Crime and Policing Bill (Tenth sitting)

Matt Vickers Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 24th April 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Matt Vickers (Stockton West) (Con)]

The clause introduces a new and significant change to the Sexual Offences Act 2003 through the insertion of proposed new section 87A. This change provides for registered sex offenders to give their notifications virtually, in specific conditions, as opposed to attending the police station in person. The provision is designed to make the notification process more flexible and efficient, while still ensuring public safety and compliance with the law.

The core idea behind the clause is to allow individuals to submit their notifications virtually, such as through video calls or similar technologies. However, the virtual submission of notifications will be allowed only when specific conditions are met, as set out in the clause. Will the Minister clarify how senior police officers will determine when it is safe to allow offenders to submit their notifications virtually instead of attending a police station in person? What specific factors will be considered in the risk assessment to ensure that public safety is not compromised? Under what circumstances can a senior police officer revoke the permission for virtual notifications, and how quickly can the decision be made?

[The Chair]

Apologies, Minister—I should have called you first, but you now have the wonderful opportunity to both reply and speak for the first time.

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[Jess Phillips]

Registered sex offenders who receive a sentence of imprisonment of 30 months or more must comply with the notification requirements indefinitely after 15 years, or eight for juveniles. They may apply for the police to review and, if appropriate, discharge their notification requirements. There is currently no power for the police to proactively review an offender’s indefinite notification requirements after 15 years. That results in offenders who are unable to make an application—for example, due to a disability—remaining subject to the notification requirements unnecessarily.

Chief Constable Mick Creedon recommended in his independent review into the police-led management of registered sex offenders in the community that the police should have the discretion to proactively review a registered sex offender’s indefinite notification requirements once the statutory minimum duration has elapsed. Although registered sex offenders already have the right to apply for a review once the minimum duration has passed, these clauses will give the police in England, Wales and Northern Ireland the ability to initiate a review themselves.

The process will remain the same as that for offender-initiated reviews. The police must seek information from other agencies responsible for the risk management of registered sex offenders to inform their decisions about whether to discharge the indefinite notification requirements. Offenders who pose a risk will remain subject to the requirements for life if necessary.

[Matt Vickers]

Clause 64 amends the Sexual Offences Act 2003 to make changes to the review process for offenders in England and Wales who are subject to indefinite notification requirements. These changes specifically apply to offenders sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 30 months or more. Under the current law, offenders subject to indefinite notification must comply with notification requirements for a minimum of 15 years, or eight years for juveniles, before they may apply to the police to review their requirements. The police, working alongside other multi-agency public protection arrangement agencies when appropriate, will review these requirements to determine whether they are still necessary to protect the public from sexual harm.

One of the significant changes introduced by clause 64 is the concept of an own motion review. This allows the chief officer of police to initiate a review of an offender’s indefinite notification requirements without the offender needing to apply. The chief officer can assess whether an offender still needs to comply with the notification requirements, based on the risk they pose to the public. While the review process can begin only once the minimum review period has elapsed, the chief officer of police must notify the offender that they are initiating a review and allow the offender to make representations. The police must also inform the responsible bodies, such as the Probation Service, and seek any relevant information they hold. Once the offender has had an opportunity to make their case, the chief officer must make a determination within six weeks. If the decision is to end the notification requirements, they cease immediately.

Clause 65 introduces new paragraphs 6A to 6D to schedule 3A to the 2003 Act, establishing provisions for own motion reviews in Northern Ireland that mirror those set out in the new sections for England and Wales. Is the Minister confident that own motion reviews of indefinite notification requirements will not undermine public safety, and how can we ensure that the decision-making process in these reviews is transparent, and that there is adequate oversight to hold the responsible authorities accountable?

[Jess Phillips]

I thank the shadow Minister for his questions. These amendments to the law were very much in the predecessor Bill to this one; I think I am the only person who has now sat through this Bill Committee twice. There have not been substantial changes from the point at which the previous Government wished to seek these changes. Frankly, this is a minor amendment that has been asked for by the very experts who currently manage the risk within the community. It came from a Home Office review that was published under the previous Government, in which Mick Creedon wrote:

“I recommend that legislation places the responsibility on the police service to proactively consider and, if suitable, apply for indefinite notification requirements to be removed where justifiable without applications from the individuals.”

This is coming from Mick Creedon and those who lead police forces, who I have met specifically to discuss the management of sex offenders. Actually, a success in an area of safeguarding law over a number of years is that an increasing number of people have been convicted of sex offences, which is largely down to growing numbers of people being convicted because the evidence base of online child abuse, for example, has grown. There is a real need for officers to be really focused on where risk is the greatest, so that they can protect the public. Protection of the public is where Mick Creedon is coming from in his review, and that is why the clause exists.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 64 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 65 and 66 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 67

Power of entry and search

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

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[Matt Vickers]

Section 96B of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 grants police officers the authority to apply for a warrant to enter and search a relevant offender’s home when necessary for assessing their risk. Currently, that application can be made only by an officer of at least the rank of superintendent. The police typically seek and execute such warrants when an offender refuses to allow the police entry to their home, thus hindering the risk-assessment process.

The clause amends section 96B by altering the application process. Instead of requiring a senior officer of at least superintendent rank to apply for the warrant, proposed new subsection (1) would allow an application to be made by a police officer, but it must first be approved by an “appropriate officer”. That term is further clarified in proposed new subsection (10) to mean a constable who is authorised to make the application by a constable of at least the rank of inspector.

That change rightly aims to streamline the process while ensuring that officers of appropriate rank and authority can make the necessary applications to protect the public and assess offenders’ risks effectively. How big an impact does the Minister anticipate that allowing officers of lower rank to apply for warrants will have on the efficiency and speed of police operations when carrying out the risk assessments? Will thought be given to the relevant training for the appropriate officers in such circumstances?

[Jess Phillips]

The shadow Minister makes some interesting points. It is impossible for me to say now exactly how much this will improve things in the future, but it will obviously be kept under review. The Government have set up a specific unit, the national centre for VAWG and public protection—the creation of a specialist policing centre for specific active training and specialisation in the space of public protection, child abuse and violence against women and girls. I think that specialist training is required not only here but across the board. We need to ensure that all police forces across England and Wales have standardised practice in public protection and safeguarding.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 67 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 68 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 9 agreed to.

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[Jess Phillips]

Stalking is a high-harm, high-volume form of violence against women and girls. It is important that the right tools are in place to manage stalking perpetrators and to ensure that victims are protected at the earliest opportunity. The changes in the clause widen the situations in which a stalking protection order can be issued. SPOs were introduced in 2019, with the aim of ensuring that effective protections were put in place as soon as risk is identified for victims of stalking.

Let me pay tribute to somebody once of this parish: Alex Chalk. He is no longer a Member of Parliament, but he was an incredible advocate for changing the law on stalking and always a pleasure to work with when I was in opposition. Currently, only the police can apply for an SPO, with applications considered by the magistrates court. These changes will enable the courts to make an SPO of their own volition at the conclusion of criminal proceedings in situations where the defendant has been convicted or acquitted. In both scenarios, there can still be a real need to ensure that safeguards and protections are in place for victims.

It can be all too easy for defendants who are sentenced to time in prison to continue stalking their victim from prison—I know that, because it happened to me. For defendants who are acquitted, the court may consider there is still a need to safeguard the victim from any further stalking behaviour. The Government’s view is that the current process of using restraining orders in these situations is not sufficient, and that was echoed in the recent super-complaint on the police response to stalking. Restraining orders were not designed specifically to address the risks associated with stalking, and cannot impose positive requirements that address the root causes of the stalking behaviour. This measure therefore provides for stronger protections for victims of stalking.

[Matt Vickers]

Stalking is a deeply harmful and invasive crime that can have severe, long-lasting effects on victims. The impacts of stalking go far beyond the initial fear that it instils. It can completely disrupt a person’s sense of safety, security and control over their own life. Victims of stalking often experience intense psychological distress, ranging from anxiety and depression to post-traumatic stress disorder. The constant feeling of being watched, harassed or threatened can lead to chronic stress, sleep disturbances and a diminished quality of life. In extreme cases, victims may even alter their daily routine, change their contact information or move to new locations to escape the perpetrator’s unwanted attention.

The emotional and psychological toll on victims extends to their families and loved ones. Friends and family members of stalking victims often share in the anxiety and fear, feeling helpless as they watch someone they care about fall victim. Relationships may become strained as the victim withdraws or becomes hypervigilant, and families may find themselves taking additional security measures to protect the victim. The overall sense of instability can erode trust and safety within the victim’s support network, leaving everyone involved emotionally drained.

The Suzy Lamplugh Trust, a leading charity focused on personal safety and stalking, defines stalking as

“a pattern of fixated and obsessive behaviour which is repeated, persistent, intrusive and causes fear of violence or engenders alarm and distress in the victim.”

It is right that, under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, steps were taken to legislate for the criminalisation of stalking. The Suzy Lamplugh Trust highlighted:

“Section 2A labels stalking as a criminal offence for the first time in English and Welsh Law.”

I am proud of the steps that the previous Government took to take action against this terrible crime, and I support the current Government in their efforts to reduce its prevalence.

Clause 69 amends the Stalking Protection Act 2019 to strengthen the ability of courts to impose stalking protection orders, even when criminal proceedings do not result in a conviction. It will insert proposed new section A1, which defines what a stalking protection order is: an order that can impose prohibitions or requirements on a person to prevent acts associated with stalking. It clarifies that SPOs may now be made on application by the police or following an acquittal, appeal or finding of insanity or disability. I would be grateful if the Minister could expand on how the Government will ensure that the power is used proportionately and not seen to be circumventing due process, particularly in cases of acquittal.

As the Minister will know, in November 2022, the Suzy Lamplugh Trust, acting on behalf of the National Stalking Consortium, submitted a super-complaint highlighting serious and widespread concerns about how the police respond to stalking. The complaint identified systemic issues, including a lack of understanding among officers about what behaviours amount to stalking. It also criticised the quality of investigations, stating that, even when stalking is correctly identified, police often fail to handle these cases appropriately.

The head of external affairs at Women’s Aid, Isabelle Younane, emphasised that changes to stalking protection orders will only be effective if the root issues are tackled. She stressed the need for the police and other agencies to have a consistent understanding of the orders and to apply them properly, ensuring that breaches result in meaningful consequences. Is the Minister confident that the police have the capacity, training and resources to effectively address stalking cases in line with the measures in the Bill?

Proposed new section 364A of the sentencing code introduces the concept of a stalking protection order designed to prevent individuals from engaging in stalking behaviours. The order can include both prohibitions and requirements. Subsection (2) directs readers to section 2A of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 for examples of behaviours associated with stalking.

Subsection (3) provides that an SPO may be time-limited or indefinite; if time-limited, subsection (4) mandates a minimum duration of two years. Allowing a stalking protection order to be time-limited or indefinite will mean that the courts can tailor orders to individual cases. In some situations, an indefinite order may be necessary to protect victims from ongoing risk, while in others a fixed-term order may be more appropriate.

This measure can help to ensure long-term protection. Requiring a minimum duration of two years for a time- limited SPO will ensure that victims receive meaningful protection. Short-term orders may not give victims the reassurance and safety they need, especially in cases where stalking behaviours persist or escalate over time. Has consideration been given to increasing the minimum period to allow for sufficient victim protection?

Proposed new section 364B of the sentencing code gives courts the power to impose an SPO following a conviction. The court must be satisfied that the offender has committed acts associated with stalking, that there is a continuing risk of stalking to another person, and that the order is necessary to protect that individual. That can include cases where the stalker targets people close to the main victim—for example, friends or family—to cause distress to the main victim.

These provisions are a positive and necessary step in strengthening protections for stalking victims. They recognise that perpetrators often target people close to the victim, such as friends, family members or colleagues, in order to cause distress, and they reflect the reality that stalking is used as a form of psychological manipulation and control. Including those indirect victims within the scope of protection will ensure a more comprehensive and preventive approach.

Requiring every restriction or requirement in the order to be necessary for the protection of the individual at risk builds in an important safeguard and ensures that conditions are proportionate and directly linked to the risk presented. It balances the rights of the defendant while prioritising victim safety. Furthermore, allowing courts to consider conduct that took place anywhere, including behaviour predating the new legislation, will ensure that they can take a holistic view of the stalker’s actions. This flexibility will enhance the effectiveness of orders and ensure that victims are not left unprotected simply because of jurisdictional or timing technicalities.

Proposed new section 364C of the sentencing code provides more detail on how prohibitions and requirements in a stalking protection order should be framed and applied. It requires that, where practicable, any conditions imposed must not conflict with the offender’s religious beliefs or interfere with their usual work or education commitments. It also confirms that SPOs have a UK-wide effect, unless specifically restricted to a certain area. Additionally, where an individual is already subject to an SPO, the court must ensure that any new conditions do not contradict those already in place. That will help to avoid confusion and ensure consistency in enforcement. How confident is the Minister that the need to protect victims is not undermined by the requirement to avoid interfering with an offender’s work, education, or religious practices?

Proposed new section 364G of the sentencing code makes it clear that breaching the terms of a stalking protection order without reasonable excuse is a criminal offence. It will be for the court to determine what qualifies as a reasonable excuse in an individual case. The offence carries a maximum penalty of six months’ imprisonment, a fine, or both, on summary conviction, and up to five years’ imprisonment, a fine, or both, on conviction on indictment. Subsection (3) states specifically that courts cannot issue a conditional discharge for breaching an SPO.

How will the Government ensure that the penalties for breaching an SPO are proportionate? Are courts being encouraged to take breaches seriously, even when no new criminal offence has occurred? Can the Minister clarify what might constitute a reasonable excuse for breaching an SPO and how consistent the courts are likely to be in applying that standard?

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[Jess Phillips]

Following what I was just saying about making things actually change on the ground, these clauses are about doing some of that. It is important that professionals with safeguarding responsibilities, such as the police, teachers, healthcare professionals and social workers, have adequate and clear guidance to support them in their work to tackle stalking and to support victims. We must also ensure that such professionals are doing all they can to pursue perpetrators while adequately safeguarding victims. To do that effectively, they must work together.

Clause 71 therefore enables the Home Secretary to issue multi-agency statutory guidance on stalking. It will apply to relevant public authorities and professionals will have to have due regard to it. In short, this measure provides a framework to support professionals to better respond to the needs of stalking victims and to better manage stalking perpetrators.

I have seen amazing examples of that. In fact, the two best examples in the country are in London and Cheshire, where multi-agency solutions, with local health services, victims services and police sitting together, are dealing not just with the victim’s trauma or getting a criminal justice response, but with the medical element—the psychological issue—of people with obsessive behaviours. I cannot praise those two multi-agency units enough.

It is important that the right procedures and policies are in place to safeguard victims of stalking as early as possible. Our manifesto committed to giving victims the right to know the identity of their online stalker. I had the privilege of working with Nicola Thorp, who has tirelessly campaigned for this measure after her ordeal with stalking. In her case, the police said they could not reveal the identity of the offender even after he was arrested, despite the perpetrator once saying that he had got so close to Nicola on the train that he “could smell” her.

Clause 72 provides for the introduction of statutory guidance, which will set out the process the police should follow to decide whether they can release the identity of a stalking suspect. In doing so, they will need to consider the risk to the victim and what steps are needed to safeguard them from further harm. The police will have to have due regard to the guidance.

We know that stalkers will often use multiple online aliases to terrorise their victims. It is extremely dangerous for victims to be unaware of the true identity of who is stalking them online. This measure is an important aspect of ensuring that victims of stalking have the best possible protections and safeguards in place.

[Matt Vickers]

Proposed new section 7A of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 is a positive step, as it allows the Secretary of State to issue formal guidance to public authorities in England and Wales on stalking-related matters. That includes the interpretation and application of relevant provisions in the 1997 Act, the Stalking Protection Act 2019, and the Sentencing Act 2020.

This guidance will help to ensure that those working across the criminal justice system and other public services, such as the police, the Crown Prosecution Service and local authorities, have a consistent and accurate understanding of the law and best practice in responding to stalking. It strengthens victim protection by promoting a co-ordinated and informed response, supports earlier identification of stalking behaviours, and provides a clearer framework for agencies to act before harm escalates.

Clause 72 gives significant responsibility to the Secretary of State to issue guidance to chief officers of police on the disclosure of police information for the purpose of protecting individuals from risks related to stalking. This power includes using existing police common-law powers to disclose relevant information, such as the identity of online stalkers, to victims of stalking. The guidance can be revised as needed. Before any issuance or revision, the Secretary of State is required to consult with relevant parties, including the National Police Chiefs’ Council and any other stakeholders deemed appropriate. Importantly, the Secretary of State must also ensure that the guidance is published and accessible.

This new provision aims to improve the safety of stalking victims by ensuring that the police have clear and consistent guidance on disclosing information that could help to protect those at risk, particularly in cases of online stalking. Making it mandatory for police officers to consider this guidance increases the likelihood that appropriate actions will be taken in situations where the disclosure of information could prevent further harm to victims. How do the Government intend to ensure that the guidance issued by the Secretary of State is effectively implemented across all stakeholders, particularly in areas where stalking cases may not be as prevalent?

[Jess Phillips]

I wish there was a place where stalking cases were less prevalent—what there will be are areas where stalking cases are less prevalently reported. To return to those two brilliant multi-agency examples, doing a job really well often increases the crime rate in that area, which is sometimes quite difficult for police forces to deal with. I pay credit to those that bother to do it.

The shadow Minister points out that the guidance is advisory, but professionals will be required to have regard to the guidance, and we will continue to work with representatives from the agencies, the stalking sector and others to monitor progress in this area. More broadly, monitoring progress on stalking will form part of the wider ambition to halve violence against women and girls and the work that I, the Policing Minister and the Home Secretary seek to do around how we monitor the standards of policing more widely and assess how well policing is doing in many different areas.

I would like to point out something shocking: currently, the police do not have any required standards for reporting on their performance around domestic abuse, sexual violence and stalking. I think the people of this country would be quite shocked to realise that we do not routinely assess the standards of forces on those things. The shadow Minister has my absolute guarantee that monitoring how such things actually work on the ground is something that I will do until the day I die.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 71 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 72 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 73

Administering etc harmful substances (including by spiking)

[Matt Vickers]

I beg to move amendment 44, in clause 73, page 88, line 33, after “aggrieve” insert “, take revenge on, prank,”.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 45, in clause 73, page 88, line 34, at end insert—

“(c) the person does so knowingly or recklessly.”

Government amendment 16.

Clause stand part.

Government amendment 19.

[Matt Vickers]

Clause 73 modernises and strengthens the law on the administration of harmful substances, including offences commonly referred to as spiking. It repeals outdated provisions in the Offences against the Person Act 1861, specifically sections 22 and 23, and replaces section 24 with a more comprehensive and clear offence.

Spiking can have a devastating and long-lasting impact on victims, both physically and psychologically. Victims often experience immediate symptoms, such as nausea, disorientation, memory loss and the loss of consciousness, placing them at serious risk of harm, including assault or injury.

Beyond the immediate physical danger, the psychological effects can be profound and enduring. Many victims report anxiety, depression, post-traumatic stress disorder and a persistent sense of vulnerability or fear, particularly in social situations. The trauma is often compounded by the fact that victims may be unable to recall events clearly, leading to feelings of confusion, helplessness and self-doubt. Furthermore, the social stigma and lack of visible support can discourage victims from reporting incidents, deepening the emotional toll.

Spiking undermines a person’s basic sense of safety, and its impact can ripple far beyond the initial incident, affecting relationships, social confidence and overall mental health. Between May 2022 and April 2023, the police received 6,732 reports of spiking incidents, including 957 involving needle spiking. On average, around 561 reports were made each month.

Despite the volume of reports, gathering reliable national data on spiking remains challenging. There is currently no comprehensive dataset that accurately reflects the prevalence of the crime. Although the Ministry of Justice records data on certain offences, it logs only the principal offence for which a person is convicted and sentenced. Since spiking can fall under a variety of criminal charges, it is difficult to determine how often it leads to prosecution or conviction. The police do collect incident-level data, and some campaign groups conduct surveys, but these sources do not provide a full picture of how widespread, or effectively prosecuted, spiking is.

Under proposed new section 24 of the 1861 Act, it is an offence to unlawfully administer or cause another person to be administered a harmful substance, with a “harmful substance” being defined as

“any poison or other destructive or noxious thing”,

with the intent to injure, aggrieve, or annoy. This modernised wording explicitly covers a broader range of harmful conduct, including situations in which harmful substances are covertly introduced into a person’s drink or otherwise ingested without their knowledge or consent, which has been an issue of growing public concern in recent years.

The offence carries serious penalties. On summary conviction in a magistrates court in England and Wales, an offender may face up to the general maximum term of imprisonment or a fine, or both. In Northern Ireland, the summary conviction maximum is six months’ imprisonment or a fine up to the statutory limit, or both. On indictment, the maximum penalty increases to 10 years’ imprisonment or a fine, or both. By updating this area of law, the Government will ensure that the criminal justice system has a more robust and relevant tool to tackle spiking and related offences, enhancing victim protection and enabling tougher sentences where appropriate.

The charity Stamp Out Spiking, which has long campaigned for a dedicated spiking offence, described the proposed new offence as

“a rallying call to empower victims”

to report incidents. However, the charity also emphasised that the new law is just one element of a broader solution. It stressed that effective collaboration between police, transport providers, venues and support organisations such as Stamp Out Spiking is essential to creating safer environments and rebuilding public confidence in nightlife and public spaces. Does the Minister accept that legislation alone is not enough and that a co-ordinated strategy involving education, prevention and enforcement is needed to truly tackle spiking? Will she commit to furthering the delivery of a joined-up approach to tackling spiking?

Amendment 44 expands the scope of intent behind the offence of administering harmful substances, including by spiking. By inserting the words “take revenge on, prank” after “aggrieve”, the amendment makes it clear that the offence applies not only when a person administers a harmful substance with the intention to injure, aggrieve or annoy, but when the intent is to take revenge or play a prank. That broadens the legal coverage of the offence to reflect real-world cases in which spiking is carried out as an act of retaliation or as a so-called joke. It would ensure that such behaviour is recognised as criminal regardless of whether the perpetrator believed it to be harmless or amusing.

Take the example of Gillian Reilly, a nursing student who experienced a harrowing incident when a friend spiked her drink as a laugh during a celebration at her university’s students’ union bar. Initially attributing her symptoms—dizziness, sharp stomach pains and violent nausea—to overconsumption of alcohol, she soon realised that something was amiss. Her condition deteriorated to the point where she feared for her life. She said:

“I felt so unwell I honestly thought I was going to die.”

The revelation that a friend was responsible for the spiking was particularly shocking, highlighting that threats can come from familiar individuals, not just strangers. The incident underscores the severe physical and psychological impacts of spiking, and emphasises the need for increased awareness and preventive measures, particularly in university settings.

The Alcohol Education Trust said that spiking cases always surge during the first term of the new academic year, but that suspected incidents had reached frightening new levels, with the National Police Chiefs’ Council revealing that there were 198 spiking incidents, including 24 via injection, across the UK in just two months.

The Drinkaware monitor survey from 2022 showed that, in most cases, no additional crime had occurred after an individual was drugged. However, where an additional crime did take place, 8.4% involved so-called pranks. That suggests that such a mentality is relevant to the intentions behind the offence. If we are to legislate on this matter, we must ensure that robust laws are in place to support effective prosecution.

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[Alex Davies-Jones]

I will happily do so. On being reckless, it would be for the court to decide and determine the case on the facts in terms of its interpretation of aggrieve, annoy and intent. It is also important to deal with amendment 45, which could cause a problem, and address the hon. Gentleman’s comments head on. The amendment would introduce the requirement that the person must act “knowingly or recklessly” before the offence of administering harmful substances is committed. That risks introducing confusion, rather than bringing clarity. For the offence to be made out, a person has to act with the specific intent to injure, aggrieve or annoy the other person. To additionally require a defendant to knowingly or recklessly act is logically inconsistent with the requirement that they act with a specific intention to injure, aggrieve or annoy the victim.

Having explained why it is not helpful to amend the clause in the way suggested, I will return to the details of the clause, which will help to provide clarity. Proposed new section 24(2) defines “harmful substance” as

“any poison or other destructive or noxious thing”.

By incorporating the language of the existing sections 23 and 24 offences, we aim to capture the broad range of substances that can, as established by existing case law, be illegal to administer.

Proposed new section 24 also modernises the law in other ways. It will become an offence triable either way, rather than an indictable only offence: this allows for less serious cases to be dealt with quickly in the magistrates court, allowing for justice to be served quicker. The penalty for the new offence will be 10 years, reflecting the seriousness with which the Government take this behaviour. That penalty is the same as for the existing section 23 offence, and an increase in the maximum penalty for the more commonly prosecuted section 24 offence. The new offence will extend to England, Wales and Northern Ireland.

Finally, Government amendments 16 and 19 add the new offence, as with the other offences in the Bill, to the list of serious offences that exclude a person from claiming as a defence that they committed the offence as the result of being subject to modern slavery.

In conclusion, the Government believe that the new offence to capture spiking will simplify the current legal landscape and be more readily understood by both the public and the police. It is part of our wider programme to increase public awareness of the illegality of spiking, encourage reporting and help the police to better respond to this abhorrent crime. I commend clause 73 to the Committee.

[Matt Vickers]

I will press the amendment to a Division.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

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[Matt Vickers]

Clause 74 creates a new criminal offence targeting individuals who intentionally carry out acts capable of encouraging or assisting another person to seriously self-harm. Crucially, the offence goes beyond previous legislation, such as section 184 of the Online Safety Act 2023, by covering not just verbal or digital communications, but any form of direct or indirect action. That includes, for example, physically providing someone with an object like a blade to use for self-harm.

The new offence is based on a recommendation from the Law Commission, which proposed criminalising the intentional encouragement or assistance of serious self-harm. The proposal was modelled on the existing offence of encouraging or assisting suicide, as set out in the Suicide Act 1961. The Law Commission highlighted the need for any such offence to be carefully and narrowly defined to ensure that vulnerable individuals, particularly those who share self-harm content online, are not unintentionally criminalised.

Subsection (1) sets out the core of the offence. A person commits it if they carry out

“an act capable of encouraging or assisting the serious self-harm of another person”

and they did so with the intent that such harm would be caused. Subsection (2) clarifies that the offender does not need to know who the victim is. The offence still applies if the act is aimed at an unknown or unidentified individual, such as in the case of anonymous online posts targeting vulnerable people. Subsection (3) states that an offence is committed whether or not serious self-harm actually takes place. The focus is on the intent and the potential for harm, not the outcome.

Self-harm is a deeply concerning issue that affects people of all ages, but especially young people and those struggling with mental health challenges. It involves deliberately causing pain or injury to oneself as a way of coping with overwhelming emotional distress, anxiety, trauma or feelings of numbness and hopelessness. The physical risks of self-harm can be severe, ranging from permanent scarring and infections to life-threatening injuries and even accidental death. The psychological toll is often even more damaging. Those who self-harm frequently experience shame, isolation and a deepening of the very mental health struggles that led them to harm themselves in the first place.

It is not just the individuals who suffer. Families, friends, schools and communities are all affected. Loved ones often feel helpless or guilty, and support systems can become strained. In many cases, self-harm can escalate to suicidal ideation or attempts, making early intervention critical. The rise of online content that normalises or encourages self-harm has made the issue even more urgent. Vulnerable individuals can be influenced or manipulated into dangerous behaviours by others, sometimes even strangers, through social media or online forums. The law must recognise and respond to this modern reality to better protect those at risk. Tackling self-harm requires not just healthcare support and early intervention, but strong legal tools to prevent others from encouraging or facilitating this deeply harmful behaviour. Clause 74 takes an important step in that direction.

Clause 75 strengthens the framework around the offence of encouraging or assisting serious self-harm by closing potential loopholes in enforcement. It ensures that individuals who arrange for others to carry out a harmful act are equally accountable if those acts are carried out, even if indirectly. The provision also captures cases where the intended harm could not physically occur, such as when a person mistakenly believes a harmless item will cause harm, or when the planned outcome does not materialise as expected. That underlines that liability can arise from intention and belief, not just outcome.

Furthermore, the clause draws a clear boundary for internet service providers, confirming that they will not be held criminally responsible solely for providing the platform through which harmful content is transmitted. The provision aligns with broader legislative changes by removing overlapping measures in existing law, ensuring clarity and consistency in how such offences are addressed. I would be grateful if the Minister would outline what further steps might be under consideration to ensure that platforms and tech companies have a legal duty to report and remove harmful content, and that this provision is implemented alongside adequate mental health support.

[Luke Taylor]

I will speak briefly about the concern raised by a self-harm charity that has been in contact with us that it may fall within the scope of encouragement of self-harm, because when sufferers and victims—individuals who are engaging in self-harm—try to access support to reduce their dependence on the habit, they are often advised to moderate and change the behaviour. Does the Minister have any thoughts on the details of how charities involved in this incredibly important work to help people in extremely difficult situations would not, through treatment and other measures to mitigate and moderate particular practices, fall within scope of what is an incredibly well intentioned and important measure to stop the encouragement of them?

[Alex Davies-Jones]

Clause 76 aims to fill a small but important gap in the law on child abduction in relation to the detention of a child abroad without appropriate consent. It is already an offence, under section 1 of the Child Abduction Act 1984, for one parent, or person with similar responsibility, to take or send a child under the age of 16 out of the UK without the consent of the other parent or person with responsibility or of the court.

In 2012, the court confirmed, in the case of Nicolaou v. Redbridge magistrates court, that it is not a criminal offence, for a parent who has consent to take a child abroad, to detain that child outside the UK for longer than the permitted period. In contrast, section 2 of the 1984 Act makes it an offence for a person other than a parent or person with similar responsibility to take or detain a child out of the control of any person entitled to lawful control, whether or not the child is taken out of the UK.

The Law Commission, in considering Nicolaou in its 2014 report “Simplification of Criminal Law: Kidnapping and Related Offences”, concluded that wrongful retention of a child abroad by a parent or person with similar responsibility should be an offence. That is what the clause seeks to do.

Disputes involving children retained abroad without appropriate consent can usually be resolved through civil dispute and family court processes, including under the 1980 Hague convention on the civil aspects of international child abduction, rather than criminal law. The new child abduction offence aims to supplement such civil dispute mechanisms where the force of the criminal law is required.

Reunite International, the leading charity in this area, has called for legislative change to close the gap in the law, indicating that there appears to be an issue of children being detained abroad without appropriate consent. The charity says that about 40% of the cases to its helpline concern a child being wrongfully retained abroad. That suggests that parents realise that that is an easier route to abduct the child, with no criminal charges or police involvement.

The purpose of the clause in filling that gap in the law is to add to the suite of measures available to deter parents from illegally detaining children abroad. In effect, it will mean that a parent or person with similar responsibility who has detained a child abroad without appropriate consent could face extradition to the UK and a criminal sanction if, or when, they return to the UK.

Clause 76(2)(a) therefore amends section 1 of the 1984 Act to insert the new child abduction offence. That means that a person connected with a child under the age of 16 will commit an offence if the child is taken or sent out of the UK with the appropriate consent and, at any time after the child is taken or sent, the person detains the child outside the UK without the appropriate consent.

In inserting the new offence into section 1, other minor amendments, detailed in subsection (2)(b), (c) and (d), and subsection (4), are required to the 1984 Act so that the provisions in section 1 and the schedule properly apply to the new offence in the same way as the existing section 1 offence. Additionally, since the new offence by its very nature takes place outside the UK, at subsection (3) an amendment is made so that the new offence is not carved out from having extraterritorial jurisdiction in the relevant circumstances.

The clause will apply to England and Wales. The consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions will be required to prosecute, and the maximum penalty will be the same as that which applies to the taking or sending offence in section 1 of the 1984 Act, which is seven years’ imprisonment.

We have given considerable thought to whether it is right to potentially criminalise a parent for detaining their child abroad and how that will impact on the safe and prompt return of the child. The new offence, however, will criminalise only parents who intentionally keep the child out of the control of the other parent. Other important protections are also built into the offence. For example, the detaining parent will not commit the offence if the other parent has unreasonably refused to consent.

There is evidence that suggests that some parents are deliberately seeking to circumvent the law. We are therefore persuaded that it is necessary to fill the gap and to criminalise such behaviour. I stress again the importance of the Hague conventions as a route to ensure the safe return of children. The UK continues to work with other states parties to the 1980 Hague convention to improve its operation, including considering the impact of allegations and evidence of domestic abuse in judicial decision making. The new criminal law provision supplements the international civil remedies and deals with a small but important gap in the law. I commend the clause to the Committee.

[Matt Vickers]

Proposed new section 1(1A) of the 1984 Act addresses a deeply concerning and potentially damaging loophole by making it an offence for a person connected to a child to detain that child abroad after initially taking or sending them out of the UK with proper consent, unless they continue to have that consent. That ensures that consent must be maintained throughout and not just at the point of departure.

The 2012 judicial review highlighted a potential gap in the legal framework under section 1 of the Child Abduction Act 1984. The issue arose in situations where a parent lawfully took or sent a child out of the UK with the required consent, but then failed to return the child once the agreed period ended. The case involved Nicholas Nicolaou, who in 2007 arranged for his son to visit him in Cyprus for a limited time, in accordance with a court order. However, he did not return his son to the UK when the permitted visit expired.

Following unsuccessful attempts to resolve the matter through the family courts, a warrant was issued for Nicolaou’s arrest. Nicolaou challenged the warrant through judicial review, arguing that he had not committed an offence under section 1 of the 1984 Act. His reasoning was that his son had been taken out of the UK with the appropriate consent, and that section 1 covers only the act of removal, not the failure to return a child thereafter. The High Court upheld Nicolaou’s claim, agreeing that section 1 applies only to the removal of a child from the UK, and that what matters legally is whether consent was in place at the moment the child left the country. As a result, the High Court granted Nicolaou’s application for judicial review, exposing this serious loophole in the existing legislation.