National Security (State Threats) Bill (Allocation of Time)

Alicia Kearns Excerpts

Allocation of time motion
Wednesday 17th June 2026 Commons Chamber

[Alicia Kearns (Rutland and Stamford) (Con)]

Let me be clear from the outset that the Opposition support the Bill and want it on the statute book, but we cannot support the manner in which the Government are seeking to pass it. This motion, for something that seeks to make a permanent change to the criminal law of our country, was laid only late on Tuesday, and with it the Government are seeking to drive through every single stage in one afternoon. The months of debate that the Bill should have had are gone, and the line-by-line scrutiny and votes on amendments in Committee have all been taken away, so the first test of this law will be in a court room, where it may well collapse. The case for these powers was made well over a year ago. The House does not exist to waive through legislation; it exists to test it and to find weaknesses before our enemies do. A motion that forbids us that duty does not strengthen the Bill but imperils it. Therefore, with regret, we will seek to divide the House.

National Security (State Threats) Bill

Alicia Kearns Excerpts

2nd reading
Wednesday 17th June 2026 Commons Chamber

[Alicia Kearns (Rutland and Stamford) (Con)]

We support the ambitions in the Bill, we want the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to be designated, and we want the Bill on the statute book, so the Government will find no enemies on our Benches today—only an Opposition determined to ensure that this law protects our people and our country. That is not a cause that belongs to those on one side of the House alone.

The Government are right to bring forward this legislation, but they must now have the courage to get it right. The head of MI5 warned us that state-based threats have risen by more than a third in a single year, and that since 2022 our security services have disrupted more than 20 Iran-backed plots to kidnap or kill on British soil. That is 20 plots in our country, and against people who came to this country precisely because they believed it lay beyond the reach of the regimes they had fled.

There is a national emergency of antisemitism in our country. Jewish families, many of whose parents and grandparents came to these shores fleeing persecution, now find themselves looking over their shoulders once more. They have endured threats, intimidation and violence on a scale that this House swore we would never see again, and Jewish lives have become smaller. The Bill is a step towards ending that, because much of the activity is fomented, funded and directed from beyond our borders.

In the face of that national emergency, and attacks on our Jewish communities, a Bill that confronts hostile state activity on British soil is not just welcome but overdue, because a hostile state is not a gang or a terrorist cell. It poses a different challenge, operating through proxies, the hired gun and the useful idiot, recruited to sow chaos on our streets—but all backed by a foreign state with a flag, an embassy, a seat at the United Nations, and resources beyond the reach of most terrorist groups. That is what makes this Bill so difficult, and why it demands such care.

If the Bill is found wanting, it will handicap our police and the security services in their work—work that is largely unseen and for which they are too rarely thanked. Those officers deserve a Parliament ready and willing to give them the tools required for the task. That is what the Bill is for and why, in principle, it is right.

But—I am sure the whole House heard the “But” coming—the Bill has gaping deficiencies. It was laid in the House at the end of last Tuesday, and the Government want to carry out all its stages in one sitting by the end of today. A law on how we confront the gravest threat, short of outright and declared war, is being published, debated and railroaded through in a matter of days. That is a serious point, not a procedural complaint, because if we get the scrutiny wrong, our country will pay the price. We exist to find the weaknesses before our enemies do, and the Bill is meant to protect more people.

More than a year ago, Jonathan Hall KC, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, set out in detail why this sort of legislation was needed, and the Government accepted all his recommendations. But then we saw nothing for a year. When the House is told there is no time to get this right, let me be clear that there was time—14 months, to be exact. There was not the will to use it, until a single day was chosen for reasons that have nothing to do with the tempo of the threat.

I have called for this legislation for years, so no one will accuse us of wishing to delay it, but I say to the Secretary of State with complete candour that the threat did not arrive in a hurry and it will not be beaten by rushing today. There is no prize for being first to the statute book with a law that fails in the first courtroom that tests it. A Bill passed fast but built wrong is not a blow to hostile states; it is a gift to them. That is why we have tabled 13 amendments, not one of them to stall the Bill or to blunt it, but all to better protect us.

I will take the House through the amendments in Committee, but let me now name the gravest gaps, so that we go into this first debate with our eyes open. First, extraordinarily, the Bill is gentler on hostile states than the law currently is on terrorists. Under the Bill as drafted, to convict a person who, for example, supports the IRGC, the Crown must clear a hurdle that it does not face when prosecuting someone for support for the very terrorist groups that the IRGC arms and funds. The IRGC, the world’s biggest sponsor of terrorism, is being handed protection in law that the terror proxy is denied. I can find no version of that argument that survives being said out loud.

It should not be harder to prosecute the body that trains, funds and directs the terrorists than to prosecute the terrorist themselves. The provision on “prohibited purpose” sets a higher threshold, which lawyers for hostile actors will delight in. There is no reason beneficial to the UK for anyone to be engaging with the IRGC, so our amendments would simply bring the offence in line with the Terrorism Act 2000, from which it was copied and then weakened by the Government. The Secretary of State has just said that she wants hostile states to be treated the same way as terrorists, but that is not the case in this legislation.

Secondly, the Bill risks making Britain a launchpad for hostile acts against our friends—a state terror hub. A cell that conspires here, be it in Manchester or London, while directing its activity at Baghdad, Beirut, Berlin, Brussels or even Hong Kong will slip the net because the harm was meant for another state’s streets and not ours—it is not prejudicial to the safety of the UK. That is not just a hole in our law but an affront to our allies. Britain will not become a safe harbour for plots against our friends due to inaction from our side, and that is why we have tabled an amendment to close that gap.

Thirdly, as drafted, the Bill does not give the police the power to stop state-backed threats before they are enacted and therefore to secure a prosecution. Our terrorism law lets us intervene while an attack is still being planned, and that is among the most important powers our counter-terrorism police have. This Bill has no equivalent, so we could be powerless to charge a person who plans to assist the IRGC or another terrorist state organ unless they act. Our security services do not wish to clear up after plots; they wish to stop them and prosecute beforehand.

Fourthly, the Bill has not learned the hardest lesson of the last 20 years, which is that the most common danger that our security services have to deal with is no longer the directed plot but the lone individual who absorbs a hostile body’s propaganda and acts on it without specific direction. A hostile state brings sophistication and reach to its propaganda, yet the Bill catches only those commissioned and instructed, rather than those who are inspired by the climate created by the hostile state. It guards us against the plot that is ordered, but leaves us open to one for which no order has been given.

I will press the detail of these points in Committee, but I raise them now because they go to the heart of whether the Bill will work. I am afraid that Foreign Office lawyers, Home Office lawyers and Home Office officials have been unable to reassure me on any of these points. In fact, their answer—[Interruption.] If the Home Secretary wishes to intervene and clarify where I am wrong, she is very welcome to, but her own officials have said that it is “likely” the Bill may cope with these issues. I am not interested in “likely”. If someone is a traitor and they betray our country by supporting a hostile state, I want to make sure that they will be able to be prosecuted. Not one Government official has been able to reassure me or say that our concerns are wrong. I am glad that the Home Secretary of State finds that amusing. She is still very welcome to intervene.

[Mark Pritchard]

The shadow Minister is making an excellent contribution, as always, and I completely agree with her. I support the Bill, but I think it is thin. I also support the former Attorney General, my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright), and the comments about legal ambiguity. That runs through the whole Bill.

The Home Secretary talked about diplomatic cover, saying that diplomats will not be affected by this, yet it is public knowledge that intelligence officers from certain countries operate under diplomatic cover. For example, if an intelligence officer from an embassy in the United Kingdom gave a great big bag of cash to a small criminal—I will not mention where they might be from—and said, “Go and commit some sabotage,” or “Go and commit some arson,” how would that be prosecuted in the courts? How is the Crown Prosecution Service going to disaggregate that? It would have to say, “This bit we can prosecute, but the other bit, the important bit, we cannot.”

[Alicia Kearns]

The reality is that an individual such as that would not be captured, because they would have diplomatic protections under the Vienna conventions. I admit that I have not been able to find an amendment that would correct that. That is why we have scrutiny of the House, because the shadow Front Bench is not the sole arbiter of where the gaps are. We would have been able to do this if we had had more time.

However, I will use this as a chance to touch on the fact that there is a protection in the Bill that if a person acts

“for or on behalf of, or holds office under, the Crown, or is in Crown employment”,

they are protected against any interactions they may have with the IRGC. However, there is a slight concern, because that is followed by:

“(whether or not they engage in the conduct in that capacity).”

We would all like to say, hand on heart, that no one who works for our country as a civil servant—a Crown servant—would ever betray us, but technically, under this legislation, we could not prosecute anyone who did so, even if they did so outside their official capacity and were therefore genuinely working to abet another organisation. Again, if the Home Secretary would like to clarify how we would prosecute rogue civil servants, I would be happy to take an intervention from her—but there isn’t one.

The Government decided that it was wise to attempt to pass such vital legislation in just one day, but we think that scrutiny is important because the Bill needs to work as well as it can. It is littered with omissions. I have already set out some of them. Additionally, Jonathan Hall said that we should give powers to the police to strip passports at the border, but the Government have not included that. It was proposed that there should be serious police protection orders, but they have removed them. We are gifting defences to would-be perpetrators, and the Bill should not be left as it is. These examples are only the gaping holes I could find in the two and a half days and late nights that I was given to find issues and table amendments.

