Rearmament and Warfighting Readiness

Alex Baker Excerpts

Wednesday 8th July 2026 Commons Chamber

[Mr Francois]

In a moment.

We face a revanchist Russian led by Putin, who launched an invasion of Crimea and the Donbas in 2014, and then an even more brutal, full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. As someone who visited Ukraine in February of this year, I remind the House that the Ukrainians would argue that they have therefore been at war with Russia not for four years, but for 12 years—longer than the first and second world wars combined.

Against that rising threat, Labour produced its much-vaunted strategic defence review, and there was much good in it. However, it still contained echoes of the 10-year rule, declaring the Government’s intention, on page 43,

“to deter, fight and win—with allies—against states with advanced military forces by 2035.”

That is nine years away. The Chief of the General Staff has warned that we might have to fight Russia by 2027, the First Sea Lord said 2029, and even the outgoing Prime Minister said that this might happen by 2030. How are we supposed to deter Putin without a single attack submarine currently at sea, with no new AWACS aircraft in service in the Royal Air Force, still, and with Ajax almost a decade late and still not in operational service, despite Ministers previously promising us that it was fine? That really is corrosive complacency, is not it? The threat is now, and we need to rearm accordingly, including by spending 3% of GDP on defence by 2029 at the very latest, if not earlier.

The three co-authors of the SDR were adamant that the cost of implementing it was spending 3% of GDP on defence, and a year after the SDR was published, we finally received Labour’s plan for how to pay for it: the so-called defence investment plan. But that was not before Labour’s Defence Secretary and Armed Forces Minister—the hon. Member for Birmingham Selly Oak (Al Carns), who is in his place—both resigned on 11 June after months of frustration with the Treasury over the paucity of funding in the plan.

As the outgoing Defence Secretary powerfully wrote in his resignation letter to the Prime Minister,

“you have been unable, and the Treasury has been unwilling, to commit the resources the nation needs to defend the country at this time of rising threats.”

That is damning. The former Armed Forces Minister said in his letter:

“I have sat in the rooms, seen the assessments, and spoken to the commanders who will be asked to do more with less, and I cannot in good conscience stand at the dispatch box and defend a level of investment I know to be inadequate to the task.”

Moreover, the outgoing Defence Secretary revealed that he had been offered an increase in defence spending to only 2.68% of GDP by 2030—billions short of what the SDR authors required.

The new Defence Secretary has tried to argue that he has been given some additional funding—a bit more than £1 billion—but that takes defence spending to barely 2.69% of GDP by 2030, a difference that does not even touch the sides. Sadly, it is worse than that. The chiefs of staff have been urging the Prime Minister and the Chancellor to invest an additional £28 billion in defence over the next four years, partly to enable them to implement Labour’s SDR. They were offered barely £15 billion instead. On closer examination, even that sum unravels rapidly.

As we have heard, £10.7 billion relies on so-called efficiency savings, which is Whitehall code for cuts in MOD spending over the next four years, the bulk of which have not even been identified. On the day of publication, the Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee described that as an old accountant’s trick. It still does not disguise the fact that the MOD would have to make massive in-year spending cuts, including from operations and training, to recycle that money to fund the defence investment plan. The Chief of the Defence Staff warned of the implications of doing that only the other day.

The disastrous DIP also relies on a further £4.7 billion, which has not yet been cleared by the Treasury and will be subject to another public spending round. In other words, the two sums combined will be more than the £15 billion of extra money that was promised. There is practically no new money for defence at all. All we have been offered is Enron accounting and smoke and mirrors to try to pretend that there is a massive increase in defence spending—barely 0.01% of GDP over four years.

[Alex Baker (Aldershot) (Lab)]

Will the right hon. Member give way?

[Mr Francois]

No, I am summing up.

Lord Robertson, the lead author of the SDR, told the Defence Committee only yesterday that

“we are running out of years… the challenge is now bigger, more serious and earlier than we had anticipated, yet the defence investment plan does not come up to it.”

General Barrons, his co-author, told the same Committee that

“the Prime Minister is saying that Russia could attack NATO by 2030, and we essentially lost a year of mobilising for that.”

Incredibly, even the DIP says on page 78:

“The figures presented are indicative rather than precise cost estimates. They do not constitute binding commitments and are subject to the Government’s approval processes, affordability considerations and contracting procedures. Figures have been rounded and, therefore, may not sum.”

You can say that again. In other words, the document isn’t worth the paper it’s printed on. The plan relies on extra money that does not exist. We will not deter the likes of Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping with such unfunded proposals. If Trotsky was right, and war is interested in us, we must rearm now to deter it.

I reluctantly find that the Labour Government are failing the people of this country in the first duty of Government: the defence of the realm. If the incoming Prime Minister cannot plug the £5 billion black hole that he is about to inherit, he should make way for people who can.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Bailey]

Twenty four years of serving this great nation means that I am acutely aware of the risks that the Opposition presented me and manifested during my time in service. That is why I am resolute in addressing these challenges and why I am backing the defence investment plan.

Let me make one point crystal clear: Britain has always met its NATO spending obligations in the past, and under this Government we always will. That begins with the early delivery of our first commitment to raise defence investment to 2.7% of GDP next year, compared with just 2.3%, which was missing from the Opposition’s analysis of the decline in our defence spending.

[Alex Baker]

The debate about percentages of GDP is slightly irrelevant, because even if defence spending were raised to 3%, we have no ability to spend that money within the industrial base, as we do not have the capacity. Does my hon. Friend agree that we need to look at a much more innovative approach to some of these things, with multilateral options? I have been campaigning for the UK to join the Defence, Security and Resilience Bank for over a year.

[Mr Bailey]

My hon. Friend has advocated for the Defence, Security and Resilience Bank and alternative finance methods for the past two years. It was pleasing to see the DSR Bank announcement from Canada over the last couple of days alongside the multilateral defence mechanism announcement from our Government, which, significantly, was joined by Poland. I hope that we will see the DSR and the MDM aligned as we go forward.