Historical Forced Adoption

Alicia Kearns Excerpts

Thursday 2nd July 2026 Commons Chamber

[The Prime Minister]

I thank my hon. Friend for her work on the APPG and for her campaigning, and acknowledge what she has done. As for the number, 185,000 is a shocking figure, but I worry that it may be higher than that. I worry that there are cases that we still do not know about—those where the records are not available and where, as I say, some people feel that they still cannot talk. That rapid access to therapeutic support is hugely important and she is right to highlight it.

[Alicia Kearns (Rutland and Stamford) (Con)]

To all the mothers and your stolen children who have wrongly carried grief and shame for so long, you were denied the love that you deserved and tortured by a state—and the silence only revictimized you. We are sorry. It is shameful that Barnardo’s and the Salvation Army have yet to apologise and face up to the role that they played in this. My father was haunted by the way in which Barnardo’s played a role and he would tell me of his horror, which he carried for life, of seeing the laundries as he walked around the streets of Dublin.

In addition to those who were cruelly and forcibly adopted, hundreds of babies died—frankly, they were killed—as their mothers were tortured, and they were buried in unmarked graves. Will the Prime Minister, as he continues with his important work on this, put in place an effort to find those graves and to force the opening up of those records so that the mothers who were denied a lifetime of memories with their children can at least now bury them and have time at those graves with them?

[The Prime Minister]

I can give that undertaking, and I thank the hon. Member for raising that important aspect. With each question, with each issue, we can begin to understand the very many ways in which the injustice—across a number of different fields and a number of different strands—played its part. For those who lost their babies altogether, that work on graves and on records is really important.

Cabinet Office

Alicia Kearns Excerpts

Monday 29th June 2026 Commons Chamber

[Alicia Kearns (Rutland and Stamford) (Con)]

This debate is very timely, and I congratulate the hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington (Matt Western) on securing it. In recent months, the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy has been joined by an ever-growing and increasingly anxious chorus of voices despairing at the Government’s failings on national security. Lord Robertson, who this Government commissioned and asked to lead the strategic defence review, warned in April that Britain’s security was “in peril” due to the “corrosive complacency” that was being shown towards defence. He went so far as to accuse the Treasury of “vandalism”.

Earlier this month, the right hon. Member for Rawmarsh and Conisbrough (John Healey) resigned as Defence Secretary. He was clear that the reason was a defence investment plan—which, it appears, The Times newspaper has also had sight of—that did not give the armed forces “the resources they need”. He was followed out of the door by the Armed Forces Minister, the hon. Member for Birmingham Selly Oak (Al Carns), who said that the Government’s plans were

“neither transformative enough nor sufficiently funded.”

Given that the hon. Member had served in our armed forces, one would have thought that his warning might have been heeded.

[Sir Julian Lewis (New Forest East) (Con)]

Bearing in mind an item that has appeared in the news reports today, does my hon. Friend agree that either the right hon. Gentleman or the hon. and gallant Gentleman to whom she has just referred would be a far more suitable future Secretary-General of NATO than the present Prime Minister, whose lack of proper funding of a defence policy—among other deficiencies—has led him to be looking for a new job?

--- Later in debate ---

[Alicia Kearns]

I always found the former Defence Secretary to be very decent in how he engaged, how he worked across parties and how seriously he took the job. I do not think there is a vacancy for the NATO Secretary-General for at least another eight years, but the current Prime Minister, who has taken us from third place to 12th in NATO defence spending in the past couple of years, would not be the right man to lead NATO at this time or any other.

The shadow hanging over this whole state of affairs is the defence investment plan. It was due for publication in autumn 2025, and we have not yet seen it. As a NATO member, we are committed to spending 5% of GDP on defence and national security by 2035, with 3.5% on core defence and 1.5% on national security and resilience. Let us review where the Government are. On rearmament and the progress towards 3.5% and 1.5%, we are second to last—31st out of 32 NATO members. We have only moved to that place in the past year. We best only Iceland, a country that has no armed forces at all. That is where the Government have left us on the road to rearmament. On defence spending as a percentage of GDP, we have gone from third in 2021 to 12th this year. Both those things are on the Labour Government.

The failure of this Government to properly fund our core defence is not just a disaster, but an international humiliation, and the very same pattern is playing out across national security and resilience. Lord Harris, the chair of the National Preparedness Commission, has said that funds for these vital areas are currently being treated as a “creative accountancy exercise”. When we look at the figures before us today, we can see what he means. I recognise the headline increase in the Cabinet Office’s security-focused expenditure, but the vast bulk of that additional £130 million is simply the integrated security fund being moved from the Foreign Office to the Cabinet Office. It is not new money; it is the same money in a different pocket. Meanwhile, the figure that tells the real story is the budget for the national security secretariat, which has been cut to £18.9 million—down from £34.4 million last year. That has nearly halved—at a moment like this.

While little detail has been given to us to scrutinise, it is clear that Cabinet Office spending on national security and resilience is not at the level required, and nor will it match the threats that we face. I will press the Minister on specific areas shortly, but let us check in on whether some past commitments. Have they been fulfilled—or, like the defence investment plan, are they languishing out of sight, underfunded and promised but never delivered?

In February, the former Security Minister, the right hon. Member for Barnsley North (Dan Jarvis), promised a one third increase to the integrated security fund for Indo-Pacific threats: primarily, the Chinese Communist party. There is no sign of that increase. We were promised a £17 million increase in counter-terrorism funding and a further £10 million to address organised crime by the end of 2026-27. Are the Government on track to deliver those things, or have they, too, been quietly forgotten?

I will turn to the specific areas that demand the attention of the House. The first is cyber-security. As we have heard from various Members, 40% of British businesses have suffered a cyber-attack or breach over the past year, including iconic names such as Marks and Spencer, and Jaguar Land Rover. The Government brought forward the Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill, which was welcome, but it was not sufficient. Indeed, it failed to name the threat of the Chinese Communist party. Extraordinarily, it excluded central and local government computer systems from its scope. The very systems that hold our citizens’ data have been left outside the Bill. What investment is being made to bolster our cyber-defences, and is that funding rising?

Secondly, the JCNSS reported last September on the risk of our undersea cables being targeted by hostile states. They carry 99% of our data. They are the arteries of our economy and our daily life. Closer co-operation with Joint Expeditionary Force nations, especially Norway, has been welcomed across this House, but specific plans and any funding remain elusive. These cables carry everything that we do, and there is no plan to protect them. When will funding come forward to do so?

Thirdly, we have discussed the covid pandemic today, and the inquiry that followed, which laid bare the need for a greater focus on biosecurity. The Government promised that it would publish the Cabinet Office’s plan for biological emergencies this spring. That deadline has, like many others, been missed. When will those plans finally appear, and when will the £1 billion promise to establish a network of national biosecurity centres come into being?

Fourthly, on our critical national infrastructure, Putin’s renewed illegal invasion of Ukraine and the brutality that Russia has industrialised should serve as a warning. The Russian military has deliberately targeted power infrastructure—substations, pylons and cables. Drone warfare has made our energy networks a target for terrorists and hostile states. As the Member for Rutland and Stamford, I am dismayed by the Government’s plans to put a string—mile upon mile—of pylons across eastern England. One single drone could plunge huge swathes of our country into darkness, and Google Maps literally provides an online map—a targeting plan for anyone who wishes us harm. We have the capability to lay those cables underground. Instead, the Government have chosen to sacrifice our security to save a few pounds, when we should be learning from Putin’s daily attacks on Ukraine’s infrastructure.

The fifth area—this matters more than any other line, and it has been discussed by every single Member—is whole-of-society resilience. The threats that we discuss cannot be tackled by Government alone, and it would be foolish to suggest so. They demand that each and every one of us is prepared and able to play our part, but the Government therefore have to kick off the national conversation that they promised. Here we must be honest that the failure is not Labour’s alone.

I agree with the chair of the JCNSS, the hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington, that since the Iraq war it has suited the political class to say to the public, “You don’t need to worry about national security or foreign policy—don’t you worry your little heads; we’ve got it under control.” We have taught a generation or two that danger is someone else’s problem, that resilience is a job for the state, and that citizens do not need to think about it at all. We have allowed the public to abdicate their personal responsibility, be that choosing whether or not to be on TikTok—get off it!—the purchases they make or the way they live their lives. That is a fatal arrow in the heart of our national resilience. When the crisis comes—and it will come—a people who have never been asked to prepare will not suddenly know how to be ready.

The Risk Assessment and Risk Planning Committee in the Lords, the JCNSS and the National Preparedness Commission have all called for a single, simple step: the appointment of a chief resilience officer to co-ordinate across Government. It is a sensible suggestion and I am not sure why it has been ignored. That role would look at protecting everything, whether that is our research, our innovation, our education, our universities, our genomics, our charities or the information environment, and it would tackle such things as the use of organised crime, which led to that heinous attack on our Prime Minister. That has been exploited by foreign states, which have misconstrued what took place to harm the Government. That is a shameful state of affairs, and I agree that we should have discussed it more.

I will now turn to China. Before the election, Labour promised to take China to the international courts over the genocide of the Uyghurs, which is an issue that you, Madam Deputy Speaker, and I have spoken about consistently in this place. The Government promised a full audit of China policy to guide strategy across every Department, yet the China audit was never published, its contents have never been shared with this House, and we are now in a situation where the National Security Adviser travels regularly to Beijing to meet Chinese Communist party officials. We only find out about those meetings because the Chinese Communist party publishes press releases. It is more transparent than our own Government, and that is not least because the National Security Adviser will not appear before this Parliament, unlike all his predecessors, to face justice—apologies, to face scrutiny. Well, both actually, because does our country not deserve to know that things are being done right? How can we know that they are being done right, that our country is being protected, and that hostile states are being held to account, if there is no scrutiny?

Our own Government keep quiet while preparing to pay billions to surrender sovereignty over the Chagos islands, and the protections that we put in place are not used. We passed the National Security Act 2023 precisely to counter the threat from hostile states, yet Labour refuses to put China in the enhanced tier, and the results speak for themselves. In July, it will be one year since the foreign interference registration scheme came into force. How many organisations or companies have registered as working for China on the foreign influence risk register? Not one. Three have registered as working for Republika Srpska, a tiny little entity within Bosnia, but no one says they are getting any money from the Chinese state. Have there been any investigations about this failure of anyone to register themselves? No. Have there been any prosecutions? No. Why? It is because the Government are too busy wooing the Chinese Communist party to deter it.

When the Prime Minister went to Beijing, he even met Cai Qi, the very man who had been running a spy network targeting this Parliament. The Prime Minister did not apologise for doing so; he seemed to think it was the right thing to do. Since that case collapsed last year, there have been zero repercussions for the Chinese Communist party for spying on this Parliament. That is not deterrence; it is rewarding a state that attacked our Parliament. Why are this Government content to let our own laws be flouted by Beijing?

Let us be honest about what has been described. A retailer that sells our groceries has been halted by hostile actors. A car maker that employs thousands of our constituents has been brought to its knees. Undersea cables carrying 99% of our data have been shadowed and mapped by Russian vessels. A spy network was run from Beijing against our own Parliament. Our Prime Minister was attacked. Luckily, he and his family were not hurt, but the Government answer all this with a transferring of budgets, missed deadlines and an audit they will not publish.

These are not isolated incidents. We are not at peace, but we may not be in the same state of war as our grandparents would have recognised. There is no declaration, no frontline, no army massing on our borders—thankfully—but make no mistake: we are under sustained, deliberate and co-ordinated attack every single day. Call it what you will, but previous generations understood their duties when the nation was under threat, and they put our country on a war footing. They found the money, told the public the truth, and did not hide behind “creative accountancy”—not my words, but those of an expert. We are 31st out of 32. We have a National Security Secretariat that has been cut in half. There is no resilience officer, no investment plan, and no published audit. That is not the posture of a country that knows it is under attack. So my challenge to the Minister is simple: fund what must be funded, and protect what must be protected.

Given that this is a debate about the money, let me end by asking about what the figures cannot show. Once we strip out the transfers of function and the accounting changes, what is the real-terms trajectory of spending on the security and resilience functions of the Cabinet Office? If it is rising, by how much and how fast is it rising? The first duty of the state is to protect its people, and on the evidence before us today, based purely on the figures, it is a duty in which the Government are failing. History will not forgive those who saw the danger, named it and looked away. We therefore hope that the Government will take away our request and act to fund our defence, fund our national security, and step up and fund our national resilience.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Angela Eagle]

The hon. Lady points out that adaptation is a cross-Government, cross-departmental thing. The way that the UK Government are organised means that Departments that are responsible for school buildings or transport deal with the adaptation issues that crop up in those Departments. I do not disagree with the hon. Lady’s analysis, but while the Cabinet Office does have a co-ordinating role, I do not necessarily think that having a Minister co-ordinating it would make an awful lot of difference.