There is one more thing that the Government and the House must hold in mind as we fix our gaze on Tehran. This power is rightly organisation agnostic. We must not write a law for the IRGC alone. We are writing a law for every hostile state organ that comes after it, and the next may look nothing like the last. I think of the United Front Work Department of the Chinese Communist party, of whose reach I have spoken often, and I hope the day comes when the Government turn this power on it. I doubt that that will happen, but I set out that ambition. That day will come only if we build this Bill for the second designation, the third and the fourth.

As drafted, this legislation has been written with a single, already sanctioned organisation in mind, and that shows. There is no reference to sanctions read-across in the Bill because the IRGC is already sanctioned. The Government said, “We don’t need to do a read-across for sanctions because the IRGC is already sanctioned.” I am not just looking at the IRGC. There are more organisations that will need to be designated in future. The law must fit not just one adversary but all. Otherwise, it is a single-use power dressed up as a meaningful law.

We support the principle of this Bill without reservation, and we will support it on Second Reading, but we will support it in the right way, with scrutiny, attention and determination to ensure that a rushed process does not result in us not meeting the scale of the threats we now face. It is vital that the Government engage today in good faith and listen to Members on all sides. Their failure so far to accept any amendments does not give me cause for optimism, but there is still time for them to accept some. The delay of the last 14 months should not be undone by haste today, because a half-built Bill will not redeem that time; it will simply compound the danger.

--- Later in debate ---

[Sir Jeremy Wright]

My right hon. Friend and Committee colleague is right in what he says, and I will come back to how and why we distinguish what the Bill proposes from the proscription regime.

On what is required to prove at least one of the criminal offences set out in this Bill, clause 2 introduces a new offence under a proposed new section 17A of the National Security Act 2023. The offence involves support for a designated body, but only if such support is given for “a prohibited purpose”, which proposed new section 17A(4) sets out is

“a purpose that the person knows, or having regard to other matters known to them ought reasonably to know, is prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom.”

That is an additional element that the prosecution must prove. That will undoubtedly make this offence more difficult to obtain convictions under, and there may be good reason for that, but if there is, I want to understand what it is.

I make two observations on the Government’s chosen approach in relation to that specific proposed new offence. The first is that this is not equivalent to proscription under the Terrorism Act 2000. I use that expression because that is the wording the Government have used in setting out their aspirations with the Bill. Although the Government intend designation to be similar to proscription in many respects—I accept it cannot be in all respects—proscription does not require an additional motive for someone who supports a proscribed organisation, but merely that they support the proscribed organisation and know that that is what they are doing. No additional motive, demonstrating some kind of animus against the welfare of the United Kingdom, is needed, and that is an important distinction.

The Government may say that the reason for that difference is to protect those who are engaging with a legitimate entity in a way that, just as my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings (Sir John Hayes) says, can never be possible with a proscribed terrorist organisation. In that case, however, I am struggling a little with the purpose and effect of designation itself. Surely the point of designation in the Bill is to move an organisation from the acceptable column into the unacceptable column. Surely the list of reasons why someone might be designated, which I read out earlier, is there to show us that those organisations, when they are doing those things, should not be worthy of support of any kind; but that is not, I think, where this legislation leaves us.

[Alicia Kearns]

That is precisely the point that I made in my opening speech. The Government are saying that it is not legitimate to engage with these bodies. Of course they want a carve-out to protect Crown servants, but that is explicitly included in the Bill. What they are doing, essentially, is creating a carve-out whereby people could say that it was legitimate for them to engage with the IRGC, and that somehow it would not be inherently dangerous or unbeneficial to engage with it. We are creating a threshold that I do not believe the courts will be able to meet, so we will not get the prosecutions that the Bill is designed to create.

[Sir Jeremy Wright]

I will come to exactly that point about the carve-outs. It is, I think, evident from a close reading of the Bill that the Government’s approach to the first of the new offences it creates differs from their approach to the next two. I want to understand from the Minister for Security—and this is my second observation—why that difference exists. I should say at this point that it is a great pleasure to see the Minister, the hon. Member for Wallasey (Dame Angela Eagle), in her place. As a distinguished former member of the Intelligence and Security Committee, she knows about these matters. However, I am also conscious that she has only just arrived. I hope I am setting out these specific concerns in a way that will give her two chances to answer them, on Second Reading and in Committee. If she is concerned about the lack of time between the two, she has no one to blame but her own colleagues—but we will come back to that.

As I was saying, my second observation relates to precisely the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Rutland and Stamford (Alicia Kearns). There is a difference between the way in which the Bill sets out the first of the new offences and the way in which it approaches the other. For example, new section 17B, which amends the National Security Act, creates the offence of “Assisting a designated body”, while new section 17C creates the offence of

“Obtaining…material benefits from a designated body”.

Neither of those requires the additional motive of acting with a prohibited purpose. Instead, both allow for defences to be raised by those accused to establish that they were acting for a proper purpose. That would, of course, include not giving carte blanche to anyone who works for the British Government to behave as they wish, but if that person is acting within the purposes of their public appointment, it would offer them the chance to raise that defence, and would also offer opportunities to present a defence of acting in compliance with a UK legal obligation. I simply want to understand from the Minister why that approach was not taken in relation to the offence of supporting a designated body, because that would have been an attractive way forward.

Perhaps the Government will say that the prohibited purpose requirement matches some of the offences in the National Security Act, where they are carried out for or on behalf of a foreign power, but the National Security Act definition includes any foreign power, benign or malign. This, of course, is different, because a designated body has already been designated by the Secretary of State as a body that is— if I can use unparliamentary language—up to no good, and should therefore, in my view, be in a different category. Perhaps we have already established that demonstrating that they were acting innocently in support of it would be a high bar for any potential defendant to meet. It would be helpful to understand the Minister’s view on that.

Let me finish where I started. I agree with the purpose of the Bill; I think we all do, and it is clearly important for the Government to plug an evident gap in our legislative armoury. However, we must be certain that the way in which the Government are approaching the plugging of that gap is the right way, and that all these parts of the Bill fit together—not least, as we heard from the Chair of the Home Affairs Committee, my right hon. Friend the Member for Staffordshire Moorlands (Dame Karen Bradley), with other parts of the sanctions and other regimes. It is that process that I hope the Minister will be able to deal with, either when she winds up this part of the debate or subsequently in Committee.

[Mark Sewards (Leeds South West and Morley) (Lab)]

I start by commending the Government for the speed with which they have brought forward this legislation. I understand the charges made by the Opposition about the amount of time available to debate the Bill, but the House will recall that when the Prime Minister spoke to Jewish communities following certain attacks this year, he promised not only that the IRGC would be proscribed, but that this legislation would be brought forward and accelerated. That was just prior to the April recess, the local elections and the King’s Speech, so there has not been too much parliamentary time between then and now, and he has fulfilled at least one of his promises by bringing forward the legislation.

[Alicia Kearns]

I have been very clear that we must stand by our Jewish communities. Yesterday, I sat down with the Jewish Leadership Council, the Community Security Trust and representatives of other organisations. They do not recognise the need to rush this Bill through the House, and they want us to scrutinise it in order to close the gaps that we discussed in that meeting. Although I wish we could have acted sooner, and I fully support the Bill and want to get it done, they want to get it done right, so that we do not have the gaps that my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright) has just set out.

[Mark Sewards]

I appreciate what the hon. Lady says, and I am glad to hear that she has been meeting those organisations. The Prime Minister made two promises, and this Bill fulfils one of them. Proscribing the IRGC is the other, and I will come to that in a moment.

This Bill captures the sophistication of the entities that it seeks to target: those groups operating under alternative names and front organisations. It targets them to ensure that they are unable to exploit any potential loopholes. Creating the new power of designation—which is almost equivalent to proscription but not quite the same, as we have heard in this debate—is absolutely welcome. The Bill also makes supporting designated bodies for a prohibited purpose—including arranging meetings, professing support for them or materially assisting their activities in the UK—a serious criminal offence. I am grateful to the Home Secretary, the Foreign Secretary, the Prime Minister and the previous Security Minister for enduring my endless questions about this issue, both in this House and in private. I am very appreciative that the Bill does what I have been asking for it to do, and what many other Members of this House have been asking for it to do. I am also very pleased that offences will carry substantial penalties, including sentences of up to 14 years, which is absolutely the right move.

I appreciate what the right hon. and learned Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright) said about this being primary legislation, and he is right to say that today’s discussion has to be about the content of the Bill, not the bodies that we seek to proscribe through it. I absolutely take his point, and he set out a very eloquent argument about what he sees as the problems with the legislation. However, given the impact of the IRGC on this country and on the communities I speak to, I want to take this opportunity to set out not only why this legislation should pass through its Commons stages today, but why it should be used to proscribe the IRGC as soon as possible, as I will not have many further opportunities to do so.

