Immigration and Asylum Bill (Thirteenth sitting)

Debate between Anna Turley and Blake Stephenson

Committee stage
Thursday 29th October 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Blake Stephenson (Mid Bedfordshire) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Stuart.

New clause 6 would require the Government to start negotiations to join the EU pact on migration and asylum within three months. Committee Members should not be surprised to hear that the official Opposition oppose this new clause. The hon. Member for Wimbledon spoke at length about the returns agreement, but it is not simply a returns agreement. At its heart is a so-called solidarity mechanism, under which member states either accept asylum seekers relocated from other states or pay contributions instead. Joining it would mean the United Kingdom accepting people we did not choose, under rules we did not write, ultimately subject to the European Court of Justice. That is the opposite of taking back control.

The Conservative borders plan takes a completely different approach. We would ban asylum claims by people who enter the country illegally and remove them within a week. We would seek returns agreements with countries of origin, backed by visa sanctions on those that refuse to take their nationals back, and we would support our allies in Europe to stop illegal entry with intelligence, policing and maritime resources. That is co-operation, and it does not require us to hand control of our asylum system to Brussels.

The Liberal Democrats have shown clearly during this Committee that they are not capable of being serious about controlling immigration. They will say that the pact will let us return people to the EU, but the price is relocation quotas and EU jurisdiction, and the evidence from the pact so far is that returns between member states remain very limited indeed. I hope the Minister will confirm today that the Government have absolutely no intention of seeking to join the pact or its solidarity mechanism.

[The Minister for Border Security and Asylum (Anna Turley)]

It is a pleasure to see you back in the Chair, Mr Stuart. I thank hon. Members for tabling the new clause and for their thoughtful contributions to the debate.

I agree with the hon. Member for Wimbledon that deeper international co-operation is important. That is why the Home Secretary is in regular contact with her counterparts across Europe, including in France, Germany and Belgium, and we are continuing to establish a more comprehensive relationship with Europe as a whole. However, I remind him that irregular migration is not an issue limited to EU nation states. That is why we as a Government are looking even wider and being even more ambitious: not only tackling the issue when it emerges within European territories, but working upstream to prevent the vile trade of organised immigration crime in the first place.

For example, in August 2025 we signed an agreement with Iraq to bolster efforts to deter small boat arrivals. In October 2025, we signed an agreement with Vietnam to crack down on illegal migration and increase returns. In August this year, we signed a migration partnership with Egypt, which will continue to bear down on illegal migration and cut the time needed to return Egyptian nationals with no right to be in the UK by 90%. Those are just some examples of the importance of that broader co-operation and partnership. My hon. Friend the Minister for Migration and Citizenship also attended this year’s Berlin process meeting of Interior Ministers in Montenegro in September. It was a fantastic opportunity to strengthen international police co-operation and develop a joint response to cross-border security challenges not only with our EU counterparts but with representatives from the western Balkans.

I agree that international co-operation is an essential strand of our overarching strategy to tackle illegal migration, and one that I am keen to highlight is bearing fruit. As hon. Members will know—I will say it again, just for the record—small boat arrivals have decreased by more than 40% compared with this point last year. I am not claiming that the job is done—far from it—but we are taking a holistic approach to this issue, of which the Bill is one part. However, the Government will not support the new clause.

I want to pick up on a couple of the points the hon. Member for Wimbledon raised about the impact on returns and about Eurodac. We continue to work with our European partners on the shared challenge, including on returns, but joining the pact would not guarantee increased returns, and our focus is on practical co-operation that delivers real returns outcomes.

Eurodac is a matter for the EU, not a unilateral UK decision. Eurodac is one example of a pact measure where our participation is not legally possible without EU agreement, and the Eurodac legislation makes that clear. Access to asylum data could, of course, help identify individuals who have previously claimed protection in an EU member state before travelling to the UK, but it is for the EU to decide whether it wishes to extend access to third countries. In the meantime, we are strengthening practical co-operation with European partners, including through intelligence sharing and our observer status in the European Migration Network, which delivered on a key PM commitment from the UK-EU summit, and I will come on to say a bit more about the work we are doing on that.

Going back to the new clause, participation is not a straightforward proposition. The pact is not a single agreement that third countries can simply choose to join. It is complex collection of EU legislative measures, many of which are designed specifically for EU member states and Schengen countries. There is no established model for third-country participation, so any form of UK participation would require agreement from the EU and significant EU and operational change before extensive negotiations could commence. The pact is still being implemented across the EU and has been in application only since June this year. Member states are working to implement it, with the EU rightly focused on making it work for its own member states. That is a significant challenge, particularly for frontline countries that are facing the greatest migration pressures.

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[Blake Stephenson]

I was surprised to hear the hon. Member for Wimbledon be so supportive of rejoining the EU—I think we have all learned something this morning. We have also learned that the Liberal Democrats feel that that would be a silver bullet to fix all these issues. Yet still the hon. Member comes forward to ask for a cost-benefit analysis to prove it. His statutory duty to benchmark every bilateral agreement against the EU pact is designed to build a case for joining the pact, not to improve returns, and for that reason, the Conservatives oppose it.

[Anna Turley]

I am grateful to the hon. Member for Wimbledon for his new clause. I understand the case that he is trying to make. He is trying to build his evidence base to persuade us to join the EU pact, but, despite his earlier efforts, I am afraid we will not support his new clause.

We agree that migration co-operation should deliver clear operational benefits, represent value for money and be subject to appropriate scrutiny. Indeed, that is already the case. Relevant spending and significant proposals are assessed under the established appraisal, assurance and accounting officer requirements. Ministers rightly expect officials to demonstrate that policies are deliverable, affordable and capable of achieving their intended objectives. I remind colleagues that we have already published an impact assessment for the Bill. I appreciate that there are details still to be refined, but colleagues will find in the impact assessment information that I hope will support their understanding of the Bill.

I want to be clear that the value of migration co-operation is complex. Some agreements help to deter irregular migration, and some help to change behaviour and prevent dangerous journeys from happening in the first place. Those benefits can sometimes be difficult to measure directly, but they are no less important when considering the overall value of an agreement. Equally, the Government are not lacking in transparency. We regularly publish information on major migration partnerships—for example, we have published details of UK-France co-operation under the broader framework of the Sandhurst treaty and subsequent agreements, including funding commitments, operational activity and strategic objectives. UK-France co-operation is also subject to regular strategic review by the French Government and the UK Government.

The hon. Gentleman’s new clause goes considerably further, however. It would require the Government to publish an annual assessment comparing our existing bilateral migration agreements against a wholly hypothetical model of UK participation in the EU migration and asylum pact. We do not believe that that is a sensible or proportionate requirement. The pact is an internal EU framework comprising 10 separate legislative measures. The UK is not seeking to participate in it, and there is no established mechanism through which non-EU, non-Schengen countries such as the UK can do so.

That means that there is no settled understanding of what the legal route to participation might be, what obligations it might entail, what operational arrangements would be required, or indeed, as my hon. Friend the Member for Great Grimsby and Cleethorpes said, what costs might arise, yet the new clause would require the Government to produce an annual assessment based on assumptions and theories about all those issues, about which we would have no information. Any such exercise would be inherently speculative. It would require officials to assess a theoretical arrangement that does not exist, using assumptions that cannot be verified and for which there is no established evidence base.

The new clause also appears to rest on the assumption that participation in the pact would somehow replace the UK’s existing network of bilateral migration arrangements and partnerships. There is no reason to believe that that would be the case. EU member states, operating within the EU’s common asylum and migration framework, continue to maintain bilateral arrangements with third countries to support returns, migration management and broader co-operation. The need to engage directly with countries of origin and transit does not disappear because a country participates in the EU system.

At the same time, many of our migration partnerships are about far more than asylum processing or returns. They sit within broader bilateral relationships, helping us to tackle migration pressures at source, disrupt organised immigration crime, strengthen returns co-operation and support wider foreign policy objectives. Participation in the pact would not remove the need for many of the agreements that the new clause seeks to assess. In practice, the UK could find itself maintaining a significant proportion of its existing partnerships, while also incurring additional costs associated with participation in the pact itself.

The new clause also takes no account of the cost of pursuing that proposed participation. As I have already highlighted, negotiating any bespoke arrangement with the EU would require significant official resource, extensive discussions with EU institutions and member states, and potentially substantial legislative and operational change. At the same time, the pact is still being implemented across Europe. Its impacts, costs and benefits are still emerging, and it will take time before there is a clear and reliable evidence base from which lessons can be drawn.

Against that backdrop, requiring officials to construct and maintain an annual assessment of theoretical policy that the Government are not pursuing would not represent good value for money. As I said—and I hope the hon. Member for Wimbledon understands my values and intentions here—the Government are committed to deeper co-operation with European partners on tackling illegal migration. As the hon. Gentleman mentioned, the Prime Minister has set out that Europe is our neighbour and that stronger co-operation with our European partners is essential to tackling these shared challenges. That is why we will be using our engagement with the EU, including the forthcoming summit on 20 November, to pursue practical co-operation on border security, organised immigration crime and improved information and data-sharing, where that supports our national interest. However, none of that requires participation in the pact. We reject the suggestion that joining the pact is the only route, or the necessary route, to achieving these objectives. Our focus is on practical co-operation that delivers results, not a hypothetical arrangement whose terms, costs and obligations cannot be known. For those reasons—

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[Anna Turley]

I disagree with much of what the hon. Gentleman has said today, but he is right on that point. There is opportunity for broader co-operation on many of these fronts, which is why we will continue to explore co-operation. However, signing up to these restrictive pacts would limit that opportunity. I think we have the best of all worlds here: not only can we have direct negotiations with other countries, but we can scale up things such as the one in, one out deal when we think there is potential to do so with other countries. On that note—

[Blake Stephenson]

I caught the Minister just in time. She described the one in, one out scheme as a “pilot”. I do not recall it ever being described as a pilot when it was launched. Can she unpack what the expectations were, what was delivered and why the scheme has been cancelled?

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[Blake Stephenson]

The hon. Member for Wimbledon has described the real pressures on councils across the country. When people are granted protection and leave asylum accommodation, many present as homeless, and local authorities across the country pick up the cost. However, in our view, a statutory taskforce will not solve that. The root of the pressure is the number of people arriving and the time that they spend in the system. Fewer arrivals and faster outcomes would do far more for councils than any taskforce.