[Alicia Kearns]

Since as early as 2013, when I was working with the Cabinet Office—specifically with the Joint Intelligence Organisation and others—climate change has been included in the matrix that it is required to plan for, respond to and seek to mitigate from a national security perspective. It is very much reflected in the national —I have forgotten the exact words, but it is the one that does not have an acronym. That is what happens when you work on something for too long. Climate change is in there and has been in there for a very long time, even way back when I was a civil servant.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

The hon. Lady is correct, and she talks about mitigation. There is also an adaptation issue here, which I was addressing, but clearly the cross-departmental nature of co-ordination happens within the Cabinet Office.

Our country’s resilience is front and centre of our approach to national security. Without security and resilience at home, we cannot deliver economic growth or any of our other missions to improve the lives of the British people.

My hon. Friend the Member for Bolton West (Phil Brickell) gave a good speech about what happens if corruption is allowed to get out of hand and people who defraud the public purse of money are allowed to get away with it. I thank him for asking important questions about Tom Hayhoe’s recommendations. I promise to make inquiries with colleagues in Government, and commit to writing to him about the specific issues that he raised in his speech.

The Government inherited a resilience landscape that had too often been neglected, leaving our nation exposed to the shocks of an increasingly volatile world. The resilience action plan, published last July, sets out the Government’s strategic approach to creating a stronger and more resilient UK, and the steps being taken to deliver it. We face a rapidly changing global risk landscape. From severe weather to geopolitical instability, the risks are complex and numerous. We must be honest with the public about the challenges while demonstrating our resolve to address them head-on, and we have to strike a balance by giving an appropriate warning without panicking people. Building a truly resilient society requires a fundamental cultural shift in the way that emergency preparedness is thought about. That includes being clear about the risks we face and the actions that we can all take to improve collective resilience, as the hon. Member for Hazel Grove (Lisa Smart) said from the Liberal Democrat Front Bench.

In summary, our No. 1 priority is to keep the country safe. The Government are undertaking plenty of work within our own shores to strengthen our stance, which is further bolstered by our unshakeable commitment to Europe-wide security. That responsibility has been spread right across the Government, and it is emblematic of the good work that can come when collaboration is at the heart of planning. Thanks to this work, the risk landscape is not an unknown country; we have made it familiar terrain through rigorous mapping of what could harm us and our citizens, and of what our response should be. It is through level-headed planning that we will create resilience at home and, through that work, create a secure foundation for families, businesses and economies to thrive.

Infected Blood Compensation Scheme

Alicia Kearns Excerpts

Thursday 18th June 2026 Commons Chamber

[Clive Efford]

I have not had conversations with the Government about an approach like that, but I do agree with my hon. Friend, and I will address that later. The Government need to learn lessons, and to set up a system, so that we do not have to learn all over again all the lessons of paying compensation and implementing inquiries’ recommendations every time this happens.

[Alicia Kearns (Rutland and Stamford) (Con)]

The hon. Gentleman has set the point out very powerfully. It is distressing for any of us in this House, and particularly for those of us who cannot imagine our children being put through that in such a callous way. In addition to the questions around compensation, one of the most horrendous things is the additional burden being put on parents where they have to prove, with documented evidence, that they lived with their child 40 or 50 years ago when that was done to their baby, to the future of their family. Will the hon. Gentleman touch on how outrageous it is that that is required, and the additional heartache and burden that that puts on those families?

--- Later in debate ---

[Damian Hinds (East Hampshire) (Con)]

As the hon. Member for Eltham and Chislehurst (Clive Efford) did, I thank the Backbench Business Committee for granting this debate. I pay tribute to him for securing it and for all his work with the all-party parliamentary group on haemophilia and contaminated blood. He puts an awful lot of work into it—it is not like a normal APPG—and we are all very grateful.

This scandal is of such a scale that probably every MP has at least one constituent who has been infected or affected, but in my constituency it has a particular weight attached to it because East Hampshire is home to Treloar’s school and college. Treloar’s is an internationally recognised centre of excellence in which incredibly committed people provide the most remarkable level of support, care, nurture and education for children and young people with some of the most profound disabilities imaginable, but it was also the place where, in the 1970s and 1980s, there was the single biggest concentration of people who were victims of these terrible practices. The reason was that at any one time there were 40 to 50 haemophiliac patients there. It was seen as an opportunity to study the disease; the NHS haemophilia centre was established nearby, and it later moved into the school grounds.

Treloar’s looms large in Sir Brian Langstaff’s report: an entire section is given over to it. It describes how research objectives were put ahead of the interests of children and how those children were subjected to unethical research techniques, without them or their parents being informed or consulted about the risks attached. As the hon. Gentleman mentioned, of the 122 children with haemophilia who attended the school between 1970 and 1987, only about 30 are alive now. There have been much wider effects, too: the stigma that could be attached, the interrupted education, the long-term mental scarring for the people and their families, and the trauma through families that has lasted for decades. This is a story of lost childhoods and lost futures.

It has been my privilege to meet a number of the Treloar’s boys over time. There is one gentleman in particular, Adrian Goodyear, with whom I have been in contact since I was first elected in 2010; he had previously been in contact with my predecessor Michael Mates for many years. In our 2010 debate, I read out a line from one of Ade’s emails to me that haunted me then and haunts me now:

“We’ve now lost so many of our friends from the Treloar days—in fact, we stopped counting at 40”.

I pay tribute to Ade, to all the Treloar’s boys and to everybody in this community who has kept up the fight, for their remarkable tenacity in seeking justice in the name and memory of their friends lost.

I thank the Paymaster General for his continued and consistent positive engagement on the subject. He always comes to these events in person, which I think the House really appreciates. I have a few questions that I hope he will address later in the debate.

First, I have been asked specifically to raise the lack of parity between bereaved parents whose child was over 18 and those whose child was younger. I hope that the Minister can comment on that point and on whether a change may be possible.

On further elements of the award, I thank the Minister for his letter in response to our exchange at Cabinet Office questions about the special category mechanism and the psychological harm payments, but I continue to receive questions from my constituents about the unethical research awards. The increase in the amount is very welcome, but in our November 2024 debate I asked how the figures had been reached, and even with the higher number I am still being asked that question. Clearly one cannot put a value on this tragic loss or say that any amount of money could compensate it, but even if the answer is that there is no way of calculating such a number, it would be helpful to have that set out.

I think IBCA has tried to engage well with MPs, which is welcome, but clearly the administration of the scheme needs to accelerate. Inevitably with these processes, things move relatively well at first with the more straightforward cases, but it becomes harder when we get on to the more complex cases. As the hon. Member for Eltham and Chislehurst says, we are talking about victims who are increasingly elderly and who, tragically, may die before they receive the compensation they have been promised.

[Alicia Kearns]

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for giving way and to the hon. Member for Eltham and Chislehurst (Clive Efford) for securing this debate. It is very difficult for any of us to contain our unadulterated rage at what happened.

My constituent lost her mother to infected blood. Unfortunately, her father is now in his final days, and soon she will lose him as well. He received compensation, and of course there was no inheritance tax on it then, but as his child she knows that the Government will be putting inheritance tax on that money when it passes to her in a very short time. Will my right hon. Friend give his view, which I am sure will be heard on the Government Front Bench, on how we are to ensure that when that compensation passes down from a father who lost his wife to a daughter who lost her mother, it does not incur inheritance tax?

[Damian Hinds]

My word! My hon. Friend puts it in very striking terms. [Interruption.] I see the Minister indicating that he has heard her question, so I think it is right that I defer to him to say a word about the matter when he makes his speech.

As the hon. Member for Eltham and Chislehurst and other colleagues have said, this is not the first compensation scheme that has been set up. Obviously every case is somewhat different and involves different categories of harm, but it seems that every time this happens, processes and systems have to be set up and time is thereby lost. We want lessons to be learned from this scheme, but they should also have been learned from previous schemes. I welcome the fact that the Public Accounts Committee is conducting its inquiry; I hope to hear a commitment from the Minister that lessons will be learned, particularly from that inquiry.

The last thing I want to mention is the possibility of a criminal investigation. I know that you and your constituent have been involved in discussions about that, Madam Deputy Speaker, and that you and I have both had discussions with the police and crime commissioner for Hampshire, Donna Jones. This is clearly not a question for this Minister or any Minister—not for the Cabinet Office or the Home Office; it is about the criminal justice system, the police and whether a threshold has been met. But I want to take this opportunity through the debate, without expecting the Minister to respond directly, to say that with all the passage of time, there is a premium on knowing what will happen and if we will move in this regard.

Nothing will ever or could ever make up for the multiple failings of the state in this case—from successive Governments, the civil service, the national health service and many more—but we can and must ensure that at this point, we have a compensation scheme that now does pay out in a timely way, and is as effective and humane as possible for all the victims and their families. We must face up clearly to our failings as a state and —let’s be honest—as a political system over those many years, and give truth to that phrase, “Never again”.

National Security (State Threats) Bill

Alicia Kearns Excerpts

Committee of the whole House
Wednesday 17th June 2026 Commons Chamber

[Alicia Kearns (Rutland and Stamford) (Con)]

I beg to move amendment 16, page 2, line 12, at end insert—

“33AA Conduct relevant to designation

(1) For the purposes of section 33A, a body is to be regarded as involved in foreign power threat activity if the Secretary of State reasonably believes that the body is, or has been, involved in—

(a) transnational repression;

(b) abusive lawfare;

(c) sanctions evasion connected to a foreign power, a designated body or foreign power threat activity;

(d) the concealment, movement or control of assets for or on behalf of a foreign power or a body acting for or on behalf of a foreign power; or

(e) conduct which enables, facilitates, assists or conceals any activity falling within paragraphs (a) to (d).

(2) For the purposes of this section, “transnational repression” means conduct carried out by, for, or on behalf of, or with the intention of benefiting, a foreign power, where the conduct has the purpose, or effect, of intimidating, coercing, punishing, silencing, controlling or retaliating against—

(a) a person in the United Kingdom;

(b) a United Kingdom national;

(c) a person resident in the United Kingdom;

(d) a person with a substantial connection to the United Kingdom; or

(e) a family member, associate or representative of a person falling within paragraphs (a) to (d).

(3) Conduct falling within subsection (2) includes, but is not limited to—

(a) surveillance, harassment, intimidation, threats or coercion;

(b) threats or reprisals against family members or associates overseas;

(c) forced return, attempted forced return, abduction or attempted abduction;

(d) misuse of criminal, civil, immigration, extradition or administrative processes;

(e) misuse of Interpol notices or other international police cooperation mechanisms;

(f) targeting of journalists, activists, human rights defenders, lawyers, political opponents, dissidents, whistleblowers or members of diaspora communities; and

(g) conduct intended to conceal, enable or facilitate any activity falling within paragraphs (a) to (f).

(4) For the purposes of this section, “abusive lawfare” means the use, or threatened use, of legal, regulatory, administrative, criminal, civil, immigration, extradition or other proceedings where the predominant purpose, or one of the predominant purposes, is to—

(a) intimidate, silence, punish or deter a person from engaging in public interest speech, journalism, advocacy, democratic participation or human rights work;

(b) deter investigation or scrutiny of corruption, human rights abuses, sanctions evasion, hostile state activity or foreign power threat activity;

(c) impose disproportionate cost, delay, pressure or reputational harm on the target; or

(d) protect, conceal or advance the interests of a foreign power or a body acting for or on behalf of a foreign power.

(5) Proceedings, or threatened proceedings, are not abusive merely because they are brought by, or on behalf of, a foreign power, or a person connected to a foreign power.

(6) For the purposes of this section, “sanctions evasion” means conduct which has the purpose, or effect, of enabling or facilitating the evasion, circumvention or frustration of—

(a) sanctions imposed under the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018;

(b) asset-freezing measures;

(c) trade sanctions;

(d) export controls;

(e) immigration restrictions;

(f) public procurement restrictions; or

(g) any other restrictive measure imposed by or under an enactment for the purpose of protecting the safety or interests of the United Kingdom.

(7) Nothing in this section is to be read as preventing legal advice, representation or advocacy, provided that such activity is not undertaken for the purpose of facilitating foreign power threat activity, transnational repression, sanctions evasion, abusive lawfare or the concealment of assets connected to a designated body.”

