United Kingdom Internal Market Bill

Debate between Lord Wallace of Tankerness and Lord Falconer of Thoroton

Report stage & Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords & Report: 1st sitting & Report: 1st sitting: House of Lords
Wednesday 18th November 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, and a real privilege and honour to follow the speeches of the noble and learned Lords, Lord Hope of Craighead and Lord Mackay of Clashfern, the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay of Llandaff, and the noble Lord, Lord Bourne of Aberystwyth. They were speeches of real quality, and they got absolutely to the heart of the problem that had been identified in the Commons—indeed, identified time and again.

Everybody accepts the need for trade that is as frictionless as possible within the internal market of the UK. Everybody equally respects the need for appropriate divergence. How are those two matters to be dealt with? The answer, which everybody in this House and the Commons agreed with, was the common frameworks process, set up by the Conservative Government, with the agreement of the devolved Assemblies, in October 2017. It is a process that has stood the test of time and works to deliver divergence by agreement.

I note in passing that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, said that he often led the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead. However, one thing that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, did not learn from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, was emollience. However, the trenchant language used by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, today was appropriate. He said that “actions speak louder than words”. He said that if we are to believe the commitments repeated in the last 24 hours by the Government on devolution, they need to deliver on their promise that the common frameworks process should be allowed to complement the internal market arrangements.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, said that, without some amendments to this Bill, it would be a “misuse of language” to say that they complement each other. I beg to suggest that what he meant by that is that if you have only the market access principles and no legal recognition of the common frameworks process, that process is completely ignored because—to use the language of the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay of Llandaff, in an earlier part of the proceedings on this Bill—this is a “blunderbuss” that, in the words of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, does not allow for a key part of the functioning of devolution, namely divergence in the appropriate case.

We on this side of the House support Amendments 1, 38 and 51. We think they do give effect to the common frameworks in a legally binding way, without in any way undermining the need for a properly functioning internal market—the need for which we recognise. I earnestly ask the Government, on behalf of this side of the House, to do what they kept saying they would do: find a solution to the problem. It is so important, not just for the proceedings of this Bill but for the preservation of the devolution settlements in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, and the preservation of the union.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness (LD) [V]]

My Lords, it is a great privilege to follow all the speeches so far, which have so compellingly made the case for the common frameworks process. I wish to speak in favour of the amendments in this group, which have been spoken to so effectively by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead. These are amendments which, rightly, seek to give effect and primacy to decisions agreed under the common frameworks process. I regret that it was not possible for me to join the Committee stage proceedings, but I have read the Official Report of the first-class discussion of similar amendments debated on 25 October.

The issue of common frameworks and the lack of any recognition in this Bill of their existence, let alone their importance, goes to the heart of many of my profound misgivings about this proposed legislation. As has been noted several times in the past and already several times today, the creation of the common frameworks process can be traced back to the Joint Ministerial Committee declaration on 16 October 2017. Among the principles set out in that communique was that:

“Common frameworks will be established where they are necessary in order to: enable the functioning of the UK internal market, while acknowledging policy divergence”—


and the noble and learned Lords, Lord Hope and Lord Falconer of Thoroton, emphasised the words “policy divergence”. Among the other principles was that:

“Frameworks will respect the devolution settlements and the democratic accountability of the devolved legislatures, and will therefore … maintain, as a minimum, equivalent flexibility for tailoring policies to the specific needs of each territory as is afforded by current EU rules”.


Crucially, and to state the obvious, that declaration was agreed by the United Kingdom Government and the devolved Administrations.

The importance of such agreement being reached was recommended by the conclusions of the European Union Committee of the House, which, in its fourth report of the 2017-19 Session, said:

“Any durable solution will need the consent of all the nations of the United Kingdom, and of their elected representatives.”


It went on to say that

“A successful settlement cannot be imposed by the UK Government: it must be developed in partnership with the devolved Governments.”


The Government themselves acknowledge in their most recent report, published only a few weeks ago, that

“the UK Government and devolved administrations have continued to work jointly to develop UK Common Frameworks, to protect the UK economy and give maximum certainty to businesses, consumers and international partners”,

and, notably, that United Kingdom Ministers commend UK common frameworks as ensuring

“regulatory coherence across the UK by flexibly managing any potential policy divergence across the four nations.”

Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Wallace of Tankerness and Lord Falconer of Thoroton

Committee stage & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 13th May 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

My Lords, we have adumbrated many of the same points over and over, because they keep coming up again and again, so I will try to restrict my remarks on these amendments to essentially only new points. This group of amendments effectively deletes the Government’s regulation-making power where the regulations in effect intend to say how an international treaty shall apply either as between Scotland, England, Wales and Northern Ireland—within the United Kingdom—or as between the United Kingdom and the Isle of Man, any of the Channel Islands or a British Overseas Territory.

The effect of my amendment is that the Clause 2 power cannot be used where it is proposed to apply an international convention between the parts of the UK; to apply an international convention between the UK and a relevant territory; or to amend, extend, adapt or revoke any declaration made at the time of ratification. It is wholly wrong that any of these things should be done by regulation as opposed to primary legislation. I use these amendments simply to indicate the width of the power being sought. I beg to move.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness (LD)]

My Lords, I will make two preliminary points. The first echoes what has been said in many of our proceedings so far this afternoon. Perhaps not surprisingly, as a member of the Constitution Committee, I do not think that Clause 2 should be in the Bill, for all the reasons already outlined both in committee reports and by a number of your Lordships in debates on earlier groups. I have not yet been persuaded or heard any argument to the contrary, so my primary position is that Clause 2 should not be there.

The second point is that, where these amendments relate to jurisdictions within the United Kingdom, it is a question not of whether it should be done but of how. In his response to the first group of amendments, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, gave some good reasons why, as a matter of public policy, there should be certainty in the arrangements, for argument’s sake, for enforcing a Scottish court’s order in England, as there would be for enforcing an English court’s orders in France. Therefore, it is a question not of whether there is merit in having some kind of intra-UK arrangements but rather of how it should be done.

During Second Reading I reflected briefly on this and referred to the briefing from the Bar Council. It is perhaps worth going back to it and reminding ourselves what it said in relation to the provisions in Schedule 6:

“The question, however, whether to apply an international convention’s rules between parts of the United Kingdom is often a very difficult one. Where it is to be applied, extensive amendments to that convention are often appropriate, (an example being the provisions in the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, which apply a substantially modified form of the European Union rules to intra-United Kingdom cases). The Bar Council is concerned that schedule 6 does not provide sufficient safeguards in this respect and considers that it should be amended to provide the requisite clarification.”


I endorse that. It is not a question about whether it should be done. We have heard that, for example, in the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 there were requirements to amend or change the rules for intra-UK cases.

It is also important to note that we are giving powers to the national authorities—not just the United Kingdom Parliament but to Scottish Ministers and Northern Ireland Assembly Ministers. As far as I can see—I stand to be corrected if I have not noticed something —these regulations would be brought in without any consultation between the different Administrations. There is no doubt that private international law is a devolved matter as far as the Scottish Parliament is concerned, but negotiating international treaties does not affect the sovereignty of the United Kingdom, and it seems to make some sense that there should be some negotiation, or at least consultation and discussion among the constituent parts of the United Kingdom, before regulations are brought forward. As far as I can see, neither Clause 2(2) nor Schedule 6 makes any provision for that.

My position is that it is not a question about whether it is right and proper that there should be intra-UK arrangements but rather that what is proposed in the Bill does not provide adequate safeguards about how that should be done.

Justice and Security Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Wallace of Tankerness and Lord Falconer of Thoroton

Wednesday 11th July 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

The noble Lords, Lord Hodgson and Lord Lester, and the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, have made important points, but we must surely address the issue on the basis of what within our court system produces the most just result available, recognising that imperfect justice may be involved. Everybody accepts that two conflicting principles are valid, namely a properly functioning justice system and the need to protect national security. My view is that if a case is made that unjust results might be being reached, with claimants making claims that they know the Security Service cannot defend, then we should do enough to enable our justice system to properly defend those cases. Open justice is a means to producing justice. The courts have always recognised that if you cannot do justice that is open—for example, if you destroy the confidentiality that the justice system is designed to protect—then exceptional measures are needed for exceptional cases. I do not think our security services are being well served if they are forced to admit claims that they should not, and neither is respect being paid to our judges if they are simply a rubber stamp.

The right answer in relation to this issue is, first of all: is the case proved? That is an open question at the moment, as far as I am concerned. If the case is proved that some measures are needed then these should be kept to a minimum and the judges should decide what is required in order to create the fairest possible system. The problem with the amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, which I think he would be the first to acknowledge, is that they involve the judge considering whether there would be any serious risk of injustice to either party if the application for a closed material procedure were to be granted. However, everybody involved in closed proceedings knows perfectly well that if you have procedure that reveals evidence about person A and A never knows what is said about him or her, the prospect of an injustice is significant. However, that may be the best that can be done under the circumstances.

I respect the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, for raising these points. I just do not think the House of Lords can avoid asking: what is the right answer? The only guide we have is to try to reach the right answer. That is the only way we shall retain respect for what we do. The task we are engaged in is trying to balance those two factors. As I said before supper, what we are aiming for in this bit of the debate is fairness because ultimately national security can be protected by the security services pulling a case, so it is all about deciding whether there are a sufficient number of unfair cases that some special procedure needs to be crafted.

As it happens—and I think the noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill, is right here—the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, are pretty well the same points we had before supper, and he acknowledged this in his opening remarks. The noble Lord’s basic approach in Amendment 44 is to say that one should go the PII route first; then only if the PII decision is non-disclosure do you go on to CMP. I do not like that approach for the reasons I advanced in response to the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, in concert with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf. It is too inflexible. I do not see why we cannot give the court all the options at the time it makes the decision, as the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, suggested. This would avoid opportunistic applications and allow the court to come to the fairest possible results. I would be repeating myself if I went on about that. The noble Lord’s amendment has promoted debate, but the effect of that debate is that we do not want the lack of flexibility that his amendment proposes.

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Wallace of Tankerness)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts for putting forward these amendments and for indicating his concerns: that we should be seeking fairness and reflecting on the possible impacts upon society.

I repeat again the passage from paragraph 2.5 of the Green Paper, which is pertinent here, where the Government assert that the,

“appropriate mechanism for triggering the CMPs will help to ensure that they are only used where it is absolutely necessary to enable the case to proceed in the interests of justice. The principle of open justice is an extremely important one, and any departure from it should be no more than is strictly necessary to achieve a proper administration of justice”.

Inasmuch as we are testing this legislation, that is where this House serves an important part of our democratic procedures. Before the dinner break we tested it very well with all the points that were made. I hope that when my noble friend does the outreach he can say that, in trying to ensure no more than is strictly necessary to achieve the proper administration of justice, these tests have been applied and that there has been a very active engagement of Members of your Lordships’ House in trying to ensure that that outcome is reached.

If we are trying to ensure fairness and that there should be no in-built bias, there will be cases where the use of closed material proceedings means that people who might otherwise have been excluded get an opportunity for material to be heard which might well exculpate them. That may be more relevant to one of the later clauses.

The noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, made a point about fairness. Indeed, it might be important fairness in terms of how the public approach these matters. If the intelligence service, the Security Service, has a full answer to many of the allegations made against it, it is inherently wrong that it should be denied being able to put forward an answer. I perhaps can do no better than again to quote Mr David Anderson QC, much quoted in today’s deliberations:

“We are in a world of second-best solutions: but it does not seem to me that the level of injustice inherent in the use of CMPs in a case of this nature necessarily exceeds either the injustice to the claimant of a case being struck out, or the moral hazard and reputational damage to the intelligence agencies that is caused by settling a case which, had it been possible to adduce all the evidence, would have been fought”.

Bearing in mind these considerations too, I think that all parts of the House are trying to ensure that we find a way forward to achieve the objective.

My noble friend indicated the type of safeguards that he wished to put in. I will not go over them in any detail again but, in response to the previous debate, I think that I explained why the Government do not believe that an exhaustive use of PII before applying for a CMP is appropriate. There clearly will be cases when it could be futile to do so because it is very obvious that to exclude all that evidence by way of PII could render the case that a proper defence could not be put forward.

If my noble friend’s intention is to ensure that CMPs are used only in extremely rare circumstances, I am not persuaded that these amendments are the way in which to achieve that. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, indicated some of the difficulties inherent in the requirement that there should be no serious risk of injustice. The point to remember is that important safeguards are built into this Bill to ensure that national security is not claimed erroneously and that the fair trial rights of all parties are respected. The court will grant a declaration that a CMP may be used only where disclosure of relevant material would otherwise damage national security. As I indicated earlier, there is a second stage in which the court—with the full engagement of special advocates appointed to represent the interests of an excluded party—will adopt a painstaking process to ensure that only material heard in closed session will be material, the disclosure of which would damage national security.

In addition, I mentioned that the operation of the procedure is explicitly made subject to the right to a fair trial protected by Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights under Clause 11(5)(c). In a CMP, the court will make the necessary orders to ensure that the proceedings are conducted in a manner that complies with the article. The judge, with the assistance of the special advocates, will ensure that as much information as possible can be disclosed into open court. If the full document cannot be disclosed, the court will also consider whether it could be disclosed in part through redactions or whether a summary could be provided to the other parties without damaging the interests of national security.

If there is a serious risk of injustice of the kind which my noble friend describes, the court can take the steps which I have described. Equally, if the judge is not satisfied that a CMP has properly enabled the fair testing of closed material he will simply put no weight on it. That approach is the right one in the national security context. A court will grant a declaration under Clause 6 or permit material to be heard in closed session only on the extremely narrow ground that disclosure of material would damage the interests of national security and there are strong safeguards already available to the court.

It is important that we air not only some of the details of my noble friend’s amendment but look at the context in which he proposed it. However, I believe that these balancing considerations have been considered in the proposals before your Lordships’ House. While I do not in any way quibble that these amendments raise an important issue, I hope that I have explained why they are unnecessary, given the other safeguards in the Bill. I ask my noble friend to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

Certainly, it could be thought about. We just wanted to make it clear in the Bill that Article 6 was pertinent. I am answering this to the best of my ability. The noble and learned Lord asked whether Clause 11(5)(b) ousted PII when a court was thinking about closed material proceedings. I am not sure if that was his question.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

The noble and learned that Lord said before supper, “Oh, well. You could always bear in mind if a PII application was made that the court could say that it was not very keen on it. The much better course would be to apply for a closed material proceedings”. I read Clause 11(5)(b) as saying that you have to ignore the possibility of a CMP application when you are considering PII, because the clause states:

“Nothing in sections 6 to 10 … affects the common law rules as to the withholding, on grounds of public interest immunity, of any material in any proceedings”.

I am not therefore sure that it would be open to a judge to say, “I am not going to look at PII because I want you to do a CMP”.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, obviously we will reach Clause 11. My understanding is that concerns were expressed in some quarters that what we were proposing in some way ousted PII and that it was, as some of the more extreme comments suggested, dead in the water. The purpose of the provision was to make it clear that PII is not lost in time or space, and that the common-law rules relating to PII are not affected. If that is not a full answer, we can deal with this in more detail when we consider Clause 11.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I know my noble friends are trying to be helpful and I am sure that equally they will understand why I am not prepared to make a concession on the hoof, as it were. This is clearly something one would wish to consider and clearly we will also have the opportunity in good time to consider my noble friend’s Amendment 58. I am glad that he made the distinction between getting through the gateway—which is what Amendment 45 applies to—and the second stage. We are of the view that if the two tests in Clause 6(2) are satisfied to the discretion of the judge, the application for the closed material procedure must succeed and thereupon the detailed consideration of the documentation takes place under the rules of court, which are to be set out under Clause 7.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

I understand that the noble and learned Lord is seeking to say that there is no discretion to determine whether the threshold is passed. However, something akin to a discretion is reached in Clause 7. Looking at the wording of it, the Clause 7 requirement is rules. Under Clause 7(1)(a), you are not allowed to have the claimant present when you are looking at the individual material. If the court is satisfied that there is damage to national security, it has give permission for it not to be disclosed. It is not a discretionary matter. It is simply determining, as the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, said, whether the threshold is met. If the threshold is met, there is no discretion. One additional power is given; namely, can a summary be given that does not give away the national security material? It is not a question of proportionality. It is exactly the same test in practice as that which is referred to in the gateway in Clause 6(1). If the Secretary of State says, “If you disclose that document I am advised by the security services that it will damage national security”, unless the judge thinks that the Secretary of State is irrational, which would be very rare, he will be obliged to give effect to that. It is not a question of discretion at all. There are no balancing factors. It is simply, “Right, the consequences are that I cannot disclose that. Can a summary be given?”. That is the only thing that a judge is allowed to consider under this Bill. Although I understand what the noble and learned Lord is trying to say, it is not really right to say that there is a gateway under Clause 6 and then some sort of discretion under Clause 7. There is not a discretion under Clause 7.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I make the following point in response to what the noble and learned Lord says. He is right to say that Clause 7(1)(d) would give rise to gisting. However, under Clause 7(1)(c), it may well be that after representations, argument and debate a document is redacted, and of course the redaction may well be the material that should not be disclosed because it is the material which could be damaging to national security. However, once redacted, the remainder of the document might then be admitted to open proceedings. That is an important part of the process. It is not a blanket application to the document as a whole. It may be that the non-disclosure extends to only part of that document. Only part of that document would be a matter of damaging national security. For example, it could be that a document gives the name of an agent. If that was redacted, the rest of the document could well be admitted to open proceedings, but the name of the agent is something which quite properly should not be disclosed.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

It would not get through the gateway.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

The noble and learned Lord says that it would not get through the gateway, but it is not a gateway for every document. It is a gateway to trigger the closed material proceedings. It may be a sample document saying, “Here is the kind of defence we want to mount. There is material here on which we will wish to rely but it cannot be put into the public domain because it would be damaging to the interests of national security”. If the judge agrees that there is documentation there that would satisfy that, the application is granted and thereafter the documentation or evidence is gone through page by page. It may be that you can take something out of a document and the rest of it would be quite safe from the point of view of national security to allow into open proceedings.

That is the process that we envisage being gone through at stage 2. It is an important part of the process, which means that only a small amount of material would be subject to closed material proceedings. However, to get to that process of going through material document by document, you must first get through the gateway. It is on getting through the gateway, if the two tests are satisfied, that the application should be granted. Going back to my noble friend’s amendment, he argues that there should be some discretion at that point. The Government’s position is that the two tests should be met but can be challenged. Special advocates can be involved at that stage to challenge whether the tests have been met. However, if they are met, we should get through the gateway and, thereafter, we can look at issues such as redaction and gisting. That is an important part of the stage 2 proceedings.

Justice and Security Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Wallace of Tankerness and Lord Falconer of Thoroton

Wednesday 11th July 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

Yes, and indeed my noble and learned friend—although I should not refer to him as learned, but he is learned in every other respect—Lord Beecham is saying that that is exactly the point that the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, made. There is agreement all round on that.

Where we come out in relation to this is: prove your case. If you do that, then having no balancing or requirement to go through steps beforehand is an inadequate response. We favour more the amendments tabled. We particularly like the idea of flexibility that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, and the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, have advanced. We hope that the Government will, having heard the debate, produce a reformed approach that will reflect a pretty unanimous view around the House on how best to deal with this issue.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I join the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, in congratulating all who have taken part in the debate. It has been very helpful. I certainly welcome the spirit in which various proposals were put forward.

Perhaps I may deal first with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, who said that he remains to be convinced. I noted that most other contributors to the debate thought that there were cases, albeit a small number, where closed material proceedings would be required. He quoted David Anderson QC, who has had access to some of the material and has been satisfied. There is only a small number of cases. No one is claiming that there is a huge number, and I will come on to that in a moment. There is the experience of people such as the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham -Buller, who have seen the kind of cases where this issue could arise. I generally agree with the analysis where the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, indicated at the outset of his speech that there were two different issues here—fairness in civil proceedings that by their nature are not of the Government’s instance, and other cases that we will consider later in Committee with regard to Norwich Pharmacal.

We are trying to secure fairness. The Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law, which has been quoted and referred to in this debate, said, in its response to the public consultation that,

“we consider that the prospect of claims alleging very serious wrongdoing on the part of state agencies (such as complicity in kidnapping, forced disappearances and torture—as have been made in several recent cases) being dismissed because key evidence inculpating state agencies is held to be immune from disclosure, to be a very concerning one from the perspective of the rule of law”.

We are seeking to ensure that there is material there and, if so, that it can be placed before a judge, obviously subject to safeguards, and that if national security issues are involved they would not be prejudiced by the material coming into the public domain.

I detected in the debate a sharing of that objective. It is perhaps worth reminding the Committee that in the Green Paper that the Government published last year, we made it clear in paragraph 2.4 that:

“CMPs should only be available in exceptional circumstances, and where used, every effort is and should continue to be made to have as much material considered in open court as possible. But in the small number of cases where sensitive material is crucial to the outcome, it is better that the court should be able to decide the case, despite the additional complexities a CMP might create, than—in a worst case—that the case should not be tried at all”.

We also said in paragraph 2.5:

“An appropriate mechanism for triggering the CMPs will help to ensure that they are only used where it is absolutely necessary to enable the case to proceed in the interests of justice. The principle of open justice is an extremely important one, and any departure from it should be no more than is strictly necessary to achieve a proper administration of justice”.

I hope that that provides reassurance to a number of my noble friends; the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, emphasised the importance of it—as did the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer.

Perhaps I may first address the amendment of my noble friend Lord Faulks. It would introduce a system of statutory public interest immunity for national security material only. I fully recognise that the purpose of the amendment is, as it were, as a precursor to Amendment 40. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, indicated, nevertheless it would represent a change from a situation where public interest immunity has proceeded on a common-law basis. Putting it on a statutory footing would be a significant change. We obviously need to put closed material proceedings in civil cases on to a statutory footing, because in Al Rawi the Supreme Court indicated that there was no common-law basis for them. We are dealing with two different things in that respect.

PII is a principle that the courts have developed over a number of years to deal with the handling of sensitive material, and a wide and flexible range of public interests falls within its ambit. However, I have concerns that to change all these things may lead to more difficulties than the problem the change was intended to resolve. The Government ruled out a statutory PII in the Green Paper because it would offer little advance on the current system in providing clarity on the applicable principles, stability and certainty. If you start to create a statutory presumption in relation to national security when PII is asserted, it would start to raise questions when PII is claimed and sought in respect of some other grounds.

However, I accept that the primary purpose of the amendment was to prepare the way for Amendments 40 and 47, on which my noble friends Lord Faulks and Lord Thomas raised important issues about the relative benefits and interaction of closed material proceedings and public interest immunity.

My noble friend Lord Faulks asked whether Clause 6(5) was a tick-box exercise. It is important to emphasise that it is a statutory duty. The Secretary of State would consider whether a claim for PII should be made before applying for a CMP on the basis that it is a statutory duty and a legally binding obligation. Were someone to apply for judicial review of that exercise, the Secretary of State would in practice need to show the court that he or she had in fact properly considered PII as an alternative to a CMP application. That entails giving the matter serious consideration, taking into account all relevant considerations, ignoring irrelevant ones, and coming to a rational conclusion on the facts of a particular case.

The statutory duty would mean that, were PII successfully claimed, for example, the Secretary of State would consider factors such as what this would mean in terms of exclusion of materials which CMPs would otherwise allow the court to take into account. It may relate to the volume of national security material, or only one piece of evidence in the case might be relevant. Why go through the requirement for PII if indeed there is only one piece of evidence or—at the other extreme, and this is the term that has been used—if it is saturated? It may also relate to how relevant or sensitive the national security material is to a particular case. However, it is not a tick-box exercise.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, talked about trying to square the circle. By the time I come to the end of my remarks, I will perhaps suggest that the circle is not as far from being squared as may appear from some of the comments that have been made. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, is a member of the Constitution Committee of your Lordships’ House, and its report did not go so far as to recommend that the Bill require PII to be exhausted before a CMP declaration is sought from the court. The report stated:

“We can see force in the argument that it will sometimes be otiose to push the PII process to its completion before turning to CMP”.