We will not support the new clause, but let me ask the Minister a question, building on the one that the hon. Member for Wimbledon asked. What is the current move-on period after a grant of protection, and what assessment have the Government made of the cost of refugee homelessness to local authorities throughout England?

[Anna Turley]

I am grateful to the hon. Member for Wimbledon for raising this issue through his new clause, because it is a big priority for this Government, as he alluded to. I want to put it on record that I and the Government support the notion that no one should be sleeping rough. As the Prime Minister has set out, ending homelessness is his No. 1 priority.

As Members will be aware, in the immediacy, the Government have committed £442 million to ensure that everyone who is sleeping rough is off the streets by Christmas. That feeds into the wider £4.4 billion being invested in homelessness and rough sleeping services over the next three years. This combines immediate accommodation support with longer-term settled housing and intensive support for people who have experienced prolonged rough sleeping. The Christmas ambition is the first phase of that wider effort. It is a programme of practical delivery and, as I have laid out, it is not one that depends on establishing a separate statutory taskforce.

Looking beyond the Christmas delivery plan, the Government are already taking a cross-Government approach through the national plan to end homelessness in England and the interministerial group on homelessness and rough sleeping. That group brings together work on housing, health, employment and transitions out of public service with regular monitoring of delivery. A separate taskforce would duplicate existing co-ordination arrangements rather than address the practical barriers that people face.

We recognise that newly granted refugees can face particular challenges. Asylum move-on liaison officers, where present, explain next steps, signpost housing and benefit support, liaise with local services and escalate barriers. They provide practical help with navigating the transition. The hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire asked what the move-on period is: it is currently 42 days.

We regularly review the role of the liaison officer model to ensure that it meets the needs of users and to reduce homelessness among newly recognised refugees. This includes exploring earlier, targeted housing advice before an asylum decision, and working with accommodation providers to improve the quality and timeliness of information given to local authorities when asylum support ends.

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[Blake Stephenson]

New clause 11 would require the Government to restore refugee family reunion within six months, but I understand that it also widens definitions to include children up to the age of 25, which was not in the hon. Member’s opening remarks, so I hope I am not mistaken.

We oppose this measure. Family reunion, as proposed in new clause 11, would add a further reward to a successful illegal crossing. Every grant would bring the prospect of encouraging a wider family member, and it would create a well-known incentive for families to send one member ahead, sometimes a child, on the most dangerous journey of all. We all want to stop and limit dangerous journeys. Safe and legal routes should be for people from regions of conflict who we choose to help, as we have done for Ukraine, Hong Kong and Afghanistan. There should not be a reward for illegal and very dangerous crossings. We will not support the new clause, but can I ask the Minister to tell us when the Government intend to publish their replacement for the suspended family reunion route, as I think she intimated they would in the previous debate, and whether the intention is for it to be capped?

[Anna Turley]

New clause 11, tabled by the Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough, seeks to reopen the refugee family reunion route and greatly expand eligibility to wider family members. The Government took the difficult decision to suspend the refugee family reunion route in September 2025. That was done in response to immediate pressures placed on local authorities and public services by the rapid rise in arrivals in recent years.

The family reunion route had grown exponentially, placing significant and unsustainable pressures on local authorities and public services. Grants rose from approximately 5,500 per annum between 2015 and 2022 to more than 20,000 in the year ending September 2025. As the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire said, we cannot have a situation where families are sending men on dangerous journeys, through other safe countries, to reach these shores with the intention to bring their families. We are extremely keen to prevent that. We want to ensure that there is a sustainable route for families that are genuinely fleeing war and persecution to come to this country, and that was not it.

Suspension remains in place while we are developing the wider reforms to the family migration system. I know that colleagues are on tenterhooks, and I wish I could expand on that further, but I can assure them that they do not have very long to wait at all—as I am sure they can see from the increased media frenzy around these issues. I will not pre-empt the Home Secretary’s announcements, but I reassure colleagues that those announcements are well on their way and they do not have long to wait.

The system we want to see will be fair, controlled and sustainable. The Government recognise the importance of family unity and the distress that separation can cause. We also recognise the contribution that families can make to helping refugees integrate. However, we must ensure that our approach takes account of the capacity of communities to support those arriving.

I want to be clear that suspension does not mean that family members have no way of applying to come to the UK. Other family routes remain available where people meet the relevant requirements, with provisions such as fee waivers available, and a consideration of any exceptional circumstances where an individual may not meet the criteria set out in those routes. In addition, applications under the suspended route that were submitted before the suspension came into force continue to be processed.

New clause 11 would go considerably further than simply restoring the previous arrangements. It would require the Government to establish a new and expansive refugee family reunion scheme within six months, and prescribe a significantly wider group of qualifying family members, including parents, siblings, unmarried adult children and siblings up to the age of 25 and other unspecified family members. This is highly likely to lead to considerably more people arriving than ever before, without any necessity for their sponsor to support them.

The new clause would also cut across established routes that already make specific provision for these relationships, including Appendix Child Relative for vulnerable children joining a close relative with protection status, and the Adult Dependant Relative route for adults requiring long-term, personal care. Those routes contain carefully designed eligibility, dependency, care, maintenance and accommodation requirements. The new clause risks creating an overlapping route for the same cohorts without specifying any safeguards that would apply, potentially undermining the workings of our wider family migration system.

The new clause would further enable children to sponsor their parents and siblings, which is something that was not possible under the previous route. We must consider the incentives that such a change would create. If a child reaching the UK alone could subsequently provide a route for other family members to join them, there is a real risk that smuggling gangs could exploit that expectation, leading to more children being sent on dangerous journeys, including on small boats. That would put children at greater risk of abuse and death.

The proposals tabled by the hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough should also be considered together. Amendment 54 would have provided that requirements being imposed must demonstrate that arriving family members could be suitably supported and accommodated by their sponsor. Together, these proposals, if accepted, would pre-empt the Government’s ongoing work that I have mentioned on our future family migration framework by constraining our ability to consider refugee family reunion alongside the wider reforms that we are making. It would be premature to prescribe the outcome of that work in the Bill. They are also likely to lead to a large increase in arrivals, which would further exacerbate existing pressures on local authorities and public services.

The hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough should consider how the consequences of such a surge in arrivals, if these proposals were enacted, would be managed. Where would families live if suitable accommodation had not been secured? Who would meet their immediate needs if their sponsor could not support them? Do we expect already stretched local authorities and public services to support those arrivals? If children are allowed to sponsor, as he proposes, a child cannot be expected to obtain a sufficient income or secure suitable accommodation for an arriving family, so who would meet those needs? What assessment has he made of the additional resources that would be needed, and how does he propose these costs should be met?

Those responsibilities simply cannot be left for local authorities to resolve after families arrive. They have practical consequences for homelessness services, temporary accommodation, children’s services and school places, as well as the local people who rely on those services. For those reasons, I ask the hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough to withdraw the new clause.

Immigration and Asylum Bill (Twelfth sitting)

Debate between Anna Turley and Blake Stephenson

Committee stage
Tuesday 27th October 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Anna Turley]

New clause 5 will mean that a person’s exemption from deportation under section 7 of the Immigration Act 1971 can be disapplied where they have engaged in conduct such as terrorism, war crimes or serious organised crime. Section 7 provides protection from deportation for certain Commonwealth and Irish citizens who were ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom before 1 January 1973. It is an important safeguard for many people with long-standing ties to the UK.

The recent high-profile case of Shabir Ahmed highlighted a significant anomaly in the current law. In cases where the person’s conduct is serious enough to justify the removal of their citizenship, section 7 prevents us from deporting them. That cannot be right. Some of the most serious offenders, including individuals involved in terrorism, serious organised crime, sexual grooming or war crimes, should not be able to avoid deportation purely on the basis that they have been in this country since before 1973.

Our new clause will end the disparity in the powers available to protect the public from the most dangerous people. Decisions to disapply the exemption will be taken personally by the Home Secretary. Safeguards put in place by the new clause ensure that the legislation will not affect the vast majority of people protected by section 7. It will be used to ensure that only those individuals whose conduct places them among the most serious threats to the public can be deported.

As we saw with the case I mentioned, changing the law is only half the problem. Arranging the deportation of such individuals can take time, as successive Governments have found previously. Introducing this important new clause will ensure that we have the power to deport this individual, and that will be taken forward in the usual way. Given the danger that this individual poses, Government amendment 47 would amend the commencement clauses in the Bill to ensure that the new clause comes into effect upon Royal Assent.

[Blake Stephenson (Mid Bedfordshire) (Con)]

New clause 5 closes an anomaly that dates back to 1973, under which Commonwealth and Irish citizens living in the country when the Immigration Act 1971 came into force are protected from deportation by section 7, however serious their conduct. The new clause would let the Home Secretary decide that such a person is liable to deportation where they have been or could have been deprived of citizenship on conduct grounds. We support it and amendment 47, which brings it into force on Royal Assent.

The Conservative plan is to deport all foreign criminals. Not some of them—all of them. Any measure that removes a barrier to deportation is a step in that direction. New clause 5 is indeed a step in the right direction, but it is such a small step that it is challenging to see that it will make a noticeable impact. It is a personal discretion, not a duty, for the Home Secretary. Every person it covers will still be able to resist removal under article 8 and article 3, through the Human Rights Act 1998. Compare that with the much more robust new clause 45, tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for Croydon South (Chris Philp), which would mean automatic deportation for every foreign national convicted of an offence. That is what our borders plan means by deporting all foreign criminals.

For the purposes of the debate, I have three questions for the Minister. How many people do the Government estimate are protected by section 7 and could be made liable to deportation under new clause 5? What is the Government’s legal assessment of the clause’s reliance on conduct before commencement? How will the power apply to Irish citizens, given the common travel area, and have the Irish Government been consulted on the measure?

We will support Government new clause 5, but if the Government accept the principle that dangerous people should not be protected from deportation by legal technicalities, I hope they will support our new clauses in that regard too.

