Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateDepartment: Home Office
Afzal Khan
Main Page: Afzal Khan (Labour - Manchester Rusholme)Department Debates - View all Afzal Khan's debates with the Home Office
Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Bill
Afzal Khan ExcerptsMonday 28th January 2019
(5 years, 10 months ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Bill 2017-19 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Angus Brendan MacNeil
I want to give the right hon. Lady some breaking news: apparently Labour has U-turned on its abstention and is now going to oppose the Bill. Is that right?
Angus Brendan MacNeil
My goodness, we have breaking news in the Chamber: “Wait and see.”
Afzal Khan (Manchester, Gorton) (Lab)
We have heard passionate speeches from Members on both sides of the debate. By my count, 27 Members have contributed. The hon. Member for Chatham and Aylesford (Tracey Crouch) raised the niche but important issue of immigration in football. I thank the SNP spokesperson, the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East (Stuart C. McDonald), and I hope he will continue to work with us in Committee.
A new immigration system must not damage our economy and our society. My speech will cover the four broad areas that Labour’s objections to the Bill fall into.
Afzal Khan
We will be against. Is that good enough?
First, the Bill is not a blueprint for a new immigration system, but a blank cheque. It contains broad Henry VIII powers that would allow the Secretary of State to amend both primary and secondary legislation. That point was made by my hon. Friends the Members for Bristol North West (Darren Jones) and for Birmingham, Yardley (Jess Phillips), who drew on her constituent’s awful case to highlight the importance of parliamentary scrutiny. The White Paper on immigration is not a final draft; it is out for a 12-month consultation. In any case, the Government are not tied to doing what is in the White Paper. The Secretary of State could use the powers in the Bill to introduce an immigration system that is entirely different from anything that has been discussed without parliamentary oversight or scrutiny.
If the Government go with what is in the White Paper, that would spell disaster for our economy and our society. Their own impact analysis points out that the plans would reduce GDP and would have a cumulative fiscal cost of between £2 billion and £4 billion in the first five years. The suggested short-term visa route would open the door to widespread labour abuses, creating a second class of migrant worker and enormous inefficiencies for businesses. That point was made by the hon. Members for St Austell and Newquay (Steve Double) and for Stirling (Stephen Kerr).
The Government’s plans have come under fire from their allies, as much as from their critics. The CBI described them as a
“sucker punch for many firms right across the country.”
The TUC called them
“a disaster for every worker”.
The British Chambers of Commerce accused the Government of leaving businesses with their “hands tied”. We will be looking to put sensible limits on those powers in Committee to ensure Parliament has a say on our future immigration system.
Our second big concern is about social security co-ordination. The Government already have the power under the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 to ensure continuity in social security in the event of no deal. In fact, the Department for Work and Pensions has already tabled a series of negative statutory instruments that do just that. As the Government admit in the explanatory notes, the powers that they are asking for in the Bill would enable them to bring in a new approach to social security. That is a massive overreach and is entirely undemocratic. At least we have an immigration White Paper that indicates the Government’s thinking. We have no idea what they plan to do on social security.
The third issue relates to EU citizens in the UK. Despite the Government’s warm words about how much they value the contribution of EU citizens and want them to say, there is nothing in the Bill that protects their rights in primary legislation. More than 3.5 million EU citizens in the UK have spent two and a half years under a cloud of uncertainty. The Government have already started rolling back on their promises—for example, not to deny settled status to EU citizens who have not been exercising treaty rights, despite the Prime Minister’s guarantee that that would not happen. Basic fairness to those who have already moved between the UK and the EU, as well as our ability to attract talent in the future, rely on our getting this right.
Fourthly, the problem of accountability and transparency goes far beyond the Henry VIII clauses. The Tories have made it harder and harder to live as a family in this country, and my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Edgbaston (Preet Kaur Gill) made the powerful point that the income threshold disproportionately affected women. The most stark and tragic illustration of this was the Windrush scandal. Let us be under no illusion: the cause of the Windrush scandal was the hostile environment. If we are to avoid a repeat of Windrush for EU citizens, the hostile environment must end. A system cannot be transparent if it is incomprehensible and inaccessible to the average person. The Government must simplify the immigration rules, follow the Law Commission’s recommendations, bring back legal aid and restore data protection.
We find the Bill a missed opportunity to address the moral and humanitarian failures of this Tory Government towards refugees and asylum seekers, as set out emotively by the hon. Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale (Tim Farron) and my hon. Friend the Member for Bristol West (Thangam Debbonaire). There is nothing in the Bill, and very little in the White Paper, on refugees and asylum seekers. At a minimum, we must bring an end to indefinite detention and fix refugee family reunion. I thank my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Camberwell and Peckham (Ms Harman) and the right hon. Members for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis) and for Sutton Coldfield (Mr Mitchell) for their cross-party work to end indefinite detention.
In conclusion, on immigration and social security, the Government have not done their homework. They have come to Parliament asking that we grant them extensive powers without any idea what they might use them for. We are not willing to grant the Government such broad powers to introduce as yet unknown rules on immigration and social security. Listening to the debate, it has become clear that Ministers’ intentions are even worse than we had expected, so we will be voting against the Bill on Second Reading.
Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Bill (First sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateDepartment: Home Office
Afzal Khan
Main Page: Afzal Khan (Labour - Manchester Rusholme)Department Debates - View all Afzal Khan's debates with the Home Office
Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Bill (First sitting)
Afzal Khan ExcerptsTuesday 12th February 2019
(5 years, 9 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Bill 2017-19 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 12 February 2019 - (12 Feb 2019)
The Chair
Q
Professor Ryan: I am Bernard Ryan. I am professor of migration law at the University of Leicester.
Professor Manning: I am Alan Manning, current chair of the MAC and professor of economics at the London School of Economics.
Afzal Khan (Manchester, Gorton) (Lab)
Q
Professor Ryan: I see the Bill as an historic measure. If you take a long view, it is one of the moments at which the basic categories of immigration law are being redefined. In relation to EU citizens, it is essentially just a framework for switching off the rights that exists, but what about the people who are here already? If it is such a fundamental change, should provision not be made for them? Particularly in a no-deal scenario, which of course we have to look at, there is clearly a question about the people who are here now. If we get a withdrawal agreement, there will be implementing legislation for that, but there is no clear plan to have implementing legislation or equivalent legislation in the absence of an agreement. That would leave the people who are already here exercising rights without legislative protection.
Maria Caulfield (Lewes) (Con)
Q
Professor Ryan: I welcome clause 2. Some of us have been arguing for a long time, particularly since the referendum in 2016, that there is not full provision for Irish citizens in immigration law. There is, in a somewhat obscure manner, recognition of Irish citizens coming from other parts of the common travel area—that, in practice, means coming from the Republic—but, of course, that does not give protection or recognition to the position of Irish citizens who might simply enter the United Kingdom from elsewhere, or indeed who are born in the United Kingdom. That is the gap in legislative terms. Of course, the policy in practice is not to require of Irish citizens leave to enter or remain. That has always been the position, but it has never been clearly expressed in legislation. Clearly, this is the time to do it.
Maria Caulfield
Q
Professor Ryan: In terms of legislation, Irish citizens are protected only when they enter the United Kingdom from elsewhere in the common travel area; they are not exempt from immigration law when they enter the United Kingdom from the rest of the world. That is the large gap that clause 2 addresses.
Afzal Khan
Q
Professor Ryan: I would not want to be specific about what might happen in future. I am conscious that the Bill will potentially define a framework for decades regarding EU citizens. We just have to look at the Windrush story. The way in which Commonwealth citizens of that generation still rely on the Immigration Act 1971 to protect them is not fully understood. Section 34 conferred upon them automatic indefinite leave to remain. That is more than 40 years ago. What was put in place then is still being used. We have to think in that kind of timescale. I do not want to be specific about what might change in the future regarding public policy for EU citizens.
Afzal Khan
Q
Professor Manning: The first potential problem is that an employer-driven system can lead to workers being extremely vulnerable. They are here only for short periods and do not really understand the system, and so on. We would need quite extensive regulation to prevent potential abuse of those workers.
Secondly, if you are concerned about the social integration of migrants, it will not help with that. Inevitably, there is no point in people who are here only for a short period investing in building a life here, and links to the wider community.
Thirdly, historically it has been the case that, because it is quite artificial—at the end of 12 months a worker has to leave, perhaps to be replaced by another—it generally sets up some kind of pressure for employers to extend the 12 months. It may start off in that form, but there is a risk of drift into a more permanent migration route.
Jack Brereton (Stoke-on-Trent South) (Con)
Q
Professor Manning: The view in the report that we published in September is that EEA migration has not had very big costs. It has not had very big benefits either. The technical analysis in the White Paper indicated that. There would be impacts here and there. The general point is that after 2004 free movement, more by accident than design, was a system for primarily lower-skilled migration. Most countries have a preference for higher-skilled migrants. The proposals that we made, and that were taken forward in the White Paper, were essentially to alter the balance towards more higher-skilled migrants.
Maria Caulfield
Q
Professor Ryan: Only that they should go together, I suppose, at the commencement of the switch-off, the moment it happens. I am thinking particularly about a no-deal scenario; that has to be in step with the arrangements for the future.
Afzal Khan
Q
Professor Ryan: I was focusing particularly on the question of guarantees for people who are exercising rights already—prior residents, as it were. That is the key detail that is left out. Apart from that, it is understandable that it is a framework and that details will be filled in later, particularly as regards timing.
Afzal Khan
Q
Professor Manning: One example that you could use is the old seasonal agricultural workers scheme. In its early years, there were issues with some undesirable practices, but in later years the MAC’s view—it was before my time, so I was not involved in that piece of work—was that it was a fairly well run system. What is envisaged in the White Paper is potentially on a much bigger scale, which would mean much more expenditure on enforcement and so on. At the moment we do not really have the infrastructure in place for enforcement; it would have to go along with development of the programme itself.
Afzal Khan
Q
Professor Manning: That kind of scheme was not in our report. We laid out reasons why we were not terribly enthusiastic about it, but it was a feature of the White Paper more than of our report.
Stuart C. McDonald (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)
Q
Professor Ryan: That is correct: I have argued in the written evidence—and I believe they will be saying something similar—that there are some adjustments that one could imagine. As it stands, the Bill does not guarantee equality as regards family migration for Irish citizens. That is thinking especially about Irish citizens who might want to relocate to the United Kingdom: they are not guaranteed to be in the same position as British citizens. That is a provision that could be made—or, one hopes that a commitment could be made that the rules will be framed so that Irish citizens will be treated in the same way as British citizens as regards family migration.
There are questions about the deportation provisions as well. I am not disputing that it should be possible to deport Irish citizens or to exclude them, but we need to recognise that the policy has been to do that only in exceptional circumstances. That is somewhat different to the “conducive to the public good” standard that is usually applied in deportation cases. It is important to get clarity about the intentions going forward as regards use of the deportation power. There is a specific issue about Northern Ireland, because of the Belfast Agreement and the entitlement of people from Northern Ireland to identify as Irish citizens. It is important that that entitlement is not compromised by the possibility of deportation of Irish citizens that is confirmed in the Bill.
I have suggested that it could be done through amendments, but the Government could clarify their intentions in relation to Northern Irish citizens.
The Chair
Splendid. Which colleague would like to ask the first question? I call Afzal Khan.
Afzal Khan
Q
Lord Green: Yes—probably medium skilled. Before I answer your question, can I just thank the Chairman for the invitation? I notice that you have about 25 witnesses and we are the only ones whose view is that immigration should be reduced. In saying that, we have the support of some 38 million people. I just leave that on the table as something that the Committee might like to be aware of.
Certainly there are medium skills that are not very well paid. I would have thought that very high skills probably are well paid.
Afzal Khan
Q
Lord Green: Yes, certainly. First of all, we are very doubtful about it in principle. It seems to us to be a rather obvious way of avoiding getting people into the official immigration statistics. I think that is a mistake in terms of public trust. We are assuming, by the way, that EU citizens will be eligible for this, and there are indications that that will be so. There is no difference in effect between somebody who is here for 11 months, goes away for a year’s cooling-off period, and who can then come back and work for a period that has not yet been defined. I only have to say that to illustrate the difficulties of knowing who these people are, where they are and how long they have been here. We simply do not have the necessary information to do that.
Afzal Khan
Q
Lord Green: No, absolutely not.
Afzal Khan
Q
Lord Green: No. Its funds have been cut back as part of general cuts in public funds. It does not have the people it needs and it is simply not able to do the job that I am sure it would wish to do. You only have to look, for example, at the number of people who are here illegally and are removed, which has declined very sharply in recent years.
Afzal Khan
Q
Lord Green: I think you are implying that the Bill does just that—that it is a framework Bill. I think it has to be read in conjunction with the White Paper. We have looked at that to see what the risks might be, and today we are publishing an estimate that it will lead to net foreign migration of about 430,000 a year in a few years’ time. It could even hit half a million unless serious moves are taken to reduce it. From that figure, you have to subtract roughly 50,000 a year, which is the 10-year average of British emigration. You are looking at something like 380,000 net migration quite soon, which is higher than the previous peak of 340,000. Reaching that calculation—as I said, I will send it to the Committee—has very serious political implications, but I will leave that to you. In reaching it, we have deliberately ignored the 11-month workers to whom you referred in your first question, Mr Khan. We think that is misleading, and in practice there will be circular migration that amounts to significant numbers of low-skilled workers.
Let me just explain the proposal to weaken the highly skilled department. As you probably know, the proposal is to reduce the level of skills from degree to A-level, to reduce the salary level from £30,000—even £21,000 has been mentioned—to remove the requirement to advertise a job beforehand, and so on. You would be left with pretty much free movement, because 50% of EU migrants who have come here already are in those higher-skilled categories that the Government are now talking about. The other 50% could come as the 11-month brigade.
You would be looking at something that is very close to free movement, and you would have enormously increased the scope for migration from around the world. As outlined in the White Paper, these moves will open 9 million UK jobs to worldwide competition. That is bound to have a very substantial effect, partly because employers will understandably scour the world for less expensive employees. What is more, there will be a substantial number of employees who would want to come here, because those routes will lead to settlement. Our view is that this is a very dangerous policy in terms of numbers, and therefore in terms of the public response to immigration and immigrants.
The Chair
Lord Green, the Clerk has taken careful note of your remarks about the balance of witnesses. I did not have any hand in it, and we will reflect on the issue.
Lord Green: It is not a criticism. This is life—we are the only body in the UK that makes these points.
The Chair
This final session is even shorter—we have only until 25 past 11. Will our witness kindly introduce himself?
Chai Patel: I am Chai Patel, I am the Legal Policy Director at the Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants.
Afzal Khan
Q
Chai Patel: No. I think to some extent that is because of failings in the Home Office and the Government, but to another it is because the issues that were exposed most clearly by Windrush are very deep-seated in immigration law and the way we conduct almost all our immigration system. I would not necessarily have expected the Government to be able to do that in the time that we have had. The problem we face is that we are moving very quickly towards a situation in which between 3 million and 4 million more people’s immigration status or leave to remain in this country will not be as clear as it once was. That is because European nationals will no longer simply be able to show a passport and have everyone immediately assume that they have the right to work, to rent, to access healthcare and to simply live their lives here.