Therefore, the idea that we should exhaust PII beforehand has some practical difficulties. Amendment 47 of my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford may try and avoid that, but I am not sure that it would because it still appears to require an exhaustive process. My noble friend referred to the Guantanamo civil damages claims, where there were 250,000 potentially relevant documents for which PII might have to be considered. We are talking about having to go through all that.

I come on to the two stages of the closed material procedures, an important part of what I wish to say to your Lordships. There is what might be described as the gateway application—basically covered by Clause 7—and then there is detailed consideration of the documents once a CMP has been granted. Of course, on the detailed consideration of the documents, not quite the same test would apply, and we would have to go through all these documents again to see if a CMP should apply to each one individually. That could take considerable time and cause delay to the claimant, which is of quite considerable importance as well.

My noble friend Lady Berridge asked if the court should have gone through PII in the Al Rawi case because it could have resulted in a balancing act and things might have gone into open court. The point is that if the court had overturned the PII certificates on Wiley grounds, the result would not necessarily have been disclosure of the material in open court, if disclosure would have damaged national security. The Government would have to seek to have the material removed from the litigation by making concessions or by seeking to settle. Indeed, that is one of the issues that we are trying to address with these proposals.

Some have suggested that under public interest immunity more material would be heard in open court than in a CMP. We do not believe this to be the case. Nothing heard in open court now should be heard in secret in consequence of these provisions. In practice—and for the very reason I have just given to my noble friend Lady Berridge—claimants will have access to the same level of information, because, where the court declares that the case is one where closed material procedure may be used, this does not mean that all material in those proceedings is automatically heard in closed proceedings. As with PII, there will be a painstaking exercise to ensure that as much of the evidence as possible is heard in open court.

This painstaking exercise has sometimes been overlooked. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, said that the Clause 6(3) test is passed and the door closes. That is not the case. The Clause 6(3) test is only that the CMP may be used in principle, and there is then a detailed assessment at stage 2 with regard to the provisions that are available, with the rules of court to be promulgated under Clause 7. I hope this addresses some concerns. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and my noble friend Lady Berridge made a point about the second stage of the process. The decision to go into closed material procedures is an in-principle decision, and there is no equivalent with regards to PII. That is stage 1.

In stage 2, in Clause 7, the court considers what might then be done with the material. It may be on a document-by-document basis. It could lead to redaction, and it could lead to gisting. It would be quite possible for every piece of material relevant to proceedings to be partially disclosed, redacted or gisted, If this could be done without damaging national security. I hope that that gives reassurance that there is a stage which, although not exactly the same, is a very similar test and process to PII. As we said in the Green Paper, we wish to be in open court as much as possible, and we believe that that can be facilitated by going through a stage 2 process.

My noble friend Lord Faulks asked about the points made by our noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern on Second Reading with regard to Clause 7(3). The importance of Clause 7(3) is that it follows Clause 7(2)—obviously—and covers circumstances where if the court refuses permission for particular evidence to be heard in closed proceedings, and the Government elect not to disclose that material, the court has the power to direct that that material should not be relied on and should be excluded from the proceedings, or to give directions that concessions must be made. These are very important safeguards.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

My understanding of the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, is that the Government can choose to go for PII and get the material out completely or, if it helps them, to say, “Let’s have it in secret without the other side seeing it”. The Government can make that choice and nothing in the Bill would make it wrongful for them to make their choice by reference to what would give them the best prospect in litigation.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

Certainly I am aware of that concern. It was perfectly legitimate for the noble and learned Lord to raise it, because it motivated the amendments tabled by my noble friends Lord Thomas and Lord Hodgson.

For the sake of completeness, I will indicate that it is important to remember that the court will need to be satisfied that disclosure of that material would damage the interests of national security, and that any obligations under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights are met. Of course the court will have the assistance of special advocates representing the interests of excluded parties in testing whether these conditions are met. I endorse what was said by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, and my noble friend Lord Carlile, that perhaps special advocates have sometimes undersold themselves. I think it was in the case of M v Home Office that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, indicated that he had been very impressed by what the special advocates had done in challenging evidence.

I move on to the point about the Secretary of State and the important amendment spoken to by my noble friend Lord Hodgson. It raises an important issue that the Constitution Committee flagged up with very seductive arguments that we should consider. I am aware that there is concern about the potential unfairness of the Secretary of State being the only party to proceedings who can make an application. However, I will explain to the Committee that we heard that the motivation behind the amendment was concern that there would be too much control in the hands of the Government, and that were they to apply for PII to exclude material from the case, the other party would not be able to request a CMP so that the information would be put before a court. As I indicated, this matter was picked up by the Constitution Committee.

There is an important constitutional point here. Under our system of government, the Executive are the guardian of the United Kingdom’s national security interests. The courts have frequently stated that the Government’s function to protect national security by claiming PII is a duty rather than an option. Correspondingly, we believe that it should be the responsibility of the Secretary of State to apply for a declaration that a closed material procedure may be used when the sole criterion is that of national security. There would have been stronger arguments if some of the other grounds that were floated in the Green Paper had been included—but we confined this purely to national security. We believe that the courts can play an essential role.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, that is not what I said. I did say, however, that the judge at the first stage has to be satisfied that two tests are met before he even opens the gateway to closed material proceedings. There has perhaps been some misunderstanding that when you pass through the gateway, everything suddenly becomes subject to closed material proceedings. That is not the case. It is at that stage that individual pieces of evidence are looked at. That is a materially different position from the one which has sometimes been suggested that the gateway is the be-all and end-all and once you go through the gateway the doors and the shutters came down. That is not what is proposed but obviously if noble Lords do not believe that is properly reflected in the drafting, I am more than happy to try to find a way in which we can proceed.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

My Lords, I am grateful for that constructive indication. I would co-operate fully in trying to draft an answer that reflects what the noble and learned Lord is saying. I understand him to be saying that if a PII application were made, the judge would be able to say, “You cannot keep all this secret. You should deal with it in a CMP”. That is what I understand the noble and learned Lord to be saying. I think he is nodding, although it may be an involuntary twitch. Assuming that he is nodding, there seems to me to be a problem in the drafting because it gives the court the power to make a CMP order only where there is an application by the Secretary of State. I would be more than happy if the solution reached was to apply to the judge who has the power to decide, balancing all the factors, whether this should be PII, complete disclosure or a CMP. That is not what the Bill says now but that is broadly what I understand the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, to be arguing for—the noble Lord, Lord Lester, is nodding—and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, to be saying. I am more than happy to sit down with everybody and draft that but that is not the current position.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

Perhaps I may add that my Amendment 45, which we have not come to, is designed to replace the word “must” in Clause 6(2) with “may”—in other words, a discretion for the judge to decide whether to make a declaration based on the criteria that he must apply.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Debate between Lord Wallace of Tankerness and Lord Falconer of Thoroton

Monday 18th July 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

I recall that but he voted in favour of the amendment. So I think you can say where his heart lay in relation to this.

Moving away from the technical points to the point of this Bill, let us think about history for a moment. In 1924, the Labour Government were defeated in a vote because the Labour Prime Minister had interfered with the Attorney-General in the exercise of his discretion. The moment he was defeated on the Floor of the House of Commons, there was a general election and the Conservative Party was returned to power. Imagine if Mr Ramsay MacDonald had been faced with the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill in 1924: first, being defeated on the proposition that he had interfered with the Attorney-General would not have led to a general election. There would had to have been a vote of no confidence put down by the Opposition. Let us assume that that had passed but that would not have been the end of it. Mr Ramsay MacDonald would then have had 14 days to try to cobble together a bit of support. Let us remember that he had a small majority in relation to this. He could have tried to survive on that basis. Is it seriously being said that that sort of behaviour would have led to the public having more confidence in the Government?

Moving forward in time to 1974, Mr Edward Heath perfectly legitimately wanted to test who governed the country because the country was in a major crisis in relation to the miners’ strike. Despite the fact that he legitimately wanted to go to the country, he could not have gone because he would not have been allowed to under this Bill unless he had tabled a vote of no confidence in his own Government. I think it was the noble Lord, Lord Hamilton, who said that perhaps he could have done that. But what would people think of a Government who put down a Motion of no confidence in themselves?

Finally, the father of my noble friend Lady Jay in 1979 was defeated in a vote of confidence on the Floor of the House of Commons. The most quoted extract from political history in the course of this debate was what Mr James Callaghan said when he was defeated. He said, “I have been defeated in the House of Commons. I must now take my argument to the people”. After this Bill has been passed he would have to say, “Now that I have been defeated on a vote of no confidence, I must see if I can scrabble together a majority to stay in power because this beastly Act gives me 14 days in which to try to do it”.

Okay, I say to the coalition, have your miserable Act so that you can stick together until 5 May 2015, because we respect your right to force that upon us. However, there is nothing unconstitutional in saying that it is appropriate for this House to stick with the principle that says, after that, let the next Parliament decide whether it wants to continue with what I say is a terrible Act. We will support the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, in his excellent sunset clause.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, once again on this subject, we have had a very full and interesting debate, and I thank all noble Lords who have made important contributions to it.

It is clear that a number of noble Lords who spoke in the debate approached the amendment on the basis of whether they supported fixed-term Parliaments. My noble friend Lady Stowell and my noble friend Lord Dobbs gave compelling reasons why they believe in fixed-term Parliaments, whereas the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, departing from his party’s manifesto at the last election, indicated that he is now not quite so sure about them. When the House was debating whether the fixed term should be four or five years and the noble and learned Lord was asked whether, if five years was passed rather than four, a future Labour Government would try to bring it back to four, I remember his not being able to give an answer. If this Bill is passed and the amendment which we are currently debating is not included, I cannot see a future Government trying to repeal it either.

Back in 1992, as my noble friend Lord Rennard reminded us, fixed-term Parliaments was a policy of the Labour Party on which it fought the election; it is a policy which my party has espoused for many years; and it is a policy of the coalition. The argument that the legislation was meant to last only until 5 May 2015 is nonsense. The coalition agreement makes a clear commitment to legislate for fixed-term Parliaments in the future. The title of the Bill refers to fixed-term Parliaments in the plural, so it was never intended simply to be a fix for the current Parliament. Many of the arguments brought forward, particularly when we were debating four or five years, related to the ability to plan government business over a period of time. Whether one could test the feasibility of that in this first Parliament, when we do not have the Bill on the statute book, is doubtful.

I want to put to rest the idea that the Bill was meant to be for only one Parliament. It is very clear in the coalition agreement that it was intended for future Parliaments, subject crucially to the fact that no Parliament can bind its successor, as the noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan, said. The important point here is that if a Parliament cannot bind its successor and future Parliaments do not want fixed-term Parliaments, they should bring forward legislation. That would be the proper way of scrutinising whether the fixed-term Parliament has worked. As things stand with this amendment, no resolution whatever would be required if one did not wish to continue with fixed-term Parliaments. There would be no post-legislative scrutiny, no opportunity to consider whether the idea had delivered what those of us who support it claim it would. If one had to bring forward a Bill repealing the legislation, it would provide ample opportunity to debate the pros and cons.

I say with all due respect to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, that the idea that, somehow, Acts of Parliament should be suspended or ended at Dissolution and that, if you wanted to continue them into a future Parliament, you should bring back a new Bill to do it, rather than what we have thought for years, which is that if you wish to repeal an Act of Parliament you do so by primary legislation, was a very novel constitutional proposal which I certainly would not like to argue before the Constitution Committee if it became an act of faith.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Debate between Lord Wallace of Tankerness and Lord Falconer of Thoroton

Monday 16th May 2011 Lords Chamber

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Wallace of Tankerness)]

I am sure that the noble and learned Lord will want to complete the picture and remind the House that the proposal for a referendum on AV was also in the Labour Party manifesto at the last election. He seems to have ignored that fact.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

I do not know whether the noble and learned Lord noticed, but we lost the election. In a sense, I would not have been able to say that we would have had much credibility in putting that forward as the losing party—but you might think that that illustrates my point. The AV referendum was defeated, and the party that proposed it was defeated; the Liberal Democrats did not propose it and the Tories did not propose it. Because of the deal that was done and because of the influence that the coalition has on both Houses of Parliament, it is possible for such a constitutional change to get through both Houses of Parliament. An even more interesting point is that I do not think, although the noble and learned Lord will know better than I, that the AV constitutional change—if we ignore the referendum result for the moment—would have actually passed through Parliament; the only way that an attempt could be made to get it on to the statute book was by using the referendum route. The Conservatives would not have voted for it and half of my party would not have voted for it; all the Liberal Democrats would have voted for it, but I do not think that that constitutes a majority.

Most countries have some sort of entrenched or embedded position to protect the constitution, because most countries believe that if their constitution is working it should be more difficult to change it than other provisions. The heart of our constitution is in our democratic arrangements, such as how long Parliaments last, how we elect Members of Parliament, how we determine what the constituencies are and how many constituencies there are. All those arrangements have been fundamentally changed by the first two Bills, except that the AV referendum was defeated. The significance of the defeat in the AV referendum is that it indicates that the public are not interested in, or particularly keen on, a particular change in those particular systems. Before this series of Bills was introduced, my inclination would have been to be more trusting of Parliament to stop changes that go to the heart of the constitution and do not have popular support. Inevitably, in the light of what the coalition has done, one’s faith in Parliament’s ability to resist, because of the coalition, goes down.

The importance of what my noble friend Lord Grocott is proposing in this amendment, which I doubt he will push to a vote—but it is an incredibly important debate to have—is that, if parliamentarians are prepared to play with the constitution in the way that the coalition has done, as simply a counter to be given away in order to get into power, Parliament needs to look at how you protect the constitution against backroom deals in smoke-filled rooms. I am not aiming that particularly at the Liberal Democrats or the Conservatives; I am saying what the consequence is of coalitions.

I end with a reference to the noble Lord, Lord Tyler. I do not know whether noble Lords remember the excellent contribution that he made to the Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill, but he was an enthusiast for all of it. I happened to read in my Observer after the AV thing was lost, where the noble Lord said words to the effect that, “Now the AV vote has been lost, I should remind the Conservatives that there still yet needs to be a vote on the new constituencies that are being drawn”. I took that to mean that it was all basically politics that was going on, that it as just a deal that was done, and that if the Liberal Democrats did not get AV they might look askance at what they had previously said was a major constitutional change. I understand why constitutional change. I understand why the noble Lord did it, but does that not suggest that we need to build in a few more protections in relation to major constitutional change? It would appear that this House, which has previously been good at stopping major constitutional change, is now faced with a coalition that has not viewed constitutional change with the same degree of responsibility as previous Governments.

I take the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Newton. He is absolutely right that from time to time we did propose constitutional changes, but we got drawn up short by Parliament. That has not happened with this suite of constitutional measures. That is what my noble friend Lord Grocott is saying needs very careful thought. It might not be a referendum that is needed, but something is certainly needed to give a bit of strength to Parliament to resist the possibly politically motivated constitutional changes that the coalition has brought forward—as opposed to in the national interest.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

Thank you very much indeed for that. I also draw to the attention of the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, that there was also the referendum on a north-east regional assembly. No doubt before I leave the room there will be 53 other referendums that I shall refer to.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

First, my Lords, as I think the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, said, we owe a debt to the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, for moving his amendment and stimulating an interesting and thought-provoking debate. The noble Lord, Lord Grocott, said that he was not going to move or speak to his Amendment 23 regarding your Lordships’ House. Although he did not, it was certainly the subtext of a number of the contributions—and sometimes not even the subtext, as the clever speech made by the noble Lord, Lord Reid, indicated. When I listened to what he was inviting me to do or not to do, phrases such as “Greeks bearing gifts” seemed to come to mind from time to time. However, there will be ample opportunity to reflect on the issues in relation to the future of your Lordships’ House over many weeks and months to come.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Debate between Lord Wallace of Tankerness and Lord Falconer of Thoroton

Monday 16th May 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I am not sure that it is necessary to insert “maximum”. Perhaps I can assure my noble friend that 14 days is a limit; it is not an expectation or a requirement. Let us take as an example the situation in 1979, after Mr James Callaghan was defeated on that famous evening in March. If, rather than saying, under existing constitutional arrangements, that he was going to the Queen to seek Dissolution and take his case to the country, he had said that he would table a Motion for Dissolution the following day and that if it was supported, as inevitably it would have been, by both parties and had two-thirds of Members voting for it, there would have been no need to wait for 14 days before the election took place. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, looks perplexed by that. Mr Callaghan could have tabled a Motion for Dissolution the following day and two-thirds of Members could have agreed.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

In different circumstances.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

In these circumstances, yes. Had this Bill been in place, that could have happened. Perhaps I may reassure my noble friend Lord Cormack that 14 days is a maximum, but if there is consensus in the House that there should be an immediate election, it would be possible the following day for a Motion commanding the support of two-thirds of Members for an early election to be passed and there would be no need to wait for 14 days. I hope that is clear. It is an important point that perhaps has not always been fully appreciated; there may have been an impression that after every Motion of no confidence there would have to be a period of 14 days before there could be an election.

The proposed new power in the amendment for the other place to vote explicitly for an early Dissolution deals with the circumstances in which it would be appropriate to move directly to a Dissolution and a general election, as I have said, and there may be other circumstances. There has been some suggestion that the situation in 1951 could have led to that happening.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Debate between Lord Wallace of Tankerness and Lord Falconer of Thoroton

Tuesday 10th May 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

I had thought before hearing the debate that I would tend to support the noble Lord, Lord Rennard, but I found what the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, said powerful. Everyone appears to agree that the election is unlikely to be called early anyway; if there is sufficient consensus for it to be called early, that can be dealt with by the two-thirds provision. If it is to be up to two months late, that is a moderately massive exception and if it is to be done, there needs to be consensus. If there is that degree of consensus, it is extremely likely that emergency legislation can be got through in order to achieve it. We are much better off being certain. Having not intended to take this view, I am afraid that I found what the noble Lord, Lord Norton, said, rather powerful. I invite the Government to reflect on what the noble Lord said and perhaps bring the issue back at Third Reading. If the Minister brings back the issue at Third Reading in a way that reflects the arguments of the noble Lord, Lord Norton, or alternatively says, either now or at Third Reading, why the noble Lord is wrong, I would not support the noble Lord. However, if he does not, my inclination is to support the noble Lord, Lord Norton, either now or, as seems more sensible, after the Government have had an opportunity to reflect and come back at Third Reading.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, as has been indicated, the purpose of the operation of the order-making power in Clause 1(5) is to provide, by a resolution of both Houses, for a Parliament to be extended by two months or for an election to be brought forward by up to two months because of an emergency or unforeseen circumstance. The Bill provides for five-year fixed terms and it is envisaged that elections would happen on the first Thursday in May every five years. However, we are conscious that there could be a short-term crisis that would mean that it would not be practicable to hold the election on the prescribed date. As was discussed in earlier debates and again this evening, such a scenario occurred in 2001 when an outbreak of foot and mouth disease meant that it was necessary to delay the date of the local elections in England, which were set by statute, and primary legislation was required. As it was only four years into the Parliament, it did not theoretically affect the date of the general election, although the widely anticipated date of the election was postponed because of the outbreak.

The power would allow the Prime Minister to vary the date by affirmative order by two months, earlier or later. It is worth bearing in mind that the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee examined this power and concluded that it,

“does not consider the power to be inappropriate in principle”.

However, it recommended that the Bill should be amended to require that a statement setting out the Prime Minister's reasons for proposing the change of polling date must be laid before both Houses at the same time as the draft order. The Government considered and listened to the recommendation and the case made by the committee and, as noble Lords will recall, made the appropriate amendment in Committee, which indicated that we were ready and willing to respond to the committee.

The power is deliberately framed to be non-prescriptive. It is intended to be used in emergencies when we cannot predict what situation will arise, and to deal with a variety of scenarios. When including this power in the Bill, as my noble friend Lord Norton indicated, we looked at powers in the devolution Acts that allow for the dates of general elections to the devolved institutions to be delayed or brought forward. In the case of the foot and mouth outbreak in 2001, there would have been no point in bringing forward the election.

I accepted earlier that I had struggled to find a reason why we might want to bring forward an election. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, suggested that the Olympics or the World Cup might be such occasions. We considered these as well. We know that the Olympics are unlikely to be awarded again to Britain for the foreseeable future, given that they will happen here next year. Regrettably, England did not succeed in its bid for the World Cup, and I am not sure that Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland have a bid in preparation. I offer as a piece of political trivia that, such is the importance of the World Cup, the one parliamentary election in recent times not to be held on Thursday was the Hamilton by-election in 1978, which was held on a Wednesday so that it did not clash with Scotland's opening match in the World Cup in Argentina. I am not sure that it did Scotland much good.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Debate between Lord Wallace of Tankerness and Lord Falconer of Thoroton

Tuesday 10th May 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I apologise. I misunderstood the noble and learned Lord. I thought that he was arguing for four years subsequently. But the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer—as one of the three key reasons why he said it should be four and four—said that it would be wrong if the Government had one set of rules for the first Parliament and a different set of rules for the others. Of course the Government are not seeking to do that. We are seeking to be consistent with five years both for this Parliament and for subsequent Parliaments. Therefore, he cannot hold that argument against the Government.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

My Lords—

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I will just finish the point and then give way to the noble and learned Lord.

If the Government had come forward with a proposal for five years for this Parliament and four years thereafter, I can imagine the criticism that would, with some merit, have been directed at us.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

So if this House decided that it should be four years for subsequent Parliaments, the right course would be for the Government to say that it should be four years for this Parliament as well?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, in the spirit in which the amendment was moved, I do not wish to detain the House. We have had a full debate about the arguments about four years and five, but I shall simply talk about how the Government would prefer the position to be determined with regard to this Parliament. I think that I indicated in my reply to the previous debate that if we are going to have fixed-term Parliaments, it makes sense if we oblige this Parliament to move into the same rules as those governing what will happen in future Parliaments. I understood the noble and learned Lord to say that he thought there was some merit in that consistency.

While I have no doubt that this Government will carry on in our measured fashion up to an election in May 2015, if something is not fixed at that date it is inevitable, as one knows only too well, that speculation can start running rife, and the measure not being in place would perhaps give more grounds for speculation. That would actually hinder the productivity of this Parliament in its latter years when there might be more focus on opinion polls than on the legislative programme, something that the Bill is intended to avoid. We would be far better knowing definitely when the next election would be—namely, the first Thursday in May 2015. I therefore invite the noble and learned Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

Persuasive an advocate though the noble and learned Lord is, I wish to test the opinion of the House.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

It is very difficult to answer that question, and I will not try.

This is an important opportunity for the Government to show their sincerity in relation to the way that constitutional legislation should be done and to accept the amendments. If they do not, I will support the movers of the amendment if they put it to the vote.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, as we have heard, Amendments 4, 5 and 25, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, with the support of the noble Baroness, Lady Boothroyd, and the noble Lords, Lord Butler and Lord Armstrong, provide that the Bill’s provisions would be subject to a sunset clause combined with a potential sunrise clause after the next general election. As my noble friend Lord Tyler said, these amendments are both interesting and seductive. It is also fair to say that they are somewhat complex.

I want to take a moment to set out what the amendments seem to be designed to achieve. They would enable the next parliamentary general election to be on the date set out in the Bill, namely 7 May 2015. After this parliamentary election, however, the apparatus in the Bill—the date of general elections after the 2015 election; the process for calling early elections, and it is important to remember that there is a process for calling early elections which has sometimes been overlooked; and the consequential matters in the Bill—would all cease to apply unless revived. It could be revived by a resolution of each House of Parliament—a sunset clause combined with a sunrise clause. I think that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, gave an accurate and factual answer to the noble Lord, Lord Turnbull, when he said that that resolution could take place at any time. It could add to the uncertainty, and I do not think that that is a particularly happy arrangement.

In bringing forward this Bill the Government sought to put in place a provision that we hoped would become part of our constitutional arrangement—fixed terms for the United Kingdom Parliament, just as there are fixed terms for local government, for the devolved Parliaments and Assemblies and for the European Parliament. Two of the Bill’s key provisions are: to deny the Executive the ability to choose a date for a general election to suit their own party political ends, and to deliver certainty about how long a Parliament should last. On Second Reading, the noble Lord, Lord Hennessy, remarked on the importance of these provisions. I think that he also called them a collector’s item, not least because the Executive, and specifically the Prime Minister, were surrendering a long-held power.