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[Anna Turley]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Section 33 of the UK Borders Act 2007 sets out exceptions to the automatic deportation of foreign criminals. This technical amendment provides greater legal clarity in relation to the exception that may apply where a foreign criminal is also a confirmed victim of modern slavery.

At the time the UK Borders Act was enacted, there was not a detailed domestic legal framework in place for the identification and protection of victims of modern slavery. Since then, the Government have introduced specific domestic modern slavery legislation, including the Modern Slavery Act 2015 and the Nationality and Borders Act 2022. The ongoing work on this Bill has highlighted the outdated reference to the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings—ECAT—and this provides an opportune moment to update the legislation so that it refers to the relevant domestic modern slavery framework.

New clause 32 replaces the existing reference to the United Kingdom’s obligations under ECAT with a reference to the relevant domestic modern slavery legislation, namely the temporary permission to stay provision in the Nationality and Borders Act 2022.

Since the introduction of the 2007 Act, the UK has introduced specific modern slavery legislation and these provisions will now provide the legal framework for identifying and protecting victims of modern slavery in the UK. The new clause aligns the deportation framework with existing domestic legislation on modern slavery provisions and provides greater legal clarity.

The new clause does not expand or alter the protections. It simply clarifies and clears up any ambiguity in the law. It simply places the exception to automatic deportation on a clearer domestic statutory footing, while ensuring the Secretary of State retains flexibility to grant temporary permission to stay in exceptional circumstances where appropriate.

[Blake Stephenson]

New clause 32 rewrites the exception to automatic deportation for foreign criminals who are victims of trafficking. At present, section 33(6A) of the UK Borders Act 2007 disapplies automatic deportation where removal would breach our obligations under the Council of Europe trafficking convention. The new clause would replace that with a test based on leave under section 65 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022, including where the Home Secretary merely intends to grant such leave, even where she is under no duty to do so.

A criminal conviction should trigger automatic deportation, and those deported as foreign criminals should not be able to make protection claims to stop that deportation. New clause 32 keeps a route by which a foreign criminal can avoid automatic deportation and it widens the discretion to use it.

I am sure nobody in this Committee wants genuine victims of trafficking to be left unsupported, but in clause 38, the Government accept that people who pose a threat to public order should be disqualified from protection. Why, then, keep the exception to automatic deportation for people who have been convicted of crimes here? Why widen the range of cases where there is no duty to grant leave at all?

How many foreign criminals relied on the trafficking exemption in each of the past three years? In what circumstances would the Home Secretary intend to grant leave under section 65 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 where there is no duty to do so? How many foreign criminals do the Government expect to benefit? Unless the Minister can show that this exception will be rare and tightly controlled, it is a back door through which foreign criminals will continue to avoid removal.

[Anna Turley]

Temporary permission to stay is granted only in limited circumstances for specific purposes and for time-limited periods. Confirmed victims who are considered a risk to public order who have made a modern slavery claim in bad faith will not usually be granted temporary permission to stay in the UK. In rare cases, the Secretary of State may decide that temporary permission to stay is to be granted to an individual who has been convicted of a crime, for example, where their presence is necessary to support a law enforcement investigation or criminal proceedings. The new clause ensures that the Secretary of State retains this discretion as is befitting with clauses we considered earlier. Any grant of temporary permission to stay is subject to the individual continuing to meet the relevant requirements and lasts only for as long as it is necessary to achieve the purpose for which it is granted.

I will undertake to write to the Committee on the specific numbers that the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire asked for. I thank Members for their interest in the new clause. It replaces the existing reference to the United Kingdom’s obligations under the Council of Europe convention on action against trafficking in human beings with a reference to the relevant domestic modern slavery legislation, namely the temporary permission to stay provision in the Nationality and Borders Act. The technical new clause provides greater legal clarity in relation to the exception that may apply where a foreign criminal is also a confirmed victim of modern slavery.

Question put and agreed to.

New clause 32 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 33

Enforcement of decisions of the Immigration Services Commissioner

“(1) Part 5 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 (immigration advisers and immigration service providers) is amended as follows.

(2) In section 92F (enforcement of penalty notices) (inserted by paragraph 9 of Schedule 1 to the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Act 2025)—

(a) in subsection (1), after ‘notice’ insert ‘(“a penalty”)’;

(b) for subsections (2) to (4) substitute—

‘(2) In England and Wales, the penalty is recoverable as if it were payable under an order of the county court.

(3) In Scotland, the penalty may be enforced in the same manner as an extract registered decree arbitral bearing a warrant for execution issued by the sheriff court of any sheriffdom in Scotland.

(4) In Northern Ireland, the penalty is recoverable as if it were payable under an order of the county court.

(5) Where action is taken under this section for the recovery of a penalty, the penalty—

(a) in relation to England and Wales, is to be treated for the purposes of section 98 of the Courts Act 2003 (register of judgments and orders etc) as if it were a judgment entered in the county court;

(b) in relation to Northern Ireland, is to be treated for the purposes of Article 116 of the Judgments Enforcement (Northern Ireland) Order 1981 (S.I. 1981/226 (N.I. 6)) (register of judgments) as if it were a judgment in respect of which an application has been accepted under Article 22 or 23(1) of that Order.’

(3) In Schedule 5 (the Immigration Services Commissioner), in paragraph 9C (enforcement of orders to refund fees or pay compensation) (inserted by paragraph 14(5) of the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Act 2025)—

(a) for sub-paragraph (3) substitute—

‘(3) Any amount to be refunded or paid under the order (“the amount owing”)—

(a) in England and Wales, is recoverable by P or the Commissioner (on P’s behalf) as if it were payable under an order of the county court;

(b) in Scotland, may be enforced by P or the Commissioner (on P’s behalf) in the same manner as an extract registered decree arbitral bearing a warrant for execution issued by the sheriff court of any sheriffdom in Scotland;

(c) in Northern Ireland, is recoverable by P or the Commissioner (on P’s behalf) as if it were payable under an order of the county court.’;

(b) in sub-paragraph (4), for ‘make an application under sub-paragraph (3)’ substitute ‘take steps to recover or enforce an amount owing’;

(c) for sub-paragraphs (5) and (6) substitute—

‘(5) Where action is taken under this paragraph for the recovery of an amount to be refunded or paid under an order of the Commissioner, the order—

(a) in relation to England and Wales, is to be treated for the purposes of section 98 of the Courts Act 2003 (register of judgments and orders etc) as if it were a judgment entered in the county court;

(b) in relation to Northern Ireland, is to be treated for the purposes of Article 116 of the Judgments Enforcement (Northern Ireland) Order 1981 (S.I. 1981/226 (N.I. 6)) (register of judgments) as if it were a judgment in respect of which an application has been accepted under Article 22 or 23(1) of that Order.

(6) For the purposes of this paragraph, an appeal is pending during the period—

(a) starting when the appeal is brought, and

(b) ending when the appeal is finally determined, abandoned or withdrawn.’”—(Anna Turley.)

This amendment would insert a new clause, to go in after clause 49, amending the provision inserted into the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 about the enforcement of orders made by the Immigration Services Commissioner for penalties, refunds and compensation, so as to make it work effectively in Northern Ireland.

Brought up, and read the First time.

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[Anna Turley]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Government new clause 33 seeks to amend the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 to ensure that the enforcement of orders made by the Immigration Services Commissioner under that Act for penalties, refunds and compensation work effectively in Northern Ireland. Provisions regarding enforcement of unpaid monetary penalties, refunds of fees or payments of compensation in England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland were part of the Immigration Services Commissioner measures in the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Act 2025. Upon making preparations to commence the measures, however, it became apparent that the current provisions are not compatible with the system in place in Northern Ireland. Therefore, the Government are taking steps to rectify the situation so that the enforcement regime can operate as intended.

The Government new clause ensures that any unpaid monetary penalty, refund of fees or payment of compensation imposed by the Immigration Services Commissioner on advisers providing poor or illegal immigration services or advice can be recovered in Northern Ireland as they can in England, Wales and Scotland. It also makes provision for penalties to be entered into the relevant registers in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. Procedures for recovery of debts differ in Scotland from those in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. In Scotland, statutory penalties need not be treated as an existing court judgment. In keeping with other types of statutory penalty in Scotland, the proposed drafting allows for these penalties to be treated as an extract registered decree arbitral, bearing a warrant for execution for purposes of enforcement. That means that no application is needed to the court to enforce a debt or penalty, as it is treated as having been registered with the court and authority given the execution.

Amendments in later groups will make provision for the commencement of the new clause to take place in conjunction with the measures it relates to within the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 as amended by the Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Act 2025.

[Blake Stephenson]

New clause 33 makes the Immigration Services Commissioner’s penalties, refund orders and compensation orders enforceable as court orders across the United Kingdom, including in Northern Ireland. These are technical improvements and we support them.

Rogue immigration advisers do real damage. They take money from vulnerable people, and, too often, they coach claims designed not to establish the truth but to delay removal, including the late claim lodged the night before a flight, and the fresh claim built on a story that has changed. We would end immigration legal aid and limit judicial review to cases where the Home Office has acted outside its powers, which would remove much of the market that these advisers exploit.

In the meantime, the regulator should have teeth. How many penalties has the commissioner imposed in the last three years, how much has actually been recovered and how many prosecutions for giving unregulated immigration advice have there been? As I said, we support this move, but I look forward to the Minister’s response.

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[Anna Turley]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

This new clause makes a straightforward technical amendment to the UK Borders Act 2007. It adds the Bill, once enacted, to the statutory list of enactments that comprise “the Immigration Acts” in the 2007 Act. References to “the Immigration Acts” appear throughout the statute book and are used in connection with a wide range of immigration powers, enforcement provisions and other immigration functions. It is therefore important that, once enacted, the Bill is included within that established statutory definition.

The effect of the new clause is to ensure that references elsewhere in the legislation to “the Immigration Acts” will apply consistently to the revisions contained in the Bill in the same way as they apply to other immigration legislation. The new clause is a technical provision that ensures the legislation fits coherently within the wider immigration statute book and that existing references to “the Immigration Acts” operate as intended.

[Blake Stephenson]

Mr Twigg, you and the Committee members will be pleased to hear that this will be the shortest speech of the day. The new clause adds the Bill, once enacted, to the list of “the Immigration Acts”. It is a technical provision, and we do not oppose it.