There is no clearer threat to the UK and the British Jewish community than that posed by the IRGC. We know that the IRGC directs terror abroad, and we know it funds Hezbollah, the Houthis and Hamas. We know that it brutally crushes dissent at home in Iran and murdered more than 30,000 people in the January protests, and it continues to repress its people as well as cut off internet access, which makes us unable to update the figures and to know what is truly going on in some parts of the country. We know that the IRGC is a clear and present danger to Britain’s national security. It plans terror attacks here, it tries to radicalise people here, and it promotes extremism here.

I pay tribute to our security services for all the work they have done to protect us against the IRGC and others. As we know, MI5 confirmed last October that it had identified more than 20 potentially lethal plots, backed by Iran, in the previous year alone. On that point, I want to focus my remarks on the threat that the IRGC poses to the Jewish community in this country. As the Chief Rabbi said in April, our fellow citizens are facing a sustained campaign of violence and intimidation. We know that Jews have been stabbed on the streets of Golders Green. We know that Finchley Reform synagogue, Kenton United synagogue, and Jewish organisations and charities have all been targeted. We know that ambulances belonging to Hatzola, an organisation that serves the entire community, were burned.

Police investigations are ongoing, and it would not be appropriate for me to comment on all the specific circumstances of each case, but we know that paid proxies are operating here. We also know that the US Department of Justice has identified paid proxies operating in our country that are directly linked to the IRGC, and the threat is not contained to Britain, with a number of attacks across Europe in recent months. The threat is not disputable. Senior intelligence figures such as the former head of MI6, Sir Richard Dearlove, have stated clearly that the IRGC poses a threat to the British Jewish community, and that threat is of long standing. Over the past decade, we have seen growing evidence of Iranian efforts to radicalise young people here. Senior IRGC commanders have addressed student audiences and urged them to

“raise the flag of the Islamic Revolution, Islam and martyrdom”,

and calling on them to join an “apocalyptic war”.

--- Later in debate ---

[Bob Blackman]

I thank my right hon. Friend for that intervention.

Another issue, which the Committee also referred to, was that certain charities in this country are linked to or directed and funded by Tehran. At least 13 charities are under investigation by the Charity Commission. I have asked continually for action from the Government and the Charity Commission to close down those charities to prevent them from acting against the interests of this country. At the moment, there is a lack of action and co-ordination, and it is not clear to me that this legislation will catch those charities, or whether there is sufficient legislation to do so. I would appreciate the Minister addressing that issue.

[Alicia Kearns]

One of the powers that the Government could look to take—outside this Bill, because it is not within its scope—would be to give the Charity Commission the power to wind up a charity. It currently does not have that power, but we can be absolutely certain that states are creating brand new charities across our country specifically to infiltrate them. That might be my hon. Friend’s best course of action to get that done, and I am sure he would have the full support of most of the House for it.

[Bob Blackman]

It is clear that this is one of a series of actions that need to be taken. If we had had the opportunity to give the Bill pre-legislative scrutiny, suggestions could have been made to increase its scope to deal with these issues once and for all.

It is pretty clear to me that action needs to be taken to defend our people and the people who come here fleeing the Iranian republic. Following this legislation, we look forward to the proscription of the IRGC or whatever sanction we are going to take, as well as specific sanctions against the commanders. The assets of the IRGC and its various bodies should be frozen and subject to enhanced security, and we look forward to seeing protections for the Iranian dissidents and opposition figures living in Britain.

Let us make sure that we send a clear message. Members of all parties agree that this legislation is necessary, but further legislation is also necessary. This Bill could be improved, provided the Government were willing to listen to the proposals that my hon. Friend the Member for Rutland and Stamford (Alicia Kearns) has put forward. I hope that we will hear those arguments in Committee and ensure that the Government take note of that. I also hope that, if the Government do not act today, they will agree to act in the future on the sensible proposals that my hon. Friend has made.

This is a moral and national security necessity. We know that operatives from Iran, whether it is the IRGC or other state-based organisations, are taking action right now on our university campuses to stir up trouble and antisemitism. They are taking direct action, as has been said, against Jewish businesses, synagogues and, indeed, even now places where Jewish people live. That is absolutely unacceptable, and the people responsible obviously have to be brought to justice, but the organisations that they are part of must also be brought to justice and prevented from operating. All we can do is pass this legislation and hope that the Home Secretary can take the necessary decisions.

I draw attention to one final issue: the operation of the communications. The Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting is a propaganda arm of the regime. It is tied directly to the IRGC. It is not clear to me that it will be caught by the provisions of the Bill. It has a hub in Acton in west London, and it actively airs threats against Iranian dissidents and against the Jewish community. That operation should be closed down straightaway, and I hope the Home Secretary will take the necessary action to do so.

I look forward to the responses from the Minister. I know she is new in the job, but I also know that she has the best interests of the security of this country at heart, and I wish her well in carrying out those duties.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alicia Kearns]

I welcome the Minister to her place for the first time, and I wish her every success in a vital role in our country and in the Government.

Let me end where I began. We support this Bill and will not push its Second Reading to a vote, because its principle is sound. The power is overdue, and the Government are right to seek it, but let the House be in no doubt about what is being asked of us today. We are asked to take a Bill that was laid before Parliament only last week, and progress it through all stages in just one day. It is what the House would normally do over months. However, the threat is permanent. Haste is temporary, but the harm can be enduring. Our enemies will study and exploit that asymmetry, because bad laws made quickly are not easily redeemed, and the effect may be felt for years in courtrooms in cases that collapse, and in the quiet calculations of the very people we are trying to deter.

Let me be clear about what is and what is not in question. I do not doubt the Government’s good faith. I do not doubt for one moment that the Ministers want to make our country safe, but good faith is not a working law, and good intentions do not disrupt plots. A Bill that reaches the statute book but fails in the courtroom is worse than no Bill at all, because it lets us tell ourselves that we have acted, while the threat goes untouched. The people hunted by proxies on our streets, and by hostile states, are owed more than sincerity; they are owed a law that holds in the police station, in the courtroom and at the border on the day it is tested.

I know what the answer will be—that gaps can be dealt with on another day, in some future Bill, but this House has heard that before, and we have learned what “another day” means. I never took my Government’s word when they said that to me, as anyone will know who watched me damned well refuse to take it when I was Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee. I will not take it today, because “another day” is where good intentions are sent to be forgotten, and the country does not get to tell the assassin at the journalist’s door that the relevant clause is pencilled for the next Session. We have the Bill before us today, and we have amendments before us today; the only thing we are being asked to leave for later is the part that makes this Bill effective.

I want to touch on the speeches made, starting with that by the hon. Member for Cardiff West (Mr Barros-Curtis), who rightly spoke about the importance of civil liberties. Our amendments would give clarity on some aspects of that issue, particularly the flying of flags and the wearing of uniforms. The Chair of the Home Affairs Committee, my right hon. Friend the Member for Staffordshire Moorlands (Dame Karen Bradley), was absolutely right to say that there has been insufficient scrutiny thus far. I am surprised that her Committee was offered a briefing only once this Bill had completed its passage through the House. I was offered a briefing only once, three days after the deadline for amendments had passed; however, we were able to rectify that. She is also right to raise questions about future misuse—an issue that I did not have time to go into, so I am grateful to her for touching on that.

The hon. Member for North Durham (Luke Akehurst), who I am sure will return to the Chamber in due course, touched on the Australian model. Under one of our amendments, assisting a designated body, or accepting money or any sort of benefit from it, would carry a sentence of up to 25 years. We believe that the sentence for supporting such a body, which is 14 years or a fine, should be increased for those actively assisting it, or receiving material benefit from it.

My good friend my right hon. Friend the Member for Hertsmere (Sir Oliver Dowden) rightly set out the experience of our Jewish communities. They are terrified and they are suffering, and this Bill will go some way towards helping them. He also rightly touched on the Muslim Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood is difficult to address, because it is not an organisation, although some like to talk about it as if it was. It must be tackled in the same way as an ideology such as Nazism, and we must find a way of dealing with it, because those who subscribe to its ideology are using funds to undermine this country. I also welcome his managing to include a discussion around AI in this debate. I thank the hon. Member for Leeds South West and Morley (Mark Sewards) for raising the point about our need to stand by our Jewish communities.

My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright) was absolutely right about concerns around the need for engagement with the IRGC or similar bodies to be for “a prohibited purpose”. There is no good reason for that threshold at this point. He pointed out that there is a very clear distinction in the legislation between supporting on the one hand, and assisting or receiving material benefit on the other. The Government must explain why they are treating those separately.

It was a pleasure to listen to the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Harrow East (Bob Blackman), who has been clear-eyed for a long time about the threat from the IRGC and the Iranians. He is particularly right to raise concerns about charities and the way in which they are exploited. The openness of our society is a strength, but of course it also provides more points of entry for those seeking to harm us. He also rightly touched on the impact on our Jewish communities, as so many on both sides of the House did. It is because of that impact that our amendment requiring prosecution of those who fly flags or wear uniforms in support of these organisations must be considered. Even last weekend, we saw people marching through Jewish communities, flying the flags of proscribed organisations to intimidate and scare.