Over a period of years, several Governments have introduced a compliant or a hostile environment where immigration checks are part of day-to-day life and where private individuals have to carry them out, which we know causes discrimination for non-EU citizens. For example in the right to rent, we know that landlords are less likely to rent to people without British passports. We know that in some situations that can cause ethnicity discrimination. We are now proposing that the status of another 3 million to 4 million people should be potentially uncertain because their passport does not mean what it once did.
As an organisation, we do not have a formal position on the continuation of free movement or on exactly what the best political solution is to these problems. We are concerned with the human rights, the procedural rights and the legal rights of all people in this country, particularly migrants. The situation we are in and the way in which the Government have approached the settlement scheme and resolving some of these issues increases those risks.
Afzal Khan
Q
Chai Patel: Absolutely. I think you have already heard evidence that, at the end of the period allowed for people to make their settlement applications, potentially hundreds of thousands of people will not have been successful in doing so. Those people will be undocumented. They will be in exactly the situation that Windrush people found themselves in. If there is no deal, that could happen much earlier because it becomes very unclear what the difference is between the rights of EU nationals who arrived during the transition period and those of EU nationals who were already here. You might start to see some of those problems occurring much more immediately.
Afzal Khan
Q
Chai Patel: At the moment, non-EU immigration law is extraordinarily complex. Supreme Court judges, Court of Appeal judges, immigration experts and immigration lawyers have all said in public that it is almost impossible for anyone to navigate, let alone for people who are expected to do so without necessarily having perfect English or legal aid. To a great extent, the reason why it is so complex is that immigration rules have been made over many years and over many Governments, and they are frequently made in response to political pressures, without very much consideration of the consequences or of the underlying evidence for making them. They just pile on top of each other and you end up with a system that does not work for anyone.
You have that in the context of a Home Office that has been underfunded for some time and which has seen real-terms cuts to its funding over the past few years. It is now about to be asked to move from a system of free movement, which was, as the Minister said, a light-touch and simple system, to one that is potentially very complex. You, as parliamentarians, are being asked not just to approve that move but to approve the Home Office taking complete control over how the new system is going to work at a time when successive Home Secretaries and Prime Ministers have failed to construct a system that works when they have had the power to do so. At this time, Parliament should not be abdicating its responsibility to scrutinise and to decide what the immigration system should look like. At the moment, from everything that we have seen, the Home Office is not capable of administering the existing system.
Afzal Khan
Q
Chai Patel: One of our recommendations is certainly that the Law Commission’s exercise of simplification should be carried out before any substantial changes are made to the position of EU nationals.
Eleanor Smith
Q
Chai Patel: We have a number of recommendations that we would make if the settlement scheme remained an application process, but we think that, by far the simplest, most cost-effective and safest thing to do is to make it a declaratory scheme immediately and for all EU nationals and all relevant individuals who are currently in the UK under the EU treaties to be granted a legal right, as of law, permanently to remain in the UK. They should then be given the opportunity, over a number of years and with no strict cut-off, to register for documents as they need them.
I understand that concern has been expressed about how to encourage people to apply if there is no cut-off. I think that people will need those documents as part of their day-to-day lives and will apply for them when they need to. It is really important that they are not at risk of becoming undocumented because they have not done so. I hesitate to suggest this because we do not agree with it, but at the moment, the penalty for failing to apply is to lose your status. I understand that there are potentially exceptional circumstances or even some good reasons that might mean that you do not lose it, but the default is that you will lose your status. It is not beyond the wit of Government, if they want to, to devise some other incentive scheme that does not involve losing immigration status.
Jack Brereton
Q
Chai Patel: I do not have any opinion on that, I am afraid. That is beyond our remit as a charity concerned with the human rights of immigrants going through the system.
Afzal Khan
Q
Chai Patel: The Bill is premature because there is no plan for what follows. Our primary concern is the Henry VIII powers given to the Home Secretary to remove people’s rights, without the new system having been clearly set out. I know that there is the White Paper, but I also know that it is contested in Cabinet, and is still subject to intense debate.
The White Paper itself raises concerns about, for example, the one-year visas, which would cause exploitation and problems with integration. It also misses the opportunity to fix many of the problems that we saw with Windrush. There is nothing to address Home Office capacity, with so many new people coming through the system, or the problems with the hostile environment, which remain. We know that it causes discrimination, and we have not seen anything from the Government to roll back those provisions, or to thoroughly review them.
Caroline Nokes
Q
Chai Patel: I think so, yes. Any kind of scheme relating to someone’s rights in respect of continuing work, changing employment or changing the sector in which they are employed will result in exploitation, because they have fewer rights to move between employers than British nationals.
Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Bill (Second sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateDepartment: Home Office
Afzal Khan
Main Page: Afzal Khan (Labour - Manchester Rusholme)Department Debates - View all Afzal Khan's debates with the Home Office
Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Bill (Second sitting)
Afzal Khan ExcerptsTuesday 12th February 2019
(5 years, 9 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Bill 2017-19 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 12 February 2019 - (12 Feb 2019)
Afzal Khan (Manchester, Gorton) (Lab)
Q
Rosa Crawford: The TUC is very concerned that the Bill opens up a wide scope for increased exploitation and insecurity among not only European Union citizens in this country, but UK citizens abroad. To focus on the first part of your question, we are worried that the legislation, by removing EU rules on social security co-ordination, paves the way for the Government to bring in plans to restrict EU social security entitlements for EU citizens, such as jobseeker’s allowance.
We have also seen in the White Paper plans to bring in an immigration health surcharge on EU citizens. From a welfare point of view, we are very concerned that that will mean 3.8 million citizens facing increased poverty and having to pay health charges. The TUC absolutely opposes the immigration health surcharge both for EU citizens and for all migrant workers.
Also, in the context of the Brexit negotiations, it seems reckless to suggest that we will introduce restrictions on EU citizens claiming social security entitlements here in the future when we know that more than 1 million British people live in the EU, many of whom now claim pensions, or will do soon. It is expected that EU countries may well reciprocate, with restrictions on British citizens abroad claiming sickness insurance and unemployment insurance and on claiming their pensions abroad, which is obviously a huge injustice. People have paid all their lives in one country and expect to be able to claim in another. We are very worried about the increasing social insecurity and the welfare repercussions for British people abroad.
On the second half of your question, on exploitation, we have said that the Bill will not only make life harder for EU citizens and workers in this country, but have the effect of making conditions worse for all workers. We say that because, by ending EU rules on free movement, and the right to change employers freely that comes with that, the Bill also paves the way for a more restrictive work visa regime, as the Government outlined in the immigration White Paper. What we have seen of those proposals is a recipe for increasing worker vulnerability.
We know that time-limited visas of the kind the Government have said they want to introduce—specifically the 12-month time-limited visa for low-skilled workers—would increase worker vulnerability exponentially by limiting people’s legal status in a country to their employment. If workers have a limited time to move from one employer to another, we know that will be an incentive for them to stay in abusive forms of employment, because of the difficulty of getting another legal form of employment.
If workers leave an abusive employer and cannot find another, legal form of employment, they become undocumented workers and, under the terms of the Immigration Act 2016, they are committing a criminal offence by working. That means that if they are then abused in an undocumented form of employment and go to the authorities, they could face a jail term and deportation as a result of reporting abuse.
We at the TUC are absolutely opposed to those measures, because they just encourage exploitation. As I said, they make it easier for bad employers to use irregular migrants or those with question marks about their immigration status, who accept lower conditions and undercut UK workers on terms and conditions and on pay. We already see that happening in agriculture, distribution and some sections of cleaning and care. The Bill will make it easier for that exploitation to happen, which is why we are calling on MPs to oppose it.
Afzal Khan
Q
Rosa Crawford: The TUC has said that the Government should scrap all the proposals in the Bill and that we should instead continue to have the current system in place for EU workers to come here, work freely and have all the legal protections in place. For any temporary visa migration system, as I said, time-limited visas bring the inherent risks that workers will face further exploitation because their condition of employment is linked to their legal status in the country.
An important change that would mean that all workers were less at risk of exploitation would be to make sure that workers, regardless of immigration status, could enforce their employment rights. That is in line with the International Labour Organisation’s recommendations. Employment rights are human rights—it is not a crime to work and it should not be a crime to try to claim your right at work. An important step would be to roll back the provisions in the Immigration Act 2016 that criminalise undocumented working. As I said, we have grave concerns about the introduction of any temporary visa scheme for EU citizens, because it would just increase exploitation and make it easier for bad employers to commit undercutting.
Afzal Khan
Q
Vivienne Stern: Perhaps I could start with a comment on the tier 2 route? For a long period, we have had some concerns about the way that the visa regime is working for universities for non-EU nationals, particularly the compliance system, the burdens of the compliance system and the overall effect on the attractiveness of the UK as a place to come and work. The extension of that regime to European economic area nationals raises some significant challenges because of the dependence of universities on EEA workers in some areas; because of the really rather significant increase in the compliance burden that could result—although I understand that there may be opportunities to think about how that can be reduced—and because of the impact of the proposed salary threshold on universities’ ability to recruit in some occupations where it has historically been quite difficult to fill roles with UK-domiciled workers.
Professor Dame Donna Kinnair: We would add to that. We think that we, as a country, are dependent on nurses coming from overseas, so we are absolutely dependent on overseas workers. We know that the impact of the threshold would damage our profession if it were applied to it, because its emphasis is on “Agenda for Change”. The £30,000 is an arbitrary figure and we do not understand where it has come from. Most skilled nurses that come into the country from overseas are not getting that.
We know that there have been some exemptions, but the whole process is arbitrary and we think that it would impact negatively on the workforce on which we are highly reliant. The nursing workforce are one of the major planks that this Government are using to fill shortages in the nursing profession, particularly in social care. It is highly important that the unintended consequences do not apply to the profession, because otherwise we will not have the people to care for our patients.
Afzal Khan
Q
Rosa Crawford: The TUC is very concerned about the impact of the £30,000 threshold. We are concerned about it now—it applies to non-EU workers—and applying it to EU workers would have a devastating impact on many sectors. The Government estimate that 80% of EU workers would fall below the threshold. It is not only nursing and other parts of the health service, but distribution, hospitality and many parts of industry, that are heavily dependent on EU workers. There would be a really negative impact on those workers if that threshold was introduced.
The TUC is saying that, in the long term, there needs to be action on pay so that more workers receive a better settlement. The Migration Advisory Committee has suggested that this threshold would be an incentive to improve pay, but unfortunately that is not what we have seen. The pay cap has been in place for seven years, and we are only just moving out of that. The TUC is still calling for a fully funded settlement to ensure that workers are decently paid and that their wages keep up where they have fallen behind for the last seven years. We have not yet seen that.
Unfortunately, there are not enough employers in the private sector paying workers decently, so many million workers are still in insecure contracts and are not being paid a living wage. We want action on pay alongside action to ensure that the workers we need now to fill the critical shortages that Donna has talked about can come in. We need not to have the £30,000 threshold, and we need serious action on pay in the public sector and key parts of the private sector to ensure that everybody is treated decently and that migrant workers and UK workers receive decent pay for their work.
Maria Caulfield (Lewes) (Con)
Q
Professor Dame Donna Kinnair: You will have seen that the RCN has been lobbying for an increase—we lobbied long and hard on “Scrap the Cap” for nurses—but we are where we are. We have a shortage of 42,000 nurses at the moment, and it is predicted that it will rise to about 100,000 in the next 10 years. Those are people who look after our patients. We are where we are.
Of course we need to increase the domestic supply of nurses, and that includes paying them appropriately. We fully support that, and we have been lobbying on that basis. However, the people who gave evidence to the Select Committee about the Government’s plans talked about three areas: international recruitment, return to practice and retention. We know that you cannot have a nursing workforce fit for the needs of the population of this country unless you increase the domestic supply. As you will have heard, we have been lobbying up and down the country. Unless we get the right staff in the right organisations, we will also seek legislation on staffing. We know that if we do not have the right number of people, care falls, and that is damaging to our patients.
In summary, we are lobbying. We do not understand the proposal about low-skilled workers, because who in nursing is a low-skilled worker? What does that mean? The 12-month visa does not allow continuity of care, because by the time someone has got to grips with the culture of this country, they are ready to go. It is also contrary to people being able to bring their dependants into the country. Many nurses have families. Are we going to split up families? Are we asking them to leave their children while they come and provide care for the UK population?
Maria Caulfield
Q
Professor Dame Donna Kinnair: We welcome the fact that there is one system. The less complex a system is, the better it is, because people can navigate it. It has been a particular Government intention to turn to non-EU nurses, and once we knew that we were coming out of Europe, they sought to draw in nurses from outside the EU. We have concerns because we believe in ethical recruitment. We do not believe that we should be raiding countries that require their nurses, despite the risk of not increasing our domestic supply.
Afzal Khan
Q
Vivienne Stern: For the university sector this is primarily a question of access to specific sorts of skills, and competitiveness. Overall, almost a quarter of academic staff in the university sector come from outside the UK, and in some disciplines and roles the reliance is much greater. EEA nationals make up 11% of all staff in universities, and they comprise 17% of academic staff. For staff on research-only contracts, that figure is 27%. In particular subject areas the concentration of EEA nationals can be even higher, particularly in science, technology, engineering and mathematics, as well as areas such as economics, where more than 30% of academic staff come from outside the UK.
Universities require specific skills, sometimes at relatively short notice, and the pool of talent is geographically distributed in some funny way. For example, the University of Cambridge has a world-leading strength in Arctic and Antarctic research, and it requires a pool of technicians who are able to analyse certain sorts of geological data. Quite often, those teams of individuals are deployed at relatively short notice when the climate conditions are right and boats are available, and it all comes together at the last minute. A group of individuals in Italy possess those skills, and historically Cambridge has called on them, and recruited from Italy to staff up those teams when they need those skills. That does not mean that over time we could not generate our own labour force with those specific skills, but in the short term if we moved from one regime to another, would institutions simply be unable to access the specific skillsets they need for one reason or another? Would they be less able to compete effectively and perform their research because they are constrained in that regard?
Overall, our particular concern relates to staff in technician roles, 63% of whom earn below the £30,000 threshold. That is why we propose that the Government should consider a lower threshold. We would like to suggest £21,000 as the level at which the majority of staff—particularly in those technician roles—will be able to continue to come to the UK. That would be a compromise. We also suggest that for staff whose jobs fall under the shortage occupation list there should be no salary threshold. As others have argued, a salary threshold is not a good proxy for skill level.
Afzal Khan
Q
Vivienne Stern: My concern right now is the low level of take-up of that scheme. I think the last I heard was that the Department for Education estimated that something like 20% of the staff who should have gone through that process had done that, so for us right now, there is a communication effort to make sure that staff are aware of the scheme and how to apply. There were some early glitches. There was a bit of frustration about the app in the very early days, but I think those problems were pretty swiftly resolved, and I am not aware of any significant concerns about the operation of the scheme.
Jack Brereton (Stoke-on-Trent South) (Con)
Q
Rosa Crawford: I think you can take many things from the referendum result in 2016. What is clear is that we need working people to not suffer as a result of that referendum result. As I have outlined, the provisions of the Bill make it easier for bad employers to use one group of workers to undercut other groups of workers, at the cost of everybody’s rights. We want a Brexit deal that ultimately delivers ongoing protections for UK workers at EU levels of rights, as well as tariff-free, barrier-free trade, and that ensures that there is no hard border between Northern Ireland and the Republic. For us, probably the best way to achieve that at this stage would be ongoing membership of the single market and a customs union.