[Anna Turley]

I thank Members for their overwhelming interest in and enthusiasm for this new clause. As discussed, this is a straightforward amendment that adds the Bill to the statutory list of enactments that comprise “the Immigration Acts” in the 2007 Act. It will simply mean that references elsewhere in legislation to “the Immigration Acts” will apply consistently to the provisions contained in the Bill in the same way that they apply to other immigration legislation.

Question put and agreed to.

New clause 34 read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Jade Botterill.)

Oral Answers to Questions

Debate between Anna Turley and Blake Stephenson

Monday 26th October 2026 Commons Chamber

[Anna Turley]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. We remain firmly committed to the ECHR and the protections it gives us all, including the prohibition on torture, a right to life and protections from the state. However, we are determined, through this legislation, to protect its principles from over-interpretation, both domestically and internationally, and to ensure we have an immigration and asylum system that has the consent of the British people.

[Blake Stephenson (Mid Bedfordshire) (Con)]

There are 21,000 serious foreign criminals still in the UK. Today, a foreign criminal jailed for four years or more cannot use family or long residence exceptions to avoid deportation. Last week, the Government voted down our amendments in Committee to keep that rule and extend it to terrorists, making the Immigration and Asylum Bill softer on the worst offenders than current law. Will the Home Secretary admit that only leaving the ECHR will guarantee us that foreign criminals are deported?

[Anna Turley]

It is sad to see the Conservative party so spooked by the far right that they are trashing some of the finest work of their greatest Prime Minister, Winston Churchill. When he said, “Never again,” and led the way in building a European convention on human rights, he knew the protection it gave everyone from tyrants, despots, torture and death. This Government will defend Churchill’s legacy—even if the Conservatives will not—by reforming both the ECHR, internationally, through co-operation with our European neighbours, and its domestic application through the forthcoming Bill, to ensure that its protections and principles are fit for the modern world.

Immigration and Asylum Bill (Ninth sitting)

Debate between Anna Turley and Blake Stephenson

Committee stage
Thursday 22nd October 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Blake Stephenson]

I absolutely agree with the hon. Gentleman. This is not a refugee tax.

On 18 March 2025, Labour Members voted down that new clause 37. The then Minister told that Committee that it was not sufficiently developed to be put into primary legislation. Interestingly, we heard the same criticism from witnesses about clause 23 of this Bill, and even the Government’s own impact assessment rates the impact of these measures as “uncertain”. I ask the Minister what amount and what income threshold the Government intend to set. The Home Office has spoken of £10,000; will that be a flat rate per adult, and over what period? How will the threshold be set so that the charge does not deter people from taking work or declaring their earnings—a risk that the Government’s own impact assessment identified?

Amendment 76 would prevent any payment that would leave a person or household with below 60% of median household income. Clause 23(5) already provides that no one will be required to pay if it would make them “destitute”. Amendment 76 would go far beyond destitution: with a 60% median test, very few people who had been supported by taxpayers would ever pay anything; it would turn into a repayment scheme in name only.

Amendment 81 would cut the amount owed by 20% for every 30 days beyond six months that the Home Office took to decide a claim. I understand the point being made—delays cost money and are not the claimant’s fault—but it is the taxpayer who has paid for those months, and the answer to delays is making faster decisions, not giving a discount. What is the current average time to an initial decision, and what is the Government’s target?

Amendment 79 would cap repayments at the cost of the support received. I would be surprised if the Government intend anything else. Will the Minister confirm that nobody will be asked to repay more than the support they receive, which is the point made by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion? If so, the amendment is unnecessary.

Government amendment 124 will enable repayments to be reduced, waived or refunded, including by giving the Secretary of State discretion. Amendments 125 and 126 deal with insolvency. The supplementary memorandum to the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee says that the powers will be subject to the negative procedure because they can only benefit individuals. The Opposition will not oppose the measures, but the use of a discretion to waive, exercised on a case by case basis and never reported, is how schemes like this quietly stop working. What criteria will govern waivers? Will the number and value of waivers be published each year? Will a person be able to clear the debt by making themselves bankrupt?

The Committee is entitled to know whether the scheme will ever recover meaningful sums. Migration Observatory expects that unless the threshold is set significantly below the minimum wage, the number of people earning enough to reach it will be relatively small. That is set against the enormous cost to the British taxpayer. Around 97,500 asylum seekers receive taxpayer-funded support, costing the taxpayer roughly £4 billion in 2024-25. Simple division of that figure suggests that the costs are close to £40,000 a year per person supported. A £10,000 contribution, if it were ever collected, would recover only a small proportion of the initial cost.

During the Committee’s oral evidence session, when my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton West asked the Minister what measurable difference the Bill will make, she said:

“I do not want to put a specific figure on it.”––[Official Report, Immigration and Asylum Public Bill Committee, 15 September 2026; c. 72, Q127.]

Can she do so now? How many people do the Government expect to pay? How much will be recovered each year, and over what period? How much will it cost to build and run the system? Given that the Government do not have a good history of running systems, can she assure us that the scheme will raise more money than it costs?

Amendment 141, tabled in my name, would ensure that where an individual has been required to repay asylum support costs, any unpaid amount can be considered when deciding applications to enter or remain in the United Kingdom, including for settlement. That would give the scheme more weight by providing that the debt will influence settlement decisions until it is paid off. If amendment 141 is not made, the consequence of not paying will depend on earned settlement rules that have not been laid before Parliament. Will the Government support the amendment?

The Opposition oppose amendments 81, 76 and 79, but not Government amendments 124 to 126. As I mentioned, the principle of clause 23 was originally in a Conservative proposition, so of course we support it, but our concern is that a repayment scheme with discretionary waivers and no consequences for non-payment will be ineffective. We look for assurance from the Minister on that. I will be pressing amendment 141 to a Division.

[Anna Turley]

I thank Members for their important contributions to this debate on asylum costs and the mechanism the Government are creating to recover some of them. As we heard from my hon. Friends, fairness is at the heart of this debate. We are discussing the concept that individuals who have benefited from the sanctuary and generosity of this country and its taxpayers should contribute towards the support that they received. That is not about punishing anyone; it is about those who have received support having a stake in the success of this country and contributing to the cost of that support, and thereby to the sustainability of giving it to others, once they are financially able.

The right to receive support must come with responsibilities. Each year, the taxpayer funds £4 billion of asylum costs. While it is right that we support those fleeing war and persecution, it is also right that those who have received that support make a fair and proportionate contribution when they can. The measures will ensure that they put back into the system that supported them and contribute towards the provision of that support to others, as well as ensuring that others who are paying for that support consent to doing so.

We have heard examples of our constituents contributing to many different forms of collective support, including through national insurance, and through tax to fund access to healthcare. Contribution is an important principle of the social contract in this country. For that reason, the Bill introduces a new power, under which asylum seekers will pay back a portion of the cost of their support when they are financially able to do so. It will be possible to recover those costs through tax receipts, benefit payments and/or as a debt to the Home Office. That mirrors the way in which the Department for Work and Pensions deducts from universal credit where people have child support payments due, owe money for hardship payments, or have unpaid bills or tax.

Amendments 81, 76 and 79, which were tabled by the hon. Member for Brighton Pavilion, seek to prescribe in the Bill how and when asylum support contributions should be calculated and reduced. The Government cannot accept the amendments because they would be too complex to enable effective delivery of the policy and would move us away from the policy intent of a fair and proportionate contribution towards the costs of support once a person is financially able to pay.

Clause 23 establishes an important principle that, where someone has received asylum support at public expense and later has the means to contribute, it is fair that they do so. Of course, any contribution must remain affordable and not push a person into destitution. Clause 23(5) already requires regulations to include provisions to ensure that nobody pays where it would leave them destitute. Further details of this important safeguard will be set out in the regulations that we have committed to sharing during the passage of the Bill.

Immigration and Asylum Bill (Seventh sitting)

Debate between Anna Turley and Blake Stephenson

Committee stage
Tuesday 20th October 2026 Public Bill Committees

[David Smith (North Northumberland) (Lab)]

rose—

[Blake Stephenson]

rose—

[Anna Turley]

I will give way first to the hon. Gentleman.

[Blake Stephenson]

I want to press that point. If the Minister’s position is that she wants the starting point for tribunals to be “no weight”, then what is the harm in adding “must” to make it absolutely clear that the House expects tribunals to apply “no weight”? But then she says that she wants tribunals to have flexibility, so which one is it?

[Anna Turley]

I appreciate the point that the hon. Gentleman is trying to make, but we absolutely cannot bind the courts’ hands in this situation. The reality is that they have to be flexible. We can set a very clear steer—that is on the record, in the Bill and in legislation—but it is important that we allow the courts flexibility, because their role is to establish the facts, case by case.

[Anna Turley]

As my hon. Friend rightly flags, “no weight” is the starting point for the weight that should be given to a person’s private or family life established in the time that they were in the UK without permission. That is a clear definition for the court. Applying the “no weight” rule to all breaches of leave could mean minor or technical breaches leave cases open to challenges of disproportionality.

Amendment 106 is in a similar vein. Although we agree that non-compliance must have consequences, it is appropriate that we distinguish between serious breaches and less significant or technical non-compliance, because we always have to have proportionality. Removing “serious” would considerably widen the provision and could require the same approach to be taken to conduct of very different gravity. The Government’s reforms already substantially strengthen the public interest side of the article 8 balancing exercise. The inclusion of “serious” helps to ensure that the reforms are focused on the cases of greatest concern.

[Blake Stephenson]

In that case, if “serious” is to remain in the Bill, will the Minister help the Committee to understand what types of scenarios might constitute serious or not serious?

[Anna Turley]

I appreciate the hon. Gentleman’s attempts to define this, but it is important to say that we are keen not to include specific definitions in the Bill, as we are worried that they could result in disproportionate outcomes. Our approach is to be robust, targeted and, crucially, legally sustainable. We do not want to allow ourselves to be open to challenge.

Immigration and Asylum Bill (Fourth sitting)

Debate between Anna Turley and Blake Stephenson

Committee stage
Tuesday 13th October 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Blake Stephenson]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stuart; I hope you are ready for a lot of Divisions over the next few weeks. While clause 2 decides who the adjudicators will be, clause 3 decides how the quality of their decisions will be protected. That matters because poor-quality decisions will result in appeals, and appeals mean delays, fewer removals and increased costs for the taxpayer to bear.