I thank my right hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Tonbridge (Tom Tugendhat) for once again sharing the work he did with Jo Cox—I know that they were very good friends. I think we all remember where we were when we heard of her brutal murder, and this House has less heart as a result of her loss. My right hon. and gallant Friend was absolutely right to mention the Islamic Centre of England—we must give the Charity Commission the power to shut down such organisations. He was also right to touch on TikTok; few have as much expertise as he does in this area. It is a weaponised platform. China does not allow its own children to have access to it, and countries such as India have taken action to say that they will not have it in their country. We must protect our country.

I now turn to the difficulty that the Government can no longer escape. The gaps in this Bill have been named; we will discuss them in more detail shortly in Committee, but they are on the amendment paper. If they are waved away tonight, not in ignorance but in full knowledge, no one will be able to call this haste any longer; it will have become a decision. It will be a decision to put in place weaker powers against hostile states than those we already hold against the terrorists those states fund, to leave a plot that is merely planned beyond the reach of the law, and to let inspired attackers fall through a gap that our terrorism law rightly closed two decades ago. It will, I fear, be a decision made to suit a timetable that has everything to do with internal party politics, rather than the threat. It will not be the Prime Minister’s decision alone—it will belong to every Member who walks through the Lobby to oppose the amendments tonight.

I say directly to Government Members, to all those who have spoken so powerfully—I thank every Member for being so clear-eyed about the threats that the IRGC, the Chinese, the Russians and the North Koreans pose to our country—that they did not campaign for so long for a Bill containing these powers just for them to fall at the first legal hurdle. They did not demand action against hostile states just to hand them a gentler regime than we use for terrorists. The amendments before them are not Opposition traps; they are the protections we need, and I think many Government Members feel in their gut that they are needed. I came to this place because national security had been my career—tackling terrorist groups such as Daesh and tackling the Russian Government. I stand by the offer I made to the Government, in the spirit I always make it. I am not here to frustrate this Bill; I am here to complete it. Take the amendments and lay them as Government amendments, or lay them in the Lords. We do not want to make this party political; we just want to close the holes in the Bill. Accepting an amendment that ends the absurdity of having a higher bar for the sponsor than for the terrorist is the right thing to do.

In Committee, I will take the House through all 13 amendments we have tabled, clause by clause, to highlight what stands between the Bill in its current state and what it should be. It is not ideology, not a desire to delay, and not politics; it is time that was not given. Strip away the procedure: two years from now, there will be a prosecution, and we need to ensure that we do not allow a defendant to be freed by words written in haste. In the end, this is not about us, the timetable, or whose name sits at the top of the amendment paper—it is about protecting our people and giving our police what they need. I support the Bill, which is why I have spent hours and hours over the past week trying to get it right. I urge the Government to work cross-party, accept our amendments—be it here or in the other place—and ensure we give our police and prosecutors the power that we all know they will not fully have without those amendments.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I am more than happy to create a circumstance in which we can do that. I think there have been some misunderstandings about what protections are offered in the Bill, and some of the amendments seek to address gaps that are not actually there. However, I am more than happy to deal with that, and I will be in touch with the right hon. Gentleman to organise it before the Bill goes to the House of Lords.

The hon. Member for Rutland and Stamford (Alicia Kearns) said that the Bill did not take into account activity outside the UK. She was wrong to say that that was not covered. The offences capture activity outside the UK where it is contrary to the safety or interests of the UK, and case law has made it clear that the definition of “safety and interests of the UK” is wide. As I have said, we have worked closely with operational partners to shape the Bill, and we are confident that it will provide the powers that are needed. There have been successful prosecutions under the National Security Act, which demonstrates that powers of this kind work.

[Alicia Kearns]

Yes, the law specifically covers UK citizens who then travel abroad to commit a crime in support of these proscribed groups. However, it explicitly states that that does not apply if they are planning the crimes here in the UK and they happen abroad, unless it is prejudicial to the safety of the UK. It would be very straightforward for a lawyer to argue that something that takes place in Iraq is not prejudicial to the safety of the UK.

When I met Foreign Office and Home Office lawyers last night, they said it was “likely” that that would be captured. I said, “I recognise that ‘likely’ is hopeful, but it is not absolute.” [Interruption.] The Minister will be able to answer in a moment. I am formally repeating the conversation that I had, a conversation that was requested, in which I was told that this was “likely”. That is very different from saying, “We will be able to prosecute, and we must be able to do so.” We should be wanting to pass clarifying amendments to put additional protections into law so that it is watertight, to ensure that the actions of anyone in Manchester planning something abroad will definitely be captured.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I suspect that lawyers often use words like “likely”, because they are very rarely ready to commit to “absolutely”. Perhaps we need to deal with some of this in more detail in Committee, but we are assured that overseas activity will be covered in the interactions of this Bill, and case law makes that more likely.

I am loath to go through in detail the Committee-style points that were made during the debate. What I will say is that designation is the closest we can get to state-inspired and connected proxies or organisations, so that we can prevent them from behaving in the way that they are behaving on our streets day in, day out. A designation will allow us to ensure that we capture and prosecute the malign activity in which hybrid and state actors involve themselves, so this Bill closes the gap that Jonathan Hall discovered in the National Security Act.

We wish to get the Bill on the statute book so that we can deal with the rising threats on our streets, which many Members on both sides of the House mentioned in their Second Reading speeches. I am extremely grateful that all Front Benchers support the Bill and will not vote against it, and I look forward to dealing with some of the amendments in much greater detail in Committee. I urge the House to give this Bill a Second Reading.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill accordingly read a Second time; to stand committed to a Committee of the whole House (Order, this day).

National Security (State Threats) Bill

Alicia Kearns Excerpts

Committee of the whole House
Wednesday 17th June 2026 Commons Chamber

[Alicia Kearns (Rutland and Stamford) (Con)]

I beg to move amendment 16, page 2, line 12, at end insert—

“33AA Conduct relevant to designation

(1) For the purposes of section 33A, a body is to be regarded as involved in foreign power threat activity if the Secretary of State reasonably believes that the body is, or has been, involved in—

(a) transnational repression;

(b) abusive lawfare;

(c) sanctions evasion connected to a foreign power, a designated body or foreign power threat activity;

(d) the concealment, movement or control of assets for or on behalf of a foreign power or a body acting for or on behalf of a foreign power; or

(e) conduct which enables, facilitates, assists or conceals any activity falling within paragraphs (a) to (d).

(2) For the purposes of this section, “transnational repression” means conduct carried out by, for, or on behalf of, or with the intention of benefiting, a foreign power, where the conduct has the purpose, or effect, of intimidating, coercing, punishing, silencing, controlling or retaliating against—

(a) a person in the United Kingdom;

(b) a United Kingdom national;

(c) a person resident in the United Kingdom;

(d) a person with a substantial connection to the United Kingdom; or

(e) a family member, associate or representative of a person falling within paragraphs (a) to (d).

(3) Conduct falling within subsection (2) includes, but is not limited to—

(a) surveillance, harassment, intimidation, threats or coercion;

(b) threats or reprisals against family members or associates overseas;

(c) forced return, attempted forced return, abduction or attempted abduction;

(d) misuse of criminal, civil, immigration, extradition or administrative processes;

(e) misuse of Interpol notices or other international police cooperation mechanisms;

(f) targeting of journalists, activists, human rights defenders, lawyers, political opponents, dissidents, whistleblowers or members of diaspora communities; and

(g) conduct intended to conceal, enable or facilitate any activity falling within paragraphs (a) to (f).

(4) For the purposes of this section, “abusive lawfare” means the use, or threatened use, of legal, regulatory, administrative, criminal, civil, immigration, extradition or other proceedings where the predominant purpose, or one of the predominant purposes, is to—

(a) intimidate, silence, punish or deter a person from engaging in public interest speech, journalism, advocacy, democratic participation or human rights work;

(b) deter investigation or scrutiny of corruption, human rights abuses, sanctions evasion, hostile state activity or foreign power threat activity;

(c) impose disproportionate cost, delay, pressure or reputational harm on the target; or

(d) protect, conceal or advance the interests of a foreign power or a body acting for or on behalf of a foreign power.

(5) Proceedings, or threatened proceedings, are not abusive merely because they are brought by, or on behalf of, a foreign power, or a person connected to a foreign power.

(6) For the purposes of this section, “sanctions evasion” means conduct which has the purpose, or effect, of enabling or facilitating the evasion, circumvention or frustration of—

(a) sanctions imposed under the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018;

(b) asset-freezing measures;

(c) trade sanctions;

(d) export controls;

(e) immigration restrictions;

(f) public procurement restrictions; or

(g) any other restrictive measure imposed by or under an enactment for the purpose of protecting the safety or interests of the United Kingdom.

(7) Nothing in this section is to be read as preventing legal advice, representation or advocacy, provided that such activity is not undertaken for the purpose of facilitating foreign power threat activity, transnational repression, sanctions evasion, abusive lawfare or the concealment of assets connected to a designated body.”

This amendment would specify categories of conduct that may be regarded as involvement in foreign power threat activity for the purposes of designation.

