Crime and Policing Bill (Tenth sitting)

Alex Davies-Jones Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 24th April 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Joe Robertson (Isle of Wight East) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Roger. I rise to speak to Opposition amendments 44 and 45 and to address directly what I consider to be a major loophole in this proposed law, which has really good intent behind it. There are two elements to the spiking loophole. I can envisage a defendant getting away with administering a harmful substance by saying that he or she did not intend to injure, aggrieve or annoy. Furthermore, they may claim that it was intended merely as a prank, but the act was so obviously reckless and stupid that they should nevertheless be captured by the provision.

As the hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam just mentioned, we heard really good evidence on this issue. I pose the rhetorical question: what is the point of evidence sessions if we do not take on powerful and direct testimony from somebody whose family were affected in the most tragic way? “Pranking” was the word used in that session, and we heard that it is on the rise. Spiking can be done with the worst intent—to cause serious harm—but clearly any law should cover someone who intends a prank with a harmful substance.

The idea behind broadening the offence beyond merely intent—we are no longer necessarily talking about pranking, but about the intent to injure, aggrieve or annoy—to recklessness has plenty of foundation and precedent in law. In fact, we have just debated that point with clause 57, relating to exposure. Under the new law relating to exposure, someone commits an offence if they expose their genitals for the purpose of obtaining sexual gratification. There are two reasons why clause 57 will capture someone under criminal law: if the person intends to be seen, or if they are reckless as to whether anyone sees them. When it comes to spiking, the idea should be the same: that a person who administers a harmful substance does so either with intent to injure, aggrieve, annoy or prank, or is reckless as to that being the effect of administering the substance.

Let us be clear: under clause 73, administering a harmful substance on its own is not a criminal offence. It requires something in the mind of a person—currently, only intent. I urge the Government to include reckless behaviour in respect of which, to a reasonable person, it should be obvious that injury, grievance or annoyance would result, even if that was not the intention.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Alex Davies-Jones)]

I thank all hon. Members for their contributions to the debate, which has been a good one, getting to the heart of the important issue of spiking, which needs to be tackled. I am particularly grateful to the hon. Member for Stockton West for tabling amendments 44 and 45, which enable me to give a fuller answer to the question he raised at the end of the Committee’s evidence session and to explain the rationale for clause 73.

Clause 73 fulfils our manifesto commitment to crack down on spiking and bring perpetrators to justice. I reassure the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam and my hon. Friends that the new offence is just one part of a package of measures designed to tackle this crime. Alongside the Safeguarding Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Yardley, I co-chair the cross-Government violence against women and girls strategy, which we will publish shortly. We will of course work with all the many agencies in this field—across the night-time economy, transport, the Department of Health and Social Care, the police and education sectors—to try to prevent this abhorrent crime and to support the victims who have sadly suffered.

The new offence is just one step in the Government’s commitment to halving violence against women and girls in a decade, and to making our streets safer. I should also say that although the majority of spiking victims are women, we should not forget—as Colin Mackie reminded us in evidence to the Committee—that men are victims too. Colin’s son, Greg, died after his drink was spiked with ecstasy. I pay tribute to Colin and Mandy Mackie from Spike Aware, and to the formidable Dawn Dines from Stamp Out Spiking for all her incredible campaigning over the years to get us to the point where we are clarifying this offence. I thank the many other organisations—my hon. Friend the Member for Gravesham told us about the brilliant ones in Gravesend—for their work in this area to protect victims and stop these crimes happening.

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[Joe Robertson]

I have a modicum of sympathy for how the Minister is addressing the words “prank” and “revenge”, although I do not necessarily agree with her. Will she address the issue of intent and recklessness, because that has a clear precedent in law, and indeed in the Bill itself?

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I will happily do so. On being reckless, it would be for the court to decide and determine the case on the facts in terms of its interpretation of aggrieve, annoy and intent. It is also important to deal with amendment 45, which could cause a problem, and address the hon. Gentleman’s comments head on. The amendment would introduce the requirement that the person must act “knowingly or recklessly” before the offence of administering harmful substances is committed. That risks introducing confusion, rather than bringing clarity. For the offence to be made out, a person has to act with the specific intent to injure, aggrieve or annoy the other person. To additionally require a defendant to knowingly or recklessly act is logically inconsistent with the requirement that they act with a specific intention to injure, aggrieve or annoy the victim.

