(5 years, 9 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, we need to ensure that the police have appropriate powers to deal with threats on school or further education premises involving corrosive substances. Given the significant harm that corrosive attacks can cause and the fear that they can instil, it is important that we ensure that the police have sufficient powers to be able to take swift and preventive action.
We know that there are around 800 attacks per year in England and Wales, and we need to ensure that action can be taken not just to deal with actual attacks but with threats to use a corrosive substance. Clause 31 is designed to ensure that the police can effectively enforce the offence of threatening with a corrosive substance in a private place as it applies to schools and further education establishments.
The noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, has explained his concerns that this new power will be disproportionately used against black, Asian and minority ethnic pupils and students. I appreciate and understand the noble Lord’s concern, which should be taken seriously. It is, however, important to recognise that this power can be used only in circumstances where a police officer has reasonable grounds for suspecting that someone has been threatened by another person with a corrosive substance. Reasonable grounds might include a report from a teacher, a parent or a pupil.
It is also important that we ensure there are sufficient protections in place for our schools and further education premises to deal with any situations where a pupil or student may threaten to throw or squirt a corrosive substance over another student or a teacher. The police need to be able to enter and search a school or further education premises and any person on them to prevent an actual attack. That said, I have indicated that the noble Lord has raised a perfectly proper concern.
While I do not consider this amendment to be necessary, I can give your Lordships an undertaking that we will consult relevant school and further education bodies, including teaching unions, local authorities and other associations, on the implementation of this power before we bring the clause into force. With that assurance, I hope the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, before the noble Lord replies, I had read this clause as primarily directed to the power to enter and search premises—in fact you have to do that—as well as a person. Can the Minister assure the Committee that, as well as the consultation she has mentioned, information and statistics will be kept that show the BAME profiles? I should not use the word “profile”, but the Minister will understand what I am saying. This is an issue we have brought up at other points in the Bill.
I am glad to be able to reassure the noble Baroness that that will be the case.
(5 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am grateful to the Minister and the Government for pursuing the point. I looked at this for some time and came to the view that the words “reasonably be expected” were the best that one could provide to cover circumstances that cannot be listed in detail. Indeed, I confess that having complained throughout the Bill’s progress that I did not want to rely on the CPS tests, the police’s common sense and all the rest of it, I will do so on this one. I thank him.
However, I want to raise another point and I hope the Minister is aware of it—I emailed the Bill team about it yesterday. I am happy with the drafting amendments, which are to do with regulations, but given the supplementary delegated powers memo, I thought that I should pursue the issue of peacebuilding as a reasonable excuse. The paragraph of the memorandum dealing with “reasonable excuse defence” gives,
“purposes of a peacebuilding nature”,
as a possible example of a purpose that can be referred to as a reasonable excuse. I referred to peacebuilding at the previous stage, on 3 December, and the noble Earl said:
“I entirely accept the importance of peacebuilding activity … the government amendment does not preclude a person advancing this or any other category of reasonable excuse. I am of the view that legitimate peacebuilding activity could very well be a reasonable excuse”—[Official Report, 3/12/18; col. 860]—
but that it was up to a jury.
The debate continued and, as the House is aware, the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, which we supported, was agreed on a Division. Therefore, the point rather floated away. Essentially, I hope the noble Earl can commit the Government today to considering adding peacebuilding when the Bill goes back to the Commons. It seems, from correspondence I have received since I emailed the Bill team, that peacebuilding may or may not be what is understood to be a humanitarian activity. There is a particular concern that—given that this is not something that we talk about and define every day—juries may be puzzled as to what it is and not understand its value. I am not sure whether that is a fair comment. However, it has been described to me as being “complementary to humanitarian aid” and covers a large range of activities, including mediation, support to the local community, justice and reconciliation, psychosocial support and research in the area. The Government have been considering this matter. It would complete the provisions in this area if it could be referred to specifically when the Bill is enacted.
My Lords, I support very strongly indeed what has just been said. Having spent much of my life working with humanitarian agencies, I know that the importance of what has been said cannot be overemphasised. We must not slip into an attitude in which relief, when things have gone badly wrong, may be interminable and highly costly, apart from anything else. There is a real need in hot situations to be working at prevention.
In broad government statements we get very reassuring remarks about the importance of conflict resolution and peacebuilding. The humanitarian agencies frequently find themselves involved in this and I think with all possible clarity that that is valid. They should not just be tolerated, they should be supported by the Government and others. That is significant because anything that either intentionally or unintentionally detracts from the commitment in that area would be very unfortunate.
My Lords, I am doubly grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken. I am sympathetic to the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, but only up to a certain point. Given that this is Third Reading, our starting point has to be that any further amendments to the Bill should be limited to those that are absolutely necessary to improve the drafting of the Bill in the light of the amendment agreed by the House at Report. I am not persuaded that adding to the list of exemptions from the offence properly falls within the category of amendments that we should now be contemplating at this late stage of the Bill, either today or when the Bill returns to the Commons to consider the Lords amendments.
However, I can assure the noble Baroness that the Government will keep the list of exempted purposes under review. The Bill now helpfully includes a power by regulations—a Henry VIII power to all intents and purposes—to add to the list of exempted purposes should it be appropriate to do so in the light of experience of operating the new offence. I am sure that officials in the Home Office will closely scrutinise the use of this power and will work with their colleagues in the Department for International Development and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to determine if peacebuilding could usefully be added to the list of exempted reasons in the future.
But I need to make clear to all noble Lords that this is a nicety. In the absence of such an exemption the Government are clear that entering and remaining in a designated area for the purpose of engaging in peacebuilding would constitute a reasonable excuse. We have that all-encompassing provision, as the noble Baroness is aware, in the Bill. There is a problem associated with any approach that has within it a list of some kind, which is why we started out with a very short list indeed. Through our debates we persuaded ourselves that it would be helpful to augment the very short list that the Government started off with, but we have to ask ourselves where we stop.
I hope what I have said has offered some assurance to the noble Baroness and she understands that, while it would not be appropriate to add peacebuilding to the list of exemptions at the moment, that will not preclude us doing so in the future, should there be an operational imperative.
My Lords, to be rather blunt it is always frustrating when procedure gets in the way of substance. I ask the Minister to ensure that Home Office officials appreciate that “in the light of experience” should not just be what may happen when someone comes back and says, “I have been working on peacebuilding in Syria”. It is also about deterring NGOs from going into conflict or post-conflict areas to work on peacebuilding. That could be a consequence we do not want to see from the offence we have created in the Bill.
(5 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, my noble friend Lord Paddick has added his name to this amendment. I want from these Benches to support the noble Baroness. At the previous stage of the Bill, I tabled a number of amendments, including to this clause, on behalf of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. I am not suggesting that it has in any way abandoned concerns about the Bill, but I do not now speak on its behalf, simply because we have not had an opportunity to consider further where the Bill has got to.
One of those amendments would have imported “supports” rather than “supportive”. “Supportive” seems far more open to interpretation than “supports”, the former being much more subjective than the more active “supports”, which is, as the noble Baroness said, the term used in Section 12 of the Terrorism Act 2000. Like her, I looked back at the debate in Committee and noted that the term used by the Minister during much of it was “supports”.
New paragraph (b), adding recklessness or intention to “supports”, creates a new and separate offence, although it occurred to me only yesterday that we might have amended “a proscribed organisation” to “the proscribed organisation”.
The existing Section 12 offence is very direct, referring to “invites support”, and in the context of a meeting, albeit a small, private meeting. Under new subsection (1A)(a), it will be an offence to express an opinion without mentioning a proscribed organisation. Many people in this Chamber could probably advise me of the answer to the following question. If were to say that I could understand that a 15 year-old girl in London might find herself persuaded or groomed to travel abroad to support freedom fighters in an area where Daesh was active and there had been plenty of press reports of the situation—I refer noble Lords to the splendid novel Home Fire by Kamila Shamsie if they want to be provoked to think further about what might underlie such a situation—would I be committing an offence? The answer is probably not in this Chamber, but if I did so at a meeting at a university with a young audience, I am not sure what my position would be.
Turning to “reckless”, I believe that I would be unable to rely on a defence similar to that in the existing Section 12(4) of the Terrorism Act, allowing a person to prove, with the application of Section 118, that he or she had no reasonable cause to believe that an address to a meeting would support a proscribed organisation. I would be hard put to think of a context—which I think was the term used by the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza, at the last stage—other than something like this debate, where one could be fairly confident of expressing an opinion and not being reckless. The Minister in Committee focused on recklessness and said little about support or being supportive, so I look forward to hearing the response today.
Like the noble Baroness, we are not happy with how the Government appear to be moving against freedom of speech in this clause, but we have the opportunity here to make it somewhat more proportionate. I thought I should look at Article 10 of the Convention, on freedom of expression. Article 10.2 reminds us that the right is qualified— understandably, of course—in such a way as is,
“necessary in a democratic society”.
That phrase really struck home to me. I would like to think that what we are doing through the Bill is necessary in a democratic society. I am not persuaded by Clause 1 as it stands.
My Lords, in considering the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, we have to look at the two new paragraphs (a) and (b) together. In the Bill, the Government seek to eliminate various routes by which an ingenious individual who wants, in effect, to incite people to support a terrorist organisation might create a defence. It is a combination of the two new paragraphs that seems to me to be important. An individual might claim that that they are not supporting a terrorist organisation, but merely supportive of its objectives. They might express that supportive nature of the objectives in such graphic and bloodcurdling terms that it might be deemed to have an effect on those listening to those descriptions. But of course, if they then went on to claim that they had no intention of making people act and follow that particular terrorist organisation, they would be permitted to do so.
By including both being “supportive of” the general objectives and at the same time being reckless as to the consequences of that, the Bill seems to attempt to avoid those ingenious individuals proclaiming that in fact they are not encouraging people to join a particular terrorist organisation, but are merely being supportive of the objectives of that organisation and have no intention at all of making people take action on that. The fact remains that that they have been supportive of the organisation and at the same time reckless as to the consequences. My concern with the amendment is that it actually allows two routes by which people can claim a defence when they have clearly, in the most common terms, been trying to persuade people to support a terrorist organisation. That is why I think the combination of “supportive” with the reckless intent makes a degree of sense.
My Lords, the noble Earl says that all will become clear. I am afraid that I have another question for him that occurred to me quite close to the debate: where do you put paragraph (a) in new subsection (3A)? I can see three places where it might go. Depending on the answer I will be even more welcoming of the Government’s amendment. It could go after the words “subsection (3)”, after,
“but are not limited to”,
or after “action or possession”. There might be other places as well. The noble Earl might want an opportunity to consider that.
We welcome the explicit safeguard, but our concern is that streaming by someone through,
“foolishness, inquisitiveness or curiosity, without intending to do harm”,—[Official Report, 29/10/18; col. 1168.]
were actions for which the Minister expressed “sympathy”. He went on to say that the offence was,
“aimed at those of a terrorist mindset”.—[Official Report, 29/10/18; col. 1167.]
Journalism, academia and, no doubt, other appropriate applications of inquisitiveness are relatively limited. If you are inquisitive, you will very probably have had reason to believe that the record is likely to contain information useful to someone preparing an act of terrorism. I do not ignore the CPS code test, but I am left with an uncomfortable feeling that the government amendment might narrow the offence and that Clause 3 remains rather wide.
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken, especially for the supportive comments from the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, and my noble friend Lord Attlee, but also for the very helpful remarks from the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy. I shall endeavour to cover all questions that have been put.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, asked a drafting question. She asked where paragraph (a) will actually fall in the text. I can tell her that paragraph (a) will begin with the words after line 40 on page 2, so I hope that it will run in the broad way rather than the narrow way in which she hoped it would.
The last words of line 40 read,
“in which at the time”
and the next line starts, “of the person’s action”. As I said, I identified two places in line 40 where paragraph (a) might be inserted. It is a drafting point but also a point of substance, because where paragraph (a) starts actually affects the whole of the point. Can the Minister give a little more assistance?
My Lords, perhaps if my noble friend the Minister is not absolutely certain on this point we could return to it at Third Reading to clarify the drafting amendment.
My Lords, I was not as precise as I should have been. The words after,
“(but are not limited to) those in which”,
will become paragraph (a). So it will read,
“(but are not limited to) those in which (a) at the time of the person’s action or possession, the person did not know”,
et cetera. Paragraph (b) will follow after line 44. I hope that that clarifies the point.
My noble friend Lord Lothian asked a series of very reasonable questions about the meaning of the words “journalist” and “academic”. The distinction between journalism that constitutes a reasonable excuse and that which does not, for the purpose of this offence, will inevitably be highly fact-specific. As several noble Lords commented in earlier debates on the Bill, it is just not possible to provide in advance an exhaustive definition of a journalist or of a legitimate journalist. This is something that we are clear needs to be determined by a jury in particular cases on the basis of all the evidence. We have made it clear that our amendment adds an indicative list of categories of reasonable excuse and does not provide either an exhaustive list or an absolute exemption. It is important to remember that juries will retain their existing discretion to decide whether a particular excuse is reasonable on a case-by-case basis. The same logic would apply to the meaning of the word “academic”. The category of person that my noble friend described might or might not be considered by a jury to be an academic: it would depend on the facts of the case. The jury might consider that there was still a reasonable excuse for a particular individual. I hope that that is helpful.
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for that explanation because it answers my point and deals with my amendment. I am sorry to have been tedious and to have consolidated my reputation for pedantry—the noble Lord, Lord Harris, says that is impossible—but I think it was a substantive point. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, we also have Amendments 13, 14 and 17 in this group as amendments to the government amendment. We welcome the indicative non-exclusive list that the Minister has put before your Lordships. At the last stage the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, made the point that we should not rely on guidance or some other executive action in this connection, and that must be right. However, we must also be confident in the list. The more examples are given, the less easy it may be to argue for additions which are not spelled out. I was going to refer to the array of lawyers opposite me, but their numbers have been reduced by half in the last few minutes. Nevertheless, I am sure they can tell me whether I am wrong to be worrying about the sui generis rule, because I am.