This amendment would specify categories of conduct that may be regarded as involvement in foreign power threat activity for the purposes of designation.

[The First Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means (Judith Cummins)]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 15, page 2, line 42, at end insert—

“33C Mandatory review following designation

(1) Where regulations are made under section 33A designating a body, the Secretary of State must, within 30 days of the regulations being made, conduct a review of whether further action should be taken in relation to—

(a) the designated body;

(b) any person who owns or controls the designated body;

(c) any person owned or controlled by the designated body;

(d) any officer, employee, agent, member or representative of the designated body;

(e) any person acting for or on behalf of the designated body;

(f) any person who materially assists the designated body; and

(g) any person who provides funds, economic resources, professional services, goods, technology or other material support to the designated body.

(2) The review under subsection (1) must consider whether it is appropriate to take, recommend or request action including—

(a) designation under the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018;

(b) asset-freezing measures;

(c) travel bans or other immigration restrictions;

(d) director disqualification;

(e) public procurement exclusion;

(f) civil recovery, restraint, freezing or forfeiture action;

(g) referral to Companies House, the National Crime Agency, the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation, the Financial Conduct Authority, the Solicitors Regulation Authority, the Bar Standards Board, HM Revenue and Customs, the Charity Commission, the Electoral Commission or any other relevant authority;

(h) enhanced beneficial ownership checks;

(i) enhanced reporting requirements; and

(j) any other action necessary to protect the safety or interests of the United Kingdom.

(3) In conducting a review under subsection (1), the Secretary of State must consult—

(a) the Treasury;

(b) the Secretary of State responsible for foreign, Commonwealth and development affairs;

(c) the National Crime Agency; and

(d) any other Minister of the Crown or public authority as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.

(4) Within 30 days of a body being designated under section 33A, the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament a statement confirming—

(a) that the review required by this section has been conducted;

(b) what categories of action listed in subsection (2) have been considered;

(c) whether any such action has been taken, recommended or requested; and

(d) where no such action has been taken, recommended or requested, the reasons for that decision.

(5) A statement under subsection (4) may omit information where the Secretary of State considers that publication of that information would be contrary to the interests of national security, international relations, the prevention or detection of serious crime, or the protection of ongoing legal proceedings.

(6) The Secretary of State must keep under review whether further action under subsection (2) is required in relation to a designated body and persons connected to it.”

This amendment would require the Secretary of State, within 30 days of designating a body, to review whether further action should be taken against the body and persons connected to it, and to lay a statement of the outcome before Parliament.

Clause stand part.

Amendment 3, in clause 2, page 3, line 8, leave out from “body” until end of line 9.

This amendment and Amendments 4 to 6 would remove the additional defence of supporting a designated body for a non-prohibited purpose.

Amendment 4, page 3, line 16, leave out from “body” until end of line 17.

See the explanatory statement for Amendment 3.

Amendment 5, page 3, line 21, leave out from “body” until end of line 22.

See the explanatory statement for Amendment 3.

Amendment 6, page 3, leave out lines 23 to 25.

See the explanatory statement for Amendment 3.

Amendment 1, page 4, line 23, at end insert—

“(3A) The conduct specified in subsection (3) includes establishing, administering or maintaining a company, trust, partnership or similar arrangement which conceals, or is intended to conceal, the beneficial ownership of assets connected with a designated body.”

Amendment 8, page 4, line 27, after “United Kingdom” insert

“or are conducted outside, but were planned from within, the United Kingdom”.

Amendment 7, page 5, line 15, leave out “14” and insert “25”.

This amendment would increase the maximum sentence for assisting a designated body from 14 years to 25 years imprisonment.

Amendment 11, page 6, leave out lines 21 to 23.

This amendment would remove the defence of reasonable excuse for retaining a material benefit provided by or on behalf of a designated body.

Amendment 12, page 6, line 38, leave out “(7) or”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 11.

Amendment 9, page 7, line 8, at end insert—

“17D Uniform and publication of images in relation to a designated body

(1) A person in a public place commits an offence if he—

(a) wears an item of clothing, or

(b) wears, carries or displays an article

in such a way or in such circumstances as to arouse reasonable suspicion that the person is a supporter of a designated body.

(2) A person commits an offence if the person publishes an image of—

(a) an item of clothing, or

(b) any other article,

in such a way or in such circumstances as to arouse reasonable suspicion that the person is a supporter of a designated body.

(3) In subsection (2) the reference to an image is a reference to a still or moving image (produced by any means).

(4) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale (or both).

(5) A constable may seize an item of clothing or any other article if the constable—

(a) reasonably suspects that it is evidence in relation to an offence under subsection (1), and

(b) is satisfied that it is necessary to seize it in order to prevent the evidence being concealed, lost, altered or destroyed.

(6) In connection with exercising the power in subsection (5), a constable may require a person to remove the item of clothing or other article if the person is wearing it.

(7) But the powers conferred by subsections (5) and (6) may not be exercised so as to seize, or require a person to remove, an item of clothing being worn next to the skin or immediately over a garment being worn as underwear.”

This amendment would create an offence of wearing or displaying in public, or publishing an image of, an article in a way that arouses reasonable suspicion that a person is a supporter of a designated body.

Amendment 10, page 7, line 8, at end insert—

“17D Preparation of acts relating to a designated body

(1) A person commits an offence if, with the intention of—

(a) committing an offence under section 17A, 17B or 17C, or

(b) assisting another to commit such an offence,

the person engages in any conduct in preparation for giving effect to the intention.

(2) It is irrelevant for the purposes of subsection (1) whether the intention and preparations relate to one or more particular offences, offences of a particular description, or such offences generally.

(3) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable, on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years or a fine (or both).”

This amendment would create an offence of engaging in conduct in preparation for committing, or assisting another to commit, an offence relating to a designated body.

Amendment 13, page 7, line 8, at end insert—

“17D Self-directing acts in support of a designated body

(1) A person commits an offence if the person engages in conduct of any kind which is—

(a) inspired by the ideology, actions, and self-promotion of a designated body, and

(b) prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom.

(2) A person commits an offence if the person—

(a) engages in UK-related activities that are likely to assist the stated, or assumed, aims of a designated body, and

(b) knows, or having regard to other matters known to them ought to reasonably to know, that their activities are likely to assist the stated, or assumed, aims of a designated body.

(3) UK-related activities” means—

(a) activities taking place in the United Kingdom;

(b) activities taking place outside the United Kingdom which are prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom.

(4) Subsections (1) and (2) apply to conduct outside the United Kingdom, but apply to conduct taking place wholly outside the United Kingdom only if the person engaging in the conduct—

(ab) is a UK person, or

(b) acts for or on behalf of, or holds office under, the Crown, or is in Crown employment (whether or not they engage in the conduct in that capacity).

(5) In proceedings for an offence under this section it is a defence to show that the person engaged in the conduct in question—

(a) in compliance with a legal obligation under the law of the United Kingdom which is not a legal obligation under private law,

(b) in the case of a person having functions of a public nature under the law of the United Kingdom, for the purposes of those functions,

(c) as a lawyer carrying on a legal activity, or

(d) in accordance with, or in relation to Uk-related activities carried out in accordance with, an agreement or arrangement to which—

(i) the United Kingdom was a party, or

(ii) any person acting for, or on behalf of, or holding office under, the Crown was (in that capacity) a party.

(6) A person is taken to have shown a matter mentioned in subsection (5) if—

(a) sufficient evidence is adduced to raise an issue with respect to it, and

(b) the contrary is not proved beyond reasonable doubt.

(7) A person who commits an office under this section is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years or a fine (or both).

(8) The following terms have the same meaning as in section 3—

“Crown employment” ;

“financial benefit” ;

The “law of the United Kingdom”;

“lawyer” ;

“legal activity” ;

“UK person” .”

This amendment creates a new offence of undertaking conduct harmful or prejudicial to UK interests that is inspired by a designated body, rather than actively commissioned on behalf of a designated body.

Amendment 14, page 7, line 8, at end insert—

“17D Dissemination of publications relating to a designated body

(1) A person commits an offence if the person engages in conduct falling within subsection (2) and, at the time of doing so—

(a) intends an effect of the conduct to be a direct or indirect encouragement or other inducement to support, or to provide assistance to, a designated body, or

(b) is reckless as to whether the conduct has that effect.

(2) A person engages in conduct falling within this subsection if the person—

(a) distributes or circulates a publication relating to a designated body;

(b) gives, sells or lends such a publication;

(c) offers such a publication for sale or loan;

(d) provides a service to others that enables them to obtain, read, listen to or look at such a publication, or to acquire it by means of a gift, sale or loan;

(e) transmits the contents of such a publication electronically; or

(f) has such a publication in the person's possession with a view to its becoming the subject of conduct falling within any of paragraphs (a) to (e).

(3) For the purposes of this section a publication relates to a designated body if matter contained in it is likely to be understood by a reasonable person as a direct or indirect encouragement or other inducement to support, or to provide assistance to, a designated body.

(4) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to show that—

(a) the matter by reference to which the publication was treated as relating to a designated body neither expressed the person's views nor had the person's endorsement, and

(b) it was clear, in all the circumstances of the conduct, that the matter did not express the person's views and did not have the person's endorsement.

(5) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years or a fine (or both).”

This amendment would create an offence of disseminating, or possessing with a view to disseminating, a publication that encourages support for or assistance to a designated body.

Clause 2 stand part.

Amendment 2, in clause 3, page 7, line 27, at end insert—

“(5) Regulations under subsection (3) may not be made unless a draft of the statutory instrument containing them has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, each House of Parliament.”

This amendment ensures that any regulation under section 33C made by the Secretary of State to remove a designation is subject to the draft affirmative procedure.

Clauses 3 to 8 stand part.

New clause 3—Designation of the IRGC—

“(1) The Secretary of State must take reasonable steps to lay before Parliament regulations under the provisions of this Act to designate the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a body involved in foreign power threat activity.

(2) Before laying such regulations, the Secretary of State must be satisfied that the IRGC fulfils the conditions set out in Section 1 of this Act.

(3) The regulations specified in subsection (1) should be laid before Parliament within a month of this Act coming into force.”

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to take reasonable steps to bring forward regulations designating the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) within a month of this Act coming into force.

New clause 4—Assessment of the adequacy of the powers contained in the Act—

“(1) Within twelve months of passing of this Act, the Secretary of State must commission the Independent Reviewer of State Threats Legislation or another such person performing a similar function to produce a report on the adequacy of the powers contained in this Act.

(2) The report specified in subsection (1) must consider the effectiveness of the Act’s powers in tackling the threat posed by state-backed and state-linked actors to the security of the United Kingdom.

(3) The report specified in subsection (1) must include any proposals for legislative changes to the provisions of the Act as are considered necessary by the Independent Reviewer.

(4) As soon as receiving the report, and no later than three months after receiving it, the Secretary of State must lay the report before both Houses of Parliament.

(5) Within three months of laying the report before Parliament, the Secretary of State must publish a response to the report and to any recommendations made by the Independent Reviewer.”

This new clause would require the Independent Reviewer of State Threats Legislation to assess the adequacy of the powers introduced by this Act twelve months after its passing.

New clause 5—Seizure of Passports etc from Person Suspected of Assisting a Designated Body—

“(1) This section applies in the case of a person at a port in Great Britain, Northern Ireland, or in the border area, if a constable has reasonable grounds to suspect that the person—

(a) is there with the intention of leaving Great Britain or Northern Ireland for the purpose of assisting a designated body outside the United Kingdom; or

(b) has arrived in Great Britain or Northern Ireland with the intention of leaving it soon for that purpose.

(2) The constable may—

(a) exercise any of the powers in sub-paragraph (4) in the case of the person, or

(b) direct a qualified officer to do so.

(3) A qualified officer must (if able to do so) comply with any direction given by a constable under sub-paragraph (2)(b).

(4) The powers are—

(a) to require the person to hand over all travel documents in the person’s possession to the constable or (as the case may be) the qualified officer;

(b) to search for travel documents relating to the person and to take possession of any that the constable or officer finds;

(c) to inspect any travel document relating to the person; and

(d) to retain any travel document relating to the person that is lawfully in the possession of the constable or officer.

(5) The power in sub-paragraph (4)(b) is a power to search—

(a) the person;

(b) anything that the person has with him or her; and

(c) any vehicle in which the officer believes the person to have been travelling or to be about to travel.

