(6 days, 1 hour ago)
Public Bill Committees
Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)
It is a pleasure to have you overseeing proceedings this morning, Mr Stuart.
I will abstain on new clause 8, but I absolutely appreciate the sentiments behind it. I will not back it in full because the Green party has been thinking about this issue for some time, and we have our own alternative proposal. I will speak a little about the ways in which breaking up the Home Office—along the lines set out in new clause 8—would be a good idea.
I refer in particular to the “No Way Home?” report, which was commissioned in June 2025 by my hon. Friend the Member for Bristol Central (Carla Denyer), and produced by Zoe Gardner, an independent researcher and campaigner on immigration and asylum policy. The report recommended that we make a new Department for population, infrastructure and immigration and a Department for community security from the Home Office. Previous Green party policy has used different names for those ideas—including in 2019, when we talked about creating a Ministry for sanctuary and a Ministry for the interior—but they follow the very same lines in splitting up the responsibilities.
The “No Way Home?” report goes into more detail. It says in particular that cross-governmental work should be embedded in the remit of the new Departments, and that
“A Department for Population, Infrastructure and Immigration”
should be
“taking on joint task forces with shared budgets with Department for Housing, Communities, and Local Government in order to ensure a long-term approach to the country’s population, workforce and infrastructure needs is built into the management of immigration policy.”
On the other side, the new Department for policing and security matters—a “Department for Community Security”—should have
“joint teams working across mental health, housing, homelessness and social services”
to manage things such as addiction, rather than taking an enforcement approach to drug policy—allowing social services to deal with that—and ensuring that policing work is better integrated across the board with a preventive approach to crime. The report says:
“The current remit of the Home Office does not include responsibility for long-term integration, infrastructure planning, and community cohesion”.
Those are all issues that we have raised in this Committee as being harmed by the Bill, potentially because the Home Office is not tasked with being concerned about such harms.
The report talks about the history of the Home Office as a Department, and how it has been “beset by repeated scandals”. Very famously, those have included the Windrush scandal, which emerged out of the policies of the former Prime Minister, now Baroness May of Maidenhead. Her hostile environment policies, which I think were enacted between 2012 and 2016, were
“designed to make life unbearable in the UK for immigrants who were unable to prove their status”,
and the Windrush scandal resulted. The “Windrush Lessons Learned Review” made it abundantly clear not only that the political direction set by the then Home Secretary but that the culture and internal structures at the Home Office were at fault for producing the crisis. Earlier, in 2006, a scandal emerged regarding the release of about 1,000 foreign national prisoners, which forced the resignation of the then Home Secretary, Charles Clarke. He was replaced by John Reid, who famously proceeded to describe the Department as “not fit for purpose”. We are nearing a consensus view on the issue, I believe, and the Department should be looking very closely at what it can do.
The current work and remit of the Home Office
“covers some of the most hotly politically contested areas”.
I know that from my brief as my party’s spokesperson in the House on the Home Office and the Justice Department—we are constantly in the news on these issues. Every change is fought over in the public arena, because these are some of the most salient issues of the day. It is no wonder that
“the role of Home Secretary is often viewed as a poisoned chalice.”
Ministers—in the room today and more widely—might be interested in a more focused remit if they are to take on these responsibilities in future.
Despite repeated attempts at reform,
“the Home Office has continued to exhibit deep-rooted cultural and institutional problems in its management of the immigration brief, in particular…As a result, a growing number of voices from across the political spectrum have begun to call for an exploration of options for more radical reform. In most cases, the conclusion is that the Department should be split,”
with immigration moved into a more dedicated department. The report concludes:
“The remit of the Department itself contributes to negative outcomes by linking immigration with security, but neither immigration nor security with community cohesion, infrastructure, or the country’s economic needs”.
It says:
“The time is ripe for root and branch reform, and only a full break up and redistribution of the responsibilities of the Department has the potential to solve all the problems”.
I hope that Ministers will look at that in the future, and that this new clause nevertheless stimulates some discussions in Cabinet and with the Prime Minister about how to improve those deep-seated problems and scandals and avoid them in future.
New clause 8, tabled by the hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough, sets out the desire for a new Government Department for immigration and border security to be established, and for the transfer of all the Home Secretary’s immigration, asylum and border security functions to that new office. I have to say that I really admire the hon. Members for Harrogate and Knaresborough and for Wimbledon for attempting to reshape Whitehall through an amendment to a Bill—it is impressive, and I will do my best to respond to it. I appreciate that it is a thought-provoking new clause that of course warrants broader discussion.
Siân Berry
The right to work does not impact only those seeking sanctuary; the impact also falls on their children and on communities. Giving people seeking sanctuary the right to work—or, rather, restoring their agency—is a matter of basic dignity and human rights. People who have fled war or persecution should have the opportunity to rebuild their lives in the UK with dignity and independence. That means that they need a safe place to live, access to support and a genuine right to work, as set out in new clause 24. It is important to stress that this debate is about restoring choice and agency to people seeking sanctuary, not imposing new requirements on those who are not ready or able to work.
As it stands, the law permits a person seeking asylum to request permission to work if they have been waiting more than 12 months for a Home Office decision on their asylum claim through no fault of their own. That may be 12 months after they initially claimed asylum or 12 months after they made further submissions, which are then considered as a fresh claim.
It has been more than two decades since those seeking asylum could apply to work after six months. People repeatedly raise the issue of enforced worklessness while claims are processed. My new clause 24 would simply restore the previous time limit and match the Home Office’s own targets for decision making. The Liberal Democrats’ new clause 10 would grant the right to work at three months, which is also perfectly reasonable. New clause 24 goes into more detail about how the proposal should be implemented. It states that the right should be automatic, without the need for an application, and that there should be no restrictions on the type of employment. It also states when the right should end, if a decision on the application is made one way or the other.
More often than not, vulnerable people are left waiting for months, and often years, for a decision. For that entire period, however qualified and willing they are, they are not permitted to work. That is profoundly felt by people who arrive with real skills, a keen willingness to contribute and a desire to rebuild their lives. Instead, the current rules require them to survive on a small weekly allowance. They are unable to contribute, build a life and often even volunteer in their communities without navigating endless bureaucratic red tape.
The most potent and poisonous rhetoric of the far right plays up the dependence that people are left in; it stokes conflict between people in the asylum system, who are denied the ability to earn, and others in society. Members can hear the voices I am referring to in their heads right now. There is absolutely no need to leave in place the restrictions that fuel that kind of rhetoric and racism, and that badly harm the acceptance and integration of refugees.
Work can bring not only integration and community strength but genuine benefits to people fleeing war, trauma or oppression. That is because people seeking sanctuary in the UK are five to six times more likely than the general population to have mental health needs. A review of the impact of asylum processes on mental health found that policies restricting work contributed to psychological distress and social exclusion. The mental health cost of robbing vulnerable groups of the ability to exercise their agency and provide for themselves and their loved ones is far too high.
Many people seeking asylum in the UK and elsewhere are living with trauma. That contributes to their poor mental health. They might also be recovering from illness or caring for family members. It is important that a humane and just system recognises the structural barriers to finding work that many of these people will face. We must recognise that some people will want to work immediately, while others may need time and support to rebuild their lives. Therefore, my new clause is set out as a right to work. If the Government make any moves in this direction, they must refrain from making it a mandate to work.
Despite the clear and mounting evidence in favour of the right to work, successive UK Governments have closed their minds to the idea and refused to implement it. The usual response, which has already been aired in this debate, is that permitting work sooner risks acting as a pull factor to further migration, but that does not hold water given the evidence. The UK maintains one of the strictest systems in Europe concerning the right to work for people seeking asylum. The international evidence is unequivocal and the difference in waiting times across comparable countries is enlightening.
In 2018, Ireland opted in to the recast EU reception conditions directive and allowed work after nine months. That was subsequently reduced to six months in 2021. Comparable countries in Europe have far more lenient policies on the right to work. In Germany, it is granted after three months, with the only restriction being on self-employment. There is a similar policy after 60 days in Greece. In Italy the period is two months, in Spain it is six months, in Belgium it is four months, and in Denmark it is six months—all with no restrictions. In Sweden someone can apply to work immediately in limited sectors, and in France there are restricted types of work that someone can do after six months. All this is evidence that an alternative can be imagined that is intensely practical, would not have the knock-on effects that other parties have suggested, and can work.
Alongside the moral arguments, there is a strong economic angle to be considered. The Lift the Ban coalition, which has already been quoted in this debate, estimates that lifting the ban could save the Treasury over £280 million per year, and recent research by the National Institute of Economic and Social Research found that lifting the ban after six months could save the Government a total of £4.4 billion per year, increase tax revenue by £880 million and add £1 billion to GDP.
Restricting access to legal work inevitably increases the risk of exploitation. When people are prevented from supporting themselves lawfully, they can be pushed towards unsafe and illegal forms of work. Granting people the right to work therefore extends itself to protecting vulnerable people from further exploitation and abuse, and extends the ability to maintain community cohesion and safety.
In my view, though, the greatest cost of the current policy is the human cost—years of wasted potential, lost independence and lives left on hold while awaiting a decision. The Government should heed the approach taken by much of mainland Europe already and accept these amendments.
I thank the hon. Members for Harrogate and Knaresborough and for Brighton Pavilion for tabling the new clauses, and I am grateful for the discussion. As we have heard, new clauses 10 and 24 would significantly change the Government’s policy on the period before asylum seekers can seek permission to work from the Home Office, reducing that period to three months and six months, respectively. New clause 24, tabled by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, would go much further and grant asylum applicants and their adult dependants an automatic and unrestricted right to employment and self-employment after six months of waiting for a decision on their asylum claim—a right that would continue until the claim and any appeal had been finally determined.
Hon. Members will know that those who claim asylum are not normally allowed to work while their claim is considered. They may instead receive accommodation and support to meet their essential living needs if they would otherwise be destitute. Under our current policy, asylum seekers may be eligible to apply for permission to work in the UK where their claim has been outstanding for 12 months or more, through no fault of their own. Where permission is granted, employment is restricted to jobs on the skilled worker occupations at regulated qualifications framework level 6 or above.
To respond to the question of the hon. Member for Wimbledon about legal entrants, it is important to flag that all legal entrants are prohibited from working. Some individuals who claim asylum after being here legally retain the right to work throughout their claim. An asylum seeker is allowed to apply for permission to work after 12 months, as I said, if they have not received a decision and will be employed in a high-skilled job. On the statistics he asked about, the Home Office publishes a vast amount of statistics regularly. The numbers for those who have permission to work will fluctuate constantly, as people move in and out of the system quite rapidly. Our focus has been on ensuring that people receive an initial decision on their claim as quickly as possible.
(1 week, 1 day ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI thank all hon. Members for their contributions. This is a really important discussion because these are important clauses. Clause 35 clarifies who can make decisions about whether an individual is a victim of modern slavery for the purposes of part 5 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022. For adults, as I have said, it will formalise the existing operational model, with the Secretary of State acting as a competent authority for all modern slavery decisions. For children, it will enable the Secretary of State to nominate other public authorities to act as the competent authority. That will allow modern slavery decisions relating to children to be devolved nationally, ensuring that decisions are made by those best placed to safeguard and support them, building on the success of the pilot.
Schedule 4 complements these changes by making important consequential amendments to reflect the definition of competent authority and ensure consistency across the statute book. It will enable the Secretary of State to lay regulations on the making of reasonable or conclusive grounds decisions by all competent authorities and issue guidance on the processes to be followed by nominated public authorities.
Clause 36 places on a statutory footing credibility considerations that are already set out in guidance. That will make it clear that these factors will be considered to be damaging to a person’s credibility unless good reasons are put forward. That will provide a more robust framework—one that supports consistent decision making while recognising factors that could impact credibility indicators, such as a person suffering from coercion, fear or trauma.
I come back to the points raised during the discussion. I am afraid that I take issue with the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion for talking as if the purpose of the Bill is just to drive rhetoric or a political argument. These important measures will give our constituents confidence in the immigration and asylum system, and they will make sure that these important provisions, which are a credit to the Conservatives, are genuinely there to protect those who require and deserve support having faced the horrendous issue of modern slavery. It is really important that we protect them from abuse.
I go back to some of the facts and evidence I have already mentioned. The hon. Lady seems to dismiss the evidence out of hand, but there are some important factors here. I mentioned in my introductory remarks that modern slavery referrals have gone up 900% since 2014. Of arranged returns that failed to go ahead, 34%, or over a third, involved a referral for modern slavery made after the return had been arranged—not prior, but after. That is people who have gone through numerous appeals processes and have had numerous opportunities to highlight issues or concerns, but who had a return arranged because they have no right to be in this country.
Of cases raised through the national referral mechanism’s out-of-hours decision-making service ahead of a charter flight, 76% were raised between the hours of 3 pm on the day prior to the planned removal and 6 am on the day of the planned charter removal. Of the total referrals, 15% were raised after 11 pm.
I am just addressing the hon. Lady’s point. She said that those are not big statistics, or she dismissed them. They might appear small in scale, but they place a hugely disproportionate pressure on operations. Home Office officials are getting all the paperwork in place and liaising with different countries and airlines. These cases are hugely expensive and damaging for operations. They delay removal action due to disingenuous claims, prevent proper decision making and impact support for those who need it most. That is what the Bill aims to address.
Siân Berry
This is a useful debate, because the Minister’s points are speaking to the operational nature of this. I hope she will go away and reflect on the wider harm that will be caused by adding this to all victims, in response to what is an operational decision. She is very much relying on that, rather than on our obligations under human rights law and the nature of why late referrals may occur in those circumstances.
I appreciate the hon. Lady’s intervention. I will come on to trauma and the exemptions that we have, because this is really important. We want to make sure that genuine victims are protected, but I want to outline another fact—the facts are really important here—because the UK refers more victims of modern slavery than the whole of Europe put together. In 2023, the UK referred 17,004 cases, yet there were 10,907 referrals in the whole EU. I do not think anyone can accuse us of not living up to our obligations on modern slavery.
