Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateBaroness Fox of Buckley
Main Page: Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-affiliated - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Fox of Buckley's debates with the Department for Work and Pensions
(4 weeks, 2 days ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am sympathetic to the Government’s aspirations to tackle fraud and to reclaim money, in effect, ripped off from the public purse. Whether it is those grants for fake community schemes mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent, at the beginning or the more mundane benefits cheats, there is nothing more galling for the public than people who exploit the system. For those who work their guts out and struggle to make ends meet to see a minority claiming benefits that they do not have a right to and yet seeming to have a better standard of living than the people who are working so hard, it can be and is infuriating.
Yet I have some serious reservations about how the Government are approaching this, and parts of the Bill, at least, feel like a sledgehammer to crack a nut. There is a nagging feeling that the Government are going after low-hanging fruit and that it has become a distraction from the real culprits and deeper problems—indeed, some dodgy schemes created or allowed by the DWP. In the recent furore about the apparent ease with which some could use the Motability scheme to access fancy cars, for example, and to get state-paid insurance, excise duties, servicing and breakdown cover, the upset was, of course, not about a scheme that allows those with disability to access transport to aid their independence—the British public are fair like that; they want that. Rather, it seemed to me that the upset was because legitimate systems were set up by the private company that ran Motability that were there to be played. It was not fraud, but there were lax assessments and a management who never queried why its customer base swelled by 14.7% in the last year, and executives who were awarded eye-watering pay bonuses and who boasted that their scheme was the largest car buyer in UK and doing a public service by promoting electric vehicles to help deliver the transition to greener transport. Maybe that is why the Government turned a blind eye to what obviously needed to be tightened up. I therefore think that there is more going on when it comes to welfare being exploited than this Bill sometimes allows.
When I first heard about the Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill, no disrespect, but it sounded a bit dull, technical, workmanlike, and I thought, “I won’t bother with that; I’m not going to get involved.” The problem was that I then read it. There is a good reason why it has been labelled a Big Brother deal, a snoopers’ charter allowing mass surveillance of those who get means-tested benefits—we heard some of the concerns from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier. I agree that one of the most contentious parts of the Bill, as we have heard from other noble Lords, is the eligibility verification measures, which, frankly, I find quite worrying.
The Government seem, however, to be quite matter of fact about this new requirement ensuring that banks and financial institutions trawl through their datasets to highlight where someone may not be meeting the specific eligibility criteria for certain benefits. Apparently, the attitude is that if it helps the DWP identify incorrect payments and verify or otherwise claimants’ entitlement to public money, it is okay—that is the justification—but I feel queasy. I also think that it is peculiar that we think it is okay for the DWP to outsource the dirty work to private third parties that are, first, unaccountable to the public but also being forced to do a job the DWP should be doing itself. Coercion is involved; the banks do not have a choice. They are not being asked whether they want to do this. They will be served with a special eligibility verification notice setting out the specific information that the DWP requires, and there will be penalty notices for non-compliance. This seems an example of huge state overreach. It will also mean that banks, building societies, et cetera will have to trawl through all account holders’ databases to identify which match search criteria supplied by the DWP—criteria, by the way, which are not available to us as legislators to scrutinise, nor, in fact, to the banks.
Therefore, I understand why Big Brother Watch, Privacy International and other civil liberties organisations have invaluably raised the alarm about what have been labelled “bank spying powers”. Ministers have responded by suggesting that this is alarmist hyperbole—a kind of “Nothing to see here”.
I appreciate that this Labour Government have drafted this Bill more tightly than the previous Conservative Government’s version. Yes, it is good that the Bill limits the powers of eligibility verification notices to request only information about accounts in receipt of three named benefits—that is good. However, from reading the Explanatory Notes it is clear that, while initially only those benefits will be looked at, the Bill contains the authority for the Secretary of State to expand the range of benefits covered at any time in the future, with Parliament reduced to a nodding-dog status rather than us being able to debate it.
I am sure that all these details will be subject to debate and amendments in Committee, but for now we should take a step back and note that, whatever smoke and mirrors the Government deploy, the fact is that some people on benefits—as well as, by the way, people with associated accounts, who may be their carers or guardians; that is, account holders who are not even on benefits—will be subject to having their private financial data pre-emptively monitored, intruded on by banks and other financial institutions, in case they are involved in fraudulent activity, all without their knowledge and all because of coercive orders given out by the state.
In the other place, there was an interesting amendment tabled by Labour MP Neil Duncan-Jordan. He sought to limit the exercise of an EVM to cases where the welfare recipient was suspected of wrongdoing and expressed concerns about
“the slippery slope of compelling banks to act as an arm of the state”.
The Government’s rebuttal of that amendment was revealing. Mr Duncan-Jordan was told that this would “undermine the measure entirely”, as powers in the Bill are not intended to deal with suspected fraud but to
“help check that claimants are meeting the criteria for their benefit and to detect incorrect payments at an earlier stage before any suspicion of wrongdoing has arisen”.—[Official Report, Commons, 29/4/25; cols. 243-251.]
This is suspicionless surveillance, which I do not think is a good answer to the problems that we are trying to tackle.
I argue that the Government should note that, on principle, we should not intrude on citizens’ bank accounts without very good reason. It risks an important commitment to the “innocent before proven guilty” point by treating all those on certain benefits as would-be criminals by default. Some might say, “Civil liberties be damned: it is all worth it to crack down on cheats and reclaim all that misappropriated money”. However, we must remember that, even by the Government’s own analysis, if this measure works—this unprecedented bank intrusion—it is expected to recover less than 3% of the estimated annual loss to fraud and error.
Beyond bank spying, there are parts of the Bill that also make me gulp. I will not go into most of them, but does the Minister think that boasting about the use of non-criminal penalties is appropriate? It is explained as a benign way of reducing the burden on the courts, which can be costly and time-consuming, and that civil penalties will show that there are meaningful consequences for breaking the law, as we heard at the beginning, even when criminal prosecution is not achievable—that is, there is not sufficient evidence to get a conviction. Should we be welcoming this non-optional use of civil penalties because they have a lower burden of proof, being on the balance of probabilities rather than beyond reasonable doubt? It is easier to convict and find someone guilty if due process is sidelined.
Other people have mentioned the danger of aligning fraud and error. Even though the Government go to great lengths to distinguish between them, when it comes to detection and recovery they are indistinguishably punitive. Also, too often, as we have heard from others, overpayment errors are the fault of the DWP, yet little attention is paid to this failure in the Bill. A freedom of information request has revealed that, in 2023-24, nearly 700,000 of the new universal credit overpayment debts entered on to the DWP’s debt manager system were caused by government agency mistake. Yet this Bill’s powers focus on making claimants pay the price. In an insightful article, Siân Berry MP quotes—someone whom I do not usually agree with—the CEO of the Public Law Project:
“No one is expecting the DWP not to make any mistakes. However, it is incumbent on the department to take responsibility for those mistakes, rather than pushing that burden onto people it should in fact be supporting”.
