow retailers to sell knives online and deliver them to domestic premises—she talked about bread knives and steak knives. This wording would require the product to function only with a blade. That clearly would not apply to a bread knife; if it does, every knife can function only with a blade. I am not suggesting that the precise detail of this amendment be included in the Bill, but this all goes to show that if we resist being specific here, we risk causing more problems, not fewer. If I did not say so before, nothing I have said seeks to undermine in any way what my noble friend Lord Paddick said about his overarching approach, which we should be following.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

It comes back to the noble Baroness’s point about consultation. In developing the guidance, we must and will engage with business and organisations such as the BRC. The intention is that it will be developed with them. We could have a circular argument here about whether things should be directly specified in the Bill or how helpful the guidance will be in helping retailers and the criminal justice system, but guidance generally will help the Government keep pace with developments.

Amendment 86 is similar to Amendment 81 and again seeks to require the Secretary of State to issue guidance. We have already debated government Amendment 106, which will enable the Secretary of State, Scottish Ministers and the Northern Ireland Justice Department to issue statutory guidance on certain parts of the Bill, including those dealing with offences of remote sale and delivery of knives. We intend that there should be guidance to retailers on what items are prohibited from dispatch to residential premises or a locker under Clause 18. I think the government amendment is adequate to cover this.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Duke of Montrose]

Before my noble friend the Minister sits down, can she give us any examples of how the current legislation allowing for religious reasons has worked out? Have there been cases where it has been cited, and was it effective?

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, following exactly from that point, the Minister has relied on the wording “for religious reasons”, which would be substituted in the Bill by “in religious ceremonies”. By saying that the Government will continue to work on this, is she in fact suggesting that that is inadequate? While I understand the concerns, it seems to me that there is a lot in support of what she has been saying about the use of that phrase.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I am trying to say that we are trying to come to a workable solution, particularly for the Sikh community. On the question of other legislation, what immediately springs to my mind is that there was of course the exemption for Sikhs on mopeds who were wearing a turban. So we are, I hope, trying to reach a solution that will work for the Sikh community.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Barran]

My Lords, Clauses 28 and 37 to 39 make provision for payments to be made to owners of offensive weapons, firearms, bump stocks and ancillary equipment, who will be required to surrender these items to the police by virtue of them being prohibited by the Bill. The purpose of Amendments 93, 98, 100 and 102 is to widen the regulation-making powers as drafted in these clauses so as to allow the Secretary of State, Scottish Ministers and the Northern Ireland Department of Justice, as the case may be, to set the amount of compensation that will be paid to each claimant. This will be necessary for claims to be settled, given that the amount paid out will be based on the evidence of the value of the weapon provided by the claimant.

We believe that this is the right approach, given that the value of individual surrendered items will vary greatly and it would not, therefore, be equitable to the owners or in the interests of the public purse for the regulations to specify a fixed amount of compensation for each type of item made unlawful by the Bill. I remind noble Lords that the compensation regulations, which we have published in draft, are subject to the affirmative procedure. Accordingly, they will need to be debated and approved by both Houses before they can come into force. Amendments 92, 97, 99 and 101 are minor drafting amendments. I beg to move.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I am sorry to prolong this a little. As the Minister said, the amendments allow for discretion, both as to whether to make a payment and as to the amount under the provisions relating to the surrender of weapons. The Secretary of State, Scottish Ministers and the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland must make regulations and may make regulations restricting eligibility and the procedure to be followed, which is understandable. So we have an overall mandatory context but a discretion both as to whether to make a payment and its amount. How can that operate justly and fairly?

The Minister said that the arrangements must be equitable, and I agree, but the draft regulations include provisions about eligibility for compensation and determining the amount of compensation,

“taking account of the valuation evidence supplied”.

They also provide for no compensation if the Secretary of State is not satisfied that, under the regulations, compensation is payable. Is what I have just quoted a discretion? It does not seem so to me. The term “discretion” in the amendments suggests there is a distinction for people who surrender weapons in an arbitrary fashion. I cannot believe that is what the Government intend but, given that we already have provision for valuing the weapons, why is discretion needed on top of secondary legislation that provides for the valuation?

[Baroness Barran]

If I have followed the noble Baroness’s question correctly, there are two elements to this. First, there is an element of discretion around the need for the individual who is surrendering weapons to show documentary evidence that they are the legal owner, and that the weapons have been lawfully acquired. Secondly, there is a range of valuations that could be provided, including from an auction house or for insurance. My understanding is that there is an element of discretion in judging the validity of those.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I understand why the Secretary of State or whoever has the final say in that, but I do not think that that is the same as discretion. I will not pursue the matter any further now.

Amendment 92 agreed.