Clause 3 sets out who is responsible for what: adjudicators decide on the cases; the chief executive must ensure that the adjudicators are adequately trained, as the Minister explained earlier; the chief appeals officer allocates cases, organises a system of legal support and oversees quality development and assurance; and the professional standards officer sets standards and publishes a code of conduct.

Dr Casey warned that adjudicators without legal training would be more likely to make “errors of law” and that the backlog, rather than genuinely decreasing, could simply relocate to the upper tribunal. The solution to that potential consequence must lie in this clause. What exactly is the “system of legal support” for adjudicators in subsection (3)(b)?

A question occurred to me over the adjournment, following the earlier debate about magistrates: will adjudicators sit with legal advisers, as lay magistrates do? That may or may not be helpful, but I would be interested in the Minister’s response. If so, at what cost?

The Law Society points out that the chief appeals officer is responsible for quality but has no power to intervene in any decision. What powers will the chief appeals officer have to act on poor performance?

Amendment 88 is a probing amendment. It would require the chief appeals officer to publish the number of applications for permission to appeal to the upper tribunal, how many are granted each year, the number and proportion of appeals authority decisions that the upper tribunal sets aside, and the number of decisions that the appeals authority reviews under clause 6, with their outcomes.

In her oral evidence session before the recess, Dr Sumption told this Committee that one of the key measures of success should be how many decisions are overturned. This amendment would ensure that Parliament is told every year whether that relocation of the backlog to the upper tribunal, which Dr Casey described, is happening.

Will the Minister confirm whether the appeals authority will publish annual data on the quality of its decisions, including the rate at which they are set aside? If the Minister can give assurances on that, we will not press this amendment. Finally, what training standards will apply under clause 3(2), and will they be published? Will the code of conduct be published before the first case is heard?

The Opposition support clause 3, which ensures that the quality of the decision making is the best answer to the criticism that the appeals authority would generate more appeals than it resolved, but only if it is real, resourced and reported to Parliament.

[The Minister for Border Security and Asylum (Anna Turley)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stuart. I thank the hon. Members for Mid Bedfordshire and for Stockton West for tabling amendment 88. I will turn to that after giving a brief overview of the clause as it stands.

Clause 3 sets out the IIAA’s executive and non-executive members’ powers and duties. It makes the adjudicators responsible for the authority’s primary function: to make decisions on immigration and asylum appeals and certain bail applications. This will be the sole responsibility of executive adjudicators. Senior adjudicators will also have a responsibility to perform this function, but they may also have further responsibilities that are delegated to them by the chief appeals officer, as the clause permits. No other member or employee can determine the outcome of an appeal or application, reinforcing the autonomy of the adjudicator as the decision maker.

The clause also makes clear what the chief executive, chief appeals officer and professional standards officer are responsible for. Those members are responsible for putting adequate training and support in place for adjudicators, developing a quality assurance mechanism and setting the standards required of IIAA adjudicators. Those roles together will enable the IIAA to operate effectively and independently. Parliament will be kept abreast of important matters concerning the IIAA members or the administration of justice through written representations of the chief executive. Those representations must be laid before Parliament by the Secretary of State. This will also act as an important mechanism for the independence of the authority, which can communicate to Parliament through the Secretary of State on matters of concern.

Amendment 88 tabled by His Majesty’s Opposition would require the chief appeals officer to publish annual data on internal reviews and onward appeals against IIAA decisions. The Government support transparency and agree that the quality of the authority’s decisions must be properly monitored. However, we are confident that the Bill already establishes a comprehensive framework for quality assurance and accountability. Clause 3 requires the chief appeals officer to oversee the quality of adjudicators’ decisions, organise legal support and develop a quality assurance mechanism. The professional standards officer is also responsible for setting and maintaining the standards required of adjudicators, as well as publishing a code of conduct.

The authority will be required to produce an annual report; that is not for me to determine, but I fully expect it to cover the kinds of areas that the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire set out in his amendment. The annual report will be laid before Parliament. Its operation will also be subject to independent external scrutiny by the independent chief inspector of borders and immigration. Although I agree that it is important to scrutinise the specified figures that the hon. Member flags in his amendment, we do not feel that they on their own would provide a reliable measure of decision quality. It is therefore unnecessary to prescribe those particular measures in primary legislation. I ask the hon. Member to withdraw the amendment, but will quickly refer to a couple of points that he raised.

We discussed earlier the standards of adjudicators that the hon. Member mentioned, but it is important to reiterate that adjudicators should have the required training to give them the necessary decision-making expertise to make determinations on appeal cases and bail applications. It will be the responsibility of the chief executive to ensure that adjudicators have adequate training and support. The chief appeals officer will be responsible for organising a system of legal support for them. The Bill provides strong safeguards and quality assurance mechanisms to ensure high standards and to ensure adjudicators are entirely independent of the Executive.

The hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire flagged adequate training and support, and it is important go into a bit more detail on that. The chief executive will be responsible for ensuring that the authority’s adjudicators have adequate training and support to maintain independence from the Executive. The chief appeals officer is responsible for overseeing that quality. The chief appeals officer will also be able to identify any specific training needs of adjudicators and recommend them to the chief executive if they desire. The important point is that the authority is independent. It is really important that we remember that. It is not for the Government to decide what accreditation and continuous development is required for the authority’s adjudicators. They will be making decisions against appeals to which the Home Office will be a party, so it is important that we allow the authority to set those standards itself.

I will move on to how things will be monitored. As I mentioned, we have built a few steps of quality assurance into the system from the outset through training, legal support, professional standards, decision quality oversight, internal review and onward appeal rights. As I said, the chief appeals officer will be responsible for organising that system of legal support, the professional standards officer will be responsible for setting professional standards, and the detailed operation of those arrangements will be developed through the authority’s quality assurance framework and procedural arrangements as they are established.

I hope that reassures the hon. Gentleman that we agree with the principle behind the amendment. We do not think the specific figures he outlined are the best way to reliably measure decision-making quality, but we share the determination to ensure that there are opportunities to scrutinise it throughout the process.

[Blake Stephenson]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Blake Stephenson]

The clause allows the IIAA to review its own decisions once, to correct errors, amend reasons or remake the decision. An internal review of that kind is consistent with the Opposition’s own plan for a short internal appeal. Clause 7 provides the only route from the IIAA to a court—appeal to the upper tribunal on a point of law, with permission—and also applies to the post-Cart ouster in section 11A of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, with refusals of permission. Government amendment 36 limits the IIAA’s power of review to errors of law. Errors of fact will instead be corrected under the procedure rules. We do not oppose that. A review that can reopen the facts is a rehearing by another name.

That changes the argument about clause 1(8), however. The narrower the IIAA’s own remedies, the harder it is to say that there is an adequate alternative to judicial review. How will errors of fact be corrected, and how quickly? Do the Government still regard review and appeal together as an adequate alternative remedy? What time limit will apply and will a pending review delay removal or an onward appeal? I think that the Minister touched on that in her remarks, but I will be grateful if she could unpack that somewhat. How many reviews do the Government expect, and what effect will those have on the upper tribunal? Do the Government regard review and appeal together as an adequate alternative remedy that justifies excluding judicial review?

The Government’s own impact assessment—admittedly the one published earlier, not the one published yesterday, because I have not seen that—expects a “sustained increase in demand” on the upper tribunal. What additional capacity—judges, sitting days and so on—has been funded, and how many onward appeals does the impact assessment assume? What proportion of IIAA decisions do the Government expect to be set aside?

Clause 6(3) is significant; it applies the partial ouster that the previous Conservative Government enacted in the Judicial Review and Courts Act 2022, which was drafted precisely with narrow exceptions and is accepted by the courts. Professor Ekins, in his oral evidence a few weeks ago, told us that the model could be applied here to IIAA decisions. If that is right for the upper tribunal, why is it not right for clause 1(8)?

I have two final questions. First, will time periods such as those in clause 8 apply to upper tribunal appeals? Secondly, where an error of law is found, will the upper tribunal remake decisions itself or send them back? We support Government amendment 36 and clauses 6 and 7. A credible internal review and speed at the second stage, as well as the first, are part of a system that is fast, final and defensible in court.

[Anna Turley]

I thank hon. Members for the constructive way they have approached the clauses and amendments. As I mentioned, the clauses are important to ensure that decisions can be reviewed either by the authority itself or by the upper tribunal where there are errors in law. The Government amendment in this group seeks to clarify this position and support it on the face of the Bill.

I will turn to a few of the questions raised. On the point of law and the question posed about whether a review power is necessary if there is already a right of appeal to the upper tribunal, the review power enables IIAA to correct errors directly without requiring parties to pursue what can be a longer and more resource-intensive appeals process. This can lead to quicker resolution of cases and reduce unnecessary onward appeals. On the supposition that this is just an additional layer of appeal: it is not. The clause provides the IIAA with the power to review its own decisions, as I said. It does not remove or replace the onward right of appeal to the tribunal. The review mechanism and the onward appeal route operate as part of the wider appeals process established by the Bill.

On the question whether an appeal is limited to a point of law, this measure reflects the existing onward appeal route from the first-tier tribunal. The IIAA will determine the merits of the case. The upper tribunal’s role is to consider whether the law was applied correctly rather than, as the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire mentioned, to provide a full rehearing. I think reference was made to why permission is required as well. Permission provides an appropriate filter so that we can ensure that appeals only within an arguable point of law proceed. We are keen to avoid unnecessary resource expenditure and delay in the finality of decisions. Permission may be sought from either the independent immigration appeals authority or the upper tribunal. Any further questions, particularly around costs, will continue to develop during the process and development of the policy, and I will continue to keep Members updated.

Amendment 36 agreed to.

Question put, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Anna Turley]

The clause allows the Secretary of State to request expedition of an appeal, bail application or procedural step within these proceedings where there is a public interest in securing a quicker resolution. This is an exceptional power for exceptional cases. It ensures that matters of particular importance can be brought to the attention of the IIAA for consideration of expedited treatment.