While this Bill is keen to punish even those who make unintended errors—perhaps not supplying the correct paperwork or missing deadlines—the Government could be accused of equal negligence.
In reply to lots of the issues raised today, the Government will tell us that much of the detail on safeguards, procedures, appeals and fines will be contained in three key codes of practice, yet not even drafts of those codes of practice were published before the Bill finished in the other place, and we will not get them—if we do—until Committee. This breaches the spirit of the official Guide to Making Legislation, which sets out the procedures by which a code of practice should be made available in order to properly consider the appropriateness of statutory provisions. We do not have them. I say to look to ourselves before we start overpunishing the most vulnerable.
I hand noble Lords over to someone far more edifying. I am delighted that I will be followed by the noble Baroness, Lady Spielman. I have long admired her and often agreed with her from afar. I hope that her credibility will not suffer from my endorsement, by the way—she may feel free to distance herself. I look forward to hearing her maiden speech and many speeches that she will make in the future.
It is a percentage of the amount of fraud that was recognised. Clearly, we do not have figures for the amount of fraud of any kind that has not been identified or recognised. That was the figure for the amount we have on our books as organised fraud.
The reality is that, whether it is done by organised criminals or by individuals, this is not okay. It is not fair to taxpayers who fund social security, nor to the vast majority of people who claim only the benefits to which they are entitled. In my job, when money is as tight as it is now, I want every penny available for social security to go to the people who need it most.
This Government are determined to tackle the issue head-on with a Bill that will provide the right tools to protect public money and fight modern fraud, coupled with the right safeguards. The Bill is tough on those who commit fraud against our public services or our welfare state. In doing so, it gives reassurance to taxpayers. One of the side effects is that it will be helpful to DWP claimants who make genuine mistakes, by helping to spot errors earlier so they can avoid getting into lots of debt.
I thought the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Spielman, about reciprocity was there. If people do not have confidence in our welfare state and the underpinning mutual shared obligations, that challenges our ability to maintain confidence and carry on supporting people in the future. We need to get this right, but we do not need to demonise people to do that. We just need to make it clear that people should get what they are entitled to, and, if they are not getting that, we should address it.
We believe this Bill strikes the right balance, giving the Government new powers proportionate to the problem we are tackling while ensuring that those powers are wrapped around with effective safeguards and protections to give confidence to Parliament and the country. Having said that, and having listened to the debate, I recognise that it is just possible that not everybody agrees with us—or, at least, not yet. We have some way to go. I have every confidence that, once I have fully explained this, there will be unanimity across the House—or near-unanimity at least, being a realist.
Having listened to the debate, it seems to me that there are a number of challenges. First, I offer a couple of truisms. There is no silver bullet to fraud. If there were one single thing to do, the previous Government would have tackled this, or some other Government would have done it. Tackling fraud is an accretion of a series of small decisions which, between them, add up to make a difference. Therefore, this Bill does what it does and does not do other things: it does not tackle bank robbers or tax evasion. It is a contribution, and I think it is an appropriate one.
Secondly, we have to be a bit careful that the best is not the enemy of the good. What is in front of us is action that this Government will take that has not been done before, and I commend it to the House. The challenges that we have seem to come in three broad categories: we are not going far enough, we are going too far, or there are some challenges in the way that we are doing this. I will briefly look at each in turn.
I start with the challenges that we are not going far enough, which have come from a number of noble Lords. The noble Baroness, Lady Stedman-Scott, and I have great respect for one another, but I say very gently that some of the critiques she has made of the Bill strike me as a little ironic, given that the last Government were in for 14 years and had all that time to take action. What did we get? We got one predecessor of one of these measures, which was put in at the fag end of the last Government and dropped into the other place after Committee, with none of the information that the noble Baroness is demanding from me—nothing at all, not even a requirement to produce a code of practice, never mind actually producing one, and absolutely none of the safeguards or protections. Now she is in opposition, I fully respect that it is the job of the Opposition to demand things of the Government, and she does a fine job of doing that. She also will not mind if, in turn, I occasionally throw back at her what her own Government failed to do. In this area, I think we are doing rather better.
Having got that off my chest, let us move on. It is worth saying that this Government are actually doing something. We committed to the biggest-ever savings package on fraud, error and debt at the Autumn Budget. Along with the Spring Statement, DWP fraud and error measures are estimated to achieve £9.6 billion of savings by 2029-30, of which up to £1.5 billion will be generated by this Bill. So this Bill is not all that we are doing, but it is an important thing that we are doing.
The noble Baroness, Lady Stedman-Scott, asked about cost. In the end, the costs of DWP working through these measures will be dependent on the munificence of the Treasury at the spending review, which I am not allowed to pre-empt. The impact assessment sets out our estimate and shows that around four times the benefit of every pound of our departmental spending will come back on scored measures to 2029-30.
On not doing enough, the noble Baroness asked about “sickfluencers”. She is right—it is the view of this department that we have the powers to deal with these crimes at the moment. We think the Bill will help the PSFA to do that at the same time. But, if she has ideas about other ways in which that could happen, I look forward to hearing them, along with her many other ideas for tackling fraud, which I have no doubt Committee will give us every opportunity to discuss.
While I am on the point, the noble Baronesses, Lady Kramer and Lady Stedman-Scott raised the question of whistleblowing. We absolutely agree; we want people to pass on information about fraudsters who are taking from our public services. We are open to keep looking at the best way to do that. We are working with partners such as Action Fraud to make it simple and easy for the public.
In the case of DWP, benefit fraud can be reported by the public online, by phone or by post—and, trust me, it is. But also, DWP staff have clear channels to report. On top of that, the PSFA will look into the possibility of being listed by the Department for Business and Trade as a body with which individuals can raise concerns around public sector fraud. That will help on that side.
While we are on the PSFA, concerns were raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, and others about whether it is doing enough and about the scale. The PSFA’s enforcement unit is relatively new in what it does. The noble Baroness, Lady Finn, was a little a little bit harsh on test and learn. When the enforcement unit is as new as it is and will only with the passage of the Bill get the powers it needs to do any of these things, surely testing and learning is the right thing to do. If it can demonstrate clearly that results come from that, the possibility for scaling will be significant. I promise I am not making any assumptions of the Treasury.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, asked whether the Government audit the work of the PSFA and whether the powers in the Bill will add anything. The PSFA publishes annual reports and has benefits audited by the Government Internal Audit Agency. Examples were given in my noble friend’s opening speech of where the PSFA currently cannot make the desired progress because it has not got the powers it needs. The Bill will give them to it.