If these amendments were accepted, the position would not be clear not only in the Parliament elected after May 2015 but, indeed, in subsequent ones. Again, the political parties would be able to choose whether Parliaments should have a fixed term, in which case all the arrangements would be in place, or whether to return to the default position of the Prime Minister of the day choosing at some stage during the five years, assuming the quinquennium was revived, when to hold an election. That would mean that in each Parliament the Government of the day could have the allegation levelled against them that they were in some way operating for a partisan advantage.

It has been suggested not just in this debate but in a number of debates that the whole purpose of the Bill is to make arrangements for this Parliament. However, it is clear that it is intended that the fixed-term Parliament should, as I said, become part of our constitutional arrangements. That is what the Labour Party said in its manifesto and my own party has argued that for some time. I thought I heard the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, say that that was still the Labour Party’s policy but I fear that supporting this amendment, as he does, puts that into question. It would allow the Government of the day elected after 2015 to decide, if they had a majority, whether to table the Motion or resolution to re-establish fixed-term Parliaments or whether to revert to the situation that existed prior to this Bill.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

If we discovered that these provisions did not work well or reduced confidence in our constitution, would it not then be right not to prolong them?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, in spite of all the criticisms that the Constitution Committee of your Lordships’ House made of these proposals, it thought that the architecture of Clause 2 and the double triggers for Dissolution were suitable and appropriate. However, if it were felt that other mechanisms were required, clearly amending legislation could be brought forward, and later I shall say something about the importance of using legislation.

In establishing fixed-terms, we are providing that the Government and the Opposition have to face the electorate on a set day. As my noble friend Lady Stowell said on the first day in Committee,

“it would ensure that the Government and the Opposition had to face the electorate on a predetermined date, whatever the political conditions are at that time. That is the most compelling thing about fixed-term Parliaments”.—[Official Report, 15/3/11; col. 223.]

If this amendment were passed, we would allow the situation to revert to the status quo and, as a number of my noble friends have indicated, it would mean that the fixed term would apply only to this Parliament. When this Parliament established fixed terms for the Scottish Parliament, the Welsh Assembly and the Northern Ireland Assembly, a sunset clause was never suggested, and indeed no one in any of the devolved institutions has ever suggested that we should revisit the idea of fixed-term Parliaments. No one is suggesting that Mr Alex Salmond should be able to choose to call an election to suit the best interests of the SNP some time over the next five years. I accept all the caveats that it is not possible to make a complete comparison between this Parliament and the devolved institutions; nevertheless, fixed-term Parliaments for legislatures have worked and no one is suggesting that that should change.

A fixed-term Parliament will deliver certainty. We debated earlier whether better planning is achieved over four or five years, but we believe that a fixed term will facilitate better planning across government. The nation will no longer be left on tenterhooks or have to deal with wild speculation about whether the Prime Minister will go to the country or how the opinion polls are going. In introducing his amendment, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, talked about Prime Ministers agonising over the decision, and sometimes they got it wrong. Harold Wilson arguably got it wrong when he called an election in June 1970. However, let us not kid ourselves: the agony is over whether it is going to be in the best interests of their party. As my noble friend Lord Dobbs has said on more than one occasion during our debates, the key question is, “Can we win?”. It is not unreasonable for a political party to want to win but that is not necessarily the same thing as national advantage. In his book, The View from No. 11: Memoirs of a Tory Radical, my noble friend Lord Lawson said about the then Prime Minister, now the noble Baroness, Lady Thatcher:

“Her view was that a Government should always wait until the final year of the quinquennium, but once there should go as soon as it is confident it will win”.

Noble Lords may say that that is stating the obvious but that is what the Bill tries to change. There will be a fixed term and it will not be possible for the Prime Minister of the day to choose the moment that will be to the party’s partisan advantage.

I should be interested to know how the proposers of the amendment would react if the change were made by repealing legislation rather than having an affirmative order. How would they react if a Minister came to the Dispatch Box of your Lordships’ House and argued that the Government wanted to return to the Prime Minister of the day being able to make a decision to suit his party interest rather than sticking with fixed terms? Perhaps in his reply the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, will tell us how he expects all this to work. The schedule of consequential amendments contains quite important and weighty matters—for example, the repeal of the Septennial Act, changes to the Regency Act 1937 and provisions relating to the demise of the Crown. Does he see those being revived, having been repealed? He will know that there are provisions in the Interpretation Act concerning the revival of an Act that has been repealed. However, I think that there is some uncertainty about whether these would be revived.

The other point that has been made is that not much has changed from the present situation, in which a Government have come to power and introduced a maximum fixed five-year term. I do not think it is fair to say that that is analogous to the situation that would be in place after 2015. The present system is uncertain for the voter and we think that that uncertainty should be removed by introducing fixed terms. However, these amendments would add an entirely new layer of uncertainty for voters. Not only would they not know, when voting, when a subsequent general election might be but they would not even know the legal system under which the next Parliament would operate and how the next general election date would be chosen. I do not believe that that is fair or sensible for the electorate.

It has also been pointed out that the Bill alters the apparatus for calling elections. The crucial difference is that the Government propose moving to fixed terms through an Act of Parliament subject to all the safeguards that that implies. We have heard much in this debate about the importance of our constitution. The noble Baroness, Lady Boothroyd, talked about the fact that we do not have a written constitution. However, if the constitution is changed, it is done through an Act of Parliament rather than through a special procedure, and people have cherished the idea of parliamentary sovereignty.

It is not the case that this Parliament, through this Bill, is trying to bind its successors. That point was made forcefully by the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, but it was answered by my noble friends Lord Tyler and Lord Marks. We do not seek to entrench these provisions. We cannot bind a future Parliament. However, we can say that this important constitutional change has been brought into the law of our land through an Act of Parliament—by First Reading, Second Reading, Committee, Report and Third Reading in the House of Commons and by the procedures that we know in this House of First Reading, Second Reading, Committee, Report and Third Reading and by Her Majesty giving Royal Assent. That is how we change our constitution—by Act of Parliament.

Surely, if we were being true to our constitutional heritage, we would say that any change to that heritage should also be carried out through an Act of Parliament. It would have to have the same scrutiny as this Bill has clearly had and Ministers would, in the other place and this place, have to argue their case for making the change. I do not think that we can just sweep aside the concerns raised by my noble friend Lord Marks. With the exception of amendments to the Parliament Acts, with this amendment a resolution of the House of Commons could be overturned or at least thwarted by a resolution of this House. It is a unique situation and we should think long and hard before going down that route. If we do go down it, one can imagine the tensions there would be at some stage if the other House had voted for a fixed-term Parliament but this House decided it would not. I fully understand and associate myself with the concerns about our constitutional procedures and heritage, but we change the constitution by Act of Parliament and not by simple resolution. A very new venture is embodied in these amendments.

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[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I cannot readily think of one off the top of my head. However, there are enough people in the Chamber and, if there is such a mechanism, I am sure that one of them will be able to tell us. My noble and learned friend, who has wide experience, might be able to think of one, but I cannot. However, the “sunsetted and sunrisen” approach is very novel.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

My recollection is that we put sunrise or sunset clauses into a significant amount of the terrorist legislation, the result being that they would continue to have an effect only if there had been a resolution in both Houses of Parliament to carry on with them. I think that that is an answer to your Lordships’ question.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

The noble and learned Lord is right. There is a difference between an Act lapsing and not being revivable and the situation under this provision where if it lapsed for the first Parliament because it was not passed in resolution, it could be revived for the second Parliament. In practice, however, the difference may not be that great.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I stand to be corrected, but as far as I am aware it is a novel approach. Not only could it lapse and be put in suspension; it could be revived, lapse again and be revived again. We are not switching on and off light bulbs. There are quite important issues here and I am not sure that these procedures are designed to give them proper weight. That is why we argue that primary legislation should be the way of dealing with the issue, if it is felt that the provisions for a fixed-term Parliament are not working and should not be the basis for the future.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Debate between Lord Wallace of Tankerness and Lord Falconer of Thoroton

Tuesday 29th March 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

On the face of it, this seems an unwise provision. First, the similar provision in the Parliament Act is about the Speaker having to certify whether something is a money Bill. That has become a legal, constitutional issue where there is not much discretion; it is simply a question of law. I can see that assistance is important for this. Secondly, I imagine that the application of the Freedom of Information Act would mean that any document containing the advice given by the Deputy Speakers to the Speaker of the House of Commons in relation to this issue would become available very quickly. Thirdly, it does not help the constitution if there is disagreement between the Deputy Speakers and the Speakers and a doubtful Motion of no confidence. Fourthly, what is the purpose of the provision when the critical issue raised by the Bill is: what is a motion of no confidence? Though the procedure is very tight and closed, the Bill leaves that completely open.

It is not something that the courts will want to get involved in. However, it is not good for Parliament that divisions will become apparent and technical processes that need to be gone through might not be. Quite separately from the issue of whether this is a motion of no confidence—on which view there is wide discretion—the phrase, “so far as practicable”, is one to which any reasonable person can give a very substantial meaning. Two reasonable people can take two entirely differing views as to what is practicable and what is not.

I ask, in parenthesis, what do the Government envisage as making it impracticable to consult a Deputy Speaker? Is it only the illness or incapacity of one of the Deputy Speakers or do the Government have something else in mind? It seems to be extraordinarily unlikely that, apart from illness or incapacity, the tabling of a motion that might be one of no confidence, the indication by the Speaker or the debate on the motion, will happen so quickly that there will be no possibility of getting to speak to a Deputy Speaker. Perhaps the Minister can help us on that.

Like my noble friend Lord Howarth and the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, I ask what the purpose of this is once it is accepted, as it is by everybody, that an exercise of judgment may well be required by the Speaker. The judgment is his and his alone, and who he or she consults is inevitably a matter for him or her. For example, one would reasonably expect that if there is any room for doubt, he or she should consult senior representatives of all the political parties about what they think in relation to it, yet the Bill specifies only one group of statutory consultees. I can see the precedent in the Parliament Act, but the way that this is drafted is much more suitable, almost, to the exercise of a discretion by a Minister, which is then challengeable, rather than to the exercise of difficult judgment by a Speaker in the context of the House of Commons where to specify statutory consultees, apart from in the Parliament Act, is extraordinarily unusual. I do not know of any other example, and I would be interested in the other examples that the Government relied on apart from the Parliament Act, which is very different.

It feels as if this has not been thought through, and I invite the Minister, having heard the debate, to ask what we are getting out of this provision. Does it make it worse rather than better? The superficial attractions of asking the Speaker to get advice are, when you think about it, probably not real, particularly when there is nothing to stop the Speaker getting that advice if he wants to, yet here it is made compulsory. Why? What is the benefit? There does not seem to be any, and there seems to be quite a lot of disbenefits.

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Wallace of Tankerness)]

My Lords, my noble friend Lord Norton of Louth was quite correct, as other speakers in this debate have indicated, to draw attention to the provision in the Parliament Act 1911, which indicates:

“Before giving his certificate the Speaker shall consult, if practicable, two members to be appointed from the Chairmen’s Panel at the beginning of each Session by the Committee of Selection”.

My noble friend inquired whether that was simply because of precedent and suggested that there are differences between the definition of a money Bill and what is required of the Speaker in the context of this clause. I accept that this arises from there being a precedent for such a requirement and acknowledge that there is a difference between determining what is a money Bill and the nature of the certification that would be required of the Speaker in the context of this Bill. What they have in common is that they are matters which have important constitutional consequences. That is why we thought it appropriate, given that there is a precedent for the Speaker to consult two very senior members—in the case of the Parliament Act, two members of the Chairman’s Panel and in this case Deputy Speakers—that we should follow that precedent.

When I was listening to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, I was thinking that if we had not included this we would probably have been accused of not having thought this through. In the Parliament Act, there is provision for consultation with the Deputy Speaker and we would have been asked why we had not included a provision to consult the Deputy Speakers.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

I feel that the noble and learned Lord is getting a bit paranoid. No, I would not have said that.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, it is not necessarily paranoia if you think that someone is putting forward such an argument, but I will leave it to noble Lords to judge whether they could hear the noble and learned Lord making a similar argument.

I accept that the issue links into the debates we have had, and will have later, on whether we could find more objective criteria for determining what constitutes a vote of no confidence. I was not quite sure whether the argument made by my noble friend Lord Norton was that, as things stand at the moment, the Speaker has a greater need to consult in the absence of such a definition than in the context of a money Bill. Even looking at the provisions in the 1911 Act as to what constitutes a money Bill, it may be a statutory definition but it is not transparent, which I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Martin, who had to deal with these things, will recognise.

I would not wish to try to persuade the House—nor is it the case—that this is the most important provision in the Bill. Nevertheless, it is very similar to a provision that has existed on the statute book and has been in force for 100 years. It is a tried and tested procedure. That also applies to the requirement to consult “so far as practicable”. Clearly, if someone was ill or abroad, that might not necessarily be practicable. The noble Lord, Lord Howarth, was right to say that the requirement is for consultation, not to seek agreement. As I have said, they are tried and tested measures, which we thought were appropriate in a context where important constitutional consequences would flow from a decision.

On freedom of information, obviously one issue would be what form the consultation took. If the consultation was verbal, there would be nothing for a freedom of information request to latch on to. I would have to remind myself what the possible grounds of exemption are but, given that advice to Ministers can be a matter for exemption, perhaps that would also apply to advice given to a Speaker. However, without looking in detail at the terms of the Freedom of Information Act, I cannot answer that question directly, although I can say that, if the consultation was not written down, I am not quite sure what would be caught. The noble and learned Lord asked me to write to him on this and I will seek to do so.

Given that we are trying to embrace a tried-and- tested procedure, I would invite my noble friend to withdraw his amendment.

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[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

I am slightly confused by the amendment. Its effect would be that, depending on the date of the certificate, you could be compelled to have a general election between, for example, 18 December and 16 January, which would seem unwise, or from 1 August to 29 August. I have no experience of fighting elections but, speaking as a member of the electorate, I imagine that I would not particularly want a general election campaign going on between those dates. The Government cannot avoid that conclusion on the basis of the rigidity in the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames. The Government or the noble Lord may indicate that something is wrong with the current system. Have there been Prime Ministers who, having lost a vote of confidence, then held on for a year or two avoiding having a general election? This seems to be trying to solve a problem that probably does not exist.

I wait to hear the noble and learned Lord's view on this, because there may be some problem that we have not spotted. For the life of me, I cannot see it. This is a criticism not of the Government but of the amendment, but again we are struggling with a series of problems which do not exist. As the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, says: for what? To take away from the Prime Minister the power that the noble and learned Lord acknowledged that he could probably have by the back door: the ability to procure a vote of no confidence in himself whenever he wanted to go to the country anyway.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I readily understand the thinking behind the amendment moved by my noble friend Lord Marks. If the Bill is intended to remove the opportunity for the Prime Minister of the day to take a partisan view on the timing of the election, I can see why, the Prime Minister having lost a vote of confidence, you might then wish to restrict the Prime Minister's room for manoeuvre on setting the date—either to go too soon, which may give a campaigning advantage; or to delay unreasonably. Nevertheless, the amendment is unnecessary. More importantly, practical issues could flow from it.

If we take the case of delaying too long, in the context of Clause 2(6) and the Bill as a whole, it is clear that the Prime Minister would be required to recommend to Her Majesty a prompt election. If two-thirds of the House—the other place—had voted for an early election, one would imagine that the Prime Minister would be as anxious as anyone to get on with it. Likewise, although the Prime Minister may be less keen for an early election where there has been a motion of no confidence, and no other Government have been formed, that would also be a clear statement from Parliament that it expected to see change and an election. The electorate would share that view. This is pure speculation, but if the Prime Minister tried to pull a fast one and delay unduly, that decision could be subject to challenge.

On the other hand, there are limits as to how quickly the Prime Minister can move if he seeks an early polling day. Clause 3(1) dissolves Parliament 17 working days before polling day, so the timetable at Dissolution is fixed and is known to all sides. Therefore, there is no way that that could be cut short for advantage. There is already that backstop as to how an election could be called.

My biggest concern is practical. The Government decided not to set specific limits that inadvertently tied hands in circumstances which could lead to a situation such as that described by the noble and learned Lord, where the election campaign might be some time between 18 December and 16 January. It is almost inevitable that if we were to try to fix those times, the first example would be when it fell in a period where campaigning would be very difficult. We should allow flexibility to allow a general election to be called on a date—which, one would assume, would be consulted on among the parties—to minimise disruption in a Christmas period or summer vacations.

Therefore, the amendment is neither necessary—provision is already there which would stop a Prime Minister calling an election too soon; he would clearly be challenged if he tried to delay unduly—nor practical in trying to tie hands. That might run into more problems than the amendment is intended to solve.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

The noble and learned Lord said something important there. He said that the Prime Minister would be subject to challenge if he sought to delay. Interestingly enough, it is a statutory power whereby the Prime Minister is obliged to recommend a date. Is it challengeable by way of judicial review?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

It could be challengeable by judicial review if he was abusing his decision on a recommendation. That is why there is a safeguard there, which would mean that it would not be possible to delay in an unacceptable way.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

Just to pursue that: the Government envisage a situation that could not arise now—because there is absolute discretion on the part of the Prime Minister—whereby the Prime Minister recommends to the Queen that the date of the general election be, say, 1 May 2013, and other parties can take the Prime Minister to court, arguing that that is an unreasonable exercise of his discretion and ask the court to fix the date of the general election, which it could set to take place two weeks earlier or two weeks later. Is that what the Government envisage as a possibility?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

It is not what the Government envisage. However, if a vote of confidence had been on 10 December 2012, holding an election on 1 May 2013, which the noble and learned Lord mentioned, might well be considered to be an abuse of the statutory power. Under judicial reviews, the court would not necessarily substitute its own date, but the Prime Minister would be required to nominate or recommend a date to Her Majesty that would be consistent with a proper exercise of the statutory power. It is highly hypothetical and unlikely, but it would not be unreasonable; if there had been a vote of no confidence and 10 days had elapsed in December 2012, setting an election date for 1 May 2013 would be an abuse of power. That would be widely recognised.

However, the point that I am making is that we do not believe that there should be the kind of restrictions set out in my noble friend’s amendment. They could run into practical problems for the very reasons that he illustrated, but, in practical political terms, it is not likely that a date would be set that would be seen to be an abuse by taking it too far.

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[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I readily recognise where the noble Lord, Lord Howarth of Newport, is coming from on this. As the Committee will know, the Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Act 2011 requires boundary review reports to be published on a five-yearly timetable, starting in October 2013. Once this Bill is enacted, general elections will occur at five-year intervals, starting in May 2015. In the absence of any early elections, the effect would be that boundary reviews generally would be published 18 months before each general election. Our debates on the previous Bill were about allowing an opportunity for the political parties and electors to become familiar with new boundaries and, importantly, for the electoral administrators to gear up accordingly.

I understand that the intention behind this amendment is to realign the five-year cycle for boundary reviews in the event that an early election causes them to get out of sync. Unfortunately, the amendment does not achieve this. It relates only to when the order is submitted to Parliament; there is no provision made to adjust the cycles that the Boundary Commissions themselves will work to. That is not simply a technical objection but an important and fundamental one. Broadly, I have sympathy with what the amendment is trying to do to ensure that there is one boundary review in each Parliament so that constituencies remain of roughly equal size and votes remain of equal weight. We looked at the interaction between the boundary reviews and the provisions of the Bill. The conclusion that we reached, which may be an echo of what some Members said in earlier debates, was that we simply could not legislate for every scenario under a fixed-term Parliament provision. This is one where it would be far better for judgments to be made by future Parliaments, in possession of knowledge of the circumstances, depending on when the early election—if such there was—took place.

I give a brief example. If, for the sake of argument, an early election was to occur before a full boundary review had been completed—say, in early 2018, when the report from the Boundary Commission would not be due before October that year—this amendment says nothing about what should happen to that boundary review, which would be well under way and ready to report in October 2018. It says simply that the next order should not be brought into force until 2022—that is, before the election of 2023. That raises questions about whether the review that was due in 2018 should be implemented in 2022, which would mean that the boundaries could become out of date. Is it the intention that the first review after an early election should have a 2022 deadline, in which case additional provision would be required to define which register that review should use? Without that additional provision, the commissions would have to use the December 2020 register, which would give them a very short time in which to conduct the review.

As I indicated, while it would be preferable—and may still be possible for the dates of some early elections—to continue the cycle of reviews that is there, it is far better left to a future Parliament to deal with the specific circumstances if it felt that boundary reviews were not keeping pace with the cycle of elections. In any event, even without doing anything, future elections are likely to be fought with more up-to-date registers than was the case for England in 2010. I welcome what I am sure is the well intended purpose of the noble Lord’s amendment, but I do not believe that it achieves that purpose. I therefore ask him to withdraw it.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

Does the Minister envisage Parliament dealing with the issue by primary legislation each time?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

As things stand, it probably would have to be by primary legislation. It might be a very simple Bill, but I think in trying to be too prescriptive at this point you could run into difficulty. As I have said, there may well be circumstances in which the early election, should it occur, would nevertheless be one in which the actual scheduled date would still fit in quite readily and allow a reasonable time for the political parties and electoral administrators to make the necessary arrangements. That is why I do not think we can predict what is going to happen and it is better to leave it to the future—to see whether it would in fact be necessary—in the belief, and indeed the knowledge, that even under the present system, without anything further, we are likely to be fighting elections on more up-to-date electoral rolls than was ever possible prior to the passage of the 2011 Act.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

The account of history given by the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, is entirely accurate. However, if you are passing a Bill that is intended to set out what our constitution is, what happens when there is not a suspension of elections and the Commons wants rid of a particular Government because it, quite legitimately, wants a national Government? The effect of the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, is that you are not allowed to have a situation where you cannot avoid an election. I envisage circumstances in which a vote of no confidence might well reflect both a Commons view and a national view that the Government of one party be changed, for example, into a national Government. We have to be able to deal sensibly with this. The current arrangements allow for a defeat in a vote of no confidence followed by a replacement of the national Government, which the amendment does not deal with. It is not a comprehensive definition of motions of no confidence and so leaves the Speaker as exposed under these arrangements as he is under the old arrangements. I share the desire of the mover of this amendment to get to a point where the Speaker is not exposed in the way that he is at the moment. I do not believe that the amendment quite succeeds in doing that. I am open-minded about the other efforts to do it, but currently, I can see force in the sort of amendment that I suggested.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, it is obvious that we have had an important debate following a number of other debates on amendments where we have looked at the structure of Clause 2. In this case, the intention of the amendment is to seek more certainty about what will constitute a no-confidence vote. It is clear from the amendment—indeed it was said by the mover, my noble friend Lord Cormack, and the noble Lord, Lord Armstrong of Ilminster—that an early election would inevitably follow specific types of no-confidence votes being carried in the House of Commons.

It is interesting that the concern of all contributors has been about how we ensure that we are certain about what a no-confidence motion is. My noble friend Lord Maclennan of Rogart made the important point that even the amendment tabled by my noble friend Lord Cormack does not necessarily exclude other possible amendments. That indicates the difficulties. I have tried to be open about the objective, which is to try to devise a means by which there can be a trigger mechanism for an early election but with a degree of certainty and without opening the door for abuse.

If I can helpfully work on that basis, I respect the views of those who say that they are totally against fixed-term Parliaments, but this Bill is designed to bring in a fixed-term Parliament; a number of noble Lords set out specific arguments based on our having a fixed-term Parliament. I think there is some agreement that if we have fixed-term Parliaments, there must be a mechanism to trigger an early election. I have not detected any desire in your Lordships' House for a very fixed, rigid system.

The noble Lord, Lord Cormack, in introducing his amendment, rightly indicated that if we are to have what he described as the escape clause, it must be clear, simple, understandable and not capable of misrepresentation. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, asked what was the thinking behind the Government’s position as we set it out. Why had we not specified words? My noble friend Lord Norton encouraged us to have a statutory definition of a no confidence motion. The reason why—

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[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

I completely understand that it is different under the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill but remember that the consequence now of the Government losing a vote of confidence is that they at the very least have to resign and at the very most have to have a general election. There is a very high price to be paid now in relation to losing a vote of confidence or no confidence. Can the noble and learned Lord identify historically any occasion where there has been a dispute over whether something is a vote of confidence?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I seem to recall in one of our earlier debates that there was a suggestion that in the 1970s Mr Harold Wilson indicated that he would not accept as a motion of no confidence motions which on some occasions hitherto had been seen as votes of no confidence. I think that that point was made by the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, not on this amendment but in a debate on an earlier amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

My Lords, our debates on Clause 2 have been very significant. Would it be possible for the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, to suggest some process? He has been accommodating and conciliatory, and he has broadly shared the aim, expressed all around the House, of there being no uncertainty about the circumstances in which an election would be triggered. As I understand it—I may have misunderstood—the Minister is not seeking to dislodge the basic principle that, when a Government lose the confidence of the House of Commons, that Government have to go.