[The First Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means (Judith Cummins)]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 15, page 2, line 42, at end insert—

“33C Mandatory review following designation

(1) Where regulations are made under section 33A designating a body, the Secretary of State must, within 30 days of the regulations being made, conduct a review of whether further action should be taken in relation to—

(a) the designated body;

(b) any person who owns or controls the designated body;

(c) any person owned or controlled by the designated body;

(d) any officer, employee, agent, member or representative of the designated body;

(e) any person acting for or on behalf of the designated body;

(f) any person who materially assists the designated body; and

(g) any person who provides funds, economic resources, professional services, goods, technology or other material support to the designated body.

(2) The review under subsection (1) must consider whether it is appropriate to take, recommend or request action including—

(a) designation under the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018;

(b) asset-freezing measures;

(c) travel bans or other immigration restrictions;

(d) director disqualification;

(e) public procurement exclusion;

(f) civil recovery, restraint, freezing or forfeiture action;

(g) referral to Companies House, the National Crime Agency, the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation, the Financial Conduct Authority, the Solicitors Regulation Authority, the Bar Standards Board, HM Revenue and Customs, the Charity Commission, the Electoral Commission or any other relevant authority;

(h) enhanced beneficial ownership checks;

(i) enhanced reporting requirements; and

(j) any other action necessary to protect the safety or interests of the United Kingdom.

(3) In conducting a review under subsection (1), the Secretary of State must consult—

(a) the Treasury;

(b) the Secretary of State responsible for foreign, Commonwealth and development affairs;

(c) the National Crime Agency; and

(d) any other Minister of the Crown or public authority as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.

(4) Within 30 days of a body being designated under section 33A, the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament a statement confirming—

(a) that the review required by this section has been conducted;

(b) what categories of action listed in subsection (2) have been considered;

(c) whether any such action has been taken, recommended or requested; and

(d) where no such action has been taken, recommended or requested, the reasons for that decision.

(5) A statement under subsection (4) may omit information where the Secretary of State considers that publication of that information would be contrary to the interests of national security, international relations, the prevention or detection of serious crime, or the protection of ongoing legal proceedings.

(6) The Secretary of State must keep under review whether further action under subsection (2) is required in relation to a designated body and persons connected to it.”

This amendment would require the Secretary of State, within 30 days of designating a body, to review whether further action should be taken against the body and persons connected to it, and to lay a statement of the outcome before Parliament.

Clause stand part.

Amendment 3, in clause 2, page 3, line 8, leave out from “body” until end of line 9.

This amendment and Amendments 4 to 6 would remove the additional defence of supporting a designated body for a non-prohibited purpose.

Amendment 4, page 3, line 16, leave out from “body” until end of line 17.

See the explanatory statement for Amendment 3.

Amendment 5, page 3, line 21, leave out from “body” until end of line 22.

See the explanatory statement for Amendment 3.

Amendment 6, page 3, leave out lines 23 to 25.

See the explanatory statement for Amendment 3.

Amendment 1, page 4, line 23, at end insert—

“(3A) The conduct specified in subsection (3) includes establishing, administering or maintaining a company, trust, partnership or similar arrangement which conceals, or is intended to conceal, the beneficial ownership of assets connected with a designated body.”

Amendment 8, page 4, line 27, after “United Kingdom” insert

“or are conducted outside, but were planned from within, the United Kingdom”.

Amendment 7, page 5, line 15, leave out “14” and insert “25”.

This amendment would increase the maximum sentence for assisting a designated body from 14 years to 25 years imprisonment.

Amendment 11, page 6, leave out lines 21 to 23.

This amendment would remove the defence of reasonable excuse for retaining a material benefit provided by or on behalf of a designated body.

Amendment 12, page 6, line 38, leave out “(7) or”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 11.

Amendment 9, page 7, line 8, at end insert—

“17D Uniform and publication of images in relation to a designated body

(1) A person in a public place commits an offence if he—

(a) wears an item of clothing, or

(b) wears, carries or displays an article

in such a way or in such circumstances as to arouse reasonable suspicion that the person is a supporter of a designated body.

(2) A person commits an offence if the person publishes an image of—

(a) an item of clothing, or

(b) any other article,

in such a way or in such circumstances as to arouse reasonable suspicion that the person is a supporter of a designated body.

(3) In subsection (2) the reference to an image is a reference to a still or moving image (produced by any means).

(4) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale (or both).

(5) A constable may seize an item of clothing or any other article if the constable—

(a) reasonably suspects that it is evidence in relation to an offence under subsection (1), and

(b) is satisfied that it is necessary to seize it in order to prevent the evidence being concealed, lost, altered or destroyed.

(6) In connection with exercising the power in subsection (5), a constable may require a person to remove the item of clothing or other article if the person is wearing it.

(7) But the powers conferred by subsections (5) and (6) may not be exercised so as to seize, or require a person to remove, an item of clothing being worn next to the skin or immediately over a garment being worn as underwear.”

This amendment would create an offence of wearing or displaying in public, or publishing an image of, an article in a way that arouses reasonable suspicion that a person is a supporter of a designated body.

Amendment 10, page 7, line 8, at end insert—

“17D Preparation of acts relating to a designated body

(1) A person commits an offence if, with the intention of—

(a) committing an offence under section 17A, 17B or 17C, or

(b) assisting another to commit such an offence,

the person engages in any conduct in preparation for giving effect to the intention.

(2) It is irrelevant for the purposes of subsection (1) whether the intention and preparations relate to one or more particular offences, offences of a particular description, or such offences generally.

(3) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable, on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years or a fine (or both).”

This amendment would create an offence of engaging in conduct in preparation for committing, or assisting another to commit, an offence relating to a designated body.

Amendment 13, page 7, line 8, at end insert—

“17D Self-directing acts in support of a designated body

(1) A person commits an offence if the person engages in conduct of any kind which is—

(a) inspired by the ideology, actions, and self-promotion of a designated body, and

(b) prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom.

(2) A person commits an offence if the person—

(a) engages in UK-related activities that are likely to assist the stated, or assumed, aims of a designated body, and

(b) knows, or having regard to other matters known to them ought to reasonably to know, that their activities are likely to assist the stated, or assumed, aims of a designated body.

(3) UK-related activities” means—

(a) activities taking place in the United Kingdom;

(b) activities taking place outside the United Kingdom which are prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom.

(4) Subsections (1) and (2) apply to conduct outside the United Kingdom, but apply to conduct taking place wholly outside the United Kingdom only if the person engaging in the conduct—

(ab) is a UK person, or

(b) acts for or on behalf of, or holds office under, the Crown, or is in Crown employment (whether or not they engage in the conduct in that capacity).

(5) In proceedings for an offence under this section it is a defence to show that the person engaged in the conduct in question—

(a) in compliance with a legal obligation under the law of the United Kingdom which is not a legal obligation under private law,

(b) in the case of a person having functions of a public nature under the law of the United Kingdom, for the purposes of those functions,

(c) as a lawyer carrying on a legal activity, or

(d) in accordance with, or in relation to Uk-related activities carried out in accordance with, an agreement or arrangement to which—

(i) the United Kingdom was a party, or

(ii) any person acting for, or on behalf of, or holding office under, the Crown was (in that capacity) a party.

(6) A person is taken to have shown a matter mentioned in subsection (5) if—

(a) sufficient evidence is adduced to raise an issue with respect to it, and

(b) the contrary is not proved beyond reasonable doubt.

(7) A person who commits an office under this section is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years or a fine (or both).

(8) The following terms have the same meaning as in section 3—

“Crown employment” ;

“financial benefit” ;

The “law of the United Kingdom”;

“lawyer” ;

“legal activity” ;

“UK person” .”

This amendment creates a new offence of undertaking conduct harmful or prejudicial to UK interests that is inspired by a designated body, rather than actively commissioned on behalf of a designated body.

Amendment 14, page 7, line 8, at end insert—

“17D Dissemination of publications relating to a designated body

(1) A person commits an offence if the person engages in conduct falling within subsection (2) and, at the time of doing so—

(a) intends an effect of the conduct to be a direct or indirect encouragement or other inducement to support, or to provide assistance to, a designated body, or

(b) is reckless as to whether the conduct has that effect.

(2) A person engages in conduct falling within this subsection if the person—

(a) distributes or circulates a publication relating to a designated body;

(b) gives, sells or lends such a publication;

(c) offers such a publication for sale or loan;

(d) provides a service to others that enables them to obtain, read, listen to or look at such a publication, or to acquire it by means of a gift, sale or loan;

(e) transmits the contents of such a publication electronically; or

(f) has such a publication in the person's possession with a view to its becoming the subject of conduct falling within any of paragraphs (a) to (e).

(3) For the purposes of this section a publication relates to a designated body if matter contained in it is likely to be understood by a reasonable person as a direct or indirect encouragement or other inducement to support, or to provide assistance to, a designated body.

(4) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to show that—

(a) the matter by reference to which the publication was treated as relating to a designated body neither expressed the person's views nor had the person's endorsement, and

(b) it was clear, in all the circumstances of the conduct, that the matter did not express the person's views and did not have the person's endorsement.

(5) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years or a fine (or both).”

This amendment would create an offence of disseminating, or possessing with a view to disseminating, a publication that encourages support for or assistance to a designated body.

Clause 2 stand part.

Amendment 2, in clause 3, page 7, line 27, at end insert—

“(5) Regulations under subsection (3) may not be made unless a draft of the statutory instrument containing them has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, each House of Parliament.”