The Chair
We will now take evidence from Liberty and Justice. I welcome our witnesses. We have until 4 o’clock for this session. Please both introduce yourselves.
Gracie Bradley: I am Gracie Bradley, the policy and campaigns manager at Liberty.
Jodie Blackstock: I am Jodie Blackstock, the legal director at Justice.
Afzal Khan
Q
Jodie Blackstock: At Justice we have deep concerns about the potential reach of clause 4, which provides extremely broad delegated powers to the Minister of State in connection with repeal of the current free movement provisions relating to EEA nationals. Of course the provisions have to enable the repeal of those measures after we leave the EU, but it is not at all clear from the Bill what is intended to replace them. We consider that a number of changes are necessary, and we will provide separate detail on those subsequently in our written evidence—I apologise for not having that before you now, but we will provide the detail this afternoon.
First, the primary policy aims ought to be stated on the face of the Bill in primary legislation, so that Parliament has the opportunity to scrutinise those principles and amend them as appropriate. Those provisions would be to enable the accrued rights of EEA nationals who currently have settled status in this country to remain and for the transitional provisions surrounding those rights to be introduced in a clear way. Currently, the Government have proposals on both issues, and we see no reason why they could not put them on the face of the Bill. I can come back to that in more detail.
Secondly, we consider that the delegated powers set out in clause 4 should be substantially limited. The memorandum on delegated powers that the Government have provided seeks to explain that the two key aims of that clause are to deal with technical amendments to remove references that are no longer appropriate to the EU from legislation and also to protect the accrued rights of EU and EEA nationals. If that is the intended aim, those can be the powers as set out in the Bill, and we would propose that it be constrained in that way, through a provision relating to technical amendments and a power to provide consequential amendments that will give effect to accrued rights.
In our view, there are additional consequences from that relating to section 3 of the Immigration Act 1971, which provides for the immigration rules. In these circumstances, which to a certain extent are unique and will create the biggest change to immigration policy since the Maastricht treaty in 1992, we suggest that the power to make those changes ought not to be left simply to immigration rules but should be set out in the Bill, or the use of section 3 of Immigration Act to do so should be specifically constrained as an alternative to the Bill. If you would like me to go into any of those points in a bit more detail, I can do so, but I wanted to set out our primary concerns about the way the delegated power operates.
Gracie Bradley: Liberty would echo those concerns. We are really quite concerned about clause 4, and particularly the fact that the purpose of regulations under the clause may be not just in consequence of the repeal of retained EU legislation relating to free movement, but in connection with that purpose. In our view, essentially any change to the immigration system for the foreseeable future will be in connection with the end of free movement, and therefore we are delegating a huge amount of power to the Secretary of State, effectively sidelining Parliament in a really significant policy change.
Afzal Khan
Q
Gracie Bradley: The impact of the hostile environment has really been laid bare by the Windrush scandal, and I would like to set Liberty’s comments in that context. We have seen people who had a right to be here made destitute, losing their livelihoods, and potentially being unable to come back into the country that they have called their home for decades. Some people have died as a result of the stress.
That is the impact of the Windrush scandal, but of course the effects of the hostile environment are not limited to Windrush citizens; it reverberates among undocumented people more generally. Those impacts are to do with children being afraid to go to school because of data sharing between the Home Office and the Department for Education, and people, some of whom are supposed to be receiving palliative care, being charged tens of thousands of pounds for medical treatment. We have seen victims and witnesses of serious crime deterred from reporting those crimes to the police. The impact is not just on the fundamental rights of undocumented people; the impact is to warp our public services and turn our teachers and doctors into border guards.
More generally, we see an environment of suspicion towards anybody who seems visibly foreign or who is black or minority ethnic. That discriminatory effect has been evidenced by the research of the Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants into landlord checks. We see that landlords are less likely to rent to BAME people without a passport as opposed to white people. We have seen incredibly broad and harmful effects of the hostile environment on the rights of undocumented people, people with a right to be here, British citizens and our public services.
Our concern is that the Bill essentially hands Ministers a blank cheque to bring millions more people into that system while doing nothing to remedy the injustices that have been exposed. We recommend that the hostile environment be repealed and that vital safeguards are restored to the immigration system, such as data protection rights and legal aid, and that there is also an end to indefinite immigration detention.
Afzal Khan
Q
Gracie Bradley: It is important to say first that the 28-day time limit on immigration detention is not Liberty’s proposal. The Joint Committee on Human Rights proposed that back in 2006 or 2007. A joint inquiry by the all-party parliamentary groups on migration and on refugees, which I know some of you were involved with, also recommended a 28-day time limit on detention. Why do we think the Bill is the place to implement that time limit? Put very simply, the Bill will most likely make tens of thousands more people liable to deportation, because EEA nationals will come under the automatic deportation provisions in the UK Borders Act 2007.
We know that the Ministry of Justice, in response to a freedom of information request, said that it expects that up to 26,000 people per year could be liable to detention as EU nationals come under domestic immigration law. At the same time, a parliamentary question revealed that there has been no assessment of the impact of the Bill on the detention estate. Of course, we know what the impact of indefinite detention is on people. They tell us that it is traumatic. They tell us that the lack of a time limit in itself is traumatic, because they do not know when their detention will end.
Liberty is not alone in advocating for a time limit. The lack of a time limit has been criticised by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the Bar Council and the British Medical Association, and on Second Reading parliamentarians from across the House stood up in support of a 28-day time limit. Given that the Bill is very likely to make more people vulnerable to detention, now is absolutely the time to implement a time limit on detention for everybody and, indeed, to begin looking at taking deprivation of liberty out of the immigration system more broadly.
David Duguid
Q
Jodie Blackstock: It is not something that we at Justice specifically have an opinion on, other than to say that the arrangements that are created must ensure that the acquired rights that people currently exercise as a consequence of their movement between the UK and the EU are protected, and that the process that is decided for those individuals post exit needs to be subject to the scrutiny of Parliament and not decided simply through a delegated power without sufficient scrutiny. That is why we say the procedure ought to be encapsulated in the Bill through a requirement that such a policy must be subject to the scrutiny of Parliament.
There are two schemes that the Government have already implemented and will come to fruition once we leave: the EU settlement scheme for those who are already in this country and are requesting settlement, if they do not already have that status; and the proposal for temporary leave to remain for people coming into the country who wish to remain and work here. Given that one of those schemes is already in the immigration rules and the other is well advanced, so there must be policy for it, it seems to us entirely appropriate that the procedure should be laid before Parliament in the Bill and be subject to scrutiny, rather than simply left to a delegated power that does not provide you with the opportunity to debate the important issues concerning what preferential treatment EU nationals should be given.
Kate Green
Q
Jodie Blackstock: The memorandum suggests that Government require the ability to change policy on social security co-ordination, and that is the purpose of creating a power here. Policy change would arguably not be possible under section 8 of the withdrawal Act, so Government are intending to do something broader here. In our view, it is wholly inappropriate to be changing policy relating to really fundamental provision for people who cross borders. We are talking about pension rights, access to healthcare, maternity and paternity leave—provision that may have built up over a significant number of years while a UK national resides in another EU country. It is simply not appropriate to leave that to a policy change by way of delegated power, but it seems to us, from their memorandum, that Government are expressly intending to do that to get around the limitations in section 8.
Gracie Bradley: I do not have anything to add to that.
Afzal Khan
Q
Gracie Bradley: When it comes to data protection, many of you will be aware that the Data Protection Act 2018 includes a very broad exemption that allows a data controller to set aside somebody’s data protection rights when their data is being processed for the purposes of immigration control, essentially. Liberty notes from the White Paper that automated data processing is likely to be used increasingly in the context of enforcing the hostile environment, and Liberty has, for the last couple of years, been scrutinising what have been relatively secret bulk data-sharing agreements between the Home Office and other Departments, such as the Department for Education, and NHS Digital, as well as ad hoc data-sharing practices between individual police forces and the Home Office.
Essentially, what Liberty is concerned about is the fact that the Home Office is really quite a poor data controller, and yet automated data processing is increasingly going to be the linchpin of implementing the hostile environment. We see, in the most recent independent chief inspector of borders and immigration report, that actually the Home Office is developing a status-checking project that would essentially enable multiple controllers, such as landlords, employers, health services and law enforcement, to check a person’s immigration status in real time.
Liberty is concerned, first, that no mention was made of that project during the Data Protection Bill debates, despite Government being asked repeatedly what they wanted that exemption from data protection law for. Secondly, we are concerned, in the light of the Home Office’s track record on data protection, that this system is going to be implemented in such a way as to leave people without redress and without remedy when the Home Office makes mistakes.
Some of you will remember that, in 2012, Capita was contracted to text almost 40,000 people suspected of being in the UK illegally, telling them to leave the country. Those 40,000 texts were sent, and many people received the texts in error. Veteran anti-racism campaigners who had lawful status in the UK were sent texts telling them to go home. It is one thing to send somebody a text in 2012—I appreciate that will have been distressing for people—but it is entirely another thing for an error on someone’s record to mean that they cannot access housing, lawful work, free healthcare or education. The Data Protection Act immigration exemption stops people from being able to find out what information is held about them by a data processor, and stops them from having the right to know when information on them is shared between processors.
Our concern is that, in the context of the Home Office’s relatively poor track record on data processing, this digitised hostile environment will be enacted and people will be left without redress. Indeed, we see from the National Audit Office report on the Windrush scandal that the Home Office had been asked by the NAO and the independent chief inspector of borders and immigration to clean up its migrant refusal pool, and had resisted all requests to do so. We are concerned about the impact of error on people, but we are also concerned about the impact of being able, at the click of a button, to exclude people from essential goods and services that are necessary for the exercise of their fundamental rights. The hostile environment should be repealed, rather than entrenched using exemptions in data protection law.
You also asked me about legal aid. I do not have a huge amount to say about legal aid, except that for the most part, there is no legal aid for immigration claims. Again, we see from the Windrush scandal what happens when people do not have access to early, good-quality legal advice. There are people in the UK who are undocumented, not because they have intentionally tried to evade the rules, but because they have been unable to retain their status as a result of not being able to access good-quality legal advice—or, indeed, because they have been unable to make the necessary applications because they cannot afford to pay prohibitive application fees. Many of you will know that it costs more than £1,000 to register a child as a British citizen.
When it comes to safeguards, we would say: get rid of that exemption in the Data Protection Act—it is paragraph 4 of schedule 2—reinstate immigration legal aid, because it is a false economy not to give people access to it, and look again at your fees. It should not be the case that the Home Office is profiting from fees when people need to make applications to regularise their status in the UK, or to claim British citizenship—to which children should be entitled in any event. Those are the basic safeguards that need to be reinstated before millions more people are brought into the immigration system.
Afzal Khan
Q
Jodie Blackstock: In principle, there will be. At the moment, we have complicated reciprocal arrangements that require member states to give effect to policy schemes across borders. Without an agreement in place, we could unilaterally make a decision to honour those schemes in this jurisdiction, and that might be seen as a policy change that it is not possible to make pursuant to section 8 of the withdrawal Act. That might be a positive way of protecting the rights of individuals who have access to such schemes at the moment in the UK, or indeed the rights of UK nationals who are living abroad.
If that is the intention of the legislation, there must be—as the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee has said in the context of the made affirmative procedure—work that has been undertaken already, and proposals that Parliament can consider and scrutinise to ensure that they protect accrued rights. There may well be a policy decision to limit those rights, and for the same reasons we think it is appropriate that Parliament gets to see those proposals. At the moment, the provisions in this Bill, as opposed to the regulations that have been submitted under section 8 of the Act, are just too broad. We propose that there should be scrutiny of those regulations rather than having an unknown power here.
Afzal Khan
Q
Gracie Bradley: Absolutely. There are many things that I would have expected the Government to do before bringing forward this Bill, not least setting out the detail of the future immigration system, so that it could be appropriately scrutinised.
The Law Commission’s proposals are another thing that we think the Government should have looked at, but they have not necessarily looked at. Although I appreciate that the Government have given themselves this very broad delegated power, through which they may be able to implement future changes to the immigration system that take those proposals into account, when it comes to policy making that affects people’s lives, livelihoods and fundamental rights, that is not the right way to make policy.
The Chair
Before I bring the Minister in, does any other colleague want to ask anything?
The Chair
Welcome Mr Fell. Would you introduce yourself?
Matthew Fell: Good afternoon. I am Matthew Fell. I am the chief policy director at the Confederation of British Industry.
Afzal Khan
Q
Matthew Fell: There are a number of areas where we think there is a challenge. Most specifically, we would be very concerned about the imposition of a salary threshold—£30,000 is most commonly talked about at the moment. When we look at the shape of the economy today, we see a number of sectors—construction, logistics, hospitality—and many regions and nations around the UK where that threshold is significantly out of kilter with median salaries. There are a number of areas where that threshold would lead to a dramatic shortage of skills and of labour availability to meet the needs of the economy today. Although you could envisage a world in which, over time, businesses and other parts of society could adapt, we are concerned about going from the situation in which we are today in a very short period, without knowing precisely the nature of the rules or of the negotiation about what we are going to jump into. That lack of time to adapt is also a source of concern.
Afzal Khan
Q
Matthew Fell: There are a number of areas. First, we fear that that could significantly lead to an increase in the rate of churn of people, which clearly creates problems for business: it impacts on productivity, if you are constantly having to get new employees up to speed, for example, it adds to recruitment costs if you constantly need to bring new people into the organisation, and it has impacts beyond business too. Thinking about societal impacts, it could undermine the integration of people into local communities, and so on.
The second bucket or basket of concerns is around the inability to then switch on to a more skilled visa route. For example, if you invest in the training and upskilling of an individual there is currently no proposed mechanism for them to transfer from a lower-skilled 12-month route to a proper skilled visa route, so there are a number of different concerns about that.
Afzal Khan
Q
Matthew Fell: I think I am right in saying, but I am happy to take a little more detail on this, that the Government have confirmed that even in the event of a no-deal scenario there would be no, or no significant, changes to the administrative burdens on employers before the proposed new immigration system came into play. Clearly, if that situation changed, the administrative burden would be a bigger headache for business.
Jack Brereton
Q
Matthew Fell: The Migration Advisory Committee looked at that heavily in terms of any potential impact on the rest of the economy, society and so on. I think the conclusion it drew was that there was no major evidence of an impact on either jobs availability or wages. I think it highlighted some impacts on public services, and a bit on house prices and so on in certain areas, but I do not think it identified any real evidence of that.
Stuart C. McDonald
Q
Matthew Fell: The CBI’s natural constituency, if you like, is typically employers as opposed to the self-employed. The self-employed population is a huge contributor and hugely important to the UK economy. It is not an area that we particularly speak about, though, or which I focus on.
Afzal Khan
Q
Matthew Fell: I would be happy to share with the Committee a significant piece of work that the CBI published in the summer of 2018, where we took an in-depth look at a number of business sectors around the economy. The key conclusion was that it is hard to identify any sectors that are not impacted in this way. The reason for that is the interconnected nature of business today.
