Railways Bill

Baggy Shanker Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 9th December 2025 Commons Chamber

[Baggy Shanker (Derby South) (Lab/Co-op)]

I refer the House to my interest as vice-chair of the all-party parliamentary group on rail.

Rail is in Derby’s DNA. For decades, it has powered our community, moulded our economy and inspired generations of engineers and designers. I see the proof of that week in, week out, whether when meeting fantastic apprentices at Alstom, celebrating Railway 200 by bringing an incredible 40,000 people together in Derby for The Greatest Gathering or hearing how organisations such as Angel Trains, Loram, Porterbrook and many more drive forward innovation right across the sector from Derby.

As a proud Derby MP, I welcome the Bill. At its heart, it stands up Great British Rail and at the heart of Great British Rail is Derby. I was proud to campaign alongside so many others in our city who made the case for Derby to become GBR’s home. I am proud now to work alongside a Government that are committed to delivering GBR in Derby.

Despite our city’s proud rail heritage, manufacturing credentials and exciting future at the heart of UK rail, people travelling by train in Derby face the same challenges as any other commuters up and down the country. They know the frustration of paying through the nose for a train ticket only to find out that their train has been delayed or, even worse, cancelled. They navigate through confusing, fragmented ticketing systems, trying to work out if splitting a ticket will save them extra money or just end up causing havoc. I am pleased that through the Bill, our Labour Government are clearly saying that that is simply not good enough. GBR will put passengers first, whether that is through a new robust passenger watchdog with real standards and teeth or through simplifying and modernising fares with a common-sense, consistent approach.

I also strongly welcome the Bill’s requirement for the Transport Secretary to publish a long-term rail strategy. This will be good for the sector and especially good for Derby because, for far too long, rail has been in a feast and famine cycle, with boom and bust orders, factories standing idle and workers and their families left in limbo. Derby knows this story all too well, unfortunately. In recent years, we have had to fight for the future of Alstom, pulling together across our city and standing shoulder to shoulder with our fantastic trade unions to protect skilled jobs, but this uncertainty is no way to run an industry that thousands of jobs depend upon. We need stability, we need certainty and we need a long-term plan, and that is exactly what this strategy will provide, supporting our rail supply chain, protecting the thousands of jobs that depend on it and giving businesses the confidence to invest in the future. When Britain backs rail, Britain backs Derby and Derby delivers for Britain.

Railways Bill (First sitting)

Baggy Shanker Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 20th January 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Andrew Ranger (Wrexham) (Lab)]

As per my entry in the register of interests, I am a member of Unite the union.

[Baggy Shanker (Derby South) (Lab/Co-op)]

As per the register of interests, I am a member of Unite the union and vice-chair of the APPG on rail.

[Laurence Turner (Birmingham Northfield) (Lab)]

I am also a member of Unite the union.

Examination of Witnesses

Jeremy Westlake, John Larkinson and Alex Hynes gave evidence.

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[Keir Mather]

Q Thank you. My final question relates to accountability. There is a suite of measures within the Bill to ensure that GBR is compliant with its duties and the provisions of its licence as enforced by the ORR, but I understand that some people have concerns about the balance of accountability powers sitting between the passenger watchdog, the ORR and the Secretary of State—that they are either too diffuse or too concentrated in certain places—and that we could end up in a situation where the Secretary of State might want to take more control over management of the railway within the Department. From my perspective, this Bill offers safeguards against doing that, and its overriding intent is to ensure that the railway is, in a sense, run by GBR, in a way that is decentralised and taken away from Whitehall, in a system that is very different from what we have today. Do you agree with the assessment that the accountability powers within the legislation are sufficiently broad to allow GBR to be held to account, and for no one stakeholder within that mix of accountability to be able to claw back too much control for themselves?

Jeremy Westlake: First of all, I think it is well set out. When you look at how GBR will fulfil its functions, it will do that with regard to long-term strategies for rail, and I think those will set out various roles as well. Personally, I think the balance is about right; you actually want to have multiple consultations and checks and balances in the system, so I think it works.

[Baggy Shanker]

Q My first question is, do you think that the functions and duties of Great British Railways, as set out in the Bill, enable it to be an effective system operator? Also, do you think that this will result in rail travel being more affordable for passengers?

Jeremy Westlake: On the first one, about being an effective system operator, in principle, yes. What the Bill intends GBR to have to do will also require it to grow its capabilities in these areas, particularly in how it does capacity allocation. So the Bill has the intent, but GBR will need to develop key capabilities to fulfil it.