The hon. Lady and the hon. Member for Wimbledon have both mentioned victims of trauma. As a Government, we have engaged extensively with organisations working to address modern slavery. We have had a call for evidence and lived experience forums. We have had a range of expert insights, including survivor voices, to ensure that we have informed policy development. That has helped to ensure that the reforms reflect how the system operates in practice and take a trauma-informed approach to identifying and supporting victims. We will continue to engage with stakeholders as the Bill progresses, to ensure that the system remains responsive to victims’ needs.
I reiterate that individuals have opportunities throughout their immigration process to raise any modern slavery-related information, or any other information.
Siân Berry
The Minister repeatedly refers to “individuals” making the claim, but people cannot self-refer to the national referral mechanism. A professional is making the judgment that they may be a victim. Will the Minister acknowledge that? These claims of abuse hinge on the belief that individuals are making claims, but they are not.
The hon. Lady must not misinterpret us; we are absolutely clear that individuals do not make those claims. However, they raise information. If they raise information on the plane’s steps, it is very clear that many individuals are knowingly gaming the sorts of information that will be relevant to a modern slavery claim. Individuals can raise, at any point in the immigration process, not a referral but any information relating to any concerns they may have about their experience of modern slavery. That could be at the moment they arrive at a UK port, when they are encountered by immigration officials, or it could be to the police, a local authority, a community group or a charity. All this information can be flagged.
If modern slavery information is raised, or if it is identified through general immigration screening processes, a trained first responder—in these circumstances, from UK Visas and Immigration, Border Force, Immigration Enforcement or the police—will make a national referral mechanism referral. Adults must consent to such a referral being made. The referral process includes questions designed to surface any modern slavery experience, to aid decision making by the single competent authority and the immigration enforcement competent authority. People are trained specifically to ask questions throughout the process to identify victims of modern slavery.
Returning to the issues of trauma, the Government recognise the horrific experience that many victims of modern slavery have endured. We understand that trauma can have a profound effect on their ability to raise and discuss it, which is why decision makers are trained and must consider whether there are good reasons to explain the factors that might otherwise be viewed as undermining an individual’s credibility.
Detailed guidance will support decision makers in considering each person’s individual circumstances and experience. That will be trauma-informed, and it will ensure that credibility assessments are made fairly and on a case-by-case basis. First responders are also trained to recognise any signs of modern slavery and identify potential victims, to use trauma-informed approaches to help individuals disclose their experiences and, where appropriate, to refer them to the national referral mechanism.
The hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion asks about the provisions applying to children. The Bill’s credibility provisions will apply to individuals of all ages, but specific safeguards will be in place with regard to age. The Government recognise the specific vulnerabilities that children can have, which may affect their ability to disclose relevant modern slavery information. That will be factored into decision makers’ consideration of whether there are good reasons to explain the factors that might otherwise be viewed as undermining an individual’s credibility. This could include, for example, a child’s developmental stage and emotional maturity, which could have an impact on their ability to disclose information. Detailed guidance will support decision makers in considering each person’s individual circumstances and experiences, ensuring that credibility assessments are made fairly and on a case-by-case basis.
The hon. Lady also asks whether the credibility provisions will apply to British nationals. Yes, they will apply to all individuals, including British nationals. We recognise that some individuals, including British nationals who have experienced modern slavery, may have reasons for being unable to disclose information at an early opportunity. For example, victims of historical exploitation may not have previously come into contact or had repeated interactions with authorities, resulting in delayed disclosure. Equally, victims might not recognise themselves as victims of modern slavery or might be reluctant to be identified as such. That is why our first responders are trained to understand and identify signs that may indicate that a person is a victim.
The clause also requires decision makers to consider all relevant circumstances and evidence when assessing the credibility of an individual’s account on a case-by-case basis. As I said, where they identify that there are good reasons for the delayed disclosure, they will not draw a negative credibility finding on that basis alone.
The hon. Lady mentioned the al-Fayed cases. We are absolutely committed to supporting victims to come forward and disclose their experiences, including victims of historical exploitation, victims of grooming gangs and al-Fayed trafficking victims. Those are horrendous cases. Under the modern slavery system, first responders must refer consenting adults and children to the national referral mechanism when modern slavery indicators are present. This is true regardless of how long ago the incidents may have occurred. Decision makers will take this into account when considering cases. Where there is an explanation for the time taken between the exploitation and disclosing it, the delay in disclosure will not result in a negative credibility finding on that basis alone. The credibility provisions on delayed disclosure focus on where individuals have had repeated opportunities to disclose and did not do so. It is not a blanket provision on all lateness.
Hon. Members have asked for more detail on why good reasons are not listed in the Bill. The Bill sets out a pretty exhaustive list of five specific factors that decision makers are required to consider as having a negative impact on credibility when assessing the account of an individual referred to the national referral mechanism, while recognising there might be legitimate reasons for these issues arising. Where the competent authority is satisfied that there are good reasons for the issues with an individual’s account, such as delayed disclosure and inconsistency of account, this will mitigate against any adverse credibility finding. The legislation does not include an exhaustive list of good reasons, primarily because the range of potential mitigating circumstances is so broad that any attempt to provide a closed list would inevitably fail to capture the full range of potential mitigating circumstances.
Decision makers should not be restricted to a set of good reasons. Having these reasons in guidance will retain flexibility for decision makers to consider individual factors that appear to impact on an individual’s credibility. Those decision makers should consider all relevant factors in the round on a case-by-case basis before making a credibility finding. In terms of good reasons, relevant consideration may include the impact of trauma, fear of authorities, cultural or gender-related barriers to disclosure, a lack of self-identification as a victim or, for children, factors such as developmental stage, maturity and the effects of grooming, coercion and control.
The hon. Member for Stockton West asked about consistency across local authorities and local decision-making structures. It is important to say that any individual would receive a consistent decision and outcome. That is important to us, irrespective of which competent authority makes the decision. Regulations will be put in place to establish a clear framework that all competent authorities will be expected to operate within in order to ensure that decisions are taken consistently across all areas. All decisions will be made in line with modern slavery statutory guidance that will be consistent across all competent authorities. For decisions made by local public authorities, there will be separate additional guidance setting out the process and timelines for decision making through this model.
The shadow Minister also asked who might be nominated. Ahead of any public authority being nominated as a competent authority, it will be provided with a comprehensive programme of training to ensure that it understands its responsibilities as a competent authority and is able to make timely and accurate decisions. In addition, the Home Office will put in place clear oversight processes, including clear intervention steps that will be taken should concerns be raised about performance.
The shadow Minister also asked how the measures will apply in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. The intention is for this model of decision making to apply to children across all parts of the United Kingdom. We already have successful pilot sites operating in all four nations, as the model allows for local safeguarding partners to have flexibility over how they deliver many elements of the decision-making process. This means that decisions can work alongside any differences in legislative framework across the UK, while ensuring that all decisions are made to a consistent standard. We will continue to work with local safeguarding partners and devolved Governments on this approach and implementation.
Siân Berry
I also oppose clause 37. Under that clause, survivors who receive a negative decision could be immediately removed from support, which could expose them to destitution, homelessness and an increased risk of further harm and exploitation.
Allowing competent authorities to make and serve conclusive grounds decisions during the recovery and reflection period could have a devastating impact on survivors’ wellbeing and recovery. This approach may reduce the amount and quality of evidence available to inform decision making, because survivors may not have sufficient time to understand the process, build trust with support providers or access legal advice. Given the complexity of many cases and the evidential requirements often associated with conclusive grounds decisions—including the need for medical or mental health assessment reports—many individuals may find it difficult to obtain and submit the necessary evidence within such a short timeframe.
I believe that there will also be wider impacts on survivors and society—particularly an increase in homelessness, which the Prime Minister is committed to reducing. Clause 37 could result in survivors being exited from support on the same day that they receive a negative decision, which would clearly put them at a heightened risk of destitution and homelessness. A negative decision notwithstanding, anyone in the national referral mechanism was referred by a first responder who identified trafficking indicators. Those indicators suggested the need for appropriate support to prevent the individual’s situation from deteriorating, whether or not they met the threshold for identification as trafficked at the point of referral.
Additionally, instructing decision makers to decide at any point in the recovery and reflection period means that survivors may be expected to provide far too much relevant information about their case far too quickly after being rescued or escaping a situation of exploitation. Those decisions may be rushed; there may be political or administrative pressure on decision makers to rush processes so that decisions are made more quickly and support can be withdrawn. The overturning data is very instructive on that point. I agree that the quality of decisions matters more than speed. Clause 37 is very risky in its potential to do harm.
The Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association suggested in evidence that if clause 37 is retained, a further short 30-day period of support should be provided, to avoid the cliff edge. No amendment to that effect has been tabled. Does the Minister really intend for people to receive literally nothing after a negative decision, risking homelessness, destitution and re-exploitation? She should bear in mind not the six people disqualified on bad faith grounds, or the small number of people whose cases start while they are under removal plans, but the huge number of potential survivors this will affect right across the country.
I appreciate the contributions that hon. Members have made. As I have made clear, the Government are committed to ensuring that the modern slavery national referral mechanism operates efficiently and effectively. Clause 37 is an important part of that. It will remove inefficiencies and allow for support to be targeted at those who are recognised as victims, rather than having an arbitrary period to wait when we have conclusively identified that an individual is not a victim. As I am sure hon. Members would agree, support should be removed in a recovery period when there is sufficient evidence to conclude that an individual is not a victim of modern slavery.
Let me respond to some of the points that colleagues have made. I have heard language describing people whose conclusive grounds decisions state that they are not victims of modern slavery described as “survivors”. It is important to note that the conclusive grounds decision is that they are not a victim of modern slavery, and therefore that they are not considered to have recovery needs stemming from modern slavery. It stands to reason that those individuals should not be entitled to the recovery period or to modern slavery-specific support—nor would they need them.
For someone who does not receive a negative conclusive grounds decision in the recovery period, those protections will continue for the duration of the 30 days or until such time as a conclusive grounds decision is made. During the recovery period, when there are still reasonable grounds to suspect that a person is a victim of modern slavery, protection from removal and entitlement to support will be ongoing. The recovery period itself is not being reduced; the new provision merely makes it clear that, where there is sufficient evidence to warrant making a negative conclusive grounds decision during that time, doing so will end the recovery period.
The quality of decision making has been flagged by a number of Opposition Members. We are talking about highly trained staff, and negative conclusive grounds decisions are always checked by a second pair of eyes, so there is quality assurance and effective decision making. In 2025, of the 17,560 negative decisions, only 1,467 were accepted for reconsideration. Changing the outcome, however, does not mean that the original decision was incorrect. In most cases, additional information was provided that was not available originally, so that is not an issue of decision-making quality.
(1 week, 1 day ago)
Public Bill Committees
Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)
I wish to speak briefly against clause 38. Public order disqualification, in the way it has been applied so far, has exacerbated ongoing systemic issues arising from failures in identification and safeguards within the criminal justice system. Available evidence shows that this provision has disproportionately affected individuals subjected to criminal exploitation.
As we heard when discussing previous clauses, many survivors of criminal exploitation were forced to commit offences as part of their exploitation. They are often prosecuted for those crimes as a result of gaps in the application of the non-punishment principle in the UK, including defences under section 45 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015. Those who have criminal convictions are at heightened risk of exploitation, too. The criminalisation of survivors has been used time and again as a tool to control people and keep them in exploitation. The clause is an unnecessary extension of existing harms and should be dropped.
It is a pleasure to serve under chairmanship, Mr Twigg. I thank colleagues for their contributions to the discussion of the clause.
Clause 38 strengthens and clarifies the public order and bad faith disqualification frameworks due to long-standing challenges in their practical operation, especially in cases involving foreign national offenders. It expands the grounds on which an individual can be disqualified if they pose a threat to national security or public order by including suspended sentences to reflect the changes in the Sentencing Act 2020. It provides clarity in statute as to what is meant by bad faith, ensuring that those who seek to misuse the system with false and fabricated claims, or by raising information for the first time only after removal directions have been set, can be disqualified, ensuring that they are not able to take advantage of the generosity of our system.
The clause also makes it clear that no further modern slavery decision making is required should someone become disqualified. Finally, it exempts child victims from disqualification on public order grounds and makes the exemption for all victims where the risk of re-trafficking is clear. The clause provides a more consistent and robust approach to disqualification decisions and strengthens the Government’s ability to respond where individuals pose a threat to public order or seek to misuse the system.
I shall respond to some of the points that hon. Members made. The shadow Minister asked for case studies or examples of where the clause would be implemented. Suppose that individual C is convicted and receives an 11-month custodial sentence for common assault, battery or breach of a restraining order, which are not covered by public order disqualifications; when they raise modern slavery grounds, that is considered by the national referral mechanism. Where they are a victim, the individual will proceed through the decision-making stages, gaining protection from removal and access to support, and on to a conclusive grounds determination. Where they have ongoing needs and no right to remain, they would get a temporary permission to stay consideration.
Under the new system, even if individual C is a modern slavery victim, a foreign national offender who has received any custodial sentence, including a suspended sentence, will fall within scope of public order disqualification. Where the disqualification is applied, they will be disqualified from support and no further decision making on modern slavery will take place unless an “immediate and significant” risk of re-trafficking in the UK is identified. That means they will not receive a conclusive grounds decision and will not therefore be eligible for temporary permission to stay. British nationals are subject to a different threshold; they will be disqualified on the basis of a public order threat where they have committed one of the crimes set out in section 4 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015.
The shadow Minister also asked why children are still in scope of the national security limit disqualification. It is right that we can withhold modern slavery protections where an individual poses a threat to national security. That principle should apply regardless of age. Retaining the power to disqualify a child on national security grounds exists solely as a backstop for the rare circumstances in which an individual under 18 poses a significantly serious national security threat and disqualification from the national referral mechanism is therefore appropriate. The exception to disqualification where there is a risk of re-trafficking in the UK will still apply and require decision makers to consider the facts of each case.
