European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Robert Buckland Excerpts

Committee: 7th sitting: House of Commons
Wednesday 13th December 2017 Commons Chamber

[Mr Grieve]

I am entirely supportive of the intention behind this amendment, but being too much of a lawyer, I probably did not sign it because I realised the potential implications—

[The Solicitor General (Robert Buckland)]

indicated assent.

[Mr Grieve]

I see the Solicitor General nodding. However, the fact that it might have legal implications does not mean that it is not a very desirable objective.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Robert Buckland Excerpts

Committee: 3rd sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 21st November 2017 Commons Chamber

[Joanna Cherry]

Indeed I will. The hon. Lady has, in her usual clear and incisive way, anticipated something that I was going to come to in a minute. Perhaps I will deal with it now, before I come to my list. As she says, the protection of fundamental rights is absolutely central to the Good Friday agreement, and has its own section in that agreement. The fact that the Bill will take the charter out of retained law raises concerns in this respect. The Good Friday agreement requires at least an equivalent level of protection of human rights in Ireland and Northern Ireland. If the charter is taken out of domestic law, there will be no such equivalent protection of human rights in Ireland and Northern Ireland, because once the UK withdraws from the EU, Northern Ireland will no longer benefit from the charter’s protections. This could pose significant problems for the Good Friday agreement—[Interruption.] The Solicitor General is shaking his head—

[The Solicitor General (Robert Buckland)]

I am listening with great care to the hon. and learned Lady’s remarks and to the interventions that she has taken. Let us not forget that the Good Friday agreement was written in 1998, and that the charter of fundamental rights appeared in 2007. It is the European convention on human rights that is the key governing principle here, not the charter.

--- Later in debate ---

[Tommy Sheppard (Edinburgh East) (SNP)]

I support those amendments that seek to ensure that the charter of fundamental rights is not exempted when we transfer powers from the EU after Brexit. Like many people I expect, I have received a lot of correspondence from constituents, and I wanted to start by reading from one—because time is short I will just read the last section of a letter from one of my constituents, Andrew Connarty:

“I feel that the EU and its legislative and judicial bodies protect me as a citizen and have a process of checks in place to protect my human rights, my legal rights and provide me with security. A lot of conversation in the media covers the rights of EU citizens in the UK who are foreign nationals, but what about the rights of EU citizens in the UK who are British nationals?”

Andrew Connarty is one of the great number of people in this country who are fearful of what is about to happen. For them, the process of leaving the EU is not some great liberation or removal of an alien superstate that oppresses them and over-regulates them. They see this as a loss of something of themselves; they see themselves as being diminished and lessened by this process.

Some on the Government Benches will say, “Well, that view does exist, but it is the view of a small liberal elite”. Indeed, a Member earlier tried to taunt a colleague by suggesting that the vote for remain in her constituency could not possibly have been motivated by concern about the charter of fundamental rights. I accept that the great mass of people are probably completely unaware of what particular rights we are talking about, but that does not mean they are unconcerned about them. Joni Mitchell probably summed it up best with the line,

“you don’t know what you’ve got

‘Till it’s gone.”

The reason is that by their very nature political rights do not put obligations on the rights holder—they do not have to be defended and claimed every day; they put obligations on everyone else. We all have to respect the rights of others. In particular, private corporations and public institutions have to respect the rights of others. It is not until they are changed and that relationship alters that people understand that something has been taken away from them. That is why it is absolutely vital that we educate people about the process now happening.

There was some debate about whether the rights in the charter are substantial at all, about whether they mean very much and about whether they are covered elsewhere in legislation. In 2006, this Parliament established the Equality and Human Rights Commission to advise us on such matters. I have read its briefing—I suspect most have—in which it cites clear examples of articles in the charter that are not replicated in other forms of legislation and states that, if the charter is not transferred or incorporated into British law, these rights will be lost. They include—I will not read them all: article 22 on child labour; article 8 on the right to be forgotten on the internet; article 26 on independence for disabled people; and article 24 on the access of children to both parents. These are rights that we have now that we will not have if the charter does not come over post Brexit.

It is not necessary to lose these rights in order to achieve Brexit. I say to the Brexiteers: I am not one of you but you can have Brexit without losing these rights. It is entirely possible. We do not need to do this, so why are we discussing it at all? The Minister said earlier that it makes no sense to have the charter if we are not a member of the EU, because it refers to the EU, yet the entire canon of European law is being taken over and incorporated into British statute, and this charter goes along with it to give citizens rights in respect of it. It makes total sense, therefore, to bring the charter over in the process of repatriating these powers.

There has been talk that it would be silly to bring the charter over because it would create anomalies and inconsistencies with other parts of the Bill, but the Bill already recognises that there are a million anomalies in the process and makes provisions to deal with them. We wonder, then, what is so special about the charter that it cannot happen there, too. Leaving that to one side, however, the most telling argument, as colleagues have said throughout the last six hours, is surely that it is operational at the minute. Why is our legal system not grinding to a halt under the pressure of these contradictions if they are so great? The truth is they are not so great. It works at the minute, and there is no reason it could not continue to work beyond 2019.

In the absence of a rational argument for the retention of clause 5 and schedule 1, I am compelled to find myself reaching the same conclusion as the right hon. and learned Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke): what is happening here is pure politics. There are those on the other side who will be satisfied by being thrown this bone, and, as the right hon. and learned Gentleman put it himself, the idea of being able to get rid of a provision that includes both the word “Europe” and the word “rights” creates a double salivation, but I do not think that it just about sating those who are so Europhobic that they will get pleasure from this; I think there is something else going on as well.

The hon. Member for Eddisbury (Antoinette Sandbach), who is no longer in the Chamber, said earlier that the Government did not intend to remove or weaken our human rights, and I take that at face value. The Government have certainly not come here and said that that is their intention. In fact, no Members—or almost none—have said today that they want to remove people’s human rights, to weaken protection at work, or to lessen consumer protection laws in this country, although I rather fear that the hon. Member for Gainsborough (Sir Edward Leigh) nearly let the cat out of the bag when he referred to “the wrong people” having rights in the charter.

The hon. Gentleman talked about the repatriation of powers so that he could have “real human rights” in this country. I dread to think what he means by “real human rights”. I find him an honourable fellow and I am sure that he means no malintent, but I know that there are plenty of people in our society and in our community who will take advantage of any roll-back of civil and human rights protection to ensure that our religious and political freedoms are constrained so that they can adhere to theirs. I think we need to be eternally vigilant, and I hope very much that the Government will feel able to think again.

I say this to those in the centre ground of the Tory party: “If you are just trying to keep the good ship together and keep every faction on board, and if you think that by giving this concession on human rights you will shore up the Government’s support, remember that your former leader David Cameron thought he would be able to do that by having a Brexit referendum in the first place, and look how that has worked out.” I sincerely say to them, “Once bitten, twice shy. Please think again.”

[The Solicitor General]

It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Edinburgh East (Tommy Sheppard). Let me take this opportunity to assure him yet again that our commitment to rights and freedoms remains absolute. I spent nearly 20 years at the criminal Bar dealing with the liberty of the individual. Indeed, I think I was a human rights lawyer before we even coined the phrase, as were many other Members on both sides of the House.

The point has already been made that our rights and freedoms long pre-date modern developments, but modern developments have no doubt helped to sustain, improve and enhance the range of those freedoms. The fundamental question that we seek to ask about the charter is whether, in the final analysis—as we are no longer to be members of the European Union—it adds anything relevant or material to the sophisticated and developing body of law that has evolved over generations. I do not think so, and I have reached that conclusion after extremely careful thought.

It is tempting, after a long debate, to try and treat this as a Second Reading wind-up, but we are far from that. Other Members are anxious to take part, and I am mindful of the time. I will therefore be true to the principles of debate in Committee, and deal with schedule 1, which I hope will be agreed to. In doing so, however, I will address the various amendments that have been tabled on pages 8 to 12 of the amendment paper—which is still the same size although we are now on day three of the Committee stage, and I am pretty confident that that will remain the case.

[Mr Kenneth Clarke]

Before my hon. and learned Friend moves on—very authoritatively, I am sure—to the details of the amendments, may I point out that he has just made an important statement? He said that he had thought about whether retaining the charter of fundamental rights after we had left would add anything to our legal rights in this country beyond what we already have. In the past half hour, we have heard my hon. Friend the Member for Eddisbury (Antoinette Sandbach) describe what she calls the third category of rights, which do not appear anywhere else in our law, and we have just heard the hon. Member for Edinburgh East (Tommy Sheppard) list three or four rights in the charter that are not replicated anywhere else. Which of those rights would the Solicitor General be happy to see abandoned? What is going to happen to the third category of rights? He must explain why he does not think the charter adds anything, given that the main reason people are trying to get rid of it is that it has extended the scope of European-sponsored human rights law in this country.

[The Solicitor General]

As the Minister of State, Ministry of Justice, my hon. Friend the Member for Esher and Walton (Dominic Raab) has mentioned, the Government will, on 5 December, publish their full analysis of the sources of the rights that we have been talking about. I remind my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke) that the underlying principles of EU law from which the charter has been developed will be part of the body of law that we bring down to the UK, and will be able to be relied upon.

[Mr Cox]

Is not the answer to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr Clarke) that the rights might not be replicated in our existing law but the protections will be? The fact that a general statement of a right is not replicated verbatim in our law does not mean that those rights are not otherwise protected adequately and fully by our laws.

[The Solicitor General]

I am grateful to my hon. and learned Friend, but I feel as though I am about to become a proxy in a debate between him and my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe, so I will now develop my point.

[Lady Hermon]

Will the Minister give way?

[The Solicitor General]

If I may, I will move on to amendment 10, which would remove paragraphs 1 to 3 from schedule 1. My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) earlier drew the attention of the Committee to these important matters, and I am grateful to him for the constructive way in which he has sought to approach this issue. First, we cannot agree to the removal of paragraph 1 because the effect would be to create huge uncertainty. How would our domestic courts approach the task of assessing challenges to the validity of converted law? That is a job that they have never had before. Who would defend those challenges? What remedies would be available to the courts? How could converted law that was found to be invalid be replaced? The amendment does not deal with any of those vital questions.

Similarly, we cannot accept that paragraph 2 should be removed from the schedule. There is no single definitive list of the general principles. They are discovered and developed by the Court of Justice of the European Union. Paragraph 2 in its current form maximises certainty by specifying a clear cut-off point and stating that a general principle needs to have been recognised by the Court before we exit. Without that, it would be completely unclear which general principles could be used as the basis for a challenge. It is not even clear whether post-exit CJEU jurisprudence could be taken into account, and so whether new principles couldbe discovered after exit. That would be completely inappropriate.

[Mr Grieve]

I would like gently to point out that I did not propose deleting the interpretation provision 5(2). Admittedly, it does not interpret anything because the rest is gone, but it nevertheless made it pretty clear that we were talking about retained EU law and that such law was created prior to the date of our exit.

[The Solicitor General]

I think that my right hon. and learned Friend has answered his own point. Without sub-paragraph (2), paragraph 5(2) becomes rather difficult to apply. I want to get to the nub of his concern, however, which is paragraph 3 of the schedule. We recognise the strength of the views that he and other Members on both sides of the Committee have expressed on this issue, many of whom have spoken this afternoon. We are listening, and we are prepared to look again at this issue to ensure that we are taking an approach that can command the support of the Committee.

Simply removing paragraph 3 in its entirety, however, is not something that we could agree to. It would result in an open-ended right of challenge based on the general principles of EU law, however they are defined, after exit. It would mean that domestic legislation, both secondary and primary, rules of law and executive action could be disapplied or quashed if found to be incompatible with those actions. Currently, the general principles apply when a member state is

“acting within the scope of EU law”,

so after exit the circumstances in which the general principles could be relied upon would not be clear.

Allowing courts to overturn Acts of Parliament, outside the context of EU law, on the basis of incompatibility with these principles would be alien to our legal system and would offend against parliamentary sovereignty.

[Mr Grieve]

My hon. and learned Friend raised the question of scope and when this would apply, but it seems to me that he was answering his own question, because it comes when there is a clash between the law that has been retained and has supremacy and any domestic legislation. It is precisely because the supremacy of the retained EU law is kept that it is necessary also to have the potential for the general principles to have that supremacy as well, because they are essential to the purpose of interpretation of that law.

[The Solicitor General]

I wanted to deal with the issue in this way, because it seems to me that the nub of the issue that my right hon. and learned Friend is concerned about is with regard to the rights of challenge relating to pre-exit causes of action. It would be possible to retain those, and in relation to executive action even after exit in areas covered by retained EU law. We can agree that there should be appropriate mechanisms for challenging the actions of the Executive. I am happy to discuss further with him what might be needed. I am also willing to discuss whether there needs to be some further route of challenge on secondary legislation.

The rights landscape is indeed complex, and we are seeking with this Bill to maximise and not remove any substantive rights that UK citizens currently enjoy. In view of my commitment to look at this again, I invite my right hon. and learned Friend not to press amendment 10 and to agree to work with us in this shared endeavour. The Government will bring forward our own amendments on Report for the purposes of clarifying paragraph 3 of schedule 1.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

I am grateful to my hon. and learned Friend, who has just said some of the words that many of us hoped to hear, which is that Government amendments to that effect will come forward on Report. Will that include an appropriate amendment to paragraph 3(1) on the private rights of action?

[The Solicitor General]

Let me turn to paragraph 3(1) of schedule 1 to be absolutely clear. I am interested in looking at all aspects of that provision: sub-paragraphs (1) and (2).

[Mr Grieve]

I am most grateful to my hon. and learned Friend, who has made a really important concession at the Dispatch Box, which I much appreciate. It clearly reflects the disquiet that has been shown across the House. I can tell him now that, in the light of that, I will not be pressing my amendment to a vote. However, it is clear from what he has said that although some of the issues that I have raised have been met, I ought to put it on record that it is also clear that the issue about whether this could be used to disapply primary legislation appears to remain an area of potential disagreement between us, which I hope we may be able to iron out. I have to say that it is a strange area of disagreement, given that elsewhere we have precisely the possibility of that happening, by virtue of keeping the supremacy of retained EU law.

[The Solicitor General]

As I have said, I want to ensure that the dialogue that has been opened continues. My right hon. and learned Friend knows that at all times the spirit with which he and other hon. Members have tabled amendments has been entirely understood and respected by those on the Treasury Bench. We have never sought to pillory Members for doing the job of scrutinising legislation. I have been there myself many times and can remember tabling dozens of amendments in order to probe the Government’s intentions in a Bill.

[Mr Kenneth Clarke]

We are making some progress, but I point out that I am the second name on the amendments tabled by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), and I shall inquire of the Chair between now and the end of the debate whether I have a right to call for a vote on those amendments, which I think I may have. I am extremely glad to hear the Solicitor General say that he will bring forward a Government amendment, because he has vigorously rejected just about every argument that my right hon. and learned Friend has used throughout the debate and has stuck rigidly to the interpretation of the Bill as it stands—with which we started. Will the Government’s amendment at least seek a compromise if it does not move completely towards my right hon. and learned Friend’s arguments? It is no good fobbing us off with more discussion if the amendment will not actually change the policy.

[The Solicitor General]

With respect to my right hon. and learned Friend, I have talked in detail about the various paragraphs of schedule 1, and I have been looking in particular at paragraph 3. In response to the clarifications sought by my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Sir Oliver Letwin), I made sure that all of paragraph 3 would be the subject of that clarification and the tabling of an amendment. Neither my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe nor I are fans of having our cake and eating it when it comes to EU withdrawal and, with respect, I am offering something substantial here that will certainly satisfy him this evening.

[Sir William Cash]

rose—

[Lady Hermon]

rose—

[The Solicitor General]

I will give way to my hon. Friend.

[Sir William Cash]

I hope that the Solicitor General will be good enough to look at the deficiencies in amendment 10. Paragraph 5 of schedule 1 deals with interpretation and therefore also applies to paragraphs 1 to 3. As he quite rightly said before he took the intervention, the matter is being scrutinised. As Chairman of the European Scrutiny Committee, we have it on our agenda, and we are scrutinising all such matters and will continue to do so, because we want to be sure that this House is not overridden by disapplication.

[The Solicitor General]

I am grateful to my hon. Friend. I am always interested in looking at how one particular paragraph of a schedule applies to another, but I am particularly interested in paragraph 3.

[Lady Hermon]

rose—

[The Solicitor General]

I will give way to the hon. Lady, who has been very tenacious. Please forgive me.

[Lady Hermon]

Patience is a virtue, and I am not blessed with an abundance of it, so I am grateful to the Solicitor General for taking my intervention, even if I have been bobbing up and down for ages.

The Solicitor General has made an important concession this evening, and I respect that. When he carries out his promised review of the Bill’s impact on rights and the general principles, may I invite him to look carefully at the impact on the Good Friday agreement? The Bill is being used in a divisive manner at home in Northern Ireland, where it is being exploited by those who wish to do so, so it would be enormously helpful if the Solicitor General could reassure us that the Bill will not have a negative impact on the Good Friday agreement.

[The Solicitor General]

I know that the hon. Lady has a deep, long-term commitment to ensuring that the Good Friday agreement and the subsequent progress are maintained, and I share that commitment 100%. While I may not have the same knowledge that she has of Northern Ireland, I am sensitive to and understand the fact that there is still no essential consensus about what human rights should mean for every corner of Northern Ireland. It is in that spirit that I will be happy to ensure that the impacts on Northern Ireland are fully considered at all stages of any review, re-examination or clarification of the Bill. I am grateful to her for making that observation.

[Joanna Cherry]

Will the Solicitor General give way?

[The Solicitor General]

I had better make some progress, but I certainly will give way to the hon. and learned Lady in a moment.

[Paul Blomfield]

Will the Solicitor General give way?

[The Solicitor General]

If the intervention relates to the point I was making, I will give way.

[Paul Blomfield]

I thank the Solicitor General for giving way. It is important that the House has clarity on the content of the memorandum he proposes to publish on 5 December. He has said that the memorandum will seek to identify the sources of each right contained within the charter. He has heard in today’s debate that there is concern on both sides of the House that he will not be able to identify the sources of every single one of those rights, and a number of instances have been cited. Will he also undertake that, where there are gaps, his review will outline what action the Government are preparing to take to fill those gaps so that, at the point of exit, we retain all the existing rights?

[The Solicitor General]

I make it clear that, in the words of both the Minister of State, Ministry of Justice, my hon. Friend the Member for Esher and Walton, today and, previously, the Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union, we are seeking to publish such details. If there are any further concerns, we can have a continuing dialogue to ensure that the information is in a comprehensive form that seeks to address the issues raised today and elsewhere. The publication on 5 December will therefore be a meaningful event that assists everybody in greater understanding and assists greater progress on getting this process right.

On the question of general principles, I emphasise that there are good reasons to say why it would not be appropriate to incorporate the constitutional and administrative principles of the EU as free-standing principles in our law by inserting a specific right of action, or to incorporate the remedy of striking down domestic legislation based on incompatibility with EU law principles, when we are no longer a member of that institution. First, some of these principles will, indeed, cease to make sense when we have left, except for the purpose of interpreting retained EU law, whereas other principles are already, and will continue to be, reflected elsewhere in our domestic law anyway.

[Mr Grieve]

Has not the Solicitor General, again, just answered his own question? I appreciate that some of the general principles will evaporate because they cease to be relevant, but those that are relevant to the interpretation of retained EU law must still be relevant because they will be used as a tool and aid to interpretation. In those circumstances, why should an individual or a business be deprived of raising them as arguments for saying that, in fact, this law is supposed to be supreme, and therefore able to overcome our own domestic legislation, and ask why the general principles cannot be used to have that bit of offending domestic legislation set aside? I just do not understand the rationale.

[The Solicitor General]

The rationale is quite straightforward in the sense that, in seeking to achieve maximum certainty, there is danger in allowing the system to create a situation in which the law might rapidly degrade in a way that does not achieve such stability and certainty. I accept it is almost reverse logic, but there is logic in trying to make sure that we have an identifiable and pretty understandable body of retained EU law.

I give the example of the EU principle of good administration, which will not have any relevance to our UK law after exit because, of course, the bodies vested in EU agencies will be returned here and all the normal domestic rules about the exercise of such powers by public bodies will apply. Another example is the principle of subsidiarity, which does not make sense outside the concept of EU membership.

Secondly, the Bill will, of course, take a snapshot of the law as it stands at the moment we leave. Retaining a right of action based on general principles of EU law, which will of course change in the future, would lead to uncertainty for businesses and individuals about their rights and obligations if we end up in a situation where pre-exit legislation could be struck down, or where administrative decisions could be challenged, on the basis of those principles.

In other words, that is an echo of what I was just saying to my right hon. and learned Friend. This is particularly the case given the uncertainty about the way in which principles could develop or about the circumstances in which they would apply after exit. It would make no sense to bind ourselves to such an imprecise, open-ended and uncertain set of principles—it does not mitigate legal uncertainty, but increases it. It makes no sense, once we are no longer an EU member state, to bind ourselves to a set of principles that are the EU’s judge-made constitutional principles, when we have our own constitutional and common-law principles. Such an approach risks duplication and confusion.

Perhaps more fundamentally, outside the context of EU law, the ability for courts to disapply primary legislation is just inconsistent with the way our constitution works and the balance of powers that has to exist between the legislative and judicial branches.

[Vicky Ford]

I thank the Solicitor General for saying that he is going to look seriously at these points during the Committee stage. The point of bringing EU law into the UK law is to give certainty. Each of those European regulations has strict articles—the letter of the law—and the recitals, which give guidance as to how it is to be interpreted and implemented. Will he assure me that he will seek to ensure that our judges will look at not only the articles, but the recitals—the principles behind it?

[The Solicitor General]

I can assure my hon. Friend that that will be the case. We had a debate about this in a slightly different context earlier in Committee, but I can assure her that all that material is relevant for any court that might have to interpret it.

[Joanna Cherry]

I am just reminding the Solicitor General that I asked him to answer a crucial point earlier relating to the statement made by the Prime Minister’s spokesperson that the Government expect the ECJ’s role to be unchanged during an implementation period of two years following the official Brexit date in March 2019. If that is so, it completely undermines the premise of clause 5 and schedule 1, which revolve around exit day. Is he seriously still considering allowing these clauses to stand part of the Bill, in the light of what was said this morning?

[The Solicitor General]

The hon. and learned Lady has a keen memory and she will not have forgotten the Government’s commitment to a separate withdrawal agreement Bill, within which will be provisions relating to the implementation, the interim, the transition period— call it what you will. It is to that period that the Prime Minister was addressing her remarks. The fact that this Bill is taking a particular course on legal exit is nothing to do with the transition period, which has to be a separate matter, and the Government have rightly made it clear that they will bring legislation to this House in order for it to determine the law when it comes to the transitional period.

I really must press on now. The right hon. Member for East Ham (Stephen Timms) made the most important reference to the data protection amendment that stands in his name, but the hon. Member for Argyll and Bute (Brendan O'Hara) also spoke well about this. Let me just make these observations: the UK does not have to be subject to the charter in order to benefit from adequacy decisions on data protection once we leave the EU, because the charter applies to EU institutions and EU member states when acting within the scope of EU law. Countries that benefit from adequacy are third countries and are not required to be subject to the charter. There are many examples of countries that have adequacy by virtue of the data protection directive of 1995, including Canada, New Zealand, Switzerland, Uruguay, Argentina and the Faroe Islands.

I must also deal briefly with the further effects of amendments 101 and 336, which specifically seek to set out an ostensibly broader definition of which general principles are to be retained under the Bill to include principles as they are recognised in any EU legislation as well as case law.

[Anna Soubry]

rose—

--- Later in debate ---

[The Solicitor General]

I am sorry but I must press on.

The first point to make on the amendments is that whereas some of the general principles are now set out expressly in the EU treaties, the general principles were first recognised by the European Court of Justice. They were and are judge-made law, and all the principles ultimately have a basis in case law.

We debated the inclusion of article 191 of the Lisbon treaty on the functioning of the European Union at length on day two of Committee, so I will not repeat those arguments here. That said, though, I wish to re-state that the inclusion of article 191 would risk going further than the existing principles that are set out in EU and UK law today. The requirements that the amendments set out do not exist today in either EU or domestic law. If the amendments were made, they would require the courts to interpret all legislation compatibly with the environmental principles. Given that the Bill’s purpose is to bring into effect the law that we have currently, the amendments regrettably risk generating a measure of uncertainty and a degree of confusion about the legal position.

[Anna Soubry]

May I return to clause 5(1)? It states:

“The principle of the supremacy of EU law does not apply to any enactment or rule of law passed or made on or after exit day.”

Will the Solicitor General please look at that in light of the Government’s excellent determination that we will still effectively be subject to the ECJ during the beginning of the transition period, because if that is to be the case, it is not consistent with clause 5(1)?

[The Solicitor General]

I know that my right hon. Friend listens carefully to everything I say, and I am sure she would agree, first, that the transition period rightly has to be the subject of separate legislation—the Bill on the withdrawal agreement that will come before the House in due course—and secondly, that we have to cater in this Bill for as high a degree of certainty as possible for that legal exit date. That certainty is an important first step before we get into the question of transition—that interim period that I accept needs to be underpinned by primary legislation passed by this House, but which is a separate and distinct stage. I do not think there is any contradiction between the position that we want to take in a transition period—subject, of course, to the negotiation—and the clear position that we want to take in the Bill.

Before that intervention, I was dealing with amendments 101 and 336. Amendment 336 goes further, in that it would give a right of action based on a failure to comply with the environmental principles, and legislation would be at risk of being struck down by the courts if it was not compatible with them. I hope that Members were reassured and encouraged by the announcement by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs on 12 November of our intention to create a new comprehensive policy statement setting out the environmental principles. That statement will draw on the EU’s current principles and will of course underpin future policy making.

The Bill takes the right approach by retaining the principles as they have been recognised by the European Court, thereby providing the greatest possible clarity and certainty. Amendment 336 would alter the approach to the taking of that snapshot of EU law as it applies immediately before exit day. It effectively prejudges the outcome of the negotiations and introduces inflexibility, by seeking to bind us to decisions made by the European Court on general principles for the full duration of any implementation period. That pre-empts and prejudices the outcome of the negotiations. On that basis, I urge right hon. and hon. Members not to press their amendments.

Paragraph 4 of schedule 1 removes the right to what are commonly referred to as Francovich damages from our domestic law after exit. That form of damages is a specific EU-law remedy that arises only in certain limited circumstances when an EU member state, or an arm of that state, has committed a “sufficiently serious” breach of its EU law obligations and there is a direct causal link between the breach and the damage. This is not a wide-ranging general right to sue the Government; rather, it is inextricably linked to and constrained by EU membership. Nor, as some have suggested, is this an everyday course of action for the average citizen. The number of actual Francovich cases heard by UK courts over the past 26 years is relatively low. Estimates vary, but studies suggest that, in the 20 years following the decision in Francovich, there had only been between 22 and 25 cases.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Grieve]

Will my hon. and learned Friend give way?

[The Solicitor General]

No, I will not give way, as I need to develop my point.

For example, in 2015, in their legal challenges to the domestic legislation standardising the packaging of tobacco products, the tobacco companies reserved their right to claim Francovich damages should they succeed on the substance of their claims against the Government. I make this point because any suggestion that removing the Francovich procedure reduces access to justice for the average citizen is not reflected in the UK experience.

[Mr Grieve]

I am very grateful to my hon. and learned Friend. I understand everything that he is saying. He knows what I have said about Francovich damages and their disappearance being inevitable, but the point about the transition is key. I have to say to him that it is not a comfortable argument for a Law Officer of the Crown to make to suggest that just one person, or one business, being deprived of a legal right is an acceptable circumstance, because it plainly is not.

[The Solicitor General]

I did not say that. If that was the impression that was created, I am afraid that my right hon. and learned Friend is mistaken. What I am talking about is trying to balance out and put into context the use of this particular procedure, which needs to be done because we have not heard the other side of the argument. That is what I am seeking to do.

By contrast, all existing domestic law routes of challenge and remedies for breaches of retained EU law will remain undisturbed. For example, this provision does not affect any specific statutory rights to claim damages in respect of breaches of retained EU law—such as under the Public Contracts Regulations 2015—or the case law which applies to the interpretation of any such provisions. Nor does it affect the right to challenge the decisions of public bodies by way of judicial review. Claimants will also still be able to seek remedies through the law of tort, by establishing negligence or by a breach of statutory duty, and they will also still be able to make a claim for restitution for unlawfully levied tax or charges.

The existing right to Francovich damages is linked to EU membership and the obligations that we have as a member state to the EU at an international level. There is clearly a difference between substantive EU law, which is being kept by the Bill to prevent legal uncertainty, and the supranational procedural rules, principles and frameworks that will no longer be appropriate once we have left the EU.

Let me turn briefly to amendments 139 and 302, which take a slightly different approach. They would maintain the right to Francovich damages in domestic law, but only in relation to pre-exit causes of action. Amendment 335 would similarly maintain the right to Francovich damages in domestic law for causes of action occurring during any transitional period. The Bill sets out elsewhere—at paragraph 27 of schedule 8—that the exclusion of the right to Francovich damages would apply only in relation to claims that are brought after exit day.

I would like to assure my right hon. Friend the Member for Chesham and Amersham (Mrs Gillan), and indeed all Members, that we will consider further whether any additional specific and more detailed transitional arrangements should be set out in regulations.

[Mr Grieve]

I am delighted to hear the Solicitor General say that. As he will appreciate, the point is a very simple one: it must be the case that the damages are available if the action takes place before exit day. It is a very basic principle of law and quite easy to correct.

[The Solicitor General]

Perhaps I can forgive my right hon. and learned Friend his eagerness to hear the remarks that I was going to make. I am sure that when this debate finishes he and I will continue the dialogue that we have had for some time about these matters.

It would not be right to maintain, in general, such an open-ended right to this form of damages after exit for any and all potential pre-exit causes of action. I am concerned that we would end up with an almost indefinite trail of cases. That is not good for certainty, and it is not good for the transition we want to make.

[Richard Graham (Gloucester) (Con)]

Before the Solicitor General finishes his remarks, may I say, as a non-lawyer listening to what has largely been a debate between distinguished legal minds on both sides of the House, that two things strike me as important? The first is that this debate has really been about legislative quality control, rather than political Punch and Judy, and that should be very reassuring for anybody watching this debate. The second is that the tone with which my hon. and learned Friend and his colleagues have engaged with colleagues on both sides of the House to find a way through and to make the best law sends a fantastically powerful message. Will he guarantee to continue working in this spirit to take the Bill forward?

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[The Solicitor General]

I am very grateful to my hon. Friend for making that observation. [Interruption.] I can assure Opposition Members that I have listened carefully to the submissions and observations by Members on both sides of the House, in the true spirit of Committee.

[Mrs Cheryl Gillan (Chesham and Amersham) (Con)]

I am most grateful to my hon. and learned Friend for giving way, because, unfortunately, I was not able to be in the Chamber for a large part of the debate, as I was chairing a Bill Committee. I thank him for taking into consideration the points I raised on behalf of my constituent concerning Francovich. I hope that what he is a saying from the Dispatch Box will go a long way towards providing the comfort and certainty my constituent requires. May I thank those on the Front Bench for listening to the points I made in the debate the other day? I hope this will move us towards a successful conclusion in the case of my constituent.

[The Solicitor General]

I am extremely grateful to my right hon. Friend.

For the reasons I have outlined, I would, with the greatest of respect, and in the spirit of comradeship almost, urge hon. and right hon. Members not to press their amendments.

In summation, we have listened and we will continue to reflect carefully on all the arguments that have been made today. The Government believe that the approach we are taking is the right one as we carefully separate our legal system from that of the EU and restore democratic control to this Parliament. I commend schedule 1 to the Committee.

[Darren Jones]

I rise to speak in support of amendments 8, 46 and 79, the excellent amendments 101 and 105 from my hon. Friend the Member for Bristol East (Kerry McCarthy), amendment 151 and, given the list rattled off by my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield Central (Paul Blomfield), a whole lot more as well.

While I have enjoyed the opportunity today to intervene on the legal debates the hon. Member for Gloucester (Richard Graham) pointed to, it is also important, as we come towards the end of today’s debate, to think about general principles—to take a step back and to think about the politics of what we are debating today, as opposed to just the legal issues, which I may touch on briefly.

The EU charter of fundamental rights is exactly what it says on the tin: it is a statement of fundamental principles—an anchor—with which European legislation must comply. It protects the grounding of what we deem to be acceptable in our democracy. Legislative details are, of course, for debate, but we must anchor them to those fundamental rights because, as we have heard today, failure to do that can lead to actions in the courts and the awarding of damages.

The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice, who is not in his place, said from the Dispatch Box earlier that the EU charter has no standing and therefore means nothing, but I respectfully disagree. When my constituents have the right to bring actions in the courts, and in certain circumstances to receive damages, that has value—that means something to citizens. Those are fundamental, enforceable rights, which we should be proud of.

It is right to say, of course, that the UK need only respect these rights when implementing EU law, but, as we know too well, and as we will learn over the coming weeks and months, the tsunami of EU law that we seek to copy and paste into UK law comes with principles we must protect.

My earlier intervention provides one example of why the Government’s policy is nonsensical. The fact that we are bringing ECJ case law into UK Supreme Court case law under the Bill means that the case law around the charter of fundamental rights will be in the case law of this country, yet we are not willing to bring the charter with it. That cannot make sense unless the Government are saying that they wish to pick the cases out of ECJ jurisprudence when they give them UK Supreme Court status.

My right hon. Friend the Member for East Ham (Stephen Timms) raised very powerfully the issue of adequacy and equivalence in relation to the Data Protection Bill. The Government may find it politically uncomfortable to recognise the obvious fact that on financial services, data protection and other issues where we seek to maintain equivalence in the European market, we must track and embed EU jurisprudence in order to do so. In the context of the general data protection regulation and the Data Protection Bill, that means respecting the fundamental right that one’s data is protected under the EU charter.

In the absence of those on the Treasury Bench saying to me and to the Committee which of these rights they so vehemently disagree with, I am left to draw the conclusion, in common with the Father of the House, that the only thing the Government seem to be unhappy with about the charter of fundamental rights is that is preceded by the letters E and U. Yet my constituents will suffer losses in rights and losses in their ability to enforce those rights. This is not a question of ideological Brexit party politics but of fundamental rights that are enforceable by my constituents and the citizens of this country. We cannot play politics with these issues. If we fail to keep the charter of fundamental rights, we fail to ensure that the laws brought in under this Bill are anchored to the fundamental principles on which they are drafted. As we have heard, that leaves judges to interpret the rights of citizens in the direction of the winds of the day without the statutory anchor that holds them true to their underlying principles.

Having touched on legal issues, I will move on to the general principles. If we lift our heads out of the bucket of sand that is Brexit and look around us, we must ask what repealing the charter of fundamental rights says about the type of country we are and wish to be. One of the outcomes of this Brexit process is that with the removal of the charter we have failed to set out a vision of an acceptable basis for a developed, modern democracy like Britain. That is why I support the amendments. I sense that we have lost our way, because removing these fundamental rights says something about who we are and how we should conduct business as a country. The pride that all of us share in what it means to be British and our influence in the world is based on the standards that we set at home and abroad. The purpose of having the EU charter of fundamental rights is to make a statement of the standards that we should be proud of as a developed, modern democracy. I, for one, want to continue to be proud of my country.

Speaking as a desperate remoaner, and a proud one, I have to say loud and clear that the direction of travel that we are seeing through this mess of a negotiation on Brexit, and the fact that we are debating something as nonsensical as removing the EU charter when it causes us no problems and we are bringing ECJ case law into the case law of the UK anyway, shows that we do not know what type of country we want to deliver for our citizens. In the context of losing thousands of jobs from agencies relocating and, for the first time ever, losing our seat on the UN International Court of Justice, I am filled with desperation about what type of country we are seeking to deliver.

I do not see from this Government a vision of what Britain looks like in future, and removing these fundamental rights goes to the heart of that. I want my constituents and the citizens of this country, and citizens around the world, to look to Britain to see that we protect and recognise these fundamental rights—rights that we should be proud of. I think that as Brexit continues to unfold and my constituents, and others, continue to see the losses they are suffering as a consequence of the referendum —the loss of access to the single market, the loss of access to the customs union, and today the loss of rights that are currently protected in law—they deserve the right to change their mind.

I say once again to Government Members on the Treasury Bench, who are no doubt listening intently to my comments—[Laughter.] Thank you. I say to them that this is clearly a question of politics, rather than of law, as we have heard today. I plead with them to put the ideological Brexit party politics to one side, bring sense to the Dispatch Box and protect the enforceable rights of my constituents and the citizens of this country, as proudly set out in the EU charter of fundamental rights.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Robert Buckland Excerpts

Committee: 1st sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 14th November 2017 Commons Chamber

[The Solicitor General (Robert Buckland)]

I am listening with great care to the hon. and learned Lady. She will agree that references to the Court of Justice are made by the courts to interpret a particular provision of EU law, not by individuals. That is an important difference that I am sure she will appreciate.

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[Robert Neill]

That is absolutely right, and it is critical. With respect to the Minister of State, that is why I do not think the financial services sector will take much comfort from his rather high-level dismissal of these proposals earlier.

Let me just say what these two amendments, in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Wimbledon (Stephen Hammond), seek to do. They seek to give a general interpretive tool to assist the transposition process. We all accept that that has to happen in that domestication into the statute book. They would interfere with the powers to make regulations conferred by clause 7, but they would reduce the need for regulations. I should have thought that it was preferable not to have to operate by regulation if we could avoid it. If we have a known and established interpretive code, that will save the need to make lots of regulations under clause 7. However, it would also, as the Minister rightly observed, provide a backstop, and that would deal with gaps that are identified but that are not picked up in the transposition process. That is what subsections (A1) and (A2) of amendment 357 would achieve.

These changes draw on rules of interpretation that, as I indicated in my intervention earlier, were proposed by the International Regulatory Strategy Group. That body is co-sponsored by the City of London corporation and TheCityUK, and I am indebted to the Remembrancer’s Office of the City of London corporation for the drafting of these amendments—it takes the credit for the ingenuity.

[The Solicitor General]

I absolutely take the spirit in which these amendments are made, and I am grateful to the Remembrancer’s Office, but does my hon. Friend not agree that we need to be cautious? He thinks that this general interpretive approach will, of itself, amend deficiencies, but does the fact not remain that we would still have to amend deficiencies in legislation, even with these otherwise helpful-looking provisions?

[Robert Neill]

I do not disagree with the Solicitor General about that, but I suggest that it is not an either/or scenario. I very much hope that he will indicate that he is prepared to continue working with me and the authors of the amendments to take this forward. I see that he nods his assent, and I am sure that we can find a constructive means of doing so.

Let me explain why this is important. The first of the rules, in subsection (A3), would confine the territorial scope of the retained EU law to the UK. That would put it on the same territorial footing as domestic law, therefore ensuring that as a general principle, retained EU law would no longer enable or require people or businesses in the UK to do, or to stop doing, something in an EU country. It is perfectly logical from that point of view.

The second rule would ensure that reference to a member state in an EU law that has been domesticated was taken, post Brexit, as a reference to the UK. That would ensure that domesticated EU law would in fact fully apply in the domestic sphere, removing any ambiguity on that point. That will be necessary in a large number of instances to avoid the situation in which the UK will, in effect, be treated as a third country for the purposes of its own laws where retained EU law is currently framed by reference to the whole EU. That would be an absurdity, and we are seeking to remove that risk.

The third rule, in subsection (A5), would transfer all the functions exercised by EU bodies to the Secretary of State. I take the Minister’s point that not all those will necessarily be exercised by the Secretary of State. It is not prescriptive in that way—it need not be, and we can talk about that—but it would deal with the many instances where such functions are transferred to an appropriate Secretary of State as well as providing, again, a legislative backstop to cater for circumstances where the alternative arrangements had not been put in place in time, so that there is no cliff edge in that regard.

The fourth rule deals with the many situations where domestic authorities are required, either outright or as a precondition, to exercise their own functions to deal with EU bodies or authorities in member states. What does that mean in practice? It covers, for instance, cases where the UK body has to notify, consult or get the approval of an EU body before taking a particular course of action.

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[Robert Neill]

That is entirely right. That rule would preserve the flexibility to co-operate with European partners and to trade into the European markets—regulatory equivalence will be critical to achieving that—and it would do so without the risk of facing any inappropriate legal constraints on the UK’s own operations once we have left.

I am not suggesting that the answer to everything is in this amendment. It is tabled in the spirit of wanting to work with the Government as we move forward, but it does go a long way towards delivering, in a relatively simple manner, the objective of having a functioning statute book on exit day.

Amendment 358 deals with what those who worked on this perceive as a potential gap concerning the interpretation of domesticated EU law. Clause 6(3), as has already been observed, will preserve the effect of case law laid down before exit day. Clause (6)(2) will provide discretion, and we have talked a lot about taking that into account. I listened with interest to the speech by the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry) regarding her amendment on that point. Again, this amendment does not provide the whole answer, but it raises serious issues that need to be looked at, and I hope that Ministers will do so.

[The Solicitor General]

For the sake of clarity, I think that my hon. Friend will find that schedule 8(25) contains enough scope for other documents of the type that he mentions to be considered by the courts. I hope that I have given him enough reassurance on that point.

[Robert Neill]

I am grateful to the Solicitor General for that clarification. Perhaps he could confirm that he is happy to meet me and we can discuss that. [Interruption.] He says that he is of course happy to do so. I am grateful to him for that very constructive response, and characteristically so. That will enable us to deal with things like negotiating texts, which we sometimes know of as the travaux préparatoires within the EU context. [Interruption.] Again, the Solicitor General confirms that that is the sort of thing that we can discuss.

Why is that important to the International Regulatory Strategy Group, and why is the group central to this? Its membership includes virtually all the significant representative institutions of the London financial community: the stock exchange, the Association for Financial Markets in Europe, the Association of British Insurers, the British Bankers Association, the City of London corporation and major commercial organisations such as Credit Suisse, Aviva, Allen & Overy, Allianz, Fidelity, HSBC and Lloyds. The list includes all the key underpinners of the City’s operation.

We need to take those important matters into account, and I am grateful to the Solicitor General for his willingness to meet and discuss them. I commend to him and other Ministers the observation made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Chesham and Amersham (Mrs Gillan) about the Francovich cases. It clearly cannot be the Government’s intention to remove people’s opportunity to seek remedies for wrongs that were done prior to our departure. My right hon. Friend raises a critical issue, and it is important to get this right.

I hope that Ministers will observe that the guidance in clause 6(2) is clearly not sufficient to meet the concerns of our senior judiciary and that they have said as much. When Lord Neuberger, a distinguished President of the Supreme Court, says that, ironically, the discretion is so wide that it puts judges at a degree of risk of political attack, he has to be taken seriously. Several right hon. and hon. Members have praised the quality of our judiciary, and I totally agree with them. We ought to listen very carefully when our judiciary say that, as a matter of protection against malicious attack of the sort that they have suffered in the past, they look to Parliament to safeguard their ability to function independently in cases that are quite politicised.

[The Solicitor General]

I am listening with care to my hon. Friend. Will he accept from me that there is another danger, namely that by using too many prescriptive words in the Bill, we could fetter the discretion of the courts in a way that they would find equally unacceptable? There is a balance to be struck here.

[Robert Neill]

There is, and that is why it is all the more important—perhaps unusually so—for Government to talk quietly with the judiciary to find out what they are saying. They cannot compromise their independence, but those of us who are in touch with them want to make sure that the Government understand the root of their concerns. I am sure that there is a constructive way forward on that.

I know that the Solicitor General will be aware of the problem, because it was referred to in the Justice Committee’s report in the last Parliament. I also draw his attention to the concerns raised by Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, the recently retired Lord Chief Justice, in the evidence that he gave only a couple of days before he retired from that post. He gave a pretty clear steer on the sort of thing that could be helpful and posited various types of language. I hope that the Solicitor General accepts that we need to look further at the matter, and I hope that we can do that constructively as we take the Bill forward.

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Let us suppose that in this instance, for some very good reason, such as the principle of equity, natural justice or some such thing, the Supreme Court judges in the opposite direction from that of the lower courts—it has now created a precedent. The next case of a similar variety appears in a lower court, which is adjured by the statute, notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s decision, to follow clause 6(3)(a) and to apply the rulings of the ECJ, however expansive and contrary to the plain text of the treaties they might have been, and notwithstanding whatever the Supreme Court has said. Or is it? Should the lower court instead apply the principle applied by the Supreme Court when, in relying on clause 6(4)(a), it departed from retained case law?

[The Solicitor General]

I am listening with great care to my right hon. Friend. Is not the simple answer that the Supreme Court will apply the rules of precedent in accordance with its practice direction of 50 years ago, which allows it to depart from previous case authority where it appears right to do so? Principles have been set out in domestic law by the Supreme Court and its predecessor, the judicial committee of the House of Lords.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

With great respect to the Solicitor General, I draw him back to clause 6(3)(a), which directs the lower court in such a case to continue to apply the retained case law on the basis of ECJ jurisprudence, not Supreme Court jurisprudence. If that is not what the Government intend, they need to redraft clause 6(3)(a). They can have it one way or the other, but we cannot in this country have a legal system that tells our courts to do two different things. That is why the former judges are causing a harouche here. They are not being told what we, as a Parliament, are expecting of them.

[The Solicitor General]

What we are seeking to do is, in effect, settle the status of retained EU case law so that it is equivalent to that of Supreme Court authority. That is the explanation of the hierarchy that my right hon. Friend has, very fairly, outlined.

[Sir Oliver Letwin]

If the Solicitor General is trying to argue that he is aiming for equality between the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice and the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, that poses an insoluble problem for the lower court. One has to trump the other, but if the Bill is trying to make out that one trumps the other, it does not do it. It is really quite important for a human being who speaks English and reads the Bill to be able to see which trumps which.