Let me be clear: this is a power to request expedition, not direct it. The IIAA decides whether a case should be accelerated and may refuse a request where expedition would not be reasonably practicable or would not be in the interests of justice. Nothing in the clause permits Ministers to influence the outcome of proceedings or diminishes the authority’s independence. Cases will continue to be determined impartially and on their merits. The clause is a balanced safeguard. It supports the timely resolution of cases, engaging public interest while preserving fairness and independence. The principle is simple: the Secretary of State may ask, but the authority decides.

Government amendment 37 seeks to ensure that the immigration bail provisions operate consistently with the Bill’s expedited proceedings framework. The Bill already requires regard to be had, when considering whether to grant immigration bail, to whether proceedings are subject to the late claims process under clause 12. The amendments make equivalent provision where proceedings before the authority relate to a person being expedited pursuant to a request by the Secretary of State under clause 9. Clause 9 applies where the Secretary of State considers that it would be in the public interest for proceedings to be expedited. It is therefore appropriate that cases proceeding under that expedited process are treated consistently with the cases subject to the late claims process.

[Blake Stephenson]

The clause lets the Home Secretary ask the authority to expedite a case where it is in the public interest. The authority must agree unless it is not practicable or not in the interests of justice. The Home Office has said that the power will be used for cases such as high harm foreign offenders and human rights claims that are clearly without merit. The Opposition support that.

On amendment 90, tabled in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton West, the principal question is: why leave it to discretion? The public have a direct interest in foreign criminals being deported and being deported quickly, so why leave it to the Home Secretary’s case-by-case discretion? Amendment 90 would require the authority to expedite any appeal by a person who is liable to deportation and has been convicted of an offence either here or abroad, exactly as if the Home Secretary had asked. Will the Government accept that incredibly sensible amendment, which I think the British public would support? I have a couple of basic questions. What criteria will the Home Secretary use, and will they be published? How many requests do the Government expect each year?

Government amendment 37 requires anyone deciding bail to consider whether the authority is expediting the person’s appeal at the Home Secretary’s request. We support that—someone whose appeal is being fast-tracked should not be released while it is heard—but it has a cost. How many additional people do the Government expect to remain in detention as a result, and is there the capacity? How do the Government intend to implement that?

On legal robustness, the House of Commons Library notes that lawyers are already asking how an appellant could challenge a decision to expedite, given clause 1(8)—we come back to clause 1(8) and the robustness, or otherwise, of that clause. That question will be answered in the courts if it is not answered here, so how do the Government expect expedition decisions to be challenged, and do they expect them to be judicially reviewed? When will the process regulations be made, and how long will the authority have to respond to a request?

We support the clause and the Government amendment. We will oppose any attempt to remove the power. Our amendment 90 would ensure that the appeals that matter most to public safety are always at the front of the queue, and I will seek to press that to a Division.

[Anna Turley]

I thank the hon. Member for his contribution to this debate and for tabling amendment 90. To reiterate, the Government amendment ensures that the immigration bail provisions operate consistently within the Bill’s expedited proceedings framework. The Bill already requires regard to be had, when considering whether to grant immigration bail, to whether proceedings are subject to the late claims process under clause 12. The amendment makes equivalent provision where proceedings before the authority relating to a person are being expedited pursuant to a request by the Secretary of State under clause 9.

Let us move to amendment 90. The clause is deliberately designed to deal with cases where the Secretary of State considers that expedition would be in the public interest. It allows those cases to be identified individually and an expedition request to be made to the IIAA. Amendment 90 would instead apply expedition automatically to a broad category of appeals, which is not the purpose of the clause. Where there is a case for setting time periods for a wider group of proceedings, clause 8 provides the appropriate mechanism.

That said, I think it is also important that we are not specifying a particular group in the Bill. Otherwise, potentially, we may need to amend legislation for every category of appeals that the Home Secretary wishes to expedite. It is really important that we maintain flexibility for the Secretary of State to respond to public opinion and to public safety in terms of the category of appeals that she would wish to be expedited.

--- Later in debate ---

[Anna Turley]

I will give way first to the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire, then to my hon. Friend the Member for South Norfolk.

[Blake Stephenson]

You never know, Chair, we may be asking the same question. I asked the Minister whether she would provide some criteria—I am expanding my question, in fact—to give the public some certainty as to the decisions that the Home Secretary might make. Does the Minister expect some criteria to be published?

[Anna Turley]

It is important that we maintain flexibility, as I said. The Bill provides distinct mechanisms for very broad categories of cases and for exceptional individual cases. We should retain that flexibility, so I am afraid that I disagree with the hon. Gentleman on limiting the approach of the Home Secretary in the Bill. Particularly, this is also about case-specific assessment. We want to allow the Home Secretary the opportunity to look at case-specific assessments, rather than being too defined.

--- Later in debate ---

[Anna Turley]

The Independent Immigration Appeals Authority has a statutory objective to handle its cases quickly and efficiently. It cannot do that if it cannot enforce the requirements set out in its procedure rules. It is anticipated that the requirements on parties to proceedings will be set out clearly under the authority’s procedure rules.

Clause 10 provides the authority with a lever to set tangible consequences for non-compliance by enabling it to charge a party to proceedings, among others, who has acted “improperly, unreasonably or negligently,” and whose actions have caused the authority’s resources to be wasted. That is intended to disincentivise tactical delay. The charge will be payable to the authority, rather than an order to pay costs to another party. It will be for the authority to determine what meets the threshold for a charge according to the circumstances of the case, and the detailed operation of the power should be set out in the authority’s procedure rules. Any moneys the authority receives under the power will be paid into the consolidated fund.

Government new clause 1 will enable a party or the authority to seek enforcement, as if the decision of the authority were that of the relevant court. That will simplify the process of recovering funds and will bring the authority in line with existing provisions in the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007.

[Blake Stephenson]

Clause 10 allows the authority to charge a party or representative who acts “improperly, unreasonably or negligently” and wastes its resources, and the Opposition support it. Last-minute applications and poorly prepared cases waste time the system does not have.

I have a couple of questions. The Bar Council objects that non-lawyer adjudicators could charge or fine barristers, with a chilling effect. We do not accept that representatives should be immune from the consequences of abusing the process, but the power must be clear. What level of charge is envisaged, and will there be a cap? How often are wasted costs orders made in the tribunal now? Will a person who is charged have a right to review or appeal?

Of course, fairness cuts both ways. The Home Office is a party. The Library records that 36% of asylum appeals disposed of last year were withdrawn, and the Refugee Council attributes that to poor initial decisions, a point that was made earlier in the debate. Will the Home Office be liable to charges when it withdraws a decision shortly before a hearing, and will guidance define what counts as acting improperly, unreasonably or negligently?

Government new clause 1 makes sums payable under a decision by the authority, including charges under clause 10, recoverable as if they were county court orders in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, and enforceable in the sheriff court in Scotland. We support that. A charge that cannot be collected is no deterrent at all. Will charges against the Home Office be enforceable in the same way? What sums do the Government expect to be recovered each year?

We support clause 10 and Government new clause 1. A clear, fairly applied and enforceable power will discourage abuse of the process, which we think is important.

[Anna Turley]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his contribution. Government new clause 1 ensures there is a mechanism for the enforcement of cost orders between parties to proceedings in the authority, in addition to charges made by the authority under its powers in clause 10. The clause allows the authority to charge a participant in proceedings where it considers that they have acted improperly, unreasonably or negligently, and that that has resulted in the authority’s resources being wasted. Schedule 3 provides for the authority to make rules in relation to cost orders, whereby the authority may order costs to be paid between parties as a result of any party acting improperly, unreasonably or negligently. In answer to the hon. Gentleman’s question about whether the Home Office is accountable, yes, we will be.

The new clause enables a party or the authority to seek enforcement as if the decision of the authority were that of the relevant court. When enforcement of a sum is pursued following the authority’s decision, that decision is to be treated as a registrable judgment in the relevant jurisdiction—in this case England and Wales, and Northern Ireland. This simplifies the process of pursuing sums payable under the authority’s decision. It is broadly in line with equivalent provisions in the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, which enable tribunal costs to be enforced.

The hon. Gentleman made a few points about fairness and the ability to recoup the money. It is anticipated that the authority will take into account the circumstances of the case and the person’s ability to pay when deciding whether to impose a charge. Where there are genuine reasons for delay, for example, it is unlikely that those actions will meet the threshold for a charge. The value of the charge will, rightly, be set through the authority under its procedure rules. It will need to strike a balance between being proportionate and fair, and deterring tactical delay of the process. There will be appropriate parliamentary scrutiny of the charging power through the procedure rules, which will be subject to the negative procedure. We heard earlier a challenge to the use of the negative procedure, but the current tribunal rules are decided through that procedure, so there is no difference in the process.

The hon. Gentleman also mentioned enforcement. The new clause provides that a sum payable under an order of the authority is enforceable as if it were payable under an order of the relevant court. That means the person to whom the money is owed as a result of a decision of the authority can rely on the court processes for the enforcement of that sum.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Blake Stephenson]

Clause 11 tackles one of the most damaging features of the current system: claims raised at the last minute to prevent removal. It allows the Home Office to serve a claim notice on anyone liable to removal or deportation, requiring them to set out every reason they should be allowed to stay, including any modern slavery information, by a deadline. Clause 12 gives teeth to clause 11. Where someone ignores a claim notice and raises new grounds only once they are detained or given removal directions, their appeals will be fast-tracked and the late claim will count against them when bail is considered.

The Opposition support that approach, but there is a problem. The Minister told the Committee during the oral evidence sessions:

“More than a third of our charter returns that fail to go ahead have involved a modern slavery referral raised after the return arrangements have been made.”––[Official Report, Immigration and Asylum Public Bill Committee, 15 September 2026; c. 5, Q3.]

That is exactly the gaming of the system that the public will no longer tolerate. Our plan would require applicants to submit their claim in one go, with later claims disregarded unless there has been a material change in their home country. Clause 11 moves in that direction but stops short: a late claim goes into the late claims process and damages credibility, but it can still be heard and can still succeed. How long will people have to respond? Where will that be set? Who will be served? Beyond clauses 12 and 36, what are the consequences of failing to comply? Can late grounds still succeed on appeal?