(6) A constable or qualified officer—

(a) may stop a person or vehicle for the purpose of exercising a power in sub-paragraph (4)(a) or (b);

(b) may if necessary use reasonable force for the purpose of exercising a power in sub-paragraph (4)(a) or (b); and

(c) may authorise a person to carry out on the constable's or officer's behalf a search under sub-paragraph (4)(b).

(7) A constable or qualified officer exercising a power in sub-paragraph (4)(a) or (b) must tell the person that—

(a) the person is suspected of intending to leave Great Britain or (as the case may be) the United Kingdom for the purpose of assisting a designated body, and

(b) the constable or officer is therefore entitled under this Schedule to exercise the power.

(8) Where a travel document relating to the person is in the possession of an immigration officer or customs official (whether a qualified officer or not), the constable may direct the officer or official—

(a) to pass the document to a constable as soon as practicable, and

(b) in the meantime to retain it,

the officer or official must comply with any such direction.”

This new clause would replicate existing powers to seize travel documents from individuals suspected of terrorism, applying those powers in relation to individuals suspected of assisting a designated body

New clause 6—Police powers to apply for serious crime prevention orders in designation cases—

“(1) The Serious Crime Act 2007 is amended as follows.

(2) In Section 8, after subsection (2)(a) insert—

“(ab) it is an application for an order under section 1 that is related to an offence committed under section 2 of the National Security (State Threats) Act 2026.””

This new clause allows police to apply for serious crime prevention orders in relation to offences committed under this Act.

New clause 7—Sanctions—

“(1) The Secretary of State may make regulations under the provisions of Section 1 of the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 to subject any—

(a) body designated under the National Security (State Threats) Act 2026, or

(b) a person who commits an offence under section (2) of that Act

to any available sanction within that Act.”

This new clause would ensure that any body designated under this Act, or any person who commits an offence under this Act, may be subject to the sanctions regime set out in the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018.

The schedule.

[Alicia Kearns]

We have tabled 13 amendments, not to frustrate the Bill but to give it the necessary teeth. This Bill is soft where it should be hard, silent where it should speak, and blind where it should see. It is soft because, as drafted, it sets a higher bar to prosecute a person who supports the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps than a person who supports the terrorists whom the IRGC funds and commands; it is silent because whole categories of hostile conduct that our terrorism laws have criminalised for 20 years are simply missing; and it is blind because it has been written for one organisation on one timetable, with almost no provision for future designations. Good will is not enough, and we must close the holes that our enemies will exploit.

The Government have lifted much of this legislation from section 12 of the Terrorism Act 2000, yet they have added something that does not appear in the terrorism offence: a requirement that support was given for a prohibited purpose that was prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United Kingdom. Let me ask the Minister the simple question that this Bill invites: what level of support for the IRGC do the Government consider beneficial to the United Kingdom? The IRGC is the world’s largest state sponsor of terrorism, and if she agrees that there is no level of support for it that is beneficial to the UK, we can simply remove the prohibited purpose. She has just said from the Dispatch Box that she agrees that there is absolutely none, so let us act and amend the Bill.

Under the Bill as drafted, to convict someone who supports the IRGC the prosecution must prove that their support was prejudicial to the safety or interest of the UK—an additional threshold—but that requirement does not exist in terrorism law. To convict someone who supports Hamas, Hezbollah or the Houthis—the proxies that the IRGC arms and funds—there is no such hurdle, so the body that inspires, organises arms and funds the terrorists is handed a protection in law that the terrorist himself is denied. That is the difference between a prosecution that succeeds and one that never gets off the ground, and I know something about prosecutions that fail at the last moment. Our amendment 3 simply removes the extra defence and brings this offence into line with the terrorism law from which it is drawn.

I recognise that the Government may seek to argue that state entities enjoy protections in international law that terrorists do not, that we must set a higher bar than in equivalent terrorism legislation and that acting prejudicially to the UK’s interests is a reasonable test. However, state immunity protects the Iranian state from being sued or prosecuted in our courts, and it has nothing to do with the British resident who chooses to fund or promote the IRGC. We are not prosecuting Tehran; we are prosecuting the person here who does its work. The proposition that the Minister is left defending is that supporting the world’s biggest sponsor of terrorism should be harder to prosecute than supporting the groups it sponsors. That is not a higher bar; it is international lawyers tying the hands of Ministers who are meant to be keeping us safe.

On amendments 11 and 12, the same instinct to protect where we should prosecute runs through subsection (7) of proposed new section 17C, which makes a reasonable excuse a defence for accepting and keeping a material benefit from a designated body. That is not necessary, because there are already protections in the Bill for, for example, a lawyer or somebody who has no ability to know that funds were being taken. I recognise that such a provision is in the National Security Act 2023, but that is not a reason to repeat a weakness, and we have an opportunity to fix it. There is no excuse for keeping a hostile state’s money—not in this Bill and not in the Act it leans on.

The sentencing gets the gravity backwards. As drafted, supporting a designated body and actively assisting one carries the same maximum sentence of 14 years or a fine.

[Sir John Hayes (South Holland and The Deepings) (Con)]

Before my hon. Friend moves on to fines, the issue she has raised, and which I raised earlier, seems to be crucial. It is true that Jonathan Hall, as the Minister said on Second Reading, recognised that the approach to a terrorist organisation was different from the approach to a state. Nevertheless, creating this higher bar whereby to secure a successful prosecution it must be established that the individual concerned was acting on behalf of the designated body for a prohibited purpose—connection with the body alone is not sufficient—seems to me to make prosecution less likely rather than more likely. If international law is at the heart of that—the fear of appeals, and so on and so forth—we need to hear that from the Minister, and the case needs to be a highly persuasive, because it seems to me that the Government are making their lives more difficult, rather than easier.

[Alicia Kearns]

That is exactly the crux of the point I made in my speech on Second Reading. We should not set a higher threshold, because we will see prosecutions collapse for exactly that reason. We need to be arming prosecutors to go and get the justice that our country needs to better protect us.

Turning to the maximum sentence of 14 years, actively doing a hostile state organ’s work—moving its money, carrying its information, committing violence on its behalf—is graver than just supporting it. It is a kind of treason, and I suspect most British people would call it that. We urge the Government to consider having a higher potential sentence for actively working with or receiving material benefit from a designated body. Amendment 7 would therefore raise that maximum sentence from 14 years to 25 years. That figure is not plucked from the air; it matches the Australian regime under which the IRGC was listed last November. As I have said, the Government may argue that the 14 year maximum sentence is taken from the NSA 2023, but let us raise the maximum sentence in both. After all, we are talking about treason.

On amendment 10, I turn from where the Bill is too soft to where it says nothing at all. This is one of the gaps about which the Government have offered no answer, and I have looked hard for one. Section 5 of the Terrorism Act 2006 makes preparing an act of terrorism an offence, but this Bill contains no equivalent. As the Bill is drafted, a person can plan to assist a designated organ—to be straightforward, let us talk about the IRGC—and unless and until they commit the act, they have committed no offence at all under this Bill. However, the entire purpose of national security work is to prevent and disrupt before harm is done, not to see the plot and clear it up afterwards. We would not tolerate that vulnerability in terrorism law and we should not invent it here. Amendment 10 closes that gap, and lets police and prosecutors act while a plot is still on the drawing board. If the Minister believes preparation is already caught elsewhere, I would welcome her showing me where, but I have yet to be shown that in the briefings I have had.

Amendment 13 recognises that the gap left by preparation is widened by a second omission: self-directed and inspired actors. The Bill misses entirely the person who is never directly commissioned or directed, but who absorbs a hostile state’s propaganda and acts on it alone. Twenty years of counter-terrorism has taught us this lesson at a terrible cost. The gravest or most likely threat is no longer the directed plot, but the individual radicalised online who acts on their own. Hostile states bring the resources, reach and sophistication of states to that propaganda, arguably with a greater inspiring power than any terrorist group can muster. We saw that with the bots that screamed for independence in Scotland and fell silent the moment Tehran’s internet went down, something my right hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge (Tom Tugendhat) raised in his speech earlier. That is just a small insight into the ways they are invested in turning us against each other. A Bill that catches only the commissioned and directed is fighting the last war and leaving us dangerously exposed to the next. Amendment 13 captures those inspired to act by a designated body, but not directed by them.

I turn now to the most dangerous omission of all, which we touched on in the wind-ups on Second Reading, and the omission that would worry our allies and partners, which amendment 8 seeks to address. As drafted, the Bill captures activity in the UK and activity abroad that is “prejudicial” to the UK. It does not catch activity planned here on British soil to be perpetrated abroad where there is no ability to prove that it is prejudicial to the interests of the UK where there is no harm to the UK. Activity by the IRGC in France, Iran or Bosnia, or by the Chinese in Hong Kong, may not be directly prejudicial to the interests of the UK, so again we are adding an unnecessary threshold. But if it is perpetrated here, be it in Manchester, London or anywhere else, we must be able to prosecute those responsible.

In plain terms, the gap was turning the UK into a base for state terrorism: a cell here in Britain planning a campaign of intimidation against a journalist in Dublin on behalf of the IRGC, or a network running sabotage operations in Germany. Arrested and charged, their defence writes itself. If the act was not to take place here in the UK, you cannot argue that it was prejudicial to UK safety. The law does not like ambiguity. We should not leave prosecutors having to argue that an attack on Dublin or Berlin was also somehow an attack on London. Amendment 8 closes that gap directly, so that planning hostile activity from British soil is caught wherever that activity is aimed. If the Government are confident that that scope is already reached, they lose nothing by putting it beyond doubt. Far better to write the law clearly today than to watch a case fall apart on that very point.

The next omission is propaganda itself. Since 2006, it has been an offence to disseminate publications that promote terrorism. The Bill extends no equivalent protection against the propaganda of designated states. We have heard colleagues today talk about publications such as Press TV which, shamefully, former Members of this House appear on and are paid to have shows on. Two of the principal weapons of hostile states are the propaganda that recruits and the disinformation that divides. The Chinese Communist party pushes propaganda and disinformation through the United Front Work Department. I hope these powers will reach it one day, but amendment 14 brings designated bodies within the same standard applied to terrorist publications for 20 years, because I do not in any way think that the Government think that IRGC propaganda should have more latitude than that of a proscribed terrorist group.

Next is an omission that many living in our country, especially our Jewish community, will find the most difficult. Under section 13 of the Terrorism Act 2000, it is an offence to display in public the insignia of a proscribed organisation. It is the power that we rely on to take Hamas flags, Hezbollah banners and the symbols of Hizb ut-Tahrir off our streets. The Bill as drafted contains no equivalent provision whatever, so if the amendment is not accepted by the Government, either now or in the other place, the flag of the IRGC may fly lawfully on a British street, glorifying every stabbing, every attack on our Jewish communities, every kidnap plot and every assassination attempt that the regime has directed here. How do we look the people who are being hunted in the eye and tell them that the banner of their hunter is welcome on our streets?

The Government may say that criminalising the display of state symbols brings lawful state activity under UK criminal law, contrary to diplomatic convention, and that by reciprocity, hostile states could criminalise the Union Jack and UK uniforms abroad, exposing our personnel and dual nationals. I have taken the time to consider that. Yes, state immunity protects foreign states in our courts, but it should not and does not dictate what a resident of this country may do on British pavements.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Angela Eagle]

Action that is prejudicial to the safety and interests of the UK is the test that we are talking about. If one were delivering humanitarian aid and had to deal with part of a state that we did not particularly approve of, that would not be prejudicial to the safety or interests of the UK. It would be in line with what the UK wished to do, but if it were prejudicial, because it was hostile activity, the test would be passed.

[Alicia Kearns]

The Minister gives the example of a diplomat, and she is right that our diplomats in Tehran will need to engage with the IRGC—it is nonsense to suggest that they would not be able to do so—but that is why there is a specific exception for that in the Bill. Proposed new section 17A(5) refers to a person who

“acts for or on behalf of, or holds office under, the Crown, or is in Crown employment (whether or not they engage in the conduct in that capacity).”

As I have mentioned, I am concerned that that means that anyone who is a traitor and works for the civil service would have protections under any circumstances, but it means that we do not need that additional threshold, because diplomats are already specifically protected in the Bill at another point.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

It is not only diplomats. It may well be NGOs delivering humanitarian aid and people who have to come across states or their designated proxies in particular cases.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I think it is about consistency. The Bill was drafted to try to mirror—albeit in a slightly different context—the Terrorism Act provisions, while fitting into the National Security Act’s provisions, so that we do not have a complicated range of tests.