Could I invite the noble and learned Lord to convene a meeting of all interested parties—I do not mean political parties—from all over the House to discuss this, with a view to agreeing a Clause 2 that reflects the concerns that he appeared to share? The noble and learned Lord—I hope that this will not be a case of “once bitten, twice shy”—was accommodating in indicating during the Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill that he would come back with things, and he is leaving me with the impression that he shares many of our concerns. Perhaps the way to move forward is for those who are interested to meet him to try to agree a clause that reflects the sort of principles he just went through. Does that suggestion find favour with the noble and learned Lord?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I am certainly more than willing to meet. I will need to discuss with ministerial colleagues—it will not be just I who have to reflect on this—but I am certainly willing to meet, although I do not know whether that can be done constructively with a large number, or whether it is better done with a smaller number. The noble Lord, Lord Martin, has already suggested that he and the noble Baroness, Lady Boothroyd, would be willing to meet. I have said that I would welcome that opportunity, although that would be to deal with a discrete part of the Bill. I am sure that, through the usual channels, we can devise some way of meeting, either individually or by convening a much larger meeting. I am sometimes sceptical about how far you can get without convening a larger meeting. I will work out the best way to take that forward, with an undertaking to meet and include those—without, I hope, being exhaustive—who have made an important contribution to our deliberations in Committee.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

I am very grateful to the noble and learned Lord. One of the things that very much infused the debate on Clause 2 is the question of what the Government have in mind when they use the phrase “motion of no confidence”. For example, it was never clear—I am sure this is my fault for not listening; it is very late—whether a motion of no confidence includes being defeated on a motion of confidence. Does a motion of no confidence include things that are not explicit? Does the definition of a motion of confidence in Erskine May apply in helping us to construe the reference to a motion of no confidence in Clause 2? We need to know the answers to those questions. If the noble and learned Lord does not want to answer now, I am more than happy for him to write. However, we do need clear answers to those questions.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I tried to answer on this in response to the previous debate, when I indicated that we recognised that no-confidence motions could take and have taken many different forms, and that our desire in the Bill was not to be prescriptive and not to restrict flexibility. That is where we started from and that is what we sought to do. I think a vote of no confidence would not include a vote of confidence, but it would not be beyond the wit of a leader of the Opposition to table an amendment inserting the word “no”. That is clearly part of the discussion that we can have. The noble and learned Lord asked what our proposed statutory definition of a motion of no confidence was. In response to the earlier debate, I said that we recognised the many different forms that it could take, as he himself illustrated in his speech. Our desire was not to restrict flexibility. We will enter the discussion, as I have said, bearing in mind the comments that have been made from various parts of your Lordships’ Chamber.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

There was just a flicker there, in that the noble and learned Lord said a vote of no confidence would not include a vote of confidence. Therefore, you could have the strange situation where the Government are defeated on a vote of confidence but do not resign at that point. Indeed, there could not be a general election under those circumstances; under this Bill, there would then have to be a vote of no confidence at that point. How nutty is this Bill?

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[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

My Lords, this amendment deals with the question of the potential coincidence between elections for the Scottish Parliament, the National Assembly for Wales and the Northern Ireland Assembly. Our draft gives the Prime Minister the ability to lay an order to ensure that a general election must take place at least 30 days apart from the Scottish Parliament, the Welsh Assembly and the Northern Ireland Assembly elections, to avoid a coincidence of these occurring on the same day.

I put my amendment down to probe the Government’s position on this. Everybody understands that the first general election under any Fixed-term Parliaments Act is likely to occur at or near the same date as the elections for the institutions I have referred to. Subsequent to my putting my amendment down, the Government, in consultation with the relevant institutions, have now reached some sort of agreement and have now put their amendments down, as Amendments 55B and 55C. Would it be convenient to your Lordships if we heard what the Government have proposed first, because I do not fully understand it? Once we hear what the Government have proposed, it would then be possible to see whether we need to proceed with our probing amendments.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I hope this will be a helpful way to proceed, because Amendments 55B and 55C standing in my name implement agreements reached with the Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales in relation to the coincidence of elections in 2015. It is important to say from the outset that this Bill has not created the possibility that elections to the UK Parliament and the devolved institutions coincide—that could have happened anyway. However, the Bill has given us prior warning and has allowed us an opportunity to plan for the eventuality.

The Government believe that there can be tangible benefits from combining elections, in terms of voter convenience and cost. These were factors which led to the decision to combine the voting systems referendum with other polls on 5 May. However, combining elections for two legislatures arguably poses issues which did not arise from the combination of the polls with a referendum. I have outlined to your Lordships’ House previously—both at Second Reading and in one of our earlier debates in Committee—that concerns have been expressed by the Scottish Parliament, by the Welsh Assembly and in the other place that if the two sets of elections coincide it could be difficult to ensure that voters are able to differentiate between the manifestos for each election for each separate parliament, and that might inhibit the candidates’ ability to campaign effectively. There is also the added complication of different voting systems in the different elections; the 2015 UK general election could be held using a new electoral system, if the referendum on 5 May has an affirmative outcome, and will in any event use different boundaries.

This set of circumstances meant that it was not appropriate to combine the polls to the devolved institutions and the House of Commons in this instance. To that end, we have been in lengthy discussions with the Presiding Officers of both the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly. I made it clear at Second Reading that we wrote to the Presiding Officers on 17 February proposing that if the Scottish Parliament or Welsh Assembly passed a resolution, with the support of at least two-thirds of all Members, agreeing that the 2015 Scottish Parliament or Welsh Assembly general elections should be moved up to one year earlier or later, the Government would then table an amendment to this Bill which would seek to set the dates of these elections on a one-off basis. Copies of the letters to the respective Presiding Officers have been placed in the Library of the House.

The Scottish Parliament passed a unanimous motion on 3 March confirming that it wished the United Kingdom Government to bring forward a provision to defer its 2015 general election to 5 May 2016. A similar motion was passed by the Welsh Assembly on 16 March. To this end, the amendments in my name will provide that the general elections to the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly currently scheduled for May 2015 will be deferred by one year in line with the motions passed by the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly. That will ensure that the two sets of elections do not coincide in 2015.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I was not about to sit down. I was about to address how we might proceed in the future. I point out that this was not a question of the Assembly Members or the Scottish Parliament awarding themselves an extra year—the motions were passed unanimously by the outgoing Assembly and Parliament. A new Parliament and a new Assembly will be elected on 5 May but we believed it was important to bring forward provisions now so that, at least when people go to vote on 5 May, they will know the period of the Parliament or the Assembly which they are electing.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

The Minister says that people will know. Does he envisage that the Bill will be passed by 5 May 2011?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wigley]

In the first place, I thank the Minister and the Government for moving on this, following the discussion that took place in another place and the misgivings expressed quite widely. It is very helpful that these changes are proposed. None the less, there is an issue with regard to the 30 days. There would be considerable complications if two elections took place within that time, not least for those who have to organise the elections. In the context of Wales and, I suspect, Scotland the elections would be on different boundaries, as well as the possibility of there being different electoral systems. I hope that the Government will look again at the 30 days and see whether it could be elongated to two or three months. Can the decision be put in the hands of the National Assembly and not just the Secretary of State so that there is no question of any political tension arising out of this?

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

I have two or three difficulties with the Government’s proposal. First, if Parliament decides that it should be a four-year fixed term rather than a five-year one, the extension of the lives of the Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales would have been entirely unnecessary and not justified. What then are the Government going to do in relation to it? That suggests to me that the issue should have been dealt with only once it was known what the length of the fixed-term Parliament was, which you could not know until after the Bill had passed—which suggests that the Bill is coming at the wrong time in the cycle.

Secondly, it strikes me as wholly unsatisfactory that this provision deals only what the first of the elections and none of the subsequent elections. If there is always a five-year cycle, there will not be a coincidence again for a long time. However, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, acknowledges, this could happen at any time. In those circumstances, while I fully accept what the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, is saying, and maybe my proposal to separate the elections by at least 30 days does not leave long enough, a mechanism needs to be properly addressed in the Bill for going forward and ensuring that when the clash occurs there is some process by which it can be dealt with. The Bill does not deal with that. This looks like a rather unsatisfactory sticking plaster to deal with something that had not been thought through before the Bill was introduced. What are the Minister’s proposals going to be for dealing with the problem as a permanent problem? Will there be another Act of Parliament in addition to the Acts of Parliament that we can expect to deal with the boundary revisions from the Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill, to which the noble and learned Lord referred earlier in the evening? Is this another loose end left flapping in the wind? Is it intended that the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly should have five-year terms only on this occasion, or for ever?

Thirdly, why has Northern Ireland been treated differently from these other two institutions?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I sometimes wonder if the noble and learned Lord listened to what I said. I have answered those three questions, but perhaps, with respect, I did not explain clearly enough, so I shall try again.

The first question was with regard to whether we would have a four-year or a five-year Parliament. Clearly that is a debate that we will come to at Report, and I am not going to rehearse again the arguments why I believe the five-year option is preferable to the four-year one. If the Committee agrees today that these amendments in my name should be passed, I believe that they should stay because people who will be voting on 5 May should at least get some indication of what the length of the Parliament or Assembly that they are electing is likely to be.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

Is the noble and learned Lord saying that it would be four years or five years?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I am saying that they would still get five years. I do not think it would be right to elect people on the basis that they believe they are getting five years and then to say, “By the way, you’re not”. The noble Lord, Lord Bach, shakes his head. I think we would attract even greater criticism if there was an expectation of five years, and then we said, “Oh, by the way, we’ve changed our minds. You’re not getting your five years. You’re being cut back to four”. That would be the source of some legitimate criticism. Of course, if that is what happens and we do have four years—I will not again emphasise the reasons why we should not—the chances of it recurring are probably less likely, because then you could get yourself on to a four-year cycle, depending on whether there was an early election.

The noble and learned Lord asked what would happen in the longer term. I did seek to explain that we have also indicated that, subject to these amendments being accepted, in the longer term we would carry out a detailed assessment of the implications of having two sets of elections coinciding on a later date. Obviously the Electoral Commission would be involved in that. In the light of that, we would consider whether to conduct a public consultation on whether in devolved institutions the term should permanently be extended to five years. We do not proceed to do that in the context of this Bill, but we have indicated, as I have done in earlier debates, that that is our proposal. I hope that I have made it clear on this occasion that that is what has happened.

The noble and learned Lord also raised a question about Northern Ireland. I thought that I had answered that but, for clarity, the situation there is that there was correspondence with the parties in Northern Ireland on this issue. Northern Ireland Office Ministers concluded that it would be better to await the outcome of combined polls scheduled for 5 May this year before taking a decision on whether special provision would be needed in the future for Northern Ireland. It was a reflection of the dialogue that had taken place within Northern Ireland, and I see nothing wrong with this Parliament being sensitive to the views expressed in different parts of our diverse United Kingdom. I think that is to our credit, so I do not think that it would have been appropriate to have made provision for Northern Ireland if that was not the feedback that we were getting in the consultations that had taken place.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

It was my fault for not having heard that. Having heard what the noble and learned Lord said now and understood it—having been so dim-witted in not picking it up before, for which I apologise—perhaps that indicates that this Government should not have come forward quite so hastily with this Bill, but instead should have consulted on those issues, which are very important, before bringing forward the Bill. It is not too late.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

Think, like the right honourable Nick Clegg, about giving the public more control over their politicians. There is always a sense of frustration that comes when a new Prime Minister comes in and the public get no say in whether this change is right. This would reflect this mood and give the public more control.

The noble Lord is right. I cannot think how I would have taken over as Prime Minister and at the same time been unpopular. It is an unlikely scenario. However, it is a way of avoiding lots of clubhouse politics, where you move from one to another. It does not necessarily drive a coach and horses through the Bill. It would do so if the viability provision or the change in policy were there. It would, however, be worth the Government thinking of a circumstance in which, for example, a Government totter on with a majority of one and want to have a general election but the Opposition will not give them a two-thirds vote. Why should there not be a general election in those circumstances? It might well be that the country is not assisted by there being weak government in those circumstances.

I completely understand why the Government would wish to knock out the very general reasons for Dissolution. However, if the Government are serious about trying to improve the constitution, it is worth them considering whether or not there are more specific reasons of the sort proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Howarth of Newport, that might be worth including in Clause 3(2) of the Bill that says that,

“Parliament cannot otherwise be dissolved”,

except in those situations that we have dealt with before, which is the two-thirds majority, the expiry of the fixed term or a motion of no confidence.

Amendment 55A says that Parliament cannot otherwise be dissolved,

“unless the House of Commons has approved on a division a motion tabled by the Prime Minister that the Prime Minister should request Her Majesty to dissolve Parliament”.

The effect of that provision is that it would not be in the discretion of the Prime Minister alone, which is the current position. Put aside everything else. Assume no Motion of no confidence. Assume no two-thirds vote. Assume no change to the Bill to allow any special measures. The Prime Minister could nevertheless table a Motion that says, “I think there should be a general election”, and, if Parliament backed him by a simple majority, there could be a general election. This is probably the position anyway because, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, says, there is nothing to stop the Prime Minister from procuring a vote of no confidence to get rid of himself so that, for example, in the Heath situation, he could have an election to deal with a particular crisis that had struck the Government. Would it not be more sensible for there to be a straightforward mechanism that allowed that to happen? If it can happen by the back door, why should it not be allowed to happen by the front door? It does not offend against the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill because its stated purpose is to take away the right to call a general election from the Prime Minister and give it to Parliament. Amendment 55A does not offend against that principle

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Howarth of Newport, for these amendments. My immediate response was to share the view of my noble friend Lord Norton of Louth; that they do run a coach and possibly some horses though the Bill—although I do not agree with him that that is what should commend it. The other thing I noticed was that there was no certainty as to whether Parliament would in fact be dissolved in these circumstances. Parliament might otherwise be dissolved. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, suggested that it would be the new Prime Minister who would trigger this. If there is a discretion, the Prime Minister taking over in circumstances that might not be propitious for his party might not necessarily exercise it. I think we are back to the situation that the Bill seeks to avoid. My noble friend and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, recognised that issues such as changing government policy or a very subjective view about the viability of a Parliament would put the power back into the hands of the Prime Minister that this Bill seeks to remove.

I also observe that another Prime Minister may be appointed on the grounds of death or serious illness, and I am not sure that that would necessarily be good grounds for triggering Dissolution. I simply observe that in Wales where there are fixed-term Parliaments, there have been circumstances in which the First Minister resigned and a new First Minister was appointed, and I do not remember the Labour Party clamouring for an election. When subsequently the minority Government became a coalition Government, there was no suggestion then in the context of a fixed-term Parliament that there should have been an election. Nor was there any suggestion that an election would have been appropriate following the death of Donald Dewar in 2000 or the resignation of Henry McLeish in 2001. In circumstances in which we have had fixed-term Parliaments and there has been a change of First Minister, it has not been thought appropriate that there should be an election; rather, the fixed-term Parliament has seen itself out in circumstances in which the Government have the confidence of the Parliament. That is crucial because if the Government do not have the confidence of the Parliament, the provisions elsewhere in the Bill will kick in.

I do not really understand the point about the majority falling below 10. Historically, a majority of 10 could be quite a high number. I do not believe that that would be an appropriate circumstance in which there may be Dissolution.

On amendment 55A, I cannot share the view of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, that it is somehow consistent with the principles of the Fixed-term Parliament Bill. I think it drives more than a coach and horses through the Bill. I have said on a number of occasions that the situation is open to abuse. The Prime Minister of the day could contrive Dissolution by the back door, but I do not think that we should put a red carpet down to the back door or to the front door for him to do it. There would be a degree of opprobrium attached if he was thought to be bending the rules, or indeed if he went to the country on the basis of a vote of no confidence in him that had been expressed by the House of Commons. We all know the reality of this amendment; if the Prime Minister wanted to have the date of his choosing for his party’s best advantage, it would not even need the black arts of the Whips to get his Members to turn out and vote for it. It defeats the object of a fixed-term Parliament. In these circumstances, I urge the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

My Lords, I have absolutely nothing to say on prorogation but I would like to mention the significant contribution that my noble friend Lord Howarth of Newport has made to the Committee stage. I also congratulate the noble and learned Lord who has conducted Committee stage completely alone on behalf of the Government. Although I have disagreed with very much of what he said, he has done an absolutely first-class job.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, for his kind remarks. I also thank—as I have done on a number of occasions—the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, for introducing amendments that have allowed us to look at important parts of this legislation. Indeed, I thank in general all others who have contributed to our constructive debates.

The noble Lord, Lord Howarth, asked about prorogation. There is a distinction between the prerogative power of dissolution and the prerogative power of prorogation. We have identified that the prerogative power of dissolution, which this legislation seeks to remove, can be used by the Prime Minister, in advising Her Majesty, for partisan purposes. By contrast, the prerogative power of prorogation is different. It is the mechanism that is used to bring to an end a Session of Parliament and determines, subject to the carry-over procedure, when Bills have to complete their passage through both Houses so that they become law; it is also used at times in the run-up to Parliament finishing its business pending Dissolution.

An incumbent Prime Minister, even today, could prorogue Parliament to prevent the other place considering a forthcoming no-confidence motion, as happened in Canada some two or three years ago. That risk exists today but the convention is that the Government and Parliament find time to debate a motion of no confidence tabled by the Official Opposition. It is instructive that the Constitution Committee of your Lordships’ House considered the question of prorogation as part of its examination of the Bill and decided that the risk of abuse of the power of prorogation is very small. It therefore concluded that Her Majesty’s power to prorogue Parliament should remain.

The noble Lord raised the possibility of abuse in relation to the 14 days to frustrate these ends. It is perhaps thought that preserving the prorogation power could mean that a Prime Minister who wants a general election can, after a no-confidence motion is passed, prorogue Parliament during the 14-day Government formation period and thus deny the new Government the opportunity for a motion of confidence in them to be passed. It is highly unlikely that would happen. There are two basic scenarios. The first is that there is no obvious alternative Government and therefore nothing would be achieved by proroguing Parliament. If it was the wish of the Prime Minister of the day to go to an election, he would simply proceed to an election after the expiry of the 14 days. The second is that there are political factors, such as the Prime Minister resigning after a no-confidence motion and Her Majesty appointing a new Prime Minister. In such a scenario the outgoing Prime Minister would have agreed to resign and it is inconceivable that he or she would resign and then not allow the new Prime Minister to test the confidence of the House. Even if the new Prime Minister took office and found that, in the mean time, a prorogation had been slipped through by the outgoing Prime Minister and the House had been prorogued, he or she would be able, through the Queen, to recall Parliament under Section 1 of the Meeting of Parliament Act 1797.

These are hypothetical examples but it is right that we should examine them. The power of prorogation can still be used properly and sensibly and is not in the same category as the power of dissolution. I hope that with these reassuring words the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Debate between Lord Wallace of Tankerness and Lord Falconer of Thoroton

Tuesday 29th March 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

The modern trend in constitutionality is that you do not wish the monarch to make any decision that could be controversial. In those circumstances, you would normally expect the monarch to act upon the advice of his or her Prime Minister. For example, in the last election, at no stage did the monarch indicate who should seek to form a Government; she left it to the political parties to come forward. In one sense the noble Lord is right but in all practical terms the element of discretion for the monarch has effectively gone. That is the way that political parties now operate when it comes to the question of who should try to form a Government.

The noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, is shaking his head, which worries me deeply. The wording of his amendment seems to me to allow for a resignation because the choice it gives the Prime Minister is Dissolution or resignation. It does not necessarily mean that at the end of the 28-day period he or she does not re-emerge as the Prime Minister, which could be his or her intention right from the outset.

Although I am much more beside the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, than I am beside the Government, neither solution is wholly satisfactory. That is indicative of the inability of a Bill to reflect the ability of the current arrangements where there is a vote of no confidence and to reflect the differing political situations that may have emerged. It is very difficult, for example, to have envisaged the situations in 1940, 1924, 1974, 1979 or 2010, but our current constitution is well able to deal with them. It is possible to accept the principle that there should normally be a fixed-term but where there is a vote of no confidence then there may need to be a Dissolution and a general election. Why do we not have a Bill that simply says that? Even the finest constitutional brain in Britain, the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, seems to me when trying to codify it to have produced a situation that even he would not necessarily regard as particularly satisfactory.

In a genuine spirit of consensus I ask the noble and learned Lord, who is much admired for his openness and conciliatoriness, to think about why one does not just have a very simple clause that says that, where there is a vote of no confidence in the Government, the Prime Minister may ask for a Dissolution—full stop and leave it at that. It could then be read in the context of the constitutional conventions governing our country. You would have the safety valve. We would not need to contort ourselves into situations where we are trying to see what history will bring in the future—if that is not a contradiction in terms—which we are not going to be able to manage.

Let us be wide open—like the constitution—and recognise that a vote of no confidence should probably, but not invariably, lead to a general election. Let us have a Bill that reflects that.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Norton of Louth for his amendments and the noble Lord, Lord Howarth of Newport, who again has made some interesting and constructive contributions. Amendments have been tabled, not least the amendments in the name of my noble friend Lord Cormack, regarding procedures in the Bill concerning motions of no confidence, what the consequences of those might be and whether they need to be more tightly or more widely specified to cover different situations. I repeat what I said at the start of some of our amendments on the second day in Committee relating to the Dissolution provisions in Clause 2. We are willing to listen to what noble Lords have to say on these matters. I particularly note the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton. I understand that the thrust of his comments at Second Reading was that the Bill would be open to abuse by a Prime Minister who might wish to contrive a situation to get a Dissolution at the time of his or her choosing and therefore defeat the purpose of a fixed-term Parliament. I would want to consider what he proposed in the light of that and whether it might make dealing with the potential for that abuse simpler; and, on the specific amendments, whether the choice of having a Dissolution or a resignation that could lead to another Government being formed, as happened in 1924, should remain solely in the hands of the Prime Minister or whether Parliament should have a role, as we would seek to provide.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

The noble and learned Lord is absolutely right that I regard the position of there being a contrived vote of no confidence as quite easy under this Bill, but I do not think that there is any dispute about that. The noble and learned Lord accepted it, the committee chaired by the noble Baroness, Lady Jay, accepted it, and I have asserted it. So it appears to be agreed on all sides. I do not think that there is anything that can be done about that. Indeed, as I made clear, it would have been right for Mr Heath to have insisted on there being an election through a vote of no confidence if the Opposition had not agreed to an election in 1974 and if there had been a fixed-term Parliament. I see that as indicative of the fact that you are not taking away much power from the Prime Minister. My problem is the idea that the more rigid you make the measure, the more you allow a Prime Minister and a Government to stay in power when it is perfectly plain that the Commons wants to see the back of them and there should be a general election. I see that as the much more dangerous aspect of the Bill.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I am interested in the noble and learned Lord’s comments, and I shall reflect on this matter. The second point that I made was whether the choice between seeking a Dissolution or there being a resignation with the possibility of an alternative Government being formed should be entirely the choice of the Prime Minister alone or whether, as we seek to do, there should be a role for Parliament when no other Government can be formed and 10 days have elapsed without a confidence motion being passed by Parliament. As I understand it, however, the objective is much the same. In a situation when you have a fixed-term Parliament and it becomes obvious that there is a logjam or deadlock, there must be some means of breaking it and triggering an early election.

The same argument applies to a point made my noble friend Lord Norton of Louth. I assume that he sees Amendments 35 and 38 as being taken together as part of a package. Under one of his earlier amendments, Amendment 27, he said that if the Prime Minister’s discretion over the date of the election were removed, as would happen with a fixed-term Parliament, it should be provided,

“that an early election is possible only if the House of Commons passes a vote of no confidence in the Government or if the Government resign and there is no prospect of another Government being formed”.—[Official Report, 21/3/11; col. 564.]