Having explained why it is not helpful to amend the clause in the way suggested, I will return to the details of the clause, which will help to provide clarity. Proposed new section 24(2) defines “harmful substance” as

“any poison or other destructive or noxious thing”.

By incorporating the language of the existing sections 23 and 24 offences, we aim to capture the broad range of substances that can, as established by existing case law, be illegal to administer.

Proposed new section 24 also modernises the law in other ways. It will become an offence triable either way, rather than an indictable only offence: this allows for less serious cases to be dealt with quickly in the magistrates court, allowing for justice to be served quicker. The penalty for the new offence will be 10 years, reflecting the seriousness with which the Government take this behaviour. That penalty is the same as for the existing section 23 offence, and an increase in the maximum penalty for the more commonly prosecuted section 24 offence. The new offence will extend to England, Wales and Northern Ireland.

Finally, Government amendments 16 and 19 add the new offence, as with the other offences in the Bill, to the list of serious offences that exclude a person from claiming as a defence that they committed the offence as the result of being subject to modern slavery.

In conclusion, the Government believe that the new offence to capture spiking will simplify the current legal landscape and be more readily understood by both the public and the police. It is part of our wider programme to increase public awareness of the illegality of spiking, encourage reporting and help the police to better respond to this abhorrent crime. I commend clause 73 to the Committee.

[Matt Vickers]

I will press the amendment to a Division.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

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[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to consider the following:

Government amendment 17.

Clause 75 stand part.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

Although clauses 74 and 75 are separate clauses, I will speak to both at the same time for the benefit of the Committee, given that they are very much linked provisions. Encouraging or assisting self-harm remains a matter of great concern. I commend the continued work of organisations such as the Samaritans and the Molly Rose Foundation in campaigning for suicide and self-harm prevention. The Law Commission’s 2021 report on modernising communications recommended a criminal offence to target the issue. Section 184 of the Online Safety Act 2023 gave partial effect to that recommendation by introducing an offence of encouraging or assisting serious self-harm by means of communications only. The Government are now fully implementing the Law Commission’s recommendation by creating a broader offence that covers the encouragement or assistance of serious self-harm both by means of communication and in any other way. That could include direct assistance, such as giving someone a blade with which to seriously self-harm.

Clauses 74 and 75 achieve that aim by repealing the Online Safety Act offence, in so far as it extends to England, Wales and Northern Ireland, and replaces it with the broader offence. The Committee can be assured that these clauses include two key elements that the Law Commission and this Government are confident constrain the offence to only the most culpable offending—namely, that the person’s act must be intended to encourage or assist the serious self-harm of another person, and that self-harm is serious if it amounts to grievous bodily harm. That ensures that the sharing of helpful and supportive material is not criminalised. To be clear, where there is no intent to encourage or assist serious self-harm, the offence is not committed.

As with the Online Safety Act offence, clause 74 provides that a person commits an offence if they do an act capable of encouraging or assisting the serious self-harm of another person and have the intention to do so. It specifies that the person committing the offence does not need to know or be able to identify who they have encouraged or assisted in their act, and an offence is committed regardless of whether serious self-harm of another person actually occurs.

The clause further provides that an act includes any conduct except conduct consisting only of omissions. The definition of “act” is intended to cover a series of acts, as well as a combination of acts and omissions, but not a stand-alone omission or a series of omissions. It also provides that encouraging the serious self-harm of a person includes putting pressure on a person to self-harm, whether by threatening them or otherwise. Serious self-harm is when the self-harm amounts to grievous bodily harm within the meaning of the Offences against the Person Act 1861. For example, a person may cause themselves serious self-harm by alternatively purging and starving themselves of food over a period of time. The offence is triable either way and carries a maximum sentence of five years’ imprisonment.

Clause 75 then provides that a person who arranges for someone else to do an act capable of encouraging or assisting the serious self-harm of another person is committing the offence. The clause also ensures that where an act is in fact not capable of encouraging or assisting serious self-harm, it will still be treated as so capable had the facts been as the defendant believed them to be at the time of the act, or had subsequent events happened in the way the defendant believed they would happen, or both. An example of that is if a person sends razor blades to another person with the intention that they will use them to seriously self-harm, but the blades, for whatever reason, fail to reach them.