The Government’s amendment refers to,
“internationally recognised principles and standards”.
Will the Minister give an explanation or example of those? Alternatively, what might contravene that criterion—in other words, not meet the standard? Humanitarian aid is referred to. Peacebuilding was talked about in Committee. We are not confident that humanitarian work includes peacebuilding and would like an assurance or acceptance of our amendment on that. Humanitarian work probably covers development and cultural purposes, which were also referred to during the last stage. Will the Minister comment on that?
We have added “for connected purposes”, which is a little wider than “in connection with”, which is limited to the stated purposes—we would be adding a purpose. It is appropriate to mention concerns expressed before these amendments were tabled, not just about the “reasonable excuse” defence which the House has been debating. There are also concerns on the part of banks and other companies which provide services to organisations which provide aid, such as insurance—I am amazed that insurance might be available in some of these connections—and travel companies. Apparently they are concerned that the measure will exacerbate the diminishing of their appetite to support humanitarian activity, due to the increased legal ambiguity around travel to designated areas. They are also concerned about a possible chilling effect on humanitarian aid surrounding those areas. The list which the Government propose includes visiting a terminally ill relative. It is not always clear when an illness is terminal. In this context, it might be particularly difficult to get medical support for that proposition. We suggest adding “very seriously ill”, as a matter of common sense.
Amendment 14 was an excess of zeal on my part. I shall not be pursuing it, as I realise that the point is already there. On Amendment 17, the House has heard the assurances about the designations being kept under review. We welcome the sunset provision in Amendment 18 and support Amendment 19, which would shorten it. However, this does not mean that reporting to Parliament is not necessary. The noble Earl has just referred to a “meaningful and ongoing review”, but we must be aware that when a finite period is referred to there comes a temptation to address the point thoroughly only every three or two years, depending on that period. The proposal to report formally to Parliament is a matter of transparency and accountability. I hesitate to say so, but it might give the independent reviewer something to bite on. That amendment is certainly not a backstop.
My Lords, I offer my support for Amendment 15. I will speak on behalf of humanitarian aid workers following the remarks made by the noble Lord, Lord Judd, and I do so because it seems to me profoundly wrong that aid workers should potentially come under suspicion and be bracketed with potential criminals simply because they are travelling to and from a sensitive area. Of course, I realise that the Government understand in principle they are not in that category, so they have put down their own amendment with an indicative list, which the JCHR acknowledges is a step forward. Nevertheless, the Bill still potentially subjects aid workers and journalists to every sort of interference, which can only mean that aid will inevitably be held up and that people living in distressed conditions will suffer more. If aid workers in government programmes, including those of Governments in the designated areas, are protected, why on earth should non-governmental organisations and their beneficiaries suffer? What is the logic of that?
This clause has to be amended. Imagine what would happen in a country like the DRC today if people monitoring the Ebola virus had to consider the prospect of being arrested for having dealings with the Mai Mai or the Interahamwe militia. The noble Lord, Lord Judd, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, have already mentioned peacebuilding, which often involves the Red Cross and the Churches. What would be the climate of suspicion surrounding not only them but the whole aid programme? The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, quite rightly mentioned the “deterrent effect”.
I speak with feeling, having worked with several aid agencies over the years, and knowing the conditions in which they already have to work. No wonder that 21 organisations are protesting. These are in many cases the front line of our aid programme, whether they work with government or not. I will repeat two sentences of what they said in a signed letter:
“Unless urgently amended, the bill … will make it impossible for civil society organisations to deliver much needed humanitarian, development and peacebuilding support to people desperately in need … it is vital that the government and peers amend the bill so that it exempts aid workers and others with a legitimate reason to travel to designated areas”.
Let us not forget the cost of this exercise. We do not of course know the parameters of the designated regions, but we know that, for obvious reasons, many aid workers tend to be in sensitive areas of the world, so the overlap between political sensitivity and humanitarian commitment will be vast.
The noble Earl mentioned the possibility of the terrorist who intends to assume the disguise of an aid worker and become a wolf in sheep’s clothing. Obviously, that is quite different; he or she must be stopped on the grounds laid down in the Bill, and will not ultimately pass the test of reasonable excuse. I realise the difficulty the Government are in here, having to act on behalf of society. But it is quite irresponsible to risk the professional lives of all aid workers leaving those areas, with all the consequences for the programmes concerned, as a means towards that end.
(6 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, Amendment 31 is grouped with Amendment 33. Both are amendments to Clause 6, which extends the circumstances in which a terrorist offending abroad may be prosecuted in the UK, whether or not the offender is a UK citizen and whether or not the conduct is also an offence in the jurisdiction in which it took place. The overall effect of the amended provisions of the Terrorism Act is that an individual committing one of the offences within the relevant section would be liable under UK law in the same way as if he or she committed the offence in the UK. In practical terms, that person would be prosecuted only if he or she was present in the UK, though that presence could, of course, be achieved through extradition.
The offences which this Bill adds are: the dissemination of terrorist material; the wearing of clothing or displaying an item in public so as to arouse reasonable suspicion the person is a member or supporter of—in view of our debate on Monday, I have written down a query about whether that should be “supportive of”—a proscribed organisation; and making or possessing explosives under suspicious circumstances. Under these provisions, it would also no longer be a requirement that the offence be listed in the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism.
I very much enjoyed the tutorials, from which we all benefited, from the very senior lawyers who took part on the debate in Monday. I am tempted to let them go first but the amendment is in my name, so that would not be entirely the thing to do. I move these amendments, as I did on Monday, on behalf of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. Our report of 4 July commented on some of the evidence we had received, including that from the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation Max Hill QC. He said:
“placing an individual … on trial in this jurisdiction in front of judge and jury means that you need to prove a level of awareness as to the offence at the time the person committed it. If there is no equivalent offence abroad it is difficult, at the point of proof, to demonstrate that the offence has been committed”.
We also reported on the evidence of Professor Clive Walker, who talked about creating,
“a potential clash between UK law and the law of the country where the activity occurred”.
He went on to say that,
“foreign law which has chosen not to incriminate or prosecute the display of support suggests that UK law should not intervene”.
Similar points were made about the removal of the requirement for equivalence with the convention.
The committee’s report expressed our concern:
“The extension of extraterritorial jurisdiction to certain offences such as support for a proscribed organisation may be problematic in situations where there is not an equivalent offence in the country concerned”.
We took the view that this would,
“offend the principles of natural justice and sufficient foreseeability of the effect of one’s actions. It would mean a foreign national, with few links to the UK, could be prosecuted in the UK if he/she attended a protest or waved a flag overseas, in support of an organisation that is lawful within that overseas jurisdiction … We recommend that further consideration is given as to whether it is justified to bring domestic prosecutions against those who have no (or very few) links to the UK at the relevant time for conduct overseas that was perfectly lawful in the jurisdiction where it occurred”.
The Government have argued that the oversight of the Director of Public Prosecutions or, in certain cases, the Attorney-General, is a safeguard and that prosecutions would have to be proportionate. We did not regard this as a sufficient answer, nor did we regard as sufficient the Government’s comment that we need to deal with conduct in failed states which do not have the rule of law. All this raises, among other things, the issue of how evidence is found in such a place for use in a prosecution here.
Amendment 31 would delete the extension to the Section 13 offence in respect of uniforms and flags. Amendment 33 would limit the extension to where the relevant conduct is criminal in the country concerned, or where the individual is a British national or has been present in the UK for six months or more over a period of 10 years. That was a way of expressing that the individual has significant links with the UK. I beg to move.
I should notify the Committee that, if Amendment 31 is agreed to, I cannot call Amendment 32 by reason of pre-emption.
My Lords, first, I regret the personal attack on my noble friend.
The debate has assumed that the amendment has a wider impact than it does. The two amendments deal with subsection 3, which is about uniform, flags and so on. I accept that displaying a flag may be suggestive of more extreme behaviour, but I still wonder whether someone from a failed state, or a state with a different approach, who displays a flag in that country—where it is not an offence—should, if he comes to this country, be subject to prosecution. The noble Earl referred to the provision about permission from the Attorney-General. I think he said that a test would be whether or not the Attorney-General believes that the behaviour in question affects the affairs of this country. The Minister is nodding at that. I find it quite difficult to make the leap to concluding—without further evidence—that a person behaving in that way would automatically be a risk to this country.
I take the point about losing touch with the public view seriously but my experience on the Joint Committee on Human Rights is that the public really understand the importance of applying the lens of human rights to the legislation that we create. I managed to do a law degree without any module on jurisprudence. The course at Cambridge has improved considerably since then but I wonder whether there is something a bit arrogant in assuming jurisdiction when it involves other countries. I feel uneasy at that notion but, having got that off my chest, I have to beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, Clause 6 will add a number of further terrorism offences to the list at Section 17 of the Terrorism Act 2006, as I have already explained, to which extraterritorial jurisdiction—or ETJ—applies. This means that individuals can be prosecuted in the UK courts for conduct that took place outside the UK which would have been unlawful under an offence listed at Section 17 had it taken place here.
Following further consideration, we have identified two additional offences where it would be right to extend ETJ to ensure that the full range of relevant terrorism offences is covered. These are, first, the offence of inviting support for a proscribed organisation at Section 12(1) of the Terrorism Act 2000 and, secondly, the offence of expressing an opinion or belief in support of a proscribed organisation, reckless as to whether another person will be encouraged to support the organisation, which Clause 1 will insert into the 2000 Act as new Section 12(1A). Extending ETJ to these offences will help to tackle radicalisation, particularly by people who have travelled from the UK to join a terrorist organisation and reach back to the UK to spread its propaganda and promote its aims. This will allow prosecution in a case where, for example, someone overseas is in contact with a person in the UK, who may be a vulnerable person such as a child, and is either deliberately or recklessly encouraging them to support a particular proscribed organisation, such as Daesh.
Clause 6 received broad support in the House of Commons and, with the exception of the extension of ETJ to the Section 13 offence which we have just debated, has also been supported in this House. None the less, I hope that your Lordships will be persuaded that it is the right approach to ensure that we have as comprehensive coverage as possible of terrorist offences that might be committed overseas, subject to the normal safeguards, so that we can protect the public in this country. I commend this amendment to the Committee on that basis.
My Lords, since the Joint Committee on Human Rights is meeting at this moment it has not been possible to take its view on this amendment but I think it must follow from my comments on Clause 1 that it would not be enthusiastic, as these provisions obviously have to be read together. I was amused that the Minister said, as did the noble Baroness’s letter to noble Lords of 24 October, that the Government have identified further offences. They are not quite offences yet, are they? It would perhaps be fairer to say that the amendment is consequential on Clause, but that is a minor point.
My Lords, I oppose this amendment and, in doing so, I will seek to explain why the issues are rather different from those considered under the previous group. If Amendment 32 is passed then Section 12 of the Terrorism Act 2000, as supercharged by Clause 1, will apply to any person anywhere in the world who expresses an opinion or belief that is supportive of an organisation proscribed in the UK and who is reckless as to the consequences. The deficiencies of our deproscription regime, with which I have already wearied your Lordships, are multiplied when coupled with the indiscriminate grant of extraterritorial jurisdiction in this context.
To illustrate the point, I invite your Lordships to look to the Republic of Ireland, whose citizens would be criminalised by a law of this Parliament for expressing supportive opinions about organisations now committed to peace but in which their grandfathers or grandmothers once fought for freedom. I shall give one example: Cumann na mBan, the Irish republican women’s organisation. It was once aligned with the IRA and is still proscribed in this country, despite no evidence of which I am aware that it has been concerned in terrorism during this century at least. The commemoration of its centenary in 2014 in Dublin was a significant national event. The speakers included President Higgins of Ireland, who spoke stirringly and approvingly of the vision that animated the women of Cumann na mBan. The Minister will of course assure us that no one is going to seek extradition of Irish citizens who expressed opinions supportive of this proscribed group but, as noble Lords have done in relation to other clauses of the Bill, I must question whether this repeated heavy reliance on the discretion of our authorities is an adequate substitute for crafting a properly defined law.
This amendment comes in very late and, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, said, without the benefit of JCHR scrutiny. Whatever view noble Lords may take of Amendments 31 and 33, I strongly question the wisdom of extending extraterritorial jurisdiction unqualified by limitations of citizenship or residence to countries where conduct caught by the expanded Section 12 is not a crime. However it is applied in practice, this amendment might be thought to have a regrettably colonial flavour, not just in Ireland but in other parts of the world. I have no doubt that it is unintended, but it is no less unfortunate for that. This amendment seems to have been an afterthought. I suggest that this is one of those occasions where the first thoughts were the best. I invite the Minister to withdraw the amendment or, at the very least, to qualify it in the ways suggested in Amendment 33.
My Lords, Amendment 35 takes us to the sentencing provisions in the Bill. My noble friends will raise points about sentence inflation, as my noble friend Lord Marks described it at Second Reading. This is for both general and specific offences, including referring to the current sentencing guidelines, which I believe were issued after the terrorist attacks and the consultation on them.
The Joint Committee on Human Rights commented on Clause 7 and proposed an amendment to leave out subsection (3), which increases the penalty for the collection of information offence from 10 years to 15 years. I regard that to an extent as standing proxy for the other sentence increases, but that is a personal view. The committee reported the Home Office’s comment, saying:
“Increased maximum penalties better reflect the increased risk and the seriousness of these offences”,
in question. The maximum sentences for the offences, which I have mentioned, would increase to 15 years. We were not aware of evidence to suggest that the courts are sentencing to the upper limits of their powers in respect of these offences. Indeed, we took evidence to the contrary. We heard that, recently, the worst Section 58 offenders have received sentences significantly below the 10-year maximum. The Sentencing Council, I understand, reported that between 2011 and 2016, the mean average custodial sentence length, after any reduction for a guilty plea, was three years and four months.
On Monday, we discussed what we regarded as a lack of clarity regarding the defence of reasonable excuse. That, combined with the increased penalty, may have a particularly chilling effect. We recommended that,
“the Home Office provide further evidence as to why they consider the current maximum sentences to be insufficient and how this increase is necessary and proportionate”.