Amendment 91 would close the gap: reasons or grounds raised after the claim notice deadline could not be relied on in an appeal before the appeal authority or the upper tribunal unless the appeal authority is satisfied that they arise from a material change of circumstances after the deadline. That is the principle of our plan: claims must be made in one go, and later claims disregarded unless something has genuinely changed. Will the Government accept that approach and therefore our amendment?

Clause 11(10) repeals a large part of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022, including provisions on late evidence in section 26 and accelerated detained appeals in section 27. Why repeal them rather than bring them into force? What will replace them? The Immigration Law Practitioners Association points out that the priority removal notice regime gave recipients a period to access legal advice and clause 11 does not. We do not support the ILPA’s proposed legal advice precondition, but the Government should explain their answer to that point, because if they do not, it will be litigated.

Government amendment 38 goes further, repealing section 19(2) of the 2022 Act on credibility statements, which is replaced by new clauses 3 and 4. We do not oppose that approach. The risk is legal. Justice and the Bar Council remind us that, in the Detention Action case, the Court of Appeal quashed the detained fast-track rules because they were systematically unfair, and that the Court took comfort from specialist judges hearing those cases, which will not be true of the appeal authority. A fast track that is quashed delivers nothing.

What timetable will apply? Justice reports that the Home Office intends decisions “within a week”. What legal advice do the Government have that this process will survive legal challenge? How many cases are expected and what will happen to other appeals pushed back in the queue? What effect will the new bail conditions have on detention numbers and capacity? Will these cases, which often feature detention and are often complex, be decided by senior adjudicators?

Government amendments 39 and 42 mean that a person who gives modern-day slavery information late, after detention or after removal directions, will not go into the late claims process. I understand the reasoning, which responds to concerns from anti-trafficking organisations, but the Minister told the Committee that more than a third of failed charter returns involved a modern slavery referral raised after return arrangements were made. Does this change not reopen exactly that gap?

New clause 3 requires adjudicators in late claims cases to treat late information and late evidence as damaging credibility unless there are good reasons, and new clause 4 does the same for the Special Immigration Appeals Commission. We support them, but everything turns on “good reasons”. If that phrase is read generously, the rule will be swallowed up by the exception. Will the Government look to define it in the Bill or in guidance?

The written evidence adds two points to ILPA’s concern about legal advice. First, ILPA notes that nothing in clause 11 exempts under-18s from the credibility consequences of missing a claim notice deadline. Will children be exempt or protected by guidance? Secondly, Women for Refugee Women says that the Home Office’s guidance on gender-based claims

“recognises that late disclosure is common among survivors of trauma.”

The organisation After Exploitation and a coalition led by Hibiscus call a requirement to disclose everything at the outset “highly unrealistic”. How will the claim notice regime be applied consistently with the Home Office’s own guidance? Will trauma-related late disclosure count as a good reason? We want grounds raised early, but a regime that the Home Office’s own guidance contradicts will not survive its first test case.

Justice adds a point on Detention Action that the Minister should look to answer. When the Court of Appeal considered the fast-track rules, it took into account that independent specialist tribunal judges were hearing the cases. That will not be the case with the appeal authority. Has the Government’s legal advice taken that into account?

We support clauses 11 and 12 and the Government’s amendments, and we oppose attempts to weaken them. One notice, one deadline and one claim: that is the principle, and the Bill should apply it fully. I will seek to press amendment 91 to a Division.

[Anna Turley]

As the hon. Gentleman set out, we have an issue in our system in this country with late claims that are made in detention just prior to planned removal, which inevitably require release or lead to bail, as there is no mechanism for dealing with the appeals in an expedited way. That leads to a significant degree of gaming the system and compromises removals performance.

On the late claims process, a single fast appeal process, which we are setting out here, will apply to late claims—those made after the expiry of the new claim notice. Individuals must submit all relevant information up front. Failure to do so, unless justified, will damage their credibility and result in expedited handling, which will be relevant to maintaining their detention until removal. Late disclosure of modern slavery information may similarly damage credibility unless justified.

Receiving information at the earliest opportunity helps to ensure that cases are considered on the fullest possible picture, enabling timely and better-informed decision making. Clause 11 seeks to deliver that through a new claim notice, which may be issued to individuals to inform them of the need to submit any immigration claim or modern slavery information they have to the Home Office at the earliest opportunity. Where modern slavery issues are raised, that will help support early identification of needs.

Clause 11 works in conjunction with clause 12 to ensure that individuals are informed that failing to submit an immigration claim following receipt of the notice, only to make a claim from immigration detention or after being served notice of departure details, will leave them subject to an expedited late claims process and may have negative implications for their credibility. For modern slavery purposes, the notice will advise recipients that failure to provide modern slavery information only to do so after the claim notice deadline will be taken into consideration, under clause 36, as damaging the credibility of their account by decision makers assessing whether they are a victim of trafficking, unless there are “good reasons” for the delay. Clause 11 is intended to encourage early disclosure of immigration or modern slavery information and remove any perceived advantage of delayed disclosure.

Clause 12 sets out that anyone who receives a claim notice, as set out in clause 11, but makes a claim or provides information only after the deadline given in the notice when they are either in immigration detention or have received notice of their departure details from the UK will enter the expedited late claims process. It also states that, as far as is reasonably practicable, the authority will hear any appeal against such a late claim as a priority above all other claim types. The provision supports earlier disclosure of claims and enables more efficient and expedited determination of late claims. The swift timescales associated with the late claims process will support the maintenance in immigration detention, and subsequent removal from the UK, of these individuals.

--- Later in debate ---

[Anna Turley]

The hon. Lady makes an important point. Again, that is not something that is prescribed in the Bill. As we establish this, it will be important to have a look at whether that ought to be a key principle. I cannot make the commitment at the moment, but it is important that we reflect on that as the authority is established.

As I said, it is unnecessary to prescribe a detailed list of operational metrics. Precise reporting arrangements should be a matter for the authority once operational. Mandating specific requirements in primary legislation would reduce flexibility and constrain the authority’s ability to adapt its reporting arrangements as it becomes established. That will be an operational matter for the authority as it is set up, and should not be prescribed in the Bill. The Government therefore do not accept the amendment or new clause 28.

More broadly, I appreciate that there is a wider point, separate to the context of the Bill, about data and statistics. The Ministry of Justice publishes quarterly statistics that include information on receipts and outcomes. The Home Office immigration system statistics quarterly release covers data on a range of topics, including claims, outcomes and nationality. The full set of official statistics published by those Departments is kept under review in line with the code of practice for statistics. I think that is a conversation that we could have another day, but it is important that we do not accept amendments that seek to require the inspector to focus on what is not in his remit.

[Blake Stephenson]

Given the insufficient assurance on the outcome data, I wish to press the amendment to a vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Anna Turley]

Clause 14 addresses the dual-running process between the authority and the first-tier tribunal. It gives a power to the Secretary of State or the Lord Chancellor to, among other things, transfer property, rights, liabilities or staff used by the first-tier tribunal from the Secretary of State to the authority. This provision allows for operational flexibility and makes for a smoother transition in case it is later decided that assets or property should transfer to the authority.

Clause 15 provides an essential safeguard during implementation of the authority. Its principal purpose is to protect continuity. Before part 1 is fully in force, clause 15 provides for specified descriptions of cases that would be decided by the authority to be transferred to the first-tier tribunal. This could prove necessary in case of a significant disruption affecting the authority’s operation—for example, to manage unpredictable spikes in demand in the implementation period when the authority is not yet fully formed.

The clause may also be used to correct the rare occurrence in which a case needs to be moved to another body. This ensures that cases are heard by the appropriate forum without avoidable procedural complexity. This is not a power to influence individual decisions, avoid judicial scrutiny or alter appeal rights. Appeals will continue to be determined independently and in accordance with the law. Clause 15 simply provides the resilience and flexibility needed to keep cases moving and correct exceptional allocation discrepancies.

Clause 16 provides the Secretary of State with the power to make provision that is consequential on part 1 of the Bill, which establishes the authority. The clause ensures that the wider statute book can operate properly when functions transfer from the first-tier tribunal to the IIAA. It provides that the authority is generally to be treated as a tribunal where legislation applies to tribunals. However, not every provision applying to tribunals will necessarily be suitable for the authority. The clause therefore enables regulations to modify how individual provisions apply, or to disapply them where appropriate. The clause may be used to amend, repeal or revoke provision made by primary legislation that has been passed before the Bill receives Royal Assent, or passed later in the same parliamentary Session.

Government amendment 43 provides the Lord Chancellor with limited and backstop powers to make amendments to the tribunal procedure rules in connection with regulations made to transfer cases between the authority and the existing first-tier tribunal. Tribunal procedure rules will continue to be made by the independent Tribunal Procedure Committee in the usual way in all other circumstances, and in connection with the transition to the new appeals structure where time allows. However, during the transition there may be exceptional circumstances requiring urgent practice and procedural changes to be followed in the first-tier and upper tribunals that cannot be accommodated through the usual rule-making process. This amendment provides an important safeguard to ensure that tribunal procedure adequately supports the transfer of cases and that proceedings are not delayed should such circumstances arise.

[Blake Stephenson]

This group brings together the machinery clauses of part 1: transfer schemes in clause 14, the transition in clause 15, and the consequential power in clause 16. I will speak to amendment 93 tabled in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton West and to Government amendment 43.

Clause 14 is technical in nature. It allows transfer schemes to move property, rights and liabilities to the appeals authority. The Opposition support that, but it is also where the costs of the reorganisation begin to show. The impact assessment—again, the previous impact assessment, not the one that was issued yesterday—warns of significant judicial liabilities in winding down the tribunal, because full-time judges hold lifetime appointments and there are the additional costs of running two systems. What is the estimated cost of winding down the tribunal? How many staff will transfer? Why does the Lord Chancellor, as well as the Home Secretary, need this power? What will the parallel running costs be?

We want the new body up to speed as quickly as possible. Will existing first-tier immigration judges be able to transfer or apply as senior adjudicators, for example, should they wish to? How many of them do the Government expect to apply and employ? The Law Society points out that the impact assessment says the implementation plans are “not yet fully developed”, which I think the Minister reflected earlier. Will a full costing of the transfer be published before any scheme is made?