This approach intends to strike an appropriate balance between safeguarding children and ensuring that national security considerations are prioritised where necessary. In parallel with our modern slavery response, the UK has one of the most robust counter-terrorism frameworks in the world. Prevent is one of the four pillars of the UK’s counter-terrorism strategy; it operates in the non-criminal space and is designed to support people away from radicalisation before they commit an offence. The Home Office is testing new approaches to better spot and refer individuals at risk of radicalisation online, and testing how those insights can be translated into timely, proportionate interventions. That is particularly important considering the rise in children being arrested for terrorism-related activity, much of which is carried out online.
The hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion asked about how we will ensure people who are exploited in criminal activity will not be unduly penalised for the exploitation that they have suffered. It is important to flag that the criminal justice system contains safeguards against penalising victims of exploitation, including under section 45 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015. That provides a defence in criminal proceedings for people who have been forced or compelled to commit crimes through slavery or exploitation. Clause 38 also expressly sets out that disqualification will not apply where a person is considered to be at “immediate and significant risk” of exploitation in the UK.
I hope I have responded to all of the questions that hon. Members had and provided clarification. I commend amendments 114 to 118 and clause 38 to the Committee.
Amendment 114 agreed to..
Amendment 115 to 118 agreed to.
Clause 38, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 39
Removal of duty to grant leave to remain to assist recovery
I thank all the hon. Members who have tabled amendments in this group and contributed to the debate. I want to start with new clause 29, tabled by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion. As was set out earlier, it would grant eligible confirmed victims of modern slavery at least five years’ leave to remain, with a route towards settlement.
I want to be clear that temporary permission to stay is a targeted and temporary form of leave designed to meet specific needs arising from an individual’s experience of exploitation that meets the UK’s international obligations under the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings. Temporary permission to stay will continue to be available where it is necessary for a confirmed victim to remain in the UK to co-operate with law enforcement agencies in the investigation of crimes or to seek compensation in relation to their exploitation.
New clause 29 would require the Government to grant leave in a way that would go beyond what is proportionate or reasonable and would significantly exceed what is required under our international obligations.
Siân Berry
I asked in my speech not about people claiming asylum but about those here under other forms of immigration status. Does the Minister not see the replacement of those with VTS leave being reduced as a result of clause 39? That is one of the problems that I wanted to raise. When people are here under potentially coercive forms of leave, such as sponsored work visas, will VTS leave still be available as a replacement to prevent people being left in the hands of exploiters?
I will cover that in the more in-depth response to the hon. Lady’s comments at the appropriate time.
As I said, the new clause would require the Government to grant leave in a way that would go beyond what is proportionate or reasonable, and that would significantly exceed what is required under our international obligations. When individuals require protection or are seeking to remain in the UK, other routes remain available, depending on the individual circumstances. Creating an automatic pathway to long-term leave and settlement through modern slavery provisions would conflate the modern slavery identification and support system with an immigration route, and thus risks blurring that distinction. That has the potential to increase opportunities for improper use of the system and would have significant implications for wider immigration objectives, which we have been clear must operate on the principles of fairness.
I hope to cover some of the points that the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion raised—if I fail to pick them up, I ask her to come back to me or I can respond in writing. She asked whether the temporary permission to stay framework meets our international obligations. Decision to grant temporary permission to stay does not automatically lead to removal from the UK. There are various routes to remain in the UK that will remain available to foreign nationals depending on their circumstances. Any applications will be considered on their individual merits in line with published policy.
The hon. Lady asked whether any further statistics could be shared. Temporary permission to stay data is currently drawn from a number of different Home Office systems. Further work is under way to establish the most robust dataset. We are continuing to assess what information can be shared publicly and we will provide further data in due course where appropriate.
The hon. Lady also asked whether we are disadvantaging people by removing recovery from exploitation. The measure does not prevent individuals from accessing support from the point of their positive reasonable grounds decision—or earlier, if emergency support is required to assist with recovery from their exploitation. Access to the national referral mechanism support is based on national referral mechanism status, not immigration status. All adult victims in England and Wales who need to can continue to access specialist needs-based support to assist their recovery, irrespective of their immigration status or a refusal of temporary permission to stay.
The hon. Lady also flagged whether the changes were compliant with international law. The Government’s view is that the change to the temporary permission to stay policy absolutely does not impede our compliance with our international compliance. Temporary permission to stay, in its current forms, goes beyond what is required under article 14 of the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings. The changes will provide stronger clarity on the UK’s obligations while still complying with article 14.
Article 4 of the European convention on human rights imposes a positive obligation on member states to identify and protect victims of trafficking, which is met in part through the operation of the national referral mechanism. That obligation does not go so far as to require member states to grant leave. In any event, support is not dependent on temporary permission to stay leave being granted, so that even when an individual is not granted temporary permission to stay leave, they can still access modern slavery support while they remain in the UK.
Further, an individual’s immigration status and assessment of risk on return are considered if an individual makes a protection claim. That includes an assessment of whether the individual has a well-founded fear of persecution or is at real risk of serious harm. Any claim will be considered on its individual merits, in line with published policy and country information.
The hon. Lady also asked about skilled workers. As of 8 October 2026, skilled workers who receive a positive conclusive grounds decision, where that decision was made during their most recent permission, may have their visa amended for the remaining period of extant leave. Individuals will not need to be sponsored and can work in any occupation. The change supports skilled workers to leave exploitative employers and move to new, safe employment. In the immigration White Paper, the Government committed to explore introducing further reforms to our sponsorship system by putting more responsibility and accountability on effective and responsible sponsors. That will include exploring whether the Government can make it easier for workers to move between licensed sponsors for the duration of their visa, giving them more control over who they work for and reducing the risk of exploitation.
The hon. Member for Stockton West asked what the changes will mean for compensation and people’s co-operation with the process. Under the changes to temporary permission to stay, victims can continue to engage with law enforcement agencies in supporting criminal investigations and pursue compensation in relation to their exploitation. By focusing temporary permission to stay on those specific purposes, the Government can ensure that it remains available in supporting victims’ engagement with the criminal justice system and accessing compensation. More broadly, the Government are strengthening the tools available to law enforcement and courts to disrupt criminal activity, prevent modern slavery and protect those at risk.
On victim engagement with the criminal justice system, I should say that the modern slavery victim care contract provides adult victims in the national referral mechanism with a dedicated support worker to assist them to access legal aid and legal representation. That support will be further strengthened when the modern slavery victim care contract is replaced by the new support for victims of modern slavery service. The new contract introduces specialist support workers to help victims to engage better with the criminal justice system. That will include, but is not limited to, providing tailored guidance and advocacy to help victims understand complex legal processes, and helping to remove barriers to accessing and receiving the assistance they need at every point in the criminal justice process.
Siân Berry
It is my view and that of a wide range of refugee and modern slavery organisations that clause 43, particularly subsection (3), is incompatible with article 12 of the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings, which puts a duty on state parties to afford support to survivors of modern slavery in receipt of a reasonable grounds decision. The removal of the duty to provide support will put adults, children and young people at risk of destitution, homelessness and further harm, as we have discussed in relation to previous clauses.
We know that trauma can manifest in a wide range of ways and may significantly affect an individual’s ability to engage consistently with support services or comply with procedural requirements. Penalising people for such difficulties fails to take account of the realities of trauma and recovery and, again, creates detriment from a known feature of abuse. Additionally, while we agree that safeguarding and supporting children should be the responsibility of local authorities, they do need to receive adequate resources in order to discharge those duties appropriately and in the best interests of the child. Local authorities do not currently receive any funding to offer specialist support to children affected by trafficking and exploitation, and my amendments to this clause therefore seek both to reduce the harms being caused by it and to boost the support that can be offered to survivors.
Amendment 70 would remove subsection (3) and take away the Secretary of State’s power to override professional assessments. Support for the survivors of modern slavery is currently delivered through Government-funded contracts such as the modern slavery victim care contract in England and Wales, and equivalent arrangements across the devolved Administrations. Specialist organisations and trained support workers provide this support directly to survivors and are responsible for carrying out detailed assessments of need. The assessments should be informed by the professional expertise of frontline practitioners and crucially by survivors’ own views and experiences. I believe that support workers and survivors are best placed to identify an individual’s needs, because they are in direct and ongoing contact with the person concerned. It would therefore be harmful for the Secretary of State, who is removed from this direct engagement, to override such assessments without having had contact with the individual or a comparable understanding of their circumstances.
Allowing decision makers who are distant from a survivor’s situation to disregard professional assessments risks undermining survivor-centred support and could result in people being discharged from support with outstanding high needs. The Anti-Trafficking Monitoring Group has presented further evidence to us on these points, around subsection (3). It says that it
“reflects the operational reality of how the MSVCC contract already functions in assessing survivors' needs.”
It therefore makes worse what is already bad. At the moment, an MSVCC provider completes a needs assessment and submits it to the Home Office for approval. The Home Office then reviews the assessment and either agrees or disagrees with both the assessment itself and the level of support recommended. It is concerning that this decision maker power, that ultimately rests with the Home Office, will be given directly to the Secretary of State.
The Secretary of State will be even further removed from the care, safeguarding and day-to-day insight available to frontline service providers, and could issue blanket rules or directives in situations of strained resources, for example, that would even more arbitrarily remove support from survivors. The Anti-Trafficking Monitoring Group tells us that there is evidence for already ongoing issues with meeting the thresholds required to secure additional support, including for mental health needs. The recovery needs assessment process is highly bureaucratic—individuals are often discharged from support despite having significant unmet needs. If a similar approach is applied to decisions relating to the recovery and reflection period, there is a substantial risk that individuals will be discharged from support while still experiencing high levels of unmet need, exposing them to an increased risk of re-exploitation.
In amendment 72, I have asked for assistance to apply to children. While we agree that safeguarding and supporting children should be the responsibility of local authorities, I think it is very important that the Secretary of State retains an overarching duty to ensure that children receive support in line with article 12 of the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings. This would help ensure national accountability for the protection and recovery of child victims of trafficking and not leave it to the piecemeal provisions of local authorities. Maintaining this duty would also ensure that the Secretary of State remains responsible for ensuring that local authorities are adequately resourced, as my next amendment would require. It would be, therefore, an important safeguard to ensure that all children receive the support and assistance to which they are entitled, regardless of where they are located.
Amendment 73 would ensure funding for local authorities to support children. We need to make sure that they have adequate resources to discharge their duties in the best interest of children. Currently, local authorities do not receive any specialist support funding for children affected by trafficking and exploitation, but it is essential, as is the mainstream child protection that local authorities provide. The charity, ECPAT, which stands for Every Child Protected Against Trafficking, has told me that not providing dedicated funding to local authorities to meet the ECAT entitlements of children leaves an enormous gap. It says that the Home Office provides local authorities with £143 per child, per night, towards the cost of supporting unaccompanied children, but there is no equivalent funding attached to a child’s identification as a potential victim of trafficking. That responsibility is placed on the existing social care system, which we all know is under substantial financial pressure. I really hope that the Government will listen to that point.
A final point in relation to subsection (3) is that all it says is
“where the Secretary of State disagrees”
—which is incredibly broad. Will the Minister tell us whether the Secretary of State will publish criteria governing when this override power may be used, and will she address the fact that there is currently no defined threshold for displacing an authorised person’s professional assessment by the Home Office? I will not press my amendments to a vote, but I want to see the risks and problems identified by them addressed, either in regulations or in the Bill, before the legislation leaves this House and goes to the other place.
I thank the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion for tabling amendments 70 to 73, which propose several changes to clause 43 on support and assistance provided to adult and child potential victims of modern slavery. I will start by reiterating the purpose of clause 43 and then turn to the amendments. Currently, where a potential victim has had suitable statutory support put in place to meet a modern slavery need, and that support is removed due to their conduct, the Secretary of State is required to provide that person with the equivalent support again. That results in the duplication of support provided across Government and the associated excessive costs to the taxpayer.
Clause 43 will ensure that the Secretary of State is not required to provide equivalent support again in those circumstances. For example, if a potential victim has their asylum accommodation withdrawn because they did not follow asylum support conditions, they will no longer be able to access equivalent modern slavery accommodation in its place. That will safeguard the integrity of the modern slavery system, ensuring support is not provided unconditionally and indefinitely. We recognise, however, the specific vulnerabilities and impact that trauma may have on an individual’s conduct. To safeguard vulnerable victims, support will not be withheld if there is a good reason, related to their modern slavery experience, for the conduct that led to that element of support being removed.
I wish to be clear that the Government remain committed to supporting vulnerable people. We have invested £25 million in the national independent child trafficking guardianship service and are in the process of procuring the new adult victim support contract to assist victims to achieve long-term stability and to live independently, and to reduce their risk of re-exploitation. Together, those investments form part of our wider programme of modern slavery reform, designed to safeguard the integrity of the system and ensure that resources are targeted at those who need them.
Clause 43 also makes technical amendments to section 50A of the Modern Slavery Act 2015. They will not change the support provided to adult or child victims; rather, the clause ensures that current support arrangements for adult and child victims are correctly reflected in statute. In line with existing practice, the amendments remove children from the provision to reflect that local authorities safeguard and promote the welfare of all children within their area, and the independent child trafficking guardian service provides further specialist modern slavery support. The amendments also make it clear that an authorised support provider can assess the support needs of adult victims of modern slavery.
Turning to amendments 70 to 73, the Government understand that their intention is to safeguard vulnerable potential victims. The Government share that commitment and are equally committed to ensuring that all victims of modern slavery, including child victims, can access the necessary support and assistance they require. The Government do not, however, consider the amendments necessary. In fact, they directly contradict the intention of clause 43 in two ways.