To give you a small example, we have a huge challenge in this country around house building. In order to build the 300,000 homes a year that we need, we need everything from architects to electricians, bricklayers and on-site labourers. The conclusion we drew was that if you take one piece out of that, the whole project does not get done. Our findings were that you could almost extend that logic to any part of the economy. For example, take the retail sector and its dependence on the logistics sector for distribution, and so on. It is really quite hard to identify any part of the economy where, even if we think it is not directly impacted by these issues, indirectly they do have a consequence.
On the regional aspect, looking at the statistics, we have a piece of work out today that looks at analysis by region. Even if you take a really quick glance at the numbers, median wages today are somewhere between £21,000 to £24,000 in most regions of the UK outside London. That tells you that the impact is quite significant across the country.
Afzal Khan
Q
Matthew Fell: I do not know whether it would further increase inequality. As part of my job I travel around the country quite extensively. I think it would create huge headaches in parts of the UK, not least in respect of the time to adapt. I spend quite a lot of time in Belfast in Northern Ireland and in some of the northern regions in England, for example, where it is really quite significant and they are deeply concerned by it.
The Chair
If there are no other questions from colleagues, I will bring the Minister in next.
Afzal Khan
Q
Matthew Fell: In the piece of work that we published in summer 2018 we asked, “How do you really build confidence and align that to control?” At the time, we proposed dropping the net migration target, because we felt that continually missing it was undermining confidence in the system. We said that there could be a number of different controls, such as registration on arrival. If you are not in work, in training or self-sufficient after three months, that would be a test of whether you can stay in the country.
We looked at other examples of labour market tests. The other issues that we identified at the time were the better and more rapid use of things such as the controlling migration fund, so that in areas of high immigration where there are clear impacts on public services we could better address and mitigate those concerns. Those were the clutch of proposals that we were talking about at the time.
The Chair
If there are no further questions, I thank Mr Fell very much indeed for his evidence to the Committee.
The final session starts at 4.30pm, so I suspend the sitting.
The Chair
Our next evidence session is with Focus on Labour Exploitation. Could our witnesses both introduce yourselves, please?
Caroline Robinson: Good afternoon. I am Caroline Robinson, the chief executive of Focus on Labour Exploitation.
Meri Åhlberg: Good afternoon. I am Meri Åhlberg, research officer for Focus on Labour Exploitation.
Afzal Khan
Q
Caroline Robinson: At Focus on Labour Exploitation, we have been looking for some time at the risks that immigration control measures, in particular, pose for modern slavery. Obviously, with this Bill—as with all measures regarding Brexit—we have a new risk that a much greater proportion of workers could be undocumented if they do not register under the EU settlement scheme, or because of the confusion that Brexit provides.
We think that there are particular risks arising from measures set out in the immigration White Paper, namely the temporary and migrant worker programmes and the short-term visas discussed in that paper. Our particular concerns are about barriers to the integration of the workers, which could mean that they have limited access to their labour rights. That puts workers at real risk of not understanding their rights in the UK labour market, and at risk of exploitation. There is also the potential for things like debt bondage: if recruitment measures are taken overseas over which we do not have jurisdiction, and workers have to pay high fees in order to come to the UK—whether recruitment fees or just for work permits and travel—that could leave them open to a real risk of debt bondage.
Meri Åhlberg: There is a real risk, for instance, that the 12-month programme will mean a constant churn of vulnerable workers who are not aware of their rights and do not have the chance to build up social networks that could support them. Workers will not have recourse to public funds. Those coming here to work in precarious jobs—for instance, in the hospitality sector, in which they might be on a zero-hours contract and have 40 hours of work one week and two hours the next—will, if they have no recourse to public funds, be very vulnerable.
A lot of other specific migration policy issues make workers vulnerable. For instance, under the seasonal workers pilot, which is also in the immigration White Paper and is being brought in through secondary legislation, workers have no guaranteed hours or guaranteed earnings. If they come here to work in the agricultural sector and are on a zero-hours contract, they will not necessarily be earning enough to cover their flights or visa costs if there is a bad harvest, for instance. Those are the kinds of things that we need to think about.
Afzal Khan
Q
Caroline Robinson: We have had some positive signs from the Home Secretary, who mentioned at a hearing of the Select Committee on Home Affairs that measures would be taken to evaluate the risk of exploitation that the seasonal workers pilot presents to workers. However, we are still quite anxious about the detail and about what it will mean in practice.
We look a lot at the role of labour inspectorates in preventing modern slavery, and we have a particular concern about the limited resources of agencies such as the Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority, which will need to license labour providers under the seasonal workers pilot, whatever country they may come from. Understanding the legislation of the countries concerned and identifying and engaging with prospective labour providers will obviously be a heavy drain on the agency’s resources, but we have not heard that any extra resources will be provided to facilitate that role. We also welcome the Government’s intention to create a single labour inspectorate, but the detail available at this stage is very limited.
It is positive that the Home Secretary has recognised that there is a risk. We look forward to engaging on the detail of how it will be addressed.
Meri Åhlberg: It is important to recognise that within the discussion about ending free movement and moving towards temporary migration schemes, we need to include labour market enforcement, as Caroline said. The UK has one of the least resourced labour inspectorates in Europe: the International Labour Organisation recommends that there should be one labour inspector per 10,000 workers, but the UK has 0.4 per 10,000. Per worker, half as much resourcing is put into labour inspection as in Ireland. There is a real need for proactive labour market enforcement, especially as more and more migrants are brought under immigration control, given fewer rights and made more vulnerable.
Afzal Khan
Q
Meri Åhlberg: I have already mentioned a few of the features of temporary schemes that make people vulnerable to exploitation. One of the main ones is that allowing people to stay for only six or 12 months means a constant churn of workers who are not necessarily aware of their labour rights, who do not have time to build networks and so on. There are often other restrictions, such as “no recourse to public funds”, that come with temporary contracts and put people at risk of exploitation. Those are the key issues with temporary migration programmes—there is definitely a risk.
Afzal Khan
Q
Caroline Robinson: To allow businesses?
Afzal Khan
To increase fees. You have said in the past that that might lead to debt bondage, so can you elaborate on how that would happen?
Caroline Robinson: Yes, certainly. We have looked quite extensively at other temporary migration programmes around the world and previous schemes in the UK, and we certainly see a risk in relation to recruitment fees. As I mentioned earlier, there is the possibility of elevated fees and also, as Members will be aware, the definition of debt bondage is an increased fee that is disproportionate to the initial fee paid, and using that fee to coerce an individual into an exploitative working condition.
We see that as a real risk in relation to overseas recruitment, but there are also the high fees that people will have to pay for their visa and for their travel to the UK. Obviously, because we know more of the detail on the seasonal workers pilot, we know that people will be coming for a short period of time—a six-month period—and, as Meri said, on zero-hours contracts, so there is no guarantee of a high rate of pay necessarily, and with potentially quite high up-front fees. So the risk is great there.
Also, we have looked at things like bilateral labour agreements. For example, Canada and Mexico have established an agreement on agricultural workers, where clear terms are established in terms of the minimum hours that workers will have, the minimum working week and the hours that people can be guaranteed, so that there are clear terms for workers, and so workers can budget accordingly and not face the risk of a huge debt that they cannot then repay, or, as I mentioned, a debt that increases disproportionately in relation to the initial debt, which is a risk.
Meri Åhlberg: For example, in Sweden they have migration from Thailand to pick berries, and what they were finding was that people would come, and they would pay high costs for flights, and then they would pay visa costs, and then they would come to Sweden and the blueberry season would be poor and they would not be able to pick enough even to cover their flights. So they would come, work for the summer and then leave in debt.
What Sweden has done, for instance, is that there is a minimum guaranteed wage that employers in Sweden have to prove they can pay. It is a minimum of approximately £1,100 per month for these workers, to each worker that they are recruiting, to make sure that people are not coming and not earning enough to cover their visa costs or their flight costs. There are also important protections that could be put in place.
Kate Green
Q
Caroline Robinson: As I said, we work a lot on the role of the labour inspectorates, particularly, while it still exists—as I said, there is a discussion about a single labour inspectorate and the Government have committed to that—at the Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority’s licensing being expanded to high-risk sectors, particularly those that are likely to take on a number of short-term workers in the future. Those sectors are already high-risk and then they might have a high proportion of short-term migrant workers. We feel that there is a really strong case then for licensing those sectors—sectors discussed, such as care and construction—where there is a real risk to workers of exploitation.
We have also looked at the Agricultural Wages Board and the seasonal workers pilots, obviously in the agricultural sector. We are lucky that we still have an Agricultural Wages Board in Scotland and in Northern Ireland, but the absence of one in England and Wales is a real risk in terms of setting the standards for workers in the agriculture sector. So I think it would be useful to look at what kind of worker voice could be integrated in setting standards in the agriculture sector, again given the high risk of isolation and exploitation of workers.
Meri Åhlberg: Another important thing would be to grant people access to public funds. If people are coming here on work contracts they are paying taxes, so they are paying for their services. It seems counterintuitive to not allow people access to services they are already paying for, making them vulnerable in that process.
Caroline Robinson: I would mention again these bilateral labour agreements, to have some kind of engagement with sending categories. At the moment the Gangmasters and Labour Abuse Authority has to rapidly try to license labour providers in a range of countries outside the EEA. They have already found it quite hard within the EEA to license labour providers, understanding the different jurisdictions and engaging with workers’ possible vulnerabilities. Having a structure and engagement on the basis of labour rights with a country that sends workers to our country and ensuring labour standards are upheld offers a framework, at least, for enforcing labour rights.
Afzal Khan
Thank you Chair. Let me say, first of all, that throughout this day your chairmanship has been excellent. We have got through a lot of evidence. My final question—
Afzal Khan
Q
Meri Åhlberg: I’m sorry, the fees for the workers or fees—
Afzal Khan
Yes, for the employer. The suggestion was employers have to pay higher fees for the second year and higher even for the third.
Meri Åhlberg: I would have to think about that and get back to you. In terms of having longer than a 12-month period, I have already said that I think that would be important. The danger of these temporary migration programmes and of having temporary workers who are not integrated into UK society is that you are creating a two-tier employment system where you have migrant workers in low-wage jobs with poor protections and with fewer rights. They also do not have the right to vote and they do not have any say over the conditions or the laws governing them. Also, they are being changed every year, so they do not have a community, they do not necessarily unionise and so on. It is a dangerous system and I do not see why we would have to limit it to 12 months.
The Chair
I thank our two witnesses, who stepped in early and accommodated the Committee. Thank you very much for the time you spent with us.
Immigration and Social Security Coordination (EU Withdrawal) Bill (Fifth sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateDepartment: Home Office
Afzal Khan
Main Page: Afzal Khan (Labour - Manchester Rusholme)Department Debates - View all Afzal Khan's debates with the Home Office
Immigration and Social Security Coordination (EU Withdrawal) Bill (Fifth sitting)
Afzal Khan ExcerptsTuesday 26th February 2019
(5 years, 9 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Bill 2017-19 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 26 February 2019 - (26 Feb 2019)
Caroline Nokes
This is an opportunity for Members to express their views about the future immigration system. Far from giving the game away, the White Paper is an opportunity, and we have said that there will be a year of engagement on it during which we will consider all views. We already have a system in which nationals from some countries require visas for visits and others do not, and we will be seeking to establish relationships. All such matters will be for future negotiation and discussion. It is absolutely right that, as a first step in the process, we listen to what we were told in the 2016 referendum and end free movement.
I want us to continue to be an open, outward-looking and welcoming country. I reiterate what I and my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary have said many times: we value immigration and the contribution that people have made to our society, our culture and our economy. There are many people, including hon. Members on this Committee, who are rightly interested in the design of the future system. That is why we are engaging on the proposals set out in the White Paper, “The UK’s future skills-based immigration system”. That will include sessions that are open to all MPs to discuss specific points of interest on the proposals. In the past few weeks, I have held engagement sessions with Members on students and workers, and in the coming days there will be another one on asylum.
The purpose of the Bill is clear: we are ending free movement and providing the legal framework for the future border and immigration system. Clause 1 introduces the first schedule, which contains a list of measures to be repealed in relation to the end of free movement and related issues. The clause fulfils a purely mechanistic function to introduce the schedule. It is the bare bones of the Bill. I look forward to debating it further with hon. Members, who may address certain aspects of it in amendments that undoubtedly will be tabled to other parts of the Bill. To get matters under way, I commend clause 1 to the Committee.
Afzal Khan (Manchester, Gorton) (Lab)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stringer.
This clause—this entire Bill, for that matter—puts the cart before the horse. Labour has been clear that our immigration policy is subordinate to our economic and trade policy. The Government’s position on Brexit, on the other hand, has been consistent in just one way: they insist on putting immigration ahead of our economic needs. We simply cannot support measures that would cause our country to be worse off.
It is a fact that freedom of movement ends when we leave the single market, but the Prime Minister herself has recognised the need for frictionless trade and has been told categorically by the EU that that cannot be maintained without a close relationship with the single market. If the Government cannot yet be clear about what the final agreement will be on our relationship with the single market, this makes no sense. Until the Government get their ducks in a row, we simply cannot vote for such a measure.
The Bill also fails to address two major questions facing Parliament. The first is how we will protect the rights of the 3.5 million people who have already moved to the UK and made their lives here. On Second Reading, the Home Secretary said,
“my message to the 3.5 million EU citizens already living here has also been very clear. I say, ‘You are an incredibly valued and an important part of our society; we want you to stay. Deal or no deal, that view will not change.’”—[Official Report, 28 January 2019; Vol. 653, c. 507.]
Yet the Government have made no provisions in the Bill to protect those citizens.
Kate Green (Stretford and Urmston) (Lab)
Does my hon. Friend agree that the Bill would be the ideal opportunity to offer statutory reassurance to those 3.5 million people by including the details of the Government’s settled status scheme and their ongoing proposals for protecting those people’s rights?
Afzal Khan
I agree wholeheartedly with my hon. Friend’s comments. Labour has tabled a number of new clauses to the Bill that would put the rights of EU citizens into primary legislation. We hope that the Government accept those when we get to that point.
The second question is what our new immigration system should be doing in the future. The Bill is incredibly flimsy; it is only 16 pages long, which is extraordinary given that it will mean the biggest change to our immigration system in decades. Instead of putting forward a new immigration system that Parliament can discuss and debate, amend and improve, the Bill grants powers to Ministers to introduce whatever system they like through extensive Henry VIII powers. We were given an indication of what such a system might be like in the White Paper published by the Government in December. In fact, Ministers are under no obligation to use the powers to implement that system. If they implement the system described in the White Paper, it will spell disaster for our economy and our society.
We will go into these matters in more depth in subsequent debates, but expert witnesses at our evidence sessions criticised almost all aspects of the Government’s plans. The £30,000 threshold would be a disaster for business and public services such as the NHS. The 12-month visa would lead to exploitation. Labour has no problem with immigration that would treat all migrants the same no matter where they came from, but that is not the system the Government propose. The White Paper is explicit that there will be certain visas and conditions that will apply only to people from “low-risk countries”—a categorisation that the Government are not at all transparent about. Apart from those two glaring absences, the Bill before us fails to address a litany of problems with our immigration system, some of which we seek to remedy through our amendments.
Before I conclude, I have two questions that I would like the Minister to address. First, under what circumstances would the Government use the powers in the Bill? We have heard that this is a contingency Bill, so if there is a withdrawal agreement and thus a withdrawal and implementation Bill, will the Government use powers in that Bill to repeal free movement? Secondly, could the provisions in this Bill lead to a change in immigration law that affects non-European economic area migrants? Could the Government use the powers in the Bill to amend immigration legislation that affects non-EU citizens?