That is, briefly, the case for not going far enough. Let us now do the going too far case. A number of noble Lords, including the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, to a degree, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, my noble friends Lord Davies and Lord Sikka, and the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, are concerned about possible infringements on the right to privacy or other aspects of the reach of the Bill. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, for acknowledging the improvements made by the Bill. I raised a number of reservations when the last Government introduced their third-party data measure, because I felt that the powers were simply not proportionate and that there were not enough safeguards around them.
While I am here, I say to my noble friend Lord Davies that the fact that that we provide safeguards does not mean the powers are wrong. That is what safeguards are for. There are safeguards in all aspects of life. I will come back to that. It means that we want to be transparent and show people that powers the state is taking are used appropriately. That is what they are for. The noble Lord explained the limitations.
We are now limiting the benefits in scope. For all the measures there will be clear limits about what information can be requested, for what purpose, and how the PSFA and DWP will use it. That is all new, and the Bill introduces considerable oversight and reporting requirements.
I believe the Bill strikes the right balance and, in answer to my noble friend Lord Sikka, I am confident that it is complying with the Government’s duties under the ECHR. The Government’s detailed analysis on compatibility is set out in the published ECHR memorandum.
I need to take on a couple of noble Lords who have suggested that this is a sort of broad trawling expedition. It has been described as DWP going out there and trying to have access to everybody’s bank accounts—suspicion-snooping. That is a simple misunderstanding of the nature of the powers. Let me try to explain why. DWP will not be given access to people’s bank accounts by this measure, which is about banks being asked to examine their own data, which they already have and can already look at. They have been asked to provide DWP with the minimum amount of information necessary to highlight whether there is a possibility that someone may not be meeting a specific eligibility rule for a specific benefit. At the point the information is shared with DWP, no one is suspected of having done anything wrong. The presumption of innocence is still there.
It is clear that the DWP does not want to see that data, but it will be telling the banks to trawl for the data. The Minister says that they already have the data, and that they would not be trawling for a government-mandated outcome before the DWP told them to do it. As the Minister was about to say, and I have stressed this before, it is true that there is no suspicion of anyone. The only reason the bank would be doing it is that a person is in receipt of a particular benefit. The bank therefore has to check whether the person is in receipt of that benefit—because it does not necessarily know that—by going through its databases on the eligibility criteria the Government are going to give it. So no one is saying that the Government are spying, but the banks are being asked to “spy”—it is a phrase, just a slogan. We understand the point; we just do not think you are satisfying us.
I have heard accounts of people saying that disabled people will worry that DWP will know that they go to Pret and therefore cannot really need the money, et cetera, so it is important to make it clear that DWP will not have access to their bank accounts through this EVM.
DWP knows the bank accounts into which benefits are paid, so DWP will tell the banks to look specifically at the bank accounts into which those benefits are paid. It will tell them specifically the criteria they are looking for, and all they are being asked to provide is enough information to identify accounts which may, on the face of it, be in breach. Then, that information will be used along with other information that DWP holds, and it will be examined by—to reassure the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Lichfield—a human being, who will make a decision on whether to investigate. There could be a number of outcomes. The outcome could be that the person may have had, for example, more money in their account than the benefit allows, but for one of the many acceptable reasons. There could be a perfectly good reason. The person may have made a genuine error, and that will be dealt with in a different way, or in some cases there may be evidence of fraud, and that might move into a fraud investigation.
I accept that some noble Lords may not think this proportionate. We believe it is proportionate, with those safeguards wrapped around it, but I want to be clear that we are arguing about the same thing, not about different understandings of what is going on at the time.
Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateBaroness Fox of Buckley
Main Page: Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-affiliated - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Fox of Buckley's debates with the Department for Work and Pensions
(3 days, 5 hours ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, Amendments 61C and 61D in the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, and the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, seek to ensure that liable persons receive clear written communication regarding the outcomes of reviews and that Ministers demonstrate due consideration of wider circumstances when requested. This kind of transparency is crucial in practice, as it helps individuals to understand the basis of decisions affecting their finances and provides reassurance that their personal situations are being taken into account. For many people facing recovery actions, receiving clear, accessible information can make a significant difference in navigating the process and seeking further recourse, if needed.
Amendments 61E and 61F, alongside Amendments 62A and 62C, address important procedural and operational details that could impact on both individuals and employers. For example, limiting the scope of regulations as proposed in Amendment 61E may prevent regulatory overreach, providing clearer boundaries for those affected. Consulting employers on costs regarded as reasonably incurred, as proposed in Amendment 61F, encourages dialogue and can help to avoid disputes over financial responsibilities. Meanwhile, the provisions to restrict the restart of suspended deduction requirements after 24 months, as proposed in Amendment 62B, and to ensure written reasons for revocation of deduction orders, as in Amendment 62C, introduce important safeguards that promote fairness and clarity. In practical terms, these measures help to reduce uncertainty for both liable persons and employers, fostering greater trust and smoother administration. I support these amendments.
My Lords, I wanted to reiterate my particular support of Amendments 62A and 62B, even though they do not go as far as my amendment in relation to suspended orders. The sense of a sword of Damocles hanging over people is something that we could do with getting rid of. That would be an easy thing for the Government to accept without in any way compromising the aims of the Bill.
In relation to the other amendments, which I broadly support, I want to emphasise something that I keep thinking as I read the Bill and sit through Committee. Many aspects of the legislation can create an atmosphere of fear, uncertainty and sometimes even paranoia about what is going on if there is a sense of secrecy. This could be alleviated with the opening up of human communication to explain reasoning. These are difficult situations. We are talking, in some instances, about people who have committed wrongdoing of some sort, but it is important that liable persons have a sense of understanding the process. Very often, the way that the process gets stuck behind closed doors has created all sorts of problems in parallel situations.
I want to emphasise how, if things are left to internal processes, it can reduce them to hollow box-ticking. Civil servants or whoever knowing that they can be answerable will ensure that better work is carried out. It will also help to smooth the way for people to take this Bill seriously and not see it as some grand state surveillance conspiracy. It is important, in order to give credibility to the fraud recovery at the heart of the Bill, that the Government are seen to be as flexible as possible about all parties being held to account for what would otherwise be seen as some quite draconian powers.
My Lords, all these amendments pertain to deduction from earnings orders—or DEOs, as I shall refer to them from here. DEOs are a mechanism by which the PSFA can instruct an employer to make deductions from the liable person’s salary in order to recover the money owed as a result of fraud or error. This power can be exercised only after the amount owed has been agreed by the liable person, a court or tribunal, or if the penalty appeal period has lapsed or an appeal has been finally determined. People can avoid their employers being contacted if they simply engage with us and pay what they owe.