First, amendment 70 seeks to remove the Secretary of State’s power to override an authorised person’s assessment that support is necessary to assist a potential victim in their recovery. That would mean that the Secretary of State would be unable to intervene where appropriate to ensure that the outcome of a support assessment aligned with the relevant statutory guidance. That is a necessary power, ensuring fairness in the provision of support to adult victims across England and Wales. The power provides an important safeguard to ensure that Government-issued guidance on the assessment of necessary support is appropriately adhered to.
The need to intervene may arise in particularly complex cases and where other state support services have jurisdiction. For example, where an authorised support provider has determined that financial support is necessary but has not accounted for income the victim receives from another statutory service, the Secretary of State must be able to intervene to ensure that financial support is not provided where it is not necessary, in line with guidance.
As an another example, where an authorised support provider has determined that ongoing support should be provided to a victim despite their lack of engagement, but it has not given due attention to the non-engagement policy and the other statutory support available to a victim, the Secretary of State must be able to intervene to withdraw that support in line with statutory guidance on non-engagement to ensure consistency and fairness in the application of the policy across victims in England and Wales. I want to be clear, however, that the Home Office has a robust contract management regime in place to ensure that our supplier will deliver a high-quality service to victims in line with its contractual obligations underpinned by statutory guidance. The supplier has consistently met and exceeded delivery expectations, and the Home Office has a strong relationship with it.
Siân Berry
My concern is that subsection (3) provides the Home Secretary with a broad, unqualified power to disagree with the assessments that the Minister has just mentioned. Amendment 71 seems to provide a perfectly reasonable set of safeguards against breaching those international obligations. Will the Minister look at providing more detail about the criteria that the Home Secretary would use in future regulation to reassure us?
I appreciate the hon. Lady referencing that. Of course, we will always consider any issues and desires for clarification that are raised in this Committee through the development of the regulations. Her concerns have been noted, but I am reassured that we are compliant with the ECAT and ECHR obligations.
The hon. Lady made a couple of other points about a potential increase in homelessness and destitution. The Home Office remains committed to meeting legal obligations, ensuring that policies do not leave people destitute or at risk of re-trafficking. However, individuals should not be able to use modern slavery to circumvent the conditions for other statutory support services. To ensure a coherent approach across Government to supporting victims, adult modern slavery support will be withheld in particular circumstances in order to align with decisions made by wider statutory services to withdraw support from someone who has failed to follow reasonable conditions.
To safeguard vulnerable victims, support will not be withheld if a victim has a good reason related to their modern slavery experience to explain why they were unable to meet reasonable conditions. As only the particular element of modern slavery support that was removed by another service will be withheld, where necessary, support worker assistance will remain available to advise and signpost to other avenues of accommodation or financial support.
The hon. Lady also asked about the Home Office’s oversight and monitoring of local authorities to ensure that children do not fall through gaps in provision. I think I have covered most of that, but the children’s social care national framework is statutory guidance for local authorities that sets the national direction for practice. It provides clarity on the outcomes that children’s social care should achieve for children, young people and families. “Working Together to Safeguard Children 2026” is the multi-agency statutory guidance. It provides detailed information on the duties and responsibilities of all agencies to safeguard children.
Both pieces of statutory guidance—the national framework and “Working Together”—should be read alongside each other. Ofsted independently inspects local authority children’s services through its inspecting local authority children’s services framework. Those inspections consider the experiences and progress of children and families, the quality of practice and leadership, and whether services are meeting their statutory duties. Local authorities are assessed using performance data, reform, delivery and wider regional intelligence to determine the appropriate level of support and intervention.
As I have outlined, the amendments are unnecessary, as the Government are confident that support provisions for adult and child potential victims are compliant with our international obligations. Adult support needs assessments already consider the individual support needs and circumstances of victims, and local authorities already have a duty to safeguard and promote the welfare of all children within their areas. For the reasons outlined, I respectfully request that the amendments not be pressed.
Government amendments 120 to 123 will make minor changes to proposed new subsection 50A(5ZA) of the Modern Slavery Act 2015, inserted by clause 43, to clarify how the provision will work in practice. First, amendments 120 to 122 put beyond doubt that proposed new subsection 50A(5ZA) is a targeted provision such that where a particular form of support is to be withheld, such as accommodation, the duty to provide other forms of support, such as financial support, will continue. That will prevent the duplication of support provided across Government and the associated excessive costs to taxpayers by ensuring that specific forms of support are not provided unconditionally and indefinitely. However, we recognise the specific vulnerabilities and impact that trauma may have on an individual’s conduct, which is why the amendments will make the safeguards for vulnerable potential victims clearer.
As a result of amendment 123, when decision makers are deciding whether an element of support should be withheld, they will consider whether the conduct that resulted in other statutory support being removed is attributable rather than “properly” attributable to their modern slavery experience. That is to avoid decision makers having to make unduly complex assessments, which could have an adverse impact on vulnerable potential victims. I commend Government amendments 120 to 123 and clause 43 to the Committee.
I think I have answered most of the hon. Gentleman’s questions, and if not, I will clarify in writing.
Siân Berry
I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendments made: 120, in clause 43, page 45, line 9, after “support” insert “of a particular kind”.
This amendment and amendments 121 and 122 clarify that where assistance or support of a particular kind would have been available from elsewhere had it not been for the victim’s conduct it is only assistance or support of that particular kind that the Secretary of State will no longer be under a duty to provide.
Amendment 121, in clause 43, page 45, line 10, leave out first “the”.
See the explanatory statement for amendment 120.
Amendment 122, in clause 43, page 45, line 10, after “support” insert “of that kind”.
See the explanatory statement for amendment 120.
Amendment 123, in clause 43, page 45, line 15, leave out “properly”.—(Anna Turley.)
This amendment leaves out an unnecessary word from the inserted subsection (5ZA).
Clause 43, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 44
Content of slavery and human trafficking statements
Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Siân Berry
I add my support—for a change in this Committee—to the broad approach taken in this part of the Bill. I realise that the Bill’s scope is narrow, but have the Minister or the Home Secretary had any discussions with colleagues in the Cabinet and other Departments about using these quite creative new reporting requirements—which cover the supply chain and require reasons to be given for not doing things—as a template for use in other areas, such as environmental pollution or other human rights issues? Will the Minister commit the Home Office to taking the learnings from implementing this to other Departments?
The hon. Lady makes an important point. We are proud of the provisions, and a review is being undertaken by the Department for Business, Innovation, Science and Trade to consider how to develop them further. I hope that the Home Office example is setting out best practice for other Departments to ensure that, in a world of global business, we are able to hold corporations to account in our legislative and democratic framework. I appreciate her point.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 44 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 5 agreed to.
Clause 45 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 46
Application to public authorities
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Siân Berry
I want to raise a few alarm bells in terms of what I feel about this measure, and I hope the Minister can answer me clearly. My misgivings arise partly because the Minister talked about basing the need for the new clause on a single case example; partly because it has been introduced into the Bill at a late stage in our considerations; and partly because it will come into force immediately on Royal Assent. It appears to be a rush, and I am not convinced that it will not have equalities impacts or overlap with the lessons we should have learned from the Windrush scandal. If the Minister can give some more assurance that this has been looked at carefully and not rushed into on the basis of a single case, I would be glad to hear it.
I can be explicit: this change in the legislation has been inspired by one particular case. I will not apologise for that, because I am sure the hon. Lady would agree that the current situation is not acceptable. Some of the most serious offenders, including individuals involved in terrorism, serious organised crime or war crimes, cannot be deported even after we have stripped them of British citizenship, because of this loophole. It is important that we take steps to address it.
I want to give the hon. Lady some reassurance, however, because people may express concerns about protection given in law to others—for example, the Windrush generation or others who came here previously. I will be absolutely clear and explicit in Committee: they will not be affected. Any broader protection for the Windrush generation is not affected by the new clause. The power will be exercised personally by the Home Secretary. The Government are clear that the wider protections offered by section 7 will remain intact. The new clause will not affect the overwhelming majority of people protected by section 7 or their rights. This measure is intended solely to ensure that specific individuals whose conduct places them among the most serious threats to the public can be deported.
(1 week, 6 days ago)
Public Bill CommitteesThat Act is the interpretation of these principles in our domestic law, so it is the same outcome.
I have thoroughly enjoyed the debate this morning. Clause 22 ensures that our protection system remains fair, and preserves our commitment to providing sanctuary and the benefits of the refugee convention to those who genuinely need them. At the same time, it recognises that those who commit serious crimes should not be entitled to the same benefits and privileges as those who respect our laws. We are rightly obliged not to send them back to face death or torture, but that does not mean that we should give them the package of support and entitlement that other decent law-abiding refugees get. In so doing, the clause delivers a clearer, fairer and more meaningful distinction between those who deserve our protection and those who have fundamentally abused it.
Amendment 133 agreed to.
Clause 22, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 23
Power to require payments from recipients of asylum support
Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)
I beg to move amendment 81, in clause 23, page 21, line 33, at end insert—
“(3A) Subject to subsection (3B), where the Secretary of State did not make a decision on a person’s protection claim within 180 days of the making of the protection claim, any sums to be paid by the person under subsection (3) must be reduced by 20% for every period of 30 days that elapsed before a decision on the person’s protection claim was made.
(3B) Subsection 3A does not apply where a decision on the protection claim was not made within 180 days of the claim being made due to the actions of the applicant.
(3C) For the purposes of subsection (3A), ‘protection claim’ has the same meaning as in section 82(2)(a) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.”
This amendment would reduce the level of payments required from a person by 20% for every 30 days longer than six months that passed before a decision was made on the person’s asylum claim.
I thank Members for their important contributions to this debate on asylum costs and the mechanism the Government are creating to recover some of them. As we heard from my hon. Friends, fairness is at the heart of this debate. We are discussing the concept that individuals who have benefited from the sanctuary and generosity of this country and its taxpayers should contribute towards the support that they received. That is not about punishing anyone; it is about those who have received support having a stake in the success of this country and contributing to the cost of that support, and thereby to the sustainability of giving it to others, once they are financially able.
The right to receive support must come with responsibilities. Each year, the taxpayer funds £4 billion of asylum costs. While it is right that we support those fleeing war and persecution, it is also right that those who have received that support make a fair and proportionate contribution when they can. The measures will ensure that they put back into the system that supported them and contribute towards the provision of that support to others, as well as ensuring that others who are paying for that support consent to doing so.
We have heard examples of our constituents contributing to many different forms of collective support, including through national insurance, and through tax to fund access to healthcare. Contribution is an important principle of the social contract in this country. For that reason, the Bill introduces a new power, under which asylum seekers will pay back a portion of the cost of their support when they are financially able to do so. It will be possible to recover those costs through tax receipts, benefit payments and/or as a debt to the Home Office. That mirrors the way in which the Department for Work and Pensions deducts from universal credit where people have child support payments due, owe money for hardship payments, or have unpaid bills or tax.
Amendments 81, 76 and 79, which were tabled by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, seek to prescribe in the Bill how and when asylum support contributions should be calculated and reduced. The Government cannot accept the amendments because they would be too complex to enable effective delivery of the policy and would move us away from the policy intent of a fair and proportionate contribution towards the costs of support once a person is financially able to pay.
Clause 23 establishes an important principle that, where someone has received asylum support at public expense and later has the means to contribute, it is fair that they do so. Of course, any contribution must remain affordable and not push a person into destitution. Clause 23(5) already requires regulations to include provisions to ensure that nobody pays where it would leave them destitute. Further details of this important safeguard will be set out in the regulations that we have committed to sharing during the passage of the Bill.
I have a huge pile of responses to the points the hon. Lady made, and there are some important clarifications I want to make. If I do not answer her questions sufficiently, I will be happy to take an intervention.
I want to pick up the hon. Lady’s point about destitution and poverty. I think it is right to set the provision at this level, and I do not think it is appropriate to define poverty in the statute book. Given I have wards in my constituency where as many as 60% of children are growing up in poverty, as per the definition that the hon. Lady set out—I am sure the same is true for the constituencies of other Members present—I am afraid I cannot accept an amendment that says that people in my area can be below that poverty line but asylum seekers cannot. All my constituents have obligations to pay that are contributing to the challenges that they face, and I do not think it is appropriate to safeguard one group and not another, as much as we all have a desire—an absolute commitment—to reduce poverty, particularly child poverty, in this country.
The hon. Lady also raised the matter of whether the Bill breaches article 25 of the declaration of human rights. We are absolutely confident that it meets our international obligations, including under the refugee convention. We believe it is compatible with both the letter and the spirit of our international obligations, while maintaining a sustainable system for the future.
The convention does not anywhere require states to provide indefinite support, free of charge and irrespective of an individual’s circumstances. What it does require is that people fleeing persecution be given protection and access to support, which we are doing. Asylum seekers receive a comprehensive package of taxpayer-funded accommodation support, which is very different from the state support provided to destitute British nationals. Nothing in the refugee convention prevents us from requiring asylum seekers to make a contribution, when they can, towards the system that they benefit from. Protecting refugees and ensuring fairness to taxpayers are not mutually exclusive—we can and will do both.
The hon. Lady also asked how we got to the figure. The figure is an indicative amount. The exact figure will be set out in regulations. I want to reiterate that we have committed to publishing the regulations during the course of the Bill’s passage, and I undertake to do that as soon as possible. I am sure that colleagues will understand that it requires a lot of complex engagement with the Treasury and others. We want to make sure that we have got this absolutely right and that we do not fall foul of the situation Opposition Members found themselves in when they tried to introduce this Bill—the workings out had not been done.
The hon. Lady asked why anyone should pay more than the cost of the support they received. This policy is intended to generate a contribution towards the overall cost of asylum support, not to be an itemised recovery of the precise costs incurred by an individual. That would be extremely difficult—nigh on impossible—and it would undermine the ability for us to raise any money through the measure. The flat rate will be calculated by reference to average support costs and the average time spent in asylum accommodation. A flat rate is clearer and more feasible to administer, while payments will remain linked to affordability.