Amendment 7 relates to defences and sentencing. Essentially, the hon. Member for Rutland and Stamford (Alicia Kearns) wishes to increase the prison sentence for actively assisting to 25 years from the current 14 years. The idea is that 14 years would very much fit in with the sentences under the National Security Act, and we would not end up with a complex range of sentences for quite similar offences. One could increase both, if we were minded to do so, but the point about the introduction of designation in the Bill is that it is trying to fit into the National Security Act, which has been working quite well, rather than our having a whole range of different sentences for very similar offences.

[Alicia Kearns]

I fully recognise the Minister’s point that she is trying to align the provisions with those in the National Security Act, but as per my argument earlier, let us improve the National Security Act while we are at it. The Minister says that the question is whether she is minded to make the change; I say she should be minded to. If someone actively assists or materially benefits from a hostile state while committing treason, it is absolutely right that they should get a tougher sentence than that for just flying a flag or supporting a hostile state. Those acts are still heinous, but a far worse crime has been committed. I ask the Minister to consider making the change when the Bill is in the Lords.

[Dame Angela Eagle]

I note the hon. Lady’s point.

Amendment 10 would

“create an offence of engaging in conduct in preparation for committing, or assisting another to commit, an offence relating to a designated body.”

It is not necessary, because a person who engages in conduct of any kind, including preparatory conduct, that is intended to assist a designated body in carrying out UK-related activities would be caught by the Bill’s provisions.

The hon. Lady talked about what she called a loophole; she said that the Bill does not cover attacks inspired by a designated body. Her amendment 13 would create a new offence for self-directed acts inspired by a designated body, but we do not believe it is necessary. The test for the assisting offence in proposed new section 17B of the National Security Act is whether conduct is intended to assist a designated organisation, or whether the person ought to have known that their conduct was likely to assist the organisation. The person does not need to be tasked or directed by the organisation to commit the offence, so those who are inspired to do things, rather than being asked or told to do things by the designated body, are caught.

With amendment 8, the hon. Lady seeks to capture conduct that occurs outside the UK but is planned within the UK. Again, we believe it is unnecessary. If planning takes place in the UK, it is already caught in the Bill, under the offence in proposed new section 17B of assisting a designated body. That offence refers to conduct of any kind, and it will be an offence to plan something in the UK that takes place outside the UK if it materially assists a designated body in carrying out activities that are prejudicial to the safety or interests of the UK—the prohibited purpose test. That could cover someone in the UK who assists a designated body in its work, done overseas, to target an ally of the UK, so the amendment is unnecessary.

Amendment 14 would create an offence relating to the dissemination of publications that encourage support for a designated body. The conduct that the amendment seeks to address is already covered by the new offence of supporting a designated body.

I think the hon. Lady wanted people to be criminalised for wearing clothing or displaying flags or similar symbols linked to a designated body. The Bill does not ban the wearing or carrying of an image, because we cannot ban what might be worn by a foreign diplomat, but if somebody is supporting or promoting the hostile activities of a proscribed body in any way, they will be caught by the new support offence. I hope that assures the hon. Lady that that issue is covered.

New clauses 5 and 6 would give effect to other recommendations made by Jonathan Hall by creating new powers to seize travel documents, and to allow police to apply for serious crime prevention orders in relation to offences committed under this legislation. We are committed to legislating on those recommendations and, as my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary announced on Second Reading, we will do so as soon as parliamentary time allows.

--- Later in debate ---

[Max Wilkinson]

I thank the hon. Member for his intervention. The new clause will not be withdrawn. The sentiment is shared between us, and I think we should appreciate that.

New clause 3 reflects the Government’s stated intention to move by the summer recess, and it ensures that this commitment will be honoured in practice; that would give much reassurance to those watching from outside the House. Importantly, the new clause does not force the Home Secretary to designate the IRGC prematurely; it would have to do so only in line with the coming into force of the rest of the Bill. It does not override due process; nor does it lower the evidential threshold required under the legislation. It ensures that the intelligence gathering and preparatory work necessary for designation are treated as an urgent priority, rather than something that can be continually delayed. This urgency is long overdue.

Liberal Democrats will also support new clause 4, which provides for an independent post-legislative review within 12 months of this legislation passing. This is a crucial safeguard. The Bill introduces significant new powers, and it is essential that their effectiveness and proportionality are independently assessed.

[Alicia Kearns]

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right to want this. However, there is already a requirement under law for Jonathan Hall, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, to review all terrorism legislation and related legislation, including the National Security Act 2023—which this would fall under—every single year, and to report back to Parliament. Hopefully the hon. Gentleman will be reassured that this is already covered in law, and that there is a specific requirement.

[Max Wilkinson]

The hon. Lady knows much more about this than I do, and I bow to her greater knowledge.

The Home Secretary gave a reassurance on Second Reading that humanitarian organisations would not find their work being criminalised, and the Security Minister has just touched on that point as well. We welcome that further reassurance on the official record, but I have no doubt that the point will be further explored elsewhere when the Bill moves on. I am sure that Members from across the House will agree that the accelerated passage of the Bill through Parliament, which will limit the amount of scrutiny it receives, heightens the imperative for independent post-legislative scrutiny, which may be useful to the Government.

Similarly, we will support amendment 2, which ensures that any decision to remove a designation is subject to the draft affirmative procedure. Again, speed is a factor in this Bill’s passage, as the official Opposition have mentioned a number of times today, and it is likely that this will not be needed in the short to medium term. However, parliamentary oversight should apply not just at the point of designation, but at the point of removal. It is vital that there should be adequate parliamentary scrutiny if a future Home Secretary should seek to remove a designation, and this amendment will enshrine that mechanism.

We also support amendment 1, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for North Norfolk (Steff Aquarone). This amendment closes a critical loophole by making it an offence to use corporate structures to conceal assets belonging to designated individuals or organisations. It would strengthen enforcement against the murky structures which many Members of this House have long opposed. I urge Ministers to consider the merits of the amendment, even if it does not reach a Division today.

The Liberal Democrats will support amendment 8. The Bill refers to “UK-related activities”, but fails to account for activities that are conducted overseas but planned from within the UK. It cannot be right that groups planning attacks on our allies and neighbours are sheltered from the law by this oversight. These actors do not respect traditional borders and so our laws must adequately adapt to meet the challenge. The amendment would close that loophole and, in doing so, strengthen the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Dame Angela Eagle]

New clause 3, tabled by the hon. Member for Cheltenham (Max Wilkinson), would require the Secretary of State to bring forward regulations designating the IRGC within a month of this Act coming into force, but the exercise of these powers under this Bill will have significant implications for national security and foreign policy, and it is right that they should be exercised independently by the Secretary of State on the basis of expert advice, including from the security and intelligence agencies. That is what this Bill allows, and putting these designations on the face of the Bill would be a very difficult way to effect the change, so the way to do this is the way that the Bill sets out.

The hon. Member for Cheltenham’s new clause 4, which would

“require the Independent Reviewer of State Threats Legislation to assess the adequacy of the powers introduced by this Act twelve months after its passing”,

is already essentially covered by the Bill’s provisions, because they would be subject to part 3 of the National Security Act. The independent reviewer of state threats legislation has to carry out an annual review into the operation of its provisions, and is also empowered by part 1 of that Act to review any other such things he or she sees fit. Amendment 2 would require the draft affirmative procedure to be used for regulations removing a designation. He is right that such regulations should receive the proper parliamentary scrutiny, and the Bill already provides that such regulations are subject to the draft affirmative procedure. The use of the negative procedure is limited to very minor technical changes, such as the addition of aliases.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell) asked whether it would be possible to proscribe a particular group, and gave a particular example. The test is whether the body is engaged in “foreign power threat activity”; it is a high bar, and it targets organisations that pose a real threat to the UK. I cannot imagine for one minute that my right hon. Friend would be involved in any of those.

Amendment 1, tabled by the hon. Member for North Norfolk (Steff Aquarone), would provide further examples of conduct that would be considered a material benefit, and he spoke about what those might be. Obtaining material benefits from a foreign intelligence service is an existing offence under section 17 of the National Security Act, so I do not think the further examples of conduct in amendment 1 are needed, as that conduct is already caught by the provisions in the Bill.

[Alicia Kearns]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 1 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 2

Offences relating to designated bodies

Amendment proposed: 3, page 3, line 8, leave out from “body” until end of line 9.—(Alicia Kearns.)

This amendment and Amendments 4 to 6 would remove the additional defence of supporting a designated body for a non-prohibited purpose.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

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[Alicia Kearns]

The Bill asks how our country confronts the greatest threat it faces: states that behave like terrorists. We support the Bill, and have today set out its weaknesses—the places where, as drafted, it is found wanting. We tabled 13 amendments and new clauses, with not one designed to delay the Bill, not one designed to wreck it and, tonight, not one accepted—not a clause, not a line, not one additional defence for our country. There are two ways for a Government to show their contempt for the House: they may deny it time or deny it influence. They may rush this House or overrule it. This Government have chosen both.

[Mark Sewards]

Does the hon. Lady not accept that Jonathan Hall, whom Members on all sides of the House respect, backs the Bill as a narrow and focused measure to designate state threats?

[Alicia Kearns]

I am not sure that anyone has disputed that Jonathan Hall backs the Bill. I had a lengthy call with him to discuss the gaps in the Bill, which I am sure the hon. Gentleman has not had. I will not share a private conversation, but I encourage the hon. Gentleman to have a similar call with Jonathan Hall to discuss those gaps.

We are here in this place to find the gaps while they can still be mended. That is the whole of our purpose, but we were not permitted to fulfil it today because scrutiny was declined. I have to admit that it feels like our suggestions were not even given due consideration. So I must tell the House what in the Bill now leaves this Chamber unaltered. The sponsor remains more gently treated in law than the proxies that it arms. The world’s largest sponsor of terrorism keeps a protection denied to its terrorist proxies.

The self-directed actor—the lone individual that our terrorism law learned to tackle, at great and terrible cost, two decades ago—will fall through a gap that we were forbidden to close. Britain may be used as a base from which to plot against our friends in Dublin, Berlin or Brussels, or even those in Hong Kong and Tehran.

The flag of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps may still be flown, lawfully, on a British street, glorifying every threat against our Jewish communities that the regime has directed here. [Interruption.] The Minister may say, “Not necessarily,” but she specifically ruled out our amendment on the basis that we should not prevent members of the Iranian diplomatic corps from wearing uniforms here. The Bill does not apply to members of the diplomatic corps; it applies specifically to UK persons. That is therefore still the case and there is no protection against seeing those flags walked past Jewish people’s homes. In Committee, I asked the Government how we look the people the regime has hunted in the eye and tell them that the banner of the hunter is still welcome on our streets. Tonight, I have no answer to offer them.

A law passed in good faith but built wrongly fails as surely as one that is passed in bad faith. When a prosecution comes, it will turn not on the speeches given today, the Government’s good intentions or our warnings, but on what a defendant did. When that day comes and there is a gap that was identified in this House today that could have been closed in an afternoon, let the record show that it could have been mended.

The Bill now passes to the other place, and I have every confidence that their lordships will give it the scrutiny it deserves. We will not oppose the Bill tonight. We will support it, not because it delivers the full protections it should, but because a flawed shield is still a shield of some form and the men and women that the Bill is designed to protect cannot be left with nothing. We support it, having placed on the record of this House what was refused and whose hand refused it. The threat we face is patient, it is ruthless and it will not be deterred by a law that we were too rushed to finish and that the Government were too proud to mend.

I have supported this Bill at every stage, and it is because of that that I lament what the Bill could have been and that the House was given a single afternoon to try to get it right. I hope this Bill is as watertight as the Government assert, but if they wish to be absolute and to remove risk or ambiguities, we ask those in the other place to shut down any risk that the shield this aims to be might let even one traitor succeed in harming our nation. I hope they will do that on the basis of the way we have put forward our amendments: in the national interest.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Caroline Nokes)]

I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson.

Oral Answers to Questions

Alicia Kearns Excerpts

Wednesday 10th June 2026 Commons Chamber

[Mr Speaker]

For the final question, I call Alicia Kearns.

[Alicia Kearns (Rutland and Stamford) (Con)]

Lindsay Foreman and her husband Craig have not eaten in 32 and 23 days respectively. They are being held hostage by the terrorist Government of Iran, but this Government’s weak words have abandoned them, so will the Prime Minister stop raising their case and start fighting for them? He can do that by declaring today in this House that they are being arbitrarily detained—something he has refused to do—and by referring their case to the International Court of Justice, so we get them home.

