Ukraine

Tobias Ellwood Excerpts

Monday 11th September 2023 Commons Chamber

[Mr Tobias Ellwood (Bournemouth East) (Con)]

The paralysis of the G20 statement reflects the difficulties of the geopolitics we face. The absence of a communiqué to confirm that it is Russia at fault here shows what leadership is still required in leaning in to what is happening in Ukraine. This remains the biggest war since world war two. Although it is dragging on—as the Minister for Armed Forces said, we are on day 564—we should not be desensitised to what is happening; we should be concerned that there continues to be economic and security disruption right across the continent. This is a test of our staying power and our ability to continue our support. To dry up our support for Ukraine is exactly what Putin wants us to do.

Since the last time we had a debate on this matter, dramatic events have taken place over the summer. They affect what is happening on the ground in Ukraine and in Russia, and they could be game-changing. It is worth remembering that Putin thought he could win this war because he saw a divided Ukraine. President Zelensky did not enjoy the command and support that he has today. If we go back to the Maidan in 2014, Viktor Yanukovych was pressed by Putin to lean his country to the east when it was clear that the nation—or at least half of it—wanted to face the west. Putin saw the west being risk-averse in wanting to support Ukraine in its hour of need. He then pressed further by taking on Crimea and the Donbas. Again, the west did little. He then invaded in 2021, as we know, hoping to repeat what happened in 1968, when the Soviets marched into Czechoslovakia with 50,000 troops and, I think, around 5,000 tanks. It was the courage of Ukraine that meant it stood up to the mark and stood up to the third largest army in the world.

This is where we can pay tribute to what the British Government have done, because there has been commendable engagement, even prior to the invasion itself. They have provided those important anti-tank weapon systems, training on Salisbury plain, those main battle tanks—the Challengers—as well as Storm Shadows and Brimstones. They have been leading in the Ramstein group, co-ordinating efforts with other allies to make sure that Ukraine has the necessary military assistance. We have learned and become less risk-averse as time has moved forward, conscious of the escalatory ladder and knowing we are dealing with a nuclear power that has invaded another state. The west has rekindled its cold war statecraft skills, but the fundamental issue is: if we want Ukraine to win and Russia to lose, we should not be half-hearted in giving what Ukraine requires. We need to be fully committed to giving Ukraine the tools to succeed for victory.

It has been clear and mentioned already in the Chamber today that the war has not gone well for President Putin. He expected a quick win and is now frustrated on the frontline. There is little to show for his efforts. He is using conscripts and prisoners and having to replace successive generals, because command and control is not what it was. He has spent the past 23 years coup d’état-proofing, as it were, the Kremlin, Moscow and Russia to make sure that he will not be removed, because that is the Russian way. Russian leaders remain in power because they exhibit strength and are infallible. As soon as they show any signs of weakness, that is when the oligarchs, the elites and so forth realise they can no longer have their back watched by the leader in charge, and they move to replace them. That is what we are seeing today because of the game-changing events involving the Wagner rebellion and Yevgeny Prigozhin. His removal by Putin was inevitable, for the very reason I have just raised: when a Russian leader is attacked in any way, it is the Russian way to crush one’s enemies—to remove them and to eliminate them in one form or another.

Prigozhin did something exceptional: not only did he challenge Putin and bury the myth that this war was going well, but he used his own forces to charge up through Rostov-on-Don towards Moscow. That illustrated that no Russian forces were able to take on the Wagner Group—the private army—to prevent a coup d’état and a mutiny. That weakness is now recognised across Russia; Putin’s time will eventually be up.

The other dynamic is that, of all the fighting forces in Ukraine, the most powerful, capable, potent and best equipped was the Wagner Group. It had the best equipment and was the most motivated. It has now been removed from the battlefield and that provides an opportunity for Ukraine.

Lots of western pressure has been placed on Ukraine, saying, “We have given you all this expensive, exceptional, ever-complex equipment. Why has the counter-offensive not advanced further?” Again, it is because—this happened in the second world war—various phases of operations need to be conducted. We have seen Ukraine probe the frontline across 1,000 km, and we are now seeing advances taking place as it penetrates through complex minefields and anti-tank defences, particularly in the Zaporizhzhia region. That is the progress we need to see, but we need to exhibit patience. This is not going to happen overnight—there will not be a quick phase of war, with this all being over by Christmas.

What Putin is now realising is that this could be the beginning of the end of his war in Ukraine, and it could be the beginning of the end of his existence as leader, too. I do not believe he will be replaced overnight, but I do believe that the weakness exhibited is enough to unrest and unnerve many of the leaders in Russia who will be looking for a replacement in the longer term. We therefore need to be cautious and perhaps stand up to those voices in the west who are saying, “Let’s draw a line. Let’s start negotiating. Let’s get round a table and draw a close to what is happening in Ukraine.”

We need to recognise the bigger picture and what Putin —indeed, even his successor—might be trying to do, and that is to expand Russian influence in the Slavic area of eastern Europe. Again, that is the Russia way. Let us go back hundreds of years; the view has been, “If we are not being attacked, the best way is to attack, otherwise, our defences will not be enough to hold the motherland together, so let’s take advantage of the west’s weakness or risk-averseness.” I am pleased to see that we are now starting to change that.

What is next for the west? Absolutely, we must keep up that military support—that is the tactical that has been talked about today—but I would advance two further areas where we could do more to support Ukrainians. First, we must recognise that more than $300 billion-worth of frozen assets belong to Russia. We need to develop a legal mechanism that would allow each month about $20 billion of that to be slid across the table to Ukraine to help in its reconstruction and development. That might focus minds in Russia—in Moscow, in the Kremlin and Putin himself—that the longer the war continues, the more Russian money it is costing.

Secondly, I would stress the grain shipments—I brought them up with the Prime Minister—which are critical for Ukraine as well as fundamental for our own economy, where food inflation remains in double figures. I would stress the symbiotic relationship between our economic security and our national security. I am pleased that the Government are organising and participating in a global food security summit. I hope that we will look towards creating some form of expeditionary force that can provide the necessary defence and support for a maritime taskforce to protect those ships and ensure they can depart from Odesa to feed the rest of the world.

I end simply by stressing what I think many colleagues will express: because our world is getting more dangerous, not less, our peacetime defence budget of just over 2% of GDP is simply not adequate. We had the 2021 integrated review, which introduced so many cuts across all three services. Because of Ukraine, we had another IR—IR ’23. Unfortunately, none of those cuts was reversed. I hope that the new Defence Secretary, who has the Prime Minister’s ear, will be able to persuade him on that and recognise that we have done so much in advancing our hard-power capabilities, but we need to go further because of where this very dangerous world is now headed.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

I call the SNP spokesperson.

Oral Answers to Questions

Tobias Ellwood Excerpts

Monday 11th September 2023 Commons Chamber

[Mr Speaker]

I call the Chair of the Defence Committee.

[Mr Tobias Ellwood (Bournemouth East) (Con)]

Today marks the anniversary of 9/11, and while our focus now has returned to state aggression, does the Minister agree that the threat of Islamic extremism—whether home-grown or from abroad—remains and that our defence posture should reflect that?

[The Minister for Armed Forces (James Heappey)]

My right hon. Friend is absolutely right. Although the focus of the MOD and so many other parts of the Government has increasingly been on hostile state actors over the last few years, today more than any is a reminder of the threat of violent extremism. I pay tribute to the hundreds of men and women around the UK armed forces who are deployed on missions countering violence and extremism as I speak.

Oral Answers to Questions

Tobias Ellwood Excerpts

Monday 26th June 2023 Commons Chamber

[Mr Speaker]

I call the Chair of the Defence Committee.

[Mr Tobias Ellwood (Bournemouth East) (Con)]

I endorse the words of my Defence Committee colleague, the hon. Member for South Shields (Mrs Lewell-Buck). The Secretary of State himself has used the words

“the hollowing out of our Armed Forces”.

Today, the Head of the Army said at the Royal United Services Institute’s land warfare conference that our world is heading back into the 1930s with growing threats. Does the Secretary of State agree that the Treasury’s argument for increasing Defence spending to 2.5% of GDP when the economics improve is not only naive but illogical, because our economy and our national security are one and the same thing? We need to invest in our Army, Air Force and Navy now, not when Britain’s economy improves.

[Mr Wallace]

My right hon. Friend makes an important point about levels of Defence spending. First, spend on the Army is 20% higher since I started as Defence Secretary, and I have made sure that a greater proportion of that spend is on catching up and modernising the armed forces, which had been neglected all the way back to Afghanistan and Iraq, where we were spending money on urgent operational requirements rather than the core budget to modernise that equipment.

On my right hon. Friend’s point about the Treasury, it has accepted—the Chancellor did so at the Dispatch Box—that Defence will require a greater share of public spending. Part of the big challenge is recognition across Government and in Whitehall that the culture has changed, with Defence requiring a greater proportion of spend if it is to defend these shores and indeed our people. That is how it used to be. I am confident that the Prime Minister’s support for 2.5% and the Chancellor’s position puts us on the right path, and of course that could not be needed quicker.

Armoured Cavalry Programme: Sheldon Review

Tobias Ellwood Excerpts

Thursday 15th June 2023 Commons Chamber

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

I would like to just take this opportunity to add my thoughts about Glenda Jackson, as I can see there are colleagues in the Chamber who were here in the House at the same time as her. She was a wonderful colleague and a great Minister, and I think we all want to send our condolences to her family. I call the Chair of the Defence Committee.

[Mr Tobias Ellwood (Bournemouth East) (Con)]

May I immediately associate myself with your kind words about Glenda Jackson, Madam Deputy Speaker?

We now have in the Chamber not one, but three current or former procurement Ministers who bear the scars of this project. I am pleased that we are able to discuss the matter so openly and I commend the recent work that the MOD has done to get on top of the issue.

Ajax is now a case study that the MOD and DNS should use on how not to do procurement. This is all about the British Army’s recce vehicle. The current one being used, the Scimitar, was introduced in 1971. It is good to hear that the soldiers the Minister met said that the replacement is better than the last—that is brilliant, because it was built in 1971. Ajax’s journey has been miserable. It started in 2010 and the delivery date was 2017, yet it is not expected to enter service until 2030. Something very serious has gone wrong.

I absolutely welcome Clive Sheldon’s report. The Committee will look into that in more detail and, rather fortuitously, a Sub-Committee study on procurement, by my right hon. Friend the Member for Rayleigh and Wickford (Mr Francois), is currently under way. I am sure that he will have more words on how we will digest the report in more detail.

The Minister covered some of the issues. Concerns include the relationships between different entities within, or associated with, the MOD. The senior responsible officer has been criticised for not being a single point of contact or owning the actual project itself but having to have a number of projects going concurrently. Concerns got stuck because of people taking a rigid view of their remits. It is not just with Ajax that there is a problem; there is also with the land warfare capability. We have similar problems with the main battle tank and the armoured fighting vehicle. I hope that those problems will be addressed when the defence Command Paper comes out.

[James Cartlidge]

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend the Chairman of the Select Committee. Of course, we are absolutely committed to engaging with his Committee and, indeed, with the Sub-Committee, before which I will appear next week. I was born in 1974. He makes a striking point about the existing vehicle being from 1971—it is the same age as my elder brother. I take his point that one might therefore expect servicemen to say that it is night and day.

I put great store by meeting those on the frontline, and I will always continue to do that. It was a great privilege to go to Bovington. One of the soldiers I sat next to in the Ares version had been in a Challenger 2 when it was hit by an IED—I think it was in Iraq or Afghanistan; he did not say. He felt confidence in the protection. It is so important that we interact with the soldiers on the frontline. Ultimately, that is the point: we want to deliver a better acquisitions system for them and I look forward to working with my right hon. Friend’s Committee to that end.

--- Later in debate ---

[James Cartlidge]

My hon. Friend, who speaks with the expertise of a former Army officer and someone who serves on the Defence Committee, has hit the nail on the head in terms of the issue of optimism bias. [Interruption.] Did I say “former Minister”? I correct the record if I said that, but she is certainly on the Defence Committee.

[Mr Ellwood]

No, she was a Minister!

[James Cartlidge]

I apologise; she is a former Minister. She knows what she is talking about—that is for certain. She made an extremely important point about optimism bias. It may be that I was a bit pessimistic in my answer.

This is a serious point, because Mr Sheldon talks about optimism bias at length. Obviously, the new initial operating capability and full operating capability are much later than we wanted them to be, but I think what happened is that DE&S sat down with General Dynamics and said, “This time we’ve got to be realistic. Let’s have a programme we can actually deliver to.” I know it is disappointing, but that is the key thing; we want to actually get this equipment delivered.

My hon. Friend’s point about having psychological confidence to speak up is incredibly important, and she is a champion on that. We conduct the pan-Defence people survey, and the last iteration of the survey asked questions in relation to psychological confidence—are people confident in coming forward and challenging the system? In the last survey, the Army was eight percentage points above the civil service benchmark, so there is improvement happening in this space.

Global Military Operations

Tobias Ellwood Excerpts

Wednesday 14th June 2023 Commons Chamber

[The Minister for Armed Forces (James Heappey)]

I beg to move,

That this House has considered global military operations.

It is fantastic to be able to have this debate on global military operations in Government time. Looking back in Hansard—as I have done on many occasions—I noted that there was once a time when the House had an annual debate on each of the three services. Those debates were well subscribed and Members enjoyed them. While of late we have had a number of opportunities to discuss Ukraine specifically, I think it is some time since we have had the chance to discuss the totality of military operations around the world. I look forward to hearing speeches which, I suspect, will range across geographies and issues. It will be great to hear defence matters considered so widely and prominently—

[Mr Tobias Ellwood (Bournemouth East) (Con)]

rose—

[James Heappey]

—not least by my right hon. Friend the Chair of the Select Committee.

[Mr Ellwood]

I am sorry to intervene so early, but my right hon. Friend has raised an important aspect of the debate: namely, the mechanics of what we are discussing. I was pleased to hear him refer to the debates that we have had in the past, when there was more of a steady drumbeat. I hope that his words—which, I am sure, will be repeated by other Members, and I look to the Chair as well—will be heard, and I hope that the message that we need more debates and a greater understanding of what is going on in the world and our role in it can be sent to the usual channels, so that that can actually happen.

[James Heappey]

My right hon. Friend is entirely right, but he need not worry: the Ministry of Defence is a favourite of the Whips Office. Whenever the Whips come calling for us to take the opportunity to debate defence matters in the House, we are only too keen to do so, and I am delighted to have been provided with that time today.

The “Integrated Review Refresh 2023”, published in March, was clear about what we needed to do to respond to the deteriorating global security situation. It was about shaping the global strategic environment, increasing our focus on deterrence and defence, addressing the vulnerabilities that leave our nation exposed, and investing in the UK’s unique strengths. Defence is obviously at the centre of that ambition.

Ukraine has dominated defence matters over the past couple of years, so I thought I should make some mention of that, given the work that the UK has been doing in supporting the Ukrainians in their fight back against the Russian illegal invasion. Really, the update that it falls on me to provide to the House is that there is no update to give. Instead, I offer a word of caution. These are the very early stages of a necessarily complex plan, given the scale of the challenge that Ukraine faces. It will take a number of weeks until anyone can make a credible assessment of the success of the offensive. But it is under way; that much is clear. It is clear that there have been some early gains for the Ukrainians. In some parts of the Russian line, the regiments are performing credibly and holding their ground, but in many other parts of the line there is evidence of abandonment and mutiny.

But that should in no way encourage us to believe this is some war movie that ends with a wonderful, glorious, decisive victory. That might happen; it is perfectly possible, as the Ukrainians have shown time and again that they are brilliant at exceeding what normal military laws should expect. But it is also possible that a successful counter-offensive will still bring with it the requirement to go again next year. It matters enormously to our Ukrainian friends—just as it is important that Putin hears—that the international donor community is ready to rearm, retrain and go again next year, and the year after and the year after. If Putin thinks he can wait out the west, he is wrong. This counter-offensive will be successful—of that I am sure—but whether it will be decisively successful does not matter, in so much as the international community is ready to stand by Ukraine for as long as it takes.

--- Later in debate ---

[James Heappey]

It is heartening to hear that from my hon. Friend, and I agree with him. The most obvious route through which we achieve Euro-Atlantic security is NATO, but where the EU has a successful mission running, we should be perfectly willing to work with and within that mission to achieve mutual foreign policy aims. Similarly, there are plenty of parts of the world where the EU is already the framework, where the UK has no wish to be a framework in its own right but does have an interest, and again, I can see opportunity for the UK to work with and within the EU mission—take, for example, Mozambique, although I offer that as a for instance rather than any promise.

[Mr Ellwood]

I am grateful for the opportunity to pursue that important point. The trade and co-operation agreement, the Brexit deal, did not primarily include security. While recognising that NATO is the cornerstone of European security, the European Union plays a role in other aspects of non-state security across Europe, so would my right hon. Friend be minded to look at an opportunity for us to endeavour to strengthen our relationship and co-operation with the EU on that front?

[James Heappey]

Undoubtedly so; my right hon. Friend is correct. For all those countries who are on a Euro-Atlantic pathway, their aspiration tends to be NATO first, because they consider the security risks to be greatest, but for all of them that Euro-Atlantic pathway invariably means both NATO and EU membership. Whatever our views on Brexit, it is churlish to ignore that, and for countries in the western Balkans or the Caucasus who want to move away from their traditional sphere and towards the Euro-Atlantic one, we should be supportive of both their NATO and their EU aspirations.

The danger, with nearly half an hour gone, is that an awful lot of ambassadors will read Hansard tomorrow with concern about the absence of their country and region from my speech. I will sit down quickly so that the Opposition have the opportunity to respond and Members have the opportunity to contribute, but if time allowed, I would have gone on at length about the continued importance of the middle east and all our partners in that region—we value their friendship and partnership enormously. We recognise the role that we have to play in continuing to contribute to security there. We are concerned about the security challenge in the high north and continue to work with partners to address that. We recognise our responsibility to maintain a presence in the Antarctic. Quite frankly, I could probably have spoken for an hour and a half and still not covered the totality of global military operations, but 28 minutes is more than enough, so I will sit down.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Tobias Ellwood (Bournemouth East) (Con)]

I pay tribute to the Minister for his opening remarks and join him in paying tribute to the valiant work that our armed forces do. He gave us a tour de force of where we are represented around Europe and around the world, doing more than our fair share of making sure that we can sleep well at night, that our backs are covered and that we can stand up to the growing threats we face. I do not want to diminish his speech, but he could have just stood up and said, “We are busy, and we are getting busier,” because by any measure our world is getting more dangerous and more complex.

Globalisation, by which I mean international co-operation and the interdependence of the world’s economies, cultures and populations, is slowly dying. After the end of the cold war, Britain arguably embraced that concept of globalisation more than any other nation. As nations actively retreat, pushed forward by covid, becoming more siloed and protectionist and introducing more isolationist policies to reduce exposure and increase economic resilience, Britain’s economy and security are increasingly exposed.

When global security deteriorates, our economy suffers, as has been so blatantly illustrated by Ukraine and the price of oil and gas and food. It is baffling to hear the Treasury continue to say, “Yes, we will spend 2.5% on defence when economic conditions improve,” not realising the obvious connection that our economy and international security are directly related. Half our GDP is affected by international headwinds. We need to invest now to protect our economy and to allow our economy to grow.

Such is the deteriorating threat picture that the Government had to commission an update of the defence and security policy—the “Integrated Review Refresh”, as it was called. The Prime Minister’s opening paragraph said it is

“recognised that the intensification of competition between states was sowing seeds of instability.”

Paragraph 8 of the refresh stated:

“There is a growing prospect that the international security environment will further deteriorate in the coming years, with state threats increasing and diversifying in Europe and beyond. The risk of escalation is greater than at any time in decades”.

I have never seen such strong language in a Government paper before. It gives a clear warning that we are in for a bumpy decade. I therefore pose the question: why are we still stuck with a peacetime defence budget of just 2%? That is having a consequential impact on all three services.

At the time of the Gulf war in 1990, the Royal Navy had 51 frigates and destroyers and today it has just 18; the RAF had 36 fast jet squadrons and today it has just seven; and the British Army could muster three armoured divisions in Germany alone and one here in the UK. Today, we would struggle to put together one. It is not just the size of the armed forces that has diminished; the last defence review introduced ruthless cuts to equipment. The main battle tank is now reduced to just 156 and is three decades old, and upgrades will not be completed until the next decade. The armoured fighting vehicle, the Warrior, is also decades old, and it was replaced by a wheeled vehicle without a turret. The 8-tonne recce vehicle that was brought into service in 1971 was replaced by the massive 43-tonne Ajax, which should have entered service in 2017, but a dire procurement process means it is still struggling to get sign-off.

It is a grim state of affairs when our armed forces are not shaped to meet the threats, but trimmed to meet the budget. I appreciate that I am not speaking to the right Ministers here, because they understand this. It is the Treasury that needs to appreciate this, and I think we should pay tribute to the work that I know Defence Ministers are doing behind the scenes to make the case that we need to upgrade our defence posture, because the consequence of not doing so is the cuts we have seen.

The Type 32 frigate programme has been dropped completely, the E-7 ISTAR—intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance—plane has been reduced from five to three platforms, the Hawk training aircraft has been cut completely, the Typhoon fleet has been reduced, and even the plans to introduce the promised 138 F-35s have stalled at just 78. The Hercules transport aircraft, which is absolutely imperative for special forces operations, has been cut in its entirety. However, the real kick in the teeth is the armed forces’ manpower, which has been reduced from 82,000 to 72,000, while our land warfare capabilities have been severely reduced by the reductions in tanks, armoured fighting vehicles and artillery systems.

Sadly, we are neither ready for war, nor any longer able to project a viable conventional deterrent to maintain the peace. The Navy and the RAF have to some extent regrouped with investment and upgrades in response to the changing character of conflict, but the British Army has been left behind, without a clear narrative as to what it should be training for, how it should fight and, indeed, the force structure it should adopt.

[Liam Byrne (Birmingham, Hodge Hill) (Lab)]

I am very grateful to the right hon. and gallant Member for giving way. Today is the 41st anniversary of the liberation of the Falkland Islands, and it is an appropriate moment to celebrate the sacrifice of everybody who gave their lives in that campaign. It is a good moment, however, to reflect on how our country would go about embarking on such a military operation today. What is his assessment of our capability to launch a campaign like the campaign that liberated the Falklands?

[Mr Ellwood]

I certainly pay tribute, as I think we all would, to our armed forces for their courage and what they did to liberate the islands, but I am actually articulating that very point in saying that we are behind the curve. This goes against the spirit of what Ministers are trying to do to step forward, as I have outlined, and the recognition in the defence review refresh that the world is getting more dangerous.

The NATO summit in Vilnius is approaching, and there will be four main themes. The first is maintaining NATO deterrence, which will mean moving from out-of-area operations such as Afghanistan towards a NATO territorial force. Secondly, there will be plans to transform the alliance into a more modernising rapid response force, rising from 40,000 to 300,000. Thirdly, there will be support for Ukraine. Finally, there will be a look at global challenges, including China. In every one of those cases, there will be a call for greater investment in our defence posture, and that will add to our overseas commitments.

We need to recognise what we have done in Ukraine, and I again pay tribute to Ministers for that. We have stepped forward, and more so than any other nation in Europe. We can be very proud of that—not just militarily, but with the political commitment. We have been an exemplar, with the training we have done with the Ukrainians, the next-generation light anti-tank weapons, the battle tanks and the Storm Shadows, and even in encouraging the F-16s to get there as well. We have become ever less risk averse, and ever more willing to look Putin in the eye and not be spooked. I also pay tribute to the Government for planning and putting together the Ukraine recovery conference, because it is critical to look at the next steps we will actually take.

I took a look at my last speech from when we debated Ukraine, and some of the recommendations I made then remain valid today. We still need to agree what the mission is. For me, it is actually the removal of Russian forces from mainland Ukraine. That should be clarified, but I believe it is what the Ukrainians want. Crimea is a separate and more complicated challenge. We must secure UN safe haven status for the port of Odesa to go back to getting grain out so that we can reduce food inflation, which is running at about 19% in this country. We must assist Ukraine to construct its own major armaments programme—for example, in Poland—so that it can manufacture, assemble and replenish its own weapon systems, rather than relying on western stocks. We must ensure that the Wagner militia is listed as a terrorist organisation, along with sanctioning Putin directly. I also emphasise the need to welcome Ukraine into the joint expeditionary force—I still have not had an answer as to why that is not a possibility and a stepping stone into NATO. We wish the Ukrainians the very best as they move forward. There is an emphasis on saying that they can do this, but they need that continued commitment, which I hope we will see from NATO, despite what happens in the United States over the next couple of years.

As I said at the beginning of my remarks, our world is changing fast. Russia’s behaviour in Ukraine will not be limited to that part of eastern Europe. Iran could soon join North Korea in posing a nuclear and ballistic missile threat, and there is increasing instability in the western Balkans. China is also challenging the norms of international behaviour. Great power rivalry is back, global tensions are increasing, and when we add the challenges of climate change, increasing competition over resources, population growth and the proliferation of the weaponisation of artificial intelligence, there is a strong argument to increase defence spending. There are many questions for the defence Command Paper, which I hope will be produced soon.

Finally, Armed Forces Day is rapidly approaching, which is a chance for a grateful nation to show its support to the men and women who make up our armed forces community. They are on duty around the world, at sea, on land and in the air, promoting peace, delivering aid, providing security, fighting terrorism, working with our allies and supporting our comrades in arms, such as in Ukraine. Armed Forces Day is the day when barrack spaces and garrisons are opened up across the country for local communities to visit on a family day out, and to learn more about what our military does, the equipment it uses and the vital role in plays in watching our backs. Those events are held up and down the country and are both informative and entertaining, involving celebrities and local businesses. They are a simple but much appreciated way to say thank you to our valiant armed forces community for all its hard work, dedication and efforts to keep us safe in the UK and across the globe. As the armed forces covenant reminds us, we have a duty of care to all our service personnel, not just in the training they receive and the equipment that is procured, but in ensuring good provision of accommodation as well as mental health support.

Our armed forces who step in harm’s way for us deserve the best support we can provide. When we speak of the armed forces community, that is not just the regulars in uniform; it is the reservists, the cadets, the surrounding families, husbands and wives—it is all those directly supporting anyone who wears the uniform. I give a special mention to our veterans who may no longer be serving, but who remain very much part of the armed forces family. If hon. Members see anyone in uniform on Armed Forces Day, or a veteran proudly wearing their medals, please thank them for their service—it will make their day. Let us all support our brave military on Armed Forces Day.

Oral Answers to Questions

Tobias Ellwood Excerpts

Monday 15th May 2023 Commons Chamber

[Mr Speaker]

I call the Chair of the Defence Committee.

[Mr Tobias Ellwood (Bournemouth East) (Con)]

I welcome President Zelensky’s visit to the UK. Clearly, a warm relationship is developing between the President and our Prime Minister. We have a proud track record of being the first to provide those NLAWs, and of providing training on Salisbury plain, those main battle tanks and the long-range weapons systems. What next? Perhaps fast jets.

There is much talk of a counter-offensive, but I want to ask the Secretary of State about the comments of Yevgeny Prigozhin, the leader of the Wagner Group. He openly criticised President Putin for the absence of ammunition and battlefield tactics. Is the Secretary of State concerned that if the counter-offensive is successful and terrain is gained, Putin will turn ugly and resort to non-conventional chemical and biological weapons, as he did in Syria?

[Mr Wallace]

We always have to be on our guard about the behaviours of the Russian military and President Putin. As my right hon. Friend rightly comments, the use of chemical weapons in Syria was another turning point, as was the use of chemical weapons here on the streets of the United Kingdom in the poisoning of the Skripals in Salisbury. We are on our guard. The international community regularly communicates. We stand ready with NATO. We have increased our readiness and we have started to increase investment in our capabilities. That is all important, but my right hon. Friend is right that we must be on our guard about what happens next.

Ukraine

Tobias Ellwood Excerpts

Thursday 11th May 2023 Commons Chamber

[Mr Wallace]

I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for his and his party’s support. He knows as well as anyone that we are all determined to see this through. I think that this has been an exemplary example of Parliament at its best over the 440 or 450 days of the Russian invasion. I will get straight to the point and try to answer as many of his questions as I can.

On limitations, obviously we will not talk in public about whether there are limitations. The key here is to give Ukraine that capability to defend itself. What I can say is that, throughout this process, we always make sure that we gift having first examined, minimising escalation and unnecessary provocation of the Russian state—that is not the business we are in; we are in the business of helping Ukraine to defend itself within its sovereign territory. Of course, it is easy to forget that none of this would be needed—no deep-strike capability would be needed—if Russia withdrew its forces to the other side of the border and back into Russia. Every Russian force would be safe after that. Of course, that is why we are seeking deep fire within Ukraine, for example: because Russia has invaded so far into another country.

On integration with the plane, Storm Shadow is an air-fired missile. The right hon. Gentleman is correct, of course, that it is not easy to take a British-French missile and incorporate it with a former Soviet or Russian aircraft. That is one of the reasons for the time taken: working out whether it was technically feasible. I pay tribute to our scientists and technicians, who have done an amazing job—and not just with this type of capability —as well as to other scientists across Europe who have managed to produce integration of western weapons into Russian equipment, and innovative capabilities, at speed. I often question why I cannot have that speed when I try to commission some of those capabilities domestically, so there are lessons there. That is one of the areas.

I am not sure that there are many other powers with similar weapons systems providing similar support. There is, however, a drive by many allies to deliver further deep capability. HIMARS is obviously 80 to 90 km, but another American system that was gifted a few months ago—forgive me; I cannot remember its name—has a longer range.

One of our requirements in the second round of the international fund is the ability to do deep fire—deep strike. This took a long time partly because of technical feasibility, since putting a fifth or fourth-generation weapons system on what is sometimes a second or third-generation aircraft is not easy. We will see. I am not going to comment on when we expect these to be used. They have yet to be tested, and we will find out in the next few weeks or months the extent to which that has worked, but it takes time.

As I have always reassured the House, I wanted to calibrate our response. We need to make sure that we do these things in a way that helps Ukraine further its capabilities. Gifting these earlier when we were unsure whether they would necessarily work, without any form of offensive on the horizon, may have made them vulnerable and may not have made the difference that we are all trying to achieve. All I can say is that, having technically cleared the hurdles, and as everyone talks about an expected counter-offence, now is the right time to gift these to Ukraine, and they are now going into or are in the country.

No one should doubt any of our momentum here. Yes, the media come and go and cover different aspects of the world, and Sudan comes along, but if we look at the Government’s track record—Operation Interflex, which trained 9,000 last year and will train 20,000 this year around the United Kingdom, or the gifting of tanks at the beginning of the year—we see that our momentum continues.

On the right hon. Gentleman’s question about what has gone into the country, I know that all our tanks have gone into the country, as well as many of our Spartans and armoured vehicles. I do not know whether every single one has, and I am happy to write to him, but the big ones such as the tanks are all in country. They have trained and exercised both here and in Ukraine, and I know that the Ukrainian forces using them so far have enjoyed them very much and talk very highly of the Challengers. That also goes for the AS 90s, which have not only been put in but used. They seem to get excellent availability on the AS 90, so there are lessons to be learned for our capability.

On the Wagner Group designation, proscribing an organisation is a matter for the Home Office, done via collective write-round. I cannot comment on when or how those things happen. We have heard the calls from both sides of the House to proscribe it. The Wagner Group is a thoroughly nasty organisation, from not only what we see in Ukraine but what we have seen in west Africa and Syria, and does pose a threat to the United Kingdom and her allies, either directly or indirectly. It is a group that needs dealing with, although Mr Prigozhin seems to be making himself deeply unpopular with the leadership in the Kremlin at the moment—if I was him, I would not stand near any open windows if I was dealing with Mr Putin. Nevertheless, Wagner is here and we have to deal with it.

On the regional plans, I am trying—they are over 3,000 pages long and are written in NATO-speak, which probably makes them the equivalent of 12,000 pages long when we try to decipher them. It is important that we try to make commitments that meet those plans and also support others if they do not have that capability, because the strength of NATO will be whether it can carry its political determination into a military plan that makes a difference and deters—that is what we are really about—Russia or any other aggressor. There are a few more weeks and months to go, but I am wading my way through the 3,000 pages, and after this statement I am heading off to the Army on Salisbury plain to discuss exactly that.

[Mr Tobias Ellwood (Bournemouth East) (Con)]

I very much welcome this statement. I recently returned from Ukraine, and there is massive appreciation for what Britain has been doing and continues to do—not just the lethal aid provided by the Government but the humanitarian support gifted from the British people. There is huge anticipation about the counter-attack that is likely to take place, but there is also a message, as I hope the Secretary of State will agree, that it may require a second, third, or fourth counter-offensive to take place. This is not going to end simply when the Ukrainians decide to push forward. We should expect Russia to go ugly and to use unconventional systems in response.

I welcome the announcement on Storm Shadow. Britain is yet again stepping forward. Are the Americans going to match with ATACMS—the army tactical missile system? There is still a request for jets to be gifted as well. Finally, Trump last night refused to say that he wanted Ukraine to win. This is a material factor, because he could win the United States election next year, and that might be what Putin is banking on.

[Mr Wallace]

My right hon. Friend’s characterisation of the counter-offensives is correct. I do not think it is a case of “One last thrust and everything will be over by Christmas.” I think this is a matter of Ukraine quite rightly finding and exploiting, as any good general would, weaknesses and opportunities. We should always manage our expectations that it will all be over by Christmas. When we have a Russian army that does not mind sacrificing hundreds of thousands of its own people, we are not up against rational leadership that recognises, as anyone else would do, that the game is up already. Having lost 10,000 armoured vehicles, and with over 250,000 of its own soldiers dead or wounded, most people would have recognised that the game is up. That is one of the big challenges.

There are other weapons systems that Ukraine has asked for, and the ATACMS is a well-documented capability. We are pretty confident that Storm Shadow will plug some of that gap and definitely deliver the deeper range that HIMARS used to achieve when it was at 80 km. The Russians, after suffering significant losses to HIMARS, obviously worked out and moved beyond range ring, so we think Storm Shadow will absolutely help the Ukrainians make that difference.

The US President today is President Biden. I have a good relationship with him, as do the Government. They have stood firm, with $87 billion of donations. They have put their money where their mouth is. A huge amount of effort has gone into their support. I lived in America for a few years, or my parents did, and I know that the decent and good people of America would recognise that their rights are just as important as those of the people of Ukraine. Their constitution upholds rights. I think that is what will unite them, and I am confident that whoever comes next as President will continue to support the battle to uphold human rights.

Top Secret Document Leaks

Tobias Ellwood Excerpts

Tuesday 18th April 2023 Commons Chamber

[Mr Tobias Ellwood (Bournemouth East) (Con)]

(Urgent Question): To ask the Secretary of State to make a statement on the leaking of top secret military documents.

[The Minister for Armed Forces (James Heappey)]

The unauthorised disclosure of classified US documents discovered last week was clearly a concerning development. The Defence Secretary spoke to his opposite number in the US last week and has been kept closely informed since. He is in Washington this week for a long-planned briefing to the House Foreign Affairs Committee as well as for other bilateral meetings. Clearly, while there, he has been able to discuss things further with Secretary Lloyd Austin and others. The US Department of Defence and intelligence community are currently conducting their own investigation to determine the validity of those documents and the circumstances under which they were leaked.

The UK commends the swift action taken by US law enforcement to investigate and respond to the leak, including the arrest of a suspect. As the Secretary of State, the US Department of Defence and the French Ministry of Defence have already said, not all of this information apparently leaked is accurate. Colleagues will be frustrated, I know, that I am unable to tell them which bits are inaccurate as these are sensitive intelligence matters, but it is important, nonetheless, to stress the need for caution when reporting what has apparently been leaked. Obviously, the investigation is now a matter for the US legal system.

As the refreshed integrated review set out earlier this year, the US remains the UK’s most important ally and partner. The depth of the UK’s relationship with the US remains an absolutely essential pillar of our security. We remain committed to supporting Ukraine’s armed forces in response to Russia’s illegal invasion. Ukraine has repeatedly shown us its determination and resilience in the face of Russia’s barbaric invasion, and, as we have said, we are working in lockstep with allies through forums such as the G7 and NATO, and efforts such as the UK-led international fund for Ukraine, to get Ukraine the firepower that it needs to rapidly regain its territory.

[Mr Ellwood]

I thank the Minister for his statement.

Mr Speaker, may I begin with a declaration of interest that is pertinent to this subject? I am a dual US national born in the USA and I hold a US passport. I have grown up increasingly appreciating the value and, indeed, the importance of the unique and incredible bond that we have with our most trusted and valued security ally. However, when a security leak of this magnitude takes place, it should not prevent the legislatures on both sides of the Atlantic from seeking assurances—such as the Minister is giving us today—about the fall-out from the scale of top secret information that is now in the public domain and from the changes that may be considered to significantly limit the chances such an event being repeated. I ask the Minister not to hide behind that general veneer of secrecy here, but to be frank with the House about the process. Mass data are accumulated from a multitude of sources. This is then summarised to provide relevant information, and analysis of that information forms the intelligence picture. That is then presented to decision makers, and can then lead to action that might limit or alter the behaviour of an adversary to close down a threat or indeed inform and persuade other nations to join our cause.

I am pleased to hear that the Minister and the Secretary of State are speaking with their counterparts, but does the Minister believe that too many eyes now have general access to sensitive intelligence, with the pendulum of sharing files swinging too far after 9/11? Is there now too much information—almost by default—now classified as top secret? For example, if Egypt is intending to supply missiles to Russia, surely the world should know about that. If a Russian Su-27 jet did deliberately attempt to fire a missile at an RAF Rivet Joint over the Black sea last September, it was an act of war, and the details should surely be publicised, not hidden away in intelligence files. We certainly must avoid another Daniel Ellsberg situation.

As the world enters a dangerous chapter, we slide, potentially, into another cold war. The parameters for sharing and acting on pooled intelligence must surely be overhauled, so that they are fit for purpose. America, is our closest security ally, absolutely, but if a vital aspect of our relationship requires reviewing or addressing, surely we should have the confidence to do just that.

[James Heappey]

As my right hon. Friend notes, the apparently leaked documents are in the public domain. However, that does not change their classification and thus the degree to which any UK Minister or official can comment on their content, so I will not be commenting on specifics of the examples he raised, nor any others over the course of this urgent question. He is absolutely right in setting out the process by which information is gathered, assimilated and presented to decision makers; he is absolutely right that the breadth and scale of information in this data age is enormous; and he is absolutely right that one of the key decisions that any organisation with intelligence at its core has to make is how to allow access to that information so that the relevant people can use it to make good decisions.

My right hon. Friend asserts that perhaps too many eyes now have access to that information. I think that is a matter for different Departments in different countries to consider. As you would imagine, Mr Speaker, the MOD has looked at our own processes as a consequence of what happened last week. We have to place huge trust in our vetting processes to ensure that those who routinely have access to classified information have been risk-managed appropriately. Even beyond that, within the vetted workforce there is a very necessary compartmentalisation of information, so that only those who need to see things to do their jobs see them.

That said, what we are learning in the information age, when it is about getting ahead of the other side’s narrative, is that it is very useful to be able to think quickly about the information we have. There is thus a balance to strike between being overly compartmentalised and being in a position where people can be well informed and quickly make decisions in a way that meets the speed of relevance in modern competition. Suffice to say, and I hope my right hon. Friend and the House will be reassured, that of course the permanent secretary, on seeing what happened in the Department of Defence last week, has had a good look at what is going on inside the MOD to make sure that, if we have any lessons to learn, we do so.

AUKUS Defence Partnership

Tobias Ellwood Excerpts

Tuesday 14th March 2023 Commons Chamber

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

I call the Chair of the Defence Committee.

[Mr Tobias Ellwood (Bournemouth East) (Con)]

As somebody who is passionate about UK security and Britain’s place in the world, I could not hide my deep disappointment yesterday when the new integrated review spelled out a deteriorating global threat picture, but offered no new investment in our conventional forces. We are back here today, however, and I welcome this landmark announcement of ever greater collaboration between three trusted allies. Our political relationship with Washington experienced a bumpy patch post Brexit—I say that as a US-UK dual national—so it is good to see it back where it should be. Indeed, landing AUKUS, the Paris agreement and the Windsor framework shows that statecraft has returned to No. 10.

The procurement programme is for the long term and the first subs will not arrive for another couple of decades, yet the threat picture is deteriorating rapidly. If we are to commit to the Indo-Pacific tilt, does the Minister recognise the urgent need to increase the surface fleet, so that we can meet our responsibilities there?

[Alex Chalk]

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend, who is assiduous in his attention to the issue of the deterrent and the nuclear submarine capability in general. His point about the surface fleet is absolutely right. As a relatively new Minister coming into the Department, it has been encouraging to see the approach taken on Type 31—in other words, the choice of a platform that is deliverable, affordable and configurable to a mission. We have to move beyond a situation where exquisite and highly expensive capabilities are not necessarily operating on a particular mission to their full specification, so Type 31s can be reconfigured for anti-piracy missions, war-fighting missions or humanitarian missions. The British people want to see British warships and frigates acting in the national interest abroad in a sustainable and affordable way, and that is the approach we are taking.

Oral Answers to Questions

Tobias Ellwood Excerpts

Monday 13th March 2023 Commons Chamber

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Eleanor Laing)]

I call the Chair of the Defence Committee.

[Mr Tobias Ellwood (Bournemouth East) (Con)]

I am conscious that there is a statement to follow, but may I just pause and say thank you to the Defence Secretary and his team for the tireless work they have done in trying to secure additional funding of £11 billion and an increase in defence spending of 2.5%? It was not to be, and our military will be affected by that, not least our land forces. However, I do welcome the AUKUS agreement, which will secure hundreds of highly skilled jobs up and down the country. Is any part of the £3 billion of additional funding for the nuclear enterprise part of the £10 billion reserve for Dreadnought, or is it ringfenced for the AUKUS procurement programme, and is any of the £5 billion coming through subject to VAT, which would of course mean that one fifth of it will go back to the Treasury?

[Mr Wallace]

My right hon. Friend makes an interesting point about the details of the announcement. Obviously, the details will come forward in the Budget. What I can say is that the £2 billion-plus is new money. It is not part of the reserve or anything else, and it is separate from the £2.3 billion for Ukraine. It also comes on top of the £560 million of extra money for weapons and restocking announced in the autumn statement. On the nuclear chapter, the £3 billion is a recognition of the need for increased defence capability in that space, but also of the need to invest now in infrastructure, which, if we do not start now, will not be fit for purpose when AUKUS starts towards the end of the decade.