Although this is a technical problem that could be looked at, as presently constructed the proposal could mean that the Prime Minister of the day might choose neither to seek Dissolution nor to resign. I am sure that that is not the intention behind the amendment as it would create a very difficult situation. However, it could be a consequence of the amendment. I do not want to make too much of a technical point as I am sure that that is not a scenario that my noble friend seeks to advance.

At the conclusion of our debates on the second day in Committee, my noble friend presented a scenario whereby the Government had lost the confidence of the House in a way that did not necessarily trigger the provisions of the Bill. He used as an illustration what might have happened in 1972 if the other place had refused to give the European Communities Bill a Second Reading and it had not been designated by the Speaker as a vote of no confidence. In such a scenario, the Prime Minister might wish to resign or hold an election, and the provisions of the Bill would not necessarily apply. I think it is clear that if the Prime Minister had genuinely lost the confidence of the House of Commons, under the provisions of the Bill there would be a way to make that clear through a motion of no confidence and no other Government being formed by that Prime Minister, so leading to an election. Furthermore, if there was consensus that there should be an election, that could happen with a Dissolution.

Equally, it would still be open to the Prime Minister of the day to resign, as indeed Neville Chamberlain did in 1940. As the noble and learned Lord agreed in the previous debate, it would not have brought into play any of the mechanisms in the Bill. Nevertheless, it was clearly possible for a new Government to be formed under Winston Churchill in two days—I believe that was the figure that he indicated. Nothing in this Bill would inhibit that happening. If the Prime Minister of the day chose to resign, he would tender his resignation to Her Majesty the Queen and the convention would be that, so Her Majesty was not left without a Prime Minister, he would recommend to Her Majesty another MP who would be invited to form a Government. Either that new Government would fail at the first test, there would be a no confidence Motion and the new Government would not be able to get confidence, which would lead to an election; or, alternatively, a new Government might be formed and would command the confidence of the House of Commons. If it commanded the confidence of the House of Commons and could vote a supply, it would be left—

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

My Lords, if we assume the Prime Minister resigns, that does not trigger the Bill. A new person is invited to form a Government. He or she then puts his or her Government to the confidence of the Commons. If we assume there is a vote of no confidence in that Government, then the provisions of the Bill will apply and there will be another 14-day period.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, there would not necessarily be another 14-day period triggered by the first one. Subject to that, the noble and learned Lord’s analysis is absolutely correct. If someone else sought to form a Government and did not win a vote of no confidence, that would lead to an election if no other Government were then formed within 14 days.

I think there is agreement, surprising though it may seem. However, there are two other possible outcomes: that there is a Dissolution leading to an election, or another Government could be formed, the 1924 example being a case in point. As I said, the 14 days is a matter of judgment, but it does provide for a period for that second outcome of another Government being formed to actually happen. We have debated this issue already and we are due for another debate on an amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, on whether 14 days is right. However, the provision does allow for a period for that to happen and, if it does not happen, for us to proceed to an election.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I thank the noble and learned Lord for his explanation of the amendment as I found its purpose somewhat difficult to discern. He has indicated that it seeks to address the situation, perhaps immediately after an election, where no Government have been formed. My difficulty is that, if the amendment were included in the Bill, a situation such as we are discussing might arise later in a Parliament when a Government had been formed. The amendment states:

“An early general election will only be called at the end of a 14 day period following a vote of no confidence if no Government has been formed since the last general election”.

That could almost exclude an early general election being called if, the Government having been formed since the last general election, there was a vote of no confidence and no other Government were then formed. I suspect that is a technical consequence of the amendment that the noble and learned Lord did not intend. As I understand it—

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

I could leave out entirely the legitimate drafting point that the noble and learned Lord makes. If the amendment said,

“if no Government had obtained a vote of confidence since the last general election”,

would that help the noble and learned Lord to determine what I am trying to say? It is my fault for not putting it well.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I was genuinely somewhat puzzled about what the point was. However, I understand that the noble and learned Lord is trying to address a certain situation. I can see the distinction between an incoming Government following an election who have never faced the House of Commons on a Queen’s Speech and one which may have done so and lost as they are a continuing Government. He may wish to consider whether a general election should immediately ensue if an incoming Government who are not a continuing Government lose a vote on their first Queen’s Speech. I give a hypothetical example. If a minority Conservative Government had been formed after May last year, they would have been the new Government. A Government would have been formed but they may not have carried the day on a Queen’s Speech. I rather suspect that the circumstances which the noble and learned Lord sought to address in his amendment might be similar to that example. I suggest that another election would not necessarily be triggered immediately by that scenario.

As I understand it, the noble and learned Lord is saying that there are circumstances where there is the possibility of another Government being established, as, indeed, happened in 1924. He thinks that the presumption would be in favour of an early election, triggered by a vote of no confidence. However, it is a rebuttable presumption. The noble and learned Lord is trying to identify the circumstances in which that presumption might be rebutted. One such circumstance could well be where we have an election, there is no overall majority and therefore there ought to be an opportunity, if the Government lose a vote on the Queen’s Speech, for another one to be formed. I understand what he is saying but the difficulty we have in these situations is with the general assumption that an election would take place. We need to make the position certain and not leave it completely vague and imprecise. It is one of the challenges which we have sought to address in the Bill. It may seem somewhat cumbersome at times with the Speaker’s certificate mechanism but the purpose behind that is to try to ensure that there is certainty and that if situations arise which will lead to an election it is not a question of wondering whether it will or will not take place. We need to establish that certain circumstances would trigger elections while others would not.

I entirely agree with my noble friend Lord Forsyth that there are important distinctions to be made between the Scottish Parliament, the Welsh Assembly and the Westminster Parliament. I think that in an earlier intervention I indicated that you can only take the comparisons so far. If a Government have not commanded the support of the other place, have lost a vote of no confidence and no other Government have been formed who hold the confidence of the other place, an election would follow. If, however, a Government command the confidence of the other place, they would have the wherewithal to raise supply. It is very easy to look at these issues through the prism of a two-party political history, but as my noble friend Lord Newton said in one of our earlier debates, we cannot take it for granted that the simple two-party situation that has prevailed for so long will always do so. We have seen that the first past the post system could not be relied upon to produce a clear-cut majority Government in May last year. We may well find ourselves in those circumstances again. The circumstances which apply in the Scottish Parliament may well be more appropriate for a Parliament that does not regularly have Governments with an outright majority. However, I accept that there is an important distinction between a Parliament elected by proportional representation and one which is not. I do not even claim that AV is a proportional system but it is one which nevertheless could give rise to a Parliament in which no one party regularly has a majority.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My noble friend is absolutely right. That is why there was an electoral system that almost invariably would not produce a Government with an outright majority. My noble friend Lord Newton said earlier that we may be entering an era where even the first past the post system will not necessarily produce an overall majority, and we can speculate about what might happen if we have an alternative vote system. Nevertheless, the point remains that, if we have a fixed-term Parliament, there has to be a means of breaking out of it if there is a stalemate, and that is what we are seeking to achieve. We have heard a suggestion as to how that might be addressed in circumstances where there was an incoming Government after an election and you would not necessarily want to trigger another election immediately. Again, I think that that is consistent with what I said regarding earlier amendments—it is part of the mix. I do not think that there is too much between us in recognising that a way out has to be found if a Parliament is no longer sustainable, but the challenge is how to do that with the maximum certainty. I welcome the thoughts of the noble and learned Lord but I invite him to withdraw his amendment in the light of my comments.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

Of course I shall withdraw it because we are in Committee and will not really be having any votes. I completely agree with what the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, said about the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly being completely different, and I particularly agree with what he said regarding the supply issue. They are both important but they are different sorts of institutions. I do not agree that the old rules do not work because there is now more of a three, four or five-party system in the Commons. That is completely wrong. I keep going back to 1924, but it was because there were three parties and no one had an overall majority that the Queen’s Speech was defeated in January 1924. In October 1924, when again there were three parties, a vote of no confidence was passed in the then Labour Government and Ramsay MacDonald went straight to the country without any difficulty at all, understanding immediately that that was the appropriate thing to do.

With the greatest respect to the noble and learned Lord, this is not a comment on him but on the process. He struggles when he tries to explain the rationale for these provisions. He says, “We want not to be too vague and we want to bring some certainty but we do not want to be too precise”. Those are not his exact words but that is what he said in his reply. I ask: why is it not okay to say “once there is a vote of no confidence”? The noble and learned Lord should remember that the Bill deprives the Prime Minister of calling a general election unless there is a vote of no confidence or a two-thirds vote, which is a considerable restriction. The Government are trying to deliver the element of fixedness but their mistake is in saying that there has to be some complicated process thereafter. This debate simply reinforces the sense that it would be sufficient to have a general provision saying that, where there is a vote of no confidence in the Government, there may be a Dissolution. It would be viewed as a constitutional provision and would not be picked over in this legalistic way, which is the inevitable consequence of the coalition’s drafting of the Bill. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Debate between Lord Wallace of Tankerness and Lord Falconer of Thoroton

Tuesday 29th March 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

It was a very good model for Wales. The noble Lord, Lord Rennard, appears to be supporting a model under which you can lose a vote of no confidence, then have 14 days, and come back as Prime Minister. That is what this proposal does. However, that is not my point, which is, essentially, that the right answer will very much depend upon the circumstances.

It was obviously right that James Callaghan went to the country in March 1979, and it would obviously have been wrong if there had been a 14-day pause before he did so, and if the system had allowed it. Equally, when Mr Baldwin was defeated in January 1924 on an explicit motion of no confidence, and he came straight back from a general election, it was wrong for there to have been a general election. Instead, the right answer was reached and a new Government were produced. The right answer in any particular case depends upon the circumstances that apply at the time. I am sure that Mr Alun Michael giving way to Mr Rhodri Morgan was the right course there.

Why are we introducing a Bill that rigidly requires the 14-day period? Why do we not have a system whereby, if it is right to go to the country, we do so, and if it is not right to go to the country, we do not do so? The other example of a vote of no confidence that I have in mind, which is not a true example, is the vote on the conduct of the Narvik campaign in 1940, when Neville Chamberlain was Prime Minister. There was criticism of the way that the Government had conducted the raid on Narvik. He won the vote—although I cannot remember whether or not it was a vote of no confidence—but a significant rebellion on the Conservative side led to Chamberlain concluding, almost certainly rightly, that he should resign as Prime Minister. Within two days, he was replaced by Mr Winston Churchill, who formed a national Government. The matter is slightly complicated by the fact that the right to hold general elections had been suspended; but even if that were not the case, the right answer at that point would almost certainly have been for Parliament to choose a national Government and to provide a new leader for the nation. The country would have completely accepted that.

The problem with the Bill is that it rigidly introduces the 14-day period. It is worth repeatedly going back to the 1979 example. The 14-day period would have allowed the Prime Minister to try to cobble together a Government that would not have had popular support and, equally, would have allowed the Opposition to enter into a bidding war with the minor parties to try to get them to support a Government, when it was obvious that the right answer was a Dissolution and a general election. This Bill has unquestionably got it wrong by saying that there has to be that 14-day period. It would have been too long in the Winston Churchill case and too long in the James Callaghan case. It is obvious that we should have gone straight to the country at those times. Who knows whether it would have been long enough in January 1924, when Labour had to make an arrangement with the Liberals—not the Liberal Democrats—to form the first Labour Government? Would that have taken 14 days or longer to concoct? It would have depended on the circumstances. Insisting rigidly on this 14-day period feels obviously like the wrong solution.

With respect to the Government, we are in this mess—it is obvious that it is a mess—because the coalition is looking for a mechanism to hold itself together, as David Laws’s book makes absolutely clear. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, has the courage to shake his head. I therefore invite him to draw attention to those parts of Mr David Laws’s book with which he disagrees. I invite him to say so if this change has been introduced because the Government believe that it is the right thing to do for the country, rather than a means of holding the two parts of the coalition together.

We are where we are: we are looking at this ill thought-out Bill, which is a means of holding the two bits of the coalition together. What is the right solution? I respectfully suggest that the right solution is to give maximum flexibility so that normally, when there is a vote of no confidence, the Government should go straight to the country, as usually happens. There should not always be the need for the 14-day pause. However, there should be some mechanism so that, if it is appropriate, a new Government can be formed, as in the Baldwin example or the Winston Churchill example. That is what the Government should try to produce as part of this Bill, rather than have this 14-day period, which will lead to a 14-day pause when there is no Government, often when the country is simply waiting for nothing. Alternatively, there is the unseemly scene of a Government trying to avoid going to the country, bidding with the minor parties or their own Back-Benchers to get them back into the position where they vote in favour of a new Government, even though they are, in substance, the same as the old Government and have cobbled something together to get around the no-confidence vote.

Either—14 days of nothing or the old Government coming back as a retread new Government within the 14 days—is a very undesirable result. I very much hope that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, will tell me why I am wrong about both conclusions, and how the Bill deals with them. If he cannot deal with them, perhaps the answer is to go back to the drawing board and think of something that, as my noble friend Lord Grocott said, is effective in dealing with the problem at the moment—namely, the present system. A vote of no confidence normally allows for an election but is flexible enough to ensure that a Government emerge when appropriate.

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Wallace of Tankerness)]

My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, indicated in moving Amendment 34, and as was confirmed by several speakers, including the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, its effect would be to trigger an early general election simply by a vote of no confidence in the Government. In other words, a simple majority in the House of Commons could lead to an immediate general election. This amendment places the power to decide whether and when there should be an early general election very much in the gift of the Executive.

I shook my head when the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, seemed to suggest that this was some contrivance to keep together the coalition. First, I do not believe that to be the case, and, secondly, the Bill seeks a system of fixed-term Parliaments not just for this Parliament but into the future, when it may not be the Conservative Party or the Liberal Democrat party in office. It might be the Labour Party that is in office, or a combination of parties. Therefore, I wholly reject this idea that it is intended to be some quick fix. The point has been debated on a number of occasions; and the party opposite fought the last election on the policy of fixed-term Parliaments, although one sometimes would be surprised by that.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Jay of Paddington, said at Second Reading, there is a spectrum in terms of Parliaments: at one end you have complete flexibility, much as we have at the moment, as to when the Prime Minister can call an election; and at the other end you have complete rigidity. Many of the problems that have been raised would be resolved if you had complete rigidity and there were no safety valve, as I think the Constitution Committee of your Lordships’ House described it. I have not heard in any of our debates—either at Second Reading, in the other place or indeed in any of our Committee debates—anyone actually arguing for total rigidity. Therefore, there has to be a safety valve. In trying to devise these safety valves, we have produced one that reflects the two situations that could currently arise if there were a vote of no confidence. In addition to that, there is the safety valve of a Dissolution with a two-thirds majority. There was a view, certainly expressed around the time of the coalition agreement, that a vote of no confidence in the other place ought to have some consequence.

Perhaps I can just finish this point, which my noble friend Lord Norton of Louth raised: the problem with the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, is that a Dissolution would allow only for an immediate general election. However, the dual convention that exists is that after a vote of no confidence in the Government, the Prime Minister may resign and a new Administration may be formed, which happened in 1924 when the Baldwin Government were defeated and a Labour Government were then established, as was referred to by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton. Or, indeed, there could be a Dissolution, and we are saying that there would be a Dissolution if it were not possible to form another Government. We will come to the timing, but there ought at least to be some time to allow another Government to be formed.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

On 1940, let me just be clear that these provisions would never have been engaged then, as Mr Chamberlain did not lose a vote. He decided to resign and the King, no doubt on the recommendation of the outgoing Prime Minister, asked Mr Churchill to form a Government. The provisions in the Bill would not have come into play.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

The Minister is absolutely right in relation to that. I took the 1940 example because I felt that one has to deal with the position. Suppose that Chamberlain had lost the vote of confidence; what then would have been the position? We have to test it against that but I accept what he says: it would not have been engaged.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Debate between Lord Wallace of Tankerness and Lord Falconer of Thoroton

Monday 21st March 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

My Lords, again, Mr Laws explains how we got here. But when you see how we got here, it is difficult to understand why we are here. Perhaps I may read a paragraph that has not yet been quoted:

“There was a debate for thirty minutes or so on arrangements for dissolving a parliament before the end of its five-year term. This was an issue which we raised, but William Hague soon realised that the main risk lay with the Conservatives. Without a super-majority for dissolution being required, the smaller party could leave the coalition and dissolve parliament almost at will”.

He continues:

“Huhne originally suggested that there should be a 66% threshold for dissolving parliament before its full term was up, in line with the situation in Scotland. George Osborne said he thought that 66% was rather high and that 55% or 60% was closer to the mark. After some work on Ed Llewelyn’s calculator, and consideration of by-election risks, it was decided that a 55% vote of MPs would be required to provide for a dissolution. This was just greater than the combined opposition and Lib Dem parliamentary parties, thereby safeguarding the Conservative position”.

It is absolutely plain from what Laws is saying there that they were trying to guard against Dissolution, including a no-confidence vote. There is no doubt about that, because he says:

“Without a super-majority for dissolution being required, the smaller party could leave the coalition and dissolve parliament almost at will”.

That must be referring to a vote of no confidence. It is therefore plain from Laws’ book that it was envisaged that you could not get rid of the Government with an ordinary vote of no confidence and that the only provision intended to allow for an early end—that is, before the five years—was if the super-majority was satisfied, and that could not be delivered by the Lib Dems coalescing with Labour.

I think that that was to be put into a binding resolution, whatever that may mean, in the House of Commons. Pressure was then placed on the Government in the public debate which followed, and they changed this in two respects: the figure of 56 per cent became two-thirds, and they agreed to a vote of no confidence as a way of getting rid of the Government. Why are they both there? Which two separate situations are they trying to cover? It looks as though the coalition agreed to the 56 per cent to prevent the possibility of being voted out on a vote of no confidence. I am pretty sure that that is what happened, but they were pushed off it by public pressure and had to agree to a vote of no confidence. They retained the super-majority as a fig leaf in order to try to give some justification for it. That is what Mr Laws’ book is suggesting. Could the Minister say whether I am wrong about that analysis? No other factual analysis is being offered for why we are in the extraordinarily unusual position where both a simple majority and a super-majority can get rid of the Government by way of a vote in the House of Commons. It looks as if the analysis that I have given is the reason.

We are entitled to an explanation for this. The point made by the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, who is respected throughout the House as a constitutional expert, is significant: no other national parliament has this extraordinary provision in it. If it is in there only because it was part of a negotiation that then got shot away by public pressure, why are the Government keeping it in? It is important that the noble and learned Lord gives us some information about it, because at the moment the only explanation on the record is the one that I have given. It is discreditable for the Government to reform our constitution simply on the basis that an idea that was floated in the coalition agreement got shot away but they kept it in, in order to preserve I am not sure what.

A second and separate point that the Minister needs to deal with is: what happens when the Government resign and no one else wants to form a Government? On the basis of the Bill, it appears—again, the noble Lord, Lord Norton, has made this point and I have not heard an answer to it—that you have no Government and no Dissolution. I would be grateful to know what happens to our nation’s Government at that point.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Norton for opening up the debates on this clause, which raises important issues regarding the mechanisms that would trigger an early election or indeed a change of Government, and I am grateful to all noble Lords who have taken part. It is important to recognise that there are two mechanisms that can trigger an early election: either a Dissolution on a 66 per cent majority—or, more accurately, with two-thirds of Members voting for it—or a vote of no confidence passed by a simple majority and, after 14 days, no Government having a vote of confidence. They are distinctive.

I cannot endorse the speculative analysis by the noble and learned Lord Falconer. He admitted that he was speculating—

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

I am not speculating. This is what a person who was there at the negotiations said. For the Minister to describe this analysis as speculative when he is not offering an alternative explanation is wholly unfair.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, it will be obvious that the proposals in the Bill are not the ones described in the book. The noble and learned Lord asks us why we have the proposals that we do, and obviously he was speculating about why they are there. If I were presenting to the House a Bill that had a 55 per cent majority and that was it, that would be a reasonable basis on which to say, “This is how we arrived at 55 per cent”. Clearly, that is not what is proposed in the Bill, and I will address that in the course of my response to this debate.

Subsection (1) provides the House of Commons with a new power to vote for Dissolution following a process that I believe is robust and transparent. My noble friend has indicated that he has his own further amendments about what might follow, including the point raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, about what would happen in the event of a Prime Minister resigning, and we will address these when we come to my noble friend’s amendments.

The point is that if there is a clear consensus that there should be an early general election, it would be nonsensical to force the other place to engineer a vote of no confidence, particularly where confidence in the Government is not necessarily the issue and may not be what is driving the need for an early election. We believe that it would not be right or proper to conjure up a vote of no confidence in these circumstances. That is why the Bill seeks to prevent that with our proposal for a two-thirds vote.

In the case of Germany, Governments have in the past had to engineer no-confidence votes even where there was a consensus in favour of an early general election, because there was no provision in its constitution analogous to the procedure for a Dissolution vote in this Bill. At that time there was no alternative to engineering a no-confidence vote.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

I understand what the Minister said earlier. Is he now saying that this is a product not of the coalition agreement but of some other arrangement?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I might be missing something somewhere. The coalition agreement referred to the 55 per cent that the noble and learned Lord has described. At the same time, he gave a plug to my right honourable friend’s book, for which I am sure he is very grateful. However, that is not in the Bill; I am describing what is in the Bill. Of course it is a product of the coalition. It is a coalition Bill that is before your Lordships’ House.

I recall sitting in this House during Questions and listening to many noble Lords on all sides of the House criticise that 55 per cent provision. The noble and learned Lord nods his head in agreement. It was a provision that received considerable criticism. There was a criticism that it meant a vote that could lead to a Dissolution. People asked about votes of no confidence. At the same time, there was the issue of whether there ought to be a higher majority to trigger a Dissolution automatically. The two mechanisms that provide the trigger in the Bill as it stands address the criticisms that were made. I make no apology for saying that the Government listened to the criticisms that were made, tried to take them on board and came forward with what is proposed here. It may be unique to the United Kingdom but it addresses some of the concerns.

We will come later to the issue of no-confidence votes but at present this House and—it is fair to say —other commentators and people in the other place said that there was an important point about the vote of no confidence on a simple majority having a consequence. The Government listened to that. Historically, there have been two possible outcomes. In 1924, when there was a vote of no confidence in Mr Baldwin’s Government, Mr Baldwin resigned and a new Government was formed under Ramsay MacDonald. In 1979, as has often been mentioned in our debates on this Bill, when Mr James Callaghan’s Government lost a vote of no confidence, he then proceeded to seek a Dissolution and an election was held.

When we come to the next part of this clause, that is what we will be discussing. We will no doubt debate what constitutes a no-confidence vote. We seek to reflect what has been the constitutional position of the outcome of a no-confidence vote on a simple majority. Equally, we took the view that there were circumstances in which it would be more appropriate, if there was a consensus that a Parliament should be brought to an end, to have a trigger mechanism that was more than a simple majority, such as a two-thirds majority.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

First, on the amendment of the noble, Lord Marks, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth. It fails to deal with two particular problems. First, when a Government lose a vote that is obviously a vote of confidence—if the Government had been defeated on the Motion authorising the use of force in Iraq, that would plainly have been a vote of confidence—it would be wholly wrong if there then had to be a vote of no confidence thereafter.

Equally, there have been votes which the Government lose, for example, the vote on Maastricht in 1992, which they then followed—in my view, entirely correctly —with a Motion tabled by the Prime Minister on a vote of confidence in the Government. If that vote had resulted in the Conservative Government being defeated on the vote of confidence, which was the traditional method of dealing with that, the consequence should have been not that there then needed to be a vote of no confidence from the Opposition—which, as I understand it, is the view of the noble Lord, Lord Marks—but that there should be a general election, or a 14-day delay, which we shall debate later.

Those two examples would not be covered by the proposal of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and therefore lead to dealing, on one view, with the collusion argument but strengthen the other risk in the Bill, which is that a Government who genuinely have lost the confidence of the Commons are able to stay in power. Just as the noble Lord, Lord Marks, gets one piece of the wallpaper on the wall, another falls off.