The Government responded that they,
“have seen an increase in low-sophistication terrorist plots which are inspired rather than directed, and in attack operatives who are self-radicalised and self-trained without necessarily having had significant direct contact with terrorist organisations. The division between preliminary terrorist activity and attack planning is increasingly blurred”.
We did not regard this as an explanation for why existing sentencing powers are inadequate.
At Second Reading, I mentioned the risk of creating martyrs and those who project themselves as martyrs. Do the Government have any evidence of the deterrent effect of an increase in these particular sentences? In this context, clearly there is not because the increase has not happened yet. What evidence do they have that increasing a sentence from 10 years to 15 years has a deterrent impact? I beg to move.
My Lords, I too had written down not just “timelines” but “evidence to the review”. I do not think one can disregard that. The Minister also referred to lower-level offences, which were commented on by the Sentencing Council, but we seem to have slid away from that.
The Minister put great emphasis on the need to—I hope I am quoting him correctly—strengthen the ability of the police and the agencies in the criminal justice system to intervene. I do not think anyone has queried the seriousness of the offences that we are discussing, nor have we queried the powers. That has not been the thrust of the argument.
The Minister has not disputed the mean average of three years and four months. Of course, I appreciate that any average is an average, so there are much higher periods and much lower ones, but 10 years seems to send a pretty clear message, which was the term that he used, and it leaves a lot of headroom above the average. Three years and four months is quite a shortfall from 10 years. Unless there is a big increase in that, there will be an even greater shortfall from 15 years. I would have thought that that sent a rather dangerous message. The message that I take is the one from the very recent sentencing guidelines, whose consideration, as a matter of common sense, must have been taken into account in preparing the Bill—or should have been.
I think we have more discussion to come on this issue. For the moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, as we have heard, registered terrorist offenders, after release, have to notify the police of certain details and of changes to those details. The periods for which they are required to notify range from 10 to 30 years, depending on the length of the sentence, and the reporting provisions apply automatically without the possibility of review.
In considering the provisions, the Joint Committee on Human Rights commented that this was an interference with the Article 8 right to privacy, which of course does not mean that it is always objectionable. I understand that the domestic courts heard that the current scheme, when applied to 10-year periods, is in accordance with the law, in pursuit of a legitimate aim and proportionate, and so there is not a violation of Article 8. However, the courts have previously held that indefinite reporting requirements do violate Article 8, and, importantly, the European Court of Human Rights held that notification and registration requirements for up to 30 years in very similar circumstances to the UK system were compliant with Article 8 only because a review was possible. The sex offenders register has a review at the 15-year mark. We thought that that was a comparator worth referring to.
We are concerned that the revisions to the current system are likely to be considered as disproportionate and unjustified interference with the Article 8 rights because of the lack of the possibility of a review. In the light of the increased level of intrusion into private life and the lengthy period of time for which the requirements are imposed in some cases, we think that a review should be added to the provisions—that is, a review of the necessity of the notification and registration requirements—and that each individual subject to the requirements should have the right to make representations at that review.
I understand that the Government do not regard a review as necessary to ensure proportionality because the period is not indefinite. Indeed, the requirements are not indefinite but they might last for 30 years, which, if you are the subject of them, must feel close to indefinite. What harm would be done by providing for a review and right of appeal?
We anticipated that the Government might be concerned about matters being dealt with in open court, so, as well as the review involving the police, we provide in proposed new subsection (5) that the right of appeal can be dealt with by the Special Immigration Appeals Commission.
There are very detailed notification requirements in many sections of the 2008 Act, and non-compliance carries penalties. In the Public Bill Committee in the Commons, the Minister described these as providing,
“the necessary but proportionate means to monitor the whereabouts of convicted terrorists”.—[Official Report, Commons, Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill Committee, 3/7/18; col. 106.]
There are two issues: the means and, separately, the period. These are linked but, in my view, are not exactly the same. The amendment deals with both but was prompted in particular by the length of the period. I beg to move.
My Lords, as I have added my name to this amendment, I should like to say briefly that we support the principle that there should be the possibility of a review to ensure that these provisions are necessary and proportionate. The appeal process appears to get round any possible issues with matters that cannot be placed in the public domain.
I have to say that there is always a chance of rehabilitation, given the deradicalisation programmes that go on, but there will always be an element of risk, I would suggest.
My Lords, the element of risk to which I was in fact addressing my remarks was the risk to the Government that the provisions may be challenged. I would have thought that the Government might like to think about my amendment, which has come from the JCHR, in that light. I do not think that the Minister has answered my question as to what harm there would be in a review provision. My proposal would be to include such a provision in order to bolster the application of what the Government are proposing. I think I had better just leave that with the noble Baroness. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I will speak also to Amendments 40 and 41. Clause 13 inserts a new power of entry and the power to search the homes of registered terrorist offenders, not to look for something specific but to assess,
“the risks posed by the person to whom the warrant relates”.
This is, in our view, a severe intrusion into the private life of not just the registered terrorist offender but his family. In the days of control orders, I became very aware of the impact of certain restrictions on family members, including spouses, children and extended family. I am not suggesting that these powers are the exact equivalent, but the impact on those family members, as well as that on the object of the order, was something of which I became very aware. Being the subject of a search—with the use of force permitted—is not the same, but I do not think that it is completely unrelated.
In response to the JCHR’s initial report, the Government argued that the power may be exercised only as a last resort. I assume that that is a description of Clause 13(2)(c) and (d) and that it requires a warrant and compliance with the powers of entry code of practice. These are safeguards indeed, but the threshold for exercising the power is low. The government response states that the power is to allow the police,
“to assure themselves that the individual does in fact reside at the address they have notified, and to monitor compliance with other aspects of the notification regime”.
Why does the Bill not reflect this, rather than containing the vague requirement of assessing risks?
We on the Committee considered that there should be a clearer requirement that the power is used when it is necessary and proportionate, and when there are grounds for suspicion that the notification requirements have been breached. That has led to the three amendments in this group, which would narrow the power by requiring a reasonable belief that the registered person had breached the notification requirements and ensure, as I have said, that the exercise of the power is both necessary and proportionate. I beg to move.
My Lords, Clause 13 provides for a search power that Professor Clive Walker—who is, without much doubt, our foremost expert on counterterrorism law and not a man given to either naivety or overstatement—described in written evidence to the Joint Committee on Human Rights as “outrageously wide”. As he pointed out, the clause is to be contrasted with paragraph 6(3) of Schedule 5 to the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011—the TPIM Act—which confines the purpose of the equivalent search power to that of determining whether there has been any contravention of the measures specified in the TPIM notice. That is essentially the approach that Amendment 39, which I support, adopts.
I echo the noble Baroness’s point that there is a human element to this. The families of convicted terrorists, through their support and influence, are often important factors in turning offenders away from violence. The extreme anxiety experienced by the wife of a control order subject whose house was subject to frequent unannounced searches, and the upset and trauma caused to her young children, were movingly conveyed in an article from which I quoted in my final report on control orders in 2012. I felt justified in doing so, not to give publicity to an unreliable witness—something which, like my predecessor as independent reviewer, the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, I was always astute not to do—but because the woman in question had recently been described in a High Court judgment by the highly experienced Mr Justice Mitting as an impressive witness and a person whose evidence he accepted without reservation.
The risk of upsetting or alienating such people is surely evident. I have never heard it suggested in several years of, I hope, careful oversight that the powers to enter and search premises occupied by potentially extremely dangerous TPIM subjects are insufficient, so I am puzzled as to what prompted this further turn of the ratchet—at least on paper, even if reassuring words are spoken about how it may be used in practice.
It is important that the power of entry and search should not be used as an instrument of harassment and destabilisation. This reasonable amendment would help to ensure that.
My Lords, the Government were asked to reflect. I will reflect but I suspect that when I read the debate I will become more, not less, concerned. I am overwhelmed by noble Lords’ support. I have to ask something, although perhaps it is rhetorical: are the notification requirements in themselves insufficient?
I referred to control orders not because it was a matter discussed by the JCHR but because I remembered, although I may be corrected, that on one occasion a wife attempted suicide during the course of the application of the control order. That was in my mind but the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, were absolutely correct—I am sorry for sounding so patronising; I hope that they understand where I am coming from—to refer to the impact on families and communities, which itself has an impact on society’s security.
On the police, the phrase “keeping in touch” does not feel like that in the way in which it has been described. The copper’s nose applied to this is getting too long. The measure is far too nosey and risks leading to more hostility, not solving a problem. We will certainly have to come back to this issue. Of course, I will read what the Minister has said. At this stage, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(6 years ago)
Lords ChamberIn Clause 4, new Section 58B, entitled “Entering or remaining in a designated area”, states that:
“It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to prove that the person had a reasonable excuse for entering, or remaining in, the designated area”.
Under Clause 4, the burden of proof would appear to be clearly on the person charged with the offence, not on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the individual charged. The Government have said that that is not the case and that once the reasonable excuse defence has been raised, the burden of proof is on the prosecution, as laid down in existing legislation—Section 118 of the Terrorism Act 2000, which would still apply.
Even with that being the case, it nevertheless appears odd that a new section should say something incorrect: that the person charged with the offence of entering or remaining in a designated area has to prove that they had a reasonable excuse for being there, rather than the prosecution having to prove that they did not have a reasonable excuse. Our amendment would rectify this apparent anomaly by removing the Bill’s requirement for the person charged to prove they had a reasonable excuse as their defence, and instead make it a defence for the person charged simply to state that they had a reasonable excuse for entering, or remaining in, the designated area.
If the wording of the amendment does not find favour with the Government, I hope that its intention does and that the Government will agree to come back with an amendment of their own to new Section 58B at Report. We surely cannot agree to a clause which says the opposite of what is intended and is in apparent conflict with the terms of the legislation. I beg to move.
Perhaps I can ask both the noble Lord and the Minister a question: first, one to the Minister. Is the requirement for proof found in any other provision for reasonable excuse? I have been looking during the past few minutes; I could not find an example, but I did not get my iPad out to start reading through the whole of the Terrorism Act.
Secondly, I see the attraction of the term “state”. On who has to show what and in what order, we have been referred to Section 118 of the Terrorism Act. The terminology of that is “adducing evidence”. I am not sure whether the term “state” used by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, is intended to be the equivalent of “adduce evidence”.
My Lords, as we have discussed, the offence of entering or remaining in a designated area, which would be inserted as a new Section 58B of the Terrorism Act 2000 by Clause 4, is subject to a reasonable excuse defence. We have already debated the circumstances which might give rise to a reasonable excuse and how these should be catered for within the Bill.
Amendment 18 addresses a different aspect of that provision: the question of how much the evidence is required to establish a defence to the new offence. Related to this is the question of whom the evidential burden is placed on. Section 118 of the 2000 Act sets out how the evidential burden applies to a number of defences to criminal offences within the 2000 Act, including the new designated area offence.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, is concerned that the current drafting of new Section 58B(2), which contains the defence to the designated area offence, is out of step with the existing provision in Section 118 of the 2000 Act and will place a greater burden on defendants to make out a reasonable excuse than is envisaged by Section 118.
I understand and respect the noble Lord’s wish to ensure that defendants facing a charge under Section 58B are not placed in a worse position than those charged under other offences with a similar reasonable excuse defence. However, I hope that I can allay that concern and provide a clear assurance that this will not be the case if I explain how Section 118 interacts with the defence to the new Section 58B offence.
The wording used in the defence, which refers to a defendant proving that he or she had a reasonable excuse, is the exact same formulation used elsewhere in various defences to offences contained in the 2000 Act, including the defence to the Section 58 offence amended by Clause 3. It is vital to recognise that this reference in the defence to “prove” should not be read on its own; rather it is subject to the operation of Section 118, which makes further provision on what is required to prove a defence in this context.
Specifically, Section 118 provides that if a defendant,
“adduces evidence which is sufficient to raise an issue with respect to the matter”—
the matter that has to be proved under the wording of the defence—
“the court or jury shall assume that the defence is satisfied unless the prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt that it is not”.
This, together with relevant case law, has the effect that if a defendant puts forward sufficient evidence to reasonably support a suggestion that he or she has a reasonable excuse, then the burden of proof shifts to the prosecution to disprove that defence, which it must do to the normal criminal standard—beyond reasonable doubt. If the prosecution fails to do so, then the jury must assume that the defence is made out.
The precise extent and nature of evidence required on the part of the defendant to invoke the defence in the first instance will be a matter for juries to determine in individual cases. Parliament has set a threshold which is not particularly high; all that is needed is,
“evidence which is sufficient to raise an issue with respect to the matter”.
In practice, a trial judge would be cautious to rule out any proposed defence unless it was plainly incapable of being judged by a jury as a reasonable one. In relation to new Section 58B(2), the evidential burden placed on the defendant will not be any greater than that required in relation to any of the other offences to which Section 118 applies. Furthermore, were Section 118 to continue to apply to new Section 58B(2), the amendment would have no impact in practice. Whether new Section 58B(2) refers to the defendant stating or proving the defence, under Section 118, it will still be for the jury to decide whether the prosecution has disproved the defence beyond reasonable doubt.
My Lords, my noble friend is quite right. “Prove” is used in some six other sections of the 2000 Act, including Sections 57, 58 and 58A, so it is not inconsistent with the generality. However, as the noble and learned Lord has picked this out, I can do no other than to take the point very seriously, and I undertake to do so. If he will suspend his scepticism for a moment, I want to make the point that, in addition to creating an inconsistency between the designated area offence and others with a similar reasonable excuse defence, this would also unsettle a well-established legal position with which the courts and prosecutors are very familiar, and on which there is clear case law.
I very much hope that, on this basis, the noble Lord will be content to withdraw his amendment, subject to the undertaking that I have just given.
Before the noble Lord responds, I am not sure whether I heard the Minister correctly. It sounded as if he said that the requirement for proof elsewhere was proof on behalf of the prosecution. I may well have misheard him, but I am making the point now because that would not be an answer to this point, which is about proof by the defendant.
My Lords, if I misspoke or misread, I apologise. I was seeking to say that, as long as a defendant puts forward sufficient evidence to reasonably support whatever suggestion he is making—that he has a reasonable excuse—then the burden of proof shifts to the prosecution to disprove that to the criminal standard.
I thank the Minister for his thoughtful response. It made me wish that we had had a full consultation on this novel offence prior to the introduction of the Bill, or at the very least that we had not seen it introduced to the Bill at such a late stage. However, we are where we are. I concede nothing but will consider carefully what the Minister has said.
Before the noble Lord withdraws his amendment, does he share my concern about the creation of a provision where the boundaries are so woolly and grey? His amendment would have the benefit of being quite clear about proscribed organisations—everyone would know where they were. Essentially we have heard the Minister say that the Executive and the agencies that support them will know things that the rest of us do not know and will stop travel in a situation that they cannot necessarily describe. I am not entirely sure how in that situation Parliament can scrutinise the decision through the procedure to which we have been referred.
My Lords, we have debated Clause 4 pretty thoroughly. I will make just a couple of points and ask a question to add to the agenda that I suspect we will come back to at the next stage.
I make my two points on behalf of the JCHR. There is concern that Clause 4 criminalises conduct that is not in itself wrongful or inherently criminal in nature. That adds to the previous point made by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson. It attracts a potentially very high penalty. Secondly, the question of boundaries of territory under the control of terrorist organisations—or, more widely, places where there is concern about British citizens going—is one of not just agility but clarity. It may be difficult to designate areas with sufficient clarity for citizens to regulate their conduct accordingly.
My question concerns the exception that no offence is committed if,
“the person is already travelling to, or is already in, the area … and … leaves the area before the end of the period of one month”,
after the notification. The Government have clearly thought hard about this and realised that people may be caught in a difficult situation. Have they thought about how people will be told that if they stay beyond a month they are committing a criminal offence? It may be that the thinking has not gone that far, but given the indication that the Government have tried to put themselves, at any rate in this provision, into the minds and the shoes of those who may be affected, I am interested to know if they have thought through the practicalities.
My Lords, it is probably best if I write to the noble Baroness in response to her specific questions. The broad answer is that we have thought of the practicalities. As regards informing people who are already in the designated area that it has been designated and that they therefore have 28 days to leave, there would be FCO travel advice that would almost certainly have pre-existed the designation. The regulations would be given significant publicity, including as part of the requested debate of the designation regulations. There would be a notice on the government website and we would consider other methods of publicity depending on the area being designated.
On the question of the noble Lord, Lord Stunell, about innocent people who have already been caught up in events and the situation within a designated area, the reasonable excuse defence would kick in. As we said in our earlier debates, where it is perfectly obvious that someone is in a designated area for an innocent reason, it is almost unthinkable that the authorities would spend time trying to make a case against them. Their reasonable excuse would be advanced and the circumstances of the case, if they are innocent, would be obvious from the outset. As I have said, we have had the reasonable excuse defence in place for 18 years and, as far as I am aware, there have been no instances of innocent people being arrested or convicted.
That is as far as I can go at the moment, although I am conscious that I have not completely covered the issues raised. However, I will write and copy my letter to all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate.
My Lords, when the Minister writes, could he confirm that the “one month” in new Section 58B(3)(b) is 28 days? He said 28 days; the wording is “one month”. I am sure somewhere we are told whether it is a calendar month or 28 days, but perhaps he could let us know.
(8 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I thank the Minister for moving these amendments, all of which we are happy to support and some of which respond to concerns we raised in Committee.
It may assist the House if I outline at this stage the purpose of Amendment 185A, in the names of my noble friend Lord Rosser and myself, which is about safeguards for disclosing overseas-related material for our foreign allies and agencies. That is material, possibly including information sent overseas by UK residents, obtained by our security and intelligence services under bulk interception warrants. It is an amendment which we hope the Government will feel able to accept.
In Clause 142, before any information obtained under a bulk interception warrant is disclosed overseas, the Secretary of State must ensure that arrangements and safeguards are in place regarding the retention and disclosure of such material, as the Minister has outlined. These requirements correspond to Clause 141 safeguards for domestic arrangements: that is, requiring that the number of people to whom the bulk-intercepted material is disclosed, the extent of disclosure and the number of copies made is limited to the minimum necessary. These safeguards also require the destruction of such material where there are no longer grounds for retaining it.
However, unlike Clause 141 for domestic arrangements, Clause 142 for overseas disclosure provides a wide discretion for the Secretary of State, whereby she or he must ensure equivalent safeguards only,
“to such extent (if any) as the Secretary of State considers appropriate”.
It could, therefore, be possible for the Secretary of State to decide that no safeguards are required in a particular case.
We recognise absolutely that the UK will need to share intelligence with overseas agencies and our amendment does not undermine the ability of UK agencies to do that. We also accept that overseas disclosure may be of a different nature, with particular political, diplomatic or security implications, all of which the Secretary of State must consider. However, the present wording is surely too wide and, if I have understood it correctly, would not be subject to subsequent review. Amendment 185A removes this very broad discretion and requires that it must appear to the Secretary of State that safeguards corresponding to the requirements under Clause 141(2) and (5) will apply in relation to disclosure overseas.
The Minister will not be surprised if I make reference to the Szabó v Hungary finding that minimum standards should be set out in law to avoid abuses of power and that,
“it would be contrary to the rule of law … for a discretion granted to the executive in the sphere of national security to be expressed in terms of unfettered power”.
The judgment notes that,
“the law must indicate the scope of any such discretion … with sufficient clarity … to give … adequate protection against arbitrary interference”.
I hope that the Government will feel able to accept the amendment as, if anything, extra safeguards may, indeed, be required where sensitive information is being disclosed abroad. We look forward to the Minister’s response on this.
My Lords, we, too, are happy with the government amendments in this group and we support Amendment 185A. The issue is about the discretion in the application of Clauses 141(2) and 141(5)—and, shortly, Clause 143—not their relevance. The term “appropriate” suggests to me a degree of discretion which may not be related to relevance. The term “mutatis mutandis” is not one commonly used in legislation, I think, but it is that provision that one wants to see—only changing what is necessary to be changed. I do not know the proper way of dealing with that, but “appropriate” seems to be inappropriate in the context.
My Lords, I shall also speak to Amendments 245 and 246. These amendments take us back to the question of the reimbursement of the operators’ costs. We have heard frequent assurances about the operators’ compliance costs and that they are to be met, but the words of the Bill do not quite live up to some of the narrative.
Our three amendments cover two alternatives; they would not all be possible. Amendments 244 and 245 would provide that arrangements were in force to secure for the operators the full amount of all relevant costs—“relevant costs” are defined later in the clause—not an appropriate contribution. As Clause 225(1) is framed, the Secretary of State must ensure,
“an appropriate contribution in respect of such of their relevant costs as the Secretary of State considers appropriate”.
With these two amendments, we seek to take out that element of discretion.
Amendment 246 would provide that if the contribution was not an equal amount, there should be regulations regarding the basis of how the contribution is calculated. Our amendments provide that the Secretary of State should lay regulations to that effect. It will be obvious to noble Lords that our reasons are transparency, equality between operators and the opportunity to consider the criteria—the factors, if you like—applied in calculating the contribution. In other words, our intention is scrutiny, using the opportunity that regulations give for debate of their content.
We have debated this matter on a number of occasions, and the Minister will be well aware of our concern. This is an attempt, at this almost last stage, to pin down just how the contribution will be made. I beg to move.
My Lords, Amendments 244 and 245 are intended to ensure that communications service providers are fully reimbursed for their costs in connection with complying with obligations under the Bill. As the noble Baroness knows, this matter has been considered at length both in this House and in the Commons. It is important to recognise that service providers must not be unduly disadvantaged financially for complying with obligations placed on them aimed at protecting national security or combating crime. Indeed, the Government have a long history of working with service providers on these matters and we have been absolutely clear that we are committed to cost recovery.
I once again take the opportunity to reaffirm to the House a point that both my right honourable friend the former Security Minister and my right honourable friend the Prime Minister made very clear in the other place and that I made in Committee: this Government will reimburse 100% of reasonable costs incurred by communications service providers in relation to the acquisition and retention of communications data. This includes both capital and operational costs, including the costs associated with the retention of internet connection records.
The question that the House needs to consider, I submit, is whether it is appropriate for the Parliament of today to tie the hands of future Governments on this issue. That does not mean that we take our commitment lightly, or that future Governments will necessarily or lightly change course. Indeed, it is unlikely that any change in policy will ever take place. For example, the current policy has not changed since the passage of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, and so has survived Governments of three different colours, or combinations of colours.
The Bill adds further safeguards, requiring a data retention notice to set out the level of contribution that applies. This ensures that the provider must be consulted on any changes to the cost model and means that the provider could seek a review of any variation to the notice which affected the level of contribution.
Another question that I hope the House will consider is whether a communications service provider should be able to derive commercial benefit as a result of the obligations imposed on them in relation to the other powers under the Bill. Sometimes, it may be necessary for a communications service provider to upgrade part of its infrastructure to comply with an obligation imposed on it under a technical capability notice. As the communications service providers may be able to derive some business benefit from that upgrade, it is right that the legislation allows for the contribution to the costs to be appropriate to the circumstances.
Some noble Lords have expressed concern about the term “reasonable costs” and asked what it means. I hope I can provide some reassurance on that point. Significant public funding is made available to companies to ensure that they can provide assistance to public authorities in tackling terrorism, crime and other threats. As costs are reimbursed from public funds, the codes of practice make very clear that companies should take value for money into account when procuring, operating and maintaining the infrastructure required to comply with a notice. Were a company to select a solution that did not deliver best value for public funds, I am sure noble Lords would agree that it is absolutely right that the Government would need to consider carefully whether those costs were reasonable and therefore whether it was appropriate to reimburse the company in full.
The noble Baroness’s Amendment 246 acknowledges that there may be circumstances where it is appropriate for a communications service provider to be reimbursed less than its full costs. However, we do not think her proposed regulations provide the required flexibility. As I just explained, communications service providers may receive some business benefit from the changes made to their systems and it is appropriate that the Government are able to discuss these matters with them on a case-by-case basis, rather than be bound by general regulations. Indeed, while communications service providers would welcome an amendment to require 100% cost recovery in all cases, I suggest that they are unlikely to welcome regulations which enshrine in law circumstances where they would not receive full reimbursement.
I hope I have allayed any concerns about the Government’s position on costs and accordingly invite the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, until the last two or three sentences, I thought the noble Earl had made a much better case for regulations than I did. I am a little worried about his argument that regulations cannot provide for flexibility. Flexibility is not necessarily bad, but how it is exercised should be transparent, and that is what my amendment is driving at.
The noble Earl started his remarks by saying that the operators should not be “unduly disadvantaged”, and it is those words which caveat the commitment that has troubled us throughout our debates. We have tried, particularly with the third amendment, to meet the points made by the Government. I will obviously not pursue this any further; we have reached the end of the road. I have no doubt that someone will draw to our attention any problem in practice in future. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
I apologise to the House both that this is a rather inelegantly presented amendment and that it comes at a rather odd point in the Bill, but it covers a matter that was brought to our attention only very recently. I put thanks on the record to the organisation Reprieve for spotting the point. It would more naturally have come with clauses we debated on Monday, but we did not want to table a manuscript amendment for that.
In 2013, the Intelligence Services Commissioner was given additional functions by the then new Section 59A of RIPA. The commissioner is required, so far as directed by the Prime Minister, to keep under review the carrying out of any aspect of the functions of the intelligence services, their heads and the Ministry of Defence and forces engaging in intelligence activities.
My Lords, this amendment is unnecessary. The Government have already made it clear that the new Investigatory Powers Commissioner will bring together the existing responsibilities of the Intelligence Services Commissioner, the Interception of Communications Commissioner and the Chief Surveillance Commissioner. That includes oversight of the consolidated guidance on the detention and interviewing of detainees. In addition, the Investigatory Powers Commissioner will have a bigger budget and a dedicated staff of commissioners and inspectors, as well as independent legal advisers, to ensure that the highest levels of independent scrutiny are maintained. In these circumstances, I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, I chose the last words of my remarks quite carefully because it is the statutory basis of the current arrangements that is so important, which is why we raised it at this—I acknowledge—late stage. Obviously, I am glad to have these assurances. They do not answer my question but that position is now on the record. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(8 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I applaud any attempt to make the definitions precise but there comes a point when there is a negative consequence. I am slightly worried that the wording of the amendment—certainly as drafted—could inhibit the activities of law enforcement in establishing a pattern in the development of criminal behaviour and activity, particularly in the area of organised crime, if it were to be interpreted as strictly as its wording invites. Although the intention of the amendment is good, I am not yet persuaded that it can safely be included without an undesirable inhibition of a particularly important area of activity at the moment—namely, establishing whether groups with well-suspected criminal intent might be planning something worse.
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, has set perhaps the hardest task for the Minister today in asking him to comment on what was perhaps not a coded speech but simply one inviting speculation.
Turning to the amendment itself, as on the first day of Report we are sympathetic to where the noble Baroness is coming from. Indeed, I think we had an amendment on “reasonable suspicion” at an earlier stage. However, perhaps again I should phrase what I have to say as a request for confirmation, as my noble friend Lord Paddick did last week. Reasonable suspicion is encompassed by the necessity and proportionality test. The way the noble Baroness has expressed it is that there is a moderate-sized hurdle to be got over and then a higher hurdle to be surmounted, by having “reasonable suspicion” and then the necessity and proportionality test. To keep up the athletic metaphor, you will not get over the higher hurdle even if you get over the lower one, so it seems to us that you might as well just have the higher hurdle. Perhaps we can be given some more assurances about how the different criteria will bite.
My Lords, I listened carefully to the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, and I am grateful for the case she has put. However, I cannot agree with it, and I will explain why that is.