--- Later in debate ---

[Anna Turley]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his response, his questions and his challenges. Amendment 93 proposes that the authority should be able to transfer cases back to the first-tier tribunal only for a maximum of three years after clause 1 comes into force. If the amendment were to be accepted, it would reduce the flexibility within the overall appeals system to reduce the appeals backlog while simultaneously determining new appeals. I am afraid we are not able to set an arbitrary target of that kind, although I am sure that, given that we are bringing this Bill forward, the hon. Gentleman will understand our sense of urgency behind this transition. He need be in no doubt about the urgency with which we want to make this transition.

The length of time that the FTT IAC—even more acronyms—and the authority will need to run concurrently to ensure optimal efficiency in the overall appeals system will depend on a number of operational matters when the authority is established as a new statutory body corporate. Therefore, legislating for an arbitrary cut-off point of three years is unhelpful, and may result in appeals taking longer than necessary to be determined. We need to be flexible and responsive, which the current drafting of the Bill allows us to do.

Government amendment 43 provides the Lord Chancellor with limited and backstop powers to make amendments to the tribunal procedure rules in connection with regulations made to transfer cases between the Independent Immigration Appeals Authority and the existing first-tier tribunal. The hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire challenged me as to why that cannot be done by the Secretary of State. It is not appropriate for the Home Secretary to lead on that; the Lord Chancellor doing so is obviously more appropriate.

Tribunal procedure rules will continue to be made by the independent Tribunal Procedure Committee in the usual way in all other circumstances, and in connection with the transition to new appeals structure where time allows. However, during the transition there may be exceptional circumstances requiring urgent practice and procedural changes to be followed in the first-tier and upper tribunals that cannot be accommodated through the normal rule-making process. This amendment provides an important safeguard to ensure that tribunal procedure adequately supports the transfer of cases and that proceedings are not delayed should such circumstances arise.

More importantly, the power is tightly constrained and can be exercised only in connection with regulations made under clause 15, which provides that regulations can be made to transfer cases from the authority back to the first-tier tribunal, and clause 52, which provides for commencement regulations. The power is intended to be used only where urgent rule changes that cannot be taken forward in the usual process are required.

Given that the power to make rules is otherwise exercised by the Tribunal Procedure Committee, the Lord Chancellor must consult the Senior President of Tribunals before exercising it. The power is appropriately constrained and subject to parliamentary scrutiny. Regulations that amend, repeal or revoke primary legislation, as defined, must be approved by both Houses through the affirmative procedure. Other regulations made under the clause will be subject to the negative procedure.

In response to the question of the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire about which cases will transfer, clause 52 makes provision for the commencement regulations, including setting out which cases will transition and when. On his questions about cost and implementation, as I have said, detailed plans for the authority, including the costs, are being developed, and work is continuing across the Home Office, the Ministry of Justice and His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service to refine the authority costs and establish comparable, current costs for the first-tier tribunal immigration and asylum chamber. There are not yet agreed or publishable figures for either comparison, as programme costs, affordability and benefits will be developed through the business case.

The hon. Gentleman also asked when the authority will start to make decisions, and when it will take all new appeals. The authority will be introduced through a phased transition, with the FTT IAC continuing to hear existing appeals in parallel while the new authority begins taking specified cohorts of new cases. We know that the current system is taking too long to deliver decisions, so the Bill creates a more scalable appeals system with greater capacity and faster processes, while retaining independent scrutiny and fairness.

[Blake Stephenson]

The Minister did not respond to my question about the projection that by the time the appeals authority gets up and running, approximately 200,000 people could be waiting for an appeal. Does that projection resonate with the Minister? Is that situation a possibility?

[Anna Turley]

Could the hon. Gentleman say where he got that figure from?

--- Later in debate ---

[Blake Stephenson]

The figure is taken from the evidence the Committee received from Refugee and Migrant Justice.

[Anna Turley]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for that. I do not recognise that figure, but of course, the Government want to make sure that we are fully aware of the figures. As was detailed at the start of the Committee’s consideration, the Government know that there are a huge number of appeals in the backlog. As the authority is developed and starts to come into force, the transition will be made. I am afraid that I cannot give the hon. Gentleman any projections, as I would not want to mislead the Committee with any numbers or predictions we could make at this stage.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 14 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 15

Power to specify cases to be heard by First-tier Tribunal instead of IIAA

Amendment made: 43, in clause 15, page 13, line 2, at end insert—

“(4) The Lord Chancellor may by rules made by statutory instrument make amendments to Tribunal Procedural Rules in connection with regulations made by the Secretary of State under this section.

(5) Before making rules under subsection (4), the Lord Chancellor must consult the Senior President of Tribunals.

(6) A statutory instrument containing rules under subsection (4) is subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.”—(Anna Turley.)

This amendment would give the Lord Chancellor the power to amend Tribunal Procedure Rules in connection with regulations under clause 15 transferring cases back to the First-Tier Tribunal from the IIAA. (See also amendment 46.)

Clause 15, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 16 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned.—(Jade Botterill.)

Immigration and Asylum Bill (First sitting)

Debate between Anna Turley and Blake Stephenson

Tuesday 15th September 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Blake Stephenson]

Q That is very helpful, thank you. Do you want to add anything, Dr Casey?

Dr Casey: Yes, I agree. I will just say that I think that, because the Independent Immigration Appeal Authority will not be a judicial body, the courts might be more anxious in scrutinising whether a clause ousts judicial review. At the moment, the way it is drafted, as a public lawyer you read a clause trying to oust and you think how a court would read it. I can imagine a court looking at that at the minute and inserting brackets and making it “A (rational and reasonable) decision of the IIAA”, and interpreting it in that respect.

[Anna Turley]

Q I am keen to come back to some of your comments on article 8. What is your analysis of how it has, slowly over time, come to protect those it was never originally intended to cover, and how can we safeguard against that in the future? Picking up on your point about the potential knock-on effect to article 3, Dr Casey, what mechanisms can we use to prevent article 3 being abused, essentially, on the back of our changes to article 8?

Professor Ekins: On the article 8 point, my own view, which is substantiated in quite some detail in the 2021 Policy Exchange paper with the support of Lord Hoffman that I referred to is that, for a long time in the history of the ECHR, article 8 had nothing to do with immigration and asylum. It was not a provision that was understood to impose limits on the enforcement of migration law or on the deportation and removal of non-citizens, especially foreign criminals and so on. There was no connection there.

A connection has been established in the case law by reading article 8 very expansively and then effectively requiring each particular decision to enforce the migration law of a member state to involve an individuated proportionality assessment about the impact on the particular person being removed—or, in relation to article 8, quite often on his or her family or maybe his or her extended family—and for that to pass judicial muster.

As I say, I think that is an innovation in the case law of the Strasbourg court. I do not want to overstate its novelty—it is an innovation that has been going on for several decades—but it is not part of what the UK and other member states agreed when they agreed the terms of the convention, and I think it should be viewed as a misinterpretation of the convention.

In a sense, the joint declaration of the member states earlier this year recognises that something has gone wrong in the case law of the Court; that it has read article 8—we will come to article 3—to establish a kind of Europe-wide migration and asylum law, beyond the terms agreed by the member states. That needs to be addressed and wound back.

The thought that, in a sense, you are wronging a foreign criminal when you remove him or her from the UK so that he or she cannot maintain a connection with family is just fundamentally misconceived. In the same way, we are not wronging the offender by incarcerating him, which makes it very much more difficult to maintain a flourishing family life; the consequence is a side effect of the wrongful choice made by the offender. Something similar holds, I think, with the wrongful choice made by a person who violates our migration law.

There are harsh consequences in many of these cases, of course, but they are not harsh consequences whereby the UK sets out to wrong someone’s family. That structure has to be more fully recognised. We should see that something has gone badly wrong in thinking that the right to respect for private and family life entails, at least in some cases, a de facto immunity to the application of migration law.

Dr Casey: I agree with Professor Ekins entirely. The extension of article 8 into the domain of immigration law was a very conspicuous act of judicial lawmaking through the living instrument approach.

As recently as 1985 in the Abdulaziz v. the United Kingdom case, you had the UK Government—Sir Peter Rawlinson, the Attorney General—arguing tooth and nail that article 8 did not apply to questions about entry into the UK or removal and that it was just outside the scope. They lost that case, and that has been the EHCR’s position for several decades since then, but it was not understood as part of the original compact when the convention was ratified.

Professor Ekins: You asked us about article 3 as well, I think.

Immigration and Asylum Bill (Second sitting)

Debate between Anna Turley and Blake Stephenson

Tuesday 15th September 2026 Public Bill Committees

[Anna Turley]

Do you think it is fair for people to be able to circumvent an international rules-based framework by going through a safe country already before coming to claim asylum in the UK, or do you think that should have no effect at all on their asylum claim here?

Angela Afzal: We have to acknowledge that the majority of refugees claim asylum and receive protection in countries neighbouring where they had to flee. Secondly, we need to acknowledge that the UK is about 14th in the ranking of EU-plus countries in how many asylum applications we have per capita—we are quite far down the list.

The nature of our geography means that people need to be able to cross the channel in some way to reach the UK for protection. At the moment, there are not significant safe routes for people to get to the UK; we are talking about hundreds of them at the moment. In the absence of safe routes for people to get here, people who arrive here and have their claims processed should be granted the full entitlement to refugee status, so that the UK plays its part according to the obligations of the UN refugee convention.

Ideally, we would want people to have the opportunity to travel here on a safe route from the region of displacement, so that they would not have to make the dangerous journeys to Europe in the first place. As things are at the moment, there is little alternative.

[Blake Stephenson]

Q In the view of the International Rescue Committee, what safe routes should be opened up today to deal with the issue that you have just described?

Angela Afzal: We welcome the safe routes that the Home Secretary has recently announced. We think that they are a positive development. There has been a wide consultation with communities and stakeholders, and the approach has allowed communities to offer consent for the refugees who come to them. There can be planning for people arriving so that services are ready. Our experience shows that that is when you get good refugee integration and good social cohesion.

We welcome the offer of complementary safe routes, so that people who want to come here to study and work, but are not able to access the usual immigration rules—