On my amendment, I could not have asked for more from the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth. It is my view that in relation to a vote of no confidence, there is no possible mechanism one could adopt which would allow anyone to go behind the motivation of why a particular group of people voted in favour. That is an impossible task. It is like the vote of 100 in the Commons voting for an all-elected House of Lords. It has been suggested that that was a vote in order for there not to be an all-elected House of Lords. But one cannot go behind the vote; one must accept it at face value.

I tabled the amendment simply to illustrate the correctness of the conclusion of the committee on which the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, sits, chaired by my noble friend Lady Jay, that there is no ability to control a vote of confidence and that a Prime Minister with a majority can, if he or she wishes, engineer a situation where he or she loses a vote that is a vote of no confidence, even if not so called.

I have a third objection to the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Marks. Is it such a bad thing that, had these provisions been in place, it would have been open to, for example, Mr Heath to go to the country not by engineering in some deceitful way but by simply saying that he thought that the Government needed to have the confidence of the people to go on with the particular stance they were taking? He would therefore have put down a Motion of confidence in his own Government with a view to there being an election. Is that a bad thing? What is the view of the Government on that? These are probing amendments in Committee. The amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, covers one situation, but it leaves a lot of others uncovered. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth.

I tabled my amendment simply to establish the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Norton. You cannot go behind people’s motivation, which means that the Select Committee is probably right. The Government of the day can always have an election whenever they want on a majority of one. Do the Government think that is necessarily a bad thing?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, this is the first of a series of groups of amendments dealing with the trigger mechanism from no-confidence Motions. I thank my noble friend who tabled this amendment and noble Lords who have tabled subsequent amendments. A general view has been expressed, particularly at Second Reading, that there is some merit in having certainty. A number of those who have contributed to this debate have made the point about the potential for abuse.

As I have indicated, the Government believe that the package of the two trigger mechanisms is sensible and straightforward. However, I accept that there has been considerable interest in the handling of the no-confidence Motions in particular. When the Bill passed through another place, there was some detailed debate on this, but it was not amended. The more one looks at it, the more one finds that perhaps the balance that has been struck in the Bill is right. However, the function of this Chamber is to be a revising Chamber to improve legislation and I want to make it clear to noble Lords that, in our deliberations on this amendment and the subsequent amendments, the Government are willing to listen carefully and to reflect on what noble Lords have to say with regard to trying to address the issue of certainty about what constitutes a no-confidence Motion and ways of trying to eliminate abuse.

It is to address certainty and to eliminate abuse that the amendment moved by my noble friend Lord Marks provides that only a Motion of no confidence tabled by the leader of the Opposition would trigger the procedure in Clause 2(2)—namely, the 14-day period. The amendment spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, seeks to achieve the same result. We have always been clear that this Bill is not a new constitution. It is intended to bring in an important provision—fixed-term Parliaments—having proper regard to existing constitutional arrangements and conventions. On the whole, the purpose of the Bill is to replace existing conventional democratic controls with legal controls in the context of a fixed-term Parliament. The only foolproof way in which to prevent an Executive from manipulating the rules to engineer a premature general election would be to remove those rules entirely—in other words, to provide for rigid fixed terms. The mood of the House at Second Reading—and I have not heard anything to contradict it since—was that there was very little support for having such rigidity. The Bill therefore provides procedures that allow for an early general election where one is clearly required. All the debates that we have had in this House and the other place confirm that this is regarded as a necessity. I think that we are in the territory of assessing whether the procedures in the Bill are satisfactory, rather than whether we should have these procedures at all. The purpose of these amendments is to see whether they can be improved on.

It is the case that the Bill does not say who may table a Motion of no confidence. That concurs with current practice. As was mentioned by my noble friend Lord Norton and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, there is no restriction on who may table in the House of Commons a Motion of no confidence. As it happens, in practice, these have been tabled by opposition parties and almost always by the leader of the Official Opposition. The background note prepared by the Library in the other place sets out a history of confidence Motions. I am acutely aware that my noble friend Lord Norton of Louth has made an in-depth academic study of confidence and no-confidence Motions. Since 1895, not a single Motion has included the words “no confidence” other than in the name of the leader of the Opposition. As noble Lords are well aware, a decision by the leader of the Opposition to support or to table a no-confidence Motion automatically takes precedence over that tabled by any other party.

The question then is whether there is reason to deviate from current practice for the purposes of this legislation. I have listened carefully to what has been said about potential abuse, but I come back to the point that it would be obvious if the Government had set out to subvert the standard procedures of the other place. I take the view that it can in no way be excluded altogether but that there would almost certainly be retribution by the electorate. On the other hand, the electorate might decide that there was to be no retribution and that they fully supported the Government of the day—at the end of the day, the electorate are right.

The no-confidence procedures in the Bill as drafted would be activated only if the House of Commons had voted to the effect that it had no confidence in Her Majesty’s Government. One has to reflect that, even if a Government tried to contrive it, if they went to the country with the Opposition saying that the House of Commons had no confidence in the Government, they might have a presentational problem on their hands. For the moment, I put it no higher than that. Those who think that the safeguard is meaningless are perhaps trying to nail down a political process with legal certainty. I have, I hope, been quite up front in these debates when I have said that if the Government were absolutely determined to try to abuse the rules, as I think the Constitution Committee itself accepted, although it would be possible to abuse them, there would be consequences to that. I rather suspect that, as the idea of a fixed-term Parliament and the rules set down by a fixed-term Parliament became more and more part of what people were accustomed to, there would be consequences over time if it was thought that a particular Government were trying to bend or get around the rules. The political consequences would be more damaging.

The amendments would have certain unintended consequences. The first of these is that the proposal is out of step with the process of rebalancing that is going on in the other place between the Front-Benchers of all parties and the Back-Benchers. My noble friend Lord Norton of Louth made that point. In the past few years, there have been a series of reforms in the other place that have been designed to give Back-Bench MPs a greater voice. Part of this involved the report by the Reform of the House of Commons Committee, sometimes known as the Wright committee after its chairman Dr Tony Wright, the long-standing chairman of the Commons Public Administration Select Committee, and the establishment of the Backbench Business Committee. Amendment 30 would be counter to the general trend of these reforms by allowing the no-confidence procedures in the Bill to be triggered only by the leader of the Opposition.

The amendments would put in place a statutory provision that excluded the Back-Benchers and entrenched the dominance of those on the Front Benches. I am not sure that most Members of the other place would necessarily welcome the inclusion of such a provision when we returned the Bill to them. It is interesting that a similar amendment was tabled and debated in Committee in the other place, but I think that it is fair to say that it did not receive a warm welcome and was not even pushed to a vote. The amendments also leave open a number of unanswered questions, most notably what would happen if there had been a successful no-confidence vote in the Government but the leader of the Opposition failed to table a Motion of no confidence.

Finally, Clause 2 has been drafted in a way that is sensitive to the Commons having control of its internal procedures. Only the bare essentials of the new mechanisms have been put in place—there needs to be a two-thirds vote in favour to trigger a Dissolution vote, and the 14-day period commences on the passing of a no-confidence vote—but is it right to go further than this? Is it right to use legislation to tell the other place who is permitted to table a Motion or indeed to devise the precise words that should be used in a Motion for it to have legal effect?

As I said, I fully understand and indeed sympathise with the underlying motivation to these amendments, and I have indicated that we are willing to consider them, but there would be serious practical problems, and indeed constitutional problems, for the role of Back-Benchers. The alternative of letting the Commons develop its own practice and for the Speaker to inform the outside world whether this practice has been complied with through the Speaker’s certificate is preferable. We believe that the procedures that we have put in place to trigger early Dissolution are robust and transparent, and I ask your Lordships to reflect on the conclusions of the Constitution Committee on the trigger mechanisms for an early election. The Constitution Committee did have concerns about the definition of no-confidence Motions, which we have discussed and to which we will return, but it broadly endorsed that there should be two trigger mechanisms and that the sort of manipulation which noble Lords are concerned about would be seen as,

“an abuse of the Act’s provisions”.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

As regards the third question—let us assume that this Bill applied and that the Opposition did not support a general election—would the Government be willing for Heath, for example, to have a general election in those circumstances? Would they be against it? Is that an abuse?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

Just to be clear about what I am being asked, as I understand it the noble and learned Lord has asked me whether, in February 1974, when Mr Heath wanted an election, if the Opposition had been against it he could have contrived a situation to do it. Clearly, under these circumstances, it would have been possible to contrive. He might not have had the election on the date on which he wanted it if it had had to be 14 days after he had lost a confidence Motion. He may well have found in weighing that up whether it was the right course of action. It may have saved him from what happened in the end.

I believe that it would be possible but, again, it would be a matter of judgment. Indeed, the electorate did make a judgment at the time on a Prime Minister who chose to go before his term of office was anywhere near complete. If he had also contrived the means of doing that, the consequences for him might well have been greater. That is pure speculation. We will never know. On that basis, I ask my noble friend to withdraw his amendment.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Debate between Lord Wallace of Tankerness and Lord Falconer of Thoroton

Monday 21st March 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

Well, he can be accused, because noble Lords opposite will accuse him. But any reasonable person would see that, in setting the basis for a fixed-term Parliament, one could not take account five years out of the possible political vicissitudes, waves and currents in the intervening five years. If this Bill becomes law, the Prime Minister will be locked in, as will any other Prime Minister in future.

I was going to make this point later, but this is an opportune time to make it. I thought that a large part of the noble and learned Lord’s argument was that this measure is the glue that holds the coalition together. However, unless I am mistaken—and I stand to be corrected if I am—the terms of his amendment would still leave standing the election to take place on 7 May 2015. The noble and learned Lord shakes his head.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

I want to correct that, because it is certainly not my intention, which is to have four years, four years, four years and so on. It is certainly not to have five years and then four years. There may be an issue with the drafting, but this is intended to set four years as the term, so be under no illusion.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I am grateful for that clarification because I had interpreted his amendment as leaving 7 May 2015 to stand and that thereafter there would be four years. I am grateful to hear the noble and learned Lord say that that was not the intention, because that was going to be the answer that I gave to my noble friend Lord Cormack. I accept that it may well be an error in the drafting.

The point that I would make is that this Parliament was elected for a maximum of five years, so in moving to a fixed-term Parliament regime we are embodying that in the Bill—and then thereafter also to have five years. That is the point that I make to the noble Lord, Lord Butler. Of course it is right and it goes without saying that no Parliament can bind its successor. The noble Lord and others say that there is no need for this legislation, but what we are seeking to do is to have fixed-term Parliaments on into the future. Other Parliaments can repeal that, but obviously it would take primary legislation to repeal a system of fixed-term Parliaments. I would very much hope that, having established the principle of fixed-term Parliaments, in the same way as we have fixed terms for devolved Assemblies, for local government and for the European Parliament, fixed terms would become the norm.

I take the point made by my noble friends Lord Marks and Lord Rennard with regard to pre-legislative scrutiny. I have been at the receiving end of many complaints about the lack of such scrutiny. There is an issue about the first year of a Government, because when they come into office they want to get on and start dealing with things. One can readily imagine the criticism that would come from the Opposition if a Government were not doing anything. However, there has been a move over the years to having more pre-legislative scrutiny, which has the effect of increasing the workload on both Houses. It is not fanciful to imagine that, following the election in 2015, a Government of whatever colour will not be able to commence their first Session of legislation with more substantive Bills until there has been a considerable amount of pre-legislative scrutiny. So we are talking about the beginning of 2016 as the time when some key pieces of legislation are introduced, having properly been looked at beforehand.

The final year, whether the term is four years or five years, is always going to be one when those seeking re-election look to their constituencies. That would reduce by some way the effective time for legislation by a Government. My noble friend Lord Norton made the point in one of our debates on the first day in Committee that Governments might run out of steam in the fifth year. Allowing for pre-legislative scrutiny and knowing that there will be five years allows for the legislative programme to be planned more effectively. The fifth year, particularly if it is a full year, not one starting at the end of November with a wash-up in the middle of March, would then be used much more effectively.

I defer to the huge experience of the noble Lord, Lord Martin, as he was Speaker of the other place and has an understanding of the parliamentary process. However, the final year, be it the fifth or the fourth year, would inevitably be one when the shadow of the coming election loomed. I also point out that my understanding is—although I may be corrected—that now Thursday debates in the other place are very often chosen by a Back-Bench Committee and that the Government have given power to the Back-Bench Committee to determine the subject matter for debate. I would be interested to know how many Divisions there have been on Thursdays in the first Session of a Parliament, as the noble Lord made the point about how few there were in the fifth Session. That is another measure that this Government have taken to put more power in the hands of Parliament rather than the Executive.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

The noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, will get an opportunity in future to intervene. I am sure that he will make a speech on another set of amendments, to which I shall be more than happy to reply.

At the moment, we have a system that allows up to a maximum of five years. In fact, three of the past five Parliaments have gone for five years. To remove that possibility requires a more compelling argument than we have heard. To move for four years would leave the effective working life of a Parliament and a Government sufficiently curtailed that they would not be able to implement their manifesto provisions. Therefore, I ask the House to support the idea of a five-year fixed term and ask the noble and learned Lord in those circumstances to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

My Lords, I will of course withdraw my amendment at the end of the debate because the purpose of debate at this stage was in order to probe and examine the arguments. The noble and learned Lord’s speech was well delivered but disappointing because it ultimately did not address the central argument being put against him: that the effect is to change our constitution, where there is a five-year maximum but the norm is around four years, to one where the norm becomes five years save in exceptional circumstances.

What everyone around the House was asking him was: why are you making this change if we have to make the judgment on what is in the best interests of good governance in this country? The Minister never answered that question at all but it is at the heart of the debate. This is not a party-political point. The reason that the noble and learned Lord cannot answer the question is that good old Mr Laws, in order to make it clear that the record should not be perverted in any way, has explained why it is five years. I do not know why the noble and learned Lord, who is an honourable man, is weaving and dodging on this. Just say, “They wouldn’t do a deal with us unless we agreed five years”. Do not try and make it something that it is not.

One of the other things that emerged so strongly from this very powerful debate was the sense that the more one talked about it, the more this House felt uneasy about being locked into this straitjacket that the Bill brings. I am in favour of fixed-term Parliaments, in the sense that I can see it to be appropriate that Parliament should in some way endorse what the Prime Minister has decided about an election. However, the Government are saying, “You have to choose between five years and four years”. I detected a real sense of unease around the House on this, but the Government are putting it that we have got to make this choice. Therefore, looking at the arguments, let us see which the best choice is. The noble and learned Lord himself said what the reason is that the Government are doing this.

Now, I cannot find my note. That would give my noble friend Lord Foulkes an opportunity to ask me a question, but I do not think that he wants to ask me any questions. I am sorry about that.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Debate between Lord Wallace of Tankerness and Lord Falconer of Thoroton

Tuesday 1st March 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I am trying to cover quite a lot of ground. I hope that I can do justice to the many important contributions that were made during the debate.

I welcome the fact that the Constitution Committee will look at the process for constitutional reform. It occurred to me that if a Parliament could not do much in the way of legislation in its first Session—it is not just constitutional Bills that call for pre-legislative scrutiny—there would not be much time to do much business at all, particularly since a four-year fixed term of Parliament has also been advocated. There will always be that tension as regards legislation that is introduced in the first year of a Parliament. We look forward to the Constitution Committee’s report on the process that it will recommend for constitutional legislation.

I had not anticipated my noble friend Lord Dobbs asking why the election should be held in May as opposed to June or October. The simple answer is that the most recent elections have been held in May, with the exception of the 2001 election when the foot and mouth epidemic occurred. There is always a difficulty with finding other times that do not clash with traditional holiday periods. However, my noble friend has posed an important challenge and we want to reflect on it. I also note that the annual canvass to update the electoral register takes place in October in Great Britain, so that may not be an appropriate time to place yet a further burden on electoral registration officers.

The noble Baroness, Lady Gould, asked whether there could be an extension of the two months beyond the extension. The answer to that is no. My noble friend Lord Rennard asked about primary legislation in this context. I believe that it is appropriate to introduce the relevant measure by order as the latter would have to be passed by both Houses. The noble Baroness, Lady Taylor of Bolton, asked what we anticipate might happen. I have asked myself that question. I am not sure that I have an answer but I think that one could anticipate receiving a lot of criticism if one was seen to be making provision for the Government to extend their life, not to shorten it. I have no doubt that if we did not have this measure something would happen that no one could have foreseen and we would wish that we had had it. In the case of the Scottish Parliament, the Presiding Officer has the power to vary the election date by one month either way and I think that in the case of the National Assembly for Wales, the Secretary of State has the power to vary the date by a short period either way—although I cannot remember exactly by how much. The measure that we are discussing has been informed by those practices.

My noble friend Lord Norton asked why Clause 2(2)(a) refers to “a motion” whereas Clause 2(2)(b) refers to “any motion”. I think that “any motion” was chosen because it is followed by,

“expressing confidence in any Government”.

It is clearly a drafting preference. We think that “any motion” or “a motion” would have the same effect. I shall certainly contemplate that matter further, but I think that it is a drafting preference rather than having any significant constitutional importance.

The noble Lord, Lord Hennessy, referred to resetting the clock. If there has been an election and a Government have been returned with a substantial majority and a mandate, they should have the opportunity to see that through for a full term. If the clock was not reset, the electorate might find it odd if, having returned a Government with a significant majority, they were then asked some 12 months later to vote again.

I have noted the points made about parliamentary privilege, which the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, raised, as did my noble friend Lord Cormack. I am sure that we will want to look at that issue in Committee but I certainly share the analysis of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, that the provisions here would ensure that the courts would not interfere in what we believe is very much the space of Parliament.

The key issue is whether Parliaments should last for four or five years. As my noble friend Lord Rennard indicated, there is no absolutely right or wrong answer in that regard—it is a judgment. I indicated that the longer period allows the electorate to make its judgment—my noble friend Lord Marks commented on this—on the policies of a Government as they are seen to be working out in detail over time. I also believe that it allows a Government and Parliament longer to plan their activities. I cannot accept the argument that inevitably the situation has arisen under our present system whereby the fifth year has tended to be a bit of a lame-duck year and that that would necessarily follow if we had fixed-term Parliaments. As has been pointed out by a number of contributors, the fifth year has tended to be a lame-duck year because the Government in office did not think that they could win by cutting and running after four years. Therefore, it has been against a background where they have probably been at a disadvantage anyway.

The point was made by my noble friend Lord Maclennan of Rogart and by the noble Lord, Lord Armstrong of Ilminster, and I think indeed by the noble Lord, Lord Grocott—although I think he was arguing this point in the context of arguing against a five-year term—that the final year, even though it would not be under the same sort of handicap as perhaps 1976-77 or 2009-10, nevertheless would be under a handicap. Even under a fixed-term Parliament, there would be the looming shadow of the forthcoming election. The last year is not as effective a year as the earlier years of a Parliament. That is why I believe that it would be the same in the fourth year of a four-year fixed-term Parliament or the fifth year of a five-year fixed-term Parliament. A four-year fixed-term Parliament therefore would only really allow three years for the Government to put a substantial part of their programme through. I have no doubt whatsoever we will come back to this.

I also just want to say one point. I cannot wholly accept that under a five-year term accountability disappears in the fifth year. I think those of us who have fought elections and have been elected know only too well as the election comes up accountability is a very, very strong thing indeed. When one is about to go and face one’s constituents accountability is very effective.

Another key issue, to which I am sure we will return in later stages of the Bill, is the mechanism. I absolutely endorse what the noble Baroness, Lady Jay, said about there being a spectrum from total flexibility, which you might say we have got at the moment with an end point, a maximum turn with total flexibility and on to rigidity. I do not think that anyone was arguing in this debate for total rigidity. There is a consensus among supporters of the fixed-term Parliament over there being some degree of flexibility; if there is a political imperative or the Government completely fail there must be a mechanism for triggering an election. The noble Baroness, Lady Jay, said that the Constitution Committee broadly endorsed the two mechanisms for triggering an election set out in the Bill but I have listened to the concerns that have been raised. A number of historic examples have been given but it is always difficult to say what would have happened in the past under a future system. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, acknowledged this. Edward Heath in 1974 obviously wanted a dissolution. The Opposition would have agreed and they would have got the two-thirds majority for an election. Likewise, the position in 1924 was also raised by, I think, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon in an intervention on my opening speech.

In January 1924 the Conservative Government resigned after a defeat on the Queen’s Speech address but that did not trigger a general election. It actually triggered the formation of Ramsay MacDonald’s Administration. The draft Cabinet manual which was published in December last year indicates that at the moment the convention is that the Prime Minister either advises Her Majesty to dissolve Parliament or the Government resign and a new Government from the existing Chamber can be found, as indeed happened in, I think, January 1924.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

Am I right in saying that the election took place at the beginning of 1924 and Baldwin’s Government failed to win on the first Queen’s Speech and that is why we moved straight from Stanley Baldwin to Ramsay MacDonald? It would have been impractical to have gone straight to an election at that point.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

Indeed, and that was the point that I think the noble and learned Lord raised in his speech. What happens in the first Queen’s Speech after an election? I think unless people are prepared to have election after election after election or the potential for that there would be an opportunity for another Government to be formed. The draft Cabinet manual published for consultation in December last year indicated that too. There would either be a dissolution or another Administration would be formed. It is that dual possibility that the Bill seeks to address.

I listened carefully to those who argued that the wording as to what constitutes a vote of no confidence needs tightening up. In response to the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee in the other place, the Government indicated a willingness to listen to suggestions on how that might be done. Those suggestions were not forthcoming during the Bill’s progress through the other place. I have certainly thought hard about it and wonder whether trying to be too specific might cause more problems than if one leaves the wording as it is. I know that my noble friend Lord Norton has views on this matter which it will be interesting to hear and explore in Committee. However, one recognises an elephant when one sees it. If it waddles like a duck and quacks like a duck, it is generally a duck. There is an issue here, but the more I have thought about it, the more I have found that trying to find a solution might cause more problems than leaving it, as it is at the moment, to the Speaker’s discretion. If it is not to be the Speaker, I do not think that it would be appropriate, given what has been said, for a member of the Executive to sign. I do not believe that leaving it as it is would cause the difficulties that have been suggested.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, talked about manipulation. The Constitution Committee indicated that the position is indeed open to abuse, stating:

“We conclude that, if the Bill is passed, it would not be possible to prevent a government using a vote of no confidence to bring about an early election. To do so would be seen by many as an abuse of the Act's provisions and would undermine the fixed-term principle”.

I accept that that is possible, but I believe that it would be identified as an abuse. It would be a matter of politics. As far as I can see, the only way in which one can stop any kind of abuse is to have a rigid scheme, which no one apparently supports. That is why I have difficulty with those who have advocated that we keep things simple and that a simple majority of one in a vote of no confidence should be enough to trigger Dissolution. That would make the position worse in terms of the potential manipulation that the noble and learned Lord suggested could happen under the Bill. It would be even more likely to happen under a Bill which allowed for a simple majority of one in a vote of no confidence. It could be much more readily arranged.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

That is the position.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

That is not the position, because the Bill provides for a 14-day period following a vote of no confidence in which it could be seen whether another Government could be formed. That is not the same thing as going to the Palace the morning after a vote of confidence on a majority of one. If manipulation is possible under this Bill—unless the fixed terms are rigid, it is impossible to avoid—the opportunity for manipulation under a Dissolution on a simple majority of one is even greater. However, the important point is identified by the Constitution Committee: it would be seen as an abuse. That would be a matter for political debate and political comment and the electorate are the ultimate arbiters.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

I said that that was what is envisaged because the proposition with which one has to deal is that the Government of the day with a majority procure a vote of no confidence in themselves—I have in mind the Heath example, where the Opposition do not agree. If that is the position, the Government of the day will also be able to stop anything happening in the following 14 days.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, it makes it much more of a process and an abuse of that process would be seen. However, as we indicated in our response to the report of the Constitution Committee, we accept that the scenario described would be possible, but, as the committee pointed out, it would be a clear abuse of the Act’s provisions and we do not believe that that outcome would be likely. Such an abuse has been possible in the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh National Assembly—there would be a 28-day period rather than a 14-day period following a vote of no confidence—but it simply has not happened because I think that people recognise the consequences of trying to manipulate a situation to bring that about.