Alex Hynes: It is probably worth saying that one of the benefits of the system envisaged by the Bill is that Great British Railways, the ORR and Ministers will work to a set of aligned duties. The creation of alignment across all industry parties is an important part of the Bill, and those duties are essentially the criteria that we will use to make decisions in the future. One of those key duties is to promote the interests of passengers, including disabled passengers, and of course the interests of passengers include affordability—the price paid by passengers. I therefore think that we will see a more coherent decision-making process for the railway. The key policy intent here is the creation of a directing mind—under public ownership—for the railway, and the Bill sets out how we will do that.

[Baggy Shanker]

Q In your view, is anything missing from the Bill that you would have liked to have seen in it to enable that to happen?

Alex Hynes: Not from my perspective. Obviously, the sooner it gets Royal Assent, the sooner we can start creating Great British Railways and delivering the benefits of having a directing mind for the railway.

[Baggy Shanker]

Q I have to ask this question. Several years ago, the decision was made to create GBR and have it headquartered in the brilliant city of Derby, and successive Governments, Secretaries of State and rail Ministers have backed that decision. Recently, Mr Westlake, when I asked about the size and shape of the headquarters on the Transport Committee, you said that we are six to nine months away from getting to that point. Given that we are about to begin line-by-line scrutiny of the Bill, can anything be done to ensure that we hold to that six-to-nine-month milestone, or improve it?

Jeremy Westlake: First of all, we are very much looking forward to being headquartered in Derby. I have lived in Derby for 17 years and I think it is a wonderful place to have a centre for the rail industry; let me start with that. The work we are doing now is to define the internal organisation structure for Great British Railways, including its operating structures, divisions, integrated business units and network functions. That work needs to conclude before we can come back to you more clearly on the size of the HQ in Derby.

[Rebecca Smith (South West Devon) (Con)]

Q I want to go back to the accountability piece. You said to the Minister that there are adequate checks and balances in the system. I have spent quite a lot of time looking at this on the Transport Committee, and the closest thing I can relate GBR to is the NHS. It is not necessarily run by the Department of Health and Social Care; it is a separate organisation, and then it is devolved into local regions through integrated care boards and things. My experience is that it is incredibly difficult to hold it to account because you do not have direct access to the Secretary of State.

I am interested in your views on how we, as parliamentarians, will hold Great British Railways to account, not only as constituency MPs when the services do not necessarily deliver your aims, but in our scrutiny function as Select Committees. What should we focus on with GBR? How you have described it sounds as complicated as the NHS, and for 20 years I have struggled to figure out how we actually hold that to account. Ultimately, if we are creating a new organisation that has a public benefit, how will politicians hold it to account if the public cannot trust us to be able do that? In the Transport Committee evidence, the implication was that it will be done through the Secretary of State, but if I were the Secretary of State, I would not necessarily want to take responsibility for anything that is not going right with GBR. I am interested in your comments on how we as MPs can hold GBR to account once it has been established.

John Larkinson: I could say something about the role of the ORR in holding it to account. There is a distinction between the role of the Secretary of State and our role. Ultimate accountability is with the Secretary of State. For example, it is the Secretary of State who signs off the GBR business plan, which is a fundamental component of the new system, in my mind. If there were a very strategic problem at Great British Railways—if it were not following its duties or if it were breaking the law—ultimate accountability would be with the Secretary of State.

Within that, some of the accountability comes through us. We have the role of enforcing the GBR licence. In terms of the provision of information coming out of the system, one of our big roles is monitoring everything that GBR does and all its functions. That will be done largely through the monitoring of the business plan. From my perspective, it is crucial that we have the ability to do that as we see fit and to publish information. A crucial role for the regulator is providing that information base and analysis to allow Parliament to scrutinise what GBR is doing more effectively.

Alex Hynes: It is probably worth saying that there are three key mechanisms by which GBR will be held to account. First, it will have to balance its duties in law. Secondly, the business plan will need to be signed off by the Secretary of State and its delivery will be monitored by the ORR. Thirdly, there is the licence.

One thing I would say is that the railways are slightly different from the national health service in so far as we have a revenue line of more than £10 billion per annum. We want Great British Railways to be a commercial organisation that can respond to the market with operational independence at arm’s length from Ministers. However, it is the duties, the business plan and the licence by which GBR will be held to account.

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[The Chair]

With 60 seconds for question and answer, I call Baggy Shanker.

[Baggy Shanker]

Q Mr Williams, how does the Bill reflect the vision of your review that we have a more integrated and passenger-focused railway?

Keith Williams: I think it absolutely does. That was at the heart of the review. Customers’ main complaints were about punctuality and cancellation. Bringing track and train together ought to solve that issue.

[Baggy Shanker]

Q Mr Brown, how does the Bill reflect the failings that you highlighted in your review about a broken franchising system?

