Financial Services Bill

Alun Cairns Excerpts

Monday 23rd April 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hoban]

New clause 4, which is the most significant of the Government new clauses and amendments in the group, provides a framework for implementation of the Government’s proposal to retain the important rights and protections of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 to ensure that consumers do not lose out as a result of the transfer. For example, we are likely to retain section 75 of the Act, which provides for the joint liability of creditors for misrepresentation or breaches by suppliers.

The Government’s preferred approach to the implementation of the transfer of responsibility for consumer credit from the Office of Fair Trading to the Financial Conduct Authority is to ensure that the Consumer Credit Act protections are replicated in the FCA’s consumer credit rule book, and that the relevant sections of the Act are repealed. That approach is in line with the intention to move to a more responsive, rules-based regime than the current statutory framework.

However, there are limitations to the type of rules that the FCA can make, which means that it will not be able to replicate in its rules all the CCA protections that we want to retain, including protections that impose rights directly on consumers and those that affect unauthorised third parties. That means that some CCA protections will need to be kept in the CCA itself, and that certain provisions of the CCA will therefore need to remain in force following the transfer. As a result, a number of changes will need to be made to both the CCA and the FSMA as part of the transition, to reflect the fact that the FCA will be responsible for regulating consumer credit and to ensure that the FCA, as well as local trading standards, can effectively enforce the retained CCA provisions. For example, it will be necessary to replace references in the Consumer Credit Act to the Office of Fair Trading with references to the FCA. We will also need to apply certain features of the FSMA, such as references to the FCA’s objectives, statutory immunity and fee-raising powers, to the FCA’s new functions under the Consumer Credit Act, and enable the FCA to use FSMA supervision and enforcement powers that would normally be used in relation to breaches of FCA rules for breaches of CCA requirements. New clause 4 enables the Treasury to make those changes and other necessary amendments to the CCA and the FSMA by order.

I should also draw attention to the addendum to the delegated powers memorandum, which the Department has prepared and provided to the delegated powers Committee. The memorandum sets out in more detail how this power is intended to operate and why it is necessary. Copies are available in both the Printed Paper Office and the Vote Office. The order to be made under this provision will be subject to further consultation following Royal Assent to the Bill. Government amendment 11 provides that any order under new clause 4 will be subject to the affirmative procedure and so can be made only with prior approval of both this House and the other place.

Government amendment 2 supports effective collaboration between the FCA and local trading standards following the transfer, enabling the FCA to contract trading standards for the provision of services in the same way that the OFT does now—for example, to undertake local inspections and follow up on enforcement action, including by local illegal money-lending teams. Government amendment 21, and related amendments 18, 19 and 20, insert into the Bill provision for the transfer of the OFT property, rights and liabilities, including staff, to the FCA.

I hope Members will agree that the Government amendments in relation to consumer credit are sensible and practical provisions to support an effective transfer of regulation to the FCA. The new clause and related amendments sit within a process of regulatory reform that seeks to tackle some of the issues raised by Members on both sides of the House about the functioning of the credit market. We believe the FCA will have much stronger powers and greater resources than the OFT has had in order to tackle detrimental practices in the consumer credit market. Unlike the OFT, the FCA will be able to make binding rules on firms to ban specific products or product features that cause harm, to issue unlimited fines, and to require firms to pay redress when things go wrong. It will also be able to apply greater scrutiny to applications for credit licences and make it more difficult for rogue firms to enter the market.

As a consequence of the transfer we have introduced into the Bill, there will be a fundamental change in the regulation of firms such as payday lenders and debt management companies. I am pleased that the provisions enabling that transfer were welcomed in Committee.

There are a number of Opposition amendments relating to consumer credit and debt management plans, and I want to say a few words about them now. On new clauses 5 and 9, I made it clear in Committee that I sympathise with concerns about some of the practices in the fee-charging debt management sector. That is why clause 6 enables the regulation of debt management companies to be transferred to the FCA. That is also why we have chosen to leave on the statute book the enabling powers of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007.