This amendment ensures that any regulation under section 33C made by the Secretary of State to remove a designation is subject to the draft affirmative procedure.

Clauses 3 to 8 stand part.

New clause 3—Designation of the IRGC—

“(1) The Secretary of State must take reasonable steps to lay before Parliament regulations under the provisions of this Act to designate the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a body involved in foreign power threat activity.

(2) Before laying such regulations, the Secretary of State must be satisfied that the IRGC fulfils the conditions set out in Section 1 of this Act.

(3) The regulations specified in subsection (1) should be laid before Parliament within a month of this Act coming into force.”

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to take reasonable steps to bring forward regulations designating the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) within a month of this Act coming into force.

New clause 4—Assessment of the adequacy of the powers contained in the Act—

“(1) Within twelve months of passing of this Act, the Secretary of State must commission the Independent Reviewer of State Threats Legislation or another such person performing a similar function to produce a report on the adequacy of the powers contained in this Act.

(2) The report specified in subsection (1) must consider the effectiveness of the Act’s powers in tackling the threat posed by state-backed and state-linked actors to the security of the United Kingdom.

(3) The report specified in subsection (1) must include any proposals for legislative changes to the provisions of the Act as are considered necessary by the Independent Reviewer.

(4) As soon as receiving the report, and no later than three months after receiving it, the Secretary of State must lay the report before both Houses of Parliament.

(5) Within three months of laying the report before Parliament, the Secretary of State must publish a response to the report and to any recommendations made by the Independent Reviewer.”

This new clause would require the Independent Reviewer of State Threats Legislation to assess the adequacy of the powers introduced by this Act twelve months after its passing.

New clause 5—Seizure of Passports etc from Person Suspected of Assisting a Designated Body—

“(1) This section applies in the case of a person at a port in Great Britain, Northern Ireland, or in the border area, if a constable has reasonable grounds to suspect that the person—

(a) is there with the intention of leaving Great Britain or Northern Ireland for the purpose of assisting a designated body outside the United Kingdom; or

(b) has arrived in Great Britain or Northern Ireland with the intention of leaving it soon for that purpose.

(2) The constable may—

(a) exercise any of the powers in sub-paragraph (4) in the case of the person, or

(b) direct a qualified officer to do so.

(3) A qualified officer must (if able to do so) comply with any direction given by a constable under sub-paragraph (2)(b).

(4) The powers are—

(a) to require the person to hand over all travel documents in the person’s possession to the constable or (as the case may be) the qualified officer;

(b) to search for travel documents relating to the person and to take possession of any that the constable or officer finds;

(c) to inspect any travel document relating to the person; and

(d) to retain any travel document relating to the person that is lawfully in the possession of the constable or officer.

(5) The power in sub-paragraph (4)(b) is a power to search—

(a) the person;

(b) anything that the person has with him or her; and

(c) any vehicle in which the officer believes the person to have been travelling or to be about to travel.

(6) A constable or qualified officer—

(a) may stop a person or vehicle for the purpose of exercising a power in sub-paragraph (4)(a) or (b);

(b) may if necessary use reasonable force for the purpose of exercising a power in sub-paragraph (4)(a) or (b); and

(c) may authorise a person to carry out on the constable's or officer's behalf a search under sub-paragraph (4)(b).

(7) A constable or qualified officer exercising a power in sub-paragraph (4)(a) or (b) must tell the person that—

(a) the person is suspected of intending to leave Great Britain or (as the case may be) the United Kingdom for the purpose of assisting a designated body, and

(b) the constable or officer is therefore entitled under this Schedule to exercise the power.

(8) Where a travel document relating to the person is in the possession of an immigration officer or customs official (whether a qualified officer or not), the constable may direct the officer or official—

(a) to pass the document to a constable as soon as practicable, and

(b) in the meantime to retain it,

the officer or official must comply with any such direction.”

This new clause would replicate existing powers to seize travel documents from individuals suspected of terrorism, applying those powers in relation to individuals suspected of assisting a designated body

New clause 6—Police powers to apply for serious crime prevention orders in designation cases—

“(1) The Serious Crime Act 2007 is amended as follows.

(2) In Section 8, after subsection (2)(a) insert—

“(ab) it is an application for an order under section 1 that is related to an offence committed under section 2 of the National Security (State Threats) Act 2026.””

This new clause allows police to apply for serious crime prevention orders in relation to offences committed under this Act.

New clause 7—Sanctions—

“(1) The Secretary of State may make regulations under the provisions of Section 1 of the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 to subject any—

(a) body designated under the National Security (State Threats) Act 2026, or

(b) a person who commits an offence under section (2) of that Act

to any available sanction within that Act.”

This new clause would ensure that any body designated under this Act, or any person who commits an offence under this Act, may be subject to the sanctions regime set out in the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018.

The schedule.

[Alicia Kearns]

We have tabled 13 amendments, not to frustrate the Bill but to give it the necessary teeth. This Bill is soft where it should be hard, silent where it should speak, and blind where it should see. It is soft because, as drafted, it sets a higher bar to prosecute a person who supports the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps than a person who supports the terrorists whom the IRGC funds and commands; it is silent because whole categories of hostile conduct that our terrorism laws have criminalised for 20 years are simply missing; and it is blind because it has been written for one organisation on one timetable, with almost no provision for future designations. Good will is not enough, and we must close the holes that our enemies will exploit.

The Government have lifted much of this legislation from section 12 of the Terrorism Act 2000, yet they have added something that does not appear in the terrorism offence: a requirement that support was given for a prohibited purpose that was prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United Kingdom. Let me ask the Minister the simple question that this Bill invites: what level of support for the IRGC do the Government consider beneficial to the United Kingdom? The IRGC is the world’s largest state sponsor of terrorism, and if she agrees that there is no level of support for it that is beneficial to the UK, we can simply remove the prohibited purpose. She has just said from the Dispatch Box that she agrees that there is absolutely none, so let us act and amend the Bill.

Under the Bill as drafted, to convict someone who supports the IRGC the prosecution must prove that their support was prejudicial to the safety or interest of the UK—an additional threshold—but that requirement does not exist in terrorism law. To convict someone who supports Hamas, Hezbollah or the Houthis—the proxies that the IRGC arms and funds—there is no such hurdle, so the body that inspires, organises arms and funds the terrorists is handed a protection in law that the terrorist himself is denied. That is the difference between a prosecution that succeeds and one that never gets off the ground, and I know something about prosecutions that fail at the last moment. Our amendment 3 simply removes the extra defence and brings this offence into line with the terrorism law from which it is drawn.

I recognise that the Government may seek to argue that state entities enjoy protections in international law that terrorists do not, that we must set a higher bar than in equivalent terrorism legislation and that acting prejudicially to the UK’s interests is a reasonable test. However, state immunity protects the Iranian state from being sued or prosecuted in our courts, and it has nothing to do with the British resident who chooses to fund or promote the IRGC. We are not prosecuting Tehran; we are prosecuting the person here who does its work. The proposition that the Minister is left defending is that supporting the world’s biggest sponsor of terrorism should be harder to prosecute than supporting the groups it sponsors. That is not a higher bar; it is international lawyers tying the hands of Ministers who are meant to be keeping us safe.

On amendments 11 and 12, the same instinct to protect where we should prosecute runs through subsection (7) of proposed new section 17C, which makes a reasonable excuse a defence for accepting and keeping a material benefit from a designated body. That is not necessary, because there are already protections in the Bill for, for example, a lawyer or somebody who has no ability to know that funds were being taken. I recognise that such a provision is in the National Security Act 2023, but that is not a reason to repeat a weakness, and we have an opportunity to fix it. There is no excuse for keeping a hostile state’s money—not in this Bill and not in the Act it leans on.

The sentencing gets the gravity backwards. As drafted, supporting a designated body and actively assisting one carries the same maximum sentence of 14 years or a fine.

[Sir John Hayes (South Holland and The Deepings) (Con)]

Before my hon. Friend moves on to fines, the issue she has raised, and which I raised earlier, seems to be crucial. It is true that Jonathan Hall, as the Minister said on Second Reading, recognised that the approach to a terrorist organisation was different from the approach to a state. Nevertheless, creating this higher bar whereby to secure a successful prosecution it must be established that the individual concerned was acting on behalf of the designated body for a prohibited purpose—connection with the body alone is not sufficient—seems to me to make prosecution less likely rather than more likely. If international law is at the heart of that—the fear of appeals, and so on and so forth—we need to hear that from the Minister, and the case needs to be a highly persuasive, because it seems to me that the Government are making their lives more difficult, rather than easier.

[Alicia Kearns]

That is exactly the crux of the point I made in my speech on Second Reading. We should not set a higher threshold, because we will see prosecutions collapse for exactly that reason. We need to be arming prosecutors to go and get the justice that our country needs to better protect us.

Turning to the maximum sentence of 14 years, actively doing a hostile state organ’s work—moving its money, carrying its information, committing violence on its behalf—is graver than just supporting it. It is a kind of treason, and I suspect most British people would call it that. We urge the Government to consider having a higher potential sentence for actively working with or receiving material benefit from a designated body. Amendment 7 would therefore raise that maximum sentence from 14 years to 25 years. That figure is not plucked from the air; it matches the Australian regime under which the IRGC was listed last November. As I have said, the Government may argue that the 14 year maximum sentence is taken from the NSA 2023, but let us raise the maximum sentence in both. After all, we are talking about treason.