DEOs are an established mechanism used by the courts, the DWP, the Child Maintenance Service and some local authorities. We have sought to emulate best practice and established processes to make it straightforward for the employers that have to implement them. There are safeguards for the liable person, such as a protected earnings amount of 60% and the requirement for deductions to be affordable and fair, as set out in Clause 41.
Before an order is made, the liable person will have the opportunity to make representation on the proposed terms. Amendment 61C would create an obligation for the PSFA to provide the reasoning behind its decision to proceed with a DEO following these representations. Amendment 61D would create a similar obligation for the PSFA to demonstrate that it has taken the liable person’s wider circumstances into account when determining the level of affordable and fair deductions. Both these amendments are duplicative as the PSFA would be doing this anyway, as a matter of good public law. As I outlined previously, guidance will also be published detailing what information will be supplied to the liable person as part of the wider decision-making processes.
Amendment 61E would limit the regulation-making powers in Clause 41(7) to establishing affordability considerations. We have striven to put as much detail into the Bill as possible, but there are elements where it is valuable to have a degree of flexibility so that further conditions or restrictions can be added to the measures to reflect wider societal, economic and technological changes. This amendment would severely limit the Government’s ability to adapt to these changes and impact the efficacy of this recovery method, thus potentially reducing the money lost to fraud that could be recovered in the future.
Amendment 61F would require that the PSFA consults with employers on the level of admin costs that they can charge the liable person for implementing a DEO. There are standard charges of £1 per deduction period allowed by the courts and other organisations that use DEOs. It is not for the PSFA to set up a different regime single-handedly, as it will be following established processes already used across government. If it is felt that changes to this charge should be made, they would need to be done in conjunction with the other bodies.
Amendments 62A and 62B would prevent a suspended DEO from being restarted after 24 months. We discussed the same matter on Monday, in relation to direct deduction orders. I confirm that I am still reflecting on the points raised by the noble Baronesses, Lady Fox and Lady Finn, and the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, which also apply to DEOs, and I am having meetings with officials on them. It is important that the PSFA has discretion in how it can react to individual circumstances counterbalanced against its duty to recover money lost to fraud and error in the most appropriate way. There is a balance to be struck and I shall report back on my reflections in due course.
Finally, Amendment 62C would require that, when the PSFA revokes a DEO, it provides the reasoning to both the liable person and their employer. In practice, this would be shared with the liable person as a matter of good public law to safeguard the public law duty of fairness in decision-making for the individuals subject to the orders. However, there are serious privacy considerations that could be undermined by providing such information to the employer. Upon the establishment of a DEO, the employer is not told anything about the DEO other than what is to be deducted from the liable person’s salary. This is the only information of relevance to the employer. Any other information would be a breach of privacy.
Regarding some of the other points raised, particularly by the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, I think it would be helpful to your Lordships if I assist them with some more information on safeguards. Regarding the safeguards in place for the use of DEOs, including preventing hardship, the Public Sector Fraud Authority has committed to the following safeguards: vulnerability assessments, maximum deduction amounts, opportunities for representation, reviews and appeals, and the ability to notify a change of circumstances. The PSFA will continue to utilise best practice from across government.
On the question of who determines the amount of debt owed, the Public Sector Fraud Authority’s investigation will calculate the debt owed to the Government as a result of fraud or error following an investigation into suspected fraud. The liable person will be notified of the recoverable amount. If they do not agree, a firm and final determination will be sought by a court or tribunal.
The noble Baroness, Lady Finn, asked what is meant by “among other things” in Clause 41. Clause 41(6) gives the Minister powers to
“make further provision about the calculation of amounts to be deducted”
in respect of DEOs. To be clear, to make further provision would not allow the Minister to qualify or change the provision, only to add specific conditions or restrictions that can be taken into account when calculating the amount to be deducted. As given as an example in Clause 41(7), the key consideration will be hardship and defining what constitutes hardship. It is important that the definition of hardship is not fixed, as what constitutes hardship today may look very different in, say, 10 years’ time.
The term “among other things” could also include other items that can be taken into account when calculating DEOs that are not so immediately obvious. For example, the regulations could be used in allowing for a different deduction rate around the Christmas period, when the liable person might have other outgoings that would not be reasonably foreseeable when the order was first given.
I hope that goes some way to assuring noble Lords about our safeguards and that the noble Baroness will feel able to withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, I will be very brief. I have a lot of sympathy with most of the amendments in this group, apart from Amendment 63A, which fills me with dread. Fraud facilitation sounds as though it is a new crime, but I do not think this is the right place to bring it in. I appreciate that it does not necessarily have a criminal penalty, but it is also not entirely clear what it is.
I know that the Opposition have been pushing the problems of “sick influencers” in another Bill—this is a bit of a theme—but I get very nervous about requiring the authorities to trawl through people’s social media accounts yet once more to see what they are saying, then to blame them for things that happen. When I think of examples that I have been shown of “sick influencers”—but there are others—there is a thin line between people who are trying to give hacks to individuals on how to fill in labyrinthine forms and cope with the welfare system and people who show them how to cheat. I therefore urge against this: it is a can of worms, which I would keep well away from.
There is also a danger that you will allow individuals to abdicate responsibility by saying, “I did it only because I was told to by the influencer who I saw on Instagram”. This goes against the spirit of due process and of taking responsibility.
My Lords, Amendment 63A addresses the important issue of those who facilitate fraud by providing information, advice or support. It proposes that such individuals could be subject to penalties. I believe that this measure helps to close potential loopholes and hold accountable not only primary offenders but those who enable wrongdoing. From an individual’s perspective, this could strengthen the integrity of the system and act as a deterrent against abuse.
Amendment 63B seeks to prevent the Minister from unilaterally determining penalties for persons who have not received a payment, which is crucial to protecting individuals from unfair or arbitrary penalties that could cause undue financial or reputational harm.
Amendments 63D and 64A focus on transparency, accountability and procedural fairness—elements that directly affect the experiences of those subject to the Bill. Providing written reasons for decisions following a review, set out in Amendment 63D, would ensure that individuals fully understand the outcomes and the rationale behind them, enabling them to respond appropriately, or seek further recourse if necessary. Amendment 64A would remove the Minister’s sole authority to change the appeals process and would instead require independent review—we have discussed in previous sittings what “review” and “independent” mean—and parliamentary oversight. It would introduce vital protections for individuals and guarantee that any changes to how appeals are handled are thoroughly scrutinised, preserving fairness and maintaining public confidence in the system’s impartiality. On that basis, I support these amendments.
My Lords, I consider these three amendments as probably three of the most important amendments that have been tabled so far. I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, for explaining why so well. They reflect a number of other concerns—it is not as though we have not heard them before—and articulate well the sense of responsibility that we should all have in this Room, as we scrutinise the Bill, in terms of the enormous amount of power that this legislation gives the state. It is why ministerial and parliamentary oversight is important and cannot, in any way, be neglected.