More immediately, we are working with the industry to develop a protocol of best practice for debt management plans, which should cover, among other things, the nature and timing of fees. Indeed, on 14 June the Minister with responsibility for consumer affairs, my hon. Friend the Member for North Norfolk (Norman Lamb), will chair the first industry-wide meeting to discuss and take forward the protocol. That will follow several months of meetings with a smaller, representative group of stakeholders, which has talked through processes, commercial terms and advice, to reach an agreed position.

I also wish to refer the House to new guidance for the debt management sector recently published by the Office of Fair Trading, which sets out in substantial detail the standards expected of firms. I believe that it is appropriate that we give time and focus to current efforts to improve standards in the debt management sector, and take account of the significant changes to the wider regulatory regime enabled by the Bill, before we start talking about changes to a potential statutory scheme under new clause 5.

As I said in Committee, I do not think that we should throw the baby out with the bath water and shut down the market for fee-charging debt management services, as proposed by new clause 9, before fully exploring better regulation. Where suppliers of credit are aware of people who are suffering financial distress in repaying their debt, I encourage them to signpost their customers to fee-free debt advice services so that they can get the best possible advice to meet their needs.

On amendment 40 and new clause 10, I wish to reassure hon. Members that the Bill already enables the FCA to make the kind of rules proposed in those two provisions. Indeed, in relation to new clause 10, the Financial Services Authority already places a number of requirements on firms to ensure that borrowers are informed if their mortgage repayments are subject to change. I know that some hon. Members may wish to challenge the approach, saying, “But if the FCA can already make the proposed rules, what is the harm in accepting these proposals?” The point is that there are significant risks to specifying in great detail in the Bill the precise type of rules that the FCA may make. First, in doing so, we risk distracting the regulator from using its expertise and judgment to identify and address the risks that it considers pose the greatest risks to its objectives. As parliamentarians, we should be creating a framework within which technical experts can exercise their discretion, in a suitably constrained way. We should leave them to get on with the job, not provide a long laundry list of everything that we want them to do.

By specifying in detail what rules should or should not cover, we also risk creating the opportunity for challenge to the regulator’s ability to make rules that are not specified in the Bill. The lack of specific provision in the Bill does not, in any way, reflect on how seriously the Government take these issues. For example, in relation to high-cost credit, a number of initiatives are under way to improve standards in the sector. Those include work to improve industry codes on payday lending; research commissioned by the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills into the impact of a cap on total cost of credit; and a review by the OFT of payday lenders’ compliance with its irresponsible lending guidance. As well as raising standards now, the findings of those pieces of work will feed into the FCA’s approach to regulating the sector following the transfer, including on the type of rules it may make regarding these charges.

[Alun Cairns (Vale of Glamorgan) (Con)]

I appreciate the comments that have been made about the Bill and, specifically, about amendment 40. Does my hon. Friend agree that there is a risk of amendment 40 moving into price regulation, which is very different from product intervention? Price regulation would be a very dangerous line to follow.

[Mr Hoban]

My hon. Friend makes an important point, as we face a challenge in that respect. First, we believe that the FCA has the powers it needs to tackle payday lending. That could include some form of price intervention—

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[Chris Leslie]

That is a fair intervention. No, I would not say that they are all the same. There are companies, even those that may for some reason be using this fee charging process, that want to do the right thing, but my point is that that business model has had its time and needs to go. There is a better way, whether it is a for-profit or a non-profit avenue, for debt management consolidation to take place, and that is to tell the creditor that this is a way for them to get some money back, albeit not necessarily the full amount, from those heavily indebted customers who may owe them something, and in exchange for getting something back they have a duty as a creditor to stump up some of the cost for the administration of that consolidation. It is time to end the business model that has a propensity to cause hardship, not in every single case, but in too many cases, and that is why the Opposition believe that this is a perfectly reasonable new clause to bring forward.

New clause 10 concerns mortgages. People may well ask where the problem is at the time being when mortgage rates are at a low level, partly because the Bank of England is printing so much money that we end up with a low base rate. But the Governor of the Bank of England has been warning in a number of reports that this is an unsustainable situation and that over the medium term he expects interest rates to normalise. From the Bank of England’s point of view, whether the normalised interest rate is 4% or 5% is moot, but it is certainly much higher than the current rate.