On amendment 10, I turn from where the Bill is too soft to where it says nothing at all. This is one of the gaps about which the Government have offered no answer, and I have looked hard for one. Section 5 of the Terrorism Act 2006 makes preparing an act of terrorism an offence, but this Bill contains no equivalent. As the Bill is drafted, a person can plan to assist a designated organ—to be straightforward, let us talk about the IRGC—and unless and until they commit the act, they have committed no offence at all under this Bill. However, the entire purpose of national security work is to prevent and disrupt before harm is done, not to see the plot and clear it up afterwards. We would not tolerate that vulnerability in terrorism law and we should not invent it here. Amendment 10 closes that gap, and lets police and prosecutors act while a plot is still on the drawing board. If the Minister believes preparation is already caught elsewhere, I would welcome her showing me where, but I have yet to be shown that in the briefings I have had.

Amendment 13 recognises that the gap left by preparation is widened by a second omission: self-directed and inspired actors. The Bill misses entirely the person who is never directly commissioned or directed, but who absorbs a hostile state’s propaganda and acts on it alone. Twenty years of counter-terrorism has taught us this lesson at a terrible cost. The gravest or most likely threat is no longer the directed plot, but the individual radicalised online who acts on their own. Hostile states bring the resources, reach and sophistication of states to that propaganda, arguably with a greater inspiring power than any terrorist group can muster. We saw that with the bots that screamed for independence in Scotland and fell silent the moment Tehran’s internet went down, something my right hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge (Tom Tugendhat) raised in his speech earlier. That is just a small insight into the ways they are invested in turning us against each other. A Bill that catches only the commissioned and directed is fighting the last war and leaving us dangerously exposed to the next. Amendment 13 captures those inspired to act by a designated body, but not directed by them.

I turn now to the most dangerous omission of all, which we touched on in the wind-ups on Second Reading, and the omission that would worry our allies and partners, which amendment 8 seeks to address. As drafted, the Bill captures activity in the UK and activity abroad that is “prejudicial” to the UK. It does not catch activity planned here on British soil to be perpetrated abroad where there is no ability to prove that it is prejudicial to the interests of the UK where there is no harm to the UK. Activity by the IRGC in France, Iran or Bosnia, or by the Chinese in Hong Kong, may not be directly prejudicial to the interests of the UK, so again we are adding an unnecessary threshold. But if it is perpetrated here, be it in Manchester, London or anywhere else, we must be able to prosecute those responsible.

In plain terms, the gap was turning the UK into a base for state terrorism: a cell here in Britain planning a campaign of intimidation against a journalist in Dublin on behalf of the IRGC, or a network running sabotage operations in Germany. Arrested and charged, their defence writes itself. If the act was not to take place here in the UK, you cannot argue that it was prejudicial to UK safety. The law does not like ambiguity. We should not leave prosecutors having to argue that an attack on Dublin or Berlin was also somehow an attack on London. Amendment 8 closes that gap directly, so that planning hostile activity from British soil is caught wherever that activity is aimed. If the Government are confident that that scope is already reached, they lose nothing by putting it beyond doubt. Far better to write the law clearly today than to watch a case fall apart on that very point.

The next omission is propaganda itself. Since 2006, it has been an offence to disseminate publications that promote terrorism. The Bill extends no equivalent protection against the propaganda of designated states. We have heard colleagues today talk about publications such as Press TV which, shamefully, former Members of this House appear on and are paid to have shows on. Two of the principal weapons of hostile states are the propaganda that recruits and the disinformation that divides. The Chinese Communist party pushes propaganda and disinformation through the United Front Work Department. I hope these powers will reach it one day, but amendment 14 brings designated bodies within the same standard applied to terrorist publications for 20 years, because I do not in any way think that the Government think that IRGC propaganda should have more latitude than that of a proscribed terrorist group.

Next is an omission that many living in our country, especially our Jewish community, will find the most difficult. Under section 13 of the Terrorism Act 2000, it is an offence to display in public the insignia of a proscribed organisation. It is the power that we rely on to take Hamas flags, Hezbollah banners and the symbols of Hizb ut-Tahrir off our streets. The Bill as drafted contains no equivalent provision whatever, so if the amendment is not accepted by the Government, either now or in the other place, the flag of the IRGC may fly lawfully on a British street, glorifying every stabbing, every attack on our Jewish communities, every kidnap plot and every assassination attempt that the regime has directed here. How do we look the people who are being hunted in the eye and tell them that the banner of their hunter is welcome on our streets?

The Government may say that criminalising the display of state symbols brings lawful state activity under UK criminal law, contrary to diplomatic convention, and that by reciprocity, hostile states could criminalise the Union Jack and UK uniforms abroad, exposing our personnel and dual nationals. I have taken the time to consider that. Yes, state immunity protects foreign states in our courts, but it should not and does not dictate what a resident of this country may do on British pavements.

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[Dame Angela Eagle]

Action that is prejudicial to the safety and interests of the UK is the test that we are talking about. If one were delivering humanitarian aid and had to deal with part of a state that we did not particularly approve of, that would not be prejudicial to the safety or interests of the UK. It would be in line with what the UK wished to do, but if it were prejudicial, because it was hostile activity, the test would be passed.

[Alicia Kearns]

The Minister gives the example of a diplomat, and she is right that our diplomats in Tehran will need to engage with the IRGC—it is nonsense to suggest that they would not be able to do so—but that is why there is a specific exception for that in the Bill. Proposed new section 17A(5) refers to a person who

“acts for or on behalf of, or holds office under, the Crown, or is in Crown employment (whether or not they engage in the conduct in that capacity).”

As I have mentioned, I am concerned that that means that anyone who is a traitor and works for the civil service would have protections under any circumstances, but it means that we do not need that additional threshold, because diplomats are already specifically protected in the Bill at another point.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

It is not only diplomats. It may well be NGOs delivering humanitarian aid and people who have to come across states or their designated proxies in particular cases.

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[Dame Angela Eagle]

I think it is about consistency. The Bill was drafted to try to mirror—albeit in a slightly different context—the Terrorism Act provisions, while fitting into the National Security Act’s provisions, so that we do not have a complicated range of tests.

Amendment 7 relates to defences and sentencing. Essentially, the hon. Member for Rutland and Stamford (Alicia Kearns) wishes to increase the prison sentence for actively assisting to 25 years from the current 14 years. The idea is that 14 years would very much fit in with the sentences under the National Security Act, and we would not end up with a complex range of sentences for quite similar offences. One could increase both, if we were minded to do so, but the point about the introduction of designation in the Bill is that it is trying to fit into the National Security Act, which has been working quite well, rather than our having a whole range of different sentences for very similar offences.

[Alicia Kearns]

I fully recognise the Minister’s point that she is trying to align the provisions with those in the National Security Act, but as per my argument earlier, let us improve the National Security Act while we are at it. The Minister says that the question is whether she is minded to make the change; I say she should be minded to. If someone actively assists or materially benefits from a hostile state while committing treason, it is absolutely right that they should get a tougher sentence than that for just flying a flag or supporting a hostile state. Those acts are still heinous, but a far worse crime has been committed. I ask the Minister to consider making the change when the Bill is in the Lords.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I note the hon. Lady’s point.

Amendment 10 would

“create an offence of engaging in conduct in preparation for committing, or assisting another to commit, an offence relating to a designated body.”

It is not necessary, because a person who engages in conduct of any kind, including preparatory conduct, that is intended to assist a designated body in carrying out UK-related activities would be caught by the Bill’s provisions.

The hon. Lady talked about what she called a loophole; she said that the Bill does not cover attacks inspired by a designated body. Her amendment 13 would create a new offence for self-directed acts inspired by a designated body, but we do not believe it is necessary. The test for the assisting offence in proposed new section 17B of the National Security Act is whether conduct is intended to assist a designated organisation, or whether the person ought to have known that their conduct was likely to assist the organisation. The person does not need to be tasked or directed by the organisation to commit the offence, so those who are inspired to do things, rather than being asked or told to do things by the designated body, are caught.

With amendment 8, the hon. Lady seeks to capture conduct that occurs outside the UK but is planned within the UK. Again, we believe it is unnecessary. If planning takes place in the UK, it is already caught in the Bill, under the offence in proposed new section 17B of assisting a designated body. That offence refers to conduct of any kind, and it will be an offence to plan something in the UK that takes place outside the UK if it materially assists a designated body in carrying out activities that are prejudicial to the safety or interests of the UK—the prohibited purpose test. That could cover someone in the UK who assists a designated body in its work, done overseas, to target an ally of the UK, so the amendment is unnecessary.

Amendment 14 would create an offence relating to the dissemination of publications that encourage support for a designated body. The conduct that the amendment seeks to address is already covered by the new offence of supporting a designated body.