An astounding amount of power has been created in the name of tackling fraud. I sometimes think that it is disproportionate. Regardless, one would be much more reassured if there was at least the knowledge that this was always done by and answerable to Ministers and Parliament. Parliamentary oversight of something as powerful as this is essential and has been reflected in a number of amendments.
I have some other quick points. I thought that the noble Lord, Lord Palmer of Childs Hill, made a compelling argument for the Covid inquiry. It is true that, when I tell people that I am working on a fraud Bill, without exception they say, “The Covid stuff?” I say, “Possibly not; it is not there”. I listened and heard what the noble Lord said about why it is not appropriate, but I wanted to note that.
Of course, it was an extraordinary period for all the reasons that have been explained, but it has become almost impossible since to work out who said and did what to whom. In other words, there is little in the way of tracing accountability and being clear about ministerial sign-off, so I think the transparency register is a brilliant idea. It is clear; if you have these powers, let us see who signed off. No Minister should be frightened of that, because it is important for public accountability and, as has been said, is a way of ensuring that you are not held accountable for things that you did not sign off. It is a much clearer way of understanding it.
I am rather bemused by the final amendment, Amendment 68C. In my background reading, I have read a lot about the crisis in people who are sceptical about the Bill, who are worried that there are no people who are suitably qualified to see its powers through, so the way that this amendment has been posed seems sensible to me.
It is ironic, because there is an argument familiar to those who have been following the schools Bill about whether everybody who stands in front of a group of pupils needs to be qualified or not. “Not always” is my opinion, as somebody who was a teacher for many years. We should not be too rigid, because that is the nature of teaching. I was qualified, but that did not necessarily guarantee that I was a brilliant teacher. I know that qualifications do not necessarily guarantee anything but, in an instance like this, it seems absolutely right that the people entrusted to carry out these powers have the appropriate qualifications for what are complicated, complex financial matters. I therefore support all three amendments, which I think are very important.
My Lords, I am also pleased to express support for Amendments 68A, 68B and 68C, which collectively strengthen ministerial and parliamentary oversight of the powers exercised under the Bill by authorised officers on behalf of members of the Cabinet Office, as other noble Lords have said. Ensuring that robust oversight mechanisms are in place is essential to maintaining public confidence in how these significant powers are deployed. By enhancing scrutiny, these amendments help to guarantee that such powers are used appropriately and proportionately, reducing the risk of misuse or error.
Amendment 68C, which requires investigators to hold professional qualifications comparable to those of officers in the Department for Work and Pensions Fraud Investigation Service is particularly welcome. They need professional qualifications. This commitment to professionalism and expertise safeguards the integrity of investigations and reinforces trust in the system. From our perspective, it is crucial that those entrusted with such important responsibilities are properly trained and qualified, ensuring fairness and consistency in enforcement. Together, these amendments produce a more transparent—we always come back to transparency—accountable and professional framework for combating fraud within public authorities.
Let it see the light and, when it does, there is a way of controlling it. Too often, whoever are in government think they know best and ask, “Why do we have to make ourselves open to scrutiny?” But it is that scrutiny, that existence of light from beyond, that makes the legislation fit for purpose. I support these amendments.
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden, and to speak in favour of Amendments 75A and 79A, to which I have attached my name and which noble Lords will see have rather broad support in political terms—perhaps not the broadest I have ever seen but it is certainly up there. I must also pay tribute to Justice, a cross-party law reform and human rights organisation that is the UK section of the International Commission of Jurists, which has been most determined in ensuring that these issues are raised in this Bill, in this context.
I have already addressed these issues in the Chamber in a number of amendments to the Employment Rights Bill that I tabled and spoke to. I am not going to repeat all that I said there, but I cross-reference those amendments. If noble Lords want to find out more about this issue, there is an excellent book by the researcher Shannon Vallor, The AI Mirror, which is a useful metaphor for understanding the risks whereby we live in a biased society in which those biases risk being reflected back to us and magnified by the use of artificial intelligence and algorithms. That is very much what these two amendments seek to address.
The noble Lord has already given us two international examples of where using AI, algorithms, stereotypes and generalisations in investigations has gone horribly wrong. I have to add a third example, which is the infamous case in Australia of “Robodebt”. That was an automated debt recovery and assessment programme, from the rough equivalent of the DWP, that was exercised in Australia. There was controversy before and through its implementation, and it was an unmitigated disaster. I point the Minister and others to the fact that there was a Royal Commission in Australia which said the programme had been
“a costly failure of public administration in both human and economic terms”.
I note that the House of Representatives in Australia passed a public apology to the huge number of people who were affected.
In a way, I argue that these amendments are a protection for the Government, that this will be written into law: there is a stop that says, “No, we cannot allow things to run out of control in the way we have seen in so many international examples”. I think these are truly important amendments. I hope we might hear positive things from the Minister but, if not, we are going to have to keep pursuing these issues, right across the spectrum. I was very taken: Hansard will not record the tone of voice in which the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, said that the Government wish “to mainline AI”, but it is important to note that a concerning approach is being taken by the Government to the whole issue of artificial so-called intelligence.
My Lords, as part of the unusual alliance, I think that now is a good time to reflect on where we are in the Bill. We are now talking about powers targeted at recipients of universal credit, employment and support allowance, and pension credit. Relevant accounts that can be flagged to the Government include any account
“into which a specified relevant benefit is paid”.
Approximately 9.4 million people are in receipt of a benefit currently specified by the Bill—one in eight people in the UK. This already risks creating a two-tier society in and of itself, in which certain groups are subjected to intrusive financial monitoring by the state while others are not.
I was very pleased to see these two amendments because I worry when I consider that, last year, two-thirds of claims flagged by a DWP algorithm as potentially high-risk were, in fact, legitimate. We are now talking about the use of algorithms in relation to the group of people I talked about, so I am happy to support the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, on Amendments 75A and 79A.
The key thing here is to stress something that has already been discussed at great length throughout our debates on the Bill, which is what we consider “reasonable grounds”. The noble Lord, Lord Vaux, has raised reasonability throughout. Generally, but not consistently, the investigator powers in the Bill are exercisable only when there are reasonable grounds for suspicion that, for example, fraud has been committed. Reasonable grounds are a safeguard to protect individuals from baseless state interference and fishing expeditions. They uphold the rule of law by preventing arbitrary state power but “reasonable” requires clarification once we go into the context of the role of technology, which is at the heart of the Bill; that is one of the reasons why I have put my name to these amendments and will raise other amendments in relation to algorithms later on in Committee.