As the Minister will know, the Government are asking for extensive Henry VIII powers. During our Committee sittings, Adrian Berry, Steve Valdez-Symonds and Martin Hoare, all experts in immigration law, confirmed to me that the powers in the Bill could be used to make legislation affecting non-EU citizens. Is the Minister willing to contradict the experts? Does she agree that, if it is indeed the case that the powers in the Bill could be used to make legislation that affects non-EU citizens, its scope is much wider than the end of free movement?
Stuart C. McDonald
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stringer. I thank the Clerks for working their way through a mountain of amendments and making them presentable in the last few days. I thank the various organisations and individuals for their help and ideas for amendments, and I thank the shadow Minister for engaging with us over the last couple of days. Any flaws in the amendments we have tabled are my responsibility alone. Finally, I thank the Minister; she has been very open to discussion, approachable and good humoured, as ever. The fact that I can’t stand the Bill and utterly oppose it should not be taken personally. Hopefully, we will still be able to have some useful and constructive debates.
I will not rehash all the points I made on Second Reading. I love free movement; my party fully supports it and I pretty much believe it is the best thing since sliced bread. I regret that it is in danger of coming to an end. It will leave the United Kingdom in an unusual position historically. This country has, for almost its entire history, allowed certain citizens to come and go, whether EU citizens, Commonwealth citizens or, before that, absolutely everybody. All the evidence is that free movement is beneficial to us, for growth, productivity and public finances. In Scotland, it has transformed our demographic outlook from a country of net immigration to a country of positive migration. The quid pro quo for all this is that we will lose our free movement rights. My family and I have benefited from free movement, as have many Members, including on this Committee. I regret that this Parliament will pull up the ladder behind it.
The challenges of free movement that are often cited will not be solved by ending free movement but by proper labour market standards and enforcement, by integration strategies and by investment in public services. Neither do the justifications for ending free movement stack up. Indeed, it was striking in the Minister’s speech and in the speeches of some Government Members on Second Reading how little free movement and the supposed justifications for ending it were addressed.
It is wrong to say that people voted to end free movement, because it was not on the ballot paper. To argue the contrary is to argue that almost 100% of leave voters were motivated by that alone. That is not the case. This is the Prime Minister’s red line, not the people’s red line. Opinion polls and studies show that if it comes to a choice between a closer trading relationship with Europe and ending free movement, a closer trading relationship wins. Simply repeating ad nauseam that we are “taking back control of our borders” is not an argument.
Now is the most bizarre moment for MPs to consider voting to end free movement. Parliament hopefully is on the verge of taking control. Who knows what trading arrangements may be secured, perhaps involving free movement. A people’s vote is even more on the cards than it was at the time of Second Reading. As the shadow Minister said, the Bill puts the cart before the horse. Let us sort out our negotiating position first, then we can decide what that means for free movement. If the public are happy enough to retain free movement for a closer trading arrangement, it is wrong for MPs to rule it out at this stage. There is no need to rush through the end of free movement, even if we do leave in a month’s time. For those reasons, my party believes that the clause should not stand part of the Bill.
Caroline Nokes
Through the EU settled status scheme, we have provided people with the mechanism via which to demonstrate that. I have confidence in the mechanism. I recognise the challenges, some of which we heard in the evidence session two weeks ago. I am determined we get that right and make it a system that people will engage in, take part in and be able to evidence their status.
Afzal Khan
On the same point, one of the issues that came through during the evidence sessions was that it would also be helpful to have a hard copy of that evidence.
Caroline Nokes
The hon. Gentleman will be aware that the Home Office is seeking to move to digital by default in many of our processes. I recognise that this is the way forward. I spent a very happy six months at the Cabinet Office as the Minister for the Government Digital Service, recognising that the delivery of services digitally is the way forward. With the digital right-to-work checks and the roll-out of the digital right-to-rent checks, we already have a system that makes sure the individual employer or landlord can see only the evidence to which they are entitled, rather than having a biometric card that lays out all a person’s details. It can be tailored so the potential employer gets to see only the evidence of the right to work. I believe that the system works well and when I showed it to the landlords’ representative panel, they engaged with and were enthused by it. It has also worked well for employers. Digital status that is backed up and can be evidence going forward, simply and easily, is much better than a document that potentially contains the risk of fraud and that might need renewing every 10 years, in the same way we have to renew our passports.
This is the Bill that will end free movement. That is not the role of the withdrawal agreement Bill, which is where we will enshrine citizens’ rights.
Caroline Nokes
There is a terrible phrase, which I really dislike using: “statutory excuse”. If an employer has seen evidence—an EU passport or ID card—that indicates that somebody has the right to work in the same way as they do now, that provides them with the protection that the hon. Lady seeks.
Afzal Khan
I ask the Minister again: could the Government use the powers in the Bill to amend immigration legislation affecting non-EU citizens?
Afzal Khan
I echo the words of the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East. In essence, we agree that clause 2 is necessary, but we believe that it requires some improvements.
I have some questions for the Minister. First, the Good Friday agreement grants people who were born in Northern Ireland the right to identify and be accepted as exclusively Irish, as exclusively British or as both Irish and British. Does the reference to Irish citizens in the Bill, and therefore the Immigration Act 1971, include Northern Ireland-born Irish citizens who do not identify as British? Secondly, clause 2 highlights the fact that many associated rights of the common travel area are provided for only by virtue of free movement. When, if not in the Bill, will common travel area rights be legislated for to ensure that they are maintained on a clear legal footing? Finally, will the Minister make it explicit in the Bill that people in Northern Ireland who identify exclusively as Irish, as is their right under the Belfast agreement, are exempt from deportation and exclusion?
Caroline Nokes
I thank hon. Members for raising important issues linked to Irish citizens. It is important to recognise that British and Irish citizens have enjoyed a particular status and specific rights in each other’s countries since the 1920s as part of the common travel area arrangements.
Clause 2 will protect the status of Irish citizens. When free movement ends, it will allow them to continue to come to the UK without requiring permission and without any restrictions on how long they can stay. British citizens enjoy reciprocal rights in Ireland. The clause will provide legal certainty and clarity for Irish citizens by inserting new section 3ZA into the Immigration Act 1971 to ensure that they can enter and remain in the UK without requiring permission, regardless of where they have travelled from. That is already the position for those who enter the UK from within the common travel area, but Irish citizens who travel to the UK from outside the CTA currently enter under European economic area regulations. The clause will remove that distinction by giving Irish citizens a clear status.
I turn to the amendments tabled by the hon. Members for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East, and for Paisley and Renfrewshire North. Amendment 29 would establish in legislation that the immigration rules cannot treat family members of Irish citizens differently from family members of British citizens. The common travel area arrangements have never included rights for the family members of British and Irish citizens. That is an approach that we intend to maintain, but the unique status of Irish citizens means that they are considered settled from the day on which they arrive in the United Kingdom. Irish citizens in the UK can therefore sponsor family members, in the same way as British citizens can. That is the position for those of all nationalities within the UK who are settled.
I also note that Irish citizens, in line with other EU nationals, can be joined in the UK by family members under the terms of the EU settlement scheme, but the amendment would prevent that. To be clear, Irish citizens are not required to apply for status under the EU settlement scheme to benefit from the family member rights, but they may apply if they wish. Under the settlement scheme in a deal scenario, close family members who are not already resident in the UK will be able to join an EU citizen—that includes Irish citizens—under the same conditions as now, where the relationship pre-existed the end of the implementation period. I therefore ask the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East to consider withdrawing his amendment for the reasons that I have outlined.
Amendment 28 would introduce additional provisions regarding the deportation and exclusion of Irish citizens and their family members. I will use this opportunity to reiterate our approach to deporting Irish citizens in light of the historical community and political ties between the UK and Ireland, along with the existence of the common travel area. Irish citizens are considered for deportation only if a court has recommended deportation following conviction or if the Secretary of State concludes that, because of the exceptional circumstances of a case, the public interest requires deportation. We carefully assess all deportation decisions on a case-by-case basis, taking into account all the facts of the case.
In response to questions asked on Second Reading, I confirmed that the Government are fully committed to maintaining this approach. In that regard, Committee members will have noted that we are making provision to ensure that once we leave the EU, Irish citizens will be exempt from the automatic deportation provisions for criminality in the UK Borders Act 2007. That exemption is contained in the Immigration, Nationality and Asylum (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, which were laid before the House on 11 February. Therefore, proposed new subsections (6) and (8) are not needed.
As I have outlined, the UK’s approach is to deport Irish citizens only in exceptional circumstances or where the court has recommended it, which means that a family member of an Irish citizen would not be considered for deportation unless a deportation order was made in respect of that citizen in line with our approach. I also emphasise that the common travel area rights have always provided solely for British and Irish citizens. They have never specifically extended to the family members of British or Irish citizens, and we intend to maintain that approach.
With proposed new subsection (8) in mind, I must make it absolutely clear that the UK is fully committed to upholding the Belfast agreement and respects the right of the people of Northern Ireland to identify as Irish, British or both, and to hold both British and Irish citizenship as they choose. I recognise the centrality of those citizenship and identity provisions to the Belfast agreement. As I have said, deportation decisions are taken on a case-by-case basis, and we consider the seriousness of the criminality and whether it is in the public interest to require deportation.
Recognising the citizenship provisions in the Belfast agreement, we would consider any case extremely carefully and not seek to deport a person from Northern Ireland who is solely an Irish citizen. However, I recognise the hon. Gentleman’s interest in this matter and will continue to keep it under consideration. I therefore respectfully ask him to consider withdrawing his amendment for the reasons outlined.
Stuart C. McDonald
It was a little while after my first election in 2015 that I first heard the term “Henry VIII clause,” but I have become very familiar with it since then. The clauses in the Immigration Act 2016 were outrageous enough, but they are small beer compared with the powers the Government have helped themselves to in the European Union (Withdrawal) Act and in this Bill. There is no need to take my word for it; we have ample evidence. The amendments are largely based on submissions from the Law Society of Scotland and the report of the House of Lords Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. I am very grateful to both. It is unusual to have the benefit of the Lords Committee report for a Commons Bill, but it has certainly proved helpful. The Committee said:
“The combination of the subjective test of appropriateness, the words ‘in connection with Part 1’, the subject matter of Part 1 and the large number of persons who will be affected, make this a very significant delegation of power from Parliament to the Executive. The scope of this broad power is expanded even further by subsections (2) to (5).”
If we are serious about our role as legislators and about separating the Executive from the legislature, we must start putting our foot down and reining in these clauses. Otherwise, what on earth are we here for?
We can start that process through amendment 4, by replacing the subjective test of appropriateness. Through amendment 1 we can ditch the phrase “in connection with”. The Committee was absolutely scathing here. It said:
“We are frankly disturbed that the Government should consider it appropriate to include the words ‘in connection with’. This would confer permanent powers on Ministers to make whatever legislation they considered appropriate, provided there was at least some connection with Part 1, however tenuous; and to do so by negative procedure regulations (assuming no amendment was made to primary legislation)”.
Amendment 2 is also from the House of Lords Committee’s recommendations. It removes clause 4(v). It noted that subsection (v)
“confers broad discretion on Ministers to levy fees or charges on any person seeking leave to enter or remain in the UK who pre-exit would have had free movement rights under EU law”.
It recommended removal
“unless the Government can provide a proper and explicit justification for its inclusion and explain how they intend to use the power”.
That is the challenge for the Minister this morning.
As for the Government’s justifications and the memorandum on delegated powers stating that the powers are needed to protect EEA citizens, it is fair to say that the Committee was not persuaded. It said:
“We believe that transitional arrangements to protect existing legal rights of EEA nationals should appear on the face of the Bill, and not simply left to regulations with no opportunity for parliamentary scrutiny until after they have been made and come into force.”
That is exactly what Opposition MPs have sought to do with other amendments that we will come to later. The consequence of that for the Committee was that there would be no need to use made affirmative procedures set out in clause 4(vi). It recommended removal of that subsection, which is what my amendments 3 and 5 seek to do. The very unusual made affirmative procedure means that the regulations are actually in force when they are tabled in the House of Commons before we have even voted on them. Our position is that the more common made affirmative procedures should be followed, and instruments should be laid in draft and should not come into force until we examine and approve them—hence amendments 6 and 7.
I conclude with some comments by the Law Society of Scotland. It said:
“The abrogation of parliamentary scrutiny is deeply concerning and the cumulative effect of these provisions is to reduce the role of parliamentary scrutiny of legislation relating to immigration, both EU and non-EU”.
For all these reasons, I hope that the Government will listen carefully and rein in their desires for extensive delegated powers under clause 4.
Afzal Khan
I wish to speak to amendments 11, 12 and 10. Throughout the Brexit process, the Government have been carrying out a power grab, acquiring powers to amend primary and secondary legislation with little parliamentary scrutiny. The debates on Brexit legislation have shown that there is cross-party support for limiting Henry VIII powers. Back Benchers on both sides of the House recognise that Parliament’s role in making legislation is crucial and must be protected. We accept that there will be aspects of statutory legislation that the Government will need to adjust as a result of ending free movement; we need a functional statute book. However, there must be limits on these powers to ensure that Ministers cannot make significant policy changes, including to primary legislation through statutory instruments.
Currently, scrutiny of secondary legislation is weak. Statutory instruments are unamendable and the Government have a majority on all SI Committees—if the SI even gets a Committee. Those subject to the negative procedure may never even be discussed by parliamentarians, as Adrian Berry said in our evidence session. He said:
“It is true that you have the affirmative resolution procedure, but it is clearly a poor substitute for primary legislation and the scrutiny you get in Select Committees.”—[Official Report, Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Public Bill Committee, 14 February 2019; c. 90, Q221.]
He recommended the Henry VIII powers be radically redrawn. We know that the Government plan a major overhaul of our immigration system for EU and non-EU migrants set out in the White Paper. There is a risk that these powers could be used to bring in that entirely new system. Will the Minister confirm whether the Government would use the powers in the Bill to bring in the new system or if there would be a new immigration Bill? If there will be another Bill, when might it come? Would it be in addition to a withdrawal and implementation Bill, if we get a withdrawal agreement?
Immigration is already an area where the Government have extensive delegated powers. Since 1971, almost all major changes to our immigration system have been made through the immigration rules. We want to move to a situation in which there is more scrutiny of immigration changes, not less.
Labour has many issues with the proposed immigration system, but we broadly believe in the principle that certain major changes should have the chance to be fully discussed and debated before they are introduced. We are being asked to take it on trust that Ministers will not abuse the powers delegated to them in this clause. In the wake of Windrush, we should be particularly sceptical of this Government’s promises. The Windrush scandal was the result of a long period of under-the-radar changes to immigration rules, which chipped away at the rights of Windrush migrants and plunged their status in the UK into uncertainty. In the aftermath of Windrush, we should be particularly attentive to the risks of allowing Ministers the power to amend people’s rights after they have been debated and enshrined in primary legislation.
Clause 4 offers the Government a blank cheque to change our immigration laws and reduces the level of parliamentary scrutiny of immigration legislation. The Labour amendment and the SNP amendments, which we support, do four things.
First, they limit the scope of the powers. As currently drafted, changes to our immigration laws will be only in consequence of or in connection with the withdrawal of EU free movement legislation. We support the SNP’s amendment 1, which would limit the scope here. We support amendment 4, which would allow the Secretary of State to make only changes that are necessary rather than those that the Minister considers appropriate. The House of Lords Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee recommended the amendments because they were disturbed by the use of “in connection with”, as it would confer primary powers on Ministers to make whatever legislation they considered appropriate, provided that there was at least some connection with part one, however tenuous, and to do so by negative procedure regulations.
Amendment 2 would prevent the Secretary of State making changes to fees and charges. Labour has tabled new clause 38, which states that visa fees should be set at cost price. The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee raised significant concern about this sub-clause as it confers broad discretion on the Minister to levy fees or charges on any person seeking leave to enter or remain in the UK who would have had free movement rights under EU laws pre-exit. Fees are already so high that they are unaffordable. The Home Office makes enormous profits out of visa fees, and it is concerning that the Government are granting themselves the power to increase them even further.
Secondly, these amendments limit the nature of these powers. Amendment 11 in my name would allow Ministers to grant status to a group of EEA nationals but not allow them to remove any such rights without primary legislation. I am grateful to the Immigration Law Practitioners Association for its help in drafting it. We believe this is a vital safeguard and that right to remain should be set in stone, and not subject to amendment or to being removed by secondary legislation.
Thirdly, these amendments improve the scrutiny that changes to immigration rules will be subject to. Clause 4(6) sets out that some immigration rules may be made by the made affirmative procedure, which means that they will be assigned into law before being laid in Parliament. There is then a period of 40 days in which the House must approve them or they will cease to have effect. The House of Lords Committee recommended that this be removed, which is what amendment 3 does. Amendments 12, 13 and 7 will ensure that immigration rules are subject to the affirmative procedure. Labour has tabled new clause 9, which will subject them to super-affirmative procedure. Our immigration rules have an enormous impact on people’s lives, but they often receive very little scrutiny. The made affirmative procedure means that they will receive no scrutiny before coming into effect and that scrutiny will only be retrospective.
Fourthly and finally, amendment 10 will place a time limit on the Henry VIII powers in clause 4. The Government have said that they will review the White Paper proposal for 12 months. The sunset clause should ensure that they can use the Henry VIII powers in clause 4 to make small amendments to the legislation, but that at the point at which they will make bigger changes, the Henry VIII powers will expire.
We have serious concerns about the extent of the delegated powers in clause 4. Our amendments and the amendments tabled by the SNP would go a long way to limit the powers and would ensure that changes to immigration policy are properly scrutinised.
Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Bill (Tenth sitting) Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateDepartment: Home Office
Afzal Khan
Main Page: Afzal Khan (Labour - Manchester Rusholme)Department Debates - View all Afzal Khan's debates with the Home Office
Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Bill (Tenth sitting)
Afzal Khan ExcerptsTuesday 5th March 2019
(5 years, 8 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Bill 2017-19 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 5 March 2019 - (5 Mar 2019)
Alison McGovern
I accept what the Minister says, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 15
Settled status
‘(1) Any person who has their right of free movement removed by the provisions contained in this Act has the right of settled status in the United Kingdom if that person —
(a) is an EEA or Swiss national;
(b) is a family member of an EEA or Swiss national or person with derived rights;
(c) is resident in the United Kingdom on or prior to 31 December 2020.
(2) Any person who is entitled to settle status under subsection 1 has the same protection against expulsion as defined in Article 28 of Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and Council.
(3) The Secretary of State must ensure that any person entitled to settle status under subsection 1 receives proof of that status via a system of registration.
(4) The Secretary of State must issue a paper certificate confirming settled status to any person registered for settled status under this section.
(5) No fee may be charged for applications to register for settled status under this section.
(6) Any person who has acquired settled status under the provisions of subsection 1 is entitled to—
(a) remain in the United Kingdom indefinitely;
(b) apply for British citizenship;
(c) work in the United Kingdom;
(d) use the National Health Service;
(e) enrol in all educational courses in the United Kingdom;
(f) access all benefits and pensions, if they meet the eligibility requirements.
(7) A person’s right to use the National Health Service (d), enrol in educational courses (e) and access all benefits and pensions (f) under subsection (6), is the same as those for a British national.
(8) Any person who is entitled to settled status under subsection (1) loses their settled status only
(a) if they are absent from the United Kingdom for a period exceeding five continuous years after 31 December 2021 or
(b) if the criteria for expulsion as set out in Article 28 of Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and Council applies to them.
(9) In this section, “family member” has the meaning given in Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and Council.
(10) This section applies if the United Kingdom leaves the European Union —
(a) following a ratified and implemented withdrawal agreement; or
(b) without a ratified and implemented withdrawal agreement.’—(Afzal Khan.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
Afzal Khan (Manchester, Gorton) (Lab)
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The Chair
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
New clause 16—Rights of family members—
‘(1) Family members of any person (“P”) granted settled status under the provisions of clause [Settled status] are entitled to settled status in the United Kingdom after 31 December 2020 if —
(a) the family member’s relationship with “P” began before 31 December 2020; and
(b) the family member is still in a relationship with “P” when the family member applies for settled status.
(2) Any family member of any person (“P”) granted settled status under the provisions of clause [Settled status] are eligible for a family visa to come and live in the United Kingdom if that relationship began after 31 December 2020
(3) Any children born in the United Kingdom to a person granted settled status under the provisions of clause [Settled status] is a British citizen, whether the child was born before or after that person being granted settled status.
(4) Any family member who is entitled to settled status under subsection (1) loses their eligibility for settled status if they are absent from the United Kingdom for a period exceeding five continuous years after the date on which their settled status was granted.
(5) In this section, “family member” has the meaning given in Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and Council.
(6) This section applies if the United Kingdom leaves the European Union —
(a) following a ratified and implemented withdrawal agreement; or
(b) without a ratified and implemented withdrawal agreement.’
This new clause is consequential on NC15.
New clause 17—Settled status: further provisions—
‘(1) The Secretary of State must ensure that no EEA or Swiss national, or family member of an EEA or Swiss national or a person with derived rights, is denied settled status in the United Kingdom on account of their non-exercise of European Union treaty rights or a removal decision made as a result of their non-exercise of European Union treaty rights.
(2) In this section, “family member” has the meaning given in Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and Council.’
New clause 18—Right to family life—
‘(1) Article 8 of Schedule 1 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (Right to respect for private and family life) applies to all EEA and Swiss nationals who are granted settled status in the United Kingdom.
(2) Article 8 of Schedule 1 of the Human Rights Act 1998 1998 (Right to respect for private and family life) applies to all EEA and Swiss nationals who are granted a work visa under the provisions of clause [Work visas for EEA and Swiss nationals].’
This amendment is consequential on NC21
New clause 33—No time limit for applicants for settled or pre-settled status—
‘(1) No time limit shall be placed on the right of EEA and Swiss nationals to apply for settled or pre-settled status in the United Kingdom.
(2) No EEA or Swiss national can be removed from the United Kingdom under the provisions of the Immigration Act 1971 after exit day if that person meets the requirements for settled or pre-settled status under appendix EU to the Immigration Rules.
(3) In this section, “exit day” has the meaning given in section 20(1) of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018.’
This new clause would ensure that there is no time limit on applicants to apply for settled or pre-settled status and prevent EEA nationals who had not yet been granted this status from being removed.
New clause 35—Documented proof of settled or pre-settled status—
‘Any person granted settled or pre-settled status under appendix EU of the Immigration Rules must be provided with a physical document confirming and evidencing that status within 28 days of that status being granted.’
This new clause would ensure that all EEA and Swiss nationals granted settled or pre-settled status must be provided with physical proof confirming their status.
New clause 47—Settled status—
‘(1) A person to whom this section applies has settled status in the UK.
(2) This section applies to EEA and Swiss nationals, family members of EEA and Swiss nationals, and family members who have retained the right of residence by virtue of a relationship with an EEA or Swiss national and meet any one of the following conditions—
(a) they have a documented right of permanent residence;
(b) they can evidence indefinite leave to enter or remain;
(c) they have completed a continuous qualifying period of five years in any (or any combination) of those categories.
(3) This section also applies to—
(a) EEA and Swiss nationals who have ceased activity, and
(b) family members of EEA and Swiss nationals who have ceased activity and who have indefinite leave to remain under subsection (3)(a), providing the relationship existed at the point the EEA and Swiss national became a person who has ceased activity.
(4) This section also applies to family members of an EEA or Swiss national who has died where—
(a) the EEA or Swiss national was a resident in the UK as a worker or self-employed person at the time of their death;
(b) the EEA or Swiss national was resident in the UK for a continuous qualifying period of at least two years before dying, or the death was the result of an accident at work or an occupational disease; and
(c) the family member was resident in the UK with the relevant EEA or Swiss national immediately before their death.
(5) This section also applies to (a) a child under the age of 21 years of an EEA or Swiss national or (b) a child under 21 of the spouse or civil partner of an EEA or Swiss national where the spouse or civil partner was the durable partner of the EEA or Swiss national before the specified date, the partnership remained durable at the specified date, and the EEA or Swiss national has settled status under this section.
(6) The Secretary of State must, by way of regulations, make provision for EEA or Swiss nationals to secure documentary evidence of their settled status, without charge.
(7) A person with settled status has indefinite leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom; has the same rights and entitlements as a UK citizen and cannot lose settled status through absences from the UK of less than five years.’
This new clause would ensure that certain EEA and Swiss nationals, and family members, have settled status by operation of law, and make clear what settled status entails.
New clause 48—Settled status: relationships with British citizens—
‘(1) A person to whom this section applies has settled status in the UK.
(2) This section applies to a family member of a qualifying British citizen and a family member who has retained the right of residence by virtue of a relationship with a qualifying British citizen; and the person has a documented right of permanent residence.
(3) This section also applies to a family member of a qualifying British citizen and to a family member who has retained the right of residence by virtue of a relationship with a qualifying British citizen and there is valid evidence of their indefinite leave to enter or remain.
(4) This section also applies to a person who meets the following criteria—
(a) they are a family member of a qualifying British citizen or a family member who has retained the right of residence by virtue of a relationship with a qualifying British citizen;
(b) the applicant has completed a continuous qualifying period of five years either (or any combination) of those categories; and
(c) the applicant was, for any period of residence as a family member of a qualifying British citizen relied upon under subsection4(b), in the UK lawfully by virtue of regulation 9(1) to (6) of the EEA Regulations (regardless of whether in the UK the qualifying British citizen was a qualified person under regulation 6).
(5) This section also applies to a person who meets the following criteria—
(a) the person is a child under the age of 21 years of the spouse or civil partner of the qualifying British citizen (and the marriage or civil partnership was formed before the specified date); and
(b) the applicant is in the UK lawfully by virtue of regulation 9(1) to (6) of the EEA Regulations (regardless of whether in the UK the qualifying British citizen is a qualified person under regulation 6); and
(c) the spouse or civil partner has settled status.
(6) The Secretary of State must, by way of regulations, make provision for persons who qualify for settled status by virtue of this section to secure documentary evidence of their settled status, without charge.
(7) A person with settled status has indefinite leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom; has the same rights and entitlements as a UK citizen (subject to subsection (9)); and cannot lose settled status through absences from the UK of less than five years.’
This new clause would ensure that certain family members of UK citizens have settled status by operation of law, and make clear what settled status entails.
New clause 49—Limited leave to remain—
‘(1) A person to whom this section applies, has leave to enter and remain until 30 March 2024, or until such time as the person has settled status.
(2) This section applies when—
(a) a person is an EEA or Swiss national, a family member of an EEA or Swiss national or a family member who has retained the right of residence by virtue of a relationship with an EEA or Swiss national; and
(b) the applicant is not eligible for settled status because they have completed a continuous qualifying period of less than five years.
(3) This section applies when—
(a) a person is a family member of a qualifying British citizen and is in the UK lawfully by virtue of regulation 9(1) to (6) of the EEA Regulations (regardless of whether in the UK the qualifying British citizen is a qualified person under regulation 6) or a family member who has retained the right of residence by virtue of a relationship with a qualifying British citizen; and
(b) the applicant is not eligible for settled status solely because they have completed a continuous qualifying period of less than five years.
(4) This section applies when—
(a) the person is a child under the age of 21 years of the spouse or civil partner of the qualifying British citizen (and the marriage or civil partnership was formed before the specified date);
(b) is in the UK lawfully by virtue of regulation 9(1) to (6) of the EEA Regulations (regardless of whether in the UK the qualifying British citizen is a qualified person under regulation 6); and
(c) the spouse or civil partner has been or is being granted limited leave to remain under this section.
(5) The Secretary of State must, by way of regulations, make provision for persons who qualify for leave to remain by virtue of this section to secure documentary evidence of their leave, without charge.
(6) A person with limited leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom has the same rights and entitlements as a UK citizen.’
Afzal Khan
My hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield Central will speak to new clause 15.
Caroline Nokes
From the demonstrations that I have had of the digital right-to-work check, and the work that I have done with the Landlords Consultative Panel surrounding the digital right to rent checks, we have seen a very simple and straightforward procedure where the individual can send a time-limited link to a prospective employer that does not require them to do a great deal of research to find digital status; it is there at the click of a mouse button. However, I am listening to the views put to me by the Committee, and will reflect on them over the next few weeks.
As I said, the new digital capability forms part of moving the UK’s immigration system to digital by default, and is a simpler, safer and more convenient system. The proposed new clause would be a step backwards in simplifying the current system. I therefore request that the hon. Member for Manchester, Gorton withdraw the new clause.
Afzal Khan
We wish to press new clause 15 to a vote.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
Afzal Khan
I strongly agree with the new clause. I have been involved in campaigning on the TOEIC test issue. It is a burning injustice that is long overdue for resolution by the Home Office. Thousands of innocent students have spent years trying to clear their names. In Committee, we have discussed the terrible consequences of the “hostile environment”, and those all rained down on the students. I hoped that the issue would be resolved long before now, given that the scandal first broke five years ago. Given that the legal limbo continues, we support the new clause as a vehicle to compel Ministers to resolve it.
Caroline Nokes
I thank the hon. Member for Stretford and Urmston for tabling the new clause on behalf of the right hon. Member for East Ham. The new clause relates to the use of certificates to evidence knowledge of English. It raises an important issue, and I would like to explain the Government’s response to widespread abuse of English language testing facilities, which came to light in 2014.
The scale of the fraud—there is no doubt it was a fraud—is illustrated by the fact that so far more than 20 people have received criminal convictions for their role in facilitating the deception, and sentences totalling more than 60 years have been handed down. Further criminal trials are ongoing. There was also a strong link to wider abuse of the student visa route. The majority of individuals linked to the fraud were sponsored by private colleges rather than universities, many of whom the Home Office had significant concerns about well before “Panorama” uncovered the specific fraud. Indeed, 400 colleges who had sponsored students linked to the fraud had already had their licences revoked prior to 2014.
The Educational Testing Service had its licence to provide tests within the UK suspended in early February 2014 and was removed from the immigration rules on 1 July 2014. Approximately 20% of the tests taken in the UK were provided via ETS prior to its suspension.
During 2014, ETS systematically analysed all the TOEIC tests administered in the UK dating back to 2011 and classified them as either questionable or invalid. ETS categorised results as questionable where it had significant concerns about the test centres and sessions where they had been obtained.
We have always recognised that it was possible that a small number of students who took legitimate tests could have received a questionable result. That is why we ensured that those people were given the chance to resit a test or attend an interview before any action was taken against them. ETS categorised results as invalid only where the same voice was matched to two or more tests taken in different names, indicating that deception was likely to have been used.
Stuart C. McDonald
Let me say at the outset that I am stepping somewhat outside my comfort zone in discussing automated data checks, so I am grateful for the assistance provided by the Immigration Law Practitioners Association and the Open Rights Group.
The settled status scheme relies heavily on automatic data checks. Input of a national insurance number triggers the automatic transfer of certain data from HMRC and the DWP to the Home Office. That data is subjected to algorithmic machine analysis according to a Home Office business logic, details of which have not been made public. Result outputs of pass, partial pass and fail are issued to a Home Office caseworker. Once the output is received, the raw data apparently disappears. Applicants who pass the data check are deemed to have fulfilled the residence requirement for the purposes of settled status. Applicants who do not pass are invited by caseworkers to upload documents for manual checking. Applicants who cannot evidence five years’ continuous residence generally receive pre-settled status.
Campaign organisations, including ILPA and the Open Rights Group, rightly believe that the Home Office has three specific legal duties—to give reasons for data check outcomes, to ensure that its caseworkers have meaningful oversight of the checks, and to provide public information about the scheme. The new clauses identify actions that the Home Office should take to comply with those three duties. They seek more information about the data checks and they would increase transparency.
Let me briefly take each of the three duties in turn. The first is the duty to give reasons for the outcome of a data check. The Home Office is under a common law duty to give reasons for its decisions to grant or refuse settled status. The data checks are a mandatory step in the scheme and they are integral to decision making. The duty to give reasons therefore includes a duty to explain why the data checks gave the result they did. Reasons should detail what data was analysed and how the business logic was applied. That information would enable applicants to appreciate whether decisions were open to challenge for irrationality or were made on the basis of inaccurate information.
If the Home Office accepts that it has a duty to give reasons, at least in some cases, how will it approach the need to retain records to supply such reasons? What data about applicants is retained by the Home Office as a result of the data checks? For what reason, and for how long, is that data retained? Which persons does the Home Office envisage will have a genuine business need to see that data?
The second duty is the duty to inform the public about the logic of the data checks. The EU General Data Protection Regulation of 2018 requires the Home Office to process data in a transparent manner. It would be consistent with such duties of transparency and openness if the Home Office provided meaningful public information about its business logic that enabled applicants to understand how it will apply in their case. Will the Home Office provide full details of, or sufficient information about, its business logic to allow its application to all types of individuals to be understood and to allow for independent review? What steps is the Home Office taking to limit and rectify business logic operational errors?
The third duty is the duty to exercise supervisory control over data checks. Making decisions by relying on output from automated data checks without scrutinising these is likely to constitute unlawful delegation of powers. To prevent this, a manual check for system errors should be conducted when applicants challenge refusal of settled status.
Proper oversight, safeguards and transparency are essential when dealing with complex decisions and people in vulnerable situations. It is important for EU nationals to know whether they are eligible for settled status, and if they are not eligible, the future date on which they are likely to become eligible. At the outcome of the data check, the Home Office should inform non-passing applicants which years the checks accepted covered, and which not. This would also improve system efficiency by reducing unnecessary challenges.
Some final questions: on the basis that residence is not contingent on income or contribution, why does it appear that different weighting is applied to data from the Department for Work and Pensions and from HMRC? Why is HMRC requested to provide data first, and not DWP? Will the Home Office add functionality in the scheme to enable applicants to easily request and obtain the information that HMRC and/or DWP have supplied about them? What steps is the Home Office taking to address the particular challenges faced by vulnerable groups such as children in care, persons in abusive or coercive relationships, victims of labour exploitation and trafficking and people who cannot provide documentary evidence, notably children, pensioners, non-working dependants, homeless persons, casual workers and victims of domestic abuse?
Afzal Khan
We support these amendments. I make two brief comments. First, the EU settlement scheme will entail an enormous amount of data sharing between the Home Office and other Departments. It is right that the terms of this data sharing should be transparent. Secondly, the possibility of EU citizens’ data being passed on by the Home Office has understandably caused concern among those citizens. We do not want to create any barriers to EU citizens applying for settled status. Getting a high take-up rate is already going to be extremely difficult. Providing for explicit consent for data to be shared or reused would be a sensible limit on Government powers.
Caroline Nokes
I am grateful to the hon. Members for their new clauses 24 to 29 and 31. Given the similar effects of some of these new clauses, I will consider new clauses 24 to 28 and 31 together before speaking to new clause 29 separately.
These clauses cover a broad range of issues, including the gathering and using of data and matters relating to the automated residency checks under the EU settlement scheme. As I have said previously, securing the rights of citizens has always been our priority and we have delivered on this commitment. The draft withdrawal agreement published on 14 November 2018 guarantees the rights of EU citizens and their family members living in the UK, and those of UK nationals living in the EU.
The basis of the withdrawal agreement aligns closely to that of existing free movement rules with respect to when a person becomes a permanent resident and, in the case of the EU settlement scheme, acquires settled status. Significantly, the withdrawal agreement states that this assessment should be based not only on length of residence but on the fact that a person is exercising EU treaty rights for the whole qualifying period. We have, however, gone further than this and are being more generous to all EU citizens in the UK and to those who arrived during the implementation period. We do not test whether a person is exercising treaty rights—for example whether they are in work, studying or have comprehensive sickness insurance. Eligibility is based on residence alone, subject to criminality and security checks.
As part of the application process we will, where an applicant provides a national insurance number, conduct an automated check of residence based on tax and certain benefit records from HMRC and the DWP. We know that most EU citizens will have had some interaction with these departments and that this could demonstrate an applicant’s residence, either for the whole five-year period to qualify for settlement, or in part. While it is optional for an applicant to use the automated checks to prove their period of residency, in the test phases most have done so.
To date, 80% of the decisions made have been on the basis of this data alone. Where data exists, the automated checks replace the need for the applicant to submit any other form of evidence. The automated checks happen in real time as the application is completed, and the applicant is informed whether there is enough data to qualify for either settled or pre-settled status. Feedback from the three trial phases to date shows that people overwhelmingly like the simplicity of having their residence proved for them by these checks. The applicant is immediately informed if they need to provide additional documents and prompted to provide such documentation before completing their application.
In such instances, we will accept a range of documents as evidence, and they can be submitted digitally as part of the online application process. Where the applicant accepts the result of the automated check, no further evidence is required, and they will, subject to identity, security and criminality checks, be granted either settled or pre-settled status. The rules for assessing continuous residence are already set out in the immigration rules. The automated checks simply apply those principles to the data provided by HMRC and the DWP. New clauses 26 and 28, although well intentioned, are therefore unnecessary.
I understand the sentiment behind new clauses 24, 25 and 27, on publishing details of the automated residency checks in the scheme, as well as our memorandum of understanding with HMRC and the DWP. We will of course be completely transparent on how those checks work, as it is to everyone’s benefit for us to do so. I confirm that we will publish the MOU before the scheme is fully launched. We will also publish further materials, including more guidance on why automated checks may not return the expected data. The EU settlement scheme is still in the test phase, and it is important that we continue to amend our processes and design as we progress through the phased roll-out. I hope that offers reassurance to hon. Members.
On new clause 31, it may be helpful if I explain the different stages of the application process. When an applicant receives a wholly or partially unsuccessful result from the automated residency check, they are still in the middle of the application process and they have completed only some of the online form. They have therefore not yet submitted an application. Informing an applicant of why data has not matched is likely to increase the risk of fraud and identity abuse. The new clause would change the focus of the scheme from granting status to investigating the data quality of employers or of the DWP and HMRC. We consider that a distraction that would cause unnecessary delays for applicants.
I am sure all hon. Members on this Committee share my desire to keep the application process simple and quick in providing results. For the reasons I have given, the new clause is not consistent with those aims. In most cases, it would be far simpler and more straightforward for applicants to submit other evidence to prove residence, rather than seeking to resolve why data has not matched. Of course, the applicant can take up that issue with HMRC or the DWP if they wish. It is already the case that applicants, like anyone else, can ask Government Departments what data is held about them and get incorrect information rectified, as per article 16 of the general data protection regulation.
Our guidance includes a suggested list of documents that could be provided as additional evidence. Examples include bank statements, a letter from a general practitioner, and certificates from school, college, university or an accredited educational or training organisation. I assure hon. Members that we will continue to work to improve the match rates of the automated checks. The test phase gives us the opportunity to test the EU settlement scheme and to make improvements to the process.
New clause 29 seeks to prevent information from those who apply to the EU settlement scheme from being passed to immigration enforcement. Let me confirm that we fully comply with all statutory responsibilities when processing data. The ways in which this information may be processed are set out in the Home Office’s “Borders, immigration and citizenship: privacy information notice”, which is available on gov.uk. Decisions on whether information should be shared with immigration enforcement are made on a case-by-case basis. It is important that the Home Office uses data in ways that are compatible with the purpose for which it is collected—for example, to assist future citizenship and passport applications and, if needs be, to combat immigration offences.
To conclude, I thank hon. Members for raising these important issues, but I hope the assurances I have provided will lead them not to press their new clauses.
Stuart C. McDonald
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
I will be very short, because this new clause is essentially tied up with the group we have just debated. Because the automated checks involve information passing to DWP and HMRC, the role of the independent chief inspector of borders and immigration should be extended so that they have the power to look under the bonnet, as it were, of both to see what is happening and to ensure that the process is running smoothly and appropriately. That is the new clause in a nutshell. I look forward to the Minister’s response.
Afzal Khan
This is a sensible amendment. The independent chief inspector of borders and immigration plays a vital role in inspecting and reporting on Home Office activities. Where the EU settlement scheme overlaps with other Departments, it is important that the inspector has the remit to inspect those. There is some ambiguity about the oversight of the EU settlement scheme if there is no deal. The withdrawal agreement makes it clear that if there is a deal, there will be an independent monitoring authority established to oversee the scheme.
The Minister, in her letter to me on 31 January, set out that if there is no deal, the independent chief inspector of borders and immigration will fulfil that function. Will they get any additional funding to carry it out? Will the Minister expand their remit to cover other Departments, to make sure the inspections are not limited in scope?
Caroline Nokes
I thank the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East for new clause 30. However, it is unnecessary. The UK Borders Act 2007 allows the independent chief inspector to inspect the efficiency and effectiveness of services provided by any person acting in relation to the discharge of immigration, nationality, asylum and customs functions. The EU settlement scheme is primarily an immigration function. Therefore, the independent chief inspector of borders and immigration already has the powers to inspect Government Departments involved in the EU settlement scheme application process, and that includes activities undertaken by the Department for Work and Pensions and Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs in support of the EU settlement scheme application process. I therefore request the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the new clause.
Stuart C. McDonald
The new clauses highlight in different ways the concern over significant increases in costs relating to the use of the migration system. Scrapping the settled status application fee was very welcome. New clause 32 would simply enshrine that in law and ensure that any replacement scheme did not attract a fee. That territory has largely been covered by the hon. Member for Sheffield Central earlier, and I will not repeat what he said.
Will the Minister confirm that there will be no fee for seeking an administrative review of any refusal of settled status? What assessments have been made of the costs of future centres that people are required to attend if they need help to scan documents, for example?
New clause 39 allows for a debate on the skills charge of £1,000 for an employee for 12 months and £500 for every subsequent six months. This is a significant tax on employing a worker from overseas. It is not a subtle tax and seems to be based on the false premise that firms that recruit from overseas are the ones that fail to invest in training at home. That is not the case. Comparatively few businesses recruit from outside the EEA currently. Are we really going to impose a significant levy on many thousands of additional businesses, simply because it is proving impossible for them to recruit locally?
Finally, new clause 45 concerns an issue that I have raised with the Minister on a number of occasions and that I feel strongly about: the system of charging people who are entitled to British citizenship by registration, but who are struggling to meet the exorbitant fees, which have escalated to over £1,000. If they are entitled to register as British, that would give many EEA nationals a more secure status than settled status. It is important to emphasise that when Parliament changed the rules on nationality so that birth in the UK was no longer enough to secure British citizenship, it was careful to seek to protect those who would not qualify automatically, but for whom the UK was genuinely home. The debates from the British Nationality Act 1981 show that Parliament envisaged a straightforward automatic grant if certain criteria were met. The fee at that time was just £35. We are not asking for a return to that level, but simply for a level that reflects the financial cost to the Home Office, which is in the region of £300,000, although I do not have the exact figure to hand.
An early-day motion on this topic achieved extensive cross-party support, as did a Backbench Business debate, which I believe happened last year. Again, I ask the Minister to simply listen to colleagues from both sides of the House. We are talking about people who are entitled in law to British citizenship, and they should not be prevented from obtaining that citizenship merely by an exorbitant fee. The Home Secretary himself recognised that it was a heck of a lot of money to be charging children, so I hope the Home Office will stop charging that sort of sum.
Afzal Khan
We support all these new clauses. I will speak briefly on new clause 38, which is in my name.
New clause 38 has three distinct provisions. The first would ensure that EEA and Swiss nationals applying for a visa are not charged above the cost price for that visa. As with many of our amendments, we would prefer that this apply to all migrants, but the scope of the Bill required us to narrow the new clause. The Home Office makes a profit of up to 800% on immigration applications from families, many of whom will not be well off. These applications will often be turned down on technicalities, forcing families to apply and pay again. As EEA nationals join migrants from the rest of the world coming into the UK under work visas, the risk of debt bondage increases. If workers are required to pay high fees for work visas, they will be vulnerable to exploitation and may be left working to pay off debts to recruiters.
The independent chief inspector of borders and immigration has completed an inspection of policies and practices relating to charging and fees. According to his website, he sent the report to the Home Office on 24 January. It would have been helpful to have it in preparation for this discussion. Can the Minister tell us when her Department will publish the report?
The second part of the new clause stipulates that no child with entitlement to register for British citizenship should be required to pay a fee. The principle is that those children, given their entitlement to British citizenship, will not be required to pay fees to realise that entitlement. This was the intention of the British Nationality Act 1981, which ended the principle that being born in the UK in itself makes someone British, when it gave no discretion to the Secretary of State, other than the formal role of registering the citizenship of any person with the entitlement.
The third part of the new clause would require that anyone naturalising as a British citizen should not pay above cost price. It is important to keep the questions of immigration and nationality separate, and to keep entitlement and naturalisation separate as well, despite the Government’s attempt to blur that distinction.
The fees are now £1,012 for children and £1,206 for adults. That is an enormous amount, and it disproportionately affects BME people and children under local authority care. The effect of being unable to pay these fees is that British people are subject to the hostile environment, including detention and temporary deportation, which is wholly unjust.
Caroline Nokes
I am grateful to the hon. Members for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East, for Paisley and Renfrewshire North and for Manchester, Gorton for having tabled new clauses 32, 38, 39 and 45.
It may be helpful to provide some background on this issue. Fees for border, immigration and citizenship products and services have been charged for a number of years, and they play a vital role in our country’s ability to run a sustainable system that minimises the burden on taxpayers. Each year, income from fees charged contributes enormously towards the running of our border, immigration and citizenship system. The charging framework for visa and immigration services delivered £1.35 billion in income in the last financial year. It is therefore true to say that fees paid by users play an absolutely critical role in this country’s ability to run an effective and sustainable system, and as I am sure members of the public rightly expect, to minimise the burden on UK taxpayers.
I also want to explain from the outset that we already have a legislative framework in place that governs fees. Fees are set and approved by Parliament through fees statutory instruments made under powers in the Immigration Act 2014. As hon. Members will be aware, the Prime Minister publicly confirmed that
“when we roll out the scheme in full on 30 March, the Government will waive the application fee so that there is no financial barrier for any EU nationals who wish to stay”—[Official Report, 21 January 2019; Vol. 653, c. 27.]
We will be amending existing fees legislation to implement that decision.
Outside of applications made under the EU settlement scheme, immigration and nationality fees legislation has always provided for some limited exceptions for paying application fees for limited and indefinite leave to remain. However, those exceptions are limited to specific circumstances, such as for those seeking asylum or fleeing domestic abuse, or where the requirement to pay the fee would lead to a breach of the European convention on human rights. Fee exceptions do not extend to applications made by individuals who are seeking to register or naturalise as a British citizen. That is because becoming a citizen is discretionary and not necessary to enable individuals to live, study and work in the UK, or to be eligible to benefit from appropriate services. Other exemptions are provided by separate regulations governing the immigration health surcharge.
To make provisions that are specific to certain nationalities as part of this Bill would be unfair to all users of the border, immigration and citizenship system.
Stuart C. McDonald
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
New clause 51 relates to refugee family reunions. Again, I have encountered a problem with the scope of the Bill, as my new clause would extend the scope of refugee family reunion rules to EEA and Swiss nationals. That would obviously be a fairly rare occurrence; nevertheless, I think some of these amendments and new clauses would establish a principle. As I said to the Immigration Minister not long ago, if it gives rise to inequalities and problems, the answer is for the Government to equalise the situation by raising the standards in relation to non-EEA nationals who are also refugees.
Due to the restrictive rules about who is eligible, many people are not allowed to reunite under family reunion rules. Currently, the UK immigration rules state that
“adult refugees in the UK can be joined via family reunion by their spouse/partner and their dependent children who are under the age of 18.”
Those restrictions mean, for example, that parents are not automatically able to bring their children who have turned 18 to the UK, even if the child is still dependent on them and has not yet married or formed their own family. While the family reunion guidance allows some cases outside the rules to be granted in exceptional circumstances, in reality that rarely happens.
Furthermore, unlike adult refugees, children who are in the UK alone and have refugee status have no right to be reunited with even their closest family members. Again, in this regard the UK is an outlier. These are children who have often endured hardship and trauma and have been recognised by the Government as having the right to stay in the UK. They now find themselves alone in an unfamiliar country and having to navigate the immigration system themselves.
The Government argue that granting refugee children the right to sponsor family members to come to the UK would be a pull factor and incentivise or force more children to make dangerous journeys to the UK. However, there is no evidence to support that claim, and in every other EU member state refugee children can sponsor close relatives to join them.
In the 12 months before September 2018, for instance, 811 separated children were granted asylum in the UK, more than a quarter of whom had fled Eritrea. These children have been recognised by the Government as being in need of international protection, where it is not safe for them to be returned to their home country. Where possible, and where it is in their best interest, children should be able to be with their parents. Granting separated children family reunion rights would allow that to happen. That, in short, is what the new clause seeks to put us on the road to achieving.
The other point I want to make is that Parliament of course debated all this and heard all the Government’s arguments during the Second Reading debate on the Refugees (Family Reunion) (No. 2) Bill, promoted by my hon. Friend the Member for Na h-Eileanan an Iar (Angus Brendan MacNeil). Considerable effort was made to ensure that sufficient Members would be present at a Friday sitting to debate that private Member’s Bill. There was a vote and there was overwhelming support for its Second Reading. There is growing frustration about the delay in bringing forward the money resolution to enable that Bill to go to the next stage—Committee. I would therefore like the Minister to explain what is happening and when we will see the Bill get to Committee, because we are running out of time and it would be outrageous if all that good work was stymied by Government use of procedures.
Afzal Khan
We support this new clause. I spoke in the Second Reading debate on the private Member’s Bill that would have implemented these changes. I commend the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East for once again bringing this issue to our attention through this Bill.
Caroline Nokes
I am grateful to the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East, along with the hon. Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire North, for raising, through new clause 51, the important issue of refugees’ rights to family reunion.
The new clause is designed to allow EEA and Swiss national refugees, including those who are nationals of EEA countries that are not part of the EU, to sponsor certain family members to join them in the UK. I spoke last week about the inadmissibility of asylum claims from the EU and about the Spanish protocol and do not intend to repeat today what I said then. It is the Government’s view, which I hope all members of the Committee share, that all Swiss and EEA nationals are from safe countries and are highly unlikely to suffer a well-founded fear of persecution or serious harm there, save in very exceptional circumstances. For those reasons and because we do not foresee a change in these circumstances, we intend to continue our policy on the inadmissibility of asylum claims from EU nationals, as well as treating claims from Swiss and EEA nationals as clearly unfounded, post EU exit.
I hope that hon. Members can see that treating asylum seekers from Switzerland and the EEA differently from those from the rest of the world on the grounds of their nationality would be illogical and discriminatory. It would be unlikely to comply with our equalities obligations and would offer a clear avenue of challenge on human rights grounds. I appreciate that that may not have been the intention behind the new clause, but it would be its effect. In any event, in a deal scenario, which remains the Government’s priority, we will already be providing family reunification rights. New clause 51 is therefore unnecessary to secure the rights of EEA and Swiss nationals to sponsor their family members.
I know that hon. Members are keen to address refugee family reunion more broadly, and I am conscious that the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East asked a question about the private Member’s Bill promoted by the hon. Member for Na h-Eileanan an Iar. Of course, it is the usual channels that decide money resolutions. That is entirely outside my hands, but I can comment on the Government’s family reunion policy. That provides a safe and legal route to bring families together. It allows adult refugees who are granted protection in the UK to sponsor a partner and children under 18 to join them, if they formed part of the family unit before the sponsor fled their country. Under that policy, we have granted visas to more than 26,000 partners and children of those granted protection in the UK in the past five years; that is more than 5,000 people a year.
Furthermore, our family reunion policy offers clear discretion to grant leave outside the immigration rules. That caters for children over 18 where there are exceptional circumstances or compassionate factors—for example, where they would be left in a conflict zone or a dangerous situation.
The types of family member that the new clause is aimed at can apply under alternative routes. Under the immigration rules, adult refugees can sponsor adult dependent relatives. That includes parents, grandparents, children over 18 and siblings over 18 living overseas where, because of age, illness or disability, the person requires long-term personal care that can be provided only by their sponsor in the UK, and that will be without recourse to public funds.
Moreover, there are separate provisions in the rules to allow extended family who are adult refugees in the UK to sponsor children to come here where there are serious and compelling family or other considerations. That is an important measure, as it enables children to join family members in the UK through safe and legal means.
It is imperative that we think carefully about this issue. Adopting new clause 51 could significantly increase the number of people who could qualify to come here, not just from conflict regions, and irrespective of whether they needed international protection. That would risk reducing our capacity to assist the most vulnerable refugees.
We must also consider community and local authority capacity. I understand that this is a complex and emotive issue, which is why we are listening carefully to calls to extend family reunion and closely following the passage of the private Members’ Bills on this subject, and will continue our productive discussions with key partners. It is particularly important to me that hon. Members are reassured that we are taking this matter seriously, and I hope that I have gone some way in ensuring that. For those reasons, I invite the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East to withdraw new clause 51.
Stuart C. McDonald
These new clauses relate to the offence of illegal working, which we heard about in the evidence to the Committee. The substance of that evidence was essentially that the offence of illegal working is driving people into exploitative employment relationships. Obviously, that is complete anathema to the Government’s stated anti-slavery objectives.
We heard from Focus on Labour Exploitation, whose research has clearly shown that undocumented people are unlikely to come forward to labour inspectorates about abuse if they fear immigration repercussions, which has a triple effect. First, they are not identified as victims or supported. Secondly, abusive employers can operate with relative impunity because the immigration regime effectively hands them exploitable workers. Thirdly, that serves to undercut other workers, who have legal rights, thereby dragging the whole labour market down.
I am loth to see the offence extended to EEA and Swiss nationals. This offence is a year or two old now; has the Home Office done any research on the impact of its creation? What have been the implications on the Government’s efforts to tackle modern slavery? At the very least, we need to be reassured that the Home Office is alive to these concerns and will take them seriously. In the absence of such reassurance, we cannot just head off and extend the scope of those offences further.
Afzal Khan
We support the new clauses. As has been set out by the TUC and Focus on Labour Exploitation, it is essential that migrants are able to claim their rights at work. That means not being arrested for criminal offences when attempting to report abusive employers. Our labour market enforcement capacity is one of the weakest in Europe. We need to set high standards for wages and workers’ conditions, significantly improve our inspection capacity, and remove the offence of illegal working. This offence makes it less likely that people will come forward to the UK national referral for trafficking and modern slavery.
We know that many trafficking victims are already in immigration detention. In her evidence to us, Bella Sankey from Detention Action provided a powerful example of a Chinese woman who was a victim of trafficking. She was picked up at a brothel after a tip-off, but instead of being treated as a victim of modern-day slavery and trafficking, she was taken to a detention centre and held for six months. Clearly, many things went wrong at many stages of that woman’s journey through the immigration system, but removing the offence of illegal working would at least help to remove one barrier to her getting the help she needs.
Caroline Nokes
I am grateful to hon. Members for tabling these amendments. I also welcome the opportunity to explain how the offence of illegal working will be applied to EEA and Swiss nationals after we have left the EU, and how our approach to the EU settlement scheme will minimise any risk of those nationals being subject to the offence of illegal working post-EU exit. The Government have made clear our commitment to protecting the rights of EEA and Swiss nationals who are resident in the UK before exit. I recognise the concerns and the intention behind both new clauses, but they are unnecessary and discriminatory. They are also incompatible with our commitment in the White Paper to establishing a single, skills-based immigration system for all migrants coming to live and work in the UK.
Afzal Khan
We support the new clause to expand the remit of the GLAA. The GLAA performs a vital role in safeguarding the rights of workers and it is right that that should extend to the widest categories of vulnerable workers. My final point, which my hon. Friend has already made, is that the GLAA is chronically under- funded. We need to have more respect for the job it does.
Caroline Nokes
I thank the hon. Member for Stretford and Urmston for introducing the new clause and giving us further opportunity to consider the critical matter of protecting the rights of migrant workers.
New clause 57 raises an important issue and I appreciate the intention behind it. As I indicated, I share the hon. Member’s concern that overseas workers—indeed, all workers—should be safe from abusive employment practices. Although I sympathise with the sentiment behind the new clause, I do not think it would be appropriate to change the Bill in the way proposed, for reasons I will explain.
First, it presumes that the employment practices for the sectors mentioned in the new clause are the same as the sectors currently licensed by the GLAA. They are not. The Gangmasters (Licensing) Act 2004 applies only to the agricultural, shellfish gathering, and food packaging and processing sectors, as that employment method is particular to those sectors. While gangmasters may be used in some cases, the practice is not prevalent in the supply of labour in the sectors covered by this new clause. In some sectors, such as construction, many workers are self-employed and in others workers are recruited directly, such as with people employed to do cleaning work.
If this new clause were to be passed, the consequence would be that many thousands of extra businesses—potentially every café or care home—would have to register as a gangmaster, with considerable expense but potentially little benefit. The new clause would in effect extend the scope of the Gangmasters (Licensing) Act 2004 to construction, cleaning, care or hospitality work, but only where that work is undertaken by EEA or Swiss nationals, and only where those individuals have come by that work through a particular route. That restriction does not sit comfortably in the existing regime, which defines scope through work sector and not through the characteristics of the individuals undertaking the work. The effect of the new clause would be to create a two-tier system, resulting in EEA and Swiss nationals receiving a greater degree of labour market protection.
The Government are fully committed to protecting the rights of migrant workers and I reassure the hon. Lady that the Government are giving active and serious consideration to these matters. I hope to be able to say more on that in the coming weeks. As I set out at length in earlier sittings, it is of the highest importance that everyone working within our economy is safe and is treated fairly and with respect. I am proud of the Government’s track record on this issue, with the introduction of the landmark Modern Slavery Act 2015 and the further powers we have given to the GLAA. We will not be complacent.
Let me be clear: migrants working lawfully in the UK are entitled to all the protections of UK law while they are here, whether it is entitlement to the minimum wage, health and safety legislation, working conditions, working time rules, maternity and paternity arrangements, the right to join a trade union, the right to strike, statutory rights, holiday and sick pay, and any of the other myriad protections that exist in UK law for workers. They apply to those who are in the UK on work visas every bit as much as they do for the resident workforce. That applies to both migrant workers who are here under the current immigration system and to those who may come in the future, under the new immigration system.
The Immigration Act 2016 created a new power to extend statutory licensing of gangmasters to new commercial sectors by secondary legislation, so the proposed new clause is not necessary. Although I am loth to say it, this demonstrates yet again that we could make the changes through the immigration rules, which might provide a convenient route to do so. In deciding whether to extend gangmaster licensing, the Government would need clear evidence that that is the right course and would draw advice from the Director of Labour Market Enforcement. I hope that having further considered the wider impacts of this new clause and heard my assurance that the protection of migrant workers is at the forefront of the Government’s thinking, the hon. Lady will feel able to withdraw the proposed new clause.
Caroline Nokes
As we have now concluded the Bill’s Committee stage, I thank both you, Mr Stringer, and your co-Chair, Sir David Amess, for your effective chairmanship and for keeping us all in order. It might be only me who tried your patience—I am sure other Members have a view on that. I know you have been advised throughout by the Clerks to the Committee, who have acted with a great deal of professionalism. I extend my gratitude to them.
I thank all the Committee members for their thoughtful consideration of the issues we have debated over the past few weeks. Although we by no means agreed on everything, we debated important points in a constructive spirit and considered a wide range of matters very carefully. I am particularly grateful to the Opposition spokespeople, the hon. Members for Manchester, Gorton and for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East—I have said that constituency name an awful lot over the past fortnight; I hope I have pronounced it correctly—for their valuable contributions on a range of important issues. I suspect those will not be their last words on the Bill.
I thank the policemen and the Doorkeepers, who kept us safe and ensured that everyone received the support they needed, and the staff of the Official Report, who ensured that all our pearls of wisdom were faithfully recorded. Finally, I thank my Bill team, who have been unfailingly good humoured in keeping me in line and helping me through my first Bill Committee in this role. I am very much indebted to them. I look forward to considering the Bill during its next stage.
Afzal Khan
May I add my thanks to you, Mr Stringer, and your colleague, Sir David Amess, for the excellent job you have done of steering us through the Bill? I thank the Clerks for all the help they have provided, not only here but outside this room. I also thank all the Committee members; like the Minister, this is my first attempt at a Bill Committee, so I am particularly grateful to my Front-Bench colleagues for all their help. Let us not forget all the other staff who helped us, too. I look forward to the next stage of the Bill.
The Chair
I thank the Minister and the shadow Minister for their kind words, and I thank Committee members for their good humour and for getting through the business so quickly and effectively.
Question put and agreed to.
Bill accordingly to be reported, without amendment.