The hon. Lady also asked about the Home Secretary’s power to make exemptions. I want to flag that it is very similar to an existing power that the Home Secretary has that is covered by the Immigration (Health Charge) Order 2015. It is really important to maintain the ability to make exemptions in extreme and unusual circumstances.
I want to pick up the point about forcing people into destitution. That will not be the case. Payments will apply only where someone has the means to pay. Safeguards will ensure that no one is pushed into destitution. Payments will be linked to income and affordability thresholds. Deduction rates and exemptions will be designed to protect those without the means to contribute. As I said, further guidance will be set out throughout the course of this Bill’s passage. Could a person be penalised where a payment could cause destitution? No. Clause 23 requires regulations to contain provisions that ensure that a person is not required to pay where doing so would cause destitution, as we have already flagged.
Ordered, That the debate be now adjourned.—(Jade Botterill.)
(1 week, 6 days ago)
Public Bill CommitteesIt is a pleasure to see you back in the Chair, Mr Twigg. I appreciate all the discussion and debate we have had so far today. I will pick up my response to the various Opposition amendments, starting with amendment 141, in the name of His Majesty’s Opposition, which would allow outstanding liabilities to be considered in immigration applications, including for settlement. The Government are already considering the wider approach to settlement, as hon. Members will hopefully have seen from some of the media debate. That is currently undergoing a lot of discussion, so it would not be appropriate to pre-empt that work through this amendment. For those building a life in the UK, paying towards the cost of their asylum support will form part of their wider contribution to society. People with outstanding asylum support debt will be prevented from returning to the UK until that debt is repaid. It is our intention that those who receive support will be expected to make contributions when they are financially able to do so.
The detailed operation of the scheme will be set out in secondary legislation. As I have mentioned to hon. Members already today, we have committed to sharing draft regulations during the passage of the Bill, providing them with the opportunity to scrutinise the detail of the policy and how those provisions will operate in practice. That approach ensures appropriate parliamentary oversight, while retaining the flexibility needed to develop the scheme in the light of wider decisions on settlement policy. The draft regulations will be subject to the affirmative procedure and will afford a further opportunity for parliamentary scrutiny before they are made.
I will take this moment to respond to some of the questions that the hon. Member for Stockton West raised this morning. He asked whether the scheme would raise more money than it costs, which I think is an important challenge. The Government are determined to reduce the cost to the taxpayer. That is part of the principle of this, although the primary objective is fairness and sustainability, with any revenue generated reducing the burden on the public purse. As I have said, details of the scheme are under development and will be published in draft regulations. We will look for as much transparency as possible, not just in the process but in how we can publish data in our regular asylum statistics.
The hon. Gentleman also mentioned amendment 124, which is about the powers given to the Home Secretary for exemptions, and the circumstances in which they might be used. The amendment enables regulations to confer a discretion on the Secretary of State to waive, reduce or refund liabilities arising under the asylum support contribution scheme. As I mentioned this morning, that is commensurate with article 8 of the Immigration (Health Charge) Order 2015, which gives the Secretary of State for the Home Department the same discretionary power to reduce, waive or refund part of that charge. The power will of course be at the discretion of the Secretary of State, and we anticipate that it will be used only in exceptional cases.
The hon. Gentleman asked about the amount payable and how the income threshold will be set. Hon. Members have raised the £10,000 figure, which is an indicative estimate of the standard contribution that may be required. The final flat-rate contribution will be set in secondary legislation. As we discussed this morning, it is intended to reflect average asylum support costs across the system, rather than the precise costs incurred in an individual case. That is how the figure was reached. The estimates will depend on the final design and implementation of the scheme, including collection mechanisms. We will continue to assess the expected costs and benefits as the scheme is developed. However, we do not consider it appropriate to make commencement legally dependent on five-year forecasts, which may be subject to considerable uncertainty. I hope I have addressed the issues that the hon. Gentleman raised.
On Government amendment 124, the policy intention remains that those with the means to contribute towards the cost of the support they previously received should do so. However, there may be circumstances in which it would be fair and proportionate to depart from that general principle. The amendment provides flexibility to respond to such circumstances and supports the fair and effective administration of the scheme. The detailed circumstances will be set out in regulations and will be subject to parliamentary scrutiny. The amendment therefore complements the wider contribution scheme, while ensuring that it can operate fairly and proportionately in individual cases.
Government amendments 125 and 126 are technical amendments that deal with how the requirement to pay back a contribution towards asylum support operates if the recipient becomes bankrupt or enters another form of insolvency process. The amendments enable the Secretary of State to make regulations that set out the effect of a person becoming insolvent on their liability to make payments. They also define when a person is to be treated as insolvent across the jurisdictions of England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. That will allow the Government to set out in regulations that, where appropriate, liabilities under the scheme are not extinguished by bankruptcy or certain other insolvency processes.
In addition, the amendments provide a power for regulations to make consequential provision in relation to insolvency legislation where necessary. The amendments provide the flexibility needed to ensure that the asylum support scheme can operate effectively alongside existing insolvency frameworks across the United Kingdom. They make no changes to the safeguards that will be built into the scheme.
Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)
It is very good to have you in the Chair this afternoon, Mr Twigg. From the discussions we have had today, I think it is clear what a mess the proposals in clauses 23 and 24 are. If it is not an itemised recovery of costs, it is a refugee tax—worse, it has become clear that is only a poor refugee tax. As such, the philosophical basis for the proposals is broken.
The Government have set a terribly high bar for being excused, and they are not seeking any payment from successful refugees who have the means to support themselves while they wait for a decision. That is despite the hon. Member for Great Grimsby and Cleethorpes likening the proposal to NHS surcharges for those on work visas, to which the Minister also referred. The Government have been clear that they are setting a flat charge rate, but they will not apply it to all asylum seekers. Why not? If one accepts the premise of the charge—I do not—would that not be fairer across the board? The Government propose to charge it only to those people who are destitute when they arrive here.
This will do much harm to these people’s ability to settle in the future. Why would the Government drive them into poverty for extended periods and cause that kind of problem? It seems unfair to impose this on people. The Government have introduced this in clause 23, while amendment 141, tabled by the Conservatives, tries to codify it further. In my view, any kind of refugee tax should not be an additional barrier to stability. These clauses are reckless, unfair, cruel and irrational. Without my amendments, they become even worse. I will seek to divide the Committee on them.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Siân Berry
I have spoken quite a lot about my overall position on these clauses, but I would like to say a little more about the fact that clause 23 gives the Home Secretary the power to require these unfair payments from a minority of asylum seekers who are destitute when they arrive here. The Minister needs to consider the lack of safe routes and the extent to which people wanting to claim asylum here end up more destitute as they are exploited the entire way by the kind of organised criminals that are currently running the only routes into this country. We need to see much more detail than is on the face of the Bill about how the system will work.
I essentially wish to speak in support of amendment 140, tabled by the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire. He makes a good point. On Second Reading, the Home Secretary promised that Parliament would have the opportunity to see draft regulations, but we have not seen them yet. The Committee is being asked to assess and approve a system when we are not able to scrutinise the details. We deserve to see more of them now. They are not minor details. We have already spoken about the fact that £10,000 is the amount that the Government are talking about, but that is not on the face of the Bill, and neither is the payment threshold nor how much people will have to pay over that amount. All of that is information that we would need to assess the impact that this policy would have on individual refugees at the point they are trying to rebuild their lives, not just on the public purse, as the Opposition amendment seeks to set out.
Although the Government have indicated how they might recover those payments, the detail of the Bill does not cover everything. They say it will enable the Home Office to have its own cost recovery mechanism, supported by HMRC, which will apparently play its part. How will that work, how will it sit within other parts of the Government’s core protection system, and how much will it cost? That is especially important when weighed against the fact that the policy might bring in only limited amounts and may even reduce the overall tax take from this group. Without knowledge of the decisions about the system, the Government may be proposing something that costs the public purse large amounts in cash terms, let alone in its wider impacts. I think we need to see the Government’s analysis of all this.
It is also important to acknowledge that individuals claiming asylum have fled war and persecution and are not responsible for the overall cost of asylum support. That cost has grown, often as a result of policy decisions or failings of this Government and the previous one. Earlier, we discussed the difference in cost between nightly paid hotel accommodation and properly settled dispersal accommodation in genuine homes. The Government are not spending their money wisely at present, and I think Ministers are seeking to address that. Would tackling that not be more cost-effective than trying to recover money from close-to-destitute asylum seekers?
The Home Secretary has also said this policy is introducing a “contributory principle”. What she ignores, however, is that refugees do contribute, and have always done so, through working, paying taxes and contributing to their local communities. In fact, on wider impacts, the refugee tax is not introducing the idea that refugees should contribute. In my view, it is making it harder for them to do so, while also harming community cohesion and integration.
A policy that was truly focused on increasing refugee contributions could look at how barriers to employment can be removed, so that people can access work more easily, progress in a career and transfer their qualifications to this country. I have had casework on those matters, which are barriers to refugees contributing to society through their taxes and making the most of the skills they can bring here by accessing education and further training. That would all help the Government to address asylum support costs, but it would do so by supporting vulnerable refugees, not targeting them with this tax.
Has the Minister really addressed, in any of her comments today, the facts in the letter she wrote to us at the end of the oral evidence session, which admits fully that three in five of the people currently awaiting a decision are not claiming support? Why are those people not being asked to contribute in any way, if recovering the costs from people is the most important thing to the Government? Amendment 140 gets to the heart of that: what is the balance of payments?
Finally, I believe this policy is cruel. It seeks to deter people from coming to this country, and that is the key reason why it is so targeted at the most vulnerable refugees, and not at those who can pay their own way. However, will it actually work as a deterrent? In general, the Home Office already has evidence that punitive measures such as the refugee tax have little impact on where people choose to seek asylum. Furthermore, in the oral evidence session, when asked about this, the Refugee Council highlighted that people will be able to avoid these payments simply by not applying for asylum support while their application is being processed, a risk also recognised in the Home Office’s impact assessment. Although that may reduce asylum support costs, I do not think that such a result is the Government’s intention, as it will push more people seeking asylum into vulnerable situations in which they can be exploited further. Do the Government not think that policies from this and previous Governments have already done enough of that?
I thank hon. Members for their amendments in this group, as well as for the discussion and interest they have shown in this provision, which we have debated at length today.
Clause 23 enables the Secretary of State to require those who have received asylum support and accommodation, known as section 4 and section 95 support, to pay a contribution towards those costs. The clause contains an important safeguard: it requires the regulations to ensure that individuals are not required to pay when doing so would cause them to become destitute. That means that people will not be required to pay if it meant they could not meet their essential living needs or if it would place them at risk of homelessness.
The clause exempts children. Other exemptions will be set out in secondary legislation to ensure safeguards, thus protecting vulnerable groups. I look forward to working further with Members on that throughout the course of the Bill. Details of how the charge will be applied and how the system will operate will be set out in regulations and the Home Secretary has committed to sharing a draft of those regulations with Parliament.
The Bill is built on a balance of rights and responsibilities. This reform protects support for those who need it most, while reinforcing the principle that support should come with an expectation of contribution when that is affordable. When confidence in the asylum system is low, and with asylum support costing the taxpayer around £4 billion, it is right to take steps to reduce costs and ensure that those who can make a proportionate contribution do so. This policy achieves that.
The measure is not a tax on asylum seekers or refugees. It does not affect a person’s right to claim asylum nor their entitlement to receive support when it is needed. The clause reflects the broader principle that, alongside the rights and protections afforded to those seeking asylum, there are responsibilities that our constituents would expect one another to undertake: to contribute towards public costs where it is fair and reasonable to do so. This aids integration, helping to foster a shared sense of fairness, responsibility and belonging. It says to our constituents who contribute for their entitlement that no one should be entitled to a free pass.
Building on the points made by my hon. Friend the Member for South Norfolk, the measure is also about asking people to contribute for those who come after them. My hon. Friend the Member for North Northumberland mentioned the desire that he heard expressed by asylum seekers coming to this country that they want to pay and contribute. Many of them will want to enable the system to continue, so that other people fleeing war and persecution can benefit.
Clause 24 enables asylum support repayments to be recovered through the tax system. It provides a power for regulations to make provision for HMRC to collect repayments on behalf of the Secretary of State from individuals who are liable under clause 23. The clause also creates the statutory framework for information sharing between HMRC and the Home Office where that is necessary for the administration and collection of repayments.
Hon. Members asked whether HMRC will be responsible for collecting payments. We are ensuring a range of repayment mechanisms, including options that could make use of the tax system. Decisions on the final repayment model will be taken in due course, informed by our discussions. We will continue to work across Government to identify the most effective and proportionate response.
The powers we are introducing will help ensure that, should the Government decide to use the tax system as a collection mechanism, repayments can be administered effectively and efficiently. The clause therefore provides the legislative framework necessary to support recovery of asylum support costs through the tax system. I listened carefully to the points made by hon. Members and their detailed questions on the set-up of the scheme, its processes and the collection mechanisms. The Home Secretary has committed that information on those factors will be published during the process of the Bill. I undertake to ensure that hon. Members continue to get more information as the drafts are published.
Moving on to the amendments in this group, amendment 140 and new clause 62 concern transparency and reporting on the asylum support contribution system. The Government recognise the importance of scrutiny, but we cannot accept these provisions. On amendment 140, the Government have already committed to sharing draft regulations during the Bill’s passage, allowing Parliament to discuss the detailed operation of the scheme. Building on the conversation we had on the previous group, I will review whether exemptions will be subject to the affirmative rather than the negative procedure. I hope hon. Members will take that commitment.
The amendment would also make commencement of the scheme conditional on publishing five-year estimates of the number of people liable, sums recovered and administrative costs. Those will depend on the final design and operation of the scheme, and may be subject to considerable uncertainty. For example, the numbers of asylum claims in this country are coming down, so five-year estimates would not necessarily give us any degree of certainty. We will provide relevant analysis through the impact assessment, and are committed to providing data to support transparency on the effectiveness of the scheme as implemented. However, we do not consider it appropriate to make commencement dependent on such five-year forecasts.