My anxiety is that many consumers up and down the country might be under the false impression that this is a normal period, but it is not. If the mark-ups that the retail banks charge on the wholesale cost of borrowing are maintained as base rates or LIBOR rise to a more normal level, the mortgage rates that our constituents pay could end up being significantly higher, at 6%, 7% or 8%. I suspect that the difference between the price the banks pay wholesale for their money and the amount they charge customers upfront has been growing and is too wide. As soon as LIBOR creeps up, if that mark-up is maintained, we could be in serious difficulties, which is why the new clause is essential at this time.

This is a stitch-in-time new clause. We have tabled the proposal because we believe that now is a good time to require all the banks to forewarn their customers about a number of possible scenarios so that home owners with mortgages have the information necessary to prepare for them. Often when those of us with mortgages get information from lenders it is a set of retrospective information, for example on how much we have paid to defray the cost of our mortgage. We believe that it is now essential to forewarn customers about what could come in future, because we have to find a way of ending shocks to consumers, especially when changes to standard variable rates can sometimes be made with as little as two weeks’ notice.

[Alun Cairns]

I am trying to follow the hon. Gentleman’s argument, but how on earth could any individual or organisation predict with certainty what will happen in future?

[Chris Leslie]

The hon. Gentleman is right that it is impossible to predict with certainty, but this is about scenario planning and preparedness. He will know that the Governor of the Bank of England has been saying what he regards normalised base rates to be, broadly speaking. Does the hon. Gentleman not think that our constituents, especially those on variable interest rates—this might not apply to all customers with mortgages, some of whom might have fixed rates—ought to be able to see when their rates fluctuate because of the fortunes of the base rate or, as is often the case, the standard variable rate determined by their bank, and does he not think that those banks ought to help their customers plan for the future? If we end up yet again with a cycle in which people find that they cannot make their payments and their homes are repossessed, we will all have those constituents in our surgeries.

Let me give the hon. Gentleman an example. A couple of weeks ago Halifax announced that it would increase its standard variable rate by 0.5% from 1 May. RBS NatWest has done similarly, as have Clydesdale bank, Yorkshire bank and Bank of Ireland. In my view, all those increases are the result not of base rate changes, but of the fact that those banks are looking to repair their balance sheets not by squeezing remuneration and bearing down on the senior executive management costs that we all know they have, but by trying gradually to take a little more money from consumers. That is why we need a warning for customers in these circumstances.

[Alun Cairns]

I fail to understand the logic of the hon. Gentleman’s argument. If someone’s financial position at the time they take out a mortgage is relatively precarious, they probably should not have the mortgage. Furthermore, to take the logic to the next step, surely a fixed rate product would be better for those people and they should not have been on the variable rate product in the first place, so why on earth are we asking banks through additional regulation to make such predictions when it is meaningless in the reality of life?

[Chris Leslie]

We are doing this because the hon. Gentleman and I are here to represent our constituents, some of whom will be on variable rate mortgages in these circumstances. All we are saying is that we want all the banks to warn of the potential impact of rate changes across a range of scenarios. It is about helping customers anticipate what might be around the corner. It is as simple as that. The banks will give all sorts of reasons for increasing their standard variable rates. For example, they claim that costs make it difficult and often cite the special liquidity scheme, which is now beginning to taper off so the taxpayer safety net is beginning to come away, but taking more and more from consumers is in many ways unfair. I think that Lloyds bank recently borrowed many billions from the European Central Bank as part of its long-term refinancing option, so there is cheap money available wholesale for the banks. We have to keep an eye out for the way they sometimes seek to make an excessive profit off the backs of ordinary mortgage customers.

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[Sheila Gilmore]

I thank my hon. Friend for that important point of view.

If we do not take steps to deal with high-cost credit, we will do many people a disservice. I urge the Minister, even at this stage, to support amendment 40. It does not lay down a set of rules, but merely asks the FCA to make the rules an important priority. In order to protect people who will often feel that they have little choice but to use this sort of lending, we need to have controls in place.