The noble Lord, Lord Bach, helpfully confirmed in his winding-up that the Labour Party is still committed—although not entirely with the support of everyone behind him—to the idea of fixed-term Parliaments, but he objected to the way it might be done. I have no doubt that the Labour Party gave this very careful thought and I am sure that in Committee we will see the benefit of that thought in the kind of the amendments that he tables to address this. It is identified by anyone who supports a fixed term that there has to be an element of flexibility in how you do it.

I conclude by acknowledging, as have my noble friends Lord Cormack and Lord Dobbs, and many others, including the noble Lord, Lord Bach, in his winding-up, the importance of scrutiny and the important work that we will do at the ensuing stages of this Bill. It is quite clear that there is a lot of meat for the House to get its teeth into. I look forward to engaging with that, and on that note I urge the House to support this Bill and give it a Second Reading.

Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Debate between Lord Wallace of Tankerness and Lord Falconer of Thoroton

Wednesday 16th February 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

My Lords, we have had an absolutely scintillating debate on this issue. The issue for the House today is whether we should ask the other place to think again. I believe that that is an interaction of two issues: first, the extent to which we think it has been given adequate consideration already; and secondly, the importance of the issue. As for whether it has been given adequate consideration already, this proposal first emerged as a matter of debate a week ago last Monday, when the noble Lord moved his amendment and it was passed. It went to the other place yesterday. It was one of 104 amendments, of which more than 95 were not debated at all. This amendment was debated for 46 minutes. Of those 46 minutes, more than 30 were taken up by Mr Mark Harper speaking on the issue. I say in parenthesis that there may be times when Mr Mark Harper should emulate his near namesake Harpo Marx rather than Mr Mark Harper himself.

So Mr Mark Harper discussed it for more than 30 minutes, but in the course of his statements he misstated the effect of the amendment on a number of occasions. In relation to a vote in favour with a turnout of under 40 per cent, he said:

“So, even if the public had expressed a clear preference, it would not count”.—[Official Report, Commons, 15/2/11; col. 899.]

That was wrong. The same mistake was made this morning in the Times, which stated in its leader:

“In an attempt to derail the referendum on the alternative vote … system, Labour peers, led by Lord Rooker … and with the connivance of some Conservatives, have defeated the Government on an amendment stipulating that the result of the referendum should only be permitted if at least 40 per cent of the electorate turn out to vote”.

Again, that is wrong.

The position is that if less than 40 per cent of those entitled to turn out do so, it becomes an advisory referendum in exactly the same way. That deals with the critical issue: if there is a derisory turnout in favour of the alternative vote system, is it right that this country should then change its voting system, a voting system for which there would not be a majority in either House of Parliament? The legitimacy of a change of that importance must depend on getting more support for it than a normal change in the law, rather than less.

In my respectful submission to this House, it is pretty plain that this issue has not been properly considered either publicly or in the other place. It is pretty plain that it is a very important issue. It is pretty plain—and I pray in aid the very last speech we heard —that the argument in this House has been comprehensively won by those who support my noble friend Lord Rooker. In those circumstances, we on this side of the House will vote in favour of my noble friend's amendment.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, yet again, we have had a useful debate, with some powerful arguments made. I anticipated at the beginning of the debate that strong points would be made, but, nevertheless, we cannot depart from the central point. We are being invited to include in the referendum process a mechanism whereby, if a majority of the people vote yes, it will not necessarily deliver a yes outcome. I take the point made by my noble friend Lord Trimble. Although my noble friend Lord Forsyth was right to say that the 40 per cent rule in the Scottish referendum in 1979 is not the same as that proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, nevertheless, the point made by my noble friend Lord Trimble still holds. If people turn out and there is a yes vote, serious resentment would then be felt if somehow that was overturned by this House or the other House. At a time when we are trying to restore trust in the political process, to set aside the majority view of the people would be very serious.

The noble Lord, Lord Rooker, said that his amendment would not affect the outcome. I cannot accept that. It would not affect the result, but it could affect the outcome. Clearly, without his amendment, if there is a yes vote, the outcome is that the order would be laid to implement the system of an alternative vote for the next general election. His amendment could result in a different outcome, because if there was less than a 40 per cent turnout, it would not follow that an alternative vote would be used at the next election. Let us not shy away from the fact that his amendment would affect the outcome of the referendum in that important sense.

I take the point made by my noble friend Lord Lawson, who said that I had argued that it was a “stay at home” amendment. The “no” campaign could very well encourage people to stay at home to reduce the turnout. Because 84 per cent of the country will already be entitled to go to the polls on that day for the Scottish Parliament, the National Assembly in Wales, the Northern Ireland Assembly and local government elections in Northern Ireland and all parts of England bar London, if people want to vote no, we want them to turn out to vote no. We should not be giving people an encouragement to think that if they stay at home, they have the equivalent of a no vote, in as much as the yes vote may not bear fruit.

The Bill offers simplicity, clarity and certainty. It honours the promise to the electorate that they will decide how they return their representatives to the other place. They will do that as the result of a referendum without artificial barriers, without further complex, as yet undetermined, procedures and without political wrangling. It means that when they go to the polls on 5 May and want to vote yes, the outcome will not be “yes, maybe” or “yes if”. If they go to the polls to vote yes, it will count. Whatever the issues on the day are, their vote should be heard, listened to and given effect.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

This is also an important debate and, again, the question is whether or not we should ask the other place to think again. We on this side of the House think it is right that we should do so.

Again, there is an interaction of two issues: first, the extent to which the matter has been properly considered by the other place; and, secondly, the extent to which it is an important issue. On whether the Commons has had a proper opportunity to consider the issue, this debate was an hour long in the other place. In winding up for the Opposition, Mr Sadiq Khan pointed out that Mr Mark Harper had taken up two-thirds of the time available. Right across the debate there was the repeated theme that the Government were not listening and that there was not clarity about what was happening. I shall not quote from Labour Members but from coalition Members.

When addressing Mr Mark Harper, Mr Mark Field said:

“Does my hon. Friend not appreciate the concern that when we are discussing whether there should be any variance, be it of 5% or 7.5%, it is important to know how the process operates? … If we do not have at least a basic understanding of how it will operate, it will be difficult for us to make any value judgment as to where the variance should lie, which is the subject of amendment 19”.—[Official Report, Commons, 15/2/11; col. 864.]

That is what we are now talking about.

Mr Andrew George, a Liberal Democrat Member, said:

“Given the nature of some of the questions that the Minister has been asked in the past few minutes, does he agree that perhaps there should be an opportunity to review the wisdom of going ahead on the basis that he is describing?”.

Later again, the same Member—a coalition Member—went on:

“My hon. Friend is absolutely right, but I think that the inflexibility of the proposals will result in much more significant changes across the country … All I am asking is that the Government take a less intransigent and more flexible approach”.—[Official Report, Commons, 15/02/11; cols. 865-8]

One Labour Member is worth quoting. Mr Paul Murphy, who had a distinguished career and was Secretary of State for Wales, said:

“I do not understand why the Government and the Minister are being so rigid and fundamentalist on this issue”.— [Official Report, Commons, 15/02/11; col. 869]

The mood around the House, from reading Hansard, is that inadequate answers were given, that the Government were being unnecessarily rigid and that there was no proper understanding of how it would work. That is perhaps not surprising, because this amendment first saw the light of day—in the sense of it being passed by this House—a week ago today. The material in the other amendment is going back to the other place for further consideration. In my respectful submission, it would obviously be wrong if this did not go back with it.

Is this an important amendment? In my respectful submission it is. I do not know how many of your Lordships were present when the noble Lord, Lord Armstrong, told the story of Procrustes; or when the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, went through the detail of the work that he had done with the Government to get to a place with this extra 2.5 per cent. He was the only person in that debate—including the Government—who had done the work and thought through what the consequences were. For example, in relation to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, there are some wards that are so large that they will not be protected by 7.5 per cent, so obviously there will be even more wards that will not be protected by 5 per cent. The answer to the question put by the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, is that more wards will have to be broken up under 5 per cent than under 7.5 per cent. I hope that blocks the retreat for the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, at this particular point.

As far as the overall position is concerned, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, referred to the academics and the people involved in the area. Professor Johnston, the leading academic in relation to this issue, said he did not normally support public inquiries; however, what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, did not say was that he thought that, in the context of such a far-reaching change as is envisaged by this boundary review, there is a strong argument for the ability to make changes. Robin Gray, the former chairman of the Boundary Commission, said that some flexibility in addition to the 5 per cent was required.

In relation to the issues that were being considered in the previous debate, we considered the issue of judicial review in detail. Of course I respect the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, in relation to the issues that he raised, but the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, both expressed the view that most judicial reviews, even on this, would fail. I also make the point that the courts, in looking at these issues, would be well aware of the deadline, which would be sometime in October 2013. These issues would arise during 2012, so the courts, in my respectful submission, would be well able to have timetables that would ensure that the deadline of October 2013 was met. They would not be faced with these issues late on in the process, but much, much earlier on. The application for leave for judicial review would take place at such a time that the court could deal with them quite smartly. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Scott of Foscote, made the point that hopeless applications for judicial review take time—which is absolutely true—but a court keen to meet a deadline set in statute would in my respectful submission be able to deal with that.

The final point dealt with in the debate in the Commons was the statement that it was not possible to craft a genuine exception—a point I should say that was not made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, in this debate; but which was referred to by Mr Mark Harper, who cites a case called Al Rawi and others v Security Service, a case about the extent to which you can have a special procedure for terrorists. It is hard to imagine a case more different than the sort of case the courts would be dealing with here, and it may be an indication of the difficulty in finding support for that proposition. I do not ask that this House reaches a firm conclusion; all I say is that it is the right thing to do for this House to ask the other place to think again. That seems very little to ask. We support the noble Lord, Lord Pannick.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, once again I thank noble Lords who have participated in this debate on what is an important issue, as has been recognised many times during the passage of the Bill through your Lordships’ House. I start by picking up the points made by both the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern with regard to the lengthy delays in responding both to the report from the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee in the other place and to your Lordships’ Constitution Committee. I am not in a position to offer any explanation, but I do recognise that the time that was taken cannot have assisted either House and I therefore wish to apologise. Responding to the point made by my noble and learned friend, I will certainly take it upon myself personally to make sure that the comments made in your Lordships’ House—and indeed I will reflect the force of them too—will be conveyed to colleagues.

It has been argued that the role of the House in asking the other place to think again, and indeed in asking the Government to think again, has been well discharged in respect of these amendments. As has been acknowledged, the Government did engage to see whether there were ways in which we could find common ground and indeed there has been an opportunity for consideration in the other House. However, before inviting the House to send the amendments back again for further consideration, it is important that we perhaps reflect as to what this supreme constitutional principle that we are asking the other place to think about is. Is it just 2.5 per cent? One of the principles of the Bill, referred to by my noble friend Lord King of Bridgwater, is that of equal votes—one vote one value—as best we can throughout the United Kingdom. That is an important principle and one we believe is reflected in the Bill and which, bar the two issues that are now outstanding, has been accepted by both Houses. It is not slavish arithmetic, as I sought to explain. The 5 per cent variation, which gives 10 per cent in all, was not just conjured up—indeed my noble friend thought that it should have been lower than that. In response to the question from the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, we believe that the 5 per cent is the closest we can get to achieving equality in the weight of a vote—I am repeating myself but it is important to do so—and an equal say for voters in the outcome of a general election while allowing the Boundary Commission for England to continue its practice of using wards as the building blocks of constituencies in England. I remind the House that the wards themselves are drawn up with local factors in mind.

The contribution of the now much quoted Professor Johnston, in his first session before the Political and Constitutional Reform Select Committee, noted that much local political activity and engagement was based on the ward structure. Crucially, the secretary to the Boundary Commission for England, in his evidence to that committee, said that under the rules in the Bill it would be possible to allocate constituencies using wards in the majority of cases. I did say, in my opening remarks, that an absolute prohibition on splitting wards would not be appropriate because there are some places—Birmingham is a case in point—where some wards are so large that it might not be possible not to split them. In these cases, the wards may even be so large that it might make more sense for local communities for them to be broken up to get a more readily identifiable sense of community. The basic point is that in the vast majority of cases it is believed that wards will be the building blocks for the constituencies in England. That is why the 5 per cent was chosen. We have yet to hear, with all due respect, a rationale for 7.5 per cent. I have sought to explain why 5 per cent is right and why there is a rationale behind it, but we have not yet heard a clear rationale for 7.5 per cent.

Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Debate between Lord Wallace of Tankerness and Lord Falconer of Thoroton

Monday 14th February 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

I accept the noble Lord’s implied, or indeed express, criticism. My wording is not good and that is my fault. It would have been much better if the amendment had said: “Party election broadcasts during the referendum period will not be broadcast if they support any particular side in the referendum on the voting system”. It would have been much simpler if I had just said that, and then one would have known where one stood.

On whether the proposition put by the noble Lord in his question would fall foul of my amendment, if the six-week period is within the referendum period, then it would. I would have to check with the Minister because I am not sure whether the six-week period is within the referendum period. However, if we assume that it is within the referendum period, then saying, “We are strong supporters of constitutional change”, implies support, I would have thought. I beg to move.

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Wallace of Tankerness)]

My Lords, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, has indicated, this matter has been debated in Committee and on Report, and it is clear that the Government have taken a different view from him. However, I accept that it is helpful for us to be able to have a further exchange on the issue.

The Government believe that the framework that is set out in this Bill and indeed in other legislation is sufficient for this referendum. Perhaps I can establish some common ground. We agree with the principle that party election broadcasts should not be used as referendum campaign broadcasts. However, Section 127 of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 prevents the main purpose of any broadcast other than a referendum campaign broadcast being to procure or promote an outcome in a referendum, which we believe is sufficient reassurance. In other words, it ensures that a party election broadcast does not become a referendum campaign broadcast. I think there is common ground here and that the mischief which the noble and learned Lord identified—although I would not necessarily accept it—is an incidental part of an election broadcast in which one side or the other is endorsed.

Our view is that there is clear merit in maintaining some flexibility in this area while acknowledging the clear limits already imposed by Section 127. Such flexibility might enable, for example, the inclusion of a brief statement during a party election broadcast that referred to the referendum and to whether the party supported a particular outcome. Although the noble and learned Lord did not say it, I understand from him that he would find nothing wrong with the existence of the referendum being referred to or indeed with an encouragement to vote; it is the endorsement of a particular yes or no position that he seeks to address.

If such a reference was an expression of a party’s wider policy on matters—for example, on political reform—that were of relevance to the elections on 5 May, one might say that precluding mention of that position in a related election broadcast could have an adverse impact on campaigning for a particular party in those elections. To pick up on the point made by my noble friend Lord Phillips of Sudbury, I can confirm that six weeks would be within the relevant campaign period for the referendum. I understood the noble and learned Lord to agree with the proposition that if in that broadcast a party was to support, let us say, constitutional reform—I do not think that my noble friend even specified a particular outcome of the referendum—that would fall foul of the law if his amendment were passed.

I ask the House to consider that to legislate to forbid a party to articulate its legitimate policy position is an important step to take.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I have two points in response. Speaking as a member of the Administration, I am in no position to offer detailed assurances on the content of a party political broadcast when that party is only one part of the coalition. However, I shall indicate what the dynamic might be in how the broadcasting authorities treat this issue and, indeed, are doing so—it is not hypothetical.

We believe that it is ultimately a matter for the broadcasters to see that the rules in Section 127 on the content of party election broadcasts, together with relevant guidance issued under the Communications Act 2003, are adhered to. That is the Government’s position. I accept that the noble and learned Lord might disagree with it, but we have not yet heard any compelling reason to convince us that that stance is wrong. The proposed approach would in any case still require broadcasters to take a view on whether the proposed content in a broadcast complied with the new rule. Broadcasters would have to make some sort of judgment as to whether the content of a party election broadcast indicated a preference for a particular referendum outcome. Such a judgment might well be in the field of whether a general endorsement of constitutional reform fell within that or whether the content had to be much more specific, endorsing a yes/no position.

As I indicated on Report, the chair of the Broadcasters’ Liaison Group has already written to the political parties, drawn their attention to Section 127 of the PPERA and asked them to contact him if they intend to include any reference to the referendum in a party election broadcast in order to ascertain whether any reference crosses the line into Section 127 territory and could in the group’s view be unlawful. We believe that these lines of communication will clarify how the legislative framework will apply in the context of the combination of the referendum with other polls on 5 May. The framework for regulating party election broadcasts sits under the Communications Act 2003 and within the broadcasters’ guidance. We believe that that, combined with the Section 127 provisions in PPERA 2000, provides the necessary clarity.

That said, the Government acknowledge the important issue that has been raised by the noble and learned Lord in tabling this and other amendments at earlier stages. The PPERA framework for referendum regulation was introduced by the previous Government and, despite the confidence that I have expressed in the legislation, aspects of the framework might need a longer-term refresh. I reassure the noble and learned Lord that the Government will reflect further on these points in the light of the referendum and the experience of the poll on 5 May. In the mean time, I urge the noble and learned Lord to withdraw the amendment.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for his speech, but there is a fundamental problem with it; he referred to flexibility, but the amendment seeks to establish the principle that in a party political broadcast you should not be able to support an outcome in the AV Bill. The Electoral Commission says that it supports the intention behind the amendment, but goes on to say that it is not sure that it is necessary to achieve the intended outcome because of the main purpose issue in Section 127. Surely it is better that there should be clarity about what is and is not allowed—and what should not be allowed is support for an outcome in a party political broadcast, because that would drive a coach and horses through the expenditure limits. I seek the opinion of the House.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

My Lords, we support the amendment and we supported it previously. The noble Lord invited our appreciation of the amendment. I expressly appreciate the amendment for its drafting and also its mover who has spent a lifetime supporting participation of this sort. He thoroughly deserves to get his amendment.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Phillips for the amendment and I join in the general approbation of it. For all the difficulties that we have had during parts of this Bill, a common theme in all parts of the Chamber has been the importance of participation in the referendum process. As my noble friend indicated, this paragraph of the schedule does that anyway but he has highlighted the way in which it can be done even better. I am grateful to my noble friend for the constructive discussions we have had on this and the result of those is that the Government agree that the proposal adds useful clarification to the Bill, particularly by emphasising the importance of co-ordination and co-operation. I am pleased to urge the House to accept my noble friend’s amendment.

Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Debate between Lord Wallace of Tankerness and Lord Falconer of Thoroton

Wednesday 9th February 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

My Lords, the manuscript amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury, comes under the part of the schedule headed “Encouraging participation”. As I understand it, he wishes to place on the chief counting officer responsibility for co-ordinating the activities of a regional counting officer, a counting officer and a registration officer in performing their duties under paragraph 10 to encourage participation. It is very hard to see how anyone could object to that. I do not know whether there are any technical objections to the terms of the noble Lord’s manuscript amendment, but it seems a sensible measure, because there is no one in the House who does not want to encourage participation.

If there are technical problems with the manuscript amendment, I imagine that they could be tidied up at Third Reading on Monday. On the basis on which it has been advanced by the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury, we support the principle of the amendment, subject to any difficulties that we have not foreseen to which the Minister may draw our attention.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Phillips of Sudbury for tabling the amendment. He gave a history of the debate in Committee. We agreed when he withdrew his amendment in Committee that we would have further discussions. I am pleased that we have been able to have those discussions. In Committee, the Government indicated that we were not persuaded that such an amendment was necessary. My noble friend and I have agreed that there was merit on both sides. Our meeting has added clarity. It has put the issue of co-operation right up front. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, has emphasised the importance of co-operation, with which we all agree, in trying to ensure encouragement of participation in the referendum, usbregardless of which side of the campaign one might be on.

It is a manuscript amendment. If my noble friend is willing to give us the opportunity to reflect on its wording, I very much hope to be able to come back to him with a definitive response during Third Reading. Perhaps he would be prepared to withdraw his amendment at this stage on that basis.

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[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

I apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, for making two loud noises from a sedentary position, but his point was precisely that which was going through my mind about the noble and learned Lord’s response. It was not clear from what he said whether he would come back with something or whether he was just considering something. The response of the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, is exactly the response that I would have given.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

If it helps, I very much hope to be able to come back with a very positive response to my noble friend. I just wanted to check.

Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Debate between Lord Wallace of Tankerness and Lord Falconer of Thoroton

Wednesday 9th February 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I would passionately defend a united kingdom, but I do not honestly believe that it is doing service to all parts of the United Kingdom if we say that some part of it needs a hand-up. I believe in each of the constituent parts of our United Kingdom—Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and England—having equal status. That is why, when the other place is dealing with issues such as defence or macroeconomic policies, the votes of a person in Wales should carry equal value to those of a person in Scotland, Northern Ireland and England. That is not unfairness or inequality. In fact, to do otherwise would put inequality into the system. I therefore ask the noble and learned Lord to withdraw the amendment.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

My Lords, as the noble and learned Lord said, “I have not heard why Wales should be treated differently”. Our amendment simply proposes getting to the same point as everyone else but doing it in a gradual way that does not put the union under strain. Not once did the Minister address that argument. I wish to test the opinion of the House.

Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Debate between Lord Wallace of Tankerness and Lord Falconer of Thoroton

Tuesday 8th February 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I am not aware that there was a judicial review. The noble Lord said that everyone accepted it. He should consult my noble friend Lord Steel of Aikwood about how effective he thinks the present public inquiry system is.

The role of the chair has been much debated. It was said that the chair should be legally qualified in order to provide clarity and consistency of practice, and to make the process resistant to judicial review. It was claimed also that there must be report back. We have just heard about the pros and cons of that. The Government do not agree. The hearings that we propose are about giving the public and the political parties a chance to have their say as part of the consultation process. The legislation provides that a commission shall take into account the representations made at hearings, as it does the written submissions.

Another of my concerns about the opposition proposals is that the value of the written submissions appears to be somewhat relegated. We propose that there should be a counter-representation period. As I understand the Opposition's proposals, any written counter-representations would have to be channelled into the public inquiry: there would not be a time period for them.

It is important to remember that the commissions are independent. They exist to weigh the arguments. It will be for them to decide how best to do that. There is no need to interpose an independent lawyer between the commissions and the arguments in order to allow the public to have their say. The commissions will be chaired by a High Court judge or equivalent and will be very sensitive to those issues. It will be open to them to appoint the chair that they think best for the job. I will not detain the House at the moment by speaking to Amendment 18E in this group, save to say that we have tabled it to broaden the purposes for which assistant commissioners may be engaged.

The Opposition claim that the process is flawed because the hearings will take place at a point in the process before all the written representations are known. This point was picked up by my noble friend Lord Phillips. Again, that is a concern if one has the mindset of a public inquiry. We say that parties will be able to feed in their views of the commission's initial recommendations, and others will be able to hear them. We have provided for counter-representation that will allow scrutiny of the arguments of others. Although we do not envisage a public inquiry with a quasi-judicial cross-examination, I say to the noble Lord, Lord Martin of Springburn, that our amendment provides for the chair to put questions or allow questions to be put to a person present at the hearing and, if the question is allowed to be put, to regulate the manner of the questioning or restrict the number of questions that a person may ask. Therefore, there will be an opportunity for the kind of engagement that the noble Lord clearly feels is of value.

The noble and learned Lord stated that the Opposition are arguing that if we adjust the number of weeks for written consultation there is time for oral inquiries to be held. Putting a deadline in the Bill does not guarantee that it will be achieved. The Boundary Commission for England was set a deadline in primary legislation in 1992. However, it reported months later because it felt the need to focus on the process under the previous legislation. I do not criticise it for that: it believed that the process was important. However, I ask the House to consider that the Boundary Commissions may think that the process is important, and that whatever deadline we set may not be met. If that happens, there is a danger that one of the key principles of the Bill will be seriously undermined.

The noble and learned Lord indicated that two days was not enough for an inquiry. Past inquiries have taken 12 days, or 10 under the previous review. Under the Government's proposal, there would be a maximum of 90 days of public hearings in England: five in each region, lasting two days each. That would be the upper limit. The Opposition would remove the limit on the number of days, and the period for counter-representations, meaning that the only place for scrutinising the arguments of others would be in that oral public inquiry. Therefore, we could expect more 10 and 12-day inquiries. We believe that this proposal is simply impractical. I recognise that in toto the number of weeks is similar to ours but I fear that I am sceptical about whether it could be achieved in practice, even if it were desirable to restore the old-style, legalistic form of inquiry. I remind the House that it is not. I quote from academic literature:

“In effect, the public consultation process is very largely an exercise in allowing the political parties to seek influence over the Commission’s recommendations—in which their sole goal is to promote their own electoral interests”.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, indicated that he thought that all the key components were in fact ticked off with the Government’s amendment.