As the noble Baroness explained, this amendment seeks to provide that certain communications data authorisations can be approved only where there is a reasonable suspicion that a serious criminal offence has been, or is likely to be, committed. In short, the amendment would undermine the ability of law enforcement and other public authorities to catch criminals and to keep the public safe. I will now set out why I believe that is so.
I shall start with the requirement for reasonable suspicion. As we discussed and agreed in this House last week, the necessity and proportionality test is established and well understood. It is difficult, therefore, to see what benefit would be derived from inserting a different test. Indeed, in order to approve an authorisation for communications data for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime, a sufficiently compelling case will always be required—a speculative authorisation would never be approved. Therefore, I suggest that the amendment responds to a concern that is fundamentally misplaced.
Turning to the serious crime threshold that this amendment would insert, assuming that the noble Baroness intends the threshold to be equal to that currently used to authorise the interception of communications, I believe once again that the amendment is inappropriate and damaging. Taking effective action against serious criminals often requires the investigation of, if I may use the phrase, lower-level individuals for activities that are not considered serious crimes in order to build a case against higher-ranked criminals. It may also include the investigation of minor offences where stopping an offender at this point may prevent an escalation of their criminal activities, such as in stalking and grooming cases.
It might be helpful if I expand on that. Placing this additional restriction on the acquisition of communications data would disrupt police investigations of online grooming and linked crimes, such as the sending of sexual communications to a child. This is because where such activity does not meet the high threshold proposed, which will often be the case if the child is over the age of 13, it may be impossible to identify perpetrators who may go on to be involved in child sexual exploitation. As such activities increasingly take place online, law enforcement agencies will rely heavily on communications data and the new power in relation to internet connection records in order to investigate this.
The amendment would also reduce the ability to investigate online fraud, which affects everyday internet users who shop or bank online, but which could, depending on the value of the fraud, fall below the serious crime threshold proposed here. Equally, the Department for Work and Pensions, for instance, investigates false tax credit claims which can result in the collective overpayment of millions of pounds of taxpayers’ money, but these false claims may not individually reach the threshold of serious crime. Communications data are currently used to investigate such activity.
I also believe that these amendments are unnecessary given the strict safeguards that already apply to the use of communications data. Data can be accessed only on a case-by-case basis and only where judged necessary and proportionate by a senior officer of a rank specified by Parliament and who is independent of the investigation. Strong judicial oversight will also be provided by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner.
I was grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, for qualifying his party’s position on this part of the Bill. We maintain that our existing regime and the proposals in the Investigatory Powers Bill are compliant with EU law, but whatever the final judgment, given the importance of communications data to preventing and detecting crime and safeguarding national security, we will ensure that plans are in place so that the police and others can continue to acquire such data in a way that is consistent with our obligation. I hope that that is helpful.
My Lords, I move this amendment in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Paddick. The issue of destruction of material was raised by the Government last week in respect of legal professional privilege. In that case, the Minister proposed and the House agreed that when an item subject to legal privilege is intercepted and obtained, the Investigatory Powers Commissioner can impose conditions as to its disclosure or direct destruction. We proposed a further safeguard about destruction, which the Minister is considering—he said that he would like to return to it at Third Reading—but which he thought was essentially a good idea, and we recognise the Government’s approach as something that we want to build on.
Amendment 100A is in the same area. There are destruction requirements elsewhere in the Bill. Clause 58(1) deals with what is necessary and proportionate for a targeted authorisation for obtaining data. It is necessary in one of the cases set out in subsection (1)(b),
“for the purposes of testing, maintaining or developing equipment systems or other capabilities relating to the availability or obtaining of communications data”.
The amendment would provide that data obtained for any of these purposes may be used only for such purposes. The Minister may say that that must be so and critically that,
“it must be destroyed as soon as possible after the … purposes”,
have been fulfilled. We believe that it must be the case that data obtained for testing systems should be subject to such a safeguard because, by definition, they are not required for a specific investigation and are therefore not necessary in the interests of national security or any of the other purposes set out in Clause 58(7). If data are required for a specific investigation, then those other provisions will kick in.
The destruction requirement that we are seeking is confined to the very narrow situation of the testing of systems. I hope that the Minister will agree to this, but if not that he will at least explain how data obtained in that situation are to be destroyed so that they do not hang around, as it were—which is probably not a technical phrase. I beg to move.
My Lords, I hope that I can reassure the noble Baroness. Amendment 100A is unnecessary since the use, retention and destruction of all personal data held by public authorities, including communications data, are already regulated by the Data Protection Act 1998. That means that, once communications data have been obtained, there must be a lawful purpose for their use and ongoing retention, and they must be destroyed when they are no longer held for a lawful purpose. I would draw the attention of noble Lords to Chapter 11 of the Communications Data DRAFT Code of Practice, which sets out detailed requirements, consistent with the Data Protection Act, on public authorities about the use, disclosure, protection and destruction of the communications data they hold.
In addition, the amendment would unnecessarily, and in some cases very damagingly, require a public authority to destroy communications data it had obtained once they had been used for the purpose for which they were acquired, but other legitimate and important purposes for holding data may still exist. For example, a public authority is obliged by law to retain material it holds that has been used in evidence to support a conviction in case of appeal or to overturn a potential miscarriage of justice. It is also obliged to retain any material that is potentially exculpatory, even if it considers that it no longer requires the data for the original purpose for which it was acquired. This amendment would cut across those important tenets of our criminal justice system and I cannot imagine that that is what the noble Baroness wants to see.
I hope that, in combination, what I have been able to explain will reassure her sufficiently to enable her to withdraw the amendment.
I should obviously have included something like the words “except as otherwise required by law”. I am grateful for that explanation and I am sympathetic to the Government trying to get everything into the Bill, but here we find yet another example of another piece of legislation that we need to look at. However, it is helpful to have the explanation, and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, when the Bill was going through the House of Commons, the Government made a commitment to introduce a clear and appropriate threshold for accessing internet connection records. The concern was that access should not be available in connection with non-serious crime. The threshold for serious crime that the Government came up with in Committee appeared workable and appropriate.
But last April, the then Home Secretary told the then shadow Home Secretary that restricting internet connection records to serious crime would hamper the ability of the police to investigate online stalking and harassment; disrupt police investigations of online grooming or the sending of sexual communications to a child; reduce the ability to investigate online fraud; hinder the ability to identify and disrupt the sale and distribution of illegal material online, including illegal weapons, counterfeit medicines or illegal drugs; and prevent the police progressing investigations where there may be a threat to life but where it is unclear whether a crime is involved—for example, locating a missing or suicidal child—because many of these activities would not meet the serious crime threshold.
While we welcome the fact that specific offences such as stalking and harassment have been addressed and can lead to access to internet connection records, we have continuing concerns around the definition of “other relevant crime”, which is too broad and could still lead to the use of internet connection records in relation to crimes that would not be regarded as serious.
Currently the Bill defines “other relevant crime”, with some caveats, as,
“an offence for which an individual … is capable of being sentenced to imprisonment for a term of 6 months or more”.
The Government have recently stated that this threshold rules out the use of internet connection records for a large number of minor crimes, including those which are not subject to a custodial sentence and those which are subject to only a one-month or a three-month custodial sentence. The Government have also indicated a number of offences in respect of which the use of internet connection records would be excluded if the threshold in respect of “other relevant crime” was increased from six months to a sentence that is capable of attracting a custodial sentence of 12 months or more. Those offences which would then be excluded include motoring offences such as joyriding, driving while disqualified and failure to stop or report an accident; an offence of criminal damage under £5,000; some sections of the Public Order Act which do not amount to violence; and certain immigration offences and some offences relating to the supply of intoxicating substances or controlled drugs.
Our amendment would increase the qualifying term of imprisonment from six months to 12 months or more. This would exclude the kind of offences to which the Government have referred. One accepts that such offences can have significant consequences, but we do not regard them as serious in the context of the purpose for which access to internet connection records is required—and nor do we think that raising the threshold to 12 months’ imprisonment in respect of other relevant offences makes it difficult to pursue matters related to the kind of offences to which the previous Home Secretary drew attention and to which I referred earlier.
I hope that the Government will feel able to give a helpful response to this amendment, which seeks to address concerns that access to internet connection records could be used in inappropriate circumstances for which the Bill is not intended—notwithstanding the fact that any such access to internet connection records must meet the necessity and proportionality requirement, which some might argue should exclude much low-level offending. I beg to move.
The noble Lord made a very persuasive case for this amendment and I do not think that he will be surprised to be supported by these Benches, given our concerns about internet connection records—so any further constraint on them is something that we would welcome. But he went into far more detail than that and we support him.
My Lords, the Government have consistently recognised that care must be applied to the acquisition of internet connection records and, importantly, that they should not be acquired for trivial purposes. That is why we brought forward amendments in Committee to put in place a number of restrictions to provide reassurance that the powers to acquire internet connection records would only ever be used proportionately. These amendments included a threshold which would mean internet connection records could only be used to investigate certain crimes which could attract a sentence of at least six months’ imprisonment.
This amendment raises the threshold for offences which are sufficiently serious that an offender can be sentenced to at least 12 months’ imprisonment, rather than six. The amendment rightly leaves unchanged the important exceptions in the Bill to the crime threshold. The House has recognised the need to ensure that internet connection records can be obtained for the investigation of certain specified types of crime—for example, those relating to cyberbullying and harassment, and those relating to a breach of a person’s privacy—which, for whatever reason, carry a lower sentencing limit.
We recognise that this amendment will provide further reassurance and ensure public trust in the use of these vital powers, whose value and importance have been widely recognised and acknowledged. In these circumstances, we are therefore content to accept the amendment.
My Lords, Amendment 117B is grouped with government Amendments 118 and 130. It aims at the same thing, but I think that the Government’s aim is better than ours in Amendment 117B. The amendments are about the retention of third-party data, so in order to move the business on we are very happy to support the government amendments in this group. I beg to move.
My Lords, I do not understand why the noble Baroness wishes to insist on Amendment 117B.
Sorry, I am getting a great deal of advice from around the Chamber, and it is all immensely helpful.
Perhaps I may explain the purpose of government Amendments 118 and 130. As I said in Committee, we have been making good progress on drafting a clause that could put into the Bill the Government’s clear commitment that we will not require a telecommunications operator to retain third-party data.
It is important to be clear exactly what we are referring to as third-party data. Where one telecommunications operator is able to see the communications data in relation to applications or services running over its network but where it does not use or retain that data for any purpose, then it is regarded as third-party data. For example, if you use an internet access provider such as a home broadband provider to use the internet to log into a separate email provider in order to send an email, the broadband service might be able to see your access communications data in relation to the email service. If that information was not used or retained for any purpose by the broadband provider, the data would be considered to be third-party data.
I am pleased to say that we have now produced a clause that prohibits the retention of third-party data. We have tested this drafting with operational partners and with those telecommunications operators likely to be affected by the legislation and we are confident that it delivers the desired effect. That being so, the Bill essentially replicates the current position in RIPA, which is that data that already exist and could save a life or convict a criminal and so on can be accessed, but we are not insisting that data should be retained.
In these circumstances and in light of the opening observations by the noble Baroness, I commend government Amendments 118 and 130 in the event that we proceed.
I am sorry to have confused the noble and learned Lord. I was simply trying to explain that we are seeking to achieve the same thing, but that the Government have done better than we have. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(8 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, this group contains a variety of government amendments relating to oversight arrangements.
Amendments 133 and 149 clarify the delegation of functions by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner or judicial commissioners. They make clear that certain judicial functions of the IPC or judicial commissioners cannot of course be delegated to staff. The amendments also make clear that, where the Bill requires a judicial commissioner to undertake a task, any of the judicial commissioners can perform that duty. However, the IPC can still delegate a function or functions to an individual judicial commissioner in order to create a de facto deputy, should he wish to do so. Delegation of certain functions is sensible and allows for a flexible and efficient working environment. Of course, it would be inappropriate if the IPC could delegate to a judicial commissioner the ability to recommend individuals to be appointed as judicial commissioners and so this function is reserved to the IPC.
Amendment 149 puts beyond any doubt that the inspectors and expert advisers who work for the Investigatory Powers Commissioner or a judicial commissioner will be working with their full delegated authority. This responds to concerns raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, in Committee. We have been clear that the Investigatory Powers Commissioner will lead a powerful new oversight body which will rely on the work of inspectors and technical experts alongside the commissioners themselves. Those working under the authority of the commissioner will have the same right to access and interrogate information that the commissioners themselves would have. This amendment puts that beyond doubt. It makes it clear that commissioners can, formally and in accordance with statute, delegate some of their functions to the staff working for them.
However, it is right that not all functions should be capable of delegation. There are some activities and decisions, such as decisions to approve the use of powers, that should rightly be undertaken by judges. Therefore, this amendment also prevents those types of activities and decisions from being delegated to members of staff. These amendments strike the right balance between allowing members of staff to claim the full authority of the commissioner while reserving key judicial functions to those who are appropriately qualified to undertake them. I hope that that brings some satisfaction to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, who was concerned to anticipate whether these amendments would go as far as he hoped; I believe that they do.
Amendment 135 is intended to provide further clarity about when a commissioner does not need to consider the duties set out in Clause 207(6) and (7). I hope that the House will agree that while the Investigatory Powers Commissioner and the judicial commissioners who will be working for him or her will be performing vital functions, it is important that the actual performance of those functions does not damage the public interest. Subsections (6) and (7) set out a number of duties on the commissioner: for example, that they should not act in a way that in their own opinion is prejudicial to national security, nor should they act in a way that they consider would compromise the safety of those involved in a security operation.
When the Joint Committee on the Draft Investigatory Powers Bill considered the first incarnation of this clause, it expressed concern that the duty placed on the commissioners as set out in these subsections was too broad. The Government then carefully considered this clause and agreed that there should be occasions on which a commissioner was not caught by these additional duties. For example, we put it beyond doubt that a commissioner could refuse to approve the decision to issue a warrant without worrying that they were breaching their duties in relation to national security. This amendment goes further still along that same path. It increases the list of circumstances in which a judicial commissioner will not be subject to the duty contained in subsections (6) and (7). The amendment expands the list to include all circumstances in which a judicial commissioner could be said to be exercising a “judicial function” or taking a judicial decision. I hope that this provides the House with further reassurance that we do not intend subsections (6) and (7) to be unduly limiting upon the important work of the commissioners.
Clause 223 provides for membership of the Technical Advisory Board, a non-departmental public body that advises the Secretary of State on cost and technical grounds if a notice given under Parts 4 or 9 of the Bill is referred by a telecommunications operator for review. Membership of the board must include a balanced representation of those on whom obligations may be imposed by virtue of notices and of those persons entitled to apply for warrants or authorisations under the Bill. At present, subsection (2)(a) of this clause requires that the membership of the board must include persons on whom obligations could be imposed by virtue of a data retention notice or technical capability notice—namely, telecommunications operators. Government Amendment 177 makes a minor change to this provision to add persons on whom obligations could be imposed by a national security notice. The amendment will not change the scope of the persons who must be represented on the board; indeed, a national security notice may only be given to a telecommunications operator. However, this minor change will make the meaning of the provision more clear.
Amendment 136 is a minor amendment to Clause 207, clarifying the policy intention that the Investigatory Powers Commissioner should be able to review the decisions of other judicial commissioners should this be necessary.
Amendments 137, 263 and 274 move the definition of a “statutory function” to Clause 239 alongside other definitions.
I turn now to Amendment 146. In Committee, the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, sought further clarity as to precisely who is covered by the definition of a “member” of a public authority. Having reflected on the matter, I can see that perhaps this definition is not as clear as it could be. Therefore, the Government have introduced this amendment to be clear that everyone who works for a public authority or who has worked for a public authority in the past will have to provide the IPC with all necessary assistance. I hope that that gives the House reassurance that the IPC will be able to hold those public authorities properly and clearly to account.
Amendment 147 is intended to put beyond doubt the fact that the Investigatory Powers Commissioner will have access to advisers, be they legal, technical or of any other nature, that the commissioner feels is necessary to undertake their statutory functions. This amendment provides that the Secretary of State, after discussion with the IPC, must provide the commissioner with services as well as with staff, accommodation, equipment and facilities. I would like to be clear, though, that the commissioner will be entirely free to choose their own advisers and that the Secretary of State will merely supply the resources to pay for those advisers. This will allow the commissioner flexibility to “buy in” whatever advice they need at whatever time.
Amendments 154 to 156 are technical amendments providing additional certainty around the definition of the chief and other surveillance commissioners who are being abolished by the Bill and replaced by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner.
Clause 221 already makes a number of amendments to Sections 65, 67 and 68 of RIPA in relation to the functions of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal. Amendments 163 to 175 are further technical amendments simply updating the relevant provisions of RIPA to ensure that it is clear that the Investigatory Powers Tribunal has the jurisdiction to investigate any claims or complaints relating to the provisions of the Investigatory Powers Bill. I beg to move.
My Lords, we welcome the amendments in this group. The provisions on delegation are indeed extremely helpful, as we were concerned about the chain of command and chain of responsibilities. I am glad to see the little amendment about being a “member” of a local authority—or HMRC, which I think was the other example I used. I had thought I was maybe going a bit too far in raising that point, but I am glad that I did. I am also glad to see the insertion of the reference to services for the IPC, which we were also concerned about. Having said that, we are happy with these amendments.
My Lords, my noble friend Lord Paddick and I also have Amendments 178A, 178B and 178C in this group.
We mentioned in Committee how inextricably intertwined are technical and legal matters in this area. I doubt that either Minister would disagree with that, having lived with this Bill as they have. Whether and how the Act will apply will be a matter of legal interpretation in the context of the technology that we have at the time. Our Amendment 134A would give the Investigatory Powers Commissioner power to publish material regarding legal interpretations. It is clear that he would keep the interpretations under review, so this amendment is simply a matter of having the power to publish them.
We welcome government Amendment 178 and its consequential amendments providing for a Technology Advisory Panel. We have three minor amendments seeking either clarification or adjustment. Subsection (1)(a) of the new clause provides for the panel to give advice on,
“the impact of changing technology on the exercise of investigatory powers”.
We would insert there a reference to the safeguards on the exercise of powers. That may be implicit, because the exercise of powers is to be subject to safeguards, but we think it should be explicit. After all, safeguards have been very much a feature of debate on the Bill in both Houses, and the Bill has changed quite a lot in spelling out what safeguards there are.
Similarly, Amendment 178B would insert advice on the interpretation of the law in the light of technological advances and necessary amendments to legislation. It is, if you like, a first cousin to Amendment 134A.
On Amendment 178C, given that the Investigatory Powers Commissioner and Ministers will be required to consider the privacy implications when exercising powers relating to new technology, it would be helpful for the Technology Advisory Panel to be required to have regard to those same matters—that is, those matters set out in the privacy clause, Clause 2. That would be not only helpful but appropriate. After all, as an advisory panel, it must have regard to how those exercising the powers would be constrained in exercising them. I beg to move.
I appreciate that I may be speaking prematurely since the Government have not moved their amendment on the Technology Advisory Panel. On the basis that they are not about to stand up and withdraw it, I thank the Government for the amendment establishing a Technology Advisory Panel, which reflects the recommendation by David Anderson QC in his report on the bulk powers provisions in the Bill, a report that we had secured during the passage of the Bill in the Commons and a recommendation on which we had an amendment in Committee in this House.
I am obliged to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, and will resist the temptation that he laid in my path. As he observed, the government amendments have been tabled to give effect to the recommendation of David Anderson’s bulk powers review.
The review demonstrated that the bulk powers are crucial. Mr Anderson’s report concludes that the powers,
“have a clear operational purpose”,
and,
“play an important part in identifying, understanding and averting threats in Great Britain, Northern Ireland and further afield”,
and that, where alternatives exist to their use,
“they were likely to produce less comprehensive intelligence and were often more dangerous (for example to agents and their handlers), more resource-intensive, more intrusive or – crucially – slower”.
The review also concludes that bulk powers are vital across the full range of security and intelligence agency activity, including counterterrorism, cyberdefence, combating child sexual exploitation and organised crime, and supporting military operations; and that they have been used to disrupt terrorist activity, prevent bomb attacks, facilitate the rescue of hostages, thwart cyberattacks and save lives.
Mr Anderson’s report included a single recommendation, which was:
“The Bill should be amended to provide for a Technology Advisory Panel, appointed by and reporting to the IPC”—
that is, the Investigatory Powers Commissioner—
“to advise the IPC and the Secretary of State on the impact of changing technology on the exercise of investigatory powers and on the availability and development of techniques to use those powers while minimising interference with privacy”.
Following careful consideration of this recommendation, we agree with Mr Anderson’s assessment that those authorising, approving and overseeing the exercise of bulk powers must be alert to the impact of technological change on those powers’ utility and impact. These amendments therefore give effect to Mr Anderson’s recommendation in full.
The amendments provide that a Technology Advisory Panel must be established by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner and, in line with Mr Anderson’s recommendation, members of the panel would be appointed by, and clearly accountable to, the commissioner. They also provide that the role of the panel is to advise the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, the Secretary of State and Scottish Ministers on precisely those matters set out in David Anderson’s recommendation —namely, the impact of changing technology on the exercise of investigatory powers, and the availability and development of techniques to use such powers while minimising interference with privacy. The Investigatory Powers Commissioner would have the power to direct the panel to provide advice on any issue relevant to these matters.
While David Anderson’s review was in relation specifically to the bulk powers in the Bill, we agree with his view that there is no reason to restrict the scope of the Technology Advisory Panel just to those powers. Indeed, the panel giving advice in relation to the targeted powers could be just as valuable. As such, the amendments make clear that the panel’s role would extend to providing advice on all investigatory powers whose exercise is subject to review by the commissioner, which of course includes all the investigatory powers under the Bill.
To ensure that the panel would be able to undertake its role effectively, the amendments also make clear that its members would have the same right to access information as judicial commissioners. This means that any relevant person, such as any member of a public authority, must disclose or provide to a member of the panel all such documents and information as that member may require in order to carry out their functions.
We also agree with David Anderson that it should be mandatory for the Technology Advisory Panel to produce an annual report on the exercise of its functions. The amendments would therefore require that the panel make such a report to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner as soon as reasonably practicable at the end of each calendar year. At the same time as providing the report to the commissioner, a copy would also need to be sent to the Secretary of State and to Scottish Ministers where the report related to matters for which Scottish Ministers are responsible. To ensure sufficient transparency about the panel’s work, the amendments would require the Investigatory Powers Commissioner to include information about the work of the panel in their annual report.
I turn to the opposition amendments that have been tabled to the new clause establishing the Technology Advisory Panel. The first of these amendments would expand the role of the panel explicitly to provide advice to the commissioner on safeguards. While I appreciate what is intended by the amendment, I do not think it is necessary. The panel’s role is to advise on the impact of changing technology on the exercise of investigatory powers. Therefore, if technology changes in a way which means that existing safeguards are no longer appropriate or if new safeguards are needed to protect privacy, the panel can provide such advice to the commissioner and the Secretary of State. The panel must provide advice when asked to do so, but may also provide advice as it considers appropriate. While I appreciate the intent behind the amendment, I believe that the clause as drafted already provides for such advice to be given by the panel. Therefore, I do not believe that the noble Baroness’s amendment is necessary.
The second amendment to which she referred would expand the role of the panel to provide advice on an additional matter, namely,
“the impact of changing technology on the interpretation of the law and any amendments to legislation required to ensure the application of the provisions of this Act to changed technology”.
This amendment is neither necessary nor desirable. The role of the panel would, rightly, be squarely to provide advice on the impact of technology on the exercise of investigatory powers. This clearly defined role will ensure that members of the panel will be exactly what we need them to be: technical experts. David Anderson’s recommendation was designed to fill a gap. He was conscious that the Investigatory Powers Commissioner and judicial commissioners will be senior judicial figures. So, while they will be experts in the law and the interpretation of the law, they will not necessarily be experts in technology. What he felt was needed, and what the Government agree is needed, is technical experts to provide technical advice. In seeking to expand the panel’s remit to provide legal advice as well, I strongly fear we would end up with lawyers rather than technical experts. Indeed, David Anderson specifically warned that,
“the technological expertise of the TAP should not be unduly diluted”.
I pause to wonder whether one could ever dilute something with a lawyer, but I continue. That is exactly what this amendment would do, and that is why we firmly believe that it should be resisted.
This brings me to the amendment, which would permit the commissioner to make a report on his or her views about the legal operation of the Bill but would not place a duty on the commissioner to do so. I appreciate the sentiment behind the amendment, but I believe it is unnecessary. Clause 212 already gives the Investigatory Powers Commissioner a very wide remit to report on any matter relating to the functions of the judicial commissioners. That will, of course, permit the IPC, as he or she thinks fit, to report on the legal interpretation of the Bill. However, I hope that the IPC will not feel it necessary to do so, or at least to do so often. That is because the Bill serves to put beyond doubt the powers available to the state and the safeguards that apply to them. In the words of David Anderson, the Bill,
“restores the rule of law and sets an international benchmark for candour”,
but if the commissioner felt the need to report on the legal operation of the Bill, he could already do so.
Finally, Amendment 178C would require the panel to have regard to the same matters which a public authority must have regard to, as set out in Clause 2, which is referred to as the privacy clause. I appreciate the spirit of this amendment, but I believe it is unnecessary. Clause 2 is already clear that whenever exercising certain powers, such as to authorise warrants, all public authorities must have regard to the issues outlined in the privacy clause, but of course the Technology Advisory Panel will not be exercising such powers, so the amendment does not, in that context, make sense. If the intention is that when the panel gives advice it should bear in mind the various privacy considerations contained in Clause 2, then the amendment is also unnecessary, since the requirement, contained in government Amendment 178, that the panel advise on,
“the impact of changing technology on the exercise of investigatory powers”,
already includes advising on the ability to exercise those powers within the statutory framework and subject to all the safeguards contained in the privacy clause. Of course, the whole point of the Technology Advisory Panel, as specified in the government amendment, is to advise on techniques to “minimise interference with privacy”. So I really think that this amendment is unnecessary.
I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, with the leave of the House, I recognise that this is Report stage. I was aware, of course, that the panel will not be a public authority, and that is why I framed Amendment 178C as I did: the Technology Advisory Panel would need to,
“have regard to the matters”,
in Clause 2, rather than be bound by them. I suggested the amendment because subsection (1)(b) of government Amendment 178 talks about, “minimising interference with privacy”, and that seemed to me not nearly as strong as the privacy clause, Clause 2, which we took to bits but welcomed earlier in the passage of the Bill. I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 134A.
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 138 and the other amendments in this group, which would ensure that the Scottish Government are provided with appropriate means to engage with and support the work of judicial commissioners relating to devolved powers in Scotland.
Clause 210 allows a judicial commissioner to provide advice and information to any person. It requires the judicial commissioner to consult the Secretary of State first where providing advice and information might be contrary to the public interest. It is clearly appropriate that Scottish Ministers are similarly consulted if the provision of advice and information by the judicial commissioner may be prejudicial specifically to activities that fall under those Ministers’ responsibility. Accordingly, Amendments 138 and 139 would require the judicial commissioner to consult additionally the Scottish Ministers when providing information and advice that may be prejudicial to the prevention or detection of serious crime in Scotland, or the continued discharge of any devolved functions of a Scottish public authority.
Clause 216 sets out the funding arrangements for the Investigatory Powers Commissioner and the judicial commissioners. Amendment 148 would grant the Scottish Ministers the power to make such payments as they consider appropriate to judicial commissioners for work relating to the exercise of devolved functions by public authorities in Scotland. This simply maintains the current position, as the Scottish Government currently have the power to pay surveillance commissioners who carry out their functions wholly or mainly in Scotland such allowances as the Scottish Ministers consider appropriate. The surveillance commissioners will be abolished by the Bill, and their functions taken on by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner and the judicial commissioners. Accordingly, I beg to move Amendment 138.
My Lords, the noble and learned Lord may have answered one of my questions about Amendment 148. It was about whether this sort of arrangement is in place elsewhere because, on reading it, it seemed that there might be scope for some squabbles as to who should be responsible for paying how much. However, I think he said that this is already working satisfactorily under the current arrangements. My other question is about the term “allowances”, which in normal language means less than paying salaries. It does not address payment for facilities, infrastructure and so on. It seemed a curious term to use but that is probably because I do not understand quite how the system will work. Allowances, to most of us, sounds like more like an ex gratia arrangement.
Might I be permitted to respond briefly to the noble Baroness on these points? First, these amendments have been agreed with officials in the Scottish Government and reflect an existing arrangement whereby the allowances of surveillance commissioners are determined by the Scottish Ministers in that context. “Allowances” is used there, as I understand it, because we are not relying upon them for payment of certain standing charges incurred in setting up the commissioners, for example.
My Lords, Amendment 160 is a probing amendment, and the debate should be short. Schedule 7 provides for codes of practice. Our debates on the previous day of Report on journalistic material, which is referred to in paragraph 2(2) of Schedule 7, made me have a look at the personal records which are also referred to in that paragraph as being “relevant confidential information”. I was concerned about health records, because the information is described as that,
“which is held in confidence by a member of a profession”.
I wanted to check that health records would fall within this. A health authority obviously does not cover all of this. There are health records which are held for entirely proper purposes but not by people that one might describe as being professionals—or certainly not members of a profession. So I decided, even at this late stage, to table this amendment in order that we could understand precisely what is meant by confidential information when it consists of personal records. I beg to move.
My Lords, Amendment 160 would amend Schedule 7 to the Bill to require that every code of practice made under the Bill must provide guidance in relation to personal records held by a health authority. I hope I can convince the noble Baroness that this amendment is unnecessary. Schedule 7 already requires that the codes of practice must make provision relating to personal records held by a member of a profession, which would include health records held by a medical professional.
The Government do not believe that it is necessary to impose a similar requirement for personal records held by a health authority, as that is a discrete issue which will not be relevant to all of the codes of practice. For example, it will not be relevant to communications data. Of course, that does not mean that the codes cannot include such material should it be necessary to do so. There is already a reference to a health service body in the draft personal datasets code, for example.
The codes of practice have been published in draft to help facilitate parliamentary scrutiny of the Bill, but they will be subject to consultation and separate further scrutiny by Parliament after Royal Assent. That will provide noble Lords and others with the opportunity to consider the detail contained in the codes, including to argue the case for the inclusion of particular issues in particular codes of practice. On that basis, I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, that is helpful and it has enabled me to make my point, which may of course be one that we will come back to, depending on how we view the codes when we come to deal with them. I thank the Minister and beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(8 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I rise briefly to speak to Amendment 1, tabled in my name. I declare an interest as a member of the Intelligence and Security Committee. When the ISC reported on the draft Bill, we recommended that privacy protection should form the backbone of the legislation, around which the exceptional, intrusive powers would then be built. This recommendation was to underline at the very outset of the Bill that a delicate balance must be struck between an individual’s right to privacy and the exceptional powers needed by the intelligence agencies to ensure our safety and security.
The Bill has seen substantial changes in the other place and at earlier stages in this House, and those changes have introduced significant improvements in the protection afforded to privacy. Very important in this process was the introduction by the Government at the overview of the Bill of the clause on general duties in relation to privacy. This amendment seeks simply to reinforce the Government’s approach. The Intelligence and Security Committee still feels that there is merit in placing a simple statement right at the forefront of the legislation to provide additional clarity that there should be no doubt that privacy protection remains a fundamental priority. I hope that, on this occasion, the Minister may feel able to support this very brief amendment, and I look forward to hearing his response. I beg to move.
My Lords, I hesitated because I thought the Minister might wish to introduce the government amendments before I spoke to mine, as I think one of mine may be an amendment to one of his. We on these Benches support the noble Lord, Lord Janvrin, on Amendment 1. It would provide a very clear statement of purpose for the Bill, and one which would be very useful. The Lord Advocate said in Committee that an amendment similar to this would not add value. On the contrary, it would add value by giving that statement of purpose. The first clause is badged as an overview of the Act. In fact, what it does is to list the different parts of the Act and give an overview of each of them. The clause does not give an overview of the Act; the noble Lord’s amendment would do so, and the clause would live up to its name.
We have Amendments 8, 9 and 12 in this group. Amendment 8 would provide that the powers should not be used if the objectives could be achieved by other, less intrusive means. This, too, was an amendment that we debated in Committee. The Bill provides that regard must be had to the possibility of achievement by other, less intrusive means. My noble friend Lord Lester of Herne Hill apologises that he cannot be here today—although I am not sure whether one should apologise for an illness. He has kept me up to date with his position. He talked about the “rubbery” quality of the term “have regard to”. This amendment would make the obligation an absolute one—but not an unreasonable one, because the term “reasonably”, as in,
“could reasonably be achieved by other less intrusive means”,
is included. My noble friend Lord Lester referred to this as,
“classic principle of proportionality language”.—[Official Report, 11/7/16; col. 53.]
I was pleased that, on that occasion, we had the support of my noble friend Lord Carlile of Berriew, who said that the wording,
“would be more useful and more certain”,
than that with which he was comparing it, and that, above all, it would,
“avoid unnecessary disputes about the meaning of and compliance with Article 8”—
that is, Article 8 of the convention—
“in the courts”.—[Official Report, 11/7/16; col. 54.]
My noble friend Lord Lester had painted a rather gloomy picture of the problems that could arise if the legislation was not absolutely clear.
The noble Earl agreed to consider the proposition. He referred to the use of the wording in codes of practice. My noble friend Lord Carlile, who was more polite than I was about problems with codes of practice, said that he supported the amendment because it would be preferable to have the words in the Bill,
“rather than face the inevitable consequences of legal discussions in the courts as to the role of codes of practice and their enforceability? Putting the words in the Bill at least provides certainty”.—[Official Report, 11/7/16; col. 56.]
Both my noble friends have very considerable experience of arguing the case—no doubt both ways—in the courts. I am not sure whether the Government’s Amendments 10 and 11 are intended to address the point that we were debating. I am sure I will be told.
Our other amendment, which I will have to speak to now because we are on Report, is an amendment to government Amendment 11. I welcome government Amendments 10 and 11, but I am a bit uneasy about intrusiveness being gauged against the sensitivity of the information. My point is a wider one: everyone in every case should expect the least intrusive means to be tried first. Amendment 12 to government Amendment 11 is tabled to understand whether everything in Amendment 11 falls within Amendment 10. We have wording in Amendment 10 about the “particular sensitivity” of information. Amendment 11 gives examples of “sensitive” information. Are there, therefore, two hurdles to be crossed: “sensitive” and “particular sensitivity”? Amendment 12 seeks to understand how the two amendments relate to one another.
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Janvrin, has again spoken persuasively on the importance of making clear that privacy is at the heart of the Bill. The amendment tabled in his name, on behalf of the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, serves to reinforce that point and provide greater clarity. He will be pleased to know that, on that basis, I am happy to support it.
Included in this group are a number of government amendments. Clause 2 brings together in one place at the front of the Bill the considerations a public authority must have regard to, and the duties that apply, when exercising a power provided by this Bill.
Amendments 2 through to 7 are technical amendments to ensure that the obligations under Clause 2 continue to “bite” in relation to the roles of judicial commissioners under the Bill as amended in this House. Some of these could be seen as consequential to amendments that we shall discuss in the coming days. If the House will allow, I do not believe that it would be helpful to expand on them here, save to say that the Government propose to introduce greater protections in respect of the retention of communications data and the treatment of sensitive professions under the Bill. Where those protections create a role for judicial commissioners, the amendments will again ensure that the duties imposed by Clause 2 continue to apply in respect of the commissioners’ expanded remit.
My Lords, this will be, I hope, short and uncontentious. The amendment was suggested to us by the Law Society of Scotland. It seeks clarification and, of course, an amendment if one is required to achieve the point.
Clause 7 introduces Schedule 1 to the Bill and provides for “Monetary penalties for certain unlawful interceptions”. Under paragraph 4(4) of Schedule 1, a person who is the subject of a penalty notice may,
“request an oral hearing before the Commissioner in order to make representations”.
Our amendment would provide that such a person may have legal representation to assist with those representations.
The Law Society of Scotland says that,
“given the nature of the Bill and from an equality of arms perspective, legal representation should be available as a right”.
I would say that legal representation should generally be available, whatever the Bill, whether it is 10 pages or 250-plus pages and complicated. It is an important point to clarify. There is no provision which says there may not be legal representation, so it may be that this can be dealt with outside the Bill; certainly, there should be no block on it. I hope that the Minister will be sympathetic to the point. I beg to move.
My Lords, I trust I can deal with this amendment with a degree of brevity equal to that employed by the noble Baroness. I reassure her that the amendment is not necessary. It is already the case that a person on whom a monetary penalty notice has been served who requests an oral hearing before the commissioner can be legally represented at the hearing. There is nothing in the Bill that would preclude such representation, and of course it will be up to the person on whom the notice is served to choose whether or not they wish to be so represented. Therefore, what is intended by the amendment is already provided for. Accordingly, I hope the noble Baroness will feel comfortable in withdrawing the amendment.
I am grateful for that assurance. The point is that it is not provided against, rather than that it is provided for. I dare say somebody will be writing rules about these hearings at some point, so I am glad to have that assurance on the record. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, this might be a mouse after the last amendment but it is not unimportant. It is about transparency—and perhaps more than transparency. It is about positively putting information into the public domain and not simply providing information which can be looked through. It is, if you like, a companion to the very welcome privacy clauses in the Bill. It is intended to help the citizen understand what is going on and to enable operators to put into the public domain the warrants and so on with which they have to deal. It provides that they will not commit an offence by disclosing not details but the number of warrants, the number of accounts and the number of warrants complied with, going back only for a limited period of six months. The second limb of the amendment —that they can do more, or more can be done by whoever, if the Secretary of State agrees it—should go almost without saying.
I am told, and would welcome confirmation if the Minister can give it, that the Government are considering regulations to introduce a clear framework for transparency and that provisions such as this might fall within those. To that extent, my amendment is a probing amendment.
User transparency around engagement with law enforcement and government agencies is a key component of accountability to users. It is a prerequisite too, I would say, of redress. Given that the Government are committed to greater transparency than we have had hitherto through this Bill, and to this being a world-leading piece of legislation, I hope that they will be sympathetic to the provisions proposed. The amendment would permit providers to publish statistical data and would complement the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s annual report, looking at the issues through a different lens and from another perspective. I beg to move.
My Lords, it is the Government’s view that a new public reporting clause, as proposed by this amendment, is unnecessary. I will seek to explain why.
Clauses 55 and 125 already provide for the Secretary of State to make regulations that will permit operators to report information in relation to the number of interception and equipment interference warrants they have given effect to. Furthermore, the Government have proposed amendments to these clauses to give more flexibility to permit operators to publish greater statistical information about the warrants they have received. In response to a point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, I can tell the House that it is the Government’s intention that the regulations will permit companies to publish details relating to the number of warrants they have given effect to and the number of customer accounts to which these warrants refer.
However, as was previously discussed in Committee, we need to be very careful about any exemptions to prohibitions on revealing sensitive information and the extent to which they might reveal the capabilities of the agencies. It is already the case that terrorists and criminals change their behaviour and the means they use to communicate to evade detection, and we must not give them further information that would help them to do so.
The Secretary of State must have the ability to protect the technical capabilities deployed by law enforcement and the security and intelligence agencies by setting out the way information relating to warrants may be reported—for example, the time period between being served with a warrant and publication of that information, or the bandings to be used for reporting on the numbers of warrants received. It is our view that the level of detail required is appropriate for such conditions to be provided for in regulations, not in the Bill.
The Government will of course continue to work closely with telecommunications operators on their transparency reporting. We have already discussed the proposed content of the draft regulations with them. Indeed, the government amendments to Clauses 55 and 125 reflect our efforts to address issues raised by operators in response to this consultation. Of course, also, the regulations issued under Clauses 55 and 125 will in due course be subject to parliamentary scrutiny.
It is therefore our view that the Bill and the Government amendments already provide for what these amendments seek, in in a way that allows companies to be transparent and the Government to protect sensitive capabilities. Accordingly, I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, I thank the noble and learned Lord for that response. What we are really being told is that the fleshing out of transparency provisions that I seek is in train. I of course understand points such as the need to consider exceptions.
I am prompted by this to mention a question that I should perhaps have asked the Government a little while ago, but I think all noble Lords will be interested. I am not expecting the noble and learned Lord to respond to this instantly, but we would all be interested to know the timetable for introducing regulations. We know there is a deadline of the end of this year because of DRIPA coming to the end of its natural life, but I assume the Bill cannot operate without a lot of secondary legislation. I wonder whether there could at some point be an indication of not only how the Government propose to deal with regulations but how the House, which is generally very supportive of the thrust of the legislation, despite one or two bits and pieces, can be helpful without losing its proper role of scrutinising regulations.
I should not perhaps take time on Report to be as pompous as that sounds. It is intended to be both an inquiry and an expression of concern about a matter that is for Parliament, not just the Government. Having said that, and welcoming the information about the work going on on this subject, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, my noble friend Lord Paddick and I have three amendments in this group—but, first, I thank the noble Earl for the amendment reducing the five-day period in the case of urgency regarding modifications so that it is in line with the urgent issue of warrants. He referred to agility; three days preserves agility as it requires a judicial commissioner to be slightly more agile. More importantly, it is consistent and sensible. We were puzzled during Committee as to why the very similar arrangements about urgency were not consistent with regard to the time period, so we are glad to have taken that step forward.
Two of our amendments, Amendments 40 and 41, also refer to modifications. Clause 34 refers to modifications using provisions about,
“adding the name or description of a person, organisation or set of premises”.
We would add “or varying” to “adding” because it seems that a variation may be as significant as—and in effect amount to—an addition. I acknowledge that under Clause 32, which defines major modifications, variations of “name or description” are included. But Clause 34, to which our amendments would apply, allows modifications which are “necessary” and “proportionate”. Do we actually have consistency here? I am worried that by not allowing for variations within the regime of major modifications, we might let some additions in through the back door.
Amendment 66 would amend Clause 96, which is about the subject matter of equipment interference warrants. There is no restriction on the use of targeted thematic equipment interference warrants, unlike bulk EI warrants, which can be used to obtain only overseas communications data or information and are available only to the security services. Under the clause, there is no limit to the size of,
“a group of persons who share a common purpose”—
although I accept that “common purpose” contains a natural limit—nor to what is meant by,
“more than one person or organisation”.
That has dictated where we have tabled this amendment, which suggests a limit of 50 persons for a single investigation. It is clearly an arbitrary figure but it is there to try to tease out, a little more than perhaps we were able to in Committee, how this will work and how it could not grow in the application to such an extent as to defeat what we see as the purpose of those provisions. So we are not of course wedded to 50 but we are wedded to finding out a little more about the operation of this.
My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Baroness for speaking to her amendments so clearly, as she always does. Perhaps I may first address Amendments 40 and 41, which relate to Clause 34. I do not believe that these amendments are in fact necessary. I agree that in circumstances where an agency seeks to add something to a warrant, that should be possible only where it is both necessary and proportionate. That is what the Bill provides, and that necessity and proportionality test applies whether a name or description is being added, or where a factor is being added.
However, I do not agree that a necessity and proportionality test is relevant where a name, description or factor is simply being varied. In such a case, the conduct authorised by the Secretary of State and approved by the judicial commissioner is not changing in substance. An example might be where an individual is identified initially by a nickname but their true identity subsequently becomes known. I will give another example, which I hope will reassure the noble Baroness. During Committee noble Lords expressed concern about warrants against premises. If an agency applies for a warrant against a premises at, let us imagine, 25 Acacia Avenue and it turns out that it actually intended to target 125 Acacia Avenue, in that sort of case the original warrant should be cancelled and the error reported to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner —and an entirely new warrant should be sought. So there are two types of variation, if I may put it that way. One, I suggest, should not require the process that the noble Baroness has suggested; the other also should not require the process because it should be subject to an entirely fresh warrant. I hope that that provides her with the necessary reassurance.
Turning now to Amendment 66, as the noble Baroness explained, the amendment seeks to limit the number of persons that a targeted examination warrant issued under Part 5 may relate to. The amendment would clearly mean that any individual targeted examination warrant that relates to multiple persons for the purposes of a single investigation or operation under Clause 96(2)(c) could not relate to more than 50 persons. I believe that inserting such an arbitrary limit would be a mistake—I know the noble Baroness realises that it is an arbitrary figure—and that it would not add to the strong safeguards already provided for in the Bill.
The decision on whether a warrant is necessary and proportionate is rightly one for the issuing authority and the judicial commissioner. There may be circumstances in which the case for examining the material of more than 50 persons is entirely proportionate to what is sought to be gained from that task. For example, if the security and intelligence agencies are investigating UK-based users of websites hosting illegal child pornography, it would be detrimental and dangerous to limit the number of people they could investigate to a particular figure. This could in some cases result in material relating to dangerous subjects of interest escaping entirely appropriate examination simply because they were past the relevant number that would be set out in statute if this amendment or something like it were accepted.
Mandating that a targeted examination warrant must not relate to more than 50 people would mean either that vital operations could not proceed or that the intelligence agencies would on some occasions need to submit multiple applications for warrants relating to a single investigation or operation. That would needlessly increase the bureaucratic burden placed upon the agencies and the issuing authority while also hampering the ability of the issuing authority and the judicial commissioner to consider the operation in full. Such a restriction would add no additional rigour to the already robust double-lock process.
Introducing an arbitrary restriction does nothing to ensure that the principles of necessity and proportionality are upheld, but the role of judicial commissioners, already provided for by the Bill, does. That is why the Bill requires both the issuing authority and the judicial commissioner to consider, on a case-by-case basis, whether the breadth of a warrant is appropriate without the imposition of indiscriminate limits. In summary, the amendment has the potential to be damaging, needlessly bureaucratic or both, and I invite the noble Baroness not to press it.
My Lords, I was wondering whether the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, wanted to speak to his amendment before I came in with my rather more disparate ones. First, I thank the Government very much for the significant amendments which the noble and learned Lord has just introduced. The House will understand that, being members of the legal profession, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and my noble friend Lord Lester of Herne Hill were not leaving it there but were going to try to pin everything down. I have already given the apologies of my noble friend Lord Lester, and I need to give those of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, because of the religious holiday starting just about now. I also thank Tom Hickman of counsel, who drafted the amendments to which I will speak, instructed by the Law Society of England and Wales. As all the dramatis personae seem to come from the same chambers, I did suggest they might have got together over a cup of tea, but that did not happen.
Amendment 27 is an amendment to the amendment expanding the meaning of “exceptional and compelling circumstances”. The government amendment provides that the public interest in obtaining the information must outweigh the public interest in the confidentiality of it. We are of course talking about items subject to legal privilege, and the amendment would provide that it should “clearly” outweigh that second interest. I do not want to get into an argument here, but I suppose a current example would be whether 52 to 48 is a clear difference in the balance of concerns. Where a balance is being struck, it might well be one which is teetering, or where one consideration outweighs the other but barely, so is it not right to say that one public interest in this situation should “clearly” outweigh the other for the provisions to operate?
The next amendments also relate to the use of the intercepted material where the circumstances override privilege. The Bill specifies only such circumstances where a warrant is sought with the express purpose of obtaining legally privileged material or where this is the likely result of the interception. It seems to the Law Society that the principle should apply with equal force when privileged material is obtained as an unintended by-product of interception—for example, in circumstances where a warrant is sought to intercept the telephone of a suspected serious criminal who is not known to have contact with a lawyer but who, after the warrant is obtained, instructs a lawyer and speaks with him or her on his telephone.
The Bill as drafted provides that whenever material is retained, the Investigatory Powers Commissioner must be notified, but the Bill should make it clear that the commissioner should allow use of the material only in exceptional and compelling circumstances, and have express power to direct that the material not be further used, or that it should be destroyed. The amendments to the new clause after Clause 52 and those to the amendments to Clause 144 would address this.
Finally, there are proposals for protection in the Bill for privileged material in the context of communications data. The Government have accepted the principle of such protection but have proposed that it be addressed by the code. The amendment in question seeks to put the provisions into the Bill and not leave the matter to a code, which of course has a different status. It may be a more flexible document, but this issue is so important that a clause closely analogous to that requiring independent authorisation for information which could disclose a journalist’s source, which is in the Bill, should be provided to protect confidential access to legal advice.
I know that the noble and learned Lord has spent a good deal of time considering the detail of these amendments as well as the structure the Government now have, and I am grateful to him for the meeting he held with various legal luminaries and me yesterday. I hope he can accept some or all of these amendments, or help the House with a way forward in capturing in the Bill the points made by them, if not precisely in this form.
(8 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, Amendment 234A takes us to Clause 232, which provides for a review of the operation of the Act. A lot of concern has been expressed during the course of the Bill about the speed of change of technology. Most recently, David Anderson, in his report on the operation of bulk powers, said, encapsulating this very neatly,
“nothing in this field stays still forever, or even for long”.
He also quoted Matt Tait, who told the review that,
“for the overwhelming majority of the time that the IP Bill will be law, it will be interpreted in secret by HMG lawyers, when seeking to authorise as-yet unknown operations in support of not-yet decided policy objectives, needing to relate the provisions of the IP Bill to technologies that do not exist yet, where technological norms may be markedly different to how they are today”.
In most fields, five years would seem a reasonable time, even though quite ordinary products such as washing machines become obsolete—they are even made for obsolescence—within a shorter period than that. However, in this field five years is almost a generation. Devices manufactured five years ago are apparently now obsolete, as I have just discovered with the desktop PC which I have been using, and are not supported by the manufacturers. Enormous advances are made every year, and as all noble Lords who have spoken about this have acknowledged, it is essential that the Government and the authorities that will be acting under the powers that will be given by the Act keep abreast of those changes. I appreciate that a great many attempts have been made to future-proof the Bill, but this is not an easy project, and we may find the day after tomorrow that something new comes along to undermine that future-proofing.
We believe that five years and six months is too far into the future before the legislation is formally reviewed. Of course, the Secretary of State can arrange for a review without the formal provision in the Bill, but this is the requirement and it should itself be fit for purpose. We are not wedded to two and a half years, but five and half is too long. Two and a half would enable a report well before the end of this Parliament, assuming that the next election is in 2020. Although we are not wedded to two and a half years, we would be interested to hear the Government’s justification for the period of five and a half years and, I hope, an acknowledgment that a shorter period would be appropriate in this instance. I beg to move.
The purpose of the Liberal Democrats’ amendment seems to be that there is a speedier review of the legislation than was agreed in the passage of the Bill in the other place and was actually in the Bill. During the proceedings of the Joint Committee, a number of witnesses, including the Information Commissioner, argued for a sunset clause to be put into the Bill. The committee considered that; it did not agree, but at the end of the day believed that there should be,
“some form of review after five years”,
and that it should be “detailed post-legislative scrutiny”. The proposal that the Joint Committee came up with, to which I believe the Government have agreed, is that a Joint Committee of both Houses should be established within six months of the end of the fifth year after the Bill is enacted.
The difficulty with the amendment is that it refers specifically to the Secretary of State reviewing the Bill, whereas the Joint Committee was arguing that both Houses of Parliament should review it. The argument that technological change can be swifter than was thought by those of us who believe that five years was the answer is what lies behind the amendment. However, this is not simply about technology; it is also about the impact of the Act, as it will then be, upon the liberties of the people and about the nature of the various powers that we are enacting in the course of our proceedings. We therefore need some clarification: is it about the Government reviewing, or is it about Parliament reviewing? What precisely are we reviewing? I think everyone agrees with the principle, but we have to look carefully at the way in which Parliament reviews. If the amendment is eventually accepted then, frankly, it has to be secondary to parliamentary scrutiny.
My Lords, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, explained, Amendment 234A deals with the review of the operation of this legislation. The amendment would reduce the length of time for which it has been in operation from five years and six months to two years and six months. It is of course good practice to conduct post-legislative scrutiny, particularly for legislation as significant as the Bill. That is what the Bill provides for. Notwithstanding any suggestion by virtue of the amendment that the House might be eager to revisit the issue within the scope of this Parliament, I suggest that reducing the time for which the legislation had been operating before the review takes place would be profoundly unhelpful in assessing its utility.
First, the timing of when the review should occur is precisely as the Joint Committee convened to scrutinise the draft Bill recommended. As the noble Lord, Lord Murphy, said, that committee considered that work on a review,
“should begin within six months of the end of the fifth year after which the Bill is enacted”.
We have followed that lead.
I was asked what kind of review this would involve. As I mentioned, the Bill attempts to give effect to the recommendation of the committee. We cannot, clearly, bind Parliament in the actions that it takes, so the Bill provides for consideration of any report by a committee of Parliament. I hope that again accords with the steer that the Joint Committee gave us.
Of course, we must ensure that before such a review takes place, all the Bill’s provisions have commenced and been in effect for a sufficient period so that a review is meaningful and effective. As the Joint Committee again concluded:
“The evidence of several years’ operation will inform the debate”.
A review after two and a half years runs the risk that processes and capabilities will not have had sufficient time to bed down before they are subject to a formal review. We need to bear in mind, in particular, that communication service providers will need to implement legislation. Surely the last thing we want is for them to turn round after a short time, if the noble Baroness’s proposal gains traction, and say that it is too soon. We do not wish to create uncertainty for them at this stage. They have to implement this, as has everybody else. The noble Lord, Lord Murphy, rightly said that it is important that the impact of the Act should be reviewed and the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, also correctly spoke of the need to monitor how the Act was working. I do not disagree with either.
However, I would just point out that an urgent review of the Act is not necessary, given the strong oversight provided in the Bill by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner and the requirement that the commissioner should publish annual reports. The exercise of the powers provided for under the Bill will be subject to the ongoing oversight of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, and his report will be laid before Parliament. I was grateful for the intervention of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood. He referred to David Anderson’s recommendation to establish a technical advisory panel. I am reserving judgment on that recommendation in the light of our debates last week. David Anderson said, in paragraph 9.3, that the point of the TAP would not be to provide an alternative oversight function, or to place new regulatory burdens on the SIAs. Rather it would serve to inform the Secretary of State and enhance the work of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner by ensuring that both are kept as up-to-date as possible with the fast-moving technologies whose use they are asked to approve. There is good sense in not overlaying the oversight that the Act will have too heavily. For all those reasons, I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment. I hope that what I have said convinces her that there is some logic to the Government’s position.
My Lords, before I respond, I wonder whether the Minister can tell the Committee when it is expected that the provisions of the Bill will commence. Does he have that information?
I am grateful to the Minister for his response, and I am sure he will understand the importance of the question of the extent to which the Government have decided when the provision should commence. I imagine they must have a programme in mind. He says that the timing is precisely as the Joint Committee proposed, but it is not, as we have heard, the type of review proposed by the committee, as I understand the report. Yes, of course we want to avoid uncertainty, but we would argue that a shorter period would give greater confidence to the communication service providers and others that changes in technology and the operation of the Bill will be made as soon as they reasonably should, to assist them as well as everyone else.
The Minister mentioned the IPC’s report under Clause 210, but I believe the Secretary of State does not have to act on it. The Minister mentioned that the technology advisory panel is primarily about technology, although David Anderson argued forcefully that it should comprise more than technicians. I do not want that word to sound pejorative—I am searching for a more respectful term—but I am sure the Committee will understand.
This is an important issue, and I cannot promise that we shall not return to it on Report.