(5 years, 8 months ago)
Commons ChamberI agree with my hon. Friend, and I want to take this opportunity to thank her parents and the parents of millions of others for their contributions to this country. I agree with her about the importance of Wendy Williams’s work, which will be a vital step to ensuring that we right the wrongs.
I thank the Home Secretary for advance sight of his statement. Of course, it is imperative that the victims of the Windrush scandal are compensated justly for their outrageous and disgraceful treatment. If the scheme delivers some sort of justice, that will be welcome, but we need more information before we can finalise our judgment. I welcome what the Home Secretary says about there being no cap on the scheme, because the needs of victims, not the choices of the Treasury, must drive the total amount of compensation.
Will the Home Secretary explain exactly what the Home Office will be compensating? Is it only financial losses, or will the devastating impact on health, wellbeing, family relationships and other aspects of life that so many have suffered also be considered? Can he tell us whether claiming compensation will preclude victims from seeking other forms of redress from the Home Office, including through the courts, and will the nine people who have been able to claim from the hardship fund also be able to claim under the compensation scheme? It is welcome that the compensation scheme is not restricted to Caribbean countries, but why is the Department not undertaking work to find victims of the scandal from all Commonwealth countries, rather than restricting case reviews just to Caribbean countries? The Home Office has ruined the lives of citizens from all around the Commonwealth, so it should be taking steps to fix and compensate all those cases.
Finally, the Home Secretary referred to the shock felt by the whole country in response to Windrush, but it should not have been a shock to the then Home Secretary, now the Prime Minister, or her Department because the Department had been repeatedly warned that it was an inevitable consequence of the hostile environment. We still need to know why the Home Office ignored its own warnings and pressed ahead with the hostile environment regardless. When will the lessons learned review be published, and when will the Home Secretary start rolling back on hostile environment policies such as the right to rent?
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his comments. I reiterate again that, for all the right reasons, there is no cap on this scheme. He asked whether only financial losses will be considered, but if other detriment has been suffered—people may have been wrongly detained, for example—the scheme will consider that. He also asked whether people who have used the urgent payment fund will be eligible to apply under scheme. Absolutely, if they meet the eligibility criteria, and depending on the claim, there is no link between the two schemes.
The hon. Gentleman welcomed the fact that the scheme is not limited to Commonwealth citizens of Caribbean origin; it is broader than that. It is right that we have focused on those whom all the evidence suggested are more likely to have suffered detriment, but it is also right that the scheme is not limited to Commonwealth citizens of Caribbean origin. He rightly referred to the Wendy Williams’s review, which will be vital to ensure that we get everything right.
(5 years, 8 months ago)
Commons ChamberI very much agree with my hon. Friend on the issue of talent. The heart of the new immigration system, as we set out in the White Paper, is all about making sure that we are open to talent from across the world in all sectors and all industries and doing our best to make sure that it wants to come to Britain.
An effective system for the UK must mean immigration rules being tailored and differentiated for different parts of the UK. What plans does the Home Secretary have to put in place differentiated rules reflecting the particular needs and circumstances of Northern Ireland?
It is important that like the current system, the new immigration system is simple and straightforward for businesses and others to understand, so I want to avoid unnecessary complexity. The hon. Gentleman is right about making sure that it reflects the needs of different parts of the UK. That is why in the current system, we already have, for example, the shortage occupation list specifically for Scotland. I want to make sure that as we go forward, we keep looking at the needs of all the nations of the United Kingdom.
(5 years, 8 months ago)
Westminster HallWestminster Hall is an alternative Chamber for MPs to hold debates, named after the adjoining Westminster Hall.
Each debate is chaired by an MP from the Panel of Chairs, rather than the Speaker or Deputy Speaker. A Government Minister will give the final speech, and no votes may be called on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
It is good to see you in the Chair, Mr Betts. I pay tribute to the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Mr Duncan Smith), not only for securing this debate but for the work that he and Lord McColl have done on their legislation, and indeed for his very powerful and comprehensive speech.
I also pay tribute to the all-party parliamentary group on human trafficking and modern slavery, which is chaired very ably by the hon. Member for Gedling (Vernon Coaker) —I pay tribute to him and all his colleagues from the group. I have to say that, on the very rare occasions that I make it along to a meeting of the APPG, the knowledge and expertise on display puts me to shame, but I share the APPG’s commitment to the cause, as all hon. Members do, which has been demonstrated by the range of excellent and comprehensive speeches we have heard.
It is appropriate to pay tribute, as the hon. Member for South West Bedfordshire (Andrew Selous) did, to all the fantastic groups providing support to the victims of these awful crimes, as well as campaigning for reform. As hon. Members have said, it is tragic that this range of crimes is so prevalent in the 21st century in the United Kingdom. The figures and the historical perspective provided by the hon. Member for Congleton (Fiona Bruce) were horrifying.
The Modern Slavery Act 2015 was welcome and world-leading. Of course, it was very quickly followed by equivalents—indeed, almost replicas—in Northern Ireland and Scotland. The review of the legislation announced by the Government was therefore also welcome and, as anticipated, the reports produced by the review group have been both thorough and helpful. However, as I understand it, the scope of the review does not address head-on the issue of support for survivors, so this debate is a timely and welcome way to fill that gap.
Members have raised a number of issues, primarily about immigration status and the possibility of a statutory support scheme, so I will address those first of all. Regarding immigration status, the starting point has to be the Work and Pensions Committee report on modern slavery, which made powerful points about the complexity and the dubiety surrounding victims’ immigration status and their access to support after going through the NRM process. Some victims will be recognised as refugees; there will be a smaller number of non-European economic area nationals who obtain discretionary leave automatically; and there will be a similarly small number of EEA nationals who can apply for that discretionary leave. Other EEA nationals will find it difficult to show that they are exercising treaty rights at all and will have significant difficulty in accessing benefits. Many more victims will have no immigration leave at all.
During the course of the Work and Pensions Committee inquiry into modern slavery, Baroness Butler-Sloss, who is obviously an expert, told the Committee that the lack of any form of automatic entitlement for victims of trafficking while they take even basic steps to rebuild their lives is a “ludicrous situation”. The previous anti-slavery commissioner pointed out that there is precedent in the two years’ leave given to victims of modern slavery who are here under the immigration rules as domestic servants.
The Committee recommended that all confirmed victims of modern slavery be given at least one year’s leave to remain with recourse to benefits and services. Even though that is not what every single victim would want, as the hon. Member for Nottingham North (Alex Norris) pointed out—he is very sadly missed on the Home Affairs Committee—it would provide significant support and encouragement for victims of modern slavery.
Add to that the simple fact that, if imminent removal from the country is a realistic consequence of coming forward as a victim of trafficking, it makes it harder to encourage them to come forward in the first place, and therefore it also makes it more difficult for us to be able to prosecute the traffickers and the perpetrators of these crimes. For all those reasons, we support the recommendations of the Work and Pensions Committee on automatic immigration status.
I support the assessment of the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green of the pull-factor arguments sometimes put by the Government. I add the simple point that we should build our system around fear of what those who want to abuse it might do. First and foremost, the system has to be built and shaped around the needs of victims, and it is an open-and-shut case for automatic immigration leave.
Members have highlighted the fact that there is no statutory provision for support in the 2015 Act. Such a provision was written into the slightly later legislation in Northern Ireland and Scotland. That highlights the benefit of going second, when it is possible to reflect and build on what has gone before. Groups working on behalf of victims believe that the statutory underpinning of support is helpful, and the Government should address that and look to replicate it.
The Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Criminal Justice and Support for Victims) Act (Northern Ireland) 2015 came before the Modern Slavery Act 2015—it was passed in January 2015—yet we had that statutory provision for support beyond the 45 days. However, the hon. Gentleman will know that that support is constrained—it is provided only if a victim has leave to remain in the United Kingdom. While recognising that immigration matters are still reserved matters, we see that any future change would have a knock-on impact, so that the service provision in Scotland and Northern Ireland—albeit that we are ahead of the curve at this stage—would need to be replicated for victims who do not have entitlement to remain.
I am very grateful to the hon. Gentleman for correcting me and he makes a valid point about how all these things are rolled up together.
On the hon. Gentleman’s point about the length of support, the Government have moved from 15 to 45 days, which is very welcome. The Scottish Government recently consulted victims and groups that support them, and opted for an extension to 90 days. I am not engaging in a bidding war here, but simply making an attempt to best reflect the complex process of recovering from the trauma of being trafficked. There is a good case that a period of 90 days better allows people to move on from the NRM process to access housing, to apply for social security, and to apply for discretionary leave, to which Members have referred. We may need to go further in Scotland, but it is about looking at the evidence and seeing what works best.
This has been mentioned, but I hope that the Government desist in their drive to cut support to those who are going through the NRM, which was struck down in court late last year. In my view, the level of support for asylum seekers is outrageously low. If the Government want to level the rates, they should be levelling up and not down, and saving themselves money by strengthening the right to work for asylum seekers and those going through the NRM, as pointed out by the hon. Member for Nottingham North.
The chair of the all-party parliamentary group on human trafficking and modern slavery, the hon. Member for Gedling, highlighted the number of kids who are going missing. The review panel has only just published its third interim report on support for children. At first glance, it seems to acknowledge that the Government have done good things, but also makes positive recommendations about what can be done better. It mentions the acceleration of the roll-out of independent child trafficking advocates, and the length of time they are allowed to engage with children.
Although beyond the scope of the review group support, it was noticeable that it appears to be positive about the fact that, in Northern Ireland and Scotland, all unaccompanied asylum-seeking children had access to a guardian, so that support arrives even before NRM decisions. That does not address the fact that the majority of child victims are UK citizens, a point made by the hon. Member for Gedling, but it flags up the possibility that providing support for kids who are going through the NRM is one way of stopping so many of them from going missing.
There are a million other issues that we could have touched upon and have not, such as national insurance, public awareness raising, asking people to be vigilant, legal aid, reparation procedures, police and frontline training, and so on. In reality, we probably need an afternoon in the Chamber to discuss all aspects. I recognise again that there is commitment across the House to tackling this problem and a genuine desire to get as close as possible to eliminating it. We will continue to revisit the subject and keep pressure on the Home Office to deliver, but I recognise that there is commitment from every part of the House. I thank the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green again for bringing the debate.
I am also very sceptical about the pull factor argument. Even if we were to accept that there is a pull factor, is the key point not that safeguards are in place? People cannot self-refer, and a decision has to be made about whether they are a victim before they get any automatic leave. Is that not sufficient to protect against abuse? Why should we be building the system around fear of abuse, rather than the needs of genuine, recognised victims?
We are not building the system around abuse. We are building the system around the fact that, as has already been mentioned, the largest cohort of referrals to the NRM are British. Modern slavery exists in and of itself, and it sits separately from the asylum system. We must ensure that we have support for victims of modern slavery, as we do through the national referral mechanism. Questions of immigration are in addition to the support they will get through the national referral mechanism. Not every victim of modern slavery or human trafficking is a non-EEA national. The statistics, sadly, show that very clearly.
We are launching a digital system later this spring to help to make our delivery of support much more efficient, and that will help first responders to ensure that victims get into the system as quickly as possible. We are seeing faster decision-making times than ever before. We have more than doubled the number of caseworkers working on the NRM. The single competent authority launched in its shadow form in January 2019 and is on track to be fully launched in April. That single, expert unit will make all NRM decisions, regardless of the potential victims’ nationality. That will be a significant step forward, and I hope it will help victims once they are in the system.
(5 years, 8 months ago)
Commons ChamberIt is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Sheffield, Heeley (Louise Haigh).
I should like to focus on knife crime prevention orders. If we are to reduce knife crime, we need to address the issue of drug usage. So many of the young people dying in our communities are dying as a result of the drugs trade—particularly cocaine. We need to consider increasing the costs attached to the usage of drugs, because drugs are historically extremely cheap at the moment; and if we want to attack usage, we have to increase the costs attached to recreational possession. The Minister said that she had looked at dealing with gangs—she had looked at knife crime prevention orders—but I think we need to look at drug prevention orders.
I think it is appalling that the chattering classes, wherever we may find them, whatever their politics, are wringing their hands about the deaths of mostly young men and children on our streets and then, moments later, too many of them are shoving a line of cocaine up their noses. That is not a line of white powder; that is a line of blood, and users of cocaine have blood on their hands—the lives of many, many young people and children.
So I say this to the Minister. Let us not build more prisons. Let us not lock more recreational users up—but let us hit them in the pocket. If they are caught in possession of cocaine, if they are responsible for the deaths on our streets, they should be fined accordingly. Let us say that you are a City trader on £300,000 a year, Minister: you should be fined a third of your income—a third of your income—if you are caught in recreational possession. Then users might start to think. If they do not care about the young lives being lost on the streets, they might start thinking about the consequences to themselves and their finances.
It may be a City trader. It may be a Member of Parliament. It may be a doctor. It may be a teacher. But if they are using cocaine, they are responsible for the tragedies that are happening daily, and I think they should pay—pay for recreational usage. They should pay by being fined a significant amount of their income the first time they are caught in possession, 50% the second time and 100% the third time. When we introduce laws like that, Minister, people may start taking this matter seriously, and we may actually start to address the mayhem, destruction and tragedy that is afflicting so many of our communities.
I start by confirming that the SNP has supported the Bill from the outset. As I previously acknowledged, the Government here have worked closely with the Scottish Government on many of its provisions, given that the Bill’s subject matter covers a range of both devolved and reserved competences. We remain of the view that the Bill will help tackle crimes involving corrosive substances, knives and certain firearms, so it continues to enjoy our support. However, we took—and continue to take—the view that more important tools include police funding, police numbers, cross-government working and a genuine switch to a public health approach to knife crime.
For today, though, the 95 amendments passed in the Lords focus on three specific areas. One set of changes proposed in the Lords does not convince us at all. One set of changes appears absolutely reasonable to us. Another group of amendments is welcome but still falls short of what was in the Bill at the outset. We are far from convinced on the knife crime prevention orders. As we have heard, things have moved very quickly, essentially closing down time for proper consideration, scrutiny and consultation. It is fair to recall, however, that this morning the Metropolitan Police Commissioner defended the proposals robustly before the Home Affairs Committee. I absolutely respect the fact that they are well-intentioned. I question, however, whether the reasoning behind them and the form they now take are well-founded. The all-party group on knife crime, excellently chaired by the hon. Member for Croydon Central (Sarah Jones), heard evidence from a series of groups who have significant concerns about the impact they will have. As we have heard, concerns have been raised by magistrates, local government, the Children’s Society, the Standing Committee for Youth Justice, the Prison Reform Trust and the Police Federation.
(5 years, 9 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesOf course it does. I use the broad sweeping terms of arts and culture, but each of the composite parts of the British arts and cultural industry will have its own specific problems. It is easy for us to ignore it, but for a theatre producer who is looking to tour with a dance company, the ending of free movement will be highly significant.
That is even before we get to science-based industries. We have all received many representations from science-based industries that spin out of research programmes that are connected not just to EU funding, but to scientists’ ability to work easily across the continent of Europe. The Government say that they wish to support science and technology, because it is the British way to improve our economy by inventing new things—we are, of course, the home of the computer. However, free movement is an integral part of that, and it has offered the science-based industries a great ability to draw staff in from among the best in Europe, wherever they are.
Finally, we ought to consider, and the Government ought to monitor, the policy’s impact on manufacturing. The Government have argued that their policy on Brexit—specifically, ending free movement and coming out of the single market—will somehow support manufacturing. UK citizens who work in manufacturing often want to grow their skills and see, understand and manage manufacturing plants across the continent of Europe. They want to understand how things are done differently elsewhere and bring those skills back to Britain. To ignore the barrier to future manufacturing prosperity that the policy will create is to ignore an important impact of the ending of free movement.
We know far too little about the impact of immigration on our local economies. There is no evidence of a statistically significant relationship between EU immigration and employment rates or wages. We do not have enough evidence about the impact of those things on local economies, despite the political rhetoric. The Government have a duty to do better, and I hope the Minister will support my suggestion.
I was going to speak to new clause 43, which covers largely the same ground as new clause 13. The latter clause is probably better drafted, and the hon. Lady has given a comprehensive speech in support of it, so I will simply say that I approve of everything she has said.
New clauses 13 and 43 focus on requiring the Government to report on the impacts of ending free movement and our future immigration rules, respectively, on European economic area and Swiss nationals. As I have said, I appreciate that some Committee members do not believe we should end free movement. I pay particular tribute to the hon. Member for Wirral South, who spoke passionately on the matter.
I emphasise again that the Government fully recognise the great contribution that migrant workers make to the UK. We remain committed to ensuring that the future immigration system caters for all sectors, and that it benefits the UK economy and our prosperity. We want the existing workforce to stay and we want to continue to attract other international workers to the UK. That is why the White Paper contains a route for skilled workers —it will, for the first time, encompass medium-skilled workers as well as the highly skilled—and a temporary worker route, which will enable people of all skill levels to come to the UK for up to 12 months. Neither of those routes will be subject to a cap on the number of visas granted.
The Government take seriously the economic impact on the UK economy of the proposals that we set out in the immigration White Paper in December and other measures in the Bill to end free movement. These proposals are designed to benefit the UK and to ensure that it continues to be a competitive place, including for medical research and innovation.
I share the hon. Lady’s concern that policies are properly evaluated and their full impact considered. That is why the immigration White Paper contained a full economic appraisal, running to more than 50 pages. It is a serious piece of work, which I encourage all hon. Members to study carefully. However, although it is considered and well thought-through, that appraisal is, by its nature, predictive. The proof of any immigration policy is its actual effect, which can be established only once the policy is in operation. We need to understand how policies work in practice, how businesses and employers react and how individual prospective migrants behave. We also need to understand the prevailing economic conditions in the UK and the countries from which migrants might come.
The hon. Lady spoke of the quality of the debate in the referendum of 2016. I well remember some comments that were made at that time about the views of experts. Perhaps unsurprisingly, I give quite a lot of credence to the views of experts, and accordingly I have a lot of sympathy with the sentiment behind the new clauses. I am pleased to tell the Committee that the Government already have plans in place to ensure there is an annual review of the kind that is envisaged.
Hon. Members will see that there is a section in chapter 3 of the immigration White Paper on the future role of the Migration Advisory Committee. It says that the Government will commission MAC to produce an annual report on key aspects of the UK’s immigration system. That strikes me as a comprehensive offer, and I think it would be best for any annual review to be undertaken by MAC, which has a good reputation for its independence and, of course, its expertise.
Accordingly, given our existing commitment to a proper, thorough and independent review of the operation of the future immigration system, I hope that hon. Members who have tabled these new clauses will see that they are not required and feel able to withdraw them.
My hon. Friend makes a really important point. With the history of the Windrush experience being so close, one would imagine that we would not yet have forgotten its lessons and would seek to apply them in this situation. We tabled the new clauses precisely because of that concern.
It is well known that other problems with the process include its inaccessibility to iPhone users. The Government talked about how easy this process would be—people would be able to do it on their phones—but that is not the case for half of the UK’s adults, who happen to use an iPhone. The inability to develop an app for use on an iPhone does not create a great deal of confidence in the rest of the process or the Home Office’s ability to handle it. People who already have proof of permanent residence are being asked to provide evidence of it, even though they were promised a simple swap to settled status. We need to have local support centres where people can apply offline, but they are not available.
The new clauses would remove the category of pre-settled status. This distinction, whereby an individual must be resident for five years to qualify for settled status, seems to be the result of a copy-and-paste exercise from the rules for permanent residence. A number of the stakeholders from whom the Committee took evidence do not see the rationale for it and believe that it serves no clear purpose. In fact, it creates more bureaucracy for individuals and the Home Office—this morning we discussed how difficult the Home Office sometimes finds it to deal with complicated or even simple procedures.
The Government have already admitted that it will be difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish easily between EU citizens who arrive before and after 29 March, which adds another layer of uncertainty. We can easily foresee the confusion for employers and landlords, who will wonder what different rights apply to the different categories, with detrimental effects for the holders of pre-settled status. I would welcome clarification from the Minister. If it is not simply to mirror the rules on permanent residence, can she explain the rationale for pre-settled status?
New clause 15 sets out other requirements, such as ensuring that applicants are issued with physical documentation of their proof of status. I acknowledge that this replicates new clause 35, which was tabled by the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East. It is another area where the Home Office will inevitably have to move. The Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants and Professor Smismans vividly illustrated not only the administrative hassle of a digital system, but the potential implications for the treatment by what they describe as “private actors” and for
“equal access to work and housing.”
No other immigration status in this country operates exclusively digitally. The Government have said that they want this system to be more user-friendly than the current application process, but members of the3million group have made it absolutely clear that physical proof of their status would improve their experience of the system and provide some much-needed reassurance. I really do not understand why the Government are so resistant to that, and I urge the Minister to take the opportunity on this issue to work with, rather than against, EEA nationals and the people who speak for them. I imagine that this is an area that the Government will have to move on, as they did on the fee—many of us argued for it for a long time before the change was made.
New clause 15 would put on the face of the Bill the Government’s commitment not to levy a fee. For a long time, the Government were insistent on the need to charge £65 for an application. I am sure the Minister will embarrassingly recall that—in a written answer to me—she was not prepared to rule out the £65 fee for victims of modern slavery and trafficking at that stage. I am delighted that the Government moved on the issue. It might have been because of the embarrassment that, at one stage, the European Parliament was even considering covering the cost of the fees on behalf of EU nationals in this country. After campaigning by Opposition Members and other parties, along with the3million and trade unions, it was a good step that the Prime Minister conceded that the application should be free; therefore, the Government should have no issue putting that into the legislation.
New clause 16 details the rights of family members of EEA nationals who are eligible for settled status. New clause 18 would make it explicit that article 8 of schedule 1 of the Human Rights Act 1998—the right to respect for private and family life—applied to holders of settled status and of the work visa for EEA and Swiss nationals dealt with in new clause 21.
On new clause 17, the Government have repeatedly stated that there would be only three criteria for settled status: nationality of a relevant country or a family member, residence in the UK and a criminality check. The rules in the appendix of the Immigration Rules go beyond that; they leave a loophole where someone who is not a serious criminal and otherwise eligible could be denied settled status on the basis of non-exercise of treaty rights. New clause 17 seeks to address this issue. Following legal action from the JCWI, from whom we took evidence, the Government narrowed the rules, but the power still remains. In written answers to me, the Minister has stated:
“the UK has decided, as a matter of domestic policy, to be more generous than the draft Withdrawal Agreement in certain respects. In particular, those applying under the scheme will not be required to show that they meet all the requirements of current free movement rules, such as any requirement to have held comprehensive sickness insurance or generally to detail the exercise of specific rights under EU law, such as the right to work.”
The new clause would enshrine that policy in law.
If the Government do not accept new clause 17, could the Minister explain why they are so intent on wishing to retain a power that they never intend to use?
I give my support to the new clauses tabled by the hon. Members for Manchester, Gorton and for Sheffield Central, who made a lot of excellent points, including about the need or otherwise for pre-settled status.
This is probably one of the most important debates that we will have in this Committee. We all know that the settled status scheme is a huge undertaking. There is no doubt in my mind that the Home Office is doing its best to implement it to the best of its abilities. I do not question the commitment and effort made to attempt to have that scheme reach as many people as possible. The amendments are not about that, but whether EEA nationals and family members should be required to apply for their rights in the first place.
We are clear that EEA nationals’ rights should be declared in law. They should be able to retain their rights without any need to apply. Instead of applying for the right to remain in what is their home country, instead people would apply for documents simply to evidence that right. After all, that is pretty much the position they are in now: EEA nationals can make the UK their home simply by meeting the qualifying criteria by exercising their EU treaty rights. However, even though they do not need to, many find it very handy to apply for a document that proves they are exercising treaty rights and are allowed to remain here, so they apply for residence documents. Those documents do not give them any extra rights, but are simply convenient. It is far easier to hand a residence document to a landlord than a few months or years of bills, bank statements and wage slips to prove their right to be in the country.
All we are saying is that the same should happen in future. The Bill will strip people of hugely important rights; it should therefore also replace those lost rights with other rights that are granted automatically. All those who meet the Home Office criteria for settled status should be granted it as a matter of law. Applications for settled status documents would then be the means to simply evidence those rights, just in the same way as happens now. All that will become hugely important the day after the deadline for settled status applications passes.
If we do not make these changes, the evidence tells us that hundreds of thousands of people will be here without any status at all. They could, in theory, be removed. The Home Office talks of proportionate responses in allowing those with a reasonable excuse to apply late. However, that is tinkering around the edges. The fact remains that there will still be hundreds of thousands of people here without permission—people who were lawfully resident one day, and unlawfully the next.
I thank the hon. Members for Manchester, Gorton and for Sheffield Central for tabling new clauses 15 to 18. I am also grateful to the hon. Members for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East and for Paisley and Renfrewshire North for new clauses 33, 35, 47 to 49.
Before turning to the new clauses, I will say a few words about the proposal put forward by my hon. Friend the Member for South Leicestershire (Alberto Costa), to which the hon. Member for Sheffield Central referred and to which the House agreed unanimously last week. We and the EU have been clear that providing certainty for citizens is a priority. That is why we have written to the EU about ring-fencing the citizens’ rights part of the withdrawal agreement. As my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary said to the Home Affairs Committee last week, we should not underestimate the challenges involved in reaching such a joint UK-EU commitment. But we share a common goal in seeking to protect citizens’ rights. In the meantime, we will continue to seek commitments from the EU and its member states to protect the rights of UK nationals in the EU in the event of no deal.
The hon. Member for Sheffield Central raised a number of points specifically on the settled status scheme and the ease of applications. I must, once and for all, put to bed the allegation that people will not be able to use their iPhones to apply. Individuals will be able to use any desktop, laptop or mobile device to make an application. It is only during this current phase of testing that people need to use the EU Exit: ID Document Check app to verify their identity, which is currently—I use that word advisedly—available only on Android devices. When the scheme is fully live at the end of March, the use of the app will be entirely optional.
The app is just one of several ways in which people will be able to verify their identity, including by post or face to face at an application centre. Additional routes that will be available to have identity documents checked include 50 locations where applicants will be able to have their passports scanned and verified. We are also rolling out additional digital support, which I saw in operation at the Barbican library some months ago, and a dedicated telephone advice and support service is also available. It is important to the Government that we make it as easy as possible for people to apply, and the Home Secretary continues to work very closely with Apple on the upgrades to its systems—not ours—required in order to have a chip-check device available on iOS.
There was a question about pre-settled status, which we grant to people with fewer than five years’ residence. This is a well-established rule that derives from the EU’s free movement directive: after five years, a person gets permanent residence. The draft withdrawal agreement specifically refers to these rules. The Opposition’s proposal would mean that a person here for a day, and with no intention to make their life in the UK, would immediately get indefinite leave to remain.
I turn to the new clauses tabled by hon. Members. The new clauses would give automatic immigration status to EEA and Swiss nationals—to whom I will continue to refer as “EEA nationals” for brevity—and their family members resident in the UK. As I have explained before to the Committee, this is called a declaratory system: individuals would automatically acquire status without needing to apply, but could subsequently register for a document if they chose to, in a similar way to how current free movement rights operate.
I welcome the fact that hon. Members share my aim to secure the rights of EEA nationals who are resident in the UK, which we all agree is of the utmost importance. The Government devoted a great deal of thought to how best to manage the end of free movement residence rights as we leave the EU. As I have explained before, a declaratory system is not the answer. As I explained to the Committee last week, in a deal scenario the EEA regulations that implement the free movement directive will remain in force until the end of the implementation period on 31 December 2020 and will be saved for the six-month grace period thereafter.
In a no-deal scenario, clause 4 of the Bill will save the EEA regulations from the date when they are repealed by schedule 1, and these will apply for people who are resident before exit day. This will maintain their current position until the deadline for applying under the settlement scheme expires in December 2020, and will ensure there is no change in their status as a result of Brexit until then. EEA nationals and their family members will be able to secure their immigration status in UK law after EU exit through the settlement scheme, which provides a quick and easy way for EEA nationals and their family members to apply for and be granted status. As the hon. Member for Sheffield Central pointed out, this will now be free of charge.
The overwhelming majority of EEA nationals will need only to prove their identity, demonstrate residence in the UK and declare any criminal convictions. We will work with applicants to ensure that they are granted the status to which they are entitled. The scheme has, of course, been designed to comply with the Government’s obligations under the European convention on human rights. I take such obligations incredibly seriously, and they are applied by default to everything the Government do. Although new clause 18 is well-intentioned, it is unnecessary.
Some hon. Members might think that a so-called declaratory system would be better for EEA nationals, as it would provide them with an immigration status without their needing to apply. Although I understand why hon. Members wish to make the new system as streamlined as possible, I disagree with the proposals for a declaratory system. As I have said previously, requiring EEA nationals to apply for and receive a formal grant of status via the settlement scheme is key to ensuring that life continues smoothly for them in the future. Resident EEA nationals will be able to use their settled or pre-settled status to distinguish themselves from EEA nationals arriving in the UK in the future. In addition, a declaratory system for the resident population would provide much less incentive to apply for status and thereby receive the documentation that will enable them to prove that status.
The incentive is there because, in order to be able to work, rent and access services, people will need to have a document that proves they have settled status. Can the Minister address what exactly is going to happen and what the status will be of the hundreds of thousands of people—we heard about them in evidence—who will miss the deadline if this system is not declaratory?
We covered this point previously in the evidence sessions and also last week. The Government are absolutely determined to have a proportionate approach to those who miss the deadline and to assist those who have challenges through vulnerability, to make sure that they do indeed go through the settled status scheme.
It is important to us to reflect that people will want to be able to evidence their status here. However, at some point in the future we have to be able to draw a distinction between those who arrived before we left the EU and within the implementation period and those who arrived afterwards. Having a large proportion of this cohort legally entitled to a status but with no formal evidence to prove it would lead to confusion among employers and service providers and make it difficult for individuals to prove their right to benefits and services to which they are entitled.
In the longer term, it could also make it more difficult for them to prove that they have a legal right to reside in the UK. I am sure that Committee members will agree that that is not the outcome we want.
It does not make it one iota more difficult for people to prove their status, because they will be using the same scheme. The only difference a declaratory system makes is that on the day after the application deadline there will not be hundreds of thousands of people without status. It will be just as easy for people to prove their status because they are using exactly the same scheme.
The hon. Gentleman will be aware that it is the Government’s intention for there not to be hundreds of thousands of people without status and to ensure that people are assisted through the scheme where necessary. I was alarmed earlier today to hear information about a councillor from the hon. Gentleman’s own party who was encouraging others not to apply. I am sure we would all agree that that is the worst piece of advice that any elected representative could give.
I have taken incredibly seriously the lessons learned from Windrush, where individuals became entangled in measures intended to tackle illegal migration precisely because they did not hold the documentation that they needed. It is absolutely crucial that people understand their immigration status and the basis on which they have a right to remain in the UK. We have been developing plans for the EU settlement scheme. As we have been developing those plans, we have received queries about various groups of EU citizens who believe that they were here lawfully, but who are not meeting the requirements of the free movement directive.
Last week, I used the oft-quoted example of the househusband who did not have comprehensive sickness insurance, or carers who could not demonstrate the role that they were undertaking. We are catering for cases such as those through the scheme, but it illustrates the peril of declaratory systems, which lull people into a false sense of security. The EU agreed that a constitutive system was a sensible option for the UK to take and other member states are following this option for UK nationals. The Government’s approach already achieves the purpose of the amendments. I ask hon. Members to withdraw new clause 15 and not to move the others, for the reasons outlined.
I turn to the other new clauses, which relate to the EU settlement scheme. I thank hon. Members for new clause 33, which seeks to remove any deadline for applications under that scheme. However, removing the deadline is not appropriate for a number of reasons. EEA nationals will benefit from applying to the scheme before the deadline, so that they can prove their rights in the UK. After the deadline, the future immigration system will be in place; future arrivals will have different rights from those of the resident population. Without a deadline, there would be little incentive for the resident population to apply. Reducing the incentive to apply might lead to an increased number of EEA nationals failing to apply for and receive a grant of status. Those individuals would consequently face difficulty in proving their right to benefits and services to which they are entitled.
The Minister is not addressing the point I am making; in fact, she is almost making contradictory arguments—that this will reduce the incentive to apply and create difficulties in accessing benefits, services and so on. That is exactly the point, though. The difficulty in applying for benefits, accessing services, accommodation and everything else is exactly the incentive that means that people will apply for status. Yet the Minister is seeking to argue both ways.
I do not think I am seeking to argue both ways. I fear that with no deadline people will not see the need to apply, yet then might—in a moment of crisis or emergency—come up against the need to be able to immediately prove their status without having the ability to do so.
That is the critical difference between the two proposals. Under the Government’s current proposals, at that critical moment these people will have no status, and—despite vague assurances about proportionate responses, whatever that means—many of these people will find themselves without any status at all. If our proposals are correct, at the very least they will have the right to be in this country at that moment of crisis. It will simply be a matter of getting a document to prove it, if they still have that ability.
The hon. Gentleman says that it is “simply” a matter of getting the evidence to prove status, but as we saw—I am loth to go there—with the Windrush crisis, there were people who had absolutely every right to be in this country but could not evidence it. We are determined not to repeat that with this scheme: the incentive is to encourage people to apply, to provide them with a deadline, and to make sure that as many as possible can evidence their status so that they are not doing so in an emergency situation. As I have said several times, we will take a pragmatic approach to those who have a good reason for missing the deadline by allowing them to apply late. That is a requirement of the withdrawal agreement, and we will follow the same approach in a no-deal scenario.
New clause 35 would require the Home Office to provide EEA nationals with a physical document evidencing their status under the EU settlement scheme. The digital status given to EEA nationals will be a secure and permanent record held by the Home Office that is accessible to the holder at any time, but which cannot be lost or stolen. Users will be able to choose to allow third parties, such as employers, to have time-limited access to relevant information to demonstrate their status. By giving individuals direct access to their own data and the ability to share this at their discretion with service providers, we are giving them greater transparency and control over which data is shared. People will be able to better understand their rights and keep information updated.
We have already trialled this service with non-EU-national migrants to view and share their right-to-work information with employers, and the service has been well received by those involved. With an online service, we can also ensure that employers and others required to check a person’s status see only the information relevant to their need. Using a physical document as evidence of status—as has been the practice to date—does none of this. It can also cause significant problems when documents are lost, stolen, damaged, expired or in the process of being renewed. Physical documents are also more open to forgery and fraud: something we must seek to avoid.
Additionally, there are individuals whose documents are controlled by others, such as in cases of domestic violence, modern slavery and human trafficking. Moving to an online status is a step forward in tackling those who seek to control others. A digital status is also much easier to use for the visually impaired and dyslexic users who may have difficulty reading a physical document.
There are some valid points in what the Minister says, but surely there is a compromise here. Could there not be the online system but some sort of physical document parallel to that, so that we had the best of both worlds?
I thank the hon. Member for Stretford and Urmston for tabling the new clause on behalf of the right hon. Member for East Ham. The new clause relates to the use of certificates to evidence knowledge of English. It raises an important issue, and I would like to explain the Government’s response to widespread abuse of English language testing facilities, which came to light in 2014.
The scale of the fraud—there is no doubt it was a fraud—is illustrated by the fact that so far more than 20 people have received criminal convictions for their role in facilitating the deception, and sentences totalling more than 60 years have been handed down. Further criminal trials are ongoing. There was also a strong link to wider abuse of the student visa route. The majority of individuals linked to the fraud were sponsored by private colleges rather than universities, many of whom the Home Office had significant concerns about well before “Panorama” uncovered the specific fraud. Indeed, 400 colleges who had sponsored students linked to the fraud had already had their licences revoked prior to 2014.
The Educational Testing Service had its licence to provide tests within the UK suspended in early February 2014 and was removed from the immigration rules on 1 July 2014. Approximately 20% of the tests taken in the UK were provided via ETS prior to its suspension.
During 2014, ETS systematically analysed all the TOEIC tests administered in the UK dating back to 2011 and classified them as either questionable or invalid. ETS categorised results as questionable where it had significant concerns about the test centres and sessions where they had been obtained.
We have always recognised that it was possible that a small number of students who took legitimate tests could have received a questionable result. That is why we ensured that those people were given the chance to resit a test or attend an interview before any action was taken against them. ETS categorised results as invalid only where the same voice was matched to two or more tests taken in different names, indicating that deception was likely to have been used.
All this was a good few years before the Minister’s time in office, but was one of the fundamental problems here that the big multinational company responsible for messing up the test in the first place was then handed a blank cheque to mark its own homework afterwards? Why was that not handed to a completely independent body, rather than just letting ETS fix its own mess? How much did it have to pay in compensation to the Home Office?
I reject the description of a global company making a mess of it. This was systematic fraud and deception—I indicated earlier the number of criminal convictions. This was not a mess; it was fraud. It is really important to remember that.
It was a fraud, absolutely. It was far too easy to perpetrate. People employed by that company or at least subcontracted further down the line by that company were assisting people with their tests and allowing different people to sit the tests. The safeguards that the company put in place were clearly way short of what was required. It made a mess of things.
That is absolutely why that company was suspended from the immigration rules in July of that year, which is perhaps evidence of why occasionally it is useful to use the immigration rules as a very swift device to resolve problems. I would point out that the report on the ETS system, which was undertaken by Professor Peter French, concluded that the number of false matches was likely to be very small and it was more likely that people were given the benefit of the doubt than that they were falsely flagged as having cheated.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
New clause 25—Data categories for the automated residency check for the EU Settlement Scheme—
“The Secretary of State shall, on the day on which this Act is passed, publish which categories of data are provided by the Department for Work and Pensions to the Home Office for the purpose of the automated residency checks for the EU Settlement Scheme.”
This new clause would require the Home Office to publish information on which categories of data are provided by the DWP to the Home Office for the purpose of the automated residency checks for the EU Settlement Scheme.
New clause 26—Process applied by the Home Office during the automated residency check for the EU Settlement Scheme—
“(1) In relation to the automated residency check for the EU Settlement Scheme, the Secretary of State shall, on the day on which this Act is passed, publish the details of the process, which is used in order to—
(a) convert the data provided by Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs to a record of residency;
(b) ascertain whether the record of residency created using the data provided by Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs meets the criteria for settled status;
(c) convert the data provided by the Department for Work and Pensions to a record of residency;
(d) ascertain whether the record of residency created using the data provided by the Department for Work and Pensions meets the criteria for settled status;
(e) combine the record of residency created using the data provided by the Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs with the record of residency created using the data provided by the Department for Work and Pensions; and
(f) ascertain whether the combined record of residency created by the process set out in subsection (e) meets the criteria for settled status.
(2) The Secretary of State shall publish any change to the process set out in subsection (1) within a period of seven days after such a change is implemented.”
This new clause would mean that the process applied by the Home Office during the automated residency check, any changes made to that process, and information regarding that process, would be published.
New clause 27—Data protection impact assessment relating to the automated residency check for the EU Settlement Scheme—
“The Secretary of State shall, on the day on which this Act is passed, publish a data protection impact assessment relating to the automated residency checks for the purposes of the EU Settlement Scheme.”
This new clause would mean that the Secretary of State had to publish a data protection impact assessment relating to the automated residency checks within the EU Settlement Scheme application process.
New clause 28—Information to applicants on the outcome of the automated residency check—
“At the same time as an applicant to the EU Settlement Scheme receives a wholly or partially unsuccessful result from the automated residency check, the Secretary of State must provide the applicant with—
(a) the periods of time during which the Secretary of State accepts that the applicant was resident;
(b) the periods of time during which the data do not evidence residence;
(c) the data processed by the automated residency check;
(d) information on the process that was applied to the data in paragraph (c) to produce the periods of time as set out in paragraphs (a) and (b).”
This new clause would mean information was given immediately to an applicant who was informed that the automated residency check result for the EU Settlement Scheme was not successful.
New clause 29—Legal limits on the use of personal data processed during the EU Settlement Scheme—
“(1) The Secretary of State may not further process personal data that has been processed during the EU Settlement Scheme application procedure unless—
(a) the data subject has given consent to the processing of his or her personal data for such further processing, or
(b) such further processing is limited to what is necessary in relation to the purposes for which the data are processed, and not further processed in a manner incompatible with the purposes of applying for settled or pre-settled status.
(2) Transferring the personal data to immigration enforcement or to a database accessible by immigration enforcement, does not satisfy subsection (1)(b).
(3) Paragraph 4 of Schedule 2 of the Data Protection Act 2018 does not apply to further processing referred to in subsection (1).”
This new clause would mean that the data of EU nationals who apply through the EU Settlement Scheme are not passed to immigration enforcement or to a database which may be accessed by immigration enforcement.
New clause 31—Requirement to check manually for system errors when an applicant does not pass the automated residency check—
“At the same time as an applicant through the EU Settlement Scheme application process receives a wholly or partially unsuccessful result from the automated residency check, the Secretary of State must manually check for errors in the automated data checks, including but not limited to—
(a) data matching errors;
(b) errors in creation of the record of residency from the data;
(c) errors in adding data to a record of residency to create a new record of residency
(d) errors resulting from using the process applied during the automated residency checks on a record of residency to create an output.”
This new clause would mean that a manual check for errors is made when an applicant does not pass the automated residency check before they are required to provide documentation to prove their residency for the purposes of settled status.
Let me say at the outset that I am stepping somewhat outside my comfort zone in discussing automated data checks, so I am grateful for the assistance provided by the Immigration Law Practitioners Association and the Open Rights Group.
The settled status scheme relies heavily on automatic data checks. Input of a national insurance number triggers the automatic transfer of certain data from HMRC and the DWP to the Home Office. That data is subjected to algorithmic machine analysis according to a Home Office business logic, details of which have not been made public. Result outputs of pass, partial pass and fail are issued to a Home Office caseworker. Once the output is received, the raw data apparently disappears. Applicants who pass the data check are deemed to have fulfilled the residence requirement for the purposes of settled status. Applicants who do not pass are invited by caseworkers to upload documents for manual checking. Applicants who cannot evidence five years’ continuous residence generally receive pre-settled status.
Campaign organisations, including ILPA and the Open Rights Group, rightly believe that the Home Office has three specific legal duties—to give reasons for data check outcomes, to ensure that its caseworkers have meaningful oversight of the checks, and to provide public information about the scheme. The new clauses identify actions that the Home Office should take to comply with those three duties. They seek more information about the data checks and they would increase transparency.
Let me briefly take each of the three duties in turn. The first is the duty to give reasons for the outcome of a data check. The Home Office is under a common law duty to give reasons for its decisions to grant or refuse settled status. The data checks are a mandatory step in the scheme and they are integral to decision making. The duty to give reasons therefore includes a duty to explain why the data checks gave the result they did. Reasons should detail what data was analysed and how the business logic was applied. That information would enable applicants to appreciate whether decisions were open to challenge for irrationality or were made on the basis of inaccurate information.
If the Home Office accepts that it has a duty to give reasons, at least in some cases, how will it approach the need to retain records to supply such reasons? What data about applicants is retained by the Home Office as a result of the data checks? For what reason, and for how long, is that data retained? Which persons does the Home Office envisage will have a genuine business need to see that data?
The second duty is the duty to inform the public about the logic of the data checks. The EU General Data Protection Regulation of 2018 requires the Home Office to process data in a transparent manner. It would be consistent with such duties of transparency and openness if the Home Office provided meaningful public information about its business logic that enabled applicants to understand how it will apply in their case. Will the Home Office provide full details of, or sufficient information about, its business logic to allow its application to all types of individuals to be understood and to allow for independent review? What steps is the Home Office taking to limit and rectify business logic operational errors?
The third duty is the duty to exercise supervisory control over data checks. Making decisions by relying on output from automated data checks without scrutinising these is likely to constitute unlawful delegation of powers. To prevent this, a manual check for system errors should be conducted when applicants challenge refusal of settled status.
Proper oversight, safeguards and transparency are essential when dealing with complex decisions and people in vulnerable situations. It is important for EU nationals to know whether they are eligible for settled status, and if they are not eligible, the future date on which they are likely to become eligible. At the outcome of the data check, the Home Office should inform non-passing applicants which years the checks accepted covered, and which not. This would also improve system efficiency by reducing unnecessary challenges.
Some final questions: on the basis that residence is not contingent on income or contribution, why does it appear that different weighting is applied to data from the Department for Work and Pensions and from HMRC? Why is HMRC requested to provide data first, and not DWP? Will the Home Office add functionality in the scheme to enable applicants to easily request and obtain the information that HMRC and/or DWP have supplied about them? What steps is the Home Office taking to address the particular challenges faced by vulnerable groups such as children in care, persons in abusive or coercive relationships, victims of labour exploitation and trafficking and people who cannot provide documentary evidence, notably children, pensioners, non-working dependants, homeless persons, casual workers and victims of domestic abuse?
We support these amendments. I make two brief comments. First, the EU settlement scheme will entail an enormous amount of data sharing between the Home Office and other Departments. It is right that the terms of this data sharing should be transparent. Secondly, the possibility of EU citizens’ data being passed on by the Home Office has understandably caused concern among those citizens. We do not want to create any barriers to EU citizens applying for settled status. Getting a high take-up rate is already going to be extremely difficult. Providing for explicit consent for data to be shared or reused would be a sensible limit on Government powers.
I am grateful to the hon. Members for their new clauses 24 to 29 and 31. Given the similar effects of some of these new clauses, I will consider new clauses 24 to 28 and 31 together before speaking to new clause 29 separately.
These clauses cover a broad range of issues, including the gathering and using of data and matters relating to the automated residency checks under the EU settlement scheme. As I have said previously, securing the rights of citizens has always been our priority and we have delivered on this commitment. The draft withdrawal agreement published on 14 November 2018 guarantees the rights of EU citizens and their family members living in the UK, and those of UK nationals living in the EU.
The basis of the withdrawal agreement aligns closely to that of existing free movement rules with respect to when a person becomes a permanent resident and, in the case of the EU settlement scheme, acquires settled status. Significantly, the withdrawal agreement states that this assessment should be based not only on length of residence but on the fact that a person is exercising EU treaty rights for the whole qualifying period. We have, however, gone further than this and are being more generous to all EU citizens in the UK and to those who arrived during the implementation period. We do not test whether a person is exercising treaty rights—for example whether they are in work, studying or have comprehensive sickness insurance. Eligibility is based on residence alone, subject to criminality and security checks.
As part of the application process we will, where an applicant provides a national insurance number, conduct an automated check of residence based on tax and certain benefit records from HMRC and the DWP. We know that most EU citizens will have had some interaction with these departments and that this could demonstrate an applicant’s residence, either for the whole five-year period to qualify for settlement, or in part. While it is optional for an applicant to use the automated checks to prove their period of residency, in the test phases most have done so.
To date, 80% of the decisions made have been on the basis of this data alone. Where data exists, the automated checks replace the need for the applicant to submit any other form of evidence. The automated checks happen in real time as the application is completed, and the applicant is informed whether there is enough data to qualify for either settled or pre-settled status. Feedback from the three trial phases to date shows that people overwhelmingly like the simplicity of having their residence proved for them by these checks. The applicant is immediately informed if they need to provide additional documents and prompted to provide such documentation before completing their application.
In such instances, we will accept a range of documents as evidence, and they can be submitted digitally as part of the online application process. Where the applicant accepts the result of the automated check, no further evidence is required, and they will, subject to identity, security and criminality checks, be granted either settled or pre-settled status. The rules for assessing continuous residence are already set out in the immigration rules. The automated checks simply apply those principles to the data provided by HMRC and the DWP. New clauses 26 and 28, although well intentioned, are therefore unnecessary.
I understand the sentiment behind new clauses 24, 25 and 27, on publishing details of the automated residency checks in the scheme, as well as our memorandum of understanding with HMRC and the DWP. We will of course be completely transparent on how those checks work, as it is to everyone’s benefit for us to do so. I confirm that we will publish the MOU before the scheme is fully launched. We will also publish further materials, including more guidance on why automated checks may not return the expected data. The EU settlement scheme is still in the test phase, and it is important that we continue to amend our processes and design as we progress through the phased roll-out. I hope that offers reassurance to hon. Members.
On new clause 31, it may be helpful if I explain the different stages of the application process. When an applicant receives a wholly or partially unsuccessful result from the automated residency check, they are still in the middle of the application process and they have completed only some of the online form. They have therefore not yet submitted an application. Informing an applicant of why data has not matched is likely to increase the risk of fraud and identity abuse. The new clause would change the focus of the scheme from granting status to investigating the data quality of employers or of the DWP and HMRC. We consider that a distraction that would cause unnecessary delays for applicants.
I am sure all hon. Members on this Committee share my desire to keep the application process simple and quick in providing results. For the reasons I have given, the new clause is not consistent with those aims. In most cases, it would be far simpler and more straightforward for applicants to submit other evidence to prove residence, rather than seeking to resolve why data has not matched. Of course, the applicant can take up that issue with HMRC or the DWP if they wish. It is already the case that applicants, like anyone else, can ask Government Departments what data is held about them and get incorrect information rectified, as per article 16 of the general data protection regulation.
Our guidance includes a suggested list of documents that could be provided as additional evidence. Examples include bank statements, a letter from a general practitioner, and certificates from school, college, university or an accredited educational or training organisation. I assure hon. Members that we will continue to work to improve the match rates of the automated checks. The test phase gives us the opportunity to test the EU settlement scheme and to make improvements to the process.
New clause 29 seeks to prevent information from those who apply to the EU settlement scheme from being passed to immigration enforcement. Let me confirm that we fully comply with all statutory responsibilities when processing data. The ways in which this information may be processed are set out in the Home Office’s “Borders, immigration and citizenship: privacy information notice”, which is available on gov.uk. Decisions on whether information should be shared with immigration enforcement are made on a case-by-case basis. It is important that the Home Office uses data in ways that are compatible with the purpose for which it is collected—for example, to assist future citizenship and passport applications and, if needs be, to combat immigration offences.
To conclude, I thank hon. Members for raising these important issues, but I hope the assurances I have provided will lead them not to press their new clauses.
I am grateful to the Minister for her detailed answers, and particularly the undertaking to publish the MOU. I obviously need to take all that away and give it further thought, but there seemed to be a lot of helpful answers and pointers in there, so in the meantime, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 30
Extension of the remit of the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration
“(1) The Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration shall have a remit to inspect any Government department insofar as the department is involved in the EU Settlement Scheme application process.
(2) Government departments in subsection (1) shall include the Department for Work and Pensions and Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs insofar as they are involved in the automated residency checks for the EU Settlement Scheme.”—(Stuart C. McDonald.)
This new clause would mean that the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration could inspect Government departments if they were involved in the EU Settlement Scheme application process.
Brought up, and read the First time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
I will be very short, because this new clause is essentially tied up with the group we have just debated. Because the automated checks involve information passing to DWP and HMRC, the role of the independent chief inspector of borders and immigration should be extended so that they have the power to look under the bonnet, as it were, of both to see what is happening and to ensure that the process is running smoothly and appropriately. That is the new clause in a nutshell. I look forward to the Minister’s response.
This is a sensible amendment. The independent chief inspector of borders and immigration plays a vital role in inspecting and reporting on Home Office activities. Where the EU settlement scheme overlaps with other Departments, it is important that the inspector has the remit to inspect those. There is some ambiguity about the oversight of the EU settlement scheme if there is no deal. The withdrawal agreement makes it clear that if there is a deal, there will be an independent monitoring authority established to oversee the scheme.
The Minister, in her letter to me on 31 January, set out that if there is no deal, the independent chief inspector of borders and immigration will fulfil that function. Will they get any additional funding to carry it out? Will the Minister expand their remit to cover other Departments, to make sure the inspections are not limited in scope?
I thank the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East for new clause 30. However, it is unnecessary. The UK Borders Act 2007 allows the independent chief inspector to inspect the efficiency and effectiveness of services provided by any person acting in relation to the discharge of immigration, nationality, asylum and customs functions. The EU settlement scheme is primarily an immigration function. Therefore, the independent chief inspector of borders and immigration already has the powers to inspect Government Departments involved in the EU settlement scheme application process, and that includes activities undertaken by the Department for Work and Pensions and Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs in support of the EU settlement scheme application process. I therefore request the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the new clause.
I am grateful to the Minister for answering my questions. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 32
No fees for applications under appendix EU to the Immigration Rules
“(1) No fees shall be chargeable for any EEA or Swiss national making an application for leave to remain (whether for settled status or pre-settled status) under appendix EU to the Immigration Rules.
(2) No fee shall be chargeable for any EEA or Swiss national seeking an administrative review of a decision to reject an application for leave to remain under appendix EU of the immigration rules (whether for settled status or pre-settled status), or to exercise a right of appeal against any such decision.
(3) No fee shall be chargeable for any new or alternative scheme introduced for EEA or Swiss nationals in place of appendix EU to the Immigration Rules.”—(Stuart C. McDonald.)
This new clause would ensure that the Government’s commitment to scrap the settled status fee, and extend the principle to any review or appeal, or any alternative scheme set up to replace appendix EU, is legally binding.
Brought up, and read the First time.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
New clause 38—Visa fees—
“(1) A fee or charge on an EEA or Swiss national applying for a visa may be imposed only if that fee or charge is equal to or less than the cost of providing the visa.
(2) No child with an entitlement to register for British citizenship shall be required to pay a fee to register for British citizenship.
(3) A fee or charge on an EEA or Swiss national making an application to naturalise as a British citizen may be imposed only if that fee or charge is equal to or less than the cost of processing the application.”
New clause 39—Immigration skills charge—
“No immigration skills charge introduced under section 70A of the Immigration Act 2014, or by regulations thereunder, may be charged in respect of an individual who is an EU national coming to work in the EU.”
This new clause ensures no skills charge can be levied in respect of EU nationals coming to work in the UK.
New clause 45—Registration as a British citizen—
“(1) No person, who has at any time exercised any of the rights for which Schedule 1 makes provision to end, may be charged a fee to register as a British citizen that is higher than the cost to the Secretary of State of exercising the function of registration.
(2) No child of a person who has at any time exercised any of the rights for which Schedule 1 makes provision to end may be charged a fee to register as a British citizen if that child is receiving the assistance of a local authority.
(3) No child of a person who has at any time exercised any of the rights for which Schedule 1 makes provision to end may be charged a fee to register as a British citizen that the child or the child’s parent, guardian or carer is unable to afford.
(4) The Secretary of State must take steps to raise awareness of people to whom subsection (1) applies of their rights under the British Nationality Act 1981 to register as British citizens.”
This new clause would mean that nobody whose right of free movement was removed by the Bill could be charged a fee for registering as a British citizen that was greater than the cost of the registration process, and would abolish the fee for some children.
The new clauses highlight in different ways the concern over significant increases in costs relating to the use of the migration system. Scrapping the settled status application fee was very welcome. New clause 32 would simply enshrine that in law and ensure that any replacement scheme did not attract a fee. That territory has largely been covered by the hon. Member for Sheffield Central earlier, and I will not repeat what he said.
Will the Minister confirm that there will be no fee for seeking an administrative review of any refusal of settled status? What assessments have been made of the costs of future centres that people are required to attend if they need help to scan documents, for example?
New clause 39 allows for a debate on the skills charge of £1,000 for an employee for 12 months and £500 for every subsequent six months. This is a significant tax on employing a worker from overseas. It is not a subtle tax and seems to be based on the false premise that firms that recruit from overseas are the ones that fail to invest in training at home. That is not the case. Comparatively few businesses recruit from outside the EEA currently. Are we really going to impose a significant levy on many thousands of additional businesses, simply because it is proving impossible for them to recruit locally?
Finally, new clause 45 concerns an issue that I have raised with the Minister on a number of occasions and that I feel strongly about: the system of charging people who are entitled to British citizenship by registration, but who are struggling to meet the exorbitant fees, which have escalated to over £1,000. If they are entitled to register as British, that would give many EEA nationals a more secure status than settled status. It is important to emphasise that when Parliament changed the rules on nationality so that birth in the UK was no longer enough to secure British citizenship, it was careful to seek to protect those who would not qualify automatically, but for whom the UK was genuinely home. The debates from the British Nationality Act 1981 show that Parliament envisaged a straightforward automatic grant if certain criteria were met. The fee at that time was just £35. We are not asking for a return to that level, but simply for a level that reflects the financial cost to the Home Office, which is in the region of £300,000, although I do not have the exact figure to hand.
An early-day motion on this topic achieved extensive cross-party support, as did a Backbench Business debate, which I believe happened last year. Again, I ask the Minister to simply listen to colleagues from both sides of the House. We are talking about people who are entitled in law to British citizenship, and they should not be prevented from obtaining that citizenship merely by an exorbitant fee. The Home Secretary himself recognised that it was a heck of a lot of money to be charging children, so I hope the Home Office will stop charging that sort of sum.
We support all these new clauses. I will speak briefly on new clause 38, which is in my name.
New clause 38 has three distinct provisions. The first would ensure that EEA and Swiss nationals applying for a visa are not charged above the cost price for that visa. As with many of our amendments, we would prefer that this apply to all migrants, but the scope of the Bill required us to narrow the new clause. The Home Office makes a profit of up to 800% on immigration applications from families, many of whom will not be well off. These applications will often be turned down on technicalities, forcing families to apply and pay again. As EEA nationals join migrants from the rest of the world coming into the UK under work visas, the risk of debt bondage increases. If workers are required to pay high fees for work visas, they will be vulnerable to exploitation and may be left working to pay off debts to recruiters.
The independent chief inspector of borders and immigration has completed an inspection of policies and practices relating to charging and fees. According to his website, he sent the report to the Home Office on 24 January. It would have been helpful to have it in preparation for this discussion. Can the Minister tell us when her Department will publish the report?
The second part of the new clause stipulates that no child with entitlement to register for British citizenship should be required to pay a fee. The principle is that those children, given their entitlement to British citizenship, will not be required to pay fees to realise that entitlement. This was the intention of the British Nationality Act 1981, which ended the principle that being born in the UK in itself makes someone British, when it gave no discretion to the Secretary of State, other than the formal role of registering the citizenship of any person with the entitlement.
The third part of the new clause would require that anyone naturalising as a British citizen should not pay above cost price. It is important to keep the questions of immigration and nationality separate, and to keep entitlement and naturalisation separate as well, despite the Government’s attempt to blur that distinction.
The fees are now £1,012 for children and £1,206 for adults. That is an enormous amount, and it disproportionately affects BME people and children under local authority care. The effect of being unable to pay these fees is that British people are subject to the hostile environment, including detention and temporary deportation, which is wholly unjust.
I am grateful to the hon. Members for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East, for Paisley and Renfrewshire North and for Manchester, Gorton for having tabled new clauses 32, 38, 39 and 45.
It may be helpful to provide some background on this issue. Fees for border, immigration and citizenship products and services have been charged for a number of years, and they play a vital role in our country’s ability to run a sustainable system that minimises the burden on taxpayers. Each year, income from fees charged contributes enormously towards the running of our border, immigration and citizenship system. The charging framework for visa and immigration services delivered £1.35 billion in income in the last financial year. It is therefore true to say that fees paid by users play an absolutely critical role in this country’s ability to run an effective and sustainable system, and as I am sure members of the public rightly expect, to minimise the burden on UK taxpayers.
I also want to explain from the outset that we already have a legislative framework in place that governs fees. Fees are set and approved by Parliament through fees statutory instruments made under powers in the Immigration Act 2014. As hon. Members will be aware, the Prime Minister publicly confirmed that
“when we roll out the scheme in full on 30 March, the Government will waive the application fee so that there is no financial barrier for any EU nationals who wish to stay”—[Official Report, 21 January 2019; Vol. 653, c. 27.]
We will be amending existing fees legislation to implement that decision.
Outside of applications made under the EU settlement scheme, immigration and nationality fees legislation has always provided for some limited exceptions for paying application fees for limited and indefinite leave to remain. However, those exceptions are limited to specific circumstances, such as for those seeking asylum or fleeing domestic abuse, or where the requirement to pay the fee would lead to a breach of the European convention on human rights. Fee exceptions do not extend to applications made by individuals who are seeking to register or naturalise as a British citizen. That is because becoming a citizen is discretionary and not necessary to enable individuals to live, study and work in the UK, or to be eligible to benefit from appropriate services. Other exemptions are provided by separate regulations governing the immigration health surcharge.
To make provisions that are specific to certain nationalities as part of this Bill would be unfair to all users of the border, immigration and citizenship system.
There have been a number of amendments where the Minister has made the point that it would be unfair to apply the provisions to EEA nationals only. We are, of course, constrained by the Bill, but if any unfairness arises from our new clauses and amendments, it is open to the Government to amend the Bill further, and even to amend the long title of the Bill. I am sure the Minister would have support from across the Committee in doing so.
I thank the hon. Gentleman for that kind invitation. He will be aware that it is part of my duty under the Bill to make sure that we end free movement. The scope of the Bill is pretty much limited to that. As he highlighted, I do not want us to lead to a position where the Home Office discriminates against people on the basis of nationality.
I want to address some of the specific points relating to each new clause. Subsections (1) and (3) of new clause 32 provide that no application fee shall be chargeable under the EU settlement scheme, or for any successor scheme. While I am sympathetic to the intention behind subsection (1), I do not consider it necessary. We have a clear legislative framework in place for fees payable under the border, immigration and citizenship services. Therefore, new clause 32 would cut across the existing statutory framework for fees and would risk undermining the coherence of the current system.
Secondly, new clause 32 provides only for the removal of the application fee under the EU settlement scheme, which will only come into effect for applications made after the Bill is passed. As I have said, we are going further than that, and the announcement the Prime Minister made on 21 January makes it clear that the changes we are working to introduce through the fees regulations and the immigration rules will enable us to refund all EU settlement scheme application fees that have already been paid. The new clause is therefore to be unnecessary.
I will now turn to subsection (2) of new clause 32, which provides that EEA and Swiss nationals should not be charged a fee to appeal, or to administratively review, a decision not to grant settled status under the EU settlement scheme. I shall deal with administrative review and appeals separately. We have already discussed administrative review of a decision under the EU settlement scheme, for which the fee is set at £80 per review—the same fee that applies to administrative reviews of other immigration decisions. Where an administrative review is successful because there was a casework error in the original decision, the applicant will have their fee refunded.
In the context of applications under the EU settlement scheme, the right to an administrative review goes even further. An applicant who has been granted pre-settled status, but who believes that they qualify for settled status, can submit additional information that will be considered as part of their review. However, if the applicant cannot or does not wish to pay the fee for an administrative review, they have the alternative option of submitting a fresh application under the EU settlement scheme, which will be free. I therefore consider this part of the amendment to be unnecessary, because remedies that are free of charge are already available and if the administrative review is successful, the fee is refunded.
We are talking about children who are entitled to UK citizenship, and it is wrong to say that alternative ways—long routes to settlement, costing many thousands of pounds—are an adequate alternative. We are talking about something that is precious to those children, and I urge the Minister to give us some indication of when the ongoing review might conclude.
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention. He is aware that the Home Secretary has said that he is keen to review the situation and keep our fee structure under careful consideration, but I regret that I cannot give the hon. Gentleman a deadline.
It is right to point out that we already provide exemptions for eligible individuals who apply for limited and indefinite leave to remain in the UK. That is a reflection of the fact that in some circumstances, grants of such leave are necessary to enable an applicant to enjoy his or her human rights—for example, where a person is destitute or there are exceptional financial circumstances, often relating to the welfare and best interests of a child.
Those exemptions are good and it is absolutely right to have them, but why not have the same exemptions for kids who are entitled to British citizenship and who are supported by a local authority, or whose families are destitute? They are entitled to British citizenship. Why deprive them of it?
As I have indicated, the Home Secretary is keen to keep the matter under review. We are looking closely at it, and particularly at child citizenship fees. In summary, the requirement to pay a fee for citizenship does not disproportionately interfere with human rights, because of the exemptions I have described. The requirement to pay a fee is not contrary to a child’s best interest, which is to be with their family. Not having citizenship does not prevent them from doing so. Any assessment of a child's best interests is intensely fact-sensitive, so it cannot be said, as a generalisation, that it will always be in a child’s best interests to acquire citizenship. It may, for example, be in his or her best interests to preserve links to another country. As I have set out, the proposals undermine our existing statutory framework for making provision relating to fees and charges in the Bill.
New clause 45(1) raises many of the same issues about British citizenship fees for EEA nationals as new clause 38(3) did, and I refer the Committee to my earlier comments. New clause 45(2) and (3) provide that the Secretary of State may not charge the child of a person who has exercised free movement rights, which are repealed by this Bill, a fee to register as a British citizen if that child is in receipt of local authority assistance or if that child or their parents cannot afford the fee. That addresses a point similar to that in new clause 38(2). I refer Members to my previous point: the Bill is not the appropriate place to address child citizenship fees, which we are considering in the round.
New clause 45(4) would require the Secretary of State to take steps to make persons who have exercised free movement rights aware of their rights to obtain British citizenship under the British Nationality Act 1981. Information about becoming a British citizen is already published in guidance on gov.uk, and we are committed to ensuring that information of that nature is fully accessible.
It is right that, in the run-up to and immediate aftermath of the UK’s departure from the EU, the Government’s communications focus on the EU settlement scheme and what EEA nationals in the UK need to do to secure their status. We are launching a wide-ranging marketing campaign to encourage EEA nationals to apply. We do, however, make it clear when explaining the rights afforded by settled status that they may include a right to apply for British citizenship, provided that eligibility requirements are met. I hope that that reassures the Committee that we are taking steps to make people aware of their rights.
I turn to new clause 39, which concerns the immigration skills charge. Hon. Members may be aware that the charge was introduced in April 2017 as part of a major reform of the tier 2 skilled worker route. It is designed to ensure that UK-based sponsoring employers make a contribution to the upskilling and training of the resident workforce. Investing in skills is vital to achieving our ambition to increase UK productivity.
Data shows that, on average, employers in the UK under-invest in training compared with other countries. The Government have always been clear that it is right that employers should be incentivised to contribute to the upskilling and training of workers, and we have taken a carefully considered approach to the application of the charge. That is why we have provided exemptions for employers sponsoring migrants working in PhD-level occupations, as specified in the immigration rules; students switching from tier 4 to tier 2 to take up a graduate-level position in the UK; and the intra-company transfer graduate trainee category. Those exemptions build on the Government’s strong post-study work offer for international students and are intended to protect the UK’s position as a centre of excellence for education and research.
Underlying MAC’s recommendation in its final report on EEA migration, which was published last September, is the importance of retaining the charge as a key counterbalance to the recommended abolition of the resident labour market test in the proposed future skilled worker route. This will ensure the continued protection of resident workers in the future system and will provide one element of control after free movement has ended. New clause 39 runs directly contrary to the advice of MAC, which believes that it would be appropriate to apply the charge to EEA nationals in the future.
It is important to note that in the future system, the charge will apply only to employers that sponsor migrant workers under the skilled worker route. It will not apply to individual migrants who may come to the UK to work temporarily under the transitional temporary work route, and who will not be sponsored by an individual employer.
As Committee members are aware, the Government are not complacent. We have set out our intention to engage with businesses and organisations over the next 12 months, and to listen to their concerns and thoughts in response to the proposals in the White Paper. Accordingly, for all the reasons I have given, I invite the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East to withdraw the new clause.
I thank the Minister for her detailed answers. There was a lot of helpful information in there, but there was also a lot that I do not agree with and am not yet quite persuaded about. I will certainly persist, particularly on fees for the registration of children as British citizens, but that is for another day. In the meantime, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 37
Derived Rights
“(1) Any person who has resided in the UK with derived rights under relevant EU caselaw shall be treated for the purposes of an application for leave to remain under appendix EU of the Immigration Rules (whether for settled or pre-settled status) on the same basis as an EEA or Swiss national who has resided in the UK.
(2) In this section, ‘relevant EU caselaw’ means—
(a) Zambrano (Case C-34/09 of the European Court of Justice);
(b) Chen (Case C-200/02);
(c) Ibrahim (Case C-310/08) and Teixeira (Case C-480/08).”—(Stuart C. McDonald.)
This new clause would mean that non-EEA nationals with derived rights under EU caselaw would be treated on the same basis as EEA or Swiss nationals who had resided in the UK when applying for settled or pre-settled status under Appendix EU of the Immigration Rules.
Brought up, and read the First time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
I will be brief. The Minister will know that I have raised various points about non-EEA nationals and derived rights on previous occasions. The new clause would simply ensure that those people were treated on the same basis as EEA or Swiss nationals who reside in the UK, if and when they apply for settled status under the immigration rules.
My understanding is that Chen, Ibrahim and Teixeira carers are all covered by the withdrawal agreement, but Zambrano carers are not. There are also questions about what will happen to all those groups if there is not a deal. In a Westminster Hall debate, the Minister made positive noises about ensuring that their rights are protected, but I am still struggling to find detailed provisions for what will happen to each of those groups. I would appreciate an update on that.
I will be even briefer, which I am sure will be generally welcomed. We support the new clause, which concerns an important group of people with derived rights who have been left without certainty about their position. There is a strong imperative for that to be resolved, and for us to extend the same rights to them as to others.
I, too, will be as brief as I can. I thank the hon. Members for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East and for Paisley and Renfrewshire North for their new clause 37, which seeks to give those with a derivative right of residence access to the EU settlement scheme.
It may be helpful if I explain that a derivative right of residence is one that stems from the EU treaties rather than from the free movement directive, and it has been established through Court of Justice of the European Union judgments. The rights identified by the Chen, Ibrahim and Teixeira cases are protected by the draft withdrawal agreement. The rights of Zambrano carers are not protected by the agreement.
The Government have been clear that provision will be made in the immigration rules for individuals currently resident with a derivative right of residence. I fully appreciate that those people need certainty about their status. We are resolving the final details within Government, in consultation with other affected Departments. Subject to securing my colleagues’ agreement, I expect to be able to confirm the position for that cohort in the immigration rules to be laid before Parliament shortly.
In summary, the Government agree that we need to protect the rights of those who are resident here on the basis of derivative rights. We have already committed to making provision for them in the immigration rules, and we are just finalising precisely how we will achieve that. I hope to have further positive news for the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East shortly. For that reason, I ask him to consider whether it is necessary to press the new clause to a vote.
That just goes to show that short exchanges can be useful. The only thing I would add is that I hope the Home Office scheme for these groups of people is as generous as possible and does not, for example, set them off on long routes to settlement with thousands of pounds of charges in between. I hope they are offered something close to, if not exactly the same as, what is offered to EEA or Swiss nationals. I am grateful to the Minister for her answer, and I look forward to finding out more very soon. In the meantime, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 44
No comprehensive sickness insurance requirement
“Rules in Appendix EU of the Immigration Rules, or any replacement scheme, may not include a requirement for an applicant for leave to remain (whether settled or pre-settled status) to show that they have or have ever had comprehensive sickness insurance.”—(Stuart C. McDonald.)
The withdrawal agreement allows for certain EU nationals to be required to show they have comprehensive sickness insurance. This new clause would mean that no such requirement would be implemented.
Brought up, and read the First time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
Members will be aware that there were some concerns about the terms of the withdrawal agreement in relation to citizens’ rights, including about the apparent requirement for comprehensive sickness insurance. I very much welcome what the Government have said about being more generous in that respect and not requiring evidence of comprehensive sickness insurance. The new clause would simply put that commitment in the Bill.
This ground was largely covered in our debate on new clause 17, including by the hon. Member for Sheffield Central, so I do not need to say much more. We simply seek reassurance from the Minister that that remains the Government’s position and that they have no plans to change it, and ask whether she will consider putting that in the Bill.
We support the new clause. The Minister wrote to me and my hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Gorton to say that the Government have no intention of requiring comprehensive sickness insurance, so I assume they would have no issue with putting it in legislation. If they agreed to do so, they would send a very strong signal of their intentions.
I regret that the Minister is not willing to put the policy into the Bill. It is important for the 3 million that these policies are not just left to the immigration rules, which, as we have stated, are all too often changed in the blink of an eye, with little or no scrutiny. There would be a benefit to having some of these policies, which are very welcome, written into the statute, but I will not put the new clause to the vote today. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 50
Citizens’ Rights
“A Minister of the Crown must seek to secure at the earliest opportunity a joint UK-EU commitment to adopt part two of the Withdrawal Agreement on Citizens Rights, particularly as it affects people whose right of free movement has been removed by section 1 and schedule 1, and ensure its implementation prior to the UK exiting the European Union, or as soon as possible thereafter.”—(Stuart C. McDonald.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
If I had had some foresight, I should maybe have withdrawn this new clause in advance. This is a version of the Costa amendment, which the hon. Member for South Leicestershire (Alberto Costa) very ably saw through Parliament last week. I congratulate him on achieving very widespread support.
Does the hon. Gentleman not wish to move that the clause be read a Second time?
The new clause is not moved.
New Clause 51
Refugee family reunion
“The Secretary of State must make rules under section 3(2) of the Immigration Act 1971 to allow any person who has exercised a right brought to an end by Section 1 and Schedule 1 and who has been recognised as a refugee in the United Kingdom to sponsor their—
(a) children under the age of 25 who were either under the age of 18, or unmarried, at the time the person granted asylum left the country of their habitual residence in order to seek asylum;
(b) parents; or
(c) siblings under the age of 25 who were either under the age of 18, or unmarried, at the time the person granted asylum left the country of their habitual residence in order to seek asylum;
to join them in the United Kingdom.”—(Stuart C. McDonald.)
This new clause would expand refugee family reunion rules for EEA and Swiss nationals.
Brought up, and read the First time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
New clause 51 relates to refugee family reunions. Again, I have encountered a problem with the scope of the Bill, as my new clause would extend the scope of refugee family reunion rules to EEA and Swiss nationals. That would obviously be a fairly rare occurrence; nevertheless, I think some of these amendments and new clauses would establish a principle. As I said to the Immigration Minister not long ago, if it gives rise to inequalities and problems, the answer is for the Government to equalise the situation by raising the standards in relation to non-EEA nationals who are also refugees.
Due to the restrictive rules about who is eligible, many people are not allowed to reunite under family reunion rules. Currently, the UK immigration rules state that
“adult refugees in the UK can be joined via family reunion by their spouse/partner and their dependent children who are under the age of 18.”
Those restrictions mean, for example, that parents are not automatically able to bring their children who have turned 18 to the UK, even if the child is still dependent on them and has not yet married or formed their own family. While the family reunion guidance allows some cases outside the rules to be granted in exceptional circumstances, in reality that rarely happens.
Furthermore, unlike adult refugees, children who are in the UK alone and have refugee status have no right to be reunited with even their closest family members. Again, in this regard the UK is an outlier. These are children who have often endured hardship and trauma and have been recognised by the Government as having the right to stay in the UK. They now find themselves alone in an unfamiliar country and having to navigate the immigration system themselves.
The Government argue that granting refugee children the right to sponsor family members to come to the UK would be a pull factor and incentivise or force more children to make dangerous journeys to the UK. However, there is no evidence to support that claim, and in every other EU member state refugee children can sponsor close relatives to join them.
In the 12 months before September 2018, for instance, 811 separated children were granted asylum in the UK, more than a quarter of whom had fled Eritrea. These children have been recognised by the Government as being in need of international protection, where it is not safe for them to be returned to their home country. Where possible, and where it is in their best interest, children should be able to be with their parents. Granting separated children family reunion rights would allow that to happen. That, in short, is what the new clause seeks to put us on the road to achieving.
The other point I want to make is that Parliament of course debated all this and heard all the Government’s arguments during the Second Reading debate on the Refugees (Family Reunion) (No. 2) Bill, promoted by my hon. Friend the Member for Na h-Eileanan an Iar (Angus Brendan MacNeil). Considerable effort was made to ensure that sufficient Members would be present at a Friday sitting to debate that private Member’s Bill. There was a vote and there was overwhelming support for its Second Reading. There is growing frustration about the delay in bringing forward the money resolution to enable that Bill to go to the next stage—Committee. I would therefore like the Minister to explain what is happening and when we will see the Bill get to Committee, because we are running out of time and it would be outrageous if all that good work was stymied by Government use of procedures.
We support this new clause. I spoke in the Second Reading debate on the private Member’s Bill that would have implemented these changes. I commend the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East for once again bringing this issue to our attention through this Bill.
I thank the Minister for her answer and for stating that the Government are still listening on this important issue. The usual channels have also got the message that there is some disquiet over the lack of progress in relation to the Bill introduced by my hon. Friend the Member for Na h-Eileanan an Iar, but I beg to ask leave to withdraw the new clause.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 52
Illegal working: EEA and Swiss nationals
“Section 24B of the Immigration Act 1971 does not apply to any work undertaken by an EEA or Swiss national.” —(Stuart C. McDonald.)
This new clause would limit the offence of illegal working so that it did not apply to EEA or Swiss nationals.
Brought up, and read the First time.
With this it will be convenient to consider new clause 53—Illegal working: people who qualify for settled or pre-settled status—
“Section 24B of the Immigration Act 1971 does not apply to any work undertaken by a person who qualifies for settled or pre-settled status under Appendix EU to the Immigration Rules, but fails to apply for such status by the time of any deadline put in place in relation to such applications.”
This new clause would limit the offence of illegal working so that it does not apply to EEA or Swiss nationals who qualified for settled status, but failed to apply in time.
These new clauses relate to the offence of illegal working, which we heard about in the evidence to the Committee. The substance of that evidence was essentially that the offence of illegal working is driving people into exploitative employment relationships. Obviously, that is complete anathema to the Government’s stated anti-slavery objectives.
We heard from Focus on Labour Exploitation, whose research has clearly shown that undocumented people are unlikely to come forward to labour inspectorates about abuse if they fear immigration repercussions, which has a triple effect. First, they are not identified as victims or supported. Secondly, abusive employers can operate with relative impunity because the immigration regime effectively hands them exploitable workers. Thirdly, that serves to undercut other workers, who have legal rights, thereby dragging the whole labour market down.
I am loth to see the offence extended to EEA and Swiss nationals. This offence is a year or two old now; has the Home Office done any research on the impact of its creation? What have been the implications on the Government’s efforts to tackle modern slavery? At the very least, we need to be reassured that the Home Office is alive to these concerns and will take them seriously. In the absence of such reassurance, we cannot just head off and extend the scope of those offences further.
We support the new clauses. As has been set out by the TUC and Focus on Labour Exploitation, it is essential that migrants are able to claim their rights at work. That means not being arrested for criminal offences when attempting to report abusive employers. Our labour market enforcement capacity is one of the weakest in Europe. We need to set high standards for wages and workers’ conditions, significantly improve our inspection capacity, and remove the offence of illegal working. This offence makes it less likely that people will come forward to the UK national referral for trafficking and modern slavery.
We know that many trafficking victims are already in immigration detention. In her evidence to us, Bella Sankey from Detention Action provided a powerful example of a Chinese woman who was a victim of trafficking. She was picked up at a brothel after a tip-off, but instead of being treated as a victim of modern-day slavery and trafficking, she was taken to a detention centre and held for six months. Clearly, many things went wrong at many stages of that woman’s journey through the immigration system, but removing the offence of illegal working would at least help to remove one barrier to her getting the help she needs.
I thank the Minister for her answer. There were some helpful pieces of information in there. I again emphasise that the discrimination argument is not really an argument against the principle behind the new clause. If the new clause was accepted, we would also push for the Government to go further and remove the offence for all nationalities.
I particularly note the Minister’s candid admission that no evaluation of the impact of the offence has been made to date. I hope that the Home Office undertakes such an evaluation soon. The Minister can expect to hear from me very shortly if I do not hear any evidence that it has done that. In the meantime, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
New Clause 56
Recourse to public funds: EEA and Swiss nationals with children
‘(1) EEA and Swiss nationals with dependants under the age of 18 must be exempt from any no recourse to public funds condition that would otherwise be placed on them under Immigration Rules.
(2) For the purposes of this section, a public fund is defined as any of the following—
(a) attendance allowance;
(b) carer’s allowance;
(c) child benefit;
(d) child tax credit;
(e) council tax benefit;
(f) council tax reduction;
(g) disability living allowance;
(h) discretionary support payments by local authorities or the devolved administrations in Scotland and Northern Ireland which replace the discretionary social fund;
(i) housing and homelessness assistance;
(j) housing benefit;
(k) income-based jobseeker’s allowance;
(l) income related employment and support allowance (ESA);
(m) income support;
(n) personal independence payment;
(o) severe disablement allowance;
(p) social fund payment;
(q) state pension credit;
(r) universal credit;
(s) working tax credit.’—(Kate Green.)
This new clause would prevent EEA and Swiss families with children under the age of 18 from being given the right to remain in the UK but not being allowed access to public funds.
Brought up, and read the First time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
This new clause would prevent EEA and Swiss families with children under the age of 18 from being given the right to remain in the UK without being allowed to access public funds. I am grateful to the Refugee and Migrant Children’s Consortium and, particularly, the Children’s Society for helping me to prepare for this debate.
In light of what the Minister has been saying in response to a number of recent new clauses, I am aware that she will probably argue that this would be discriminatory. However, I point out that there is a very strong moral imperative on us to ensure the wellbeing of every child in this country. In particular, we are talking about the children of EEA nationals, many of whom will themselves be entitled to British citizenship or on a ten-year path to settlement.
I do not believe that the “no recourse to public funds” provisions in the immigration system are fair or necessary. We already have a very robust social security system with tough, stringent tests of people’s need for benefits and entitlement to access them. I also think it is wrong to put people in a position where they may be working and contributing to this country, in many cases through tax and national insurance contributions, but none the less are unable to avail themselves of our benefits system, to support their families and, in particular, their children.
We can see that lack of access to support for these children is very damaging. It includes, for example, lack of access to free school meals, social security benefits, and free nursery places, which are offered to disadvantaged two-year-olds. Not only is that extremely damaging to each individual child’s wellbeing, it is damaging to the welfare of the whole country in the long term. We should bear in mind that the majority of these children are likely to stay here and continue to be part of our community.
When families have no recourse to public funds, but children are at risk of destitution, there is an immediate short-term cost, which falls on local authorities. Under section 17 of the Children Act 1989, local authorities are required to take action to prevent children from falling into destitution. The number of such children is increasing for a number of local authorities, and they simply do not have the resources to discharge their statutory obligations adequately. For example, my own borough of Trafford is already facing a substantial shortfall in its children’s services budget for the future.
The significant difficulties that the section 17 provisions place on local authorities are growing and are likely to grow further after Brexit. If the Minister is not minded to accept the exact wording of my new clause, I think it is incumbent on the Government, if they continue to rely on local authorities to pick up the tab, to ensure that the local authorities involved are adequately resourced to do so.
It is extremely difficult for families subject to a “no recourse to public funds” order to have that condition removed from their immigration status. It is very difficult for them to get advice on that matter. As we heard in earlier debates, they are unlikely to be able to access legal aid to make a case for that condition to be reconsidered.
I hope that the Minister will be able to say something strong to the Committee, which will assure us that the “no recourse to public funds” condition will not be applied to children in a way that will leave them destitute. I hope that she will be able to say specifically that those who do not get settled status by the application deadline, or who only attain pre-settled status, will still be able to access all mainstream benefits and will not be subject to “no recourse to public funds” provisions.
I hope she will also be able to say that she will take forward conversations with her colleagues in other Government Departments, particularly the Department for Work and Pensions and the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, so that we can ensure that we have a proper, comprehensive and adequate system of support for families with children, and that the “no recourse to public funds” condition will not be maintained in a way that puts those children at risk of destitution.
(5 years, 9 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesGood morning, Mr Stringer. The Bill has the far-reaching potential to make many more people liable to immigration detention. Despite estimating that 26,000 more people could be liable, the Government have carried out no assessment of the Bill’s impact on the detention estate. Our detention system is broken. Its most glaring failure is the lack of a time limit on detention. We are the only country in Europe that detains people indefinitely.
The Minister has previously shown some openness on the issue. She will be well aware of the breadth of support for a time limit, including from members of her own party. Labour’s new clauses have been signed by the SNP, the Green party, the Liberal Democrats and Conservative MPs. I am keen to work constructively with the Government. The new clauses set out the position that we want, whereby independent checks and balances ensure that immigration detainees do not have fewer rights than people in the criminal justice system.
As is clear from the new clauses that I have tabled, our preference is for a time limit on detention for everyone, no matter what country they are from, but to get the provision within the scope of the Bill, we have narrowed it to just those who lose their right to free movement as a result of the Bill. I will confine my remarks today to that group.
I am grateful to all the organisations that have been making the case for a time limit on immigration detention and, in particular, to Detention Action, Liberty and Refugee Tales for their help with the drafting of the provision.
Before getting into the detail of the new clauses, I will give some background to the arguments for a time limit on immigration detention. Labour has been making the case for a time limit for some time. We called for one in our 2017 manifesto. The argument can be made from multiple angles. This is a rule-of-law issue. The Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association, the Bar Council and the Law Society all support a time limit. Wherever the state deprives someone of their liberty, as happens with immigration detention, there should in principle be independent judicial oversight and time limits at every stage. Detention is currently an administrative process whereby the Government are allowed to mark their own homework. The detention of Windrush people showed that current oversight is severely lacking.
This is a health issue. The British Medical Association supports Labour’s proposal. Its report entitled “Locked up, locked out: health and human rights in immigration detention” states:
“Depression, anxiety, and post-traumatic stress disorder…are the most common mental health problems, and women, asylum seekers, and victims of torture are particularly vulnerable. Even if it does not reach a clinical threshold, all immigration detainees will face challenges to their wellbeing during their time in detention.”
Those issues are worsened when detention is indefinite. There is a widespread crisis of self-harm in immigration detention. Stephen Shaw’s report on the issue found that the current safeguards for vulnerable people were not working effectively enough.
This is an equalities and human rights issue. The Joint Committee on Human Rights has called for a 28-day time limit and recommends using the Bill to implement it. The Equality and Human Rights Commission and Liberty support our new clause. The EHRC’s briefing for the debate points to various human rights articles violated by indefinite detention, including the European convention on human rights, the international covenant on civil and political rights and the United Nations convention against torture.
This is also a cost issue, as immigration detention simply does not work; the majority of people in immigration detention will later be released back into the community. That point was made by Her Majesty’s inspectorate of prisons and the independent chief inspector of borders and immigration in their joint report, as well as by the all-party parliamentary groups on refugees and on migration. The detention estate costs £30,000 per person detained per year, and a 2015 estimate put the total annual cost at £164.4 million. In addition, the Home Office last year announced that it had paid out £21 million in just five years for wrongfully detaining 850 people in immigration removal centres.
So there is a wealth of evidence from a number of different angles on the need for a time limit on immigration detention. The next question is why Labour has tabled these new clauses in particular. There is a lot in this group of new clauses, so if the Committee will allow me, I will briefly go through what each one would do and why it is needed.
New clause 1 prescribes an overall time limit of 28 days for all immigration detention, after which a person must be released and cannot be re-detained unless there is a material change of circumstances. We need this provision to avoid a cat-and-mouse situation in which the Government can detain someone for 28 days, release them and then immediately detain them for another 28 days.
The reason for 28 days, as opposed to some other time limit, came up in evidence sessions and has been questioned elsewhere. Home Office guidance says that detention should be used only when removal is imminent—defined as three to four weeks—which is a maximum of 28 days, so 28 days is really the Home Office’s definition. Although, since 2015, the detention population and average length of detention have decreased, the number of people detained for longer than six months has increased. The new clause would put the commitment to detain only if removal is imminent on a statutory footing for the first time.
New clause 2 sets out the general criteria for detention, preventing detention unless a person can shortly be removed from the United Kingdom and their detention is strictly necessary to effect their deportation or removal from the United Kingdom, and stating that their detention must in all circumstances be proportionate. This is intended to ensure that detention will be used only when really necessary.
New clause 3 provides for a system of automatic bail hearings. There is currently an immigration bail provision at four months, and the Government are piloting a two-month timeframe. However, we believe that that should come in much sooner—after 96 hours—to bring immigration in line with the criminal justice system. Bail hearings after two or four months are often too little, too late. We also believe that bail hearings should allow for release; at the moment, a detainee may only be bailed or detained following a hearing. The president of the first-tier immigration appeal tribunal said in evidence to the JCHR that the tribunal would need few additional resources to review all immigration detention cases. He favoured such a review to limit the use of detention and ensure that it is used for the shortest time necessary.
Before I conclude, I will touch briefly on foreign national offenders, who also came up during our evidence sessions. Labour’s view is that we should not have an immigration detention system that treats foreign national offenders differently from everybody else. First, many people detained as foreign national offenders will in fact be victims of trafficking and modern-day slavery who were coerced into criminality. The Government have made a lot of noise about their commitment to tackling modern-day slavery, but the fact is that victims are still routinely detained for extended periods, despite showing extreme signs of distress and vulnerability.
Secondly, to go back to the rule of law argument, people who have been convicted of a criminal offence will have served their sentence. Continued detention, and therefore punishment, cannot be justified by their initial trial and sentencing, unless otherwise specified by a judge or similar. Thirdly, in practical terms, the Government will have had ample time, while someone is serving their custodial sentence, to prepare for deportation upon their release.
There is a separate issue about people who are deemed to be a risk to national security. There currently exists a separate system for immigration detention cases that relate to national security. Bail applications are heard through the Special Immigration Appeals Commission, rather than the normal First-tier Tribunal, and separate law, regulations and case law govern the commission’s operation. Although the SIAC system is in need of reform—we believe that indefinite detention is not justified in any circumstances—there is a case for this to be addressed and reformed separately. We would be happy to make that clear in our new clause on Report.
It is good to see you in the Chair again, Mr Stringer. I have spoken many times about immigration detention. I will essentially echo all the shadow Minister’s points, so I will be brief. As he said, there is cross-party support for these new clauses, and the Scottish National party is four square behind them.
Immigration detention for too long has become an accepted part of life, at least among politicians, but, for the reasons that the shadow Minister gave, I detect that that is changing, and not before time. Politicians have probably been out of step with the public in that regard. Every time I have a discussion with members of the public and explain to them the existing system of detention, they are actually quite horrified to hear what goes on out of sight and out of mind. Ultimately, we are talking about the indefinite deprivation of liberty in what are basically private prisons. There is little in the way of independent oversight, and all of this is done for administrative reasons. That is a huge invasion of fundamental rights.
We detain far too many people. The Minister will often say that the vast majority are not detained but are managed in the community. However, that is not the point. We are still talking about significant numbers of people—25,000 or so every year. That is a welcome improvement on previous years—let me put that on record—but there is a long way to go before we are anywhere near an acceptable position. We have a bloated immigration estate compared to many of our European neighbours, and we are still detaining far too many vulnerable people. The changes made in light of the first Shaw report have not made the difference that we would have expected or wanted so far.
As the shadow Minister said, half of all these people are released. Detention should be a matter of absolute last resort, but instead we are detaining so many people that we just release half of them again. That is completely unacceptable. The UK is an outlier in terms of international practice. This country has a long history of being very precious about the right to liberty, with severe and strict safeguards on the Government’s power to interfere with that.
We all know—I think it is inarguable—that detention is harmful. One key harm inflicted on detainees is the uncertainty—as has been evidenced in all sort of reports—of not knowing when their detention will come to an end. For all the reasons that the shadow Minister has given, there are no excuses for applying different rules to different people, and foreign national offenders should be included in the regime that we are proposing. We also need greater scrutiny of who goes into detention. Safeguards in relation to vulnerable people are still not working. Gatekeeping is not working.
These new clauses achieve two goals. They put in place a time limit and significantly improve oversight of who is being detained. I want to put on record my gratitude to all the organisations involved in drafting the new clauses, and to all sorts of organisations who, for many years, have documented the harm that is done by immigration detention and have kept it on the agenda, even when it was at severe risk of falling off.
There is a breadth of support for this new clause. The time limit is overdue. I think it will happen this time—I hope that is the case. Like the shadow Minister, I am keen to work with all parties, including the Government, to ensure that we put in place a system that is robust and fair but respects people’s right to liberty rather than detaining them for administrative reasons.
I want to add my voice to support my colleagues on this, because in 2014 I was vice-chair of a cross-party inquiry into immigration detention. Although the focus of this Bill, and therefore of this new clause, is European economic area nationals, any decision that we make in relation to them should be seen as a stepping-stone to progress.
This is something on which I am confident we will make progress—I hope that we can make progress this morning—because there is not only strong cross-party support but very considerable support on the Conservative Benches, as the Minister knows, from the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) through to the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis); I do not think we could get much broader than that in the Conservative party at the moment.
On our inquiry team there were parliamentarians from both Houses and all the main parties, who brought in huge experience. They included a retired law lord and a former chief inspector of prisons. There were more Government Members among the inquiry team than those of us from the Opposition, including the right hon. Member for Meriden (Dame Caroline Spelman), with whom I have met the Minister to talk about these issues, as well as David Burrowes and Richard Fuller, who are no longer Members of the House, but to whose work I pay tribute.
The panel was brought together by the all-party parliamentary group on migration, which at that time I chaired, although it is now more ably chaired by my hon. Friend the Member for Stretford and Urmston, who is not in her place at the moment, and by the all-party parliamentary group on refugees, which is currently chaired by my hon. Friend the Member for Bristol West (Thangam Debbonaire), who I am pleased to see joining us in the gallery today. I also pay tribute to Sarah Teather, who chaired the inquiry throughout its eight-month period of evidence taking.
After that eight-month period, our recommendations, which included the limit on detention contained in new clause 1, were endorsed by the House of Commons on 10 September 2015. It is thus disappointing that, although there is growing recognition of the issue in the Home Office and there have been some welcome moves, we have not seen progress on the central recommendation of introducing a statutory time limit on detention. We are unusual in this country in not having one, and without it we have become increasingly dependent on detention.
Detention takes place within immigration removal centres—it is important that we listen to those words, because the clue is in the title. They are intended for short-term stays, but we have become increasingly reliant on them. I recognise that we have done so under successive Governments; I am not pinning the responsibility for it on the current Government. In 1993 we had 250 detention places in the UK. By 2009, it had risen to 2,665 and by 2014, when we conducted our inquiry, it was almost 4,000. The number of people entering detention in the latest year for which figures are available, through to June 2017, was 27,300. That is a slight drop from the previous high of 32,000, but by contrast, Sweden detains something like a 10th of that number and Germany around a fifth.
Home Office policy states:
“Detention must be used sparingly,”
but the reality is clearly very different. Hon. Members will be aware of a number of high-profile incidents in immigration removal centres, including deaths and allegations of sexual assault. That was reflected in the evidence that our joint inquiry heard over three oral evidence sessions and more than 200 written evidence submissions.
At our first oral evidence session, we heard from non-governmental organisations and medical experts, but we most powerfully heard from three people directly detained at that time. We questioned them over a phone link in their detention centres. One young man, who was from a disputed territory on the Cameroon-Nigeria border, told us that he had been trafficked to Hungary as a 16-year-old, where he had been beaten, raped and tortured. He had managed to escape and eventually made his way to Heathrow using a false passport, which was discovered on his arrival, and he was detained. We then asked him how long he had been detained and he told us three years—three years in an immigration removal centre. His detention conflicts with three stated aims of the Home Office: that those who have been trafficked should not be detained; that those who have been tortured should not be detained; and that detention should be for the shortest period possible.
Time and again, we were told that detention was worse than prison. Initially, that was puzzling, but it was explained to us that, in prison, people at least know when they are going to get out.
That argument was made by successive Ministers, but the idea that there is no indefinite detention because Home Office guidance says somebody cannot be detained forever is nonsense. Folk do not know how long they are being detained for; that is what is harmful —indeed, it is harmful for everyone, whether or not they are detained for more or less than 28 days. There is indefinite detention—this is surely a matter of semantics.
I do not think it is a matter of semantics. Since becoming Minister, I have been careful to ensure that, in cases when people have been in detention for a long time—there are some, and they are almost exclusively cases of foreign national offenders—we regularly review and carefully consider the circumstances of those whom we seek to remove from the country but whom, for reasons of public protection, we deem it would not be appropriate to manage in the community. Last year, 92% of those detained left detention within four months, and 69% in less than 29 days, which demonstrates our commitment in this regard.
We are still talking about huge numbers of people—I think 10,000 or so were detained for over 28 days in 2017—but this is not just about those detained for more than 28 days. Whether people are detained for five, 10, 15 or 20 days, not know when they are getting out is harmful to their mental health, so this applies to everybody in detention.
I thank the hon. Gentleman for making that point. I am conscious that there are strong feelings on this issue. I am also conscious that in this country we have an ability to remove that in some cases is significantly better than that of our European counterparts and that we do succeed in removing people directly from detention. However, there are a number of challenges, which I will come to.
One significant challenge, and why I have such grave concerns about 28 days, is the time that it often takes to document individuals who may not have evidence of their identity or a travel document from their home country. It would be ideal if we could document people easily without their needing to be present, but unfortunately the vast majority of cases will require a visit from a foreign consulate, which takes time to arrange. In many instances, foreign consulates will not consider a visit until they know the individual is in detention. Although these are only management statistics, it has been indicated to me that it takes in the region of 30 days for an individual to be documented. In those circumstances, when it takes in the region of 30 days to get somebody with the appropriate travel document to be able to return, a time limit of 28 days would simply be unworkable.
Perhaps the hon. Gentleman has made the point that there is not yet any agreement on reasonable time limits, given that, with both 90 days and 42 days—in this new clause we are discussing 28 days—there is a wide range of opinion on what a reasonable time limit might look like.
I wish to address—as I am sure the Chairman wants me to—the individual elements of the new clauses. First, and this has already been referenced, they would apply only to EEA and Swiss nationals. The effect of these new clauses would be to introduce a system that imposed time limits on the detention of individuals of certain nationalities but not on others. As I have said in relation to other amendments and clauses limited to EEA nationals, this would clearly be discriminatory on nationality grounds, going against Parliament’s proud history of promoting laws that protect human rights and protect individuals from discrimination. I cannot see any justification for Parliament to depart from those principles in the way proposed.
While new clause 1 would introduce a 28-day longstop time limit for exceptional cases, new clause 3 would provide for a 96-hour time limit. Both would have a major impact on our ability to remove and on the processes on which removal action is dependent. For example, in 2018, there were more than 8,500 removals directly from detention. More than 2,700 individuals were removed from the UK, having been detained for 29 days or more. We believe that introducing a 28-day longstop time limit would encourage people to change behaviours, so as to run down the clock to secure release. As it stands, a presumption of release after 96 hours, other than in the most restrictive of circumstances, would make it extremely difficult to remove any individuals from the UK.
Surely it is unfair to characterise the 96 hours as a time limit. It is simply a deadline within which there should be a bail hearing. I do not see how anyone can argue, if they support strongly the presumption of liberty, that there should not be some sort of judicial oversight about whether or not someone is entered into detention in the first place.
I will come to that point shortly. There was an example that I wanted to use to demonstrate to Members some of the challenges faced, including the many claims for asylum made by people who had opportunities to raise those issues earlier, with some even claiming asylum on the steps of a plane. I will illustrate our concerns with reference to a case study provided to the Joint Committee on Human Rights in December. In that case, a failed asylum seeker absconded for nine years before re-establishing contact with the Home Office and lodging a new claim. This was unsuccessful, as were all the subsequent appeals and further submissions. The individual was detained after having been encountered working illegally. He then disrupted attempts to effect removal by refusing to leave the centre until removal was eventually achieved. It took 54 days to remove the individual from the point of detention, which would not have been possible had the time limits enshrined in these new clauses been in place.
Moving on to the further details of the new clauses and the point raised by the hon. Member for Manchester, Gorton, the requirement for the judiciary to be involved in consideration of the case at or around the 96-hour point of detention would place significant additional burdens on the tribunal service. As it stands, bail cases are normally listed within three to six days. That means that a significant number of cases would fall outside the 96-hour period, and that is without taking into account the fact that there would be a dramatic increase in the number of cases being referred to the tribunal.
Such an increase would make the system unsustainable without significant reform, which could not be achieved within the three months before commencement proposed by new clause 4. However, the proposal would also require a different type of decision by judges, which would need careful consideration by the judiciary, given their independence.
We should not forget that detainees can apply for bail at any time of their choosing. Automatic referral for bail occurs at the four-month stage, and we are currently piloting automatic referral at two months. These bail hearings are supplemented by regular reviews and by case progression panels for those held in detention beyond three months. The new clauses would allow for an individual to be detained beyond the outcome of the initial bail hearing, though only for a maximum of 28 days in total, and only in very exceptional circumstances. These circumstances are not defined. I ask the hon. Member for Manchester, Gorton to consider whether he has in mind individuals seeking to frustrate the removals process. If so, what activity is regarded as frustrating the removal process, or does he have in mind individuals who are criminals? If so, how serious would the criminality have to be to justify continued detention? These matters are not clear, but they are fundamental to managing a detention system.
On the subject of criminality, let us assume that foreign criminals are intended to be included in the category of “very exceptional” circumstances, for the moment. The provision would allow the Government to detain such individuals for up to 28 days. At that point there would be no option other than release. No exceptions for dangerous criminals are built into the provision. If we could not deport individuals within 28 days, they would be released on to the streets, even if they presented a danger to the public.
The Government are under a statutory duty to deport foreign national criminals under the UK Borders Act 2007, and this duty would be seriously undermined if detention could not be used to effect removal. The same sort of issues would apply in respect of national security cases. The new clauses provide that an individual cannot be re-detained once the 28-day time limit has been reached unless there is a material change in their circumstances. What constitutes a material change is not defined. Again, these are serious matters on which the new clauses are not clear. For example, would it be possible to re-detain an individual who had been deported from the UK, but had re-entered in breach of the deportation order?
Would the failure of the person to comply with reporting requirements, or a breach of bail conditions, amount to “very exceptional’ circumstances? Finally, the three-month implementation timescale enshrined in new clause 4 is likely to be unworkable given the extensive changes to the immigration and judicial systems necessary to implement the envisaged changes.
The Government are of the view that the new clauses would significantly impair the UK’s ability to proportionately and efficiently remove from the UK individuals who have no right to be here and who, in some cases, represent a danger to the public.
I suspect that the Minister anticipated lots of interest in these new clauses. I want to take her back to the issue of foreign national offenders, which she went through very quickly. She must agree that it is not acceptable to detain low-level foreign national offenders for months or years on end.
What exceptions does she think are necessary in order to make general inclusion of foreign national offenders in a time limit acceptable to the Government? We cannot detain everybody for ever simply because the Home Office fails to remove them by the end of their sentence.
I thank the hon. Gentleman for that intervention. Of course it is not just unacceptable but not lawful, in the case of foreign national offenders, to detain people for very long periods with no realistic prospect of removal. The Home Office works incredibly hard, sometimes in difficult circumstances, to seek documentation from different Governments in order to be able to effect the removal of foreign national offenders.
I do not pretend that any of this is easy. However, an amendment to the Bill—tightly drawn as it is to end free movement—is perhaps the wrong place to seek to implement such a significant change. That does not mean that my mind is closed; far from it. From the views that have been expressed to me over the past 12 months and this morning, I appreciate that we certainly need to do more. That is why I welcome the proposals that Stephen Shaw put forward in his re-report last year. Indeed, the Home Secretary grasped those changes with enthusiasm. There will always be more to do on the issue of detention, and I am absolutely committed to doing it. As Stephen Shaw said in his recent report, the call for the 28-day time limit,
“has been articulated more as a slogan than as a fully developed policy proposal”,
and I am inclined to agree with him. I therefore respectfully ask the hon. Member for Manchester, Gorton to withdraw his amendment.
This new clause requires that any changes to the UK’s immigration rules which affect EEA or Swiss nationals must be made under the super-affirmative procedure. As with many of our amendments, we would prefer the measure to be applied to rules affecting all migrants, but the scope of the Bill requires us to narrow it to EEA and Swiss nationals. The new clauses tabled by the SNP would similarly require a higher level of scrutiny for immigration rule changes, and, as such, we support them.
If the Secretary of State proposes to make changes to the rules, the super-affirmative procedure requires him or her to lay before Parliament a document that explains the proposal and sets it out in draft form. Over the years, immigration rules have become so long, complex and internally inconsistent that they are almost impossible for lawyers to understand, let alone for normal people who try to navigate them without legal aid or appeal rights. The new clause complements our efforts in amendments to clause 4, as well as in amendments 17 and 21 to clause 7 and in new clause 10, to make the immigration system intelligible and hold the Home Office sufficiently accountable for its decisions.
Not everything can be done through primary legislation, but since the Immigration Act 1971 almost everything has been done through secondary legislation. The negative procedure, whereby there is no discussion of the legislation unless parliamentarians kick up a fuss, has become the standard. Immigration rules are made very frequently, often in response to political scandals, without an eye on the long-term effects. Requiring rule changes to be subject to the super-affirmative procedure will give more time for scrutiny and encourage a more measured approach.
I will speak to new clauses 40 and 54. I know that Members across the Committee will be enthralled by the prospect of an immigration rules advisory committee. Indeed, if new clause 54 is agreed to, I am sure that straight away, the Minister will be open to considering CVs from people who might serve on that committee.
As the shadow Minister said, the new clauses are all about increasing the level of scrutiny. New clause 40 would require an assessment of the impact of any changes to the immigration rules on modern slavery and on children to be laid before Parliament before the changes could be made. Just as significantly, it would give rise to the possibility of MPs actually being able to debate and amend proposed changes to the immigration rules. New clause 54 would put in place an immigration rules advisory committee.
The kernel of these ideas came from a recent report by British Future, which simply points out, as the shadow Minister has done, that changes to immigration rules have been rapid and incredibly complicated. The Home Office has made more than 5,700 changes since 2010, with the rules doubling in length over the same period. Little by way of explanation is provided to MPs when changes are proposed, and even less of scrutiny or debate. In such situations it is near impossible for most MPs to keep track of changes and to fulfil their role of scrutinising the Government’s work.
Social security offers a comparison with our proposal for an immigration rules advisory committee. Like social security laws, immigration rules are constantly changed by secondary legislation. However, there has been a social security advisory committee since as long ago as 1980. It has an independent remit to scrutinise draft secondary legislation on social security, making advice available to both the Government and Parliament. It has 14 members, who come from a wide range of professional backgrounds, and Ministers are usually required to submit regulations in draft to that committee, which may decide to scrutinise them formally. New clause 54 essentially copies the language of the enabling legislation for that committee and applies it to immigration rules.
While I welcome what the Minister and the previous Home Secretary have said about the need to simplify the immigration rules, we need to improve our procedures for scrutinising changes. Our new clauses offer two reasonable and practical proposals for exactly how that could be done.
I am grateful to the hon. Members for Manchester, Gorton and for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East for providing a further opportunity to discuss parliamentary scrutiny of immigration rules, which is raised in all three of these proposals. Parliamentary scrutiny is an important issue, and I am aware that Committee members are very interested in it. I will take each new clause in turn, but first I will briefly cover a few background points.
As Committee members will be aware, the detailed provisions on who is entitled to enter and remain in the UK, and on how to apply for such leave, are set out in the immigration rules. The rules are made under the power in section 3 of the Immigration Act 1971. This power to change immigration rules, and the procedure for scrutiny of any changes, are long established. I remind hon. Members that the immigration rules were used, back in 2008, to introduce the points-based system that we currently operate.
I reiterate that none of the changes that we are making through the Bill are intended to affect that power or procedure. We will use that well-established power to set up the future immigration system once we have ended free movement and left the EU. I am in favour of parliamentary scrutiny of changes to the immigration rules, but I am not persuaded that there is any reason to depart from the existing scrutiny mechanism, which has been used to scrutinise all Governments, whether they are making minor or significant changes, for more than 45 years.
In addition, the new clauses are framed as applying only to those who lose their right to freedom of movement under the Bill. However, the Government have been clear that, once free movement ends, EEA nationals will be subject to UK immigration law, including the immigration rules. That means that all subsequent changes to the rules will potentially affect EEA nationals, so the new clauses would alter the parliamentary procedure for changing the immigration rules while purporting to be more limited.
The Minister skirted around the fact that she thinks the current levels of scrutiny are absolutely fine, but without really drilling down into why. I wonder how many people in this room have ever looked at draft immigration rules that have been laid before Parliament. If they have done, how many actually understood what the draft changes were supposed to do? On the very few occasions I have managed to look at them, that has been hellishly difficult. Will the Minister explain why that level of scrutiny is appropriate?
The hon. Gentleman may not have noticed that I said right at the beginning that I would give some background before delving into further detail. He need not worry; there is plenty to come.
I am committed to delivering a future immigration system that is fit for purpose and I acknowledge that in order to do that, we must put people first and make it easier for them to navigate our complex system. That is why the Law Commission has begun a consultation on simplifying the immigration rules; I look forward to receiving its recommendations later this year and seeing what more we can do in this area.
The Minister makes a fair point that it would not be realistic to apply that procedure to every single immigration rule change. One alternative would be to use the nice new committee that we are going to set up using new clause 54 to decide what form of parliamentary procedure would be necessary. For example, if a change to immigration rules was urgent, the committee could say that the Government could go ahead and make it, but if a change was more significant and not time-pressing, there could be a proper and full debate on the Floor of the House.
I am just coming on to the hon. Gentleman’s proposals for a sparkly new committee. New clause 54 would require the Secretary of State to establish an immigration rules advisory committee. I appreciate the concerns behind the new clause. Establishing a new set of immigration rules that will apply to all EEA and Swiss nationals is a big deal, and we need to get it right.
We have made a clear commitment that a wide range of stakeholders, including Parliament, will have an opportunity to contribute their views on the future system before the final policy decisions are made. That will help to ensure that the relevant immigration rules work for the whole United Kingdom. Clearly, Parliament will have the opportunity to scrutinise the rules throughout that process, using the well-established procedures that I have described. I note that we have never before had such an advisory committee for immigration rules. If the new clause were to be added to the Bill, we would not have a similar committee to scrutinise immigration rules that apply to persons who are not covered by the Bill.
As we have said, from 2021, the immigration rules will apply to EU and non-EU migrants alike in a single system that selects people on the basis of skill and talent, as opposed to nationality, so I regard such a committee as unnecessary. I hope that the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East and the hon. Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire North see that their new clauses are unnecessary, and I invite the hon. Member for Manchester, Gorton to withdraw new clause 9.
New clause 10 is important because, as the Committee should be aware, the Bill removes the current right, under EU law, to appeal against decisions relating to settled status. The new clause seeks to fill that gap by giving the right to appeal to the immigration and asylum chamber of first-tier tribunal to those whose application is rejected and those who have been granted pre-settled status but there is evidence to show that they should have been granted settled status.
As discussed during the oral evidence sessions, as it stands the only right to appeal consists of an administrative review at a cost of £80 or a judicial review at a significantly greater cost and with a drawn-out, time-consuming process. Ms Blackstock from Justice told us that it
“seems to be the most bureaucratic and inappropriate method for what is…potentially a simple grey area that requires a simple review.”––[Official Report, Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Public Bill Committee, 12 February 2019; c. 62, Q162.]
This is a problematic issue.
We also heard from Professor Smismans, who represents the3million, that there had been “considerable problems” with past administrative reviews by the Home Office. I am sure the Minister is aware of that. An administrative review may be fine as a first access point, but it is not sufficient on its own.
The Government clearly recognise the need to make the right of appeal available, as they have agreed that with the EU as part of the draft withdrawal agreement. That right exists under the withdrawal agreement that the Government have signed up to; UK courts and tribunals are authorised to refer cases on citizens’ rights to the European Court of Justice within eight years of the end of the transition period.
The withdrawal agreement also provides for an independent monitoring body to conduct inquiries into alleged breaches of part 2 of the withdrawal agreement. That body would also be able to receive complaints from EU nationals and bring legal action on their behalf.
So far so good, but both those mechanisms fall away in a no-deal situation. Following the delayed publication in December of the Government’s paper on citizens’ rights in the event of no deal, my hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Gorton and I wrote to the Minister and the Under-Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, the hon. Member for Worcester (Mr Walker) with our concerns. In reply, they stated their view that it is fair in a no-deal scenario to provide the remedies generally available to non-EU citizens refused leave to remain in the UK in other parts of the immigration system.
I ask the Minister: how is that fair? In the event of no deal, the Government are proposing to reduce the time that people have to apply for settled status. The process of registering 3 million people is already a challenge, and some people believe it might be beyond the Home Office. With less time comes greater risk of mistakes, so why are the Government reducing the means of appeal?
We are talking about a finite number of people who have already been subject to two and a half years of uncertainty. It is worth remembering that about 100 EEA citizens were erroneously threatened with deportation by the Home Office in 2017. Is it really fair to anybody that we are expected to trust the Home Office to mark its own homework? An accessible right of appeal under any terms on which we exit the European Union would provide much-needed reassurance to EU nationals.
My original intention was to speak in support of new clause 34, but having considered the matter I have to say that new clause 10, which also covers family members of non-EEA nationals, is better drafted, so I will speak briefly in support of it instead. Hats off to the shadow Ministers for getting it right when I have not.
I echo everything said by the hon. Member for Sheffield Central. He is right to characterise this not just as a failure to grant the right to appeal, but as the taking away of the right to appeal currently available to EEA nationals under European law. I remind the Minister that the Home Office statement of intent, published in June last year, said:
“Primary legislation is required to establish a right of appeal for the scheme, but subject to Parliamentary approval, we intend that those applying under the scheme from 30 March 2019 will be given a statutory right of appeal if their application is refused. This will allow the UK courts to examine the decision to refuse status under the scheme and the facts or circumstances on which the decision was based.”
The question is simple: why is that appropriate if there is a deal, but not appropriate if there is no deal? There should be a right of appeal regardless of whether a deal is reached. The distinction is absolutely unjustified.
From the point of view of principle and practice, appeal rights are hugely significant in immigration law. It is about the separation between those who review a decision and the decision makers themselves, and about not allowing the Home Office to mark its own homework, thereby ensuring a fair and independent hearing. It is also about the fact that the Home Office simply gets it wrong far too often. Before the current Prime Minister started her slash-and-burn approach to appeal rights, half of Home Office decisions were being overturned by the tribunal. Administrative reviews and judicial reviews are a sub-standard alternative.
Finally, we have to bear in mind that these decisions will have hugely significant consequences for those individuals affected. If the decisions are wrong, the consequences could be catastrophic. It is a small ask to ensure that they have appeal rights, regardless of whether a withdrawal agreement is reached.
I want to add to what the shadow Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield Central, and the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East have said about the importance of appeal rights. All of the new clauses make the same point. We all have suspicions that if the question of appeal rights is left unanswered, the process for EU citizens who need to apply for settled status might go terribly wrong.
There are two facts at the heart of this argument: first, the quality of Home Office decisions and the magnitude of the impact of the policy decision to end free movement; and secondly, the impact on a large number of people—some 3 million people and their families—in this country. We should not proceed without ensuring that protection is put in place in case the process goes wrong.
It seems absurd to have to offer any evidence of the quality of decisions taken by the Home Office, because as constituency Members of Parliament we deal fairly regularly with their inadequacy. That is not a comment on the Minister, who I have no doubt does her best to exercise good judgment on the issues put before her, but she has to do that far too frequently because of the poor quality of decisions taken, by and large, by the Home Office. This is not to point out the failings of individuals, either. I simply think that, systemically, the Home Office is not able to cope with the job that we task it to do.
We know that from recent media reports. We have already heard that when the Home Office appeals against immigration court decisions on asylum, it loses 75% of the cases. Mr Justice McCloskey, former president of the upper tribunal, said that the Home Office had launched one appeal
“on a wing and a prayer…It was manifestly devoid of any substance or merit and should have been exposed accordingly.”
The Law Society has described the Home Office processes as “seriously flawed”, and 50% of all appeals are upheld across the wider immigration and asylum system. We all know this to be true; these facts barely need repeating.
I will speak briefly in support of the broad thrust of the new clause—I might have suggested a slightly different approach—which effectively draws attention to the hostile environment, or compliant environment, as it is sometimes known now. Essentially, in the light of the court case that the shadow Minister referred to, it is now absolutely time that we have to roll back on the hostile environment altogether.
I stumbled across some of my notes from during the passage of the Immigration Act 2016, when the Government essentially ignored all sorts of warnings about the right to rent and various other hostile environment measures and decided to press ahead. Thanks to the independent chief inspector of borders and immigration, we have since found that the Government made next to no effort to monitor the impact of the measures they had introduced. That sequence of events is also exactly what happened with Windrush; warnings were ignored and the Government pressed ahead without looking at the consequences for the people they were warned might be adversely impacted. That is exactly the same as with the right to rent and other hostile environment measures.
I place on the record my congratulations and thanks to the Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants, the Residential Landlords Association and various others involved in that case, which they have been fighting for a long time. Their briefings in 2016 were absolutely clear: their testing found that people from black and minority ethnic backgrounds were being discriminated against when they approached landlords, as was anyone who was not able to produce a British passport.
In the light of that scathing judgment from last week, surely the Government cannot just press ahead with the extension of hostile environment measures to EU nationals. Surely they must now say that they accept that judgment and intend to roll back from the right to rent and other hostile environment policies.
I am grateful to the hon. Member for Manchester, Gorton for tabling the new clause, and I welcome the opportunity to explain how statutory eligibility controls operate for EEA nationals. The Government have made clear our commitment to protect the right of EEA nationals living in the UK before the new skills-based immigration system is introduced. While I recognise the intention behind the new clause, it is unnecessary. In some important respects, it is also technically deficient.
EEA nationals are already subject to the universal eligibility checks carried out by employers, landlords and the NHS. Those checks apply to everyone, regardless of nationality. EEA nationals currently evidence their eligibility to employers and landlords simply by producing their national passport or identity card. When accessing benefits and health services, they also need to demonstrate that they are habitually or ordinarily resident in the UK. We made it clear in our White Paper that EEA nationals will not be subject to additional requirements to demonstrate their status in the UK until the future skills-based immigration system is introduced. We recognise the importance of having an implementation or transition period to allow EEA nationals living here to secure their status in UK law by applying to the EU settlement scheme.
Importantly, the White Paper on the UK’s future skills-based immigration system also makes it clear that we will not require employers to undertake retrospective checks on existing employees when the new system is introduced in 2021. That is entirely consistent with the approach adopted by previous Governments when introducing changes to the checking arrangements. The new clause does not provide further meaningful safeguards to the commitments we have already given.
It is also important to highlight the fact that further secondary legislation would be required before EEA nationals could be compelled to produce evidence of UK immigration status in the same way that non-EEA migrants are currently required to do, to demonstrate their right to work or rent in the UK. Such legislation would be subject to parliamentary scrutiny in the usual way. I also reassure hon. Members that, in line with the draft withdrawal agreement, we will take a proportionate approach to those who for good reason miss the deadline to apply to the EU settlement scheme.
The new clause would also prevent NHS charges from applying to EEA nationals before 30 June 2021, or until 3 million people are granted settled status under the scheme. However, it makes reference to the National Health Service Act 2006, which applies only to NHS charges in England and Wales. The NHS in Scotland and Northern Ireland would be unaffected.
Charges have applied for NHS secondary care to people not ordinarily resident in the UK since 1982, except where an exemption from charge category applies. Entitlement to NHS-funded secondary care is based on ordinary residence in the UK, not nationality or payment of taxes. That means living in the UK on a lawful, properly settled basis, for the time being. EEA and Swiss nationals and their family members who are or become ordinarily resident in the UK are therefore fully entitled to free NHS care in the same way as a British citizen who is ordinarily resident.
In the event that the UK leaves the EU without a deal, the Government have made a unilateral offer on citizens’ rights. It is not dependent on EEA member states making similar assurances for UK citizens resident in those countries. Should EEA member states make less generous provision for UK nationals living or moving there, the new clause would result in a less favourable offer to EEA nationals in the UK.
The immigration exemption in paragraph 4 of schedule 2 to the Data Protection Act 2018 is entirely separate from measures designed to deal with eligibility checks on immigrants. It is a necessary and proportionate measure that we believe is compliant with the General Data Protection Regulation. It can be applied only on a case-by-case basis, in limited circumstances, where complying with a certain data protection right would be likely to prejudice the maintenance of effective immigration control. It is misleading and unhelpful to frame the matter in such a way that it appears to be aimed at EU citizens. The exemption is a necessary measure, designed to protect our immigration system from those who seek to undermine and take advantage of it. New clause 11 does not provide any additional safeguards or assurances beyond those already planned or in place.
Finally, I want to respond to points made by hon. Members about the recent High Court judgment on the right to rent scheme. The scheme was introduced to defend an important principle. Those who have no right to be here should not be renting a property, and landlords should not be making profit renting to people without legal status here, which often happens in poor conditions. The Government consulted carefully on measures to require landlords to undertake right to rent checks. We developed the scheme in close collaboration with a consultative panel, which drew together experts from the sector. The scheme was trialled in the west midlands and rolled out to the rest of England only after a thorough evaluation, which was published in full in October 2015.
My recollection is that originally there was supposed to be a detailed assessment of that pilot before it was rolled out, but that after the election of 2015 the Prime Minister said it would carry on regardless. Where is the evidence that it has had any positive impact, or that it has not had a discriminatory effect, as the High Court judge found last week?
I am minded, given the High Court judgment of last week, to be careful what I say about the issue, and I hope that the hon. Gentleman will forgive me if I just go on to speak a little about the evaluation of October 2015, which included 550 responses to online surveys, 12 focus groups, 36 one-on-one interviews and a mystery shopping exercise involving 332 encounters. That evaluation found that there was no systemic discrimination on the basis of race. The law was, and remains, absolutely clear that discriminatory treatment on the part of anyone carrying out the checks is unlawful.
Despite that, as hon. Members have mentioned, on Friday last week the checks were declared incompatible with the European convention on human rights. We disagree with the finding and are appealing the judgment. We remain committed to the principle that if someone has no right to be in this country they should not be renting property. This country has a proud tradition of upholding and promoting human rights, and we have set the standard internationally for the strength of our legal protections against discrimination. The High Court decision is not something we should take lightly.
(5 years, 9 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesThe clause is minor and technical in nature. It simply clarifies how certain terms within the Bill should be interpreted—for example, “devolved authority” and “domestic law”. In doing so, the clause helps us to ensure the clarity and coherence of the legislation.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 6 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 7
Extent, commencement and short title.
I beg to move amendment 34, in clause 7, page 5, line 15, leave out “Scotland”.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 35, in clause 7, page 5, line 15, at end insert—
“(1A) Section 1 and Schedule 1 of this Act do not extend to Scotland.”.
New clause 55—Scottish visas: review—
(1) The Secretary of State must carry out a review of how to implement a system of Scottish visas for people whose right of free movement is ended by section 1 and schedule 1 of this Act, and lay a report of that review before the House of Commons within six months of the passing of this Act.
(2) The review in subsection (1) must consider the following—
(a) whether Scottish Ministers should be able to nominate a specified number of EEA and Swiss nationals for leave to enter or remain each year;
(b) the requirements that could be taken into account when exercising any such power including that the person lives and, where appropriate, works in Scotland and such other conditions as the Secretary of State believes necessary;
(c) the means by which the Secretary of State could retain the power to refuse to grant leave to enter or remain on the grounds that such a grant would—
(i) not be in the public interest, or
(ii) not be in the interests of national security;
(d) how the number of eligible individuals allowed to enter or remain each year under such a scheme could be agreed annually by Scottish Ministers and the Secretary of State;
(e) whether Scottish Ministers should be able to issue Scottish Immigration Rules setting out the criteria by which they will select eligible individuals for nomination, including salary thresholds and financial eligibility.
(3) As part of the review in subsection (1), the Secretary of State must consult the Scottish Government.
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to carry out a review of how a system of Scottish visas could be implemented for EEA and Swiss nationals.
We now come to the debate that I think everyone in the Committee has been waiting for—a debate about Scotland and immigration policy. Half the room has left, including my hon. Friend the Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire North—I am not taking it personally.
I am not aiming to persuade the whole Committee about the merits of full devolution of immigration powers, because I am not a miracle worker. I want simply to see if we can have a sensible, civilised discussion about the huge challenge on population and migration that Scotland already faces, and how we can best address it—something that will hopefully go beyond a commitment to an immigration system that works for the whole of the United Kingdom. I want such a system as well, but the question is whether that involves applying exactly the same rules to every part of the UK, which has not always been the approach that Governments have taken. We have had a sector shortage occupation list for Scotland. We had a Fresh Talent visa for a period. Even Tech Nation visas gave some preferential treatment to different parts of the United Kingdom.
Scotland’s migration challenge is that we risk seeing too little of it. Scotland needs migration, and probably more of it. To start with some similarities with the UK as a whole, migration helps fuel our economy by creating jobs, bringing expertise, filling roles that cannot otherwise be filled, and generating wealth for all. New arrivals not only make a hugely positive contribution to our public finances but fill many vital public sector roles in the health service and in social care, education and elsewhere. They also enrich our communities and culture, bringing new ideas and ways of doing things.
Scotland’s particular challenge is that, without migration, our population will stagnate and age very rapidly, creating huge difficulties for future generations. Projections from the National Records of Scotland suggest that our population will increase only by a measly 7% over 25 years, with net inward migration accounting for 90% of this growth. The working-age population will grow only slightly—a pitiful 1%—while the proportion of the population above state pension age will increase by 25% in the coming years, as the baby boomer generation reaches retirement. That is before we even take account of the end of free movement.
We need a migration system that sustains or even increases migration in order to support Scotland’s population growth, which is the opposite of the goal that the UK Government are pursuing. We must remember and remind ourselves that Scotland has institutions that can help play a part in operating a different system. We have a Scottish Government and our own Parliament, and there is Skills Development Scotland. There is now an expert advisory group on migration and population, which hon. Members will be aware has published its first report this morning—everyone can rush home at lunchtime to read the results of the group’s analysis of the Government’s White Paper.
Free movement of people has been economically and socially beneficial to Scotland. The benefits include access to labour. On average, an EU citizen working in Scotland contributes over £34,400 in GDP and more than £10,400 in Government revenue. EU migrants take up jobs that are difficult to fill—for example, in social care and food processing—and start businesses of their own. Small and medium-sized enterprises, which dominate in Scotland, are largely locked out of recruiting from beyond the EU via the tier 2 system, so an end to free movement will hit them particularly hard.
The benefits of free movement also include benefits to our demographics and tax base. Office for National Statistics forward projections predict that if there is no net migration from the EU, population growth will be around only 3% over 25 years, and the number of people aged 16 to 64 in Scotland will fall by 9%, compared with a rise of 53% in the number of people over 65.
The amendments that I have tabled offer two broad alternatives. The first is essentially to keep free movement operating in Scotland as it does now, even if it comes to an end in the rest of the United Kingdom. Perhaps there could be some sort of variation on that, if the Home Office prefers. I am doing the Home Office a favour by offering that suggestion, because it will obviously lead to fewer applications to consider. There would be very few enforcement issues, because the Government are proposing that—even after Brexit—EU nationals will be able to come to the United Kingdom without a visa. There is no notion of Scotland operating some sort of back door for people to sneak into England, Wales or elsewhere. In terms of people, it would be no more difficult to enforce than the open border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.
I have offered an alternative to that, which is simply to ask the Government to consult stakeholders, the Scottish Government and so forth on specific Scottish visas. We could perhaps make it a specific condition of the visa that migrants have to live and/or work in Scotland. Again, there does not even need to be a loss of control for the Home Office; it can engage with the Scottish Government to agree rules and to agree the number of these visas that would be allowed, and can have ultimate oversight of who is allowed in. It could be limited to non-visa nationals, so there will be very limited enforcement issues. I also want to see it done in a way that avoids complexity and is additional to the systems available in the UK as a whole, rather than being an alternative.
I thank the hon. Members for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East and for Paisley and Renfrewshire North for tabling these amendments. The hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East said when he started to speak that he looked forward to a sensible and civilised conversation on this matter; across the whole of this Bill Committee, I think we are not doing badly on that front and I certainly hope we can continue in that vein.
These amendments cover topics that I have discussed with the hon. Members and their colleagues on a number of occasions. I fear they might find my response to be fairly predictable, but I make no apology for that. I remain to be convinced that introducing geographical variation into the immigration system is either practical or desirable.
Amendments 34 and 35 seek to change the extent of the Bill so that it does not apply to Scotland. However, the whole of the United Kingdom is leaving the European Union: England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland are leaving the EU. I believe it is our duty as a responsible Government to fully deliver on the result of the EU referendum and to end free movement. It is also important to remind the Committee that this Bill legislates for the end of free movement from the EU. It provides the legislative framework to simplify the UK immigration system by bringing EEA nationals and non-EEA nationals under one system.
Meanwhile, proposed new clause 55 would commit the Secretary of State to reviewing whether or not Scotland should have its own immigration system and its own Scottish visas, but only for EEA nationals. I am not sure how such a proposal, limited to EEA nationals, would be justified on equality grounds. Such a review would not be the first time that the question of whether or not Scotland should have more independence from the UK has been considered, including decisively in a referendum in 2014. With particular reference to immigration, we are not reopening the work of the Smith commission. Immigration needs to be a reserved matter.
I remind the Committee that, in designing the new system, we commissioned the Migration Advisory Committee to consider the best immigration policies for the UK. MAC undertook a comprehensive engagement and evidence-gathering exercise across the whole of the country over a 12-month period and produced an authoritative report that gives the Government a clear direction of travel for the UK’s future skills-based immigration system.
As part of that exercise, MAC considered whether there was an economic need for regional differentiation in the immigration system, and not for the first time concluded that there was no case for it. To quote from its final report:
“Overall, we were not of the view that Scotland's economic situation is sufficiently different from that of the rest of the UK to justify a very different migration policy.”
MAC went on to note that Scotland already has a separate shortage occupation list. The Committee will note that the composition of that list, as well as the UK-wide one—
I am always perplexed by the facing-two-ways approach that the Government sometimes take on this. On the one hand, they say that they are totally against any sort of differentiation, and then on the other they flag up the shortage occupation list. If there is no economic justification for the shortage occupation list, is it the Conservative position that it should be abolished?
I do not accept for one moment that we look both ways. Evidence from MAC suggests that there should not be a separate system, but that our policies should be able to reflect the different shortages in different parts of the United Kingdom. The hon. Gentleman will know that we have asked MAC to consider whether there should also be a different needs list for Northern Ireland, and we are consulting on that for Wales as well. There would be formidable problems with trying to implement a system that could in effect tie a worker to a specific geographical area. Business no longer happens in a single postcode.
The key visa for workers in this country is the tier 2 visa, which requires someone to work for a particular employer in a particular place. A Scottish visa would not need to be any different. Why would it be incredibly difficult to do that in Scotland when it happens day in, day out all across the United Kingdom?
I thank the hon. Gentleman for that contribution. I do not accept that that is what happens at the moment. The tier 2 visa ties somebody to a specific employer. It does not determine that they can work only in a single location. I am conscious that he said that a separate system operating in Scotland would be no different from the current situation that we have with the soft border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. I am sure that he, like me, wishes to see that situation continue, with a border that is straightforward and simple. However, he knows, from our current discussions regarding our withdrawal from the European Union, that it is proving to be far from simple to come to a solution to the matter that works for us all.
We have already undertaken engagement in all parts of the UK and will continue to do so; all sectors, nations and regions will be part of our planned 12-month engagement. However, our arguments against a regional immigration policy remain strong, for reasons of both principle and practicality. I therefore ask the hon. Members for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East and for Paisley and Renfrewshire North to withdraw their amendments.
I am hugely disappointed by the response from both Front-Bench spokespeople, and their degree of engagement on this will be a disappointment to their party colleagues in the Scottish Parliament. There has been no recognition or engagement with the challenges that Scotland faces. This issue is absolutely pivotal to our economy, tax base and public finances, and their not even recognising that as a problem, never mind offering a single solution, is hugely frustrating.
I recognise that the MAC report was not exactly wonderful for my argument, but it did not say that there should not be a differentiated policy for Scotland; it said that that would be a political decision. I acknowledge that other parts of the United Kingdom also have economic challenges, but my answer to that is to explore options to help them. I pointed to the Tech Nation visa, which has slightly different rules for one or two cities in England, so it is not as if the UK Government do not differentiate for certain parts of England.
The difference is that Scotland already has institutions that could help to operate such a policy, such as a Government and a Parliament, none of which exist in England. I will be happy to table amendments on Report that include Northern Ireland and Wales, if Members wish.
As the Minister said, the Smith commission looked at the issue, but that was long before there were any proposals to end free movement and implement the drastic new system, which has pretty much united Scotland’s businesses, trade unions and third sector organisations in opposition. She must be aware that if she does not think again about the proposals, the already increasing demand for some sort of differentiation will only grow. We have not even started to look at how things work in Canada, Australia or other places, but this does not need to be difficult; it could be simply a small additional means for Scotland to support its population and its economy.
I repeat that I am hugely frustrated by the response that we have been given this morning. I hope that we can get something better on Report, but in the meantime, there is no point in my dividing the Committee. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
I beg to move amendment 14, in clause 7, page 5, line 32, at end insert—
“(5A) This Act cannot come into force until the House of Commons has passed a motion in the form set out in subsection (5B).
(5B) The form of the motion for the purposes of subsection (5A) is—
‘That the Immigration and Social Security Co-Ordination (EU Withdrawal Act) come into force’.”
The Bill is not explicit about when clause 1, on the repeal of free movement, will come into force. Under Clause 7(8), it may
“come into force on such day as the Secretary of State may by regulations made by statutory instrument appoint.”
For reasons outlined in our debates on clause 1, ending free movement prematurely will have the effect of plunging millions of EU citizens in this country into legal limbo and may mean that they are here illegally. If we end free movement too soon, it will be impossible to distinguish those EU citizens who have just arrived in the UK from those who have lived here for decades but not yet registered for settled status. There is therefore a risk that people will be denied their rights to work, rent, use the NHS and so on because they are unable to prove that they have those rights.
If there is a withdrawal agreement, free movement will be repealed at the end of the transition period. Our amendments would ensure that if there is no deal, and therefore no transition period, the Secretary of State will not be able to repeal free movement until EU citizens have been given sufficient time to register for settled status. They would offer safeguards, protect citizens’ rights and secure their status.
I am pleased to be back on the same side as the hon. Member for Manchester, Gorton; I need not say much more than he did. The amendments would address the problems that will arise in a no-deal situation if the Government introduce their proposals. For example, how will employers and landlords go about distinguishing those who arrive before and after Brexit day? The Minister reassures us that employers need make no checks on prospective employees except whether they are EEA nationals, but the problem is that they will want to know how long those people can work for them; will they be entitled to stay in the UK for three years, or will they end up being entitled to settled status? Likewise, landlords will want to know how long tenancies can last.
Some EU nationals may have the right to be in the UK indefinitely through the settled status scheme, while others may be restricted to three years. This is not the Minister’s fault, but there is no indication how the three-year visa will feed into the future immigration system. There is a huge danger that there will be discrimination, and that the system just will not work. The very simple answer in amendment 36, proposed by the3million, is not to end free movement, either in a deal or no-deal situation, until after the settled status scheme has run its course. Only then can we be absolutely sure that different categories of EEA nationals can be distinguished.
I thank the hon. Members for Manchester, Gorton and for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East for tabling amendments to clause 7, which sets out how and when the provisions of the Bill will commence. Let me briefly outline how the clause operates.
Like clause 6, which deals with interpretation, clause 7 will come into force on the day that the Bill receives Royal Assent. That is common for such provisions.
That is acceptable if there is a deal, so I do not understand why it is completely unacceptable if there is no deal.
As the hon. Gentleman will be aware, the Government are working hard to secure a deal, but there will need to be a reasonable transition period in the event of deal or no deal. Indeed, in no deal we will have to have an element of control and transition, and there will be no case where we shall be able to implement a new system and switch off the old system overnight. Transition is important, and it is important that we retain the tools that enable us to do that.
We have been clear that we aim for the future skills-based immigration system to be in place from January 2021. This amendment would prevent us from doing that, as it would effectively extend the implementation period for a further six months. That would leave us unable to deliver on our commitments to end free movement and to introduce the new system on time. We received a clear message in the referendum that free movement should end. Delaying it further beyond the agreed implementation period would clearly be ignoring that message.
Even in a no-deal scenario, there will need to be a transition period before the future skills-based immigration system begins. That period should reassure Members that there will be no cliff-edge. The Government announced their proposals for ending free movement in a no-deal scenario in the policy paper published on 28 January 2019. This Bill, not least the measures in part 1, is needed now to enable us to deliver the result of the referendum.
We have also been clear that we will ensure the immigration status of the resident population is protected before the deadline for the EU settlement scheme, through appropriate savings made under clause 4. That will ensure that their rights remain unchanged immediately after exit, avoiding any cliff-edge. That means it is not necessary to delay the repeal of the free movement law in the way proposed to protect the resident population.
By delaying the end of free movement in a no-deal scenario, the amendment creates a group of EU nationals who arrive under free movement, after EU exit but before the end of the implementation period, who will face uncertainty in June 2021, when those free-movement rights end. They are not eligible to apply under the EU settlement scheme and would be in the UK unlawfully, unless they obtain leave under the immigration rules. The Government’s planned transition of a dedicated EU leave to remain route, to bridge the transition from the end of free movement to the introduction of the future system, is both pragmatic and fair, and avoids the cliff-edge I have described. I believe it is preferable to amendment 36, which seeks to prolong free movement unilaterally.
Amendments 14 and 15 seek to prevent the Bill, once enacted, from coming into force until after a motion in a specific form is passed by the House of Commons. While I recognise the importance of facilitating extensive debate on this Bill, I am of the view that legislating for a further motion after enactment is neither an effective nor appropriate use of parliamentary time. There is ample opportunity for Members on both sides of the House to have their views heard and to subject the Bill to scrutiny as it progresses through Parliament. We have already heard valuable and thought-provoking views from both sides of the Committee, and Members will continue to debate and vote on the Bill on Report and Third Reading, before it passes to the other place for further scrutiny.
Furthermore, when the Bill receives Royal Assent, Parliament will clearly have made the decision that it should become law and that free movement should end. The Government have been clear, both publicly and in the House, when they plan to commence the provisions in the Bill. There is no good reason to continue free movement unilaterally in a no-deal scenario, and these amendments, which seek to do so, seek to deny the result of the referendum. That is not acceptable. I therefore ask the hon. Members for Manchester, Gorton and for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East to withdraw their amendments.
(5 years, 9 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesIt is a pleasure, as always, to serve under your chairmanship, Sir David. I rise to speak to amendment 21 and to support new clause 36—after a brief difference of opinion this morning, it is nice to be back on the same side as the SNP.
Rights mean very little without the means to enforce them. The amendment would put in place a provision regarding legal aid, without which we say the repeal of the retained EU law relating to free movement should not happen. In other words, clause 1 would come into force only in the circumstances set out in the amendment.
Let me say briefly about the EU settlement scheme that the provision of a right to appeal and the legal aid necessary to enforce it would remove any uncertainty about whether there was scrutiny of those decisions. The complexity of the scheme means that errors may well be made, and a right of appeal is the optimum way to secure legal entitlements.
Returning specifically to the amendment, cuts to legal aid are a huge issue for enforcement, but they are also a potential problem with respect to the lawyer who eventually has a case. That is not to suggest that junior lawyers and fee earners in some lower categories do not do an excellent job. They do, but it obviously cannot be fair for a more junior lawyer, or a lawyer without the requisite expertise, to end up taking a case simply on the basis of the money available, without regard to the necessary experience and expertise.
Cost is a huge problem. The withdrawal of legal aid means that, to get before a tribunal with a robust bundle of evidence that gives them some chance of being granted an appeal, people often have to find thousands of pounds—£1,000, £2,000 or perhaps even £3,000. That is the cost simply for getting a bundle of evidence together to go before a tribunal, before even considering whether there is a remote chance of success. All too often, people just cannot afford that.
The amendment, which relates to new clause 36, specifically seeks the provision of legal aid to assist European economic area and Swiss nationals with immigration matters. The context for the amendment is the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, which, on the commencement of its civil legal aid provisions on 1 April 2013, largely removed non-asylum immigration advice and representation from the scope of legal aid in England and Wales. Clearly, the ending of rights by clause 1 and schedule 1 will significantly extend the impact of the legal aid cuts made by the 2012 Act by fully subjecting EEA and Swiss nationals and their family members to the immigration system and requiring them to have leave to enter or remain in the UK.
Complexity is not the only reason why the general removal of legal aid for immigration advice and representation is of profound concern. I am grateful to Amnesty International for its thorough briefing, which sets out its concerns. The reality is that substantial evidential hurdles exist for anyone who is seeking to establish rights to private and family life in the UK and measures for the best interests of children. Even if someone who is representing themselves—a litigant in person—understands relevant legal requirements and procedures, they will still have to assess, collect and present the evidence that is required to demonstrate that the rules and other requirements are met. The issue is not only that it is a daunting task and prohibitively expensive, but that the tribunal system is simply not set up to help someone in that situation. Worse still, it is a false economy, because there is no doubt whatever that the provision of a lawyer who is expert in the field will speed up the proceedings, as opposed to the proceedings being slowed down because a number of people have to represent themselves before the tribunal.
The Government have said that they wish to avoid another Windrush scandal. In that case, they would do well to accept this amendment. I should just draw attention to the fact that I was a practising barrister before I entered Parliament and I remain a non-practising barrister. For completeness, I refer to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests in that regard. I urge the Minister to accept the amendment.
I will speak to new clause 36, but I also fully support everything that the hon. Member for Torfaen has said about amendment 21. I can be very brief, given what he has said. As was revealed earlier, I used to practise as an immigration lawyer; this was a decade ago. Back then, the immigration rules were horrendously complex, but since then there have been hundreds of changes to the immigration rules and they have multiplied in size. I cannot remember what the figure is, but the appendices have just about every letter of the alphabet in their title. The system is ludicrously complex. The issue is not just that the rules are complicated; as we have heard, the evidential requirements are also incredibly complicated.
It is easy enough to say that we hope the settled status scheme is not too complicated, but that is not an end to the matter. It will be complicated for many people to access. People also have to make decisions and understand whether they actually need to apply, and that could be hugely complicated for some people. Some people will not be sure whether they have British nationality. Some people will not understand whether their right to permanent residence under existing EU law means that they do or do not need to apply. There is the situation of Irish citizens, for example, in Northern Ireland. All sorts of people are already asking questions about how this system applies to them. It is not a straightforward matter.
A number of constituents or residents in my constituency have come to me with the kinds of questions that the hon. Gentleman illustrates, and I, with my limited experience—certainly in comparison with his—have been able to clarify a lot of those cases as their Member of Parliament. Is that not something that we should all be doing as Members of Parliament?
It is fair to say that MPs can provide some basic help, but they are not immigration lawyers. All hon. Members have to be cautious to ensure that they do not hand out legal advice. A Member might be approached, for example, by someone who is entitled to British citizenship or to register as a British citizen. To set them off down the route of applying for settled status would be to do them a disservice. We have to be very careful. Although the settled status scheme in itself might appear to be reasonably straightforward, that is not the end of the matter.
I would make two points in response to the suggestion that has been made. First, no one should be giving uninsured legal opinions—obviously, that is what a lawyer would have—and, secondly, we are surely not saying that as a consequence of all the legal aid cuts that have been made, Members of Parliament should be picking up the slack when they are not trained to do so.
Absolutely. Another thing that I will say to the hon. Member for Banff and Buchan is that, thankfully, one benefit of devolution—all those who were opposing devolution earlier should take note—is that people can choose a different path, and in Scotland we have not implemented LASPO. I think that LASPO is one of the most outrageous Acts of Parliament to have gone through this place. Thankfully, in Scotland, people will still be able to obtain immigration advice through legal aid. I strongly urge the hon. Gentleman to use that, rather than potentially getting himself into trouble if he makes mistakes with his immigration advice.
To clarify, I was advocating not that Members of Parliament should provide legal advice, but that they should signpost constituents to the relevant guidance on the Government website, for example.
That is all fair enough but, ultimately, the point remains that all of this is incredibly difficult. Nationality and immigration law are complicated, and the settled status scheme, although it is straightforward in principle, has a number of complexities. Legal aid is essential.
We are talking about fundamental issues to do with human rights and citizenship—the hon. Member for Torfaen talked about Windrush earlier—and all the factors together make legal aid imperative. I am glad that we still have good legal aid coverage for immigration matters in Scotland, and I very much think that that should be the case throughout the United Kingdom.
Briefly, in the light of the two earlier speakers declaring their interests, I declare that I am a solicitor and that I practised immigration law, although I do not do so currently.
I will speak to amendments 17 and 32, which are in my name. I support amendments 38 and 39, which have been tabled by the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East.
On amendment 32, the Bill and the White Paper do not address the many deep-seated problems in our broken immigration system, but instead subject a further 3 million people to it. The Windrush crisis laid bare the extent to which the hostile environment policy impacts on human rights; British citizens were detained and deported, and the Government have acknowledged that that was utterly wrong. I will return to the need for a full review of all Windrush cases, before the Bill is enacted, when we debate amendment 16.
We have heard the opinions of several experts on the danger of a repeat of Windrush for EU citizens, and we need a two-pronged approach to avoid that. First, we must ensure that the rights of EU citizens are enshrined in primary legislation, and that there is no unnecessary cut-off for applications for settled status—an argument I will elaborate on when we discuss the new clauses. Secondly, we must address the root cause of the Windrush crisis: the hostile environment policy.
As the spokesperson for Liberty set out in our evidence session, the impact of the hostile environment goes beyond even the Windrush scandal; it reverberates throughout people’s lives. Children are afraid to go to school, sick people are afraid to go to hospital and victims of serious crime are afraid to report them to the police. Our public services have been co-opted, with doctors, teachers and landlords turned into border guards.
The hostile environment does not only affect migrants. A report by the Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants shows that inquiries from British black and minority ethnic tenants without a passport were ignored or turned down by 58% of landlords in a mystery shopping exercise. I need not remind the Committee that a large number of BME British citizens will be caught in this policy. A number of independent bodies have recommended that the Government review the hostile environment. The Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration found:
“Concerns about right to rent’s impact on racial and other forms of discrimination by landlords, exploitation of migrants and associated criminality, and homelessness, have been raised, repeatedly, by the Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants (JCWI), Crisis, Migrants’ Rights Network and others”,
but the Government did not complete an evaluation of the pilot before rolling it out, nor did they attempt to measure its impact once it was fully rolled out. The independent chief inspector found that overall,
“the RtR scheme had yet to demonstrate its worth as a tool to encourage immigration compliance.”
Internally, the Home Office has failed to co-ordinate, maximise or even effectively measure the use of the scheme. Externally, meanwhile, the Home Office is doing little to address stakeholders’ concerns. The National Audit Office found that the Government failed to fulfil their duty of care when introducing the hostile environment. Its report said:
“In its implementation of the policy with few checks and balances and targets for enforcement action, we do not consider, once again, that the Department adequately prioritised the protection of those who suffered distress and damage through being wrongly penalised, and to whom they owed a duty of care. Instead it operated a target-driven environment for its enforcement teams.”
The Government have recognised the need for an extensive review. After one of my parliamentary questions exposed the scandal of the Home Office’s requiring people who applied for visas to supply DNA evidence, the Home Secretary committed to a wide-ranging review of those “structures and processes” in the Home Office,
“to ensure they can deliver a system in a way which is fair and humane.”
That was back in October 2018, and we have heard nothing more about it since then. The Labour party is clear that we cannot have a “fair and humane” immigration system that respects human rights until we have repealed the hostile environment in its entirety. The Windrush crisis was caused by systematic problems within the Home Office, and it will take root and branch reform to return us to an immigration system that respects human rights.
I turn briefly to the question of data protection, which is related but warrants special consideration. The Data Protection Act 2018 allows an entity that processes data for immigration control purposes to set aside a person’s data protection rights in a broad range of circumstances. As I believe was said during the debate on that Bill, data protection rights help us to hold the Home Office to account. The White Paper indicates that the Government will be using data sharing more and more to enforce the hostile environment.
As Liberty set out, it is concerned that
“the Home Office is really quite a poor data controller, and yet automated data processing is increasingly going to be the linchpin of implementing the hostile environment.”––[Official Report, Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Public Bill Committee, 12 February 2019; c. 60, Q159.]
In that context, it is essential that people have some form of redress for data errors, and data protection rights are crucial. We believe that the hostile environment should be repealed, but if it is to be continued, we must at least have effective redress for errors.
The purpose of amendment 17 is to require the Secretary of State to implement the recommendations of the Law Commission’s review of UK immigration rules. In her opening remarks on this Bill, the Minister mentioned the Law Commission, and I welcome that; I hope she will commit to adopting the measures it recommends before the Government make extensive changes to immigration rules as a consequence of this Bill. In that case, we would not press this amendment to a vote.
Many changes to immigration rules have been made in a piecemeal way, resulting in immigration laws being practically incomprehensible. The JCWI pointed out that Supreme Court judges, Court of Appeal judges, immigration experts and immigration lawyers have all said in public that it is almost impossible for anyone to navigate, let alone people who are expected to do so without necessarily having perfect English or legal aid. The Law Commission points out that, on 31 December 2018, the rules totalled 1,133 and are poorly drafted, which the Government recognised by commissioning the Law Commission review. It makes sense to implement the Law Commission’s recommendations and clean up the statute book before making a whole raft of changes for EEA citizens.
The Law Commission’s project of simplifying the immigration rules officially started on 13 December 2017. It held pre-consultation meetings with key stakeholders and other experts, and with the Home Office. The consultation paper was published on 21 January 2019 and the consultation period is open until 26 April 2019. Recommendations will be delivered in a final report “later in 2019”.
Changes that the Law Commission is considering as part of its review include: a less prescriptive approach to the rules; reforming the organisation and restructuring the immigration rules; removing overlapping provisions and resolving inconsistencies; improving the drafting style; and improving the way that immigration rules are updated. We support those changes, and we believe that it makes most sense for them to be incorporated before our immigration rules are overhauled as a consequence of enacting the Bill.
I will speak to amendments 38 and 39, tabled in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire North, which are essentially subsections of the broader amendments that the shadow Minister spoke to. I absolutely endorse his comments, so I will be very brief indeed.
Essentially, the development of immigration policy has not been evidence-based or rights-based. My amendments pose a couple of questions. First, before we set out to apply the immigration rules to many thousands more people, why do we not review them and assess their impact on human rights? Secondly, my amendments ask us to revisit a pretty scandalous immigration exemption inserted into the recent Data Protection Act 2018.
On the first point, the Government tend to argue in their defence that the statutory duties that are in place are sufficient. However, we unfortunately all too often see statutory duties not properly discharged by the Home Office. For example, we heard in an earlier debate about the duty under section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009. Justice McCloskey said in 2016:
“As in so many cases involving children, there is no evidence that the statutory duty imposed by section 55(2) to have regard to the Secretary of State’s statutory guidance was discharged. I readily infer that it was not. This, sadly, seems to be the rule rather than the exception in cases of this kind.”
Rather than leaving it to statutory duties and guidelines, we want a proper assessment, to make sure that those duties are complied with, and to see how they are complied with.
On the second point, that immigration exemption gives the Home Office sweeping powers to excuse itself or others from fundamental data protections, which are vital to ensuring that people are not subjected to wrong immigration decisions, and wrongly exercised functions and powers, as befell so many members of the Windrush generation. That exemption absolutely ought to be removed.
In particular, the sharing of migrants’ data between public services and the Home Office, and the erosion of migrants’ data protection rights, are some of the most controversial aspects of the hostile environment, turning traditionally safe spaces, such as hospitals and schools, into immigration surveillance services. The policy of sharing NHS patient data with the Home Office eroded the patient confidentiality rights of migrant patients, causing outrage among doctors, royal medical colleges and the British Medical Association. In the light of evidence that data sharing caused migrants to avoid healthcare services and presented a public health risk, the policy was suspended. We need to go further than that and row back on the immigration exemption altogether, which is why I ask hon. Members to support amendment 39.
I thank the hon. Member for Manchester, Gorton for his explanation of the amendments. I will take each one in turn.
Amendment 16 seeks a further debate on the issue of Windrush. It is absolutely right that we deliver on our promise to the people of the UK and legislate to end free movement. It is, further, right that in implementing a future system we must learn the lessons of Windrush. I agree with the hon. Gentleman that that is a crucial point, and that is why, as highlighted on Second Reading, the Government have put in place a number of measures to address it. However, as I have said, we have made a commitment to end free movement and the core purpose of the Bill is to deliver on that purpose. The amendment would put conditions on its implementation, and that is unacceptable. It would have the effect of hindering the Government in that objective, which stems from the EU referendum outcome.
It is essential that the Government can implement change as soon as is practically possible following the UK’s exit from the EU. Part of that change is already in train through the EU settlement scheme. We have been clear that securing the rights of EEA citizens has always been our priority, and we have delivered on that commitment through the implementation of the scheme.
We know that some members of the Windrush generation became caught up in measures intended to tackle illegal migration, because they did not hold the documentation necessary to demonstrate that they could access the benefits and services to which they were entitled. To remedy that, a taskforce was established last April to provide support to members of the Windrush generation who needed documentation to prove their status. The taskforce has issued documentation to more than 2,400 people, who can now demonstrate their right to live in the UK. A further 610 people have subsequently been supported through the Windrush scheme application process. More than 3,400 people have successfully applied for British citizenship under the Windrush scheme.
The Home Office has taken a number of other significant steps to right the wrongs experienced by some members of the Windrush generation. Those steps include the compensation scheme, the details of which have been consulted upon; the result will be announced shortly. In addition, we have commissioned an independent lessons learned review, which has contacted a wide variety of religious and community groups for their input. The review will consider what were the key policy and operational decisions that led to members of the Windrush generation becoming entangled in measures designed for illegal immigrants; what other factors played a part; why the issues were not identified sooner; what lessons the organisation can learn to ensure that it does things differently in future; whether adequate corrective measures are now in place; and an assessment of the initial impact of those measures.
We are committed to taking into account the outcome of the review in designing the future borders and immigration system. The Department is also conducting a review of historical cases, and has therefore already committed significant resources to this work.
The Minister will be aware that the National Audit Office has been critical of the scope of the review of historical cases and has, in particular, urged the Department to widen the scope of the review to include all individuals who could be in a similar situation to those from the Caribbean—so, people of other nationalities as well. Is the Home Office willing to consider that?
Obviously, the Home Office is obliged to consider the comments of the National Audit Office, and it is doing so very carefully.
In addition to the resources committed to this work, the Government are also obliged to look to end free movement as soon as is practically possible. That is the first step in establishing a future border and immigration system that works for the whole United Kingdom. Amendment 23 would amend the commencement provisions in the Bill. The amendment would make the commencement of clause 1, which ends free movement, and clause 5—the social security provision—dependent on 3 million people having applied for, and been granted, status under the EU settlement scheme.
We are committed to securing the rights of resident EU citizens, and we have delivered that through the EU settlement scheme, which will enable us to grant settled or pre-settled status to European economic area nationals and their family members in the UK before EU exit, regardless of whether or not the UK leaves the EU with a deal.
I am pleased that the hon. Member for Manchester, Gorton supports the settlement scheme, and I hope that he and all other Members are encouraging EU nationals resident in their constituencies to apply. However, setting a target for the number of applications that must be reached before the Bill comes into force is not appropriate, for a number of reasons. First, we already have a generous deadline for applications to the scheme, which acts as an incentive for the resident population to apply. Using the power in clause 4, we will ensure that their status is protected before that deadline, so that their rights remain unchanged immediately after exit, avoiding any cliff edge.
Clearly, the EU and the UK commonly agreed that a deadline was the right approach when they provided for it in article 18 of the draft withdrawal agreement. We have been clear about what the deadline will be in both a deal and a no-deal scenario. According to the annual population survey, it is currently estimated that around 3 million EEA nationals are resident in the UK, but even that might well be an underestimate. It would be irresponsible to repeal free movement just because 3 million applications had been granted, which could easily happen before the proposed deadline. A date deadline is public and clearly understood. People can plan their affairs around it in a way that they cannot with an arbitrary figure such as the one proposed in the amendment.
That is a slightly unfair characterisation of the amendment, which does not say that we would have to end free movement when the 3 million threshold had been met. We could still wait until the deadline that the Government have imposed. The amendment simply says that the Government should not implement the end of free movement until that number of people have been registered.
It is still the Home Office’s position that we regard that as an arbitrary figure. We believe that a deadline that is set as a date is much more easily understood by individuals.
We are running an extensive communications campaign to ensure that people are aware of the need to apply. We are using all available channels to reach our audience, and last year targeted online advertising alone reached more than 2 million people. Our communications activity will be even more visible in the coming months, and we will shortly launch a wide-ranging marketing campaign that will encourage EU citizens to apply when the scheme is fully open. Nobody will be left behind, however, and we are working in partnership with vulnerable group representatives to ensure that we reach everyone. We expect the large majority of EEA nationals to have been granted status by the deadline, but if a person has good reasons for missing the deadline, we will be able to protect their status and enable them to apply afterwards.
Secondly, by requiring 3 million EU citizens to be granted settled status before the Bill can come into force and lay the ground for the future immigration system, we are presupposing that all resident EU citizens will receive indefinite leave to remain, which is what settled status refers to. That does not take into account the fact that some resident EU citizens may not need to apply for settled status. Some may want to leave the UK before the deadline; some will have arrived pre-1973 and already have indefinite leave to remain; and some may want to apply for British citizenship instead.
A significant proportion of EEA nationals who are eligible to apply under the settlement scheme will not have been continuously resident in the UK for five years, so they will not be entitled to settled status. They will be issued with pre-settled status, which gives them limited leave to remain, rather than indefinite leave. Some may then leave the UK without staying to complete the five years continuous residence required for a grant of settled status.
The date on which free movement could be repealed, or retained social security co-ordination legislation amended, would therefore be highly uncertain and operationally unworkable as a result of the amendment. The decision about whether free movement ended would be left solely in the hands of those EEA nationals. To prevent free movement from coming to an end through the Bill, they could simply refuse to apply under the EU settlement scheme, knowing that, as a consequence, free movement would not end.
That would be the antithesis of taking back control. It would put the future immigration system in the hands not of the Government or the British people, but of EU nationals who had already exercised their free movement rights and whose rights were protected, but who could prevent us from ending free movement and delivering on the outcome of the referendum.
Finally, it makes no sense to restrict the commencement of the social security co-ordination provisions in clause 5 based on the number of people who are granted settled status. Rights under the social security co-ordination regulations—for example, the right to aggregate to meet domestic entitlement for specific benefits—are not connected to the grant of leave under the EU settlement scheme. I therefore ask the hon. Member for Manchester, Gorton to withdraw his amendment.
I beg to move amendment 37, in clause 7, page 5, line 39, at end insert—
‘(8A) Regulations under subsection (8) may not be made until the Government has amended regulation 12 of the National Health Service (Charges to Overseas Visitors) Regulations 2015 to exempt EEA and Swiss nationals with immigration permission from being charged for NHS services.’
This amendment would prevent the Government from bringing into force those parts of the Bill that subject EEA nationals to the domestic immigration system until EEA and Swiss nationals with immigration permission are exempted from NHS overseas visitor charges.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
New clause 12—NHS Charges for EEA and Swiss nationals—
‘(1) Any EEA or Swiss national, or family member of an EEA or Swiss national, resident in the United Kingdom shall be deemed ordinarily resident for the purposes of section 175 of the National Health Service Act 2006.
(2) In this section, “family member” has the meaning given in Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and Council.’
This new clause would prevent EEA or Swiss nationals, and their family members, who do not have settled status in the UK from being charged for NHS services.
New clause 42—Immigration health charge—
‘No immigration health charge introduced under section 38 of the Immigration Act 2014 may be imposed on an individual who is an EEA or Swiss national.’
This new clause would prevent EEA or Swiss nationals paying the immigration health charge.
New clause 46—Payment for NHS services—
‘Regulation 4 of the National Health Service (Charges to Overseas Visitors) (Amendment) Regulations 2017 does not apply to EEA and Swiss nationals and their family members.’
This new clause would ensure NHS Trusts do not require payment from EEA and Swiss nationals and their family members before providing NHS services.
With amendment 37 and new clauses 42 and 46, I seek to provoke a debate about a particularly important and challenging aspect of the trend towards the outsourcing of immigration control and enforcement, namely the role of our national health service. I am trying to push the Government to address certain challenges and problems that have been highlighted by several organisations. I am particularly grateful to Doctors of the World and the National AIDS Trust for supporting the amendment and new clauses.
The hon. Gentleman makes a valid point. Having worked in the NHS, I know that such checks cause additional pressures. But how does he suggest that the NHS pays for treatment for non-UK citizens? It is a national health service, not an international health service.
We could do what we did previously, which was to recover the costs after the event. However, as I say, I have tabled these amendments to spark debate. At the end of the day, if it is a choice between risking people’s lives or even causing death, and risking losing out on certain funds after the event, the second of those is the lesser evil. However, it is a difficult issue; I do not have all the answers as to how we should approach it. As I say, that is why the new clauses and the amendment have been tabled.
What would be said if there was a contagious disease and people were not coming to get the help that they needed?
The hon. Gentleman makes an absolutely valid point.
I turn to amendment 37, which would prevent the Government from bringing into force those parts of the Bill that subject EEA nationals to the domestic immigration system until EEA and Swiss nationals with immigration permission are exempted from the NHS’s overseas visitors charges. This amendment would mean that all EU migrants with a visa, including temporary workers on short-term visas, are able to receive NHS services free at the point of care. That reflects the current situation of EU nationals living and working in the UK.
The White Paper indicates that EU migrants on short-term visas of 12 months will have no right to healthcare beyond emergency care, and skilled workers and their dependants will be required to pay the immigration health surcharge when making an immigration application to enter or remain in the UK. Good preventive healthcare plays a central role in maintaining a fit and healthy workforce, and the policy to exclude people on short-term visas from all healthcare beyond emergency care establishes a worrying precedent in excluding from NHS services migrants who are legally living and working in the UK.
Those on short-term visas are likely to be in lower-paid jobs and unable to pay for healthcare out of their own pockets. Requiring EU migrants on skilled worker visas and their dependants to pay the immigration health surcharge is unfair and will be cost-prohibitive for some. Payment of the surcharge, which is currently set at £400 per person per year with a discounted rate for students of £300 per year, must be made at the same time as an immigration application, and it has to cover the total cost for the duration of the visa and for all the people named on the application. A person applying for a two-and-a-half-year visa will incur a surcharge of £1,000, on top of any other immigration fees, and a family of four would be required to pay £8,100 for a visa for the same period.
For those on low incomes, the health surcharge will be cost-prohibitive. We are particularly concerned about the impact that the surcharge will have on EU migrants living in the UK when they come to renew their visa, and about the fact that large health surcharge payments will prevent those on low incomes from being able to renew their visa, causing them to lose their lawful stay in the UK. It is also of note that EU migrants who are employed—for example, those on short-term or skilled visas—will be contributing to the NHS through tax and national insurance payments and that, by being required to pay the health surcharge, they will in effect be being charged twice for healthcare.
For those reasons, I have also tabled new clause 42, which would remove the applicability of the health surcharge. The surcharge has doubled this year to what I regard as an unacceptably high level.
I wish to speak to new clause 12, which states:
“Any EEA or Swiss national, or family member of an EEA or Swiss national, resident in the United Kingdom shall be deemed ordinarily resident for the purposes of section 175 of the National Health Service Act 2006.”
When charging for non-residents was first introduced under section 175, it was not meant to add excess costs for that group of people accessing our healthcare. In 2015, costs were introduced that started at £200 for most applicants and £150 for certain groups—for example, students. The fee has now doubled. That means that a family of four would have to pay about £1,000 each in IHS costs in addition to their visa costs.
I am pleased that the Minister confirmed in November that EU citizens who are resident in the UK before it leaves the European Union in March 2019 will not pay the charge, and that the Government have come to an agreement with Switzerland, Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein that during the transition period their citizens’ rights will be protected. However, it is still unclear what will happen after the transition period has come to an end in 2021 or in the case of a no-deal scenario, After December 2020, a new visa system will be in place that could mean that EEA citizens and Swiss nationals have to pay the immigration health charge.
It seems to be forgotten that most of the EEA citizens and Swiss nationals in the UK are currently employed and are already paying for the NHS through their taxes. Extending the immigration health surcharge to them would mean that they were being charged double for NHS care, which would seem to me an unfair contribution.
That leads me to the issue of the NHS. More than 60,000 NHS workers are EU nationals and, without settled status, they could face the possibility of paying the increased surcharge as well as for their tier 2 work visa. The new system could add further pressures for the NHS, which is currently struggling to recruit the number of healthcare professionals needed to meet the country’s demand.
Labour’s intention is to level rights up, not down. We hope that, after a new immigration system applying to nationals from across the world is introduced, none will be required to pay these charges.
This has been a very helpful debate on whether and how we go about charging for NHS services. I am grateful to other hon. Members for their contributions. It is incumbent on all of us to take very seriously the concerns that have been raised by outside organisations that are experienced in the field of healthcare. It is incumbent on all of us as MPs, but also on the Minister and the Home Office, to make sure that the concerns are not just ignored and forgotten. I hope that we all treat them seriously going forward.
I am grateful to the Minister for undertaking to speak to the Department of Health and Social Care about the report that has been flagged up. I will take on board all the drafting tips that she helpfully provided. In the meantime, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 7 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Paul Maynard.)
(5 years, 9 months ago)
General CommitteesIt is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir David. I will be very brief, because the shadow Minister has said pretty much everything that I would have said. I simply echo his concerns that any sort of Brexit will be a challenge and risks harming security co-operation. In the meantime, we must make the statute book as robust and complete as possible, which is what this delegated legislation is about.
Each week, parliamentarians are asked to look through a host of very detailed and complicated statutory instruments. We get helpful explanatory memorandums alongside them, and Ministers’ introductory statements are also helpful. There is an assurance that stakeholders will be consulted, including devolved Administrations, which is important from my point of view. It would also be useful if we could see a summary of the consultation responses, because all I know is that consultations took place. I have tried to contact various stakeholders to see what they think, but it would be preferable if the Government could provide that, rather than our constantly having to do that homework week after week. Other than that, we fully support what the Government are trying to do with these regulations, which we certainly do not oppose.
(5 years, 9 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesIt is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stringer, and that of your co-Chair, Sir David Amess, who took us so ably through the evidence sessions the week before last.
At the outset, I would like to emphasise the importance of the Bill in delivering the future border and immigration system. It was clear from the EU referendum, from the many views shared on Second Reading and from the Committee’s evidence sessions that people want a fair immigration system that works for the whole United Kingdom—a system that attracts talent from around the globe and allows individuals to access the UK based on what they have to offer, not where they come from.
We heard many important views about the current and future border and immigration systems from witnesses who gave evidence before the Committee two weeks ago, as well as from organisations that provided written evidence. I am grateful to everyone who took the time to provide their opinions. The views that were put forward demonstrated a strong interest in a wide range of immigration issues, as well as in the specific design of the future system. The evidence highlighted the importance of learning lessons from the past and ensuring we get things right.
A clear message emerged about the need to create a fair and simple system, and those are key priorities for me in the design of the future system. As I have said previously, I recognise that the immigration rules need to be made simpler. That is why we have asked the Law Commission to review how the rules could be simplified. I look forward to considering its findings when they are published.
Leaving the European Union means that, for the first time in more than 40 years, we can deliver control of immigration by ending free movement. In its place, we will introduce a new system, which will level the playing field by ending preferential treatment for EU citizens. It will mean that everyone has the same opportunity to come to the UK, regardless of where they are from.
I am grateful to the Minister for giving way so early. She has asserted a couple of times that the new system will provide a level playing field for everybody, but the White Paper indicates that nationals of different countries will be treated in different ways. There will, I reckon, be preferential treatment for EU nationals with the one-year visa and for countries whose citizens are already non-visa nationals. Will she clarify that? Is she saying everybody is going to be treated exactly the same, or does she accept that the White Paper in fact does not set out such an arrangement?
The Bill certainly does set out that people will be treated in the same way, because it is a Bill simply to end free movement. The White Paper, which was published on 18 December, gives us the opportunity to discuss the future system and how people from across the globe may be treated. It gives us the opportunity to discuss whether trade deals might include treatment within our immigration system. It is important that we have a system that reflects people’s skills and what we need in our economy. This Bill, through which we are seeking to end free movement, is an opportunity to start to provide that level playing field.
I agree wholeheartedly with my hon. Friend’s comments. Labour has tabled a number of new clauses to the Bill that would put the rights of EU citizens into primary legislation. We hope that the Government accept those when we get to that point.
The second question is what our new immigration system should be doing in the future. The Bill is incredibly flimsy; it is only 16 pages long, which is extraordinary given that it will mean the biggest change to our immigration system in decades. Instead of putting forward a new immigration system that Parliament can discuss and debate, amend and improve, the Bill grants powers to Ministers to introduce whatever system they like through extensive Henry VIII powers. We were given an indication of what such a system might be like in the White Paper published by the Government in December. In fact, Ministers are under no obligation to use the powers to implement that system. If they implement the system described in the White Paper, it will spell disaster for our economy and our society.
We will go into these matters in more depth in subsequent debates, but expert witnesses at our evidence sessions criticised almost all aspects of the Government’s plans. The £30,000 threshold would be a disaster for business and public services such as the NHS. The 12-month visa would lead to exploitation. Labour has no problem with immigration that would treat all migrants the same no matter where they came from, but that is not the system the Government propose. The White Paper is explicit that there will be certain visas and conditions that will apply only to people from “low-risk countries”—a categorisation that the Government are not at all transparent about. Apart from those two glaring absences, the Bill before us fails to address a litany of problems with our immigration system, some of which we seek to remedy through our amendments.
Before I conclude, I have two questions that I would like the Minister to address. First, under what circumstances would the Government use the powers in the Bill? We have heard that this is a contingency Bill, so if there is a withdrawal agreement and thus a withdrawal and implementation Bill, will the Government use powers in that Bill to repeal free movement? Secondly, could the provisions in this Bill lead to a change in immigration law that affects non-European economic area migrants? Could the Government use the powers in the Bill to amend immigration legislation that affects non-EU citizens?
As the Minister will know, the Government are asking for extensive Henry VIII powers. During our Committee sittings, Adrian Berry, Steve Valdez-Symonds and Martin Hoare, all experts in immigration law, confirmed to me that the powers in the Bill could be used to make legislation affecting non-EU citizens. Is the Minister willing to contradict the experts? Does she agree that, if it is indeed the case that the powers in the Bill could be used to make legislation that affects non-EU citizens, its scope is much wider than the end of free movement?
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stringer. I thank the Clerks for working their way through a mountain of amendments and making them presentable in the last few days. I thank the various organisations and individuals for their help and ideas for amendments, and I thank the shadow Minister for engaging with us over the last couple of days. Any flaws in the amendments we have tabled are my responsibility alone. Finally, I thank the Minister; she has been very open to discussion, approachable and good humoured, as ever. The fact that I can’t stand the Bill and utterly oppose it should not be taken personally. Hopefully, we will still be able to have some useful and constructive debates.
I will not rehash all the points I made on Second Reading. I love free movement; my party fully supports it and I pretty much believe it is the best thing since sliced bread. I regret that it is in danger of coming to an end. It will leave the United Kingdom in an unusual position historically. This country has, for almost its entire history, allowed certain citizens to come and go, whether EU citizens, Commonwealth citizens or, before that, absolutely everybody. All the evidence is that free movement is beneficial to us, for growth, productivity and public finances. In Scotland, it has transformed our demographic outlook from a country of net immigration to a country of positive migration. The quid pro quo for all this is that we will lose our free movement rights. My family and I have benefited from free movement, as have many Members, including on this Committee. I regret that this Parliament will pull up the ladder behind it.
The challenges of free movement that are often cited will not be solved by ending free movement but by proper labour market standards and enforcement, by integration strategies and by investment in public services. Neither do the justifications for ending free movement stack up. Indeed, it was striking in the Minister’s speech and in the speeches of some Government Members on Second Reading how little free movement and the supposed justifications for ending it were addressed.
It is wrong to say that people voted to end free movement, because it was not on the ballot paper. To argue the contrary is to argue that almost 100% of leave voters were motivated by that alone. That is not the case. This is the Prime Minister’s red line, not the people’s red line. Opinion polls and studies show that if it comes to a choice between a closer trading relationship with Europe and ending free movement, a closer trading relationship wins. Simply repeating ad nauseam that we are “taking back control of our borders” is not an argument.
Now is the most bizarre moment for MPs to consider voting to end free movement. Parliament hopefully is on the verge of taking control. Who knows what trading arrangements may be secured, perhaps involving free movement. A people’s vote is even more on the cards than it was at the time of Second Reading. As the shadow Minister said, the Bill puts the cart before the horse. Let us sort out our negotiating position first, then we can decide what that means for free movement. If the public are happy enough to retain free movement for a closer trading arrangement, it is wrong for MPs to rule it out at this stage. There is no need to rush through the end of free movement, even if we do leave in a month’s time. For those reasons, my party believes that the clause should not stand part of the Bill.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Stringer. I echo the comments of the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East in thanking the Minister for being so open to colleagues in preparing for consideration of the Bill over the next two weeks.
I, too, believe that freedom of movement has been good for our country and particularly for my constituency. We are a proud manufacturing constituency that offers many skilled jobs, and we have relied heavily over the years on the skills and talents of EEA nationals who come to work in our industries. It is clear that north-west England is destined to suffer most economically from loss of access to EEA labour under free movement rules.
I echo the hon. Gentleman’s remarks about public opinion on freedom of movement. A couple of years ago I had the pleasure to participate in a citizens’ assembly organised by the Constitution Unit of University College London. One of the questions that the participants were asked to address was what kind of immigration arrangements they wanted with the European Union after Brexit. This was a deliberative process carried out with a representative sample of over 100 individuals, exactly mirroring the demographic of the referendum electorate in terms of the vote—leave or remain—geography, ethnicity, age, background and so on.
The hon. Gentleman raises an important point. If we have learned one thing from Windrush—and I sincerely hope we have learned many—it is that a declaratory system that does not give people the evidence they need to be able to affirm their right to be in the UK, to work and own property, does not work. That is why we have a scheme that I am confident will give people the evidence they need so that we can avoid a position whereby EU citizens who are here and settled are in the same situation in the future. I am conscious—Members may have heard me say this in Select Committees—that there will be children of EU citizens living in this country today who are well under the age of 16; some will be one or two years old. The hon. Member for Wirral South mentioned an ageing population and longevity, but while we in this room might be lucky to get to our late 80s, there are children who will live to 100 or 110. It is therefore important we have something that is enduring and enables them to evidence their right to be here for a century or more.
A new argument appeared for the first time yesterday at Home Office questions, saying the problem was caused because Windrush was what Ministers describe as a declaratory system. That was not what caused the problem; the problem was the lack of evidence. In fact, if people did not have rights under statute—as we would like to see here—they could have been removed ages ago and could not have rectified the situation. It is not right to say that a declaratory system caused the problem to the Windrush generation.
I disagree. If we look back to the Immigration Act 1971—I have become quite familiar with that Act over the past year in this job—it put the right of the people of the Windrush generation to be here in statute, but it did not provide them with the evidence they needed to demonstrate that. It is important we learn that lesson and make sure we do not repeat the mistake for our EU citizens.
I beg to move amendment 29, in clause 2, page 1, line 11, at end insert—
“(1A) After section 2A insert—
‘2B Family members of Irish citizens
Nothing in the Immigration Rules (within the meaning of this Act) shall lay down any practice that treats or provides for the family members of Irish citizens differently to the treatment or provision made for the family member of British citizens.’”
This amendment seeks to ensure that the family members of Irish citizens are treated in the same way as the family members of British citizens.
With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 28, in clause 2, page 2, line 13, at end insert—
“(6) The Secretary of State may not conclude that the deportation of an Irish citizen is conducive to the public good under section 3(5)(a) unless he concludes that a higher threshold is reached whereby deportation is in the public interest because there are exceptional circumstances.
(7) No person of any nationality is liable for deportation under section 3(5)(b) where he belongs to the family of an Irish citizen who is or has been ordered to be deported, unless subsection (6) is satisfied in respect of that Irish citizen.
(8) No Irish citizen is liable for deportation under section 3(6) where recommended for deportation by a court empowered under this Act to do so unless, thereafter, the Secretary concludes that his deportation is conducive to the public good in accordance with subsection (6).
(9) An Irish citizen may not be deported or excluded from the United Kingdom if they are among the ‘people of Northern Ireland’ entitled to identify as Irish citizens by virtue of Article 1(vi) of the British-Irish Agreement of 1998.”
This amendment would provide additional safeguards against deportation for Irish citizens.
Clause 2 concerns the special status of Irish citizens in the UK in immigration law. It is probably fair to say that although we often refer to the common travel area, and although we know how it works in practice and have a broad idea of the practical reasons why it exists, the actual law here is pretty obscure, vague and not very well understood. I apologise if I have maligned any Committee members who are in fact experts in this area of immigration law.
In recent years it probably has not been a concern, largely because free movement means that it has not really mattered. That now changes completely if free movement is stopped, and clause 2 is one of the steps that we need to take to ensure that the status of Irish citizens here is protected. Parts of clause 2 are welcome because, if clause 2 were not part of the law, although Irish citizens could still come to the UK without immigration control if they were coming from another part of the common travel area, if free movement ended they would have no such right if they arrived in the UK from outside the common travel area, whether on a plane from New York or a train from Paris. Clause 2 confirms the right of Irish citizens to enter and remain without permission—even if free movement rights end—irrespective of where they entered the UK from, unless they are subject to a deportation order, exclusion order or international travel ban.
The question is: does clause 2 go far enough? The evidence received in writing and heard at hearings suggests that it does not. There are other aspects of the special status that we need to have a look at as well. There is one sense in which clause 2 appears to undermine the special status afforded to Irish citizens, and that is in relation to deportation.
As Professor Ryan pointed out in his evidence, the clause provides that Irish citizens may be deported under the general deportation laws of this country—those that apply to everybody else—under the Immigration Act 1971. Those apply to: a person whose deportation the Secretary of State deems conducive to the public good, including under the controversial mandatory deportation provisions of the UK Borders Act 2007; a person whom a court recommends for deportation at the time of conviction for a criminal offence punishable by imprisonment; and a family member of a person who is or has been ordered to be deported.
The clause would also introduce a specific new power to exclude Irish citizens from the United Kingdom if the Secretary of State considers that to be conducive to the public good. However, in doing so the Bill does not imply any particular special protection regarding the threshold for the deportation or exclusion of Irish citizens. The stated policy of the Government in 2007, according to the then Immigration Minister, was:
“Irish citizens will only be considered for deportation where a court has recommended deportation in sentencing or where the Secretary of State concludes, due to the exceptional circumstances of the case, the public interest requires deportation.”—[Official Report, 19 February 2007; Vol. 457, c. 4WS.]
That is a higher test than would be applied by clause 2, and we heard evidence suggesting that the clause would water down the position of Irish citizens. In that regard, it might be useful to note that, by virtue of their exemption from Irish immigration law, British citizens are completely immune from deportation and exclusion under Irish law. Indeed, other evidence sent to us from a group of academics goes further, and asks why, if Irish citizens are “not foreign” according to the Ireland Act 1949, we need to retain the power to deport them at all. Ireland has not retained the equivalent power.
Professor Ryan raised a further important question about whether, to comply with the Belfast agreement, there should be an exemption from deportation and exclusion for Irish citizens who are from Northern Ireland. Under the Belfast agreement, both Governments recognised the birthright of all people of Northern Ireland to identify themselves as, and be accepted as, Irish, British or both, as they may so choose. As Professor Ryan puts it:
“There is a risk that, as formulated, the deportation and exclusion clauses will fail to respect the right of a person from Northern Ireland who wishes to identify as an Irish citizen.”
He questions whether it is compatible with the Belfast agreement to require a person from Northern Ireland to assert their British identity in order to resist deportation to Ireland. There might even be circumstances in which UK nationality had been renounced.
Those are the issues that amendment 28 is designed to address. It seeks to enshrine in law what is supposedly current Government practice, instead of watering down that standard on deportation. It also seeks to ensure that clause 2 does not in any way undermine the Belfast agreement. I am sure that everyone in this room today would agree that it is important that we get these things right. My final observation in that regard is that, according to Professor Ryan, as I have said, there is no provision in Irish law to deport UK nationals.
Amendment 29 probes the Government, seeking an explanation of what the exact position will be of Irish nationals who seek to have family members join them—if and when the normal family rules in the immigration rules are applied to them. As we will come to later—perhaps today, or on Thursday—I absolutely hate those draconian and restrictive rules, but at least they are there, allowing British citizens and settled persons to be joined by family members. As Professor Ryan points out, the immigration rules will allow for UK citizens returning to the UK to be accompanied by non-UK or Irish family, and for UK citizens and settled persons already here to be joined by non-UK or Irish family. That last bit should apply simply enough to Irish nationals as well, because clause 2, if passed, would appear to mean that Irish persons would be treated as settled persons for the purposes of the rules. I should be grateful for confirmation that that is the case.
The second problem is that it seems, from the clause’s drafting, that Irish persons moving here with such family would not be able to use the rules in the way that a UK citizen could, because they would not yet be settled persons. The Irish person would need to come here first and become settled, and their family would join them later. Another issue is whether the rules in other respects will treat the family members of an Irish citizen in precisely the same way as they treat family members of UK citizens. In particular, if a UK national has a UK national child here, as we all know, the child would not cause the financial threshold to increase if any application was made by an overseas spouse to join them. Would the presence of an Irish citizen child of an Irish citizen result in the financial threshold being increased for any spouse coming to join that family?
Amendment 29 simply seeks to ensure that Irish citizens will be treated in the same way as UK nationals. I will not press it to a vote, however, because as the Committee on the Administration of Justice, a cross-community human rights organisation in Northern Ireland, rightly points out, it may need to be tweaked to ensure that it does not prevent Irish citizens from benefiting from the more favourable treatment that EU families may continue to enjoy for a period through retained EU law, in comparison with UK citizens and settled persons encumbered with the immigration rules. The amendment should probably preclude less favourable treatment rather than different treatment. The CAJ’s submission goes further, supporting the view of the human rights commissions that the common travel area is “written in sand” and warning of “other gaps”, including in relation to social rights.
I thank hon. Members for raising important issues linked to Irish citizens. It is important to recognise that British and Irish citizens have enjoyed a particular status and specific rights in each other’s countries since the 1920s as part of the common travel area arrangements.
Clause 2 will protect the status of Irish citizens. When free movement ends, it will allow them to continue to come to the UK without requiring permission and without any restrictions on how long they can stay. British citizens enjoy reciprocal rights in Ireland. The clause will provide legal certainty and clarity for Irish citizens by inserting new section 3ZA into the Immigration Act 1971 to ensure that they can enter and remain in the UK without requiring permission, regardless of where they have travelled from. That is already the position for those who enter the UK from within the common travel area, but Irish citizens who travel to the UK from outside the CTA currently enter under European economic area regulations. The clause will remove that distinction by giving Irish citizens a clear status.
I turn to the amendments tabled by the hon. Members for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East, and for Paisley and Renfrewshire North. Amendment 29 would establish in legislation that the immigration rules cannot treat family members of Irish citizens differently from family members of British citizens. The common travel area arrangements have never included rights for the family members of British and Irish citizens. That is an approach that we intend to maintain, but the unique status of Irish citizens means that they are considered settled from the day on which they arrive in the United Kingdom. Irish citizens in the UK can therefore sponsor family members, in the same way as British citizens can. That is the position for those of all nationalities within the UK who are settled.
I also note that Irish citizens, in line with other EU nationals, can be joined in the UK by family members under the terms of the EU settlement scheme, but the amendment would prevent that. To be clear, Irish citizens are not required to apply for status under the EU settlement scheme to benefit from the family member rights, but they may apply if they wish. Under the settlement scheme in a deal scenario, close family members who are not already resident in the UK will be able to join an EU citizen—that includes Irish citizens—under the same conditions as now, where the relationship pre-existed the end of the implementation period. I therefore ask the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East to consider withdrawing his amendment for the reasons that I have outlined.
Amendment 28 would introduce additional provisions regarding the deportation and exclusion of Irish citizens and their family members. I will use this opportunity to reiterate our approach to deporting Irish citizens in light of the historical community and political ties between the UK and Ireland, along with the existence of the common travel area. Irish citizens are considered for deportation only if a court has recommended deportation following conviction or if the Secretary of State concludes that, because of the exceptional circumstances of a case, the public interest requires deportation. We carefully assess all deportation decisions on a case-by-case basis, taking into account all the facts of the case.
In response to questions asked on Second Reading, I confirmed that the Government are fully committed to maintaining this approach. In that regard, Committee members will have noted that we are making provision to ensure that once we leave the EU, Irish citizens will be exempt from the automatic deportation provisions for criminality in the UK Borders Act 2007. That exemption is contained in the Immigration, Nationality and Asylum (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, which were laid before the House on 11 February. Therefore, proposed new subsections (6) and (8) are not needed.
As I have outlined, the UK’s approach is to deport Irish citizens only in exceptional circumstances or where the court has recommended it, which means that a family member of an Irish citizen would not be considered for deportation unless a deportation order was made in respect of that citizen in line with our approach. I also emphasise that the common travel area rights have always provided solely for British and Irish citizens. They have never specifically extended to the family members of British or Irish citizens, and we intend to maintain that approach.
With proposed new subsection (8) in mind, I must make it absolutely clear that the UK is fully committed to upholding the Belfast agreement and respects the right of the people of Northern Ireland to identify as Irish, British or both, and to hold both British and Irish citizenship as they choose. I recognise the centrality of those citizenship and identity provisions to the Belfast agreement. As I have said, deportation decisions are taken on a case-by-case basis, and we consider the seriousness of the criminality and whether it is in the public interest to require deportation.
Recognising the citizenship provisions in the Belfast agreement, we would consider any case extremely carefully and not seek to deport a person from Northern Ireland who is solely an Irish citizen. However, I recognise the hon. Gentleman’s interest in this matter and will continue to keep it under consideration. I therefore respectfully ask him to consider withdrawing his amendment for the reasons outlined.
I am grateful to the Minister for her detailed response. As I have accepted, amendment 29 is not perfect. I also accept her general reassurances about the treatment of Irish citizens’ families in the United Kingdom, so I will withdraw the amendment and reflect further on our position.
In relation to what the Minister said about deportations and amendment 28, it seems to me that we are mostly saying the same things, but our statements are reflected better in my amendment than in the clause. We seem to be saying the same thing, but reaching different conclusions about how to enshrine it in law. I am simply asking the Government to put their current practice into statute. I will give further thought to that, but for now I beg to ask leave to withdraw amendment 29.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment proposed: 28, in clause 2, page 2, line 13, at end insert—
“(6) The Secretary of State may not conclude that the deportation of an Irish citizen is conducive to the public good under section 3(5)(a) unless he concludes that a higher threshold is reached whereby deportation is in the public interest because there are exceptional circumstances.
(7) No person of any nationality is liable for deportation under section 3(5)(b) where he belongs to the family of an Irish citizen who is or has been ordered to be deported, unless subsection (6) is satisfied in respect of that Irish citizen.
(8) No Irish citizen is liable for deportation under section 3(6) where recommended for deportation by a court empowered under this Act to do so unless, thereafter, the Secretary concludes that his deportation is conducive to the public good in accordance with subsection (6).
(9) An Irish citizen may not be deported or excluded from the United Kingdom if they are among the ‘people of Northern Ireland’ entitled to identify as Irish citizens by virtue of Article 1(vi) of the British-Irish Agreement of 1998.”—(Stuart C. McDonald.)
This amendment would provide additional safeguards against deportation for Irish citizens.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
As I said in response to the amendments tabled by the hon. Members for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East and for Paisley and Renfrewshire North, the clause will protect the status of Irish citizens in the UK when free movement ends. Without the clause, as Professor Ryan explained in evidence to the Committee, when freedom of movement ends, Irish citizens will need to seek permission to enter the UK when they arrive from outside the common travel area. I am sure all members of the Committee agree that that would be wholly unacceptable.
In addition to the evidence from Professor Ryan, I also welcome the written evidence from the Committee on the Administration of Justice, which notes that the clause is
“designed to remedy the gap for Irish citizens being able to enter and reside in the UK from outside the CTA”.
Dr de Mars, Mr Murray, Professor O’Donoghue and Dr Warwick highlight that the clause will help to clarify and simplify travel rights under the common travel area.
The Government are clear that, as now, Irish citizens should not be subject to immigration control unless they are subject to a deportation or exclusion order, or to an international travel ban. Those exceptions are set out in the Bill, and they reflect current and long-standing practice. I confirm that our approach is to deport Irish citizens only if there are exceptional circumstances, or if a court has recommended deportation in a criminal case.
This is the crux of the matter—the Minister is confirming an approach that appears to be different from the one set out in the clause. Why not just include the Government’s approach to this issue in the Bill?
The hon. Gentleman will be aware that he just lost a Division on that matter, but I am sure we will return to it on Report. He may consider his drafting to be better than that of my Home Office officials, but I must take a contrary view. I confirmed the Government’s approach in response to questions raised on Second Reading, and, as members of the Committee will have noted, once we leave the EU, Irish citizens will be exempt from the automatic deportation provisions for criminality in the UK Borders Act 2007.
The clause amends section 9 of the Immigration Act 1971 so that restrictions placed on those who enter the UK from the CTA by order under that section will not apply to Irish citizens. It also amends schedule 4 to that Act, which deals with the integration of UK law and the immigration law of the islands—Jersey, Guernsey and the Isle of Man. The schedule provides broadly that leave granted or refused in the islands has the same effect as leave granted or refused in the UK. The clause disapplies those provisions in relation to Irish citizens who do not require such leave under the Bill. They also make it lawful for an Irish citizen—unless they are subject to a deportation or exclusion order—to enter the UK from the islands, regardless of their status in them.
The clause aims to support the wider reciprocal rights enjoyed by British and Irish citizens in the other state. Citizens will continue to work, study, access healthcare and social security benefits, and vote in certain elections when they are in the other state. I reiterate that once free movement ends, Irish citizens in the UK will be able to bring family members to the UK on the same basis as British citizens, because they are considered to be settled from day one of their arrival in the UK.
Clause 3 is minor and technical in nature, but it is important for the implementation of the Bill and to ensure that we have a fully functioning statute book. Subsection (1) ensures that the Bill, when enacted, will be covered by any reference to “the Immigration Acts”, which are the Acts of Parliament that govern the UK’s immigration system. They enable, for example, grants of leave to enter and remain, and the deportation of individuals.
References to the Immigration Acts can be found across the statute book. For example, section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 requires that functions conferred by virtue of the Immigration Acts are discharged having regard to the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of children in the UK. Clause 3 will ensure that functions conferred by regulations under the Bill must be discharged according to that duty in relation to the best interests of children. Such a provision is standard for an immigration Bill, and clauses that have the same purpose and effect are included in previous Immigration Acts. For example, section 73 of the Immigration Act 2014 and section 92 of the Immigration Act 2016 both provide that those Acts are included in the definition of Immigration Acts.
Subsection (2) clarifies that the Bill is not retained EU law. That means that it is not part of the body of law that will have been saved in UK law by the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018. It is important to make it clear that the Bill cannot be treated as retained EU law. For example, it cannot be amended by the deficiencies power under section 8 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act or any other powers to deal with retained EU law.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 3 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 4
Consequential etc provision
I beg to move amendment 4, in clause 4, page 2, line 34, leave out “appropriate” and insert “necessary”.
This amendment would ensure that the Secretary of State may only make regulations which are necessary rather than those which the Minister considers appropriate.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 1, in clause 4, page 2, line 34, leave out “, or in connection with,”.
This amendment would narrow the scope of the powers provided to the Secretary of State in Clause 4, as recommended by the House of Lords Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee.
Amendment 11, in clause 4, page 3, line 1, leave out “make provisions applying” and insert
“give leave to enter the United Kingdom”.
Amendment 2, in clause 4, page 3, line 8, leave out subsection (5).
This amendment would narrow the scope of the powers provided to the Secretary of State in Clause 4, as recommended by the House of Lords Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee.
Amendment 3, in clause 4, page 3, line 11, leave out subsection (6).
This amendment would narrow the scope of the powers provided to the Secretary of State in Clause 4, as recommended by the House of Lords Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee.
Amendment 5, in clause 4, page 3, line 17, leave out “other”.
This amendment is consequential on Amendment 3.
Amendment 6, in clause 4, page 3, line 17, leave out from “subsection (1)” to “is” on line 19.
This amendment, along with Amendment 7, will ensure that all regulations made under Clause 4(1) are subject to the affirmative procedure.
Amendment 12, in clause 4, page 3, line 18, leave out
“that amend or repeal any provision of primary legislation (whether alone or with any other provision)”.
This amendment would mean that all regulations made under Clause 4 would be subject to the affirmative procedure.
Amendment 7, in clause 4, page 3, line 21, leave out subsection (8).
This amendment, along with Amendment 6, will ensure that all regulations made under Clause 4(1) are subject to the affirmative procedure.
Amendment 10, in clause 7, page 5, line 44, at end insert—
“(10A) Section 4 and section 7(5) of this Act expire at the end of a period of one year beginning with the day on which this Act is passed.”
This amendment would place a time limit on the Henry VIII powers contained in Clause 4.
It was a little while after my first election in 2015 that I first heard the term “Henry VIII clause,” but I have become very familiar with it since then. The clauses in the Immigration Act 2016 were outrageous enough, but they are small beer compared with the powers the Government have helped themselves to in the European Union (Withdrawal) Act and in this Bill. There is no need to take my word for it; we have ample evidence. The amendments are largely based on submissions from the Law Society of Scotland and the report of the House of Lords Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. I am very grateful to both. It is unusual to have the benefit of the Lords Committee report for a Commons Bill, but it has certainly proved helpful. The Committee said:
“The combination of the subjective test of appropriateness, the words ‘in connection with Part 1’, the subject matter of Part 1 and the large number of persons who will be affected, make this a very significant delegation of power from Parliament to the Executive. The scope of this broad power is expanded even further by subsections (2) to (5).”
If we are serious about our role as legislators and about separating the Executive from the legislature, we must start putting our foot down and reining in these clauses. Otherwise, what on earth are we here for?
We can start that process through amendment 4, by replacing the subjective test of appropriateness. Through amendment 1 we can ditch the phrase “in connection with”. The Committee was absolutely scathing here. It said:
“We are frankly disturbed that the Government should consider it appropriate to include the words ‘in connection with’. This would confer permanent powers on Ministers to make whatever legislation they considered appropriate, provided there was at least some connection with Part 1, however tenuous; and to do so by negative procedure regulations (assuming no amendment was made to primary legislation)”.
Amendment 2 is also from the House of Lords Committee’s recommendations. It removes clause 4(5). It noted that subsection (5)
“confers broad discretion on Ministers to levy fees or charges on any person seeking leave to enter or remain in the UK who pre-exit would have had free movement rights under EU law”.
It recommended removal
“unless the Government can provide a proper and explicit justification for its inclusion and explain how they intend to use the power”.
That is the challenge for the Minister this morning.
As for the Government’s justifications and the memorandum on delegated powers stating that the powers are needed to protect EEA citizens, it is fair to say that the Committee was not persuaded. It said:
“We believe that transitional arrangements to protect existing legal rights of EEA nationals should appear on the face of the Bill, and not simply left to regulations with no opportunity for parliamentary scrutiny until after they have been made and come into force.”
That is exactly what Opposition MPs have sought to do with other amendments that we will come to later. The consequence of that for the Committee was that there would be no need to use made affirmative procedures set out in clause 4(6). It recommended removal of that subsection, which is what my amendments 3 and 5 seek to do. The very unusual made affirmative procedure means that the regulations are actually in force when they are tabled in the House of Commons before we have even voted on them. Our position is that the more common affirmative procedures should be followed, and instruments should be laid in draft and should not come into force until we examine and approve them—hence amendments 6 and 7.
I conclude with some comments by the Law Society of Scotland. It said:
“The abrogation of parliamentary scrutiny is deeply concerning and the cumulative effect of these provisions is to reduce the role of parliamentary scrutiny of legislation relating to immigration, both EU and non-EU”.
For all these reasons, I hope that the Government will listen carefully and rein in their desires for extensive delegated powers under clause 4.
I wish to speak to amendments 11, 12 and 10. Throughout the Brexit process, the Government have been carrying out a power grab, acquiring powers to amend primary and secondary legislation with little parliamentary scrutiny. The debates on Brexit legislation have shown that there is cross-party support for limiting Henry VIII powers. Back Benchers on both sides of the House recognise that Parliament’s role in making legislation is crucial and must be protected. We accept that there will be aspects of statutory legislation that the Government will need to adjust as a result of ending free movement; we need a functional statute book. However, there must be limits on these powers to ensure that Ministers cannot make significant policy changes, including to primary legislation through statutory instruments.
Currently, scrutiny of secondary legislation is weak. Statutory instruments are unamendable and the Government have a majority on all SI Committees—if the SI even gets a Committee. Those subject to the negative procedure may never even be discussed by parliamentarians, as Adrian Berry said in our evidence session. He said:
“It is true that you have the affirmative resolution procedure, but it is clearly a poor substitute for primary legislation and the scrutiny you get in Select Committees.”—[Official Report, Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Public Bill Committee, 14 February 2019; c. 90, Q221.]
He recommended the Henry VIII powers be radically redrawn. We know that the Government plan a major overhaul of our immigration system for EU and non-EU migrants set out in the White Paper. There is a risk that these powers could be used to bring in that entirely new system. Will the Minister confirm whether the Government would use the powers in the Bill to bring in the new system or if there would be a new immigration Bill? If there will be another Bill, when might it come? Would it be in addition to a withdrawal and implementation Bill, if we get a withdrawal agreement?
Immigration is already an area where the Government have extensive delegated powers. Since 1971, almost all major changes to our immigration system have been made through the immigration rules. We want to move to a situation in which there is more scrutiny of immigration changes, not less.
Labour has many issues with the proposed immigration system, but we broadly believe in the principle that certain major changes should have the chance to be fully discussed and debated before they are introduced. We are being asked to take it on trust that Ministers will not abuse the powers delegated to them in this clause. In the wake of Windrush, we should be particularly sceptical of this Government’s promises. The Windrush scandal was the result of a long period of under-the-radar changes to immigration rules, which chipped away at the rights of Windrush migrants and plunged their status in the UK into uncertainty. In the aftermath of Windrush, we should be particularly attentive to the risks of allowing Ministers the power to amend people’s rights after they have been debated and enshrined in primary legislation.
Clause 4 offers the Government a blank cheque to change our immigration laws and reduces the level of parliamentary scrutiny of immigration legislation. The Labour amendment and the SNP amendments, which we support, do four things.
First, they limit the scope of the powers. As currently drafted, changes to our immigration laws will be only in consequence of or in connection with the withdrawal of EU free movement legislation. We support the SNP’s amendment 1, which would limit the scope here. We support amendment 4, which would allow the Secretary of State to make only changes that are necessary rather than those that the Minister considers appropriate. The House of Lords Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee recommended the amendments because it was disturbed by the use of “in connection with”, as it would confer primary powers on Ministers to make whatever legislation they considered appropriate, provided that there was at least some connection with part 1, however tenuous, and to do so by negative procedure regulations.
Amendment 2 would prevent the Secretary of State making changes to fees and charges. Labour has tabled new clause 38, which states that visa fees should be set at cost price. The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee raised significant concern about subsection (5) as it confers broad discretion on the Minister to levy fees or charges on any person seeking leave to enter or remain in the UK who would have had free movement rights under EU laws pre-exit. Fees are already so high that they are unaffordable. The Home Office makes enormous profits out of visa fees, and it is concerning that the Government are granting themselves the power to increase them even further.
Secondly, these amendments limit the nature of these powers. Amendment 11 in my name would allow Ministers to grant status to a group of EEA nationals but not allow them to remove any such rights without primary legislation. I am grateful to the Immigration Law Practitioners Association for its help in drafting it. We believe this is a vital safeguard and that right to remain should be set in stone, and not subject to amendment or to being removed by secondary legislation.
Thirdly, these amendments improve the scrutiny that changes to immigration rules will be subject to. Clause 4(6) sets out that some immigration rules may be made by the made affirmative procedure, which means that they will be assigned into law before being laid in Parliament. There is then a period of 40 days in which the House must approve them or they will cease to have effect. The House of Lords Committee recommended that this be removed, which is what amendment 3 does. Amendments 12, 13 and 7 will ensure that immigration rules are subject to the affirmative procedure. Labour has tabled new clause 9, which will subject them to super-affirmative procedure. Our immigration rules have an enormous impact on people’s lives, but they often receive very little scrutiny. The made affirmative procedure means that they will receive no scrutiny before coming into effect and that scrutiny will only be retrospective.
Fourthly and finally, amendment 10 will place a time limit on the Henry VIII powers in clause 4. The Government have said that they will review the White Paper proposal for 12 months. The sunset clause should ensure that they can use the Henry VIII powers in clause 4 to make small amendments to the legislation, but that at the point at which they will make bigger changes, the Henry VIII powers will expire.
We have serious concerns about the extent of the delegated powers in clause 4. Our amendments and the amendments tabled by the SNP would go a long way to limit the powers and would ensure that changes to immigration policy are properly scrutinised.
I am grateful to the Minister for her detailed response; she said she would go into the detail and she certainly did not disappoint. The one defence that does not really fly with me is that similar powers have been used in previous immigration Bills. I objected very strongly to some of the powers that appeared in previous immigration Bills, and certainly to those in the immigration Bill before this one. However, she gave useful examples of how the powers will have to be used. We will have to go away, think carefully about what she said and reflect on whether changes are needed.
The amendment about which I was not fully satisfied by the Minister’s answer, and which I still wish to push to a vote, is amendment 1. In my view, tidying up the statute book and putting in place transitional provisions, as the Minister gave as examples, would surely meet the “in consequence” test, and so the very loose “in connection with” test would not be needed. I also agree with the Lords Committee that transitional arrangements should be in the Bill, first to cover a no-deal scenario, secondly because it would be useful for the UK in Europe in such a no-deal scenario when trying to push other Governments around the EU for reciprocal treatment, and finally because the Bill is a much safer place for it to be than in delegated legislation.
I also have some concerns about the response to amendments 3 and 5 on the different types of affirmative procedure. I still find it startling that we are even contemplating, in a no-deal scenario, an end to free movement within a few weeks’ time. I do not think this country is remotely ready for any such prospect at all; a far more sensible option would be to put in place arrangements for free movement to continue even in a no-deal scenario until we are properly ready to make any changes that are agreed upon. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Amendment proposed: 1, in clause 4, page 2, line 34, leave out “, or in connection with,”.—(Stuart C. McDonald.)
This amendment would narrow the scope of the powers provided to the Secretary of State in Clause 4, as recommended by the House of Lords Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee.
Question put, That the amendment be made.