[Alun Cairns]

I am grateful for the opportunity to contribute to the debate and to speak to the amendments. I welcome the Financial Secretary’s opening statement on the establishment of the Financial Conduct Authority, and the development away from the Financial Services Authority and the tick-box approach it adopted under the structure set up by the former Administration, which contributed to failures and had a harmful impact on many families and individuals. That is relevant to the responsibilities that the FCA will inherit. We shall now be able to secure an appropriate degree of protection; to promote choice and competition, which are regulatory concerns within the industry; and to protect and enhance the integrity of the UK financial system.

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[David Rutley]

My hon. Friend is making a characteristically powerful speech about his concerns about various products and what the FCA should do to move things forward. I am concerned about some of the speeches and interventions from the Opposition, who are trying to be too prescriptive about what the FCA should do with particular products. Clearly, there is a range of issues and concerns, but ultimately we should surely allow the new chief executive of the FCA to take the decision based on what he or she feels should be the priority. Does my hon. Friend agree that we should not be too prescriptive?

[Alun Cairns]

I entirely agree. That is one of my reasons for opposing amendment 40. In my view, it will not achieve what it sets out to achieve, but will have far-reaching consequences for not only the FCA but consumers and providers.

[Stella Creasy]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Alun Cairns]

I will give way to the hon. Lady, and I trust that I shall then have a chance to respond to her question.

[Stella Creasy]

Will the hon. Gentleman enlighten the House on his concern about the expertise of the FCA and its ability to exercise the powers granted by the amendment? The amendment simply gives the FCA those powers; it does not direct it to use them automatically. I should also like to know why he was concerned by what the Minister said earlier about his support for the use of price regulation.

[Alun Cairns]

There are clauses that allow for product intervention and refer to terms and conditions, but that only underlines the fact that amendment 40 is not necessary. I do not understand the inconsistency. I am also worried about the reference to maximum pricing in the amendment. If it were passed, price regulation would be introduced to the financial services sector for the first time, because banking services are currently based on variable cost. Many products are intended to remove the risk from the consumer, and the risk is priced accordingly. Price controls could not accommodate changes and fluctuations in the marketplace. The amendment poses a major threat to the supply of valuable products to many consumers, to the free market, and to competition principles.

Direct pricing also poses the threat of practical consequences. How would the FCA determine the price of a product? One of my hon. Friends said that he considered 50% to be appropriate, but some Members are now shaking their heads, suggesting that that might be too high. How would the FCA decide whether the basis of pricing should be fixed or variable? What about the cross-subsidies that are arranged within financial institutions with the aim of securing the financial certainty that many consumers demand? What about the long-run incremental costs? It would be impossible to price products accordingly; but even if that were a solution, it would require a large-scale, sophisticated infrastructure body to provide continual oversight of the hundreds of products provided by hundreds of organisations.

For those reasons, I oppose amendment 40. In the same breath, however, I pay tribute to the campaigning that has highlighted the scandal of payday loans, and to the Treasury, which has responded accordingly. We have already heard that there will be a report by the end of the summer, and that it will be acted on. I hope that those who share the concern expressed by the hon. Member for Walthamstow about payday loans will be reassured by what has been said not only by Ministers but by Back Benchers, who will maintain the pressure for action.

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[Chris Leslie]

In certain circumstances, Parliament should be sovereign. That is an important principle in our constitution. I do not think that regulators should be able to override Parliament, if that is the Minister’s suggestion. I am pretty sure it is not. Ultimately, in certain circumstances, Parliament should be able to make the final decision. That is an important cornerstone of our constitution.

[Alun Cairns]

It would helpful if the hon. Gentleman could outline some of the circumstances in which Parliament should overrule the regulators.

[Chris Leslie]

It is entirely hypothetical. Of course we cannot do that at this stage, but there might be circumstances. I will remember the hon. Gentleman’s intervention for the many years that he will be in Parliament for when the time comes, if it comes, that he disagrees with a particular outcome of a regulation as it affects his constituents.