[The Prime Minister]

I thank the hon. Member for raising this important case and give her and the House the assurance that this is raised regularly by us. The Foreign Secretary has raised it very recently. We raise it every time we can; we do everything we can in relation to this case. We are doing everything that we can, as she would expect and as the Conservatives would have done in office, but she is right to raise the case.

Lord Mandelson: Response to Humble Address

Alicia Kearns Excerpts

Monday 16th March 2026 Commons Chamber

[Darren Jones]

I refer my hon. Friend to the content of my statement, and the very wide-ranging review by the Ethics and Integrity Commission into the process not just for appointments but for vetting, as well as into transparency on lobbying, declarations of interests and business appointment rules. The Government hope that the work of the commission will allow us to have a process that avoids these problems in future.

[Alicia Kearns (Rutland and Stamford) (Con)]

For four months, I asked the Government what severance payments Mandelson received. According to the permanent secretary of the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, I received no reply due to an “error”. Now, we have the failure to release 56 documents. Mandelson should have been dismissed for gross misconduct, yet the British people had to fork out for a payout. Even though Treasury rules say that severance payments cannot be used

“to avoid…unwelcome publicity or reputational damage”,

Foreign Office advice to the Prime Minister said:

“Given the reputational impact for HMG, a modest settlement as proposed is the recommended course of action.”

Does the Minister maintain that no rules were broken with Mandelson’s payoff?

[Darren Jones]

I repeat for the House that, in line with the Humble Address, all documents that the Government have were published. The hon. Lady’s reference to 56 documents is a reference to 56 documents that the Opposition like to think exist, as opposed to those that have been published by the Government. On severance payments, the documents were published in a bundle last week, and they speak for themselves.

Lord Mandelson

Alicia Kearns Excerpts

Wednesday 4th February 2026 Commons Chamber

[Lisa Smart]

The best disinfectant is often daylight. I am strongly in favour of transparency; I welcome it, including about the information that is being requested today.

[Alicia Kearns (Rutland and Stamford) (Con)]

The hon. Lady’s point about the wider establishment is important. Individuals like Sir Richard Branson clearly offered to help Epstein launder his identity and reputation by suggesting public relations advice on how he might recover from his prosecution. We have gentlemen like Bill Gates, whose wife has bravely spoken out, saying that one of the reasons she left him was his links to Epstein. How do we make sure that such men, who continue to have extreme power, face some sort of justice?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lisa Smart]

My hon. Friend makes the point extremely well. I believe that an inquiry in public, which could take evidence in camera, when appropriate for reasons of national security, would be the right way forward. I encourage the Minister to consider where we go from here.

Transparency must be prioritised over the potential embarrassment that any of these documents could cause. Surely Government Members must see that. The intentionally broad wording of the Government amendment would permit the Government to keep any correspondence hidden that they think might embarrass them or our allies—that means Trump and his cronies—or that might paint the Prime Minister somehow as weak. That is surely a relevant factor when considering international relations. It must not be allowed to do so, and we will be voting against the pretty shameless Government amendment.

There are rumours that Peter Mandelson is still receiving a salary, or payments from the UK Government, potentially including his ambassador’s salary severance pay and/or a pension from his time as a Minister. I would be grateful if, when winding up the debate, the Minister could confirm whether any of that is the case.

[Alicia Kearns]

Will the hon. Lady give way one more time?

[Lisa Smart]

I will give way one last time.

[Alicia Kearns]

I thank the hon. Lady for raising that issue. I wrote to the Cabinet Secretary on 5 December, asking when Peter Mandelson’s pay had stopped, how much the severance pay was, and whether taxpayers have had to foot the bill for it. Although that was well over two months ago, I have received no response. How can we have any confidence that this investigation will be carried out properly when the Cabinet Secretary will not even answer basic questions about how Mandelson was paid and how much it cost us all?

[Lisa Smart]

I strongly agree with the hon. Lady. Transparency is what the public deserve, and it is what we in the House demand.

This whole sorry tale is about more than the failures, greed and corruption of one man, or even whole swathes of rich, powerful men who conspired to abuse their wealth and power over many years. It is about judgment, and also about a system that has long been not fit for purpose, and an establishment that wants to keep things just the way they are because that suits their needs. We should use this shocking situation to bring about the changes that our country needs, that trust in politics demands, and that those brave women who spoke out deserve.

--- Later in debate ---

[Emily Thornberry]

I will come to that, because it is important, and it is important to put it in context.

Since then, we have seen not just that, but treachery of the worst kind. The question is: how did we get here? How did a man like that become Britain’s ambassador to the United States? We must begin by taking ourselves back to the time when Donald Trump was elected, and consider how challenging and difficult it was to know who was the best choice for ambassador. There was a choice: we could have continued with the ambassador who was already there, Karen Pierce. She had been invited to Mar-a-Lago many times; she had connections with Donald Trump’s circle; she was an older woman; she was a powerhouse; she is great at making friends; she wears mad shoes. She is one of a generation of senior, older women, too many of whom are no longer in the Foreign Office and have been replaced by boys. At the time when Labour was elected, all the other six members of the G7 were represented by women, as was the United Nations. Now there is only one.

We had a choice between deciding to ask Karen Pierce to continue to be the ambassador and going in another direction. The question was: what was the right way to do it? We chose Mandelson because it was seen as an imaginative response, and I welcomed it as an imaginative response. Personally, I would have continued with Karen Pierce, who is a woman I know, trust and admire, but if a different direction was to be taken, it was a choice that was imaginative and one that made some sense in the context of Donald Trump becoming President.

On 3 November, when we discovered more information about Mandelson’s relationship with Epstein, we asked Chris Wormald, the Cabinet Secretary, and Oliver Robbins, the permanent under-secretary at the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, to come before the Foreign Affairs Committee to give evidence, because we were concerned about how this had happened. Clearly, so much background information about Peter Mandelson was out there but did not seem to have been considered properly before a decision was made, so we asked how it had happened. We were told that the first thing that had happened was due diligence. Due diligence meant fast-stream civil servants having the opportunity to search open sources, so they go to Google and they look, and that threw up reference to Peter Mandelson’s relationship with Jeffrey Epstein.

I said to Sir Chris Wormald—this is question 313 in the transcript—

“It is really important to be clear about this—I am sorry to keep banging on about it—but was the Prime Minister told that Peter Mandelson had stayed at Epstein’s Manhattan townhouse in 2009, when Epstein was in prison for soliciting an under-age girl?”

Perhaps this is because of my background as a lawyer, but there seems to me to be a difference here. To stand by a friend who has been accused of something shows one sort of character—it shows a certain strength—but to continue to be friends with them after they have been convicted, and to stay at their house, shows a completely different type of character. That, to me, was a nub point, so I wanted to know whether the Prime Minister had been given that information, which was publicly available—although, I have to say that it had passed me by; I knew of the friendship, but that is different from knowing that the friendship had continued post-conviction. I think it is really important to establish that difference, and that was something we asked about in the Committee hearing. The answer was, “I am not going to tell you the contents of the due diligence report.”

[Alicia Kearns]

I understand that the right hon. Lady is saying that the information that Peter Mandelson had maintained a relationship with a then convicted paedophile passed her by. However, she does have an entire committee of Clerks who will have advised her. She also says that she said that this was an imaginative appointment. I am afraid she actually said that it was an “inspired appointment”. I know, because I spoke out against the appointment. Will she please tell me whether her Clerks at any point shared with her concerns about the background of Epstein and his relationship with Mandelson, and whether she will therefore now say that she regrets calling it an “inspired appointment”?

--- Later in debate ---

[Alicia Kearns]

I thank my right hon. Friend for making that point. From my perspective—I wonder if he agrees with me—if the amendment had said that anything that was secret or top secret needed to be withheld, that would be a very different argument. However, the use of the very vague terminology of “national security”—which has never been used in a previous Humble Address by the Opposition, as I made clear in a point of order after Prime Minister’s questions—is a nonsense, and the idea of “international relations” is completely vague.

[Sir Julian Smith]

I agree with my hon. Friend on that point. I am aware that one of our Five Eyes allies gave a warning about Peter Mandelson. I do not know whether that is true, but I know that as a humble Back Bencher. The House now needs to know, because this is a House matter. If we do not deal with it satisfactorily, we will all be condemned by what has gone on. I urge Ministers to ensure that, in the next hour or so, the discussions focus on not just ISC involvement, but ISC oversight of all sensitive diplomatic or security-related documents.

My second point is about the nature of the Humble Address itself. It is very tempting for the Government of the day to take a narrow view of what the Opposition have asked them, but as we heard from Opposition Front Benchers, there is evidence, or at least there are allegations, about Peter Mandelson’s time in Washington. That relates to who attended embassy parties and how UK Government contracts came about last year. In my view, we should now address all these issues and get them out in the open, so that we can fully understand not just what happened and the judgment of the Government, but what was behind the threats and what our allies were worrying about, which included China, Russia and many more things than just the corrupt act itself.

This Humble Address should be regarded by the House, and particularly by the Government, as a vehicle. It is a vehicle for protecting our democracy, and for beginning to unpick exactly what happened, on behalf of Jeffrey Epstein’s victims.

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[Matt Bishop]

Yes, I completely agree. I will get on to the ISC in a second.

What would I say to those victims? That transparency matters, except when it is inconvenient? That accountability applies, except when it is uncomfortable? As a party, we promised to halve violence against women and girls. We promised to put victims at the heart of everything we do. Yet today we are being asked to accept an internal review into how the close friend of a known paedophile was vetted—an internal review carried out by the very structures that failed to prevent this in the first place.

[Alicia Kearns]

I wish to credit the hon. Gentleman for the speech he is giving today. Very early in my career, I voted for something and I could not sleep that night. Never since have I voted for something that has made me feel ashamed of myself, and I will never do it again. It takes bravery to do that so early in the hon. Gentleman’s time in Parliament. It is really important. I hope his colleagues on the Labour Benches, in particular the new intake, stand behind him, support him for the decision he has made and do not criticise him, because he is doing what he believes to be right. All credit to him, because we know how difficult that is, from having governed for so long. I thank the hon. Gentleman for what he is saying and what he is doing today.

[Matt Bishop]

I thank the hon. Member for her words.

How can we mark our own homework on matters of such gravity? I want to be clear. I understand the position the Government find themselves in. I understand the concerns that have been raised about embarrassment, reputational damage, and national and international security. They are serious considerations and should not be dismissed lightly, but if vetting decisions were influenced by compromising relationships, we have a far bigger problem—one that demands scrutiny, not silence; one that requires us to re-evaluate how this country operates on the international stage, and whether transparency and accountability are truly guiding principles or merely slogans.

An independent review by the ISC, coupled with a commitment to release documents, subject to independent legal advice, is not an unreasonable request. The public are not naive, and if such a process is deemed unfavourable by the Government, they will draw their own conclusions. I am not making any accusations today. I am asking reasonable questions on behalf of my constituents and victims who are watching this debate closely. Will No. 10 be candid? Will it show humility? Will it choose transparency over defensiveness?

Let me be equally clear about something else: I do not believe the Opposition tabled this motion with victims at heart. We can all see the political point scoring at play, but the motivations of the Opposition do not absolve us of our responsibility. Given the strength of feeling among victim and survivor groups—and, frankly, given my own conscience—I cannot in good faith support a position that risks further eroding trust in our commitment to justice. Power and trust go hand in hand. The responsibility that comes with holding public office must never be understated. We are entrusted—all of us—with shaping national policy, representing our communities and safeguarding the most vulnerable. That trust must be earned every single day.

So today, not because it is politically convenient to me but because it is morally necessary, I am voting with the victims, I am voting with the survivors and I am voting for the principle that no one, however powerful, should ever be beyond scrutiny.

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[Simon Hoare]

My right hon. Friend is right, but if this motion is passed unamended this afternoon, all those papers will be available either to this place or to the ISC, and then we will know.

We are all aware of these sorts of things. Somebody will set a hare running at some point and we will say that we think this, that and the other. I have heard, for example, that Peter Mandelson was at Labour party headquarters each and every day in the run-up to the general election and that he was intimately involved with the selection of candidates—I can see a couple of Labour Members nodding as if to say, “Yes, I knew exactly what was going to happen”—and that in essence, the ambassadorial position was a thank you present: “Thank you for getting us back into No. 10—here’s your final gift from the public purse. Go and be our ambassador to Washington.”