In conclusion, the House is faced with a choice between a new mechanism for ensuring that the public can genuinely engage in the boundary review process through hearings or the recreation of the old inquiry process that we know can be alien to the public and would return us to the days of six-year boundary reviews. Even if it does not do that, it would certainly lead to a length of time which could undermine getting the boundary review through and the next election being fought on modern, up-to-date boundaries. I believe that the Government have moved a long way on this point and they have done so after careful consideration. I urge noble Lords carefully to consider the proposals that we are putting before the House today and to support them.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

My Lords, there is a very real and important issue here. On close analysis, the noble and learned Lord’s proposals are flawed, and fatally so. First, on the point about delay, I do not think that the noble and learned Lord was listening to what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, were saying. In his closing remarks, he agreed that the period of time specified for his scheme and for the Opposition’s scheme is broadly the same. With ours it is 26 weeks and with his it is 24 weeks. Therefore, a scheme is being proposed to enable the process to finish by October 2013. I want to spare the blushes of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, but they are probably the two leading experts on judicial review in this country and they are saying that there will be more judicial reviews. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, whom I greatly respect, is shaking his head but, with respect, I am listening to them, not to him, and they are saying that there will be more judicial reviews. They say that they do not know what form they will take but there will be more of them. Therefore, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, is making his scheme more vulnerable to delay through the process that he is proposing. I say that not on the basis of my opinion but on the basis of the opinion of the noble Lord and the noble and learned Lord. Therefore, with respect, his point about a delay is wrong.

Secondly, he says that this process will engage people, in that his scheme will allow people to come and say something—a process that the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, described as a day in court. The noble Lord, Lord Faulks, spent many days in court, but I have never known a day in court where you say something but then nothing happens. As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said—in my submission, entirely correctly—that will be bound to increase resentment, not reduce it. As my noble friend Lord Rooker said, someone will not be saying, “Well, I have heard your arguments and you’re wrong on this and right on that”. It is, with respect, a point that the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, put his finger on and it is incredibly important.

The third point that the noble and learned Lord made is that academics are all against us. They are not. They are saying, as we are saying, that we must streamline the process. We must not allow it to become abused, but we must have some process like this. The person who knows best about this is the boundary commissioner, Robin Gray, who said that if you do not have a process where the public can put their point of view and have a response to their point of view rather than complete silence, you are going to have real disquiet about an area where there is no disquiet at the moment. With the greatest of respect, I must say that the Government have moved some way, but they have moved nowhere near enough, and they have put us in a position where we have no alternative but to seek the opinion of the House. I beg to move.

Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Debate between Lord Wallace of Tankerness and Lord Falconer of Thoroton

Monday 7th February 2011 Lords Chamber

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Wallace of Tankerness)]

My Lords, these are important amendments. I immediately take the point made by the noble and learned Lord on the follow-up to Committee. I regret any discourtesy that has been felt by the noble and learned Lord. While he was making his comments, I had the draft of a letter to him; I have now had it confirmed by the Leader of the House that it has been issued. It is dated with today’s date, so he might not have received it yet, but it is a fairly comprehensive letter that runs to almost three pages. I will not read it out or put it on the record. I apologise if the noble and learned Lord has not yet received it.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

What on earth is the point of sending me a letter, which I have not had a chance to consider, that arrives after Report has started?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I can only confirm the factual position. I fully take the point that the noble and learned Lord has not yet had an opportunity to consider the letter. I have no idea when it was put into the system. I saw a draft earlier but was not in a position until now to confirm that it had been issued. As I indicated, I apologise for any discourtesy to the noble and learned Lord.

I turn to the two amendments. On the first one, as we explained in Committee, the Government introduced the clause to which the amendments relate in the other place after the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee identified an ambiguity in the current legislation—the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000—over whether publication of material about the referendum by a media organisation in favour of a specific result would be caught by the spending restrictions that apply to the campaigning groups. Clause 5 provides that the costs of covering and reporting on the referendum in the media are not referendum expenses. In the interests of the freedom of the press, it would be wrong for the spending restrictions to apply in this way. I think that is common ground across the House.

The amendment moved by the noble and learned Lord seeks to add “referendum campaign” before “broadcasts” to line 7 of page 4. This would go against Schedule 13 to the PPER Act 2000, which sets out that,

“agency fees, design costs and other costs in connection with preparing or producing”,

referendum campaign broadcasts are to be included as referendum expenses. I am not sure whether it was the noble and learned Lord’s intention to exempt such expenses from counting, but the Government do not agree that this should be the case. Designated lead campaign organisations are entitled to free referendum campaign broadcasts in terms of airtime, but the expenses incurred in respect of the production of these referendum campaign broadcasts do and should count towards referendum expenses. Therefore, it would not be right to accept this amendment, which would exempt these production expenses from counting.

Another reason why we do not agree with the first amendment is that it would bring back the ambiguity that we sought to remove through Clause 5 by limiting the provision to referendum broadcasts only. It would not therefore cover other types of broadcast, as it was designed to when we added it to the Bill. The result would be to reactivate the question of whether any broadcast other than referendum campaign broadcasts would be caught by the spending restrictions as they are currently drawn. It would then be ambiguous as to what would and would not count as referendum expenses in other types of BBC or Sianel Pedwar Cymru broadcasts—such as news programmes and politics programmes—other than those for the referendum campaign. We all agree that the media play a vital role in building public awareness and presenting facts and opinions on the matters raised by the poll. This amendment could prevent media comment if the spending limit for referendum expenses was reached. This would not be right. That was also the view of the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee in the other place. We believe that accepting this amendment would go against the Committee.

We agreed in Committee to consider carefully the second amendment. I can assure the House that the Government have done so. I regret the lateness of the letter, but the position is set out in it. The Government agree with the principle that party election broadcasts should not be used as referendum campaign broadcasts. As was highlighted in Committee, there is a clear definition of what constitutes a referendum campaign broadcast under Section 127 of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act—to which the noble Lord, Lord Soley, drew our attention. Any broadcast whose purpose or main purpose is to procure or promote an outcome in the referendum is a referendum campaign broadcast. Referendum campaign broadcasts can be made only by the designated lead campaign organisations. The current law therefore already provides that the purposes—or main purpose—of party election broadcasts must not be to promote or procure a referendum outcome. Therefore, we can be assured that party election broadcasts cannot be used by political parties as a significant referendum campaign opportunity. In a moment, I will come to the crucial point that the noble Lord, Lord Soley, raised.

Section 127 of the PPER Act provides a safeguard against a political party using a party election broadcast as a referendum campaign broadcast. However, it also provides appropriate leeway for broadcasters to make a judgment call as to whether material that a party might want to broadcast strays beyond mentioning the referendum in passing in an election broadcast and into the realms of what would become a referendum campaign broadcast.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

Is the noble and learned Lord saying that, if one of the purposes of a political party’s broadcast—though not its main purpose—was to encourage people to vote in a particular way in the referendum, it would infringe Section 127 of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

The amendment is re-moved but not removed—yet. I fully accept the spirit in which the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, re-moved it. As he recognises, this is not entirely consequential. We could get a turnout of 80 per cent and yet, with this change, we would still create a power rather than an obligation. I do not need to elaborate, as the point has been made. The Government cannot accept the amendment. In the spirit in which the noble Lord re-moved it, I ask him to withdraw it.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

My understanding when I was a Minister was that, when an amendment was carried, the Government would bring forward amendments to tidy up the Bill to reflect the position in relation to the plain intent of the amendment—in this case, Amendment A1. We always did this and we expect the Government to make the rest of the Bill reflect the effect of the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Rooker.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

I apologise. I was keen to find out the position of the Government in relation to this. What the Chief Whip said was unhelpful. It is important for the Government to state their position.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, the vote took place only a few hours ago and the Government are still to consider how they will respond to it. In answer to the noble and learned Lord’s question, this is neither a consequential amendment, as the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, and I have indicated, nor is it a tidying-up one, because it does not tidy up. It goes much further than that. Indeed, it breaks the linkage, because it would make the power permissive rather than a duty. As I indicated, that could therefore mean that the power was there in any circumstance. Even if there was an 80 per cent turnout at the referendum with a 75 per cent vote in favour, the effect would not be to oblige the order to be brought forward to implement a yes vote. That was not what the House voted for and therefore I cannot accept the noble Lord’s amendment, which I think he fully understands.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

My Lords, my name is on this amendment as well. To slightly increase the excruciation for the noble and learned Lord, it is impossible to understand what the basis of the conditionality is. Assume that 99 per cent of the population were to vote in favour of changing the system to AV, even if something happened to prevent the Boundary Commission changes being introduced, then, as I understand the Government’s position, they will not introduce AV. Why is that? What is the logic? The only logic must be some sort of political deal. Honesty would help the noble and learned Lord a lot.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, these amendments, as the noble Lord, Lord Lipsey, has indicated, seek to undermine, even remove, the link between the commencement arrangements for the AV and for the constituencies parts of the Bill. Anyone who has ever been a political realist would recognise that in terms of a coalition one part of the Bill—the first part—had greater salience and resonance with the Liberal Democrats, and the same applied to the Conservative Party when it comes to Part 2. I believe in equality of votes across the United Kingdom and I have not had difficulty, therefore, in arguing that case.

The issue of linkage has been one which we have debated from the outset. The noble Baroness, Lady McDonagh, raised an issue about it as we started Committee stage and withdrew her amendment, and the parties and the coalition Government have made it very clear that these two parts are linked. The question has been raised—it was hinted at by the noble Lord, Lord Lipsey—as to why, if the referendum does not produce as successful an outcome as the Liberal Democrats would wish to see, we are tied in, as it were, with the boundary change. Quite apart from the fact that, as I have already indicated, there is something right in principle about trying to seek greater equality among constituencies, as a liberal and a democrat I would find it very difficult to say, if the people had expressed their view in a referendum and said no, that somehow or other we should try and thwart another part of this Bill which is linked.

There is nothing wrong in parties entering into an agreement that they then make their best endeavours to deliver; in fact it is honourable and perfectly proper. I believe both parts of this Bill hang together and are linked. They give the people a say as to whether they want to change the way in which the House of Commons is elected while also ensuring that the House of Commons is elected, be it on first past the post or on the alternative vote, in constituencies that are much nearer to being equal.

On that basis I would invite the noble Lord, Lord Lipsey, to withdraw his amendment.

Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Debate between Lord Wallace of Tankerness and Lord Falconer of Thoroton

Monday 7th February 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick]

If that argument is correct, why does it not also apply to general elections and constituency votes, which some noble Lords wish to alter?

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

Is it not also right that it was an automatic no when the level was not reached in 1978, which is not what my noble friend Lord Rooker is proposing here?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

There is a difference because the 40 per cent related to something different. I am not entirely sure that I follow what my noble friend Lord Lamont said, because in general elections there is no threshold for what the turnout should be to make those elections valid and no one has ever suggested putting a turnout—

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

First, I congratulate my noble friend Lord Rooker, who knows the mood of the House much better than anyone else in it. It was a splendid victory. Perhaps I may also say how much I agree with his request for the list of concessions. I can help him on that. I was handed them at 2.29 pm this afternoon, and I have to say that they do not amount to very much, I am afraid. I obviously support the amendments that my noble friend is proposing. In effect, they make whole the amendment passed in Committee.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, for moving the amendment, as he said, on behalf of the coalition. He described the reasons for it. The Bill as it stood was defective, because, while the noble Lord specified that the referendum had to take place before 31 October, there was no means for identifying when the date had to be set—hence the need for an order.

The amendment also sets an appropriate test for Ministers to satisfy before using any order-making power, whereby,

“it is impossible or impractical for the referendum to be held on 5 May 2011, or that it cannot be conducted properly if held on that day”.

The test is right, because the referendum date can be moved away from 5 May only for practical reasons. It would be wrong, and have very serious implications, if the reason for that was the result of some delay that had not allowed consideration of the Bill to be completed in time.

The associated amendment to Clause 4 is also necessary in this context to ensure that the scheme which the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, envisages is properly workable. It provides a new power to make provision in secondary legislation to take account of a situation in which other polls are due to be held on any other referendum date set by the order.

Clause 4 as it stands will ensure that any poll which that clause already mentions is automatically combined with the referendum if it takes place on a new date set for the referendum. Any polls which Clause 4 does not mention would not be combined with the poll. It is impossible to say at this stage whether it would desirable to combine a referendum with other polls. A decision on that would need to be taken at the time and will depend on the types of polls.

In conclusion, I reassure noble Lords that, given the flexibility that these powers need to provide, any order made using the new powers will necessarily be subject to the affirmative resolution procedure. I end on a note of caution, because I cannot speak on this subject without saying how unfortunate it would be if the referendum were not to take place on 5 May.

Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Debate between Lord Wallace of Tankerness and Lord Falconer of Thoroton

Tuesday 1st February 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, this group contains Amendments 110B, 110C, 110C, 110D and 110E. The amendment would give the chief counting officer, who is chair of the Electoral Commission, the power to incur expenses for the effective conduct of the referendum and in certain limited circumstances, make payments in respect of those expenses out of moneys to be provided from the Consolidated Fund. I can assure the Committee that the chief counting officer will be able to spend conduct moneys only where doing so provides a clear financial benefit. The Royal Mail, for example, has indicated that it may be able to provide a cheaper service for the sweeps of mail centres—a service that ensures that any votes still in the mail centres towards the end of polling day are identified, extracted and provided to returning and counting officers before the close of poll that evening—if it can contract for this on a national basis with one individual rather than having to negotiate and contract with more than 350 officers who will be conducting the poll at local level.

The amendment would help to make the administration of the referendum easier for the chief counting officer and for counting officers, and provides an opportunity for savings to be made on the conduct of the poll. I beg to move.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

This seems very sensible, but I am slightly bewildered. How on earth does the chief counting officer not have that power anyway?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, when this issue arose, the view was taken that it was uncertain that that power existed and hence there was the need to put it beyond peradventure that it did. The issue was flagged up by the example of the Royal Mail that I gave, and there was concern that that power did not exist. As the noble and learned Lord says, it is a sensible power and one which I hope will commend itself to the Committee.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

This is an important point which my noble friend Lord Foulkes has put so accurately. The position should not be different in England and Scotland. In England, interest is sufficient, which means a general interest—almost in a layman’s sense—in the subject matter, whereas in Scotland, interest and title are needed, title meaning, as my noble friend Lord Foulkes said, some legal relationship which gives them a right to sue. The amendment would make Scotland and England the same in relation to whether you are entitled to challenge an electoral process which is identical on both sides of the border. That seems sensible. I would be interested to hear what the Minister has to say.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, for bringing this amendment forward. He and I well know that the matter has been raised by the Law Society of Scotland. Indeed, I tabled a similar amendment in the previous Parliament.

The amendment would amend the provisions so that a challenge brought through judicial review in Scotland can be launched if its purposes are on the same basis as proceedings elsewhere. In Scotland, there are two separate tests for bringing judicial review, in that a petitioner has to demonstrate both title and interest, whereas in England, Wales and Northern Ireland there is a single test of interest alone.

The noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, also mentioned the recommendation made by Lord Gill, the Lord Justice Clerk, in his Report of the Scottish Civil Courts Review. However, I am concerned that because of the way in which this amendment is drafted, it will not have the desired effect. By stating that,

“the petitioner’s interest alone shall be sufficient to enable a petition to be lodged”,

it has almost gone too far and would effectively disapply the need to establish all other matters when considering a case for judicial review—including, indeed, whether there is sufficient legal grounds for a challenge.

The other, perhaps more practical, point is that it is difficult to see what the practical effect would be, as we think it is likely that the Scottish courts would entertain a judicial review from any elector entitled to vote at the referendum or at parliamentary elections and any permitted participant. By their very nature, they have an interest—they were taking part in the election.

We should be mindful of the fact that this issue goes wider than the referendum alone. It raises important issues about the nature of judicial review in Scotland, not least those flowing from Lord Gill’s report, and the circumstances in which they should be permitted to raise petitions for judicial review. That is an important issue. It is one that undoubtedly is receiving detailed consideration, not least by the Scottish Government and the Scottish Parliament. It would not be helpful if this Bill somehow tried to pre-empt it on an ad hoc basis, particularly, as I have indicated, we believe that an elector in Scotland would be able to raise a petition.

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[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

That is very helpful. I read the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, as saying that the current requirement in Scotland for judicial review is title and interest. He is expressing the view from the Dispatch Box that if you were an elector in the relevant election that you wished to challenge—the referendum—that would give you title and interest for the purpose of Scottish judicial review. That being so, the difficulties and dangers of trying to do an ad hoc change here do not arise and we should be reassured that any elector would be able to bring a judicial review challenge in Scotland, just as they would in England.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

As I am sure the noble and learned Lord knows, these will ultimately be matters for the court but that is certainly our understanding, or my belief.

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[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

I should perhaps have asked this before but, on page 25, Schedule 1 requires the Electoral Commission to,

“prepare accounts in respect of their expenditure in relation to the referendum”,

only if,

“directed to do so by the Treasury”.

Is the Treasury going to give such a direction? It seems extraordinary that we would not know what the expenditure of the Electoral Commission was on the referendum unless a direction had been given by the Treasury. It might be that this is, as it were, language which is always in, and that it will of course give that direction, but I thought that it was a very odd way of doing it. It would mean that we could not find out how much had been spent on the referendum, but you can bet your bottom dollar that there will be a lot of questions asked about how much the referendum cost at some stage.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I probably share the noble and learned Lord’s view. It is almost counterintuitive to think that the Treasury might in some way not wish that—well, it may be, I do not know. Freedom of information requests might well flow fast and furiously if that did not happen. Perhaps if I talk long enough, I may get a definitive answer on whether this is indeed something that generally appears in such legislation or whether there is some reason unbeknown to us.

The answer is that it is part of the Electoral Commission’s accounting framework that it normally accounts to the Speaker’s office. I suspect that the paragraph makes provision that the accounts in relation to the referendum could be extracted. If that is incorrect, I will ensure that a proper clarification is intimated to the noble and learned Lord and duly circulated.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

As the noble Lord the Leader of the House said, I am getting a sapling of an idea of what the reason is and I think I understand. This is not a major point, but perhaps the noble and learned Lord could write. He should not bother to write if the sapling of the idea is, as I think was said, that we have to do it slightly differently because of this and that there will be accounts. If there will not be accounts available, perhaps he should write; otherwise, we can forget it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

My noble friend Lord Rooker has Amendment 113 in this group, but he has had to leave. It is effectively the same as the amendment tabled by my noble friend Lord Foulkes in that it proposes that the polls should shut at 11 pm. The point has already been made but it seems a good thing that the time should be extended for people to vote. There may be reasons why that is a bad thing. I will wait to hear what the Minister says.

The next group of amendments, which would have been moved by my noble friend Lord Rooker, but which I will move because he cannot be here, seek to deal with the overcrowded polling stations issue, which we have already discussed and in which there was an impressive intervention by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern. There was quite broad support for the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Phillips. The amendment that proposes that the polls should shut at 11 pm, as opposed to 10 pm, might, subject to the information that the Minister has, be of assistance in relation to that. If the number of people who would vote between 10 pm and 11 pm was quite low—even though there might be a late surge—it would reduce the likelihood of what happened in the previous general election happening again. It might, for that additional reason, be worth contemplating.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, for raising these issues with his amendments, which would provide electors with earlier notice of the referendum and give voters extra hours to cast their ballots. As noble Lords are aware, it is the Government’s intention that the referendum should be held on 5 May. Therefore, any alterations to the timetable and the hours of polling proposed for the referendum would inevitably create inconsistencies between the rules governing the referendum on the one hand and those governing the elections scheduled to take place on 5 May, with which the referendum will be combined, on the other. Fundamentally, this would be confusing and unhelpful for voters. Noble Lords may already have noted that that view is supported by the Electoral Commission. The amendment would also be inconsistent with the combination of rules in Schedules 5 to 8 to the Bill.

I turn to the first part of the amendment, which deals with the referendum timetable and the issuing of the notice of poll. With the exception of the Scottish parliamentary election, the 25-day timetable will be used for all other polls that are scheduled to take place on 5 May 2011. During the Bill’s passage through Parliament, we specifically amended the deadline for issuing the notice of poll from 16 to 15 days before the date of the poll. The noble Lord’s amendment would take that up to 20 days before the date of the poll. The purpose of the amendment was to ensure that a consistent deadline for the publication of the notice of poll applied for most of the polls that will be combined across the United Kingdom.

Only in Scotland will the deadlines for publication of the notice of the two combined polls be different from each other, due to a slightly different timetable that applies to Scottish parliamentary elections. However, moving the deadline to 20 days before the poll would lead to inconsistency right across the United Kingdom and potential confusion for voters and electoral administrators. The Electoral Commission will take steps, however, to ensure that electors are aware of the referendum before the statutory timetable commences, and electors will not have to wait until notice of poll is issued, or until they receive their official poll card, to change their voting arrangements should they wish to do so.

I turn now to the amendment on polling hours. It is an important amendment and important arguments have been adduced in its favour. It would extend the polling hours for the referendum, which could be difficult for polling staff and polling agents. It may even be difficult for people who rely on public transport to get to a polling station for 6 am for the opening of the poll. At the end of the day, extending the close of poll by one hour could have implications for the staff at the time of verification, not least in those cases where two polls will be combined on one day. However, perhaps more importantly, it could be confusing to voters to have polls taking place on the same day but closing at different times. Under this proposal, voters would turn up before 7 am or after 10 pm to vote in the referendum, but would perhaps be told that they were unable to vote in the Scottish parliamentary election, the Welsh National Assembly election or some of the local government elections in England. I suspect that would increase, rather than reduce, the possibility of voters missing their opportunity to vote, which could cause some dissension.

The important point, which I think the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, mentioned, is that the opportunities for postal voting and voting by proxy are now such that if the current polling hours are unsuitable for electors, they still have the opportunity to vote. I readily accept that in many cases work patterns and family patterns may make it difficult, but it is now possible to vote either by proxy or by post. As we all know from taking a keen interest in elections, the number of postal votes has increased considerably; obviously a good number of people take that opportunity. It may be that the message about opportunities for postal and proxy voting can be reinforced in the context of information relating to the polls.

It is also important that the issue regarding the timetable for the polls goes wider than the referendum alone. It should perhaps be reviewed in the longer term for future national elections and referendums. With these words and assurances, I hope the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.

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[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, this is a minor and technical amendment to correct a cross-reference under rule 13(6)(a) of the referendum rules. The effect of this minor amendment is that the number of ballot papers counted or votes cast may not be questioned by reason of any non-compliance with the provisions under rule 13(3) for England and rule 13(4) for Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland relating to the provision of polling stations. Noble Lords will note that, as it stands, the reference is not to rule 13(3) and rule 13(4) but rather to paragraph 13(5)(a) and (b). The purpose of this amendment is to get the cross-reference correct. I beg to move.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

Just for clarity, the reason why sub-paragraph (5) is not now included as an exception in sub-paragraph (6)(a) is because it is included in sub-paragraph (4). Is that right? Looking at it to start with you want it to apply to sub-paragraph (5) as well, but sub-paragraph (5) appears to go in the drafting because the deletion in the amendment goes up to the second “or” in the second line. You would not want a vote not to be counted if the polling station happened to be in the wrong district. I assume that sub-paragraph (5) is deleted because it is included in sub-paragraph (4), or am I wrong about that? I cannot see any reason why a technical failure of the position of the polling station in Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland should vitiate the vote. I assume it is because the polling stations in sub-paragraph (5) are included in sub-paragraph (4). Officials are nodding. It might be better if the noble and learned Lord says yes.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

The noble and learned Lord has accurately identified the issue and that is, as it were, the error that this amendment seeks to correct.

Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Debate between Lord Wallace of Tankerness and Lord Falconer of Thoroton

Monday 31st January 2011 Lords Chamber

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Wallace of Tankerness)]

My Lords, I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, and the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, for their contributions and questions. I was just a bit wary when the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, mentioned me coming here for the clinching, particularly for an amendment moved by the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza, but I understood the spirit in