Richard Brown: I did not actually say that franchising was broken; I said that it needed to be substantially improved. Frankly, having reread my review before this session, I think the complexity of the review proved too difficult for the Department to manage effectively, and I think it is past its time, so I do not think it is not relevant to the current discussion.

[The Chair]

Order. We have reached the end of our allocated time. I thank the witnesses for their time today.

Examination of Witnesses

Alex Robertson, Emma Vogelmann, Ben Plowden and Michael Roberts gave evidence.

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[Rebecca Smith]

Q As I understand it, one of the ways that a lot of it will be delivered—the detail of what GBR has to provide—is through the licence. Do you think it is a problem that the Committee has not had sight of the draft GBR licence yet, setting out what we expect accessibility to look like in the Bill versus the reality of what it will look like?

Ben Plowden: I would make a slightly broader point, which is the number of other documents and processes that will need to be in place either in parallel with the Bill or subsequent to it being passed—I stopped counting at 19. There is a long-term rail strategy, the GBR business plan, the licence that you have just mentioned, the statement of funds available, and the list goes on.

One of the questions for the Committee is whether it sees some of those documents as part of its scrutiny, and understanding how all the different components of the system that GBR will operate within are going to work, when they are going to materialise and how they will interact with each other. Even though the Government’s intention is to simplify the system, it will still be quite a complex system of delivery, regulation, oversight, investment and so on. A broader understanding of the entire system that the GBR Bill will create is important. Not having had sight of some of those critical documents is part of that uncertainty.

[Baggy Shanker]

Q Do you agree that the accessibility duty, if combined with detailed targets in the business plan, will improve the whole system for disabled passengers?

Emma Vogelmann: From our perspective, having accessibility targets and so on that are not built into statutory instruments is not a guarantee of change in accessibility. We have seen accessibility requirements or targets being spread across all transport sectors, and particularly in rail, but the amount of change and enforceability is very low. As much as possible needs to sit in the primary legislation.

Alex Robertson: It is a difficult balancing act as to how much you put in legislation and how much comes later. It is absolutely critical that the GBR business plan properly sets targets for accessibility. One of the things that we touched on earlier is that the licence will give us the power to set the standards in relation to accessibility. We will do that in the way that I talked about, by co-creating them with disabled passengers. We will do it in a way that makes sure they are right.

There is a whole series of things that will need to happen. Ultimately, it is for you all to decide the extent to which you need to see that up front, as opposed to recognising that the direction, intent and duties are clear in legislation, and that the organisations that will be responsible for delivering it are in a position to do that.

[Baggy Shanker]

Q If those targets are in the business plan, they cannot just be ignored, can they?

Alex Robertson: Absolutely not. The ORR will have a role to play in highlighting progress against that. We would have a role in being consulted—we have to be consulted in the development of the business plan—and our duty to reflect the interests of disabled passengers would be at the forefront of our mind as that happens. Obviously, GBR will be accountable to the Secretary of State for how well that plan is delivered in practice. I have said before that a very important change that we will need to see through the creation of GBR is how GBR is held to account in public. Those targets will be public, and it will have to account for how well it is delivering against them.

Michael Roberts: I have a lot of sympathy with where Emma is coming from. When one thinks about the experiences of disabled travellers, which are regularly reported in the media, you can understand why there is a wish to have as much certainty and traction over whatever commitments are made. Having said that, I think that the arrangement that you have indicated could be made to work. I am mindful that in London, the mayor has a transport strategy. In that, he has set out targets that TfL are delivering against for improvements to the number of step-free tube stations. For example, the strategy includes a target to reduce the difference between the time a journey takes for somebody with reduced mobility and the time it takes for somebody who does not have those impairments.

It comes down to making sure that there are the resources to back up the targetry in the plans, that there is an energetic passenger watchdog ensuring that GBR and the industry more generally are doing what they are expected to under the plans, and that the ORR is ready to enforce if and when necessary.

[Edward Argar]

Q I want to pick a little further at the accessibility point, particularly on step-free access. By way of example, last week I got a letter from the Minister—neither of the two excellent Ministers in the Committee—saying that Sileby station in my constituency, which can be reached only by very steep steps, along with 40% of other stations in the current programme, was being cut from works to improve accessibility on the grounds of funding pressures.

The reality is that there will always be tensions between what is desired and what is affordable—that is in the nature of government. Building on what you have already said, how can those tensions be resolved to meet the duties envisaged in the Bill and the aspirations that all parties in this place have for improved accessibility, while recognising that there will always be a funding tension in anything the Government do?

I was a Health Minister and wrestled with such issues when deciding what to put in primary legislation, in secondary legislation and in statutory guidance. I would argue they have greater weight than, for example, a business plan, which is vaguer, less enforceable and less tangible than each of those other layers. You have to strike a balance of proportionality. Where do you think the specific obligations on accessibility would best sit in that hierarchy, from primary legislation in the Bill, which is right up at the top and cast in stone, to a business plan, which is much less enforceable, vaguer and can be changed?

Alex Robertson: That is a good question. You have set out the challenge and the dilemma that is true for this aspect of public services, as it is for many others. I will try to answer it in this way: wherever you put it, it must allow for the consideration of the ambition to significantly—it must be significantly—improve the service that disabled passengers receive, with decisions about funding. If you separate those two, you will get into a position where you have set a target, but it is not realistic and has no plan behind it.

You have to do that and, as I have said before, do it in a way that involves disabled passengers in the decision making. Whatever the scale of the ambition, it is perfectly possible to spend good public money inefficiently and ineffectively, and not on doing what is in the best interests of disabled passengers. It is about doing it right, as well as the amount you do.

Emma Vogelmann: From Transport for All’s perspective, as has been picked up by many others, unless accessibility is enforceable, it is treated as an optional and a nice to have: “We will get to it when we get to it, or when there is a surplus of money,” which of course there rarely is.

We have seen initiatives to make changes in the name of affordability; I am thinking particularly about the proposals to close ticket offices at stations in England a couple of years ago. That was very much an economic argument about staff not being confined to the ticket office, but in practice, for disabled people that meant that the network would become increasingly unusable and a completely unviable mode of transport for some.

I agree with what was said about needing a balance between ambition and the reality of how far those ambitions can go, but we need to be ambitious. We need to make sure that we are not accepting a slower rate of change because it is more economically secure.

Ben Plowden: Going back to a point I made before, I think the Bill should set the strategic intent that accessibility should increase over time, not just that it should be taken into consideration by GBR and the Secretary of State. The Bill should also set out how that increase is delivered. To Alex’s point, that could be done in a number of different ways, such as through service provision, infrastructure investment and so on, that would then be set out in the subordinate documents such as guidance, the licence and the business plan. The intent in the Bill would clearly be that, over time—in a way and at a rate to be determined by those other processes—accessibility would increase, not just be taken into consideration,

Michael Roberts: You have exposed exactly the difficulties in trying to navigate through all these challenges and priorities. At the risk of motherhood and apple pie, I think co-creation with the disabled community is extremely important in trying to find a way of managing these different priorities that carries the confidence that that is being done with the full consideration of the needs of the disabled travelling public.

I also think legislators ought to think, “What are the mistakes that we want to try to avoid next time around?” and then think about what levers can address those mistakes. It is extraordinary that the industry is spending over £1.5 billion building a new station at Old Oak Common, and there is no level boarding for the Elizabeth line, which is the busiest railway in the UK. I am not sure that legislation is going to fix that—that is as much about the quality of decision making within the industry—but thinking about what good looks like and then working back and thinking, “Right. What are the ways in which we can best promote that?” seems like a good way of trying to think around the problem.

Railways Bill (Second sitting)

Baggy Shanker Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 20th January 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Keir Mather]

We can set that out a little later, probably in the evidence that I give, but thank you all very much. I will let other Members ask questions.

[Baggy Shanker (Derby South) (Lab/Co-op)]

Q In the existing framework, open access applications are routinely refused due to lack of capacity, or perceived lack of capacity. That pitches passengers against freight all the time. What is good about that system that you would want to keep? What would you like to see change?

Steve Montgomery: The system at the moment is independent. The regulator evaluates, takes all the different evidence from the applicant and from Network Rail on how much capacity is there. It takes all that evidence and does an abstraction test to make sure that an open access application is not abstracting revenue from the existing operators. That independence is there, and it allows the regulator to evaluate that and make its decision. In the last year, it has granted some applications and refused others.

The system works—maybe not to everyone’s satisfaction, but it does work and it is independent. Under GBR, it will be a huge public sector body with no real regulation. Looking at it at the moment, it is difficult to see where that independent regulation is, looking at the industry and holding GBR to account. Capacity is one of the areas we need to look at, and likewise access charges, where that comes into play.

[Baggy Shanker]

Q Are you saying that we do not need any changes in this area?

Steve Montgomery: We can modify it, but we need that comfort that it will be evaluated fairly and not have the constraints of GBR putting everything in front of it, saying, “We might use those paths in the future again”. We cannot have that; we need certainty. As I said earlier, we need the opportunity to allow investment in the railway. If private sector investment is coming in while there are paths sitting there not being used, that means that we are not funding the industry up to the capacity that it may have.

John Thomas: There are no protections in the Bill for open access operators. As Keir said, freight is mentioned at least 100 times and there is a freight growth target that GBR must have regard to, but there is nothing on open access. There is an inherent conflict when you have a body that will be granting access to its competitors. We would rather see the Office of Rail and Road still making those decisions. We accept that that is unlikely, because that is not the direction of travel from the Government, so as a minimum we think that a fair and non-discriminatory provision in relation to GBR decisions will help.

We think, as I said earlier, that the provision for ORR to have regard to the benefits of competition in hearing appeals will help. It will not be as sufficient as today. This is not part of the Bill, but we think that the access and use policy ought to carry on with the not primarily abstractive tests. It is not just because of lack of capacity that decisions have been rejected in the past; as Steve said, it is the revenue abstraction test as well. There is nothing to stop GBR increasing test in terms of the level of abstraction that is allowed before not granting access to open access operators. There is a lot to be worked through in the access and use policy to protect open access operators but, as I say, there is nothing whatsoever in the Bill to protect them at the moment.

Maggie Simpson: We recognise that the current system is not perfect, but my members want to understand two things: first, if they are running a train today that their supply chain relies on, that they can reasonably expect to be running that train in the future. Today, the ORR would have a presumption of continuity—forgive me, this is not in the Bill—so if we came to the end of an access contract they would let the trains go into the next one. The infrastructure capacity plan process is different: it throws everything up in the air. People are really worried that they will commit and invest against a service that their supply chain relies on, and then in future something else will be judged to be better value and they will be taken off the network.

Secondly, when people are looking at investments, whether that is a new port or a new terminal—a new interchange might be a £1 billion investment—they need to have a sense that the capacity for the trains coming out of that interchange will be there when they need to use it. The current system has more capacity for that. That is why clause 63 worries people, because they think that that capacity could be taken away from those trains.

John Thomas: Clause 71 is also a real concern for us, because it allows the Secretary of State to establish regulations to amend or even abolish access rights or access contracts. That seems quite a draconian power to us. We have been assured that that is not the intention, and that the intention is to use that power to amend contracts so that they are operable in the new structure. Our view is that the clause should be limited to enable contracts to be operable in the new structure, and not to give the Secretary of State unilateral powers to amend or abolish access contracts or access rights. Again, that will make private sector operators really nervous about future investment. I agree with Maggie: I get no impression that the current Administration would ever use that clause—but, if you are never going to use it, why have it in there?

[Edward Argar (Melton and Syston) (Con)]

Q A brief question from me: in this morning’s session my colleague Ms Smith highlighted 19—and counting—different documents, plans and strategies that are referred to here. This Committee has not had any sight of drafts of them yet and I am conscious that nor will you, but they will be fundamental to how this works or does not work in practice. Recognising that you have not seen the documents, what assessment would you make of the Bill’s provisions on how, for example, the access and use and the infrastructure capacity policies will be produced? How should they be produced to properly reflect both the needs of an effective railway and the multiple groups with a stake in this? How can they be framed to ensure that GBR, which will essentially be a monopoly provider with a weakened regulator, is meaningfully held to account for what it puts in those policies?

Maggie Simpson: My members and I are working collaboratively with Network Rail colleagues and DFT colleagues to try to ensure that those policies and plans are going to be written in the right way. It is fair to say there is a lot of work still to be done, particularly on capacity allocation. On track access charges we feel a little more comfortable with the Bill provisions and that we will get there, but on capacity allocation there is a huge amount of work yet to be done.

Some of that work is practical stuff around the interplay between capacity plans on different routes, regions and sections of network, which could be quite big or quite small, and how we wind a freight train through what could be 10 or 20 different infrastructure capacity plans. There is a lot of work to do. There are great people working on this, so let us hope that they get there.

In terms of how GBR is held to account, that is a macro question for this Committee across a lot of different aspects. There are lots of powers in the Bill that you will have seen going in both directions between GBR, the Secretary of State, the regulator and so on. Our focus is on that appeals function, which I have already spoken about.

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[Olly Glover]

Q You have made some really good points about the complexity of rail and the criticality of the relationship between renewals, electrification, signalling and rolling stock, and all the interfaces and dependencies between them. At risk of putting words in your mouth—hopefully I am reflecting back what you said—would you agree that some of those interfaces and the decisions around them have been, historically, a bit suboptimal? In that context, do you think there is enough in the Bill that recognises that and gets us to a better future? In particular, should the Bill explicitly state that there is a need for a rolling stock strategy? I know the Department for Transport says that it is making one, but it is not specifically in there. Do you have any thoughts about how the Bill deals with all those issues?

Darren Caplan: I think the question was about whether it is suboptimal at the moment. Yes, it is. We have a control period that lasts for five years and looks at operations, maintenance and renewal. That does not include enhancements. That was taken out in 2018, 2019, so enhancements have been reduced. It did not include major projects; we are very supportive of the announcements on East West Rail and Northern Powerhouse Rail, but that is not part of the overall plan. There is no rolling stock pipeline or strategy—we have called for that, but we are still waiting to hear back. There is nothing about decarbonising the network, or having an electrified network—when you have that, it is stop-start and boom-or-bust.

This is an opportunity to get it together. Back in 2024, we called for a long-term strategy for rail, and we are positive that it is in the GBR plans, so we support the long-term strategy and reviews. I totally agree with these guys that we need to bring more than just ORR work into that pipeline and have a 30-year purview. However, there is quite a lot of work to do on it, and the Bill does not quite capture that yet, but it is a start.

Rob Morris: From my perspective, I totally agree that it is currently sub-optimal. Decisions have been made in the past where things have been switched on and then switched off—electrification is a good example. With GBR, we now have a great opportunity to look at the whole system as a fully integrated system, so that we can manage the risks and the performance all together. That suggests that there will now be an opportunity for greater clarity of thinking, reduction in costs and much more efficient execution of the whole system.

The important thing is that we have a review of the long-term strategy in regular periods to make it transparent—perhaps every five years, so that the supply chain can set itself up for the next five years. What has happened in the past is that, when there has been a change of approach, it has not been communicated and it has created a vacuum. When there is a vacuum, there is uncertainty and we will not invest in those sorts of things. Then, when we restart things such as an electrification programme, it costs significantly more than if you had a steady-state approach to it.

Malcolm Brown: I agree that it has been sub-optimal. I think the clue is in the title; it is a rail system, and therefore a system has a number of components that we require to work as one. For example, I will invest £1 billion in new trains that we have made in Derby, and then those trains are getting maintained. These are state-of-the-art trains—they are absolutely brand new—but they are being maintained in sheds that were built in the Victorian era. That is not how I would like to look after my assets. I would like a holistic, full-system approach that takes these things into account. It cannot be perfect, but there is a lot more that we can do. The one word of caution I would give is this: be careful we don’t try to boil the ocean. We cannot have answers to everything, and nor should we expect the long-term rail strategy to have them.

Lastly, it is a long-term rolling stock and infrastructure strategy, and if it comes through, that is a major step forward. There is no point in devising electric trains with pantographs and batteries if we do not have the infrastructure to support that, either in maintenance or passenger service. Those two combined are utterly critical, and it is certainly in the title.

Rob Morris: May I add one comment to what Malcolm said? That old-system thinking with GBR opens up opportunities for the supply chain—ROSCOs and OEMs like ourselves. We can provide the optimum infrastructural rolling stock solution that also does the best in net zero outcomes for carbon, such as the battery bi-mode trains and discontinuous electrification of new technology that manufacturers like ourselves provide.

[Baggy Shanker]

Q I suppose the crux of this is: do you guys, with your organisations and trade bodies, believe that the creation of GBR will make things better going forward? I am thinking of things like giving stability to what UK rail looks like; being able to invest in infrastructure and rolling stock; collaboration between industry and organisations such as GBRX for innovation and bringing in best practice; and having an investment pipeline to give certainty to what you guys are trying to do to drive your businesses forward—all while making sure UK Rail plc, call it what you like, is in a better position than it is now.

Malcolm Brown: To cut to the chase, yes. Our hope has to be that with GBR—we have talked in this room about the missing building blocks, but our hope is that they all align—we will end up in a better place than we have been, certainly for the past six or seven years.

You referenced GBRX. It is a limb of GBR that does all the very high-tech and signalling aspects. That seems to be working very well. We work closely with it, and we are investing in new technology—for example, on the east coast main line. We have been installing that on trains. It is very much future forward—we are looking into the future. We know that that will not be an immediate change, but we can see in the future that this is—to go back to this point—the direction of travel. It is not a no-regrets bid, but it is something that we have a degree of confidence in.

Rob Morris: To add to that, yes, again the funding ambition and the need that it generates is the fuel for innovation. The one thing I would say, though, is that I am a little concerned about the Bill’s requirement for GBR to do R&D. R&D is a good thing, and we would expect it, but the thing that GBR should not do, perhaps, is to crowd out the R&D that suppliers like ourselves and many others do, both locally here in the UK and globally, because we will potentially end up reinventing the wheel. While we as global suppliers, and our competitors, have wheels to put out all around the world—the wheels are an analogy, of course—they all have functional spokes, and what we do not want to do is to reinvent the shape of that wheel for the UK. That would be abortive, it would cost, it would take time and it would be the taxpayer who pays for it. The provision in the Bill should be about harmonising with the supply chain on what is done within R&D for the benefit of the passenger, the taxpayer and the freight user.

Darren Caplan: We are very concerned. We think that GBR is heading in the right direction, but Members might not be aware of how difficult it is in the supply chain supply sector at the moment. Through Savanta, we conducted a poll at the end of last year, between October and December, of rail business leaders: 64% of them said that the market is going to contract this year, which is up from 48% last year, and last year had been our record low; 62% are freezing or reducing headcount at the moment, with 34% actively laying off staff; and 85% expect a hiatus this year, which is partly because of the time it has taken for GBR to be set up, which is often cited as a reason why there is lack of confidence in the market at the moment. That is in contrast to the international situation: UNIFE, the European trade association, does a global market study, which shows that around the world, rail has grown between 3% and 6% every year.

I know lots of products are out there and things feel positive, but actually our members in the supply sector are feeling that they are in a very difficult place at the moment. We need certainty, and any measures that can help with that. We have already mentioned schedule 2, which does not help at all—it has to be changed, because it makes things less certain—but clause 72 also has potential to deter private investment. That is the regulation to make changes to non-GBR infrastructure facilities and services. It gives the Government the powers to make future changes to legislation by regulation outside a parliamentary vote—so-called Henry VIII powers. That weakens the power of MPs. It will mean that the Government can rewrite the rules about non-GBR networks and how those integrate with the GBR network, including setting conditions of access and charges.

That is for any network, station or track not operated by GBR, which could be High Speed 1, freight terminals, depots—we heard from freight earlier—ports and airports, telecoms and energy assets. They all integrate with the GBR network, and there is a lack of certainty about how they will integrate in the future, which will deter private and third-party investment. One global logistics company would strongly like to see such sites excluded because of the effect that it will have on investing in those assets. If you get rid of schedule 2 and amend clause 72, you can help to create a better situation when it comes to investment.

I have a prop here, which is a chart showing the current investment for renewals in the UK over the past 30 years—you can see that it goes up and down. The situation that we are talking about with GBR makes it less certain. I have another chart here that shows electrification—

[The Chair]

Order. Sorry, Mr Caplan, but props are not allowed.

Darren Caplan: My apologies. The charts show how uncertain the current situation is, and these measures would make it less certain. If we can have the positives for GBR going forward, and get these issues addressed, that will be better for the supply chain.

Railways Bill (Fifth sitting)

Baggy Shanker Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 27th January 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Keir Mather]

I will turn in a moment to the specific points that the shadow Minister raises around the chief executive, but I think I share his views on the importance of GBR’s compliance with its fundamental functions and with the law. That is why amendments 15 and 18 are peculiar—they do not recognise GBR needing to be able to have enforcement through that particular route.

Amendments 14 and 16 both relate to the transparency of directions. Amendment 14 would require directions to be laid before Parliament, but we believe that is unnecessary as provisions in the Bill already require directions issued under this power to be published, and Parliament has the power to call the Secretary of State to account should it take the view that more information is required.

[Baggy Shanker (Derby South) (Lab/Co-op)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship again, Sir Alec. The Minister is quite eloquently setting out why some of these amendments are not needed. The shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Broadland and Fakenham, set out earlier why they were needed, but also referred to problems that may happen in the future. It is difficult to write a Bill while trying to tackle problems that may or may not happen in the future.

The fact remains that rail reform failed to happen during 14 years of Conservative Government. The previous Rail Minister admitted that the Government failed to bring in the necessary reform. We had 10 Rail Ministers, I think—correct me if I am wrong—in 14 years. That was not just a failure to bring in a Bill; it failed passengers, railways and our workers who support the railways. Is it not time that we crack on, pass the Bill and deliver the improvements that this industry so greatly needs?

Railways Bill (Seventh sitting)

Baggy Shanker Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 29th January 2026 Public Bill Committees

Just in my own region of east Anglia, Greater Anglia’s franchise renewal bid rested on a complete renewal of all rolling stock. The franchise turnover every seven or eight years—let us call it every 10 years—gave an opportunity for bids to come in that said, “We are not just carrying on with the status quo; we’re not just shaving off a bit here and adding a little bit there; this is our bold renewal programme.” That is what Greater Anglia did, and it really has transformed the passenger experience in the east of England.

[Baggy Shanker (Derby South) (Lab/Co-op)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Western. I think this is an opportune moment to ask a question, as a Derby MP with Alstom in my constituency— the only place in the UK now where a train can be designed, engineered, manufactured and tested. Under the previous Government, Alstom had to make thousands of redundancies because there was just no certainty about work and there were delays on various projects. Can the hon. Member explain why the previous Government did not take any steps to come up with a rolling stock strategy?