In the general scheme of things, that is perfectly fine, but I think we deserve to see the paperwork that shows the paper trail. It is not unusual for political appointments to be made in that way, but that is in the abstract. In this specific case, it is unconscionable, and it is surprising given the fact that the Prime Minister flaunts, with some degree of credibility, his previous role as a senior lawyer and his ability to tell right from wrong. And by God, did we not hear that when he was Leader of the Opposition? Whenever a Conservative committed even a minor misdemeanour—if they put something plastic in the paper recycling box—by God it was a hanging offence: “They should all be taken outside, hanged, drawn and quartered” and so on.

Being in government is obviously different, but the reason the appointment of Mandelson befuddles everybody is that the argument that the Prime Minister has deployed is that the full extent of the relationship and friendship with Epstein was not known. The fact that there was any relationship with Epstein post conviction should have precluded Mandelson’s appointment. Why? Because an ambassador is not a representative of the Government. The position is His Majesty’s ambassador to the United States of America, so it brings in the impartiality of the Crown as well. There are therefore serious questions to ask about the operation of No. 10 and about how the Prime Minister exercises his judgment.

[Alicia Kearns]

There does seem to be amnesia about this. When Mandelson was made ambassador, it was well known that he continued the relationship with the convicted paedophile post his conviction, and there were simpering emails already in the public domain saying things like, “Oh darling one, all should be forgiven.” The suggestion that it only recently became unacceptable for him to be ambassador is wrong. If Labour Members want to suggest that it was not well known, let me tell them that colleagues like me raised it in this Chamber on the day that he was appointed, and I was greeted with jeers and boos from the Labour Benches. No one said, “Absolutely, maybe there are concerns”. Should that amnesia perhaps be reconsidered?

[Mr Speaker]

Order. It is not me who will say when it is 4 o’clock, but I would gently say that this is Opposition day and the Opposition may want to extend the time available for this debate. I am very bothered that not many people will get in given the rate that we are going at. I leave it to Members to take care of time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stephen Flynn]

Four hours is plenty for me, Mr Speaker.

This is a dark and disgusting day for this Chamber and for each and every person living on these isles, because their Prime Minister admitted that he knew about the relationship. Of course he knew; in The Guardian in 2023, Rowena Mason wrote about the court documents that had been released in the United States of America, which referenced the fact that Jeffrey Epstein had maintained a relationship with two individuals prominent in British public life. Members will know them. They were Andrew Mountbatten-Windsor and Peter Mandelson. The Prime Minister knew, just as he knew when Jim Pickard of the Financial Times asked him in January 2024 about the relationship. He has seen the photos that each of us in this Chamber has seen of Peter Mandelson in luxury accommodation in New York alongside Jeffrey Epstein.

[Alicia Kearns]

Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

[Stephen Flynn]

I will not, I am afraid.

The Prime Minister knew that the two had a relationship, yet he ignored it. He ignored each and every victim of Jeffrey Epstein when he chose to appoint Mandelson as the ambassador to the United States of America.

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[Sir John Whittingdale]

I completely share the view of my right hon. Friend. Like her, I went through a process in which I was required to get rid of shareholding interests, which were rather smaller than those held by Lord Mandelson. This is just one of a huge range of questions to which we need to know the answers.

[Alicia Kearns]

Another appointment that we have had is that of the National Security Adviser, Jonathan Powell, who some might argue is the de facto Foreign Secretary. Given that he is running around having secret meetings with Wang Yi and other Chinese senior officials, how can we have confidence that he went through the appropriate vetting, when we cannot have confidence that it was done for our ambassador to America?

[Sir John Whittingdale]

Once we get the revelations from the documents as to precisely what occurred in the case of Lord Mandelson, that is bound to raise questions about what procedures were followed in the case of other appointees, particularly Jonathan Powell, who in many ways is the Foreign Secretary of this country.

We were told that the second stage of the process was the “due diligence” carried out by the Cabinet Office. The due diligence consisted of “identification of information” and judgment about it. However, all the information that was obtained in the due diligence was actually in the public domain already. No additional investigation took place; it was simply, essentially, an internet trawl. That due diligence report was presented to the Cabinet Secretary for onward transmission to the Prime Minister. However, due diligence through an internet trawl, even at that time, would already have shown up the fact that Peter Mandelson had stayed in the townhouse belonging to Jeffrey Epstein after his conviction, so the continuing association after his conviction had already been reported in the press and was therefore bound to form part of the due diligence process.

The question that has been raised several times in this debate already is this: when the appointment was made, did the Prime Minister know? We understand that, potentially, he did, which I assume was contained in the due diligence report. That was put directly to the Cabinet Secretary:

“did you tell the Prime Minister about Mandelson staying in the Manhattan townhouse when Epstein was in jail?”

All that the Cabinet Secretary said to us was:

“I will consider whether there is further information that can be shared and write to the Committee.”

We have never had a full answer to that question.

The third part of the process was the developed vetting, which we are told is a usual process for very senior appointments. We are told that it consists of a wide range of different investigations into staff files, company records checks, spent and unspent criminal records, credit history, a check of security service records, and an interview—not just of the candidate, but of the referees supplied—by a trained investigating officer. We will need to see the outcome of that report, even if it can only be provided, as the Government have now conceded, to the Intelligence and Security Committee.

With those three processes, the Prime Minister still decided that there was no obstacle to the appointment of Peter Mandelson as ambassador to the United States. We then come to the question put to him at Prime Minister’s questions following the Bloomberg report of the large number of emails. The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office learnt of those emails the night before Prime Minister’s questions. I pressed the permanent under-secretary on whether No. 10 had been told that the emails contained material evidence that could potentially change the whole perception of Lord Mandelson’s relationship. He said that he had a “duty of care” to Lord Mandelson and therefore needed to make checks. He essentially told us that No. 10 had not been informed. I find that very hard to believe. As somebody who used to prepare a Prime Minister for answering questions, I find the idea that the Prime Minister was not told something of that order absolutely extraordinary.

There is another question that needs to be asked. The British Government say that they discovered all the emails that proved the relationship was of very long standing and much closer than had ever been admitted by Lord Mandelson, because Bloomberg obtained copies in a leak. They were held by the US Government in the Department of Justice for months. The US Government knew all about them, but we are told it was only when Bloomberg obtained them that the British Government found out.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alicia Kearns (Rutland and Stamford) (Con)]

“Liberation Day!”—that was how Mandelson described the day of Epstein’s release from prison for procuring children to be trafficked and raped. His next message was, “How is freedom feeling?” Epstein replied,

“she feels fresh, firm, and creamy”.

Mandelson’s next reply: “Naughty boy”.

We had not seen those emails, I admit, when the ambassador was appointed, but let us look at what we did know when he was appointed ambassador. We knew at that point that he had consoled this paedophile on his being found guilty and convicted of just one of the many crimes he committed. We also knew that while he was Deputy Prime Minister of this country and Business and Trade Secretary, and while he was carrying the flag of our great nation, he stayed in a convicted paedophile’s flat while on an official visit to New York. How dare he do that while representing this country! Did no one in the Cabinet Office or the Department for Business and Trade—no civil servant or political appointee —know that he had said, “No, I don’t need a hotel, thank you ever so much. I’m going to stay at my friend’s Epstein’s house. Oh, by the way, he happens to be in prison, but I’m going to stay at his house anyway”? There are serious questions about why he was not pursued for misconduct in public office at that point. No one can say that the Labour Government did not know, because I have been a civil servant; I knew where my Ministers were staying when they were abroad. I am not sure that they always wanted me to know, but I knew, and none of them would have ever done that. That is at the heart of the issue with the judgment of the Prime Minister.

On Monday, a Government Minister said that nobody objected when Mandelson was appointed. Look at Hansard: I remember objecting very clearly and repeatedly, because it was clear at that point that Mandelson had repeatedly said that Epstein did not deserve to be in prison, that this was an awful time for him, and how he cared about and was thinking about his good friend.

Why was there no investigation, and why was the vetting not done right? There is no question but that the vetting cannot have been conducted properly. I have been through vetting myself—not as a Minister, I accept, but as a civil servant. I have sat in a room with a rather elderly gentleman for two hours, being asked about my every sexual proclivity, when I lost my virginity, and whether I had taken drugs. I was asked about every single aspect of my life because both apolitical civil servants and politicians in this place should hold themselves accountable and be right for appointment to their role.

It is clear from the debate, and from the evidence put forward by my right hon. Friend the Member for Maldon (Sir John Whittingdale), that the Prime Minister wanted this appointment made, and because the Prime Minister wanted Mandelson, Mandelson was going to be appointed. We will see when the docs are released how they were able to get around the official vetting, but that brings me to my concerns about another political appointment that was rushed through because the Prime Minister demanded it: that of Jonathan Powell, the National Security Adviser. There are significant concerns about his business interests. There are significant concerns in the House about the fact that there has been no scrutiny of him because he will not come before the House and give evidence. There is also significant concern about his relationships in China and around the world, yet he is permitted—again, while flying the flag of this nation—to conduct secret visits to China, where he met Wang Yi and other senior representatives. The British Government refused to put out any press notice explaining why the visit happened, or even that it happened at all.

[Paul Holmes]

As usual, my hon. Friend is making a good speech. I was a special adviser at the Cabinet Office—a great Department with great civil servants. She mentions the cases of Jonathan Powell, and of Lord Mandelson as Deputy Prime Minister. Does she agree that this backhanded way of conducting Government business, without officials present, puts pressure on our great civil servants, and places them in difficult situations? It is not how Government should be run.

[Alicia Kearns]

I entirely agree with my very good and hon. Friend. I was taken aback by the comments of the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, the right hon. Member for Islington South and Finsbury (Emily Thornberry), who sought to give us a lecture on how Government vetting is undertaken. She kept referring to fast-stream civil servants as those responsible for vetting. Fast stream is a mode of recruitment, not a type of civil servant. It felt as if she was trying to suggest that junior civil servants should take the can for the vetting process that was pursued. I very much hope that is not the case, because it is deeply inappropriate.

The commonality between the appointments of Lord Mandelson and Jonathan Powell is Morgan McSweeney, so I must ask whether Morgan McSweeney is the one who should be held accountable. At this point, it looks as if no one will be held accountable.

[Sir Alec Shelbrooke]

This debate is about accountability; everything falls into the lap of the Prime Minister. Does my hon. Friend not find it frankly incredible that the Prime Minister has sent—I say this with the greatest of respect—a junior Minister to the House, when he alone has serious questions to answer? Would it not show real leadership if the Prime Minister came to the Dispatch Box to wind up the debate?

[Alicia Kearns]

My right hon. Friend is absolutely right. He may also recall that, following Prime Minister’s questions, I had no choice but to make a point of order because the Prime Minister had told this House that every Humble Address that the Labour party had proposed in opposition had a national security protection clause, yet neither of Labour’s last two Humble Addresses in opposition featured the words “national” or “security”, let alone the two put together. In contrast, the Prime Minister put his hand up to me and dismissed me, shaking his arm at me as he left the Chamber, as if the point I was making was not necessary. [Interruption.] And yes, on Monday, Members will also recall that he shouted that I was pathetic for asking why he met with the master of two Chinese spies during his recent trip to China.

[Markus Campbell-Savours (Penrith and Solway) (Ind)]

I will take the hon. Member’s word for it that those Humble Addresses did not contain those words, but if you take, for example, the Humble Address on Lebedev’s appointment to the House of Lords in 2022, it did not have to contain those words for the Conservative Government to use national security grounds not to provide swathes of documents—they did so without those words even being included. Their response almost mirrored the Freedom of Information Act 2000, in respect of the types of exemptions that should apply. Are you really going to deny that that was the approach—

[Markus Campbell-Savours]

Apologies, Madam Deputy Speaker; I am obviously out of practice on interventions. Is the hon. Lady aware of that convention?

[Alicia Kearns]

I am very grateful to the hon. Gentleman, because I agree that he should hold his Government to exactly those standards. I am very sorry that he missed my point of order—I recognise that it was not a show-stopper—but that is exactly the point I made: national security concerns are implicit in Humble Addresses. If the Government had put such wording in their amendment as “secret or top secret documents cannot be revealed”, I would have said, “Yes, that is absolutely fair.” But that is the point: there is no requirement to stipulate national security concerns, let alone provide some vague wording about international relationships, because that is already provided for. I thank him for confirming exactly my position.

We have touched on China. I hope that when these documents are released, we will see the full extent of Epstein’s relationship not just with the Putin state, but with the Chinese Communist party. I have deep concerns about the way in which Mandelson had a say about the Government’s China policy. There is no question but that he has been influencing it.