These amendments are safeguards to ensure accountability; to ensure that we are clear about the basis on which algorithms are used; and to ensure that we do not allow them to become the basis of lazy caricatures and stereotypes. Examples have been given by other speakers on this group, but I anticipate that it is possible that the Government might well cite the Equality Act as a guard against such discrimination. However, it is important to note that, although the Equality Act does lots of very good things, it will not necessarily help us here because not all prejudice is reducible to protected characteristics. In fact, attitudes to people on benefits in general and sections of the white working class do not fit into the Equality Act, so it is important that we do not just rely on another piece of legislation here.
Also, if we are going to say that AI algorithms, into which a potential discriminatory nature can be built—as has already been explained—were to make mistakes and discriminate against any group that is covered by the Equality Act, we would be clogging up the Equality Act with lots of legal challenges based on this Bill. I think that using the “reasonable” test for algorithms and ensuring that there is a commitment to no discrimination on the face of the Bill is a very valuable way of countering that.
My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, said, we are moving towards the DWP elements of the Bill, although I suggest that these particular amendments are more of a hybrid between the Cabinet Office and the DWP. As I think the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, indicated, the DWP elements in scope are universal credit, the ESA and pension credit.
My Lords, I will add that to the list of things to write to noble Lords about, if that is okay.
It is very reassuring, of course, to hear the Minister, absolutely correctly, insist that individual officers will not choose who to discriminate against. When I supported this, I was not thinking that the officers of the state would necessarily be wandering around with their own prejudices and saying, “nick them” or “investigate them”. I would want to imagine that that would not be the case.
What I think we are talking about here—and this is because the use of technology is so profoundly important to what the Government want to do—is the latent biases in the training data. The connections made between data points are notoriously inaccurate and can be arbitrary, so we are seeking some reassurance here, and I will come back on this in another group. In relation to the accuracy and inaccuracy of algorithms, as I said, last year, two-thirds of the claims flagged by the DWP algorithm as high risk were legitimate in the end, so this is not a foolproof method. Consequently, I am not entirely convinced or satisfied that the Minister has quite answered what the concerns were—certainly that I was raising.
I am so sorry to have disappointed the noble Baroness, but I will be writing to all Members to answer the questions I have outlined.
Baroness Fox of Buckley
Main Page: Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-affiliated - Life peer)(5 days, 5 hours ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, in moving Amendment 27, I will speak also to Amendments 29, 62 and 75, which relate to debt recovery and concerns about the proportionality, even constitutionality, of the Bill’s use of direct deduction orders. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Palmer of Childs Hill, for his support in this endeavour.
The purpose of these amendments, and those in the later group starting with Amendment 102, is to transfer the powers of the Minister in Part 1 and of the Secretary of State in Part 2 to make direct deduction orders and deduction from earnings orders to relevant courts, whether the county court in England and Wales or the sheriff court in Scotland.
Before I look at the substance of this issue, I note that Amendment 29 addresses Clause 19(2) and paragraph 3(2) of new Schedule 3ZA, inserted by Schedule 5 to the Bill, whereby the Minister or the Secretary of State are required only to believe that a person holds the bank account in question. Other provisions require such belief to be reasonable, so inserting the word “reasonably” before “believes” would impose a reasonableness test. Not having such a test removes the balance of proper scrutiny and any threshold for a belief. This needs to be addressed to prevent unscrupulous intrusion. Meanwhile, Amendment 62 probes the circumstances in which orders can be restarted where they have been suspended, because I am confused about why that is necessary.
To return to the fundamental principles at stake in Amendments 27 and 75 in particular, and the broad theme, for centuries the rule of law and the separation of powers have ensured that a person is innocent until proven guilty and cannot be punished by political diktat. The Executive cannot arbitrarily take action against a person, even a debtor, in the manner that the Bill gives the relevant Minister. The Bill allows the Minister to order a bank to supply sensitive information for the purposes of debt recovery, without either judicial oversight or individual knowledge.
On our first day in Committee, we heard from the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, the shocking details of how Clause 7 allows relatively junior civil servants in the Cabinet Office to apply for a warrant to enter and search premises and seize anything they have reasonable grounds to believe has been obtained in the commission of fraud. If handing police powers to civil servants was not chilling enough, here are powers that facilitate the state raiding bank accounts.
My Lords, a garnishee order is used to obtain money directly from a third party. That is not the process that we are undertaking; we are regaining money directly from an individual, as opposed to a third party. I am happy to write to the noble Lord with more guidance on that, but that is my understanding.
I move on to Amendment 29, which would necessitate a “reasonable belief”, rather than a “belief”, that a bank account is held by the liable person prior to the PSFA requesting bank statements from the bank to inform decisions on direct deduction orders. In practice, the PSFA will already be operating at this level as it will already, through the course of its fraud investigation, have developed an overview of the liable person’s financial information.
In addition, having thrilled the Committee with my recitations from Managing Public Money last Wednesday, I am excited to be able to quote from another government page turner, The Judge Over Your Shoulder. All “public law powers” must be exercised with
“reasonableness or rationality—following a proper reasoning process and so coming to a reasonable conclusion”.
Making a Minister’s belief a “reasonable” belief therefore has no effect, because they are already subject to it.
In addition, Clause 19 lets the PSFA issue a general information notice to banks, which provides confirmation of the accounts that a liable person holds. The amendment is therefore not adding anything new.
Amendment 62 seeks to remove the ability to restart a deduction from earnings order once it has been suspended. For some context, a deduction from earnings order is a mechanism by which public funds lost to fraud and error can be recovered directly from a liable person who is not in PAYE employment. Having listened to the debate, I have some sympathy with noble Lords; however, it is important that the PSFA remains able to issue, vary, suspend and restart, or revoke a deduction from earnings order, for very human reasons.
We need to be able to suspend and restart a deduction from earnings order due to a temporary change in the liable person’s circumstances; for example, if they were temporarily hospitalised. People’s lives, as we know, can be messy; it is important that we have the flexibility to recognise that. Where it is more appropriate to revoke the order altogether, this is provided for in Clause 47.
The purpose of the amendment therefore overlaps with existing provision which gives the necessary flexibility while maintaining clear communication with both employers and liable persons, maintaining a fair and transparent debt recovery process. If this provision was adopted, an unfortunate consequence would be the end of such flexibility and the reluctance of anyone to suspend payments due to having to restart the process.
I hope that this explanation reassures noble Lords and that the noble Baroness will withdraw Amendment 27.
My Lords, I have a number of points. It was very interesting that the Minister concluded in relation to one of these amendments that “people’s lives can be messy”. It is precisely for that reason that in saying that DDOs will be issued only due to a lack of engagement, without any consideration of why that lack of engagement might happen, it might well be because people’s lives are very messy, to quote the Minister. So I am not convinced by that at all.