Likewise, we do not think that a separate reporting scheme on liabilities, recoveries, write-offs, exemptions and administrative costs, as set out in new clause 62, should be prescribed in primary legislation. We will explore what appropriate information on the operation of the scheme can be incorporated into Government asylum statistics and reporting once the scheme is operational.
To conclude, the Government are committed to ensuring that the scheme is transparent and deliverable, and provides value for money.
I moved to my conclusion too quickly; forgive me, Mr Twigg. I still have a number of points to respond to—I thought we were getting an early escape.
The hon. Gentleman makes an important point, and one that I wanted to cover, regarding asylum support. Section 98 support is temporary emergency accommodation, which is not within the scope of clause 23. Section 98 is the immediate emergency support, and asylum seekers then apply for section 95 support, which is what the clause addresses. He asks why that is not included, and I take his point. We are trying to move away from the kind of expensive and unsustainable emergency support that we saw explode under his party’s Administration. We have already saved more than £1 billion by closing hotels, so that will not be part of this measure. The asylum support that people apply for is what is covered by the clause.
The hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire asked about repayment thresholds. As I said, the Bill establishes the principle and the key framework for the recovery of asylum costs; the detailed operation, including thresholds, will be set out in secondary legislation. That is a common and proportionate approach to drafting such legislation, for which operational detail may be adjusted over time. The policy intent is that repayment will begin only once an individual reaches a defined threshold for repayment, and that deductions will be set at a manageable rate, so that recovery remains proportionate and does not cause hardship or destitution. Any regulations will be subject to parliamentary scrutiny, and there will be clear safeguards.
The hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion asked whether we expected to raise any money. The answer is yes. As I have mentioned, the asylum system represents a significant cost to the taxpayer of about £4 billion. The Government are determined to bring those costs down. The policy of recouping asylum support is a world first. It is about ensuring that those who benefit from this specific, targeted form of support contribute towards its cost, when they can. Our objective is fairness to everyone in this country, as well as sustainability, with any revenue generated reducing the burden on the public purse. It is about not just recovering costs, but contribution. Costs will be recouped over time from individuals who have moved into employment or otherwise have the means to contribute.
Siân Berry
My question is more about the revenue and its spending. We have heard from local authorities concerned that they might have higher costs as a result of the measures. Can the Minister give us any reassurance that the costs will not spill over into services that might be affected by some of the things in the impact assessment?
The hon. Lady makes an important point, but I do not see that the implications will fall on local authorities. As I said, in the course of publishing regulations as a result of the passage of the Bill, we will explore the mechanisms for bringing the money in and for where it will go in the Exchequer. However, at this point I do not want to commit to any undertakings to local authorities. The measure is about ensuring that people contribute and pay their fair share.
The hon. Lady mentioned work—we share that commitment. We all want to see those who have come here fleeing persecution move as quickly as possible into work and into contributing to this country. That is why our new work and study routes will allow people to get off core protection, off dependency and as quickly as possible into the work and study routes that we will provide and encourage asylum seekers to use.
(2 weeks, 1 day ago)
Public Bill CommitteesForgive me, but I have not addressed these issues yet, so if the hon. Gentleman can be patient for a little longer—I am sure he will have more questions afterwards—I would like to make some progress, if I may.
The clause also introduces character and conduct as a factor in the public interest test. This will require judges to have regard to harmful conduct, including criminality below the deportation threshold and outside the mandatory suitability refusals. This is an important element of tackling abuse and takes us one step towards a fairer system that the public can have confidence in.
The clause further reduces avenues for abuse by requiring that no weight—instead of little weight, as now—should be given to an article 8 claim established when someone is here illegally, or legally but only by deceiving the Home Office, or if they have seriously breached the conditions of their permission to be in the UK. That will enable us to more effectively enforce our immigration rules and prevent people from unfairly benefiting from time spent in the UK in violation of our rules, and will avoid the creation of perverse incentives for people who are here unlawfully to try to deliberately establish article 8 claims.
Although it is right that essential protections for children are retained, it is not right that adults who abuse our immigration system are almost guaranteed to be allowed to stay if they can prove a parental relationship with a child in the UK. Currently, there is no need to carry out a full balancing exercise if there is a child. This is the main source of successful article 8 claims, two thirds of which result in residence rights being granted.
The clause clarifies which factors should be considered when determining whether it is in the public interest to remove the parent of a qualifying child from the UK, and introduces a provision to assess the impact of removing a parent where a child remains in the UK.
I thank the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion for amendment 61, which sets out a new public interest consideration, under which specific regard would be given to the circumstances of victims of violence against women and girls when assessing whether interference with an individual’s article 8 right is justified. Of course, we absolutely recognise and take seriously the importance of tackling violence against women and girls, and the devastating impact that it has on victims. However, the Government do not consider the amendment to be necessary.
Clause 19 already preserves a case-specific assessment in which courts and tribunals can consider all relevant facts and evidence, including experiences of domestic abuse, violence and exploitation, and the safeguarding concerns that the hon. Lady mentioned in her case studies. The holistic article 8 assessment that the clause retains ensures that protections exist for vulnerable people and that support remains available for those who genuinely need it. In addition, existing provisions in the immigration rules, including “Appendix Victim of Domestic Abuse” and the migrant victims of domestic abuse concession, provide specific protections. Those safeguards are there to ensure that victims’ experiences are properly recognised and taken into account.
I thank the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire for tabling amendment 104. I understand the intention behind it, but I am afraid that the Government do not consider the amendment to be helpful. I agree that good character is an important consideration in article 8 cases. Including that factor in the public interest test ensures that protections are focused on those who have acted responsibly. That is an important element of creating a fair system that the public have confidence in and that is not open to abuse. The clause establishes that and requires the courts and tribunals to have regard to harmful conduct, including that below the deportation threshold and outside mandatory suitability refusals. We will set out further detail on that in published guidance and the immigration rules.
Let me be clear that the existing guidance, including the guidance mentioned by the hon. Gentleman, will be a useful comparator and will play an important role in shaping this. We do not want to be tied exclusively to the 1981 guidance, but want to develop ours further. Our approach will therefore reflect that already taken in nationality legislation, where good character is not exhaustively defined on the face of the Bill but is addressed through the guidance.
Siân Berry
I am very interested in the fact that the Minister has just talked about going further on good character in some guidance. Will that guidance take into account factors that might otherwise weigh against the character of someone making an appeal if they have been exploited or abused? Is that the kind of thing that the Minister is thinking about in terms of deviating from the 1981 guidance?
The guidance will set out very clearly what we will ask the courts and tribunals to have regard to in relation to harmful conduct. We will also make sure, as I have already mentioned, that there is sufficient protection regarding issues around domestic violence. That will be in our immigration rules, and it is in our existing provisions. We will ensure that courts and tribunals consider all relevant facts and evidence. I place this on the record in Committee: we will expect experiences of domestic violence, abuse and exploitation, and safeguarding concerns to be a key part of that.
To go back to amendment 104, our approach will reflect the approach already taken in nationality legislation, so that good character is not exhaustively defined in the Bill, but addressed through guidance. Everything raised by colleagues in Committee will be on the record.
I am not going to rule that out here in the Committee, but I can come back and clarify that point for the hon. Gentleman. My expectation is that if someone is deported, and they wish to take their child with them, they are perfectly entitled to do so. It is not for the Government to say that the child has to stay in this country, rather than moving with their family. I will not rule that out here in the Committee.
In conclusion, clause 19 tightly defines the public interest test to ensure that individual rights are properly balanced against the public interest in effective immigration control, and to eradicate the abuse that has crept into our system.
Siân Berry
Further to the discussion with the Minister about ensuring that victims of abuse and sexual violence are protected, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment proposed: 105, in clause 19, page 17, line 3, leave out “should” and insert “must”.—(Blake Stephenson.)
This amendment would require, rather than advise, that no weight is given to private or family life established while a person is in the United Kingdom unlawfully, with leave obtained by deception or in serious breach of their conditions.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
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Public Bill Committees
Siân Berry
I would like further clarity on why those grounds—the reasons for which revocation could be made—which the Minister read out very clearly, are not simply added to the Bill at this point to make the situation incredibly clear.
I appreciate the hon. Lady’s question. The reason is that immigration rules are not normally put on the face of primary legislation. It would be unusual to do that on the face of the Bill. I can clarify that shortly with the hon. Lady, but that is my understanding of why this is not on the face of the Bill—because it is done through the usual route of immigration rules.
The hon. Lady asked what applicants will be told and how this will support those going through the process in simplifying their decision making. The decision-making process will be simplified in all decisions that would not currently be a grant of refugee status, because they will no longer refuse refugee status and then go on to separately consider serious harm. Instead, a single decision on risk on return will be made. Officials are already working with non-governmental organisations in the sector to identify the precise wording most appropriate in a new grant letter.
The hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough asked what the 30-month renewal will involve. We are committed to ensuring that our policies are sustainable and do not place unnecessary burdens on the taxpayer, and this policy is no different. In terms of resources and processing, only those who do remain on core protection will have their protection needs regularly reviewed. Reviews will be targeted based on objective country information and any other new information that comes to light, allowing us to make the most efficient use of resources. We will continue to monitor staffing levels and will deploy our workforce flexibly, subject to business needs, as we have done in the past. The approach to reviewing status will be efficient and targeted, and we will reassess where country conditions or personal circumstances change.
I appreciate the hon. Gentleman raising that point. He will understand that this decision making is part of the core business for the Home Office. I can come back to him during the Committee with more specific detail on what that process will look like, but it is important to reassure him that we will continue to monitor our staffing levels and deploy our workforce flexibly, subject to business needs.
Siân Berry
It is important to know whether the 30-month process will be more like a simple renewal—like me renewing my TV licence or something like that—or whether it will be a reinterrogation of the person seeking protection all over again? Will the onus be on the Government to say, for example, that a country has suddenly become safe, that there has been a new Government, that major changes have occurred and, therefore, that we will look more closely at a number of cases, but that in countries where the situation has remained the same, we will not be looking in depth? How simple the process will be is really bothering people. Having all their circumstances reinterrogated and having to prove themselves over and over again is something people have learned to expect from the Home Office. It is up to the Minister to reassure us on this point.
I appreciate the hon. Lady raising that point. I was intending to come to it; she will be pleased to know that I still have quite a lot to get through in my speech. To reassure her, individuals will need to meet the relevant suitability requirements for ongoing permission to stay. If someone is convicted of a criminal offence that meets the relevant thresholds, they will be excluded from protection and will not be eligible for core protection. If there has been a significant and durable change in their country’s situation or a change in their personal circumstances, their ongoing need for protection will be reviewed. For anyone who has returned to the country of persecution or serious harm, or obtained a national passport, their circumstances will be reviewed. I hope that that gives the hon. Lady a degree of clarity, but I am happy to go back and clarify that in more detail during the Committee—I can see that it would mean a lot to both her and the hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough.
Amendments 53 and 54, tabled by the hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough, would revert to the previous position of granting five years’ leave to remain to refugees and placing them on a five-year route to settlement, and would allow automatic entitlement to family reunion. In recent years, the number of people seeking protection has significantly increased, placing unprecedented pressure on housing, public services and communities across the UK. From 2004 to 2020, between 22,000 and 46,000 people were claiming asylum in the UK each year. However, there has been a huge increase since the second half of 2021, reaching a peak of 110,000 in the year ending September 2025. Although the numbers of people claiming asylum fell to 85,891 in the year ending June 2026, it still remains high compared with levels seen in the decade to 2021.
I know that many of our constituents have huge concerns about fairness, how the system operates and whether it supports those who truly need protection. That is why the Government published a new asylum policy statement in November last year that set out significant reforms to the UK’s asylum system. Core protection is one of the key elements of the asylum reforms. Under this new policy, protection will be granted for the duration of need and will be renewable where a person remains at risk on return. Greater entitlements, including a shorter period to settlement and a route to sponsor family members, will be accessed by demonstrating contribution to and integration into UK society. Settlement will no longer be automatic. Instead, there will be a 20-year route to permanent residency, crucially with the ability to reduce that period by switching into the protection work and study route to ensure long-term commitment, contribution and integration.
As a first step towards that, the Government changed immigration laws on 5 March 2026. Any adult or accompanied child who claims asylum from 2 March 2026 onwards and qualifies for a grant of refugee status or humanitarian protection will be granted leave for 30 months. At a 30-month review, refugees with a continuing need of sanctuary will have their protection renewed, while those who no longer have a protection need will be expected to return home. The safe return review will consider whether there has been a fundamental and durable change in their country of origin.
We recognise that, when a country situation changes, not everyone will be safe. Of course, as occurs now, individual circumstances will be taken into account, and each case will be assessed on its own merits. The overthrow of one political party in favour of another might only be transitory. The changes must be such that the reasons for becoming a refugee have ceased to exist and there are no other reasons for an individual to fear returning to their country.
Siân Berry
For clarity, will the onus be on the Government to prove the change, or will it be like reapplying from scratch each time? Again, my casework shows that we are more used to the Home Office asking for chapter and verse from the applicant each time. If the Minister is prepared to promise that it will be for the Government to prove changes, that would mean a lot to many people listening.
The hon. Lady pre-empts my next paragraph. To clarify for her, once the individual acquires protection status, the burden of proof is on the Home Office to demonstrate that protection is no longer required. It will be us who will demonstrate that; it will not be for the claimant to make another asylum claim, unless there are new grounds that have not been raised before. Any decision to revoke protection status will continue to have a right of appeal. As always, we will continue to uphold the fundamental principle that we will not return anyone to a country where they are at risk.
Refugees with a continuing protection need will have to wait 20 years for settlement unless they switch to protection work and study as part of the core protection model. A new, bespoke work and study route will allow access to family reunion and settlement rights, with new fees and conditions in accordance with the rules of that route. That will enable refugees to earn down the length of time before they can settle in the UK, and demonstrate that they are contributing to the UK and can support their family before they may bring their partner and children over. Further details will be set out in future immigration rule changes. This route will not include a safe return review.
(2 weeks, 6 days ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI completely appreciate where the hon. Gentleman is coming from, because I know he wants to get a sense of how many people could and would apply, but it would be impossible for us to know without knowing the family circumstances of everyone in the country. What we can do is best extrapolate from the applications that have been made as to whether they would fail or pass our new tests. I reassure him that it will be a high bar; the majority will be refused if they and their overseas family members do not meet the rules. Article 8 is a safeguard—that is what the Bill maintains—not a gateway.
The shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire, referenced the publishing of the modelling. He referred to the representative sample of 3,252 article 8-related applications. That is an internal sample that has not been published due to personal data sensitivities, but I commit to write to set out our data on article 8 for the Committee.
Siân Berry (Brighton Pavilion) (Green)
I am afraid I still cannot find the updated impact assessment, either on the website, by email or on the table in this Committee Room. I would very much like to see the new information that the Minister referred to yesterday.
I appreciate that. I believe the updated impact assessment has been published, but I will double-check. If it has not been published on the website, I am sure that the Clerks or someone in administration will be able to deal with that.
I want to draw out some of the figures from the impact assessment. There is to be an additional 3,600 removals a year. We have tried to be realistic and transparent in the impact assessment. We say that there will be 11,700 additional refusals a year. When applied to the net lifetime fiscal cost per applicant, 11,700 applicants would cost the taxpayer more than £1.7 billion, which is a considerable amount. I am sure hon. Members can understand why we are trying to do what we are doing through the Bill.
We took a deep-dive cohort analysis to examine the representative sample that I mentioned of 3,252 article 8-related applications. That was to support our policy development. I am afraid that further details of the cohort analysis from the unpublished internal sample will not be available due to personal data considerations, as I mentioned, but I appreciate the importance of further analysis. I have noted that, and we will bring that to the Committee.
A question was asked about what assessment has been made of the potential merits of disapplying the Human Rights Act to immigration matters. I remain committed to ensuring that our broader human rights framework is fit for the challenges of today, but there are currently no plans to amend the Human Rights Act. We do not have to withdraw from the ECHR—I will discuss that further this afternoon—or disapply the Human Rights Act to create meaningful reform. We are reviewing our approach to ECHR implementation within the immigration system; that is the intention of the Bill.
Articles 8 and 3 address different harms and legal thresholds. We do not expect the reforms to generate an increase in successful article 3 claims. There will be no new rights or entitlements that will make it any easier for people to apply. Indeed, we are codifying the restrictions in the clauses we will discuss this afternoon. Sponsors will still need to demonstrate a very high bar for their family to be able to join them in the UK on the basis of article 8.
The Government are keeping under review whether and how to commence the inadmissibility provisions in section 59 of the Illegal Migration Act 2023, which amended section 88 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2022 to include human rights claims. However, those provisions would not be applied to sponsored human rights claims, as in most cases it would not be reasonable to declare a claim inadmissible just because the sponsor could reside in one of the listed safe countries. Clause 17 can be commenced without that, and we can write to Members further with the details.
(2 weeks, 6 days ago)
Public Bill CommitteesIt is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Twigg. I thank hon. Members for their contributions this afternoon. It has been fascinating to have one side saying that we are not going far enough and the other that we are going too far. I hope that means that we are getting the right balance between what the British people wish to see and allowing for the fundamental human rights we all benefit from.
I hope the Chair will indulge me for a moment because I would like to directly address the comments from the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion. It was unfair and, frankly, quite insulting to suggest that we introduced the Bill to chase rhetoric. I feel very passionately on behalf of my constituents about the importance of the Bill. I know that the hon. Lady and I represent very different constituencies, but she says that there is universal support for refugees. I am sure that she, like me, is watching with horror the masked-up thugs on the streets trying to attack asylum seekers and chasing them out of their accommodation, but when I knock on doors in my constituency, people constantly raise the unfairness of people who seek to exploit our systems, processes and commitment to values like universal human rights, because they can see that those people are not genuine and that they are exploiting our generosity. While we want to fulfil those commitments, it is really important to me that the system has integrity, and that is what the Bill is about.
I do not mean to be rude, but the hon. Lady has had plenty of time. We can pick this up outside the Committee room, but I wanted to get that on the record.
Clause 18 introduces a definition of article 8 family life into UK primary legislation for the first time, giving courts and decision makers a more consistent framework to apply to immigration cases. Until now, courts have had to determine the existence and scope of family life on a case-by-case basis, which has resulted in significant variability in outcomes. Article 8 is a two-stage test. First, a decision maker or court must decide if family or private life exists. Secondly, where family or private life is established, they must decide whether interference with it pursues a legitimate aim, such as the interests of public safety or the economic wellbeing of the country, and is proportionate when the nature of the breach is balanced against the public interest of removing an individual or refusing them entry.
It is right that article 8 acts as a safeguard to protect genuine family relationships. However, these protections can create opportunities for individuals to rely on weak or peripheral family connections as a basis to remain in or come to the UK. Clause 18 addresses this. It acts in tandem with clause 19 by setting coherent parameters for when family life can be established in line with Strasbourg case law before the strengthened public interest test is applied. It provides a clearer statutory framework for determining whether family life exists for article 8 purposes.
(3 weeks, 1 day ago)
Public Bill Committees
Siân Berry
On a point of clarification, is it not correct that under clause 7 the upper tribunal can hear an appeal only based on a point of law? Will the Minister comment on the way that challenging the processes or the administration of someone’s claim could therefore not be taken to the upper tribunal? Is she removing that safeguard? I remain concerned that the complexity of the law and the lack, often, of legal representation, as well as the difficulties that we all see in our casework of people claiming asylum, dealing with the Home Office’s processes and making their way through all this, mean that quite often there are process problems that ought to be challenged, and that this has been denied to people at the upper tribunal.
The process mirrors the existing first-tier tribunal, which reviews errors of law, so it is important to clarify that this remains the same and retains the same definition. It is only on errors of law that a process can be appealed; this does not narrow that process any further.
Amendment 85 takes a very different approach. It would prevent decisions of the authority from being appealed to the upper tribunal at all. I am afraid we do not consider that acceptable. We do not believe that the authority’s decisions should be entirely prevented from onward appeal. That goes too far in the other direction and denies the right of justice where there has been an error of law.
Removing the statutory right of appeal could potentially open us up to even more litigation, as appeals where there has been an error of law would end up going straight to that process without this important safety valve. The authority will make important first-instance decisions, and it is right that there should be a means of correcting a decision when an authority has made, as we have said, an error of law.
Siân Berry
I have very nearly finished, so I will press on. At its heart, the IIAA fundamentally represents another ill-thought-through Government proposal to create a truncated legal process. It is part of the previous Prime Minister’s misconceived attempts to pander to the disturbing ideas of Reform UK and its even more unsettling offshoot, Restore Britain. We saw from Reform UK’s proposals yesterday that only standing up for asylum rights will do in the face of its politics, and that the far right of politics will never be happy with anything other than the total removal of asylum rights.
Meanwhile, measures like those in clause 1 of this Bill will prove impractical, expensive and ineffective in addressing the backlog, and they will hurt the most vulnerable people in the world. These proposals must be dropped, if not today then well before the Bill leaves the House of Commons. I will vote against clause 1.
I thank all hon. Members for speaking in the opening debates. As we have discussed, clause 1 and schedule 1 will establish the IIAA, with the key aim of overhauling the current system and driving down the unacceptable waiting times, which are causing significant problems in the system. As I set out, we know that public consent for our asylum system is fraying, and we have heard that from colleagues today.
The hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion set out very clearly and passionately that the current system is letting down those who are genuinely fleeing war and persecution as well. Genuine asylum seekers are not served by a process that gets ensnared in legal chew and does not have the opportunity to correct errors quickly. This is about enabling us to streamline the process, reduce errors and deal with people quickly and fairly in a much more managed way than the current system, which is letting everyone down on all sides, including those who are going through the process. As has been demonstrated, they are living in limbo at the taxpayer’s expense for far too long, and that is making it increasingly difficult for their cases to have a fair hearing. We all know the phrase about justice delayed, and I am afraid that that is the situation we are currently in.
I have set out the case fairly substantially, so I will not go over the arguments about the principles behind this again. Independence from Government is a cornerstone of the establishment of this new authority, and clause 1 seeks to protect that. Government amendments 22 to 24, while technical, will allow for the full operation of the IIAA when they begin their important work of determining cases. I want to come back to some of the questions raised by the hon. Member for Stockton West about transition and so on. As we have discussed, the scale and nature of the current asylum appeals caseload cannot be sustainably managed within the existing limits of the first-tier tribunal. Our assessment is that a fundamental reform is required to create a system capable of handling caseload volumes at speed while maintaining quality of decision making, fairness and independence.
The shadow Minister mentioned the Bill’s use of the phrase “adequate training and support”. In answering his question on that, as well as some of the other questions he asked that were more practical, it is really important for me to specify that it is not for the Home Office to decide that. The chief executive will be responsible for ensuring that the IIAA adjudicators have adequate training and support to maintain their independence from the executive. The chief appeals officer is responsible for overseeing the quality of decisions and developing a quality assurance mechanism. They will be able to identify any specific training needs of adjudicators and recommend them to the chief executive. It is really important that I confirm to the Committee that the IIAA is independent. It is not for the Government to decide what accreditation and continuous development will be required for the IIAA adjudicators, who will, in essence, be making decisions on appeals to which the Home Office is a party.
Siân Berry
I have heard arguments from Government Back Benchers and the Minister that, for example, Home Office officials are not required to be legally qualified. This is a notoriously complex area of law, and I cannot see how that does not reinforce the need for true expertise in appeals. We have also heard that magistrates are not required to be legally qualified, but magistrates’ decisions are backed up by appeals to a body of legally qualified people. The Bill seeks to remove that, so I cannot honestly agree with this measure.
There are two extra points I want to make from the written evidence that we received from JUSTICE. The first is about training. The Minister talks about the fact that adjudicators will be properly trained. According to JUSTICE, Home Office asylum decision makers were given 22 weeks’ training, but it was found that that was inadequate and did not provide them with the necessary information to perform their job effectively. I fail to see how things are going to work out any better for adjudicators taking the place of legally qualified professionals.
The Minister mentioned that legally qualified people advise magistrates and that legally qualified people will be available to advise the adjudicators. JUSTICE makes the point very well—
(3 weeks, 1 day ago)
Public Bill CommitteesI again thank the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion for her amendments. We are having numerous Divisions today, but it keeps us all on our toes. I will take her amendments in turn.
Clause 4 sets out that the authority will operate under a set of procedure rules determined by the IIAA procedure rules board. I will set out the details about the establishment of the board when we discuss clause 5, but that board is the body that will determine the procedure rules. In reference to some of the requests for more information on the rules, or for draft rules, those are not for us to determine. The procedure rules board will be set up through a proper establishment process as it is a statutory body, and it is important that it leads on the drafting of the procedure rules.
Those rules will be made by statutory instrument so we will have the opportunity to scrutinise them at that point. Making the IIAA procedure rules that way provides an important safeguard to the independence of the authority by placing control of its procedural framework—set out in schedule 3—in the hands of the IIAA procedure rules board. That is broadly similar to the process for the current tribunal rules, which sees the Tribunal Procedure Committee draft rule changes following consultations with relevant stakeholders. The IIAA procedure rules board, like the Tribunal Procedure Committee, will make its own procedure rules as if it were a Minister of the Crown.
Amendment 63, in the name of the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, seeks to amend clause 4 so that the authority’s procedure rules board must draft the procedural rules “with a view to” securing the statutory objectives in clauses 1(4) and 1(5). It would replace the current requirement for the board to draft the rules with
“regard to the desirability of”
meeting those objectives. The amendment mirrors the wording of the duty placed on the Tribunal Procedure Committee in the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act.
The Bill sets out that in the exercise of its primary function, the IIAA must
“aim to be accessible, fair and independent…aim to handle its cases quickly and efficiently, and…have regard to the public interest, and…to the fact that the IIAA operates as a key part of the immigration and asylum system.”
The procedure rules board is internal to the authority and therefore members of the board would be expected to comply with the statutory duty set out in clauses 1(4) and 1(5). Amendment 63 would therefore have no practical impact on the way the authority’s procedure rules board develops its rules.
Siân Berry
The Minister has not justified why the wording is different. She said that members of the board would be expected to comply; my amendment would simply make that even clearer. Why say that they should
“have regard to the desirability of”
instead of using the wording that I suggest in amendment 63?
We simply do not believe that is necessary. The procedure rules board does not require that change to the wording about its objectives, because that already forms part of the authority. As I have specified, the authority is under a duty, which is made explicit on the first page of the Bill, towards those objectives in the performance of its functions—it has to undertake them. It has a statutory objective to aim to be “accessible, fair and independent” in the performance of its functions, so we do not agree that this is any sort of watering down. The way that the procedure rules are made will be independent of the Government and it is crucial that we maintain these safeguards.
Schedule 3 establishes the framework within which the procedure rules of the authority will operate and ensures that the IIAA has the powers necessary to manage proceedings fairly, efficiently and transparently. The schedule provides for rules-governing matters such as hearings, evidence, representation, reviews of decisions, appeals to the upper tribunal, costs and the publication of decisions. It also enables the IIAA to make effective use of modern case management practices, including remote hearings and measures to support vulnerable participants.
The schedule promotes the timely and effective resolution of cases. It allows the procedure rules to address the treatment of evidence provided late, while preserving appropriate safeguards where there are good reasons for delay. It also reinforces transparency and accountability by providing for the publication of decisions, subject to safeguards, to protect the interest of justice and the anonymity of those who should not be identified. Taken together, these provisions will enable the authority to develop a clear and comprehensive procedural framework, supporting it to discharge its functions fairly, consistently and without unnecessary delay.
I turn to amendment 68, which would require the authority procedure rules to provide that an adjudicator involved in making the original decision cannot take part in a review of that decision. The Government recognise the importance of ensuring that these reviews are conducted fairly and impartially. Again, the Bill already provides appropriate safeguards around the exercise of the review power. Clause 6 will require a review to be carried out by an IIAA adjudicator, while schedule 3 will enable the procedure rules to set out the circumstances in which and the procedure by which the power under clause 6 may be exercised. Clause 3 also makes the chief appeals officer responsible for allocating cases to adjudicators and for developing a quality assurance mechanism. These are important safeguards to enable the fair and impartial allocation of reviews. The Government therefore consider that the allocation of reviews is more appropriately addressed through the authority procedure rules and case allocation arrangements, rather than being prescribed in the Bill.
Clause 5 sets out which of the IIAA members will sit on the IIAA procedure rules board and how appointments of standing members to the board can be made. The procedure rules board will consist of
“the Chief Executive…the Chief Appeals Officer…the Professional Standards Officer, and…any standing members appointed by the Chair.”
The statutory make-up of the board will ensure that it has adequate expertise to draft rules that are fit for purpose, including the legal expertise of the chief appeals officer and the professional standards officer. The option to appoint further standing members will enable the chair to ensure that the board can make rules in areas requiring specialist expertise, where relevant; that might include social worker expertise for rules related to unaccompanied asylum-seeking children, for example. Beyond that, as clause 4 sets out, the board must consult such persons as it considers appropriate. Again, that will support the IIAA to incorporate a range of views, expertise and experience into its rules.
The Government amendments in this group seek to achieve several aims. I will cover expedited appeal proceedings in more detail when we debate groups 8, 9 and 11 on the selection list. In this group, amendments 30, 31, 33, 34 and 35 will ensure that the immigration bail provisions operate consistently within the Bill’s expedited proceedings framework. The Bill already requires regard to be had, when considering whether to grant immigration bail, to whether proceedings are subject to the late claims process under clause 12. These amendments simply make equivalent provision where proceedings before the IIAA relating to a person are being expedited pursuant to a request by the Secretary of State under clause 9, which we will come to later and which will apply where the Secretary of State considers that it would be in the public interest for proceedings to be expedited. It is therefore appropriate that cases proceeding under the expedited process be treated consistently with cases subject to the late claims process.
These amendments will simply ensure that both categories are reflected in the matters to which regard must be had when determining whether to grant immigration bail. Crucially, however, they will not alter the legal test for immigration bail. The amendments will also remove applicants for immigration bail from the paragraph 11 credibility provisions in schedule 3, with the effect that those provisions apply only in relation to appellants. Taken together, these are technical and consequential amendments that will ensure that part 1 of the Bill operates as intended.
Government new clause 2 will give the Secretary of State a power to take such steps as they consider appropriate to increase the supply and capacity of qualified immigration advisers to appellants in the IIAA—that is, people who are qualified within the meaning of section 84 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 to provide immigration advice and services. Provision has already been made in schedule 3, which requires appellants to indicate whether they have obtained advice or representation.
This power is intended to complement that provision by expressly empowering the Secretary of State to invest in increasing the availability of advice and representation for appellants and bail applicants in the IIAA. I am glad to hear it welcomed by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, because it is intended to support access to justice by encouraging growth in the advice and representation sector and by increasing availability and access to advisers and representatives. It creates a clear legal basis on which to increase the general availability of IIAA advice and representation through financial and other assistance. For example, investment may be in training, accreditation, workforce development and support for service providers. Early legal advice helps to avoid delays and late claims, leads to better decisions and, crucially, ensures that individuals get the advice and support that they need at an appropriate time.
Government amendment 29 will amend schedule 3 to ensure that the IIAA procedure rules require the IIAA to provide all appellants and bail applicants with information on how to access advice and representation, reinforcing our intention that all appellants should have the opportunity to obtain it. Government amendment 28 is a small technical change to enable amendment 36, which we will come to in the next group. Finally, Government amendment 32 will limit the application of paragraph 11(3) of schedule 3, so that IIAA procedure rules are not required to make the same provision as is made in new clause 3, which we will come to later.
We are putting a huge amount into ensuring the quality and the expertise on the board that is setting up these rules. As I say, we have the legal expertise of the chief appeals officer and the professional standards officer. They will be reporting to Parliament in a whole range of ways, so we will be able to monitor the process throughout. The amendment would simply tie the hands of the procedure rules board. It is not for us to dictate how it undertakes the review process. It is important that it be independent of Government and be able to establish its own process, which will ultimately be accountable to Parliament.
It is also important to flag the equality and impartiality. There will be training, legal support, professional standards, decision quality oversight, internal review and onwards appeal rights, so there are a whole range of factors to ensure that the quality of adjudicators’ decisions is high. The chief appeals officer will oversee that. They will have to develop a quality assurance mechanism as well, and the professional standards officer will be setting and maintaining professional standards. We are putting a range of things in place to ensure the highest standards in the decision-making process.
On new clause 2, the shadow Minister asked about costs, about access and about when people will be able to have advice and representation during the process. We will ensure that all those who lodge an appeal to be heard in the new IIAA can access advice and representation, with access to legal aid where the eligibility tests are met. On the bail process, we are also ensuring that when we ask people to state whether they have advice and arrangements in place for representation, we encourage the uptake of suitably regulated advice and representation. That will help us to reduce delays, avoid disruption and provide fairness throughout the process.
I think I have answered most of the questions that hon. Members have raised, but if there are any further points that I have missed, I will come back to the Committee.
Siân Berry
The Minister’s insistence that this is not a watering down of previous rules does not wash. In my opinion, it is a double watering down: clause 4 makes a change to “have regard to”, and clause 1 includes a double use of “aim to” rather than “must”. That is certainly a watering down of the previous duties, and I think we should go along with the wording in amendment 63.
On amendment 68, we have heard a lot of assurances from the Minister that the quality assurance and rule-making processes are unlikely to do the opposite of what this amendment asks. We have heard the Minister say, “They can do this.” If she were prepared to say, “They will do this,” I could potentially withdraw the amendment, but in the absence of that assurance—with only “This is possible” and “We might see this,” and with only the negative procedure—I am afraid I will have to press it to a vote.
I appreciate what the hon. Member says, but as I say, it is not feasible for the Home Office or the Government to dictate in that way. I cannot give her that assurance, because we are setting up the body so that it can be independent and can set up its own rules, processes and procedures. It is really important that we allow it to undertake that, so I cannot put her recommendation explicitly in the Bill.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
I thank Members again for their amendments in this group. I will turn to those amendments after explaining the drafting of clause 8.
Clause 8 enables the Secretary of State, following consultation with the authority—I have been using the word “authority” for brevity, so I hope that colleagues know I am referring to the IIAA—to set time limits for certain appeals, bail applications and procedural steps. The cohorts of appeals that may be expedited under clause 8 will be set out following consultation between the Home Secretary and the authority, but potential cohorts could include removable foreign national offenders, for whom the swift resolution of appeals and enforcement of deportation where appropriate is a long-standing Home Secretary priority, as set out in the Government’s “Restoring Order and Control” statement.
The purpose is simple: to support the timely resolution of cases. The clause will help to ensure that the appeals system is efficient, responsive and capable of delivering justice without unnecessary delay. Let me be absolutely clear: this clause does not affect the authority’s independence in deciding cases. It concerns the management of proceedings, not their outcome.
The Secretary of State must consult the authority before making regulations, and the authority retains the flexibility to allow additional time where the interests of justice or the practicalities of a case require it. This is a balanced and proportionate measure. It will improve efficiency and accountability while preserving fairness and access to justice. This clause is about timely justice—which, as other hon. Members have mentioned, is just as important for those undergoing the process as it is for the wider public—not rushed justice, and efficient case management, not ministerial control.
Amendment 89 would impose an arbitrary deadline for making the first regulations under clause 8. The clause is deliberately flexible, allowing time periods to be introduced where the evidence shows that particular cases should be prioritised. I appreciate the entreaties of the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire, but it is really important that we do not pre-empt the evidence, particularly during the authority’s early development. Further reporting requirements are also unnecessary. Clause 8 already requires the authority’s annual report to cover cases where time periods have been extended.
Amendment 83 would unnecessarily broaden the statutory consultation requirement. Stakeholder engagement is of course important, and it is something I believe in very strongly, but prescribing a lengthy list of consultees in the Bill could delay our ability to respond quickly where particular cases need to be prioritised. Clause 8 already requires the Secretary of State to consult the authority and, crucially, does not restrict wider engagement if needed, so there is an opportunity for that.
I would also like to make this point: for me, Parliament is the ultimate stakeholder, and the public are ultimately the people this Bill is for. Our constituents have lived experience of this process, so it is important that they have the ultimate say, and that is why the Home Secretary is accountable to Parliament in this process. It is Members of Parliament, who represent their constituents, who can ultimately represent that stakeholder, and it is crucial to remember that.
More broadly, the Bill already places clear duties on the authority, which must exercise its primary function with a view to ensuring that justice is done. It must aim to be accessible, fair and independent, and it must aim to handle its cases quickly and effectively. It is in everyone’s interests that cases are resolved swiftly.
Before I finish, I would like to respond to a couple more of the points that were made. On the point of the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion about lived experience, we recognise the value of wider stakeholder engagement, but prescribing this lengthy list could delay action where particular cases need to be prioritised. We do not want to restrict the flexibility around that. As I have said, the Bill already requires the Secretary of State to consult with the authority before making regulations and, crucially, it does not restrict that wider engagement, which is so important.
The hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire asked for details on the timeframes and the kinds of cases that the authority will prioritise, which will be set out in regulations in due course. The Government are clear that appeals may be prioritised where there is a strong public interest or compelling operational reason to do so. As I have already mentioned, that could include the cases of foreign national offenders, where we have a genuine need to protect the public, or individuals who are in detention. Any prioritisation will support the efficient operation of the appeals system while ensuring that we maintain fairness and justice. For those reasons, I respectfully ask for the amendments not to be pressed to a vote.
Siân Berry
I will not labour the point any further. I will press my amendment to a Division, and I hope the Minister will keep looking at how this kind of consultation can be made more statutorily inclusive.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
The clause sets out the extension of the remit of the independent chief inspector of borders and immigration so that they may inspect and report on the authority’s performance. That will allow them to examine the authority’s efficiency, effectiveness and consistency, as well as wider operational matters.
Independent scrutiny is an important safeguard. It will support transparency and accountability and help maintain public confidence in the new appeals system. The clause preserves the authority’s independence. The inspector will not be able to reconsider, overturn or otherwise interfere with the outcome of any individual appeal. The inspector’s role will be to identify systemic issues and opportunities for improvement, rather than to provide an additional route of challenge for individual appellants.
Inspection reports will be handled through the existing statutory framework, including the provision for reports to be sent to the authority and the Secretary of State, and for the Secretary of State to lay them before Parliament. The clause therefore strikes the right balance between robust independent oversight and the protection of independent decision making.
Amendment 92 would require the independent chief inspector’s report on the IIAA to include the proportion of authority decisions set aside by the upper tribunal and the number of people removed following the dismissal of an appeal. I thank the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire for tabling it. The Government agree that the authority must be subject to effective and transparent scrutiny, which is precisely why clause 13 extends the remit of the independent chief inspector to cover the authority’s performance. However, it would not be appropriate to prescribe those particular measures on the face of the Bill. The chief inspector will already be able to examine the authority’s efficiency and the effectiveness of its processes. Their role is to monitor the processes, not the outcomes.
The number of decisions set aside by the upper tribunal cannot by itself provide a complete assessment of the overall quality of the authority’s decision making, and nor will the number of removals following dismissed appeals provide a direct measure of the authority’s performance. The amendment would therefore risk holding the independent chief inspector, and indirectly the authority, to account for outcomes not wholly within the authority’s control. The chief inspector already has an established role in inspecting the immigration system, and clause 13 enables them to assess, as they consider appropriate, the efficiency and effectiveness of the authority and how it is delivering against its objectives. For those reasons, the Government cannot accept the amendment, and I invite the hon. Gentleman to withdraw it.
New clause 28 relates to publishing information on the operation and performance of the authority. The Bill already contains a comprehensive framework for accountability and transparency of the authority. First, paragraph 11 of schedule 2 requires the authority to prepare an annual report on the exercise of its functions, which must be laid before Parliament. That will ensure regular parliamentary scrutiny of the performance and operation of the new body. Secondly, the clause provides independent inspection of the performance of the authority’s functions. The purpose of that is to provide additional external reporting on the IIAA’s efficiency and effectiveness. It is unnecessary to prescribe a detailed list of operational metrics in the Bill.
Siân Berry
The Minister said, “efficiency and effectiveness”. One of the issues that I raised was equalities issues and discrimination. Will that also be in the remit?
The hon. Lady makes an important point. Again, that is not something that is prescribed in the Bill. As we establish this, it will be important to have a look at whether that ought to be a key principle. I cannot make the commitment at the moment, but it is important that we reflect on that as the authority is established.
As I said, it is unnecessary to prescribe a detailed list of operational metrics. Precise reporting arrangements should be a matter for the authority once operational. Mandating specific requirements in primary legislation would reduce flexibility and constrain the authority’s ability to adapt its reporting arrangements as it becomes established. That will be an operational matter for the authority as it is set up, and should not be prescribed in the Bill. The Government therefore do not accept the amendment or new clause 28.
More broadly, I appreciate that there is a wider point, separate to the context of the Bill, about data and statistics. The Ministry of Justice publishes quarterly statistics that include information on receipts and outcomes. The Home Office immigration system statistics quarterly release covers data on a range of topics, including claims, outcomes and nationality. The full set of official statistics published by those Departments is kept under review in line with the code of practice for statistics. I think that is a conversation that we could have another day, but it is important that we do not accept amendments that seek to require the inspector to focus on what is not in his remit.