Some questions are still unanswered. As I have said almost every day this week, I wrote to the Cabinet Secretary on 5 December to ask for the details of Mandelson’s severance package. These were not complicated questions: what was the detail of the contract, and will it be published; has any non-disclosure agreement to do with it been signed at any point; when did Mandelson receive his final payment, or is he still being paid by the taxpayer; and what were the details of his severance package? Almost two months on, I have received no response from the Cabinet Secretary—in whom, as we have discussed today almost ad nauseum, we do not have confidence to carry out this inquiry. That is not a personal attack; it is recognition of the fact that he works for the Prime Minister and does not reply to straightforward questions from Members of the House.

[Harriet Cross]

Does my hon. Friend agree that, if she struggles today to get answers to those very basic and straightforward questions, we can draw our own conclusions as to the answers?

[Alicia Kearns]

Unfortunately, as Members must slowly learn, where there is a vacuum of silence in this place, our constituents, the great people of this country, see conspiracy, and sadly too often they are right. The Paymaster General has committed to get me answers to my letter, and although he is currently having a conversation with someone else, I gently encourage him that I would like answers to those questions on severance pay today from the Dispatch Box, because I raised the issue on Monday and have received no response. It is in the motion, so please can we have those answers?

I also want briefly to reflect on what has happened over the past week. On Sunday, the Labour party informed the media that it could not strip Mandelson of his membership of the Labour party—perhaps the right hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn) would like to intervene on that, as I suspect he has something to say about the Labour party stripping people of their membership. On Monday, the Government told the House that they cannot legislate as that would not be appropriate or possible, and it was too difficult, despite the entire House offering to sit until 4 am to do so. We then had silence from the Government when Members of the House asked them to refer the matter to the police. It was clear from early doors that this was going to end with the police, and hopefully in our courts, as I have argued it should have done back in 2010.

[Paul Holmes]

My hon. Friend will recall that during various parliamentary debates in the Chamber on Peter Mandelson, and despite the Prime Minister knowing that he had that relationship, at one stage she and I asked the Minister the simple question of whether the Government would strip Lord Mandelson of the Labour Whip. That question was refused an answer, and they did not remove the Whip. Does that not show a constant lack of action from a Prime Minister who does not have a grip?

[Alicia Kearns]

One lesson of being in government—there are many—that I hope we have learned is that the writing is normally on the wall. It was very clear from early days that this man was going to let down our country, but those of us who criticised him were told, “This is imaginative; this is inspired. They are putting in place a man who can shake things up and make friends with Donald Trump.” Throughout his persistent behaviour, as more and more became clear, the Prime Minister could have taken decisive action. As I said, it has been clear for a long time that this was not going to end up just with Mandelson disgraced, or with us rightly saying that he should be removed from the other place; it is going to end up with him facing court, I hope. Let me be clear: malfeasance in public office is what he should be tried for, and that carries a life sentence. That is how severe are the crimes that he has been conducting, and I am ashamed that Gordon Brown raised the flag of warning and seems to have had nothing in response to his concerns.

[Stuart Anderson]

My hon. Friend is making a passionate speech. Since today’s debate started, more information is coming out—we might be at the tip of it and there is much to come out. The Prime Minister has made a significant error of judgment, yet his Back Benchers are still defending him. Does my hon. Friend believe there is a chance that this could cause detriment to the whole Government?

[Alicia Kearns]

It is very difficult, particularly when a party has such a high number of new MPs—we have been there and experienced it—to feel the mood music, hear the jungle drums, and understand whether something is a precipice or a turning point. For many of us who have been reflecting over the past few days, this has the hallmark of things that we feel we have seen before. We have been here; we have seen this sideshow. It is very difficult, because our integrity is the only thing we take with us when we leave this place. Too many colleagues from across the House have had to learn that over the past few years, because this is a cruel game, and we can find ourselves being thrown out when we do not expect it.

May I say how much I welcome the fact that the manuscript amendment has been put forward? It is a sign that the Government are listening, and I give them credit for doing so. However, this could all have been prevented if the Prime Minister had come before the House on Monday and given a firmer commitment to take action.

[Bradley Thomas]

Does my hon. Friend agree, particularly following her point about the writing being on the wall, that the Minister, when he wraps up on behalf of the Government, needs to quash any rumours that the Prime Minister is hunkered down in Downing Street and planning a reshuffle to stabilise a sinking ship?

[Alicia Kearns]

I can give but one comment to those new MPs who may think that a reshuffle is a good thing: it causes only more upset and heartache within the party, and it will not be a solution.

[Jeremy Corbyn]

Does the hon. Member agree that the House should be slightly cautious here? We should not just roll over and accept the Government’s manuscript amendment without clear assurances about how far the inquiries will go where they relate to commercial interests, rather than just security interests, as well as a very clear process of reporting and a timetable, so that this is not just a carpet-brushing exercise to get rid of an embarrassing day for the Government.

[Alicia Kearns]

It is quite clearly the will of the House that that would be beyond unacceptable—it would be a contempt of Parliament, if it happened. I can say—I would like to think that this goes for the entire House—that I have complete confidence in the integrity of gentlemen such as my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright), who sits on the ISC. No one would impugn his integrity or question whether he would ensure that he got to the bottom of whatever is necessary. There is no question but that this issue goes so far beyond the vile and inhumane treatment of women; it appears, I am afraid, that Peter Mandelson betrayed not just his colleagues but his own country for the financial interests of others.

[Graham Stuart]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

[Alicia Kearns]

I will take one last intervention.

[Graham Stuart]

Further to that last intervention, we need an assurance that we will have urgency. We have seen victims of child abuse in this country let down by a Government who resisted an inquiry but then agreed to it in a big moment. Today could be a moment like that, when the Government appear to give way, but months then pass with nobody appointed to the inquiry. We need to hear from the Minister that the Government will move with speed to ensure that this information comes out.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alicia Kearns]

My right hon. Friend hits on a point that no one has raised in today’s debate; without it, we would have had a real missed opportunity. As yet, there has been no commitment from the Government as to how quickly files will be turned over to the ISC or how quickly all the documents mandated in this Humble Address will be released. That is vital.

I hope that, as part of any release, the Government will contact the Ministry of Justice and require the release of any additional documents that would be in our national interests, or anything that references Mandelson or any British national in any way. I ask the Minister to confirm that. Any existing documents could be on the ISC’s desk by Friday, so let us ensure that we move quickly.

Let me conclude by touching once again on the incredibly brave women without whom none of this would ever have come out, and Virginia, who obviously is not here today to hear us debate and discuss this important issue. We have to recommit in this place that we will hear women, see women and stand by women who report abuse, because all of us have seen how easily women’s concerns are dismissed, how we are spoken over and how we are ignored, particularly when it comes to men of power.

We have touched on some of the men named in these documents who are commercially very powerful, and there are concerns about who else may come out. No one who has been named in those documents who knew what happened to those women should be allowed to continue to live their lives and make profits as if this did not happen. That must be the main commitment.

I want transparency and I want those documents to come out. But, whether it is a woman in our constituency or someone from another part of the country who comes to us in concern, I want us all to say that we will stand by them. This is a stain on Britain. We must ensure that this never happens again, and that we listen to our women and defend them.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Caroline Nokes)]

I call the shadow Minister.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Ward]

I entirely agree. I could not have put it anywhere near as well as that—and, as I said earlier, my hon. Friend made an incredibly powerful speech earlier. She quoted Virginia Giuffre at length, which was an extraordinarily powerful way in which to make the point, and she made it better than anyone, because it is the victims whom we should have in mind.

[Alicia Kearns]

rose—

[Chris Ward]

I will give way once more, and then I will come to the motion.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alicia Kearns]

One of my concerns has been that when Mandelson was our ambassador in Washington DC, he was responsible for a very large embassy. There may have been members of the Foreign Office staff there who had survived rape or sexual assault, or there may well have been sexual assaults during his tenure as ambassador. Can the Minister confirm that Foreign Office Ministers have reviewed all human resources decisions that Mandelson made while he was there as ambassador, to make sure that any women who had concerns about treatment, the way that they were spoken to or the things that they reported, received the support that they deserved?

[Chris Ward]

Obviously anyone who made any allegation or report such as that would be treated seriously. I will take that up with Foreign Office Ministers and come back to the hon. Lady, because she raises an incredibly serious point.

US Department of Justice Release of Files

Alicia Kearns Excerpts

Monday 2nd February 2026 Commons Chamber

[Darren Jones]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right that releasing Government information in and of itself, let alone for personal or commercial gain, is wrong and a breach of rules that we all must comply with. If that is what happened, there should be appropriate investigations and consequences for that behaviour.

[Alicia Kearns (Rutland and Stamford) (Con)]

I am afraid that it is untenable to suggest that what was already known of Mandelson’s simpering after the conviction of Epstein was not enough to make it inappropriate for him to be ambassador, and I did object to that from day one, on that exact basis, as Hansard shows. I am afraid that a number of questions to the Cabinet Secretary—to whom I wrote on 5 December, alongside my hon. Friend the Member for East Grinstead and Uckfield (Mims Davies)—still have not been answered, so I would be grateful for the answers today. Did Mandelson receive a taxpayer-funded severance payment after stepping down as ambassador? If so, how much was it? Will details of his contract be published, in the name of transparency? Was any non-disclosure agreement signed, and when did Lord Mandelson’s salary formally cease? These are not unreasonable questions, but almost two months on, I have had no response from the Cabinet Secretary. That gives me enormous concern.

[Darren Jones]

On the first part of the hon. Lady’s question, as the Prime Minister made very clear, when the extent and depth of the relationship between Peter Mandelson and Jeffrey Epstein post his conviction became clear, the Prime Minister moved very quickly indeed to sack Peter Mandelson as ambassador to the United States. The Prime Minister was not aware of that at the point of Peter Mandelson’s appointment, and Peter Mandelson made certain commitments to the Prime Minister that obviously turned out to be untrue. On the hon. Lady’s letter to the Cabinet Secretary, I will feed what she has said back to the Cabinet Secretary and ensure that she gets appropriate answers to her questions.

China and Japan

Alicia Kearns Excerpts

Monday 2nd February 2026 Commons Chamber

[The Prime Minister]

I pay tribute to the contribution that Lord Browne has made. I assure my hon. Friend that our discussions with China did include how we derisk the risk in relation to nuclear weapons.

[Alicia Kearns (Rutland and Stamford) (Con)]

When John Major went to Beijing, he spoke clearly and said, “We will not forget Tiananmen Square.” In contrast, the Prime Minister refused to say Jimmy Lai’s name until he was wheels up. I have never said that we should not engage with Beijing; I have said that we should not give it a propaganda visit. It is extraordinary to abrogate the responsibility of the Chinese Communist party, whose actions we had to respond to, therefore pausing trade talks, as if it has done nothing wrong. Finally, the Prime Minister met with Cai Qi, the man responsible for running two spies who were undermining this Parliament, but he excluded that from his statement. Why doesn’t he tell us why he thought it was acceptable to meet this man and what he got out of it in the British interest?

[The Prime Minister]

This is so pathetic. At the highest level and one to one, I raised each of the issues of difference between our two countries—each and every one of them—in the way that the House would expect, and that is what the Opposition are criticising. They seem genuinely to believe that these issues can be progressed or influenced by doing nothing about them. You have to be in the room to have a discussion, and that is what we did.

Oral Answers to Questions

Alicia Kearns Excerpts

Wednesday 21st January 2026 Commons Chamber

[The Prime Minister]

This is an issue of real concern to parents. As the father of two teenage children, I know just how much of a concern it is. That is why we will have a consultation to look at expert and international evidence to get this right, and we will respond by the summer. That includes looking at the question of the age at which children can access social media and at restrictions on addictive features. I am also concerned, as is the Education Secretary, about the screen time of those under the age of five. We will look at all those issues and make sure that Ofsted checks the enforcement of bans during school.

[Alicia Kearns (Rutland and Stamford) (Con)]

The Bertie Arms is a fantastic family pub, but because of the Chancellor’s tax raid on local business, it faces a 2,000% increase in its business rates by 2029. That means that the Treasury will lose £200,000 in tax take and Uffington will lose the heart of its community. The Prime Minister promised not to put up taxes on working people, so how does he justify a 2,000% tax attack on working family businesses like this pub?

[The Prime Minister]

We are working with the sector to put in the necessary support. I remind the hon. Lady that 7,000 pubs closed on the Conservatives’ watch, and she did not say a word about it.