Amendment 35 talks about the impact of many of the changes within the regulatory system on consumers, particularly those on lower incomes. We believe that the FCA should have enshrined in its objectives a commitment to consider how easily consumers are able to find products that are appropriate to their income, and more broadly, products that provide value for money. In difficult times as incomes are squeezed it is right that consumers feel that they have a regulator that is on their side. If we are creating a genuine consumer champion in the FCA, it is important that it has a set of objectives and values that reflect that, particularly for those on the lowest income. It is a similar argument to that made in the previous group of amendments in respect of the Money Advice Service. We have seen excessive overdraft charges, high interest rates, and charges for hidden services. Those require a genuine consumer champion and this amendment would help to create that.

Amendment 36 would also shift the balance in favour of the consumer. It would introduce what is known as a fiduciary duty of care by authorised persons, by financial services providers, towards the consumers who are their clients. “Fiduciary” means holding in trust, holding in good faith, a concept that would help to rebuild confidence among the public in financial services. There is a serious lack of trust at present that is bad for consumers, providers and society at large. The Bill contains no explicit obligation on firms to avoid conflicts of interest, nor to profit at consumers’ expense without their knowledge and consent, nor to have undivided loyalties and duties of confidentiality to the customer. The pre-legislative scrutiny Committee commented on many of these aspects and recommended that some action be taken. Although the FSA has recently had its treating customers fairly initiative, we do not think that that is enough. We believe that a fiduciary duty of care is necessary, especially in the light of some of the major concerns of mis-selling scandals and the need to learn lessons from those.

Amendments 33 and 34 relate to the costs and expense of establishing the FCA and PRA, splitting the FSA into those component parts. I apologise for rattling through these. We have to minimise unnecessary additional expenses incurred, because ultimately the consumers will pay. The FSA’s budget for 2013-14 has gone up by 15.6%. I accept that the new regulatory system will have some costs involved in that, but the majority of those costs are operational and not necessarily related to the principles of regulation involved. It was a bit of a joke to see in the White Paper the Government say that the running costs under the new arrangements should not be “materially different” in real terms and aggregate from the current FSA. That will not happen. We are talking about extremely significant extra costs.

We suggest that the memorandum between these organisations should contain an estimate of the annual costs involved in administering the FCA and PRA, and compare those to the estimated costs of the administration of the FSA. That is a bit of a crude way of getting a cost comparator, but I would be interested in seeing it. Similarly, amendment 34 talks about minimising the

“unnecessary additional expenses that might be incurred by virtue of the separate administration of the FCA and the PRA, and to maximise any common administrative savings achievable through close co-ordination.”

The PRA is moving to plush offices in Moorgate, leaving vacant space at Canary Wharf, a lease that expires way down the line in 2018. There is a sense in which there is a bit of empire building going on at the Bank of England, which will be responsible for the PRA. The Threadneedle street empire is growing strongly.

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[Alun Cairns]

My hon. Friend is making very forceful points, especially on the FSCS. As that is currently funded by the industry itself, and given that the FCA cannot have detailed knowledge of the workings of every product, does my hon. Friend agree that in order to ensure that there is adequate protection, the FCA must work with the industry and accept the intelligence that comes from it?

[Mark Field]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right about that.

I want to touch on the impacts, however. Smaller firms dominate the advisory and investment sector, and they clearly do not have the capital available to make the sizeable pay-outs that are an integral part of the scheme on behalf of other companies. The larger banks are present in most major financial centres, but it is the success of innovative smaller companies that marks out Britain’s financial services industry, or at least has done hitherto.

I am aware, as I have spoken to this company in recent days, of a FTSE 250 firm whose costs have risen by 270% under the compensation scheme, year on year, from 2009 to 2010. That includes some £4.7 million of interim levy costs for Keydata, a current cost of £470,000 for MF Global—again, I fear that that is an interim cost—and some £700,000 for Arch Cru. The company had predicted that its total cost for MF Global could end up being as high as £9.5 million.

This situation is an enormous concern. Firms are facing increased liabilities through the compensation scheme and the future structure of the supervisory regime does not suggest that prudential regulation of these firms is likely to be improved. This matter should be addressed in this Bill, as the FCA will not be a specialist prudential regulator. As I say, the experts are located elsewhere, so it is crucial that the Bill contains adequate safeguards and assurances that robust information-sharing schemes are to be put in place between the two regulators.