I think the hon. Lady wanted people to be criminalised for wearing clothing or displaying flags or similar symbols linked to a designated body. The Bill does not ban the wearing or carrying of an image, because we cannot ban what might be worn by a foreign diplomat, but if somebody is supporting or promoting the hostile activities of a proscribed body in any way, they will be caught by the new support offence. I hope that assures the hon. Lady that that issue is covered.

New clauses 5 and 6 would give effect to other recommendations made by Jonathan Hall by creating new powers to seize travel documents, and to allow police to apply for serious crime prevention orders in relation to offences committed under this legislation. We are committed to legislating on those recommendations and, as my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary announced on Second Reading, we will do so as soon as parliamentary time allows.

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[Max Wilkinson]

I thank the hon. Member for his intervention. The new clause will not be withdrawn. The sentiment is shared between us, and I think we should appreciate that.

New clause 3 reflects the Government’s stated intention to move by the summer recess, and it ensures that this commitment will be honoured in practice; that would give much reassurance to those watching from outside the House. Importantly, the new clause does not force the Home Secretary to designate the IRGC prematurely; it would have to do so only in line with the coming into force of the rest of the Bill. It does not override due process; nor does it lower the evidential threshold required under the legislation. It ensures that the intelligence gathering and preparatory work necessary for designation are treated as an urgent priority, rather than something that can be continually delayed. This urgency is long overdue.

Liberal Democrats will also support new clause 4, which provides for an independent post-legislative review within 12 months of this legislation passing. This is a crucial safeguard. The Bill introduces significant new powers, and it is essential that their effectiveness and proportionality are independently assessed.

[Alicia Kearns]

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right to want this. However, there is already a requirement under law for Jonathan Hall, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, to review all terrorism legislation and related legislation, including the National Security Act 2023—which this would fall under—every single year, and to report back to Parliament. Hopefully the hon. Gentleman will be reassured that this is already covered in law, and that there is a specific requirement.

[Max Wilkinson]

The hon. Lady knows much more about this than I do, and I bow to her greater knowledge.

The Home Secretary gave a reassurance on Second Reading that humanitarian organisations would not find their work being criminalised, and the Security Minister has just touched on that point as well. We welcome that further reassurance on the official record, but I have no doubt that the point will be further explored elsewhere when the Bill moves on. I am sure that Members from across the House will agree that the accelerated passage of the Bill through Parliament, which will limit the amount of scrutiny it receives, heightens the imperative for independent post-legislative scrutiny, which may be useful to the Government.

Similarly, we will support amendment 2, which ensures that any decision to remove a designation is subject to the draft affirmative procedure. Again, speed is a factor in this Bill’s passage, as the official Opposition have mentioned a number of times today, and it is likely that this will not be needed in the short to medium term. However, parliamentary oversight should apply not just at the point of designation, but at the point of removal. It is vital that there should be adequate parliamentary scrutiny if a future Home Secretary should seek to remove a designation, and this amendment will enshrine that mechanism.

We also support amendment 1, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for North Norfolk (Steff Aquarone). This amendment closes a critical loophole by making it an offence to use corporate structures to conceal assets belonging to designated individuals or organisations. It would strengthen enforcement against the murky structures which many Members of this House have long opposed. I urge Ministers to consider the merits of the amendment, even if it does not reach a Division today.

The Liberal Democrats will support amendment 8. The Bill refers to “UK-related activities”, but fails to account for activities that are conducted overseas but planned from within the UK. It cannot be right that groups planning attacks on our allies and neighbours are sheltered from the law by this oversight. These actors do not respect traditional borders and so our laws must adequately adapt to meet the challenge. The amendment would close that loophole and, in doing so, strengthen the Bill.

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[Dame Angela Eagle]

New clause 3, tabled by the hon. Member for Cheltenham (Max Wilkinson), would require the Secretary of State to bring forward regulations designating the IRGC within a month of this Act coming into force, but the exercise of these powers under this Bill will have significant implications for national security and foreign policy, and it is right that they should be exercised independently by the Secretary of State on the basis of expert advice, including from the security and intelligence agencies. That is what this Bill allows, and putting these designations on the face of the Bill would be a very difficult way to effect the change, so the way to do this is the way that the Bill sets out.

The hon. Member for Cheltenham’s new clause 4, which would

“require the Independent Reviewer of State Threats Legislation to assess the adequacy of the powers introduced by this Act twelve months after its passing”,

is already essentially covered by the Bill’s provisions, because they would be subject to part 3 of the National Security Act. The independent reviewer of state threats legislation has to carry out an annual review into the operation of its provisions, and is also empowered by part 1 of that Act to review any other such things he or she sees fit. Amendment 2 would require the draft affirmative procedure to be used for regulations removing a designation. He is right that such regulations should receive the proper parliamentary scrutiny, and the Bill already provides that such regulations are subject to the draft affirmative procedure. The use of the negative procedure is limited to very minor technical changes, such as the addition of aliases.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell) asked whether it would be possible to proscribe a particular group, and gave a particular example. The test is whether the body is engaged in “foreign power threat activity”; it is a high bar, and it targets organisations that pose a real threat to the UK. I cannot imagine for one minute that my right hon. Friend would be involved in any of those.

Amendment 1, tabled by the hon. Member for North Norfolk (Steff Aquarone), would provide further examples of conduct that would be considered a material benefit, and he spoke about what those might be. Obtaining material benefits from a foreign intelligence service is an existing offence under section 17 of the National Security Act, so I do not think the further examples of conduct in amendment 1 are needed, as that conduct is already caught by the provisions in the Bill.

[Alicia Kearns]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 1 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 2

Offences relating to designated bodies

Amendment proposed: 3, page 3, line 8, leave out from “body” until end of line 9.—(Alicia Kearns.)

This amendment and Amendments 4 to 6 would remove the additional defence of supporting a designated body for a non-prohibited purpose.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

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[Alicia Kearns]

The Bill asks how our country confronts the greatest threat it faces: states that behave like terrorists. We support the Bill, and have today set out its weaknesses—the places where, as drafted, it is found wanting. We tabled 13 amendments and new clauses, with not one designed to delay the Bill, not one designed to wreck it and, tonight, not one accepted—not a clause, not a line, not one additional defence for our country. There are two ways for a Government to show their contempt for the House: they may deny it time or deny it influence. They may rush this House or overrule it. This Government have chosen both.

[Mark Sewards]

Does the hon. Lady not accept that Jonathan Hall, whom Members on all sides of the House respect, backs the Bill as a narrow and focused measure to designate state threats?

[Alicia Kearns]

I am not sure that anyone has disputed that Jonathan Hall backs the Bill. I had a lengthy call with him to discuss the gaps in the Bill, which I am sure the hon. Gentleman has not had. I will not share a private conversation, but I encourage the hon. Gentleman to have a similar call with Jonathan Hall to discuss those gaps.

We are here in this place to find the gaps while they can still be mended. That is the whole of our purpose, but we were not permitted to fulfil it today because scrutiny was declined. I have to admit that it feels like our suggestions were not even given due consideration. So I must tell the House what in the Bill now leaves this Chamber unaltered. The sponsor remains more gently treated in law than the proxies that it arms. The world’s largest sponsor of terrorism keeps a protection denied to its terrorist proxies.

The self-directed actor—the lone individual that our terrorism law learned to tackle, at great and terrible cost, two decades ago—will fall through a gap that we were forbidden to close. Britain may be used as a base from which to plot against our friends in Dublin, Berlin or Brussels, or even those in Hong Kong and Tehran.

The flag of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps may still be flown, lawfully, on a British street, glorifying every threat against our Jewish communities that the regime has directed here. [Interruption.] The Minister may say, “Not necessarily,” but she specifically ruled out our amendment on the basis that we should not prevent members of the Iranian diplomatic corps from wearing uniforms here. The Bill does not apply to members of the diplomatic corps; it applies specifically to UK persons. That is therefore still the case and there is no protection against seeing those flags walked past Jewish people’s homes. In Committee, I asked the Government how we look the people the regime has hunted in the eye and tell them that the banner of the hunter is still welcome on our streets. Tonight, I have no answer to offer them.

A law passed in good faith but built wrongly fails as surely as one that is passed in bad faith. When a prosecution comes, it will turn not on the speeches given today, the Government’s good intentions or our warnings, but on what a defendant did. When that day comes and there is a gap that was identified in this House today that could have been closed in an afternoon, let the record show that it could have been mended.

The Bill now passes to the other place, and I have every confidence that their lordships will give it the scrutiny it deserves. We will not oppose the Bill tonight. We will support it, not because it delivers the full protections it should, but because a flawed shield is still a shield of some form and the men and women that the Bill is designed to protect cannot be left with nothing. We support it, having placed on the record of this House what was refused and whose hand refused it. The threat we face is patient, it is ruthless and it will not be deterred by a law that we were too rushed to finish and that the Government were too proud to mend.

I have supported this Bill at every stage, and it is because of that that I lament what the Bill could have been and that the House was given a single afternoon to try to get it right. I hope this Bill is as watertight as the Government assert, but if they wish to be absolute and to remove risk or ambiguities, we ask those in the other place to shut down any risk that the shield this aims to be might let even one traitor succeed in harming our nation. I hope they will do that on the basis of the way we have put forward our amendments: in the national interest.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Caroline Nokes)]

I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson.