European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Alex Chalk Excerpts

Committee: 3rd sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 21st November 2017 Commons Chamber

[Paul Blomfield]

I was not about to go on to that, but clearly I am now. The hon. Gentleman knows that the charter was not binding when it was first adopted in 2000. It was made legally binding by the Lisbon treaty of 2007, which entered into force in 2009. It has, as the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield pointed out, increased in significance, and the rights that it contains have become more visible and correspondingly more effective. Labour supported the charter then, and we support it now, because it has enhanced and improved European human rights protection, and by doing so it has significantly developed the quality of human rights protection in the UK. The wider point that the hon. Member for Stone (Sir William Cash) makes is not relevant to the issue under discussion.

[Alex Chalk (Cheltenham) (Con)]

The charter applies only when national authorities are implementing EU law. Does the hon. Gentleman not agree that if it is retained, it risks creating a confusing inconsistency by giving citizens powerful rights to strike down some pieces of legislation, but not others? Is it not a case of doing either the whole thing, or nothing at all?

[Paul Blomfield]

I will come on to this point, but the charter is key to ensuring that retained law is treated properly and that the same rights of enforcement continue in the future. Without the charter, those rights are significantly diminished and access to them is diminished.

Let me proceed with the point I was making about how the charter goes wider than the Human Rights Act and the European convention on human rights, which I hope I am right in saying the Government accept. As other Members have already pointed out, it was the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union who relied on the charter in the case he brought before the High Court in 2015, against the then Home Secretary and now Prime Minister, when he was worried that the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 would impact on MPs’ ability to communicate with constituents confidentially. He cited the charter, and his lawyers argued that it went beyond the European convention on human rights and granted further protection. He relied on the charter precisely because it provided greater human rights protection than was provided for by UK law and even by the case law of the European Court of Human Rights.

Despite this, the Government have not indicated which decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union under the charter they disagree with. Moreover, the explanatory notes to the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill justify the decision to exclude the charter from retained EU law by saying:

“The Charter did not create new rights, but rather codified rights and principles which already existed in EU law. By converting the EU acquis into UK law, those underlying rights and principles will also be converted into UK law, as provided for in this Bill.”

If that were the case, it would be fine, but it is clearly not the case.

Drawing on existing rights, the charter set out a new framework for human rights protection under EU law. The rights contained in the charter may have existed in EU law for decades—the Government are relying on that point—but that is not enough. The whole point of the charter was that nobody could verify those rights or their sources, and as the lawyers among us will know, identifying the source of a right is imperative in securing effective recourse. In his speech, will the Minister therefore clarify whether the Government have succeeded, where others have not, in comprehensively identifying every single source of these rights? If not, how do they plan to uphold the same level of protections for these rights once we have left the European Union, because a right without effective recourse is rendered effectively meaningless?

By compiling and codifying these rights in a single document, the charter in effect created new rights and certainly created new protections. In short, the charter is the most effective key to unlocking vital rights, and to fail to transpose it and make it operable in UK law is to lock away those rights and deny UK citizens the key to accessing them.

On the data protection point on which the Secretary of State relied—my right hon. Friend the Member for East Ham (Stephen Timms) raises it in his amendment 151, which we support—the right to data protection exists in various documents, such as directives and regulations, but it was only by virtue of the charter creating the expressed right to data protection in article 8 that we were given the right to be forgotten.

The rights extended by the charter are not only data protection rights. Such rights start in article 1, which includes the right to human dignity. This does not exist as an enforceable right in common law or statute law applicable to retained law post-Brexit. Will the Minister, when he responds, explain how this right will be enforced after exit day if the charter is not retained?

--- Later in debate ---

[Alex Chalk]

It is a pleasure to be able to say a few words this evening. May I say what a pleasure it has been to listen to this debate, which has been a paradigmatic example of what a Committee debate should be? It is not about the principles of whether we supported leave or remain; it is about ensuring that the legislation is in the best possible shape, because that is our job.

I want to confine my remarks to two areas. First, I will talk about amendments 139 and 302, tabled by the hon. Member for Wakefield (Mary Creagh) and my right hon. Friend the Member for Chesham and Amersham (Mrs Gillan) respectively, regarding the right to seek Francovich damages post-Brexit; and then I will turn to the charter. On the first issue, it is axiomatic that, if the acts of the state that caused loss took place at a time when a remedy was available, it would be wrong for that remedy to be ripped away unilaterally. It is a principle of British law that past acts or omissions must be considered in the context of the law as it applied at the time. I have heard gratefully the Solicitor General’s suggestion that he might be looking again at the matter. I respectfully suggest that that would be warmly welcomed across the House.

I turn to the charter. I want to explain why I think—despite the fact that I supported remain and I do not resile from a single argument that I made—that the Government are right not to seek to retain the charter, and why to do so would create inconsistency and confusion. I speak as someone who values human rights and who has argued forcefully in favour of remaining part of the European convention on human rights. Indeed, I have said that to leave that would be a catastrophic mistake, and I am delighted that doing so has been taken off the table.

So why do I speak as I do? Before I explain that, I will set out why we must accept that the charter does add rights and it would be wrong to consider it inconsequential, although that is not dispositive. The right hon. Member for Leicester East (Keith Vaz) suggested that it was of no more legal effect than The Beano. That is not correct. Although it is true that there is some duplication, as compared with the ECHR, there are four ways in which the charter adds rights.

First, the charter creates some substantive new rights, which some have referred to as third category rights, including the right to dignity, the right to protection of personal data, the right to conscientious objection and guarantees on bioethics and independence for disabled people. Secondly, the charter widens the scope of existing rights in English law. One example is the right to a fair trial, which exists under article 6. The charter extends that right beyond the mere determination of civil rights and obligations and criminal charges to cover, for example, immigration cases, such as the ZZ case. Thirdly, it creates a new right to invoke the charter in respect of anyone with an interest. That is, of course, far broader than the convention. Fourthly, and most importantly, whereas breaches of the ECHR can lead only to a declaration of incompatibility, action in the case of a breach of the charter is far more muscular, because it allows the charter to take precedence over UK law and, effectively, disapply it.

Having set out all that, why am I not arguing in favour of retaining the charter? The simple reason can be summed up in one word: inconsistency. There is already an inconsistency in the law. A litigant in a case involving the implementation of EU law—that is, of course, the only category of litigation to which the charter applies—is armed with a powerful legal sword, which he can use to strike down the law. But when it comes to UK-derived law, no such legal sword exists, so the scope for absurdity becomes clear. Suppose the state were to pass a law that was a clear affront to human rights. Suppose it wanted to detain suspects without charge for six months or bring back the stocks, in breach of article 4 on torture and inhuman and degrading treatment or article 3 on slavery. In those circumstances, all the litigant could do would be to try to persuade the court to make a declaration of incompatibility; the law could not be struck down. Yet if the UK sought to enforce a law regarding personal data, it could be disapplied. Would that not create a bizarre inconsistency? Such an inconsistency already exists, by the way, but I suggest that it would become more egregious and more difficult to sustain post Brexit.

[Rachel Maclean (Redditch) (Con)]

I am following my hon. Friend’s arguments very carefully, and I am very pleased to hear him setting out why the rights he is talking about will be protected after we leave the EU. Does he agree that such inconsistencies will only further the interests of lawyers, rather than our constituents, after we leave the EU?

--- Later in debate ---

[Alex Chalk]

This is about not furthering the rights of lawyers, but about how we as a House ensure that there is a corpus of law that is consistent, serves the interests of our constituents and can be considered in an intelligible and consistent way.

My view is that the remedy for this inconsistency is not for us to bring in the charter lock, stock and barrel to apply to all law. We could do that, but it would not work because it would create great confusion respecting the existing European convention on human rights, which is of course incorporated into English law and British law. Instead, the time has come—not today and not tomorrow, but at some time in the near future—to look at granting British citizens a corpus of rights to sit alongside the ECHR, as a written constitution, as it were, that extends the Human Rights Act and allows citizens to apply their rights against any law in this country. The logical next stage is to have what is in effect a written constitution.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

As a matter of fact, my hon. Friend and I may be the only two Government Members who believe in having a written constitution. I thought I was the only one—

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

There are three of us. I am very grateful. [Hon. Members: “Four.”] Let us not count. In any event, the number is small.

Does my hon. Friend agree that, in the interim, it would be a good step if the rights we identify, as a result of the Government’s analysis, as coming out of the charter—the third category rights—should in due course, although not of course in this Bill, be added to the Human Rights Act in a way that at least enables such a degree of entrenchment?

[Alex Chalk]

That is exactly right. I, respectfully, completely agree with my right hon. Friend. What has been such a benefit of this debate is that we have identified a third category of rights that Members on both sides of the House recognise there is a real public benefit in adding to the corpus of rights enjoyed by the British people. I entirely agree that we should look at whether they can be added pro tem to the Human Rights Act.

My fundamental point is that, if we are inching our way towards a written constitution, retaining the charter, which is in effect a proto-constitution, on the basis of an amendment debated for just a few hours in this Chamber is entirely the wrong way to go about it. For that reason and that reason alone, I am supporting the Government.

[Mr Simon Clarke]

I rise to support the Bill, particularly in opposition to amendments 8 and 46, as well as new clause 16.

I want to establish from the outset that I am not in any way cavalier about the concept or the subject of human rights. They underpin a free and just society, and all parliamentarians should be vigilant in their defence. Today’s debate underscores the significance of that. However, to quote Oxford’s Professor Richard Ekins:

“There is a fundamental difference between human rights and human rights law. The Charter is one way to attempt to protect human rights, a poorly framed and…inept way at that.”

Contrary to what the hon. Member for Bristol North West (Darren Jones) said, I do not need the charter of fundamental rights to be proud of my country.

There are a number of reasons why I believe the incorporation of the charter of fundamental rights into our law would be the wrong thing to do. The first concerns the scope of the charter’s application. Article 51 states:

“The provisions of this Charter are addressed to the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union…and to the Member States only when they are implementing Union law.”

Needless to say, once we leave the Union, we will not be a member state. As has been observed, many of the charter rights are necessarily contingent on our EU membership, and still more are directed not towards member states, but the Union institutions and their policies. We have already touched on that, and I will not dwell on it further.

Let us follow the logic that we should incorporate the charter into UK law. How would this work? There seem to be two possible scenarios. First, if we were to approximate the charter’s original application, we could amend it in such a way that it applied solely to retained EU law. That is the substance of the amendments. As my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham (Alex Chalk) has pointed out, that would lead to the bizarre situation whereby some parts of UK law would be subject to a different human rights regime. That is a recipe for confusion and disaster. Alternatively, we can amend the charter so that it increases its scope to cover all UK laws and institutions. I would hazard a guess that that is not exactly what our constituents were thinking of when they voted for Brexit.

Notwithstanding that basic point, either route would further complicate the relationship between the charter and the Human Rights Act. All transposed EU law will become subject to the Human Rights Act on transposition anyway, and having two parallel and perhaps in places contradictory constitutional Acts covering precisely the same issues in the same sphere of application would serve to undermine, rather than uphold, the rule of law. That is because charter rights, most seriously social rights, are so flexible and contested that they are vulnerable to a near infinite number of interpretations, which is precisely the problem.

When I worked for my hon. Friend the Member for Esher and Walton (Dominic Raab), he would cite a quote from Montesquieu that was absolutely on point:

“Nor is there liberty if the power of judging is not separate from legislative power…If it were joined to legislative power, the power over the life and liberty of the citizens would be arbitrary, for the judge would be the legislator.”

Where we fail to legislate the judiciary fill the gaps. Rights creep has been a key objection from our constituents for many years, and rightly so. In at least two cases, British judges have gone beyond ECJ case law, relying on the charter to disapply Acts of Parliament. In Benkharbouche, parts of the State Immunity Act 1978 which protected embassies from immunity against employment law claims were set aside. In Vidal-Hall, part of the Data Protection Act 1998 was overridden, overturning a limitation on what damages could be recovered. As my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Torridge and West Devon (Mr Cox) said, this is properly a matter for the House to determine. The ECJ itself has overruled parts of the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 by reference to the charter—a decision that puts the application of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 in serious doubt. That is not a small point. The process of striking down legislation under the charter goes far beyond the scope of the Human Rights Act, which allows the courts to make a declaration of incompatibility where there is a need to do so.

There is one final reason why we should resist charter incorporation, which is that to do so would probably be superfluous. We have heard from Ministers, who have struck a notably conciliatory tone, that the Government will provide detailed analysis of how each charter right will be addressed in a memorandum that is due on 5 December. If we are to go on to address what has been referred to as the third category of rights—rights that are not listed in the European convention on human rights and which are not rendered redundant by our leaving the EU—this process should be led by the elected House of Commons. That may very well be the right thing to do, but it is clear to everyone that retaining the charter is not the right vehicle by which to do it.

Lest we forget, the British public had no idea that the charter would evolve in the way that it has. Protocol 30 of the treaty on the functioning of the European Union states that

“the Charter reaffirms the rights, freedoms and principles recognised in the Union and makes those rights more visible, but does not create new rights or principles”.

We have heard about The Beano, and about former Attorney-General Peter Goldsmith, who said in June 2004:

“The Charter is a consolidation of existing rights...It is not a mine for new human rights in this country.”

Crucially, in 2008, on Second Reading of the EU (Amendment) Bill that ratified the Lisbon treaty, David Miliband, told the House:

“The treaty records existing rights rather than creating new ones. A new legally binding protocol guarantees that nothing in the charter extends the ability of any court to strike down UK law”.—[Official Report, 21 January 2008; Vol. 470, c. 1250.]

Our constituents were given an inaccurate prospectus of how the charter would evolve, although I accept it was made in good faith at the time. In the light of that, my position is very clear that the charter should not be incorporated into our law to go on evolving in that way according to the whims of unelected judges.

Tonight we have an opportunity to reassert one final time what this House has been told for the best part of 18 years: the rights under which we live should have their origin in this House and, ultimately, in the British people, under whose authority we serve.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Alex Chalk Excerpts

Committee: 7th sitting: House of Commons
Wednesday 13th December 2017 Commons Chamber

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

Will my right hon. and learned Friend give way?

[Alex Chalk (Cheltenham) (Con)]

Will my right hon. and learned Friend give way?

[Mr Grieve]

May I just make a tiny bit more progress?

As the Government’s position has shifted, they have come up with a written ministerial statement, which seems accurately to reflect the right direction of travel. But the difficulty is that clause 9 is entirely incompatible with what the Government have set out.

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[Mr Grieve]

It would indeed be a remarkable outcome. Certainly, I think that Parliament ought to have a say. Those reasons highlight the difficulty of clause 9. There are other difficulties with the Bill, but clause 9 really has it.

I want to bring my remarks to an end, and I simply say that I do want the Government to listen. The opportunity is here for them to accept the amendment and then to come back on Report and explain themselves further or to tidy the amendment up, and I will listen and try constructively to help them if, indeed, any of this power is needed, but I am not prepared to sign off clause 9 in its present form.

The one merit of amendment 7—I tailored it very carefully and I tried quite deliberately to avoid the no-deal scenario, which is a very legitimate issue, but it is not what I went for—is that I wanted to make sure that these powers could not be used to pre-empt a statute that we should probably be considering this time next year. It is plainly wrong, and if it is to be departed from, the Government have to provide a credible reason for it.

[Alex Chalk]

May I ask my right hon. and learned Friend about a point I am struggling with and that others may be struggling with, too? On the one hand, given that the Government have conceded that there will need to be a statute to implement any agreement, it is difficult, for me at any rate, to see what the point is of clause 9, and Parliament should not legislate in vain. That is point one. On the other hand is the key point not that we will get a vote on that statute, so does this really matter? That is the part I am struggling with, and I would very much welcome my right hon. and learned Friend’s views.

[Mr Grieve]

I think that this does matter. If I understand the reason why the Government want this power, it is that, at the time when we may be considering the next statute, they will also be pushing through this House statutory instruments setting up structures for our departure from the EU that may be, or that we might consider to be, at variance with what we need in the fresh statute that we are considering. I think that that is a form of constitutional chaos, actually. I cannot see how it produces any clarity at all. For that reason—a reason of good process—this is a mistaken course of action, particularly because it is not necessary.

We have heard the argument, “We’re going to run out of time in leaving the EU.” I simply repeat what I have said previously. I realise that this is hugely objected to by some of my right hon. and hon. Friends because they are so fixated on getting us out. The article 50 mechanism provides for a sensible structure to enable us to leave smoothly, yet for reasons that I do not understand, the aim of some of my right hon. and hon. Friends seems to be to mess it up as much as possible. There is the famous amendment 381, for example, which we are going to come back to next week and which I have already indicated I will not support under any circumstances whatsoever. If we actually stick to a sensible process, I say to my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham (Alex Chalk), then we will get the right answers. As I say, if the Government are to justify keeping clause 9, they have to provide us with chapter and verse—and they simply have not done so. I have asked, and I have not had it.

In those circumstances, the only proper course of action—I say this with the greatest reluctance—is that I am going to have to vote for my amendment, and, if necessary, if it is not passed, I will vote against clause 9, because without my amendment, clause 9 becomes a really very worrying tool of Executive power that does not appear to have any reasonable presence in this legislation. Apart from on HS2, I do not think that I have ever rebelled against the Government in my 20 and a half years in this House. I do find it quite entertaining that some who criticise me for speaking my mind on this matter are individuals who appear to have exercised the luxury of rebellion on many, many occasions. But that said, there is a time for everybody to stand up and be counted. As Churchill said, “He is good party man—he puts the party before himself and the country before his party.” And that is what I intend to do.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Alex Chalk Excerpts

Report stage: First Day: House of Commons
Tuesday 16th January 2018 Commons Chamber

[Mr Leslie]

If that were the right way, the Government would have introduced a Bill to provide such certainty, instead of saying, “Mañana. Maybe at some point in the future we will try to close this loophole.” We have the Trade Bill now, as well as the Nuclear Safeguards Bill and a customs Bill. We are supposed to have an immigration Bill at some point, although I suspect that the Government are having a few difficulties figuring out how to bring it forward. These Bills are supposed to be the fundamental underpinnings of the copy-and-paste process that the Government are pursuing. They are supposed to be taking aspects of European Union rules and regulations and ensuring that they will still be here after March 2019, but no Bill relating to the charter of fundamental rights has been brought forward.

[Alex Chalk (Cheltenham) (Con)]

The hon. Gentleman is right about the importance of some of these rights, but may I suggest that incorporating the charter would create complete legal confusion? Under the convention, there is purely a power to make a declaration of incompatibility. Under the charter, however, UK law can actually be trumped. The extraordinary situation could arise in which, if a prohibition against slavery were breached, the courts could merely say that it was incompatible, but if there were a breach relating to data protection, UK law could be trumped. That would create confusion and chaos, which is not what we need in this country.

[Mr Leslie]

Personally, I believe that Parliament does and should value the provisions of the charter of fundamental human rights. I trust our legal system to be able to reconcile textual difficulties between different Acts. I would rather operate on the precautionary principle and have those rights covered within our law than see the protections that are offered to our constituents expunged at this point, only to unwittingly discover later that the rights we used to have under the charter are no longer provided for because the Government of the day did not want to transpose them.

While talking about rights, but in a completely different context, I want to talk about new clause 7, which has been tabled by the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas). It relates to animal sentience and the welfare of animals—not human rights but animal rights. If there is one issue that can be guaranteed to fill all our inboxes, it is the protection of animal rights. Our constituents really do care about this issue. The Government have already got into a tremendous pickle over this, and it would have been funny if it were not so tragic to see the Secretary of State for the Environment scrabbling around trying to pretend that, all of a sudden, the Government really cared about these matters.

Brexit will affect this area quite considerably. On the International Trade Committee, we heard evidence from various animal rights organisations and others involved in the agricultural trade sector, including the National Farmers Union and those involved with what are known as the sanitary and phytosanitary regulations relating to the import and export of animal products. There is a reason that the Americans dip their chickens in chlorine, Mr Speaker. I do not know whether you have had chlorinated chicken recently. I am not that fussy myself, but perhaps we will be invited to a tasting session at the new American embassy at some point. The reason they dip their chickens in chlorine is that the welfare standards that cover their abattoirs and the way in which their animals are looked after before slaughter are far worse than ours. Before the animals reach the consumer, they need to be cleaned up in a way that is not necessary here in the UK because we have higher welfare standards, not least by virtue of our membership of the European Union. Across all the European Union, we take a precautionary principle when it comes to this kind of regulation. We do not have to dip our chickens in chlorine, because they are already subject to certain health and safety standards.

Animal welfare issues matter in relation to trade as well. I find it perplexing when Conservative Members say that our salvation will be a trade deal with President Trump and the United States. We all know that the primary goal of the United States will be to have a treaty in respect of agriculture. If we do such a deal, the Americans will want to sell us animal products that have been produced under lower welfare and regulatory standards. That will be the deal they will seek. However, if the Secretary of State for the Environment says that we are going to have exactly the same regulatory standards as we have now, he will effectively be telling the Americans that there can be no trade deal. That would be the outcome—[Interruption.] It would certainly be a very big sticking point.