I briefly wish to discuss my new clauses 2 and 3, which seek to amend section 166 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. Section 166 sets out arrangements for a report by a skilled person, and the whole section urgently requires changing. The FSA has the power to insist on an investigation without determining who does it and without paying for it. The result has been that too many recent section 166 reports have cost the players in the financial services market huge sums, without producing anything of great value. Under the current regime, firms are guilty until proven innocent, and they have to pay for their own prosecution, regardless of whether guilt is proved or not.

The number of section 166 reports has, perhaps understandably, risen dramatically since the 2008 financial crisis. Nevertheless, such reports are increasingly used as a standard regulatory method, rather than being reserved, as they should be, for the most serious cases. They are becoming a phenomenally big burden on hard-pressed small firms. The costs can run into hundreds of thousands of pounds in each and every case, and companies often cannot recoup the costs, even if there is no evidence of wrongdoing.

I know that others wish to speak, but I just wish to put on the record the breakdown of the cost of section 166 reports. As I say, this is now an issue of major concern. In 2006-07, there were just 18 such cases, at a cost of £3.8 million. That number increased to 29, 56, 88 and 95 cases respectively for each of the four succeeding years, with the costs increasing from £3.8 million to £32.2 million for the year 2010-11. It is essential now that the FSA, which has not previously selected skilled persons to have a direct line of accountability, changes its whole approach on this matter. There is much more that I would like to say and I am sorry that time is so limited this evening. I hope that this matter will come back for further scrutiny, although I am afraid that that will be in another place.

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[Mr Hoban]

I think that it is important that the court’s non-executives perform a full role in scrutinising the Bank’s activities. They need to be able to look at the output of those reviews, consider them and express their views on them. On the issue of minutes, I will not say that we are getting into a semantic debate, because that would be unfair. What we want to do is ensure that a proper record of the court’s meetings is published.

I am not sure that the minutes should necessarily be verbatim, reporting every word that everyone has said, but they should certainly be a very good summary, catching the thought processes that took place in the court and the issues that were debated and discussed, so that Parliament and stakeholders can hold the Bank to account for the way in which it has used its powers not just when it comes to the Financial Policy Committee, but in other areas. I hope that that gives my hon. Friend the reassurance he looks for on our commitment to transparency and on ensuring that we do all we can to strengthen the transparency arrangements of the Bank of England.

I am very conscious that a number of other points were made, and I want to discuss them. The hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell) tabled two amendments on the appointment of the Governor of the Bank of England and Parliament’s role in it. We do not have time tonight to go into the detail of that procedure, but the Chancellor has said that there will be an open process, and having heard the debate in the House he will reflect on it when thinking about how the process should develop.

I turn to Government amendment 1. In Committee, the hon. Member for Nottingham East argued for a check on the PRA’s ability to decide not to disclose the use of its veto over the FCA. The Government accept that the PRA will always be the best placed organisation to determine whether or when to disclose the use of its veto, but there is room for an element of independent consideration when it decides against such disclosure. The Government have therefore decided to place a duty on the PRA, through amendment 1, to consult the Treasury on a decision not to disclose, and this will ensure that proper disclosures do take place.

I will respond in writing to the remarks that my hon. Friend the Member for Cities of London and Westminster (Mark Field) made on the use of skilled persons. He raised some important issues.

[Alun Cairns]

Does my hon. Friend recognise the strength of a practitioners panel in relation to the PRA, given that he has already accepted the merits of a practitioner panel in relation to the FCA?

[Mr Hoban]

What is important is that the PRA establishes its process for consultation with regulated firms. It is required to set out in its annual report its process of consultation.

In conclusion, this is an important part of the legislation, and I am very disappointed that the hon. Member for Nottingham East has tabled a wrecking amendment that would take the guts out of the Bill. I thought that the Opposition supported the reform of financial regulation, but they clearly do not, so I hope that if the hon. Gentleman puts his wrecking amendment to the vote the House will oppose it.