[Jerome Mayhew]

I thank the hon. Member for his intervention, and for standing up for the jobs in his constituency, which is something we all need to do. I cannot speak for the actions of the Government before I was even elected as a Back-Bench MP, but we are certainly looking to improve. I would be the first person to say that the status quo ante was capable of improvement. Privatisation did bring many benefits to the railways, particularly in encouraging innovation and focus on the customer, leading to the increase in passenger numbers, which I have already spoken about in previous sittings, but was it perfect? Of course not.

As has been trailed by the Government, this is a once-in-a-generation opportunity to redesign and improve our approach to the railways, and I think that taking a long-term approach to rolling stock investment and creating this framework would be taking advantage of that opportunity to try to improve predictability for the supply sector—for Alstom, but also for Siemens and other manufacturers as well.

New clause 36 would require GBR to publish and keep under annual review a 15-year rolling stock investment framework that sets out future needs for new and existing trains. That includes—this is important—not just the replacement of trains but refurbishment, digital upgrades, decarbonisation and accessibility improvements. It would establish how private investors could finance rolling stock and related upgrades, promote energy-efficient technologies such as battery, hydrogen and hybrid traction, and set expectations for competitive, innovative and, importantly, predictable procurement. The framework must align with GBR’s business plan and control period funding, which are two very sensible requirements, and it must also provide transparency on procurement volumes and timelines, explain changes to plans and show how private investment will be used to reduce whole-life costs, improve train quality and support jobs in the UK rail supply chain.

The Government have thrown the sector into a period of uncertainty—that is inevitable with large-scale redesigns like the ones we are going through at the moment. My concern is that the way in which they have chosen to do this, through a process of drifting nationalisation before knowing the details of its replacement, has exacerbated that uncertainty and extended it over a prolonged period. As the hon. Member for Derby South has already noted, we are already seeing that uncertainty in the supply chain and the manufacturing base.

There is uncertainty—that is the problem. This is a shell Bill; it does not have the answers, and it does not give any confidence to industry that things will be better in the future. It relies on a whole raft of provisions in the 19 documents to which we have referred to time and again, but they do not exist. We do not know whether things will get better or worse, and neither does the industry. There is no supporting documentation on how GBR will function in practice. I am not sure the Government even know that yet, and they really ought to have done better than this. New clause 36 would point them in the right direction, and I certainly look forward to pressing it to a Division, should the opportunity arise.

New clause 37 would increase accountability by setting out a reporting and accountability framework for Great British Railways. The new clause states:

“Great British Railways must publish a business plan each year”,

which we have already considered, and it dictates:

“The business plan…must include…a summary of activities that Great British Railways intends to undertake during the following year”

and

“how these activities will support the delivery of the Rail Strategy”.

At the end of the year, GBR would be required to produce a second report setting out its progress against the business plan objectives, the first of which is passenger experience—we all know the Government substantially ignore passenger experience at the moment, apart from reliability in short trains, and have just brushed the other aspects under the carpet. The other objectives include

“freight growth…accessibility…passenger growth”,

which is also ignored by the Government in the Bill as drafted,

“integration with housing and local transport”

and

“the long-term infrastructure and service improvement.”

The ORR must assess GBR’s performance against the key performance indicators set out in new clause 2, which we have already debated but not yet voted on. If the ORR finds any material underperformance, it must give notice to the Secretary of State, who must publish a written response. This general approach is very business focused; it simply asks that GBR sets out what it is planning to do at the start of the year, and then having worked through the year, there is a process for GBR to mark its homework at the end of the year. Has GBR done what it said it would do? If it has not, the spotlight is on. It is also being assessed by the ORR, which retains its role as an independent expert adjudicator that is trusted by all parts of the rail sector.

Perhaps the best thing is that, in response to that, GBR must also set out what it will do to rectify any underperformance, and it must lay a report before Parliament and make a statement. The new clause would add critical levels of parliamentary and public scrutiny to GBR, allowing both to hold this new organisation to account, which we believe is paramount when such vast amounts of taxpayers’ money will be used. The current Bill is woefully short on accountability. It lacks strong incentives to encourage GBR to perform, to be held to account and to answer for its actions—or lack of action.

This all feels a little too comfortable. We have a nationalised industry reporting to officials from the Department for Transport, and it is not focusing on the experience of customers and passengers, passenger growth or all the other imperatives of rail in the future. The Minister will of course tell us that none of that is necessary. However, with the greatest respect, direct experience of running a business tells us that we need to design in strong incentives—this is crucial; it is not primarily a political point but a trying to improve this Bill point—so that GBR is inclined to focus on the right objectives, without having to respond to external direction. These new clauses would help to point GBR in the right direction. I look forward to the Minister’s support.