Clause 75 clarifies that an internet service provider does not commit the offence by providing a means through which others can send, transmit or publish content that is capable of encouraging or assisting the serious self-harm of a person. Government amendment 17 adds

“encouraging or assisting serious self-harm”

to schedule 4 to the Modern Slavery Act 2015, thereby removing the offence from the ambit of the statutory criminal defence in section 45 of the 2015 Act.

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[Luke Taylor]

I will speak briefly about the concern raised by a self-harm charity that has been in contact with us that it may fall within the scope of encouragement of self-harm, because when sufferers and victims—individuals who are engaging in self-harm—try to access support to reduce their dependence on the habit, they are often advised to moderate and change the behaviour. Does the Minister have any thoughts on the details of how charities involved in this incredibly important work to help people in extremely difficult situations would not, through treatment and other measures to mitigate and moderate particular practices, fall within scope of what is an incredibly well intentioned and important measure to stop the encouragement of them?

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I am grateful to the Liberal Democrat spokesperson for that question. The intention of this offence is not to capture that; it is for those who have a specific intent to cause or assist self-harm. We recognise, obviously, that there are organisations that do that work. They are not intended to be captured under this offence, and we are ensuring that guidance is available.

I want to respond to the comments of the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Stockton West, regarding online safety. He will be aware that Ofcom is in the process of implementing the guidance and codes of practice that will be operational under the Online Safety Act 2023 to ensure that platforms have to act to protect children, specifically, by removing this content where it is at risk of being seen by children. If platforms do not comply with the Act and with Ofcom’s codes of practice and guidance, they could be fined. Those fines are currently being dished out by Ofcom in relation to some of the harmful and illegal practices by social media platforms.

Of course, this issue is also being looked at, in terms of violence being carried out against women and girls, and children, under our broader strategy across Government. The Safeguarding Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Yardley, and I have met the tech Minister in the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology and Ministers in the Department of Health and Social Care to look at all these issues to ensure that we have the most holistic approach to tackling some of the horrific acts and harms that are proliferating and causing damage to women and girls, and children, so that we protect them all.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 74 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 75

Encouraging or assisting serious self-harm: supplementary

Amendment made: 17, in clause 75, page 90, line 20, at end insert—

“(6) In Schedule 4 to the Modern Slavery Act 2015 (offences to which defence in section 45 does not apply), in paragraph 36D (inserted by section 17), after the entry for section 52 (inserted by section 52), insert—

‘section 74 (encouraging or assisting serious self-harm).’.”—(Alex Davies-Jones.)

This amendment excepts the offence of encouraging or assisting serious self-harm from the defence in section 45 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015.

Clause 75, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 76

Child abduction

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

[Alex Davies-Jones]

Clause 76 aims to fill a small but important gap in the law on child abduction in relation to the detention of a child abroad without appropriate consent. It is already an offence, under section 1 of the Child Abduction Act 1984, for one parent, or person with similar responsibility, to take or send a child under the age of 16 out of the UK without the consent of the other parent or person with responsibility or of the court.

In 2012, the court confirmed, in the case of Nicolaou v. Redbridge magistrates court, that it is not a criminal offence, for a parent who has consent to take a child abroad, to detain that child outside the UK for longer than the permitted period. In contrast, section 2 of the 1984 Act makes it an offence for a person other than a parent or person with similar responsibility to take or detain a child out of the control of any person entitled to lawful control, whether or not the child is taken out of the UK.

The Law Commission, in considering Nicolaou in its 2014 report “Simplification of Criminal Law: Kidnapping and Related Offences”, concluded that wrongful retention of a child abroad by a parent or person with similar responsibility should be an offence. That is what the clause seeks to do.

Disputes involving children retained abroad without appropriate consent can usually be resolved through civil dispute and family court processes, including under the 1980 Hague convention on the civil aspects of international child abduction, rather than criminal law. The new child abduction offence aims to supplement such civil dispute mechanisms where the force of the criminal law is required.

Reunite International, the leading charity in this area, has called for legislative change to close the gap in the law, indicating that there appears to be an issue of children being detained abroad without appropriate consent. The charity says that about 40% of the cases to its helpline concern a child being wrongfully retained abroad. That suggests that parents realise that that is an easier route to abduct the child, with no criminal charges or police involvement.

The purpose of the clause in filling that gap in the law is to add to the suite of measures available to deter parents from illegally detaining children abroad. In effect, it will mean that a parent or person with similar responsibility who has detained a child abroad without appropriate consent could face extradition to the UK and a criminal sanction if, or when, they return to the UK.

Clause 76(2)(a) therefore amends section 1 of the 1984 Act to insert the new child abduction offence. That means that a person connected with a child under the age of 16 will commit an offence if the child is taken or sent out of the UK with the appropriate consent and, at any time after the child is taken or sent, the person detains the child outside the UK without the appropriate consent.

In inserting the new offence into section 1, other minor amendments, detailed in subsection (2)(b), (c) and (d), and subsection (4), are required to the 1984 Act so that the provisions in section 1 and the schedule properly apply to the new offence in the same way as the existing section 1 offence. Additionally, since the new offence by its very nature takes place outside the UK, at subsection (3) an amendment is made so that the new offence is not carved out from having extraterritorial jurisdiction in the relevant circumstances.

The clause will apply to England and Wales. The consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions will be required to prosecute, and the maximum penalty will be the same as that which applies to the taking or sending offence in section 1 of the 1984 Act, which is seven years’ imprisonment.

We have given considerable thought to whether it is right to potentially criminalise a parent for detaining their child abroad and how that will impact on the safe and prompt return of the child. The new offence, however, will criminalise only parents who intentionally keep the child out of the control of the other parent. Other important protections are also built into the offence. For example, the detaining parent will not commit the offence if the other parent has unreasonably refused to consent.

There is evidence that suggests that some parents are deliberately seeking to circumvent the law. We are therefore persuaded that it is necessary to fill the gap and to criminalise such behaviour. I stress again the importance of the Hague conventions as a route to ensure the safe return of children. The UK continues to work with other states parties to the 1980 Hague convention to improve its operation, including considering the impact of allegations and evidence of domestic abuse in judicial decision making. The new criminal law provision supplements the international civil remedies and deals with a small but important gap in the law. I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Matt Vickers]

Proposed new section 1(1A) of the 1984 Act addresses a deeply concerning and potentially damaging loophole by making it an offence for a person connected to a child to detain that child abroad after initially taking or sending them out of the UK with proper consent, unless they continue to have that consent. That ensures that consent must be maintained throughout and not just at the point of departure.

The 2012 judicial review highlighted a potential gap in the legal framework under section 1 of the Child Abduction Act 1984. The issue arose in situations where a parent lawfully took or sent a child out of the UK with the required consent, but then failed to return the child once the agreed period ended. The case involved Nicholas Nicolaou, who in 2007 arranged for his son to visit him in Cyprus for a limited time, in accordance with a court order. However, he did not return his son to the UK when the permitted visit expired.

Following unsuccessful attempts to resolve the matter through the family courts, a warrant was issued for Nicolaou’s arrest. Nicolaou challenged the warrant through judicial review, arguing that he had not committed an offence under section 1 of the 1984 Act. His reasoning was that his son had been taken out of the UK with the appropriate consent, and that section 1 covers only the act of removal, not the failure to return a child thereafter. The High Court upheld Nicolaou’s claim, agreeing that section 1 applies only to the removal of a child from the UK, and that what matters legally is whether consent was in place at the moment the child left the country. As a result, the High Court granted Nicolaou’s application for judicial review, exposing this serious loophole in the existing legislation.

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The provision applies only to cases where the child is taken or sent out of the UK on or after the commencement date of the clause, ensuring clarity for any ongoing or past cases. In 2014, the Law Commission released a report examining the legal framework around kidnapping and related offences. One of its key recommendations was to expand the scope of the section 1 offence to include situations where a child is wrongfully kept abroad beyond the agreed period, either in breach of permission granted by another parent, a person with parental responsibility, or the court. Does the Minister believe that the measure goes far enough to deter wrongful retention abroad? Are the Government considering any additional safeguarding or preventive measures?

[Alex Davies-Jones]

I commend the clause to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 76 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 77

Safeguarding vulnerable groups: regulated activity

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.