To reassure the noble Baroness, efforts to engage with a liable person would not be just a one-off hit. There would be over a dozen attempts, under my understanding of the Act. So it is not just a one-time effort to engage with each liable person. By the time we got to the process of a direct deduction order, there would have been multiple efforts to engage with the liable person.
It is quite feasible that I have missed the multiple efforts in the reading of the Bill. Maybe it is there—it might be another bit that I have missed. But I do not think that is clear, so maybe that could be clarified.
I am sure that this is the intention—the problem is the principle. We were given the explanation that I thought we would be given: we are doing this directly and not going for judicial authorisation because the courts just have too much work on. I always worry about an explanation that says that it will cause too much work for the courts. On this basis, we may as well cut out sending anyone to a court and put them into prison—because that court process is so darned long-winded for everything, is it not? But we do not say that, because the court system sets in place safeguards to ensure that people are not unfairly treated. We do not have a direct situation where a Government of the day simply decide that the courts are dispensable with. That is the principle that I was trying to raise here, so I do not think that is a satisfactory answer.
I was also unconvinced by the argument, which I will go through, that HMRC already has powers to deduct money directly from bank accounts under Schedule 8 to the Finance (No.2) Act 2015. Actually, there are statutory safeguards, including the requirement that HMRC retains £5,000 in the debtor’s accounts, and guidance about who HMRC should deem as at a particular disadvantage. That is not in this Bill. It is part of that Bill, which was cited as a reassurance to me.
The comparison with child maintenance is also a false comparison. Child maintenance is money owed by one parent to ensure provision for their dependant who does not live with them. That differs greatly from an individual claiming money from, for example, the social security system, who potentially has been overpaid—as I keep pointing out, through no fault of their own. I do not think those two things count as equivalences at all.
I was grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, for the amendment on stop-starting DDOs. I have some sympathy with her approach in terms of them being permanently never allowed to start again. My nervousness with it is that it feels so arbitrary. The explanation given was that people have messy lives, which is fine, but I do not want to be in a situation whereby I am nodding through a system that means that people could keep having their direct deduction orders stop and start because of the messiness of government. We are told that it is the messiness of people’s lives, but it is not clear that that would be the only reason why this would occur; it is not in the Bill.
Of course, I shall not press my amendments, but I imagine that I will return with some of them on Report.
My Lords, I have amendments in later groups on the EVM section of the Bill with a similar effect to these, looking at the costs to the banks. This is not just about the impact on the banks, however. As many of us know from the experience of being politically exposed persons, when you put onerous responsibilities and costs on the banks that relate to a particular class of customers, you can create a disincentive for the banks to provide services to them. Most of us have probably had the experience of being PEP-ed, and it is not terribly pleasant. Here, if we are putting a load of costs on the banks that relate to benefit recipients, we make it less likely that those vulnerable people will be able to access banking services. The Government need to think about this quite carefully.
My Lords, I was going to make a very similar point. We have to consider the serious consequences of the Government, in effect, turning banks into de facto government inspectors, as well as the unintended consequences such as those for politically exposed persons. Goodness knows that that has not gone well. It has created all sorts of chaos. I am very anxious about private institutions, in effect, being asked to do the Government’s dirty work in many instances.
I want to query, though, banks being able to charge for the hard work they do via new paragraph 8 in Schedule 5, in which there is a provision for the bank to be able to deduct a fee from the debtor’s account to meet its reasonable costs in complying with the order, which is a ridiculous situation. It amounts to state-backed approval of funds being taken directly from the bank accounts of private customers to deal with administrative retrieval of overpayments. By the way, the maximum amount that banks could charge would be set by the Secretary of State via regulations, which is also not reassuring. Although I do not want the banks to be used, I also do not want them to be able to charge their own clients to do the job that the Government have demanded they do. I feel very queasy about all this.
On the discrimination point, if these measures identify a range of types of bank clients who are causing more trouble than they are worth, the obvious decision will be to debank. It makes perfect sense that they would think, just like every other private sector organisation, “Do I really want people on benefits living in my house?” We have seen this discrimination time and again. There is a serious danger of unintended consequences here that the Government have to take seriously.
My Lords, I did not speak at Second Reading, but the Bill has attracted my interest for the reasons a number of noble Lords have pointed out about procedure and due process. I share the concern about the risk of debanking en masse a group of individuals whom banks will view as not particularly good customers in terms of the money they deposit and as they now come with greater risks. I would also like to know what the Government’s thinking is on that issue.
Looking at this from the point of view of the bank, I am a bit concerned about the relationship between Clause 19(4) and Clause 19(10). Clause 19(4) says:
“The Minister may give an account information notice relating to an account only for the purpose of determining whether to make a direct deduction order in respect of the account”.
If the bank receives such a request for an account information notice, but for some reason considers there may be a different purpose in that request, what is the bank supposed to do? Clause 19(8) says:
“The bank must comply with a notice given under this section”.
However, Clause 19(4) puts a clear limit in terms of the lawfulness of giving an account information notice. Who is to assess whether there is any doubt as to the purpose of that account information notice?
In Clause 19(10), it says:
“Information given to the Minister in response to a notice under this section may be used by the Minister for the purpose of exercising the core functions but not for any other purpose”.
Of course, the core functions are wider than the purpose identified in Clause 19(4), which says that you can give an account information notice only for the purposes of determining whether to make a direct deduction order. But then, in Clause 19(10), that information may be used for wider purposes than enabling the taking of that decision.
That puts the bank in a bit of difficult position. It is told that it must comply with a notice but also that the notice must be only for the purposes of determining whether to make a direct deduction order. If it has any doubt, presumably it owes a duty to its customers and will have to consider how to behave in that situation. Further, it is also told that the information it will be providing may be used for wider purposes than simply the making of a direct deduction order. I would like to hear from the Government how they see the relationship between these various provisions in Clause 19, and where that leaves the bank in that kind of scenario.
My Lords, it would be inappropriate for me to speak on behalf of the banks, and I do not think that noble Lords would want me to do so. But as far as I am aware—having said I will not speak for them, I am now going to—the banks are supportive of the approach we are taking. In terms of fraud, we are working very closely with them. The banks, however, want us to be as similar to HMRC as possible, and we are trying to do that. Given that those are regulations they currently work with in day-in, day-out, that is what we are trying to emulate. I think that is as far as I can go. The noble Viscount should be reassured that we are engaging directly with UK Finance regularly, and he might want to reflect on the evidence that it gave in Committee stage in the other place about how comfortable it was with this section of the Bill.
I think it is fair to say that UK Finance and the banks, in terms of all the evidence that I have read, are obviously happy to sit down with Ministers to try and negotiate their way through this Bill. I do not think that is entirely fairly or accurately described as them being happy with this. They are being asked to do things by coercion in this Bill. I am not saying that word to be offensive. I mean they have not chosen to do it—the Government have told them they have to do it. In many instances, banks are required to do what the Government tell them in relation to their own customers or face penalties if they do not. Consequently, they are trying to negotiate the best of a bad deal. That is not quite the same as an enthusiasm for the Bill. I think that is worth noting, as we would not want to mislead.
I remind the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, that what I actually said was that I did not want to speak on behalf of the banks. However, I find the word “coercion” a complete exaggeration and unnecessary. Just to clarify as well, the banks will not face penalties at any point in the Bill, unless I am to be corrected—and if I am wrong, I will correct the record. This is a process of trying to recoup government funds—taxpayers’ funds—to make sure that we get the money back. That is what we are trying to do and that is why this legislation is in place. We are working with the sector to make sure we can get our money back.
My Lords, I welcome the spirit of this group of amendments. I am not clear that I understand entirely how the independent review process might work, but I do understand the importance of having an independent review process; the case for this was made convincingly by the noble Baroness, Lady Finn.
Despite the fact that we are whizzing through these amendments at great speed, I do not think that it would be right to underestimate the huge amount of power that this Bill gives the Cabinet Office. There appears to be an atmosphere of consensual camaraderie, which it is pleasant to be involved in—it may be an atmosphere I am less used to—but I emphasise the amount of concern outside this Committee about the implications of this Bill. The people who are concerned are not all hucksters or fraudsters: they are ordinary people who have genuine fears around the possibilities of the absolutely unintended consequences of the Bill if we do not have adequate safeguards. So I am keen on anything that strengthens safeguards.
I hope, therefore, that the Government will consider these amendments seriously. I think that they are very helpful. I am particularly keen, of course, on the idea that liable persons, as they are described, deserve to have somewhere they can go to make an appeal. They deserve to know, as was suggested, that, if they have legitimate concerns, they will be heard. So much of what appears to be in this Bill happens behind the backs of liable persons, which creates an atmosphere of fear, suspicion and nervousness.
I do not think that people are just being paranoid here. Consider—this has been mentioned before and will no doubt come up again—the Horizon scandal. There is nothing more frustrating than feeling as though you have been treated badly somehow but you do not know where to go. You have nowhere to appeal to. It may be that you have a perfectly legitimate explanation for something. What we saw in Horizon was “computer says no”. What we could have here is the Cabinet Office, which has just imposed something on you, not taking any notice if you should go and complain. That is a very important part of this: people deserve to know that their concerns can be heard, and so on.
There is a danger in this discussion sometimes. I fear that, if one raises concerns about this Bill, there will be an inference that one is not taking fraud seriously. That is absolutely not the case. I have constantly made the point, for example, that I worry about the conflation of error and fraud. This does not mean to say, though, that, where there is genuine fraud, we should not want to clamp down on it as hard as we can.
But it is also fair enough that we need to have a system in which there is public confidence. To clamp down on fraudulent activity, we need a watertight, safeguarded Bill that targets fraud and does not pick up any number of non-fraudulent issues, which will undermine public confidence. The intention of these amendments is to help enhance public confidence that there is a mechanism through which an independent body can review a process that could be corrupted inadvertently by a department having the capacity to mark its own homework, and, in that instance, not always see the wood for the trees when people raise concerns.
My Lords, I, too, have a few comments to make on these amendments. I very much support the intention behind them. I would like to understand a bit more about Clause 34 and how it will operate. Paragraph 219 of the Explanatory Notes says:
“This clause introduces a process for review of deduction orders by an authorised officer of a higher grade than the original decision maker upon application by relevant parties”.
As far as I can see, there is no mention in the legislative text of the authorised officer who conducts the review being of a higher grade. Perhaps I have missed it, and it is somewhere else; if so, I would be grateful to know where. If it is not somewhere else, it may be that the Explanatory Notes made that point on the basis of general principles of administrative law. Either way, it would be useful to know where that comes from.
My second point concerns the grounds for review, which are very narrow. Clause 34(4) says:
“An application for a review under this section may not be made on, or include, any ground relating to the existence or amount of a payable amount (unless the amount is said to be incorrectly stated in the order)”.
The grounds for appeal in the following clause are equally narrow. Is my understanding correct that the reason these grounds are so narrowly drawn is that there has already been a final determination of the payable amount by a court or tribunal—which was the reference to Clause 12 that we were given earlier on? Can the Minister give us some examples of grounds for review, given how narrowly drawn that provision is in Clause 34(4)?
Finally, I note that there is no time limit imposed on the Minister for carrying out the review. The applicant would have to put in an application within 28 days, but they might just sit and wait for the outcome of that review for an indefinite period. Would it not be a good idea to include a clear time limit on the reviewer—ideally the independent reviewer—or the authorised officer for that review to be concluded?
Maybe I should just clarify. I am not suggesting that the Cabinet Office is full of malign people out to behave badly, and I was not suggesting that they all need to be punished. I was more suggesting that the reason why it would be useful to have an independent review body was for exactly the reasons that fellow noble Lords have pointed out—that if people wish to challenge decisions that are made, it is very important they feel they can go to a body where they will not necessarily be working directly with the people who made the original decision, as has been described. No one is suggesting that there is an evil, scheming group there.
The comparison with the Horizon scandal that I was trying to make was about the sense of intimidation and fear when someone feels that they have been wrongly treated, then when they appeal or try and go to a body to sort it out and it ends up being the same people who punished them in the first place. Maybe I misspoke before, but it is this that I am concerned about—so I would like this independent review body to exist so that those who are liable have somewhere independent to appeal to, straightforwardly.
My Lords, in response to the noble Baroness, I state that there is the First-tier Tribunal opportunity, in terms of there being an independent process to go to. That is why we have put in place the additional safeguards with regard to the independent person who will be appointed to review all cases at their discretion, not at that of the Cabinet Office, as well as HMICFRS—so there is someone who has oversight. That is also why we are making ourselves subject to the IOPC for matters of complaints, as outlined in the Bill.
The noble Baroness raises a very important point about Horizon. I assure noble Lords that the Horizon scandal and how we ensure that it is not repeated has been central to this Government’s thinking on safeguarding. In light of the seriousness of events, the Government wish to proactively ensure the highest levels of oversight in new legislation, and that is why they exist in this Bill.
With regard to one of the points raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, on the appointment of the independent person subject to a parliamentary pre-appointment hearing, the Government cannot commit to this at this stage. Cabinet Office guidance states that it should be discussed between the relevant Secretary of State and the chair of the relevant Select Committee. The Government want to make sure that the independent person is demonstrably independent and are exploring all available routes to achieve that. I hope that we will be able to discuss that further in due course, but with these explanations I hope that I have reassured noble Lords and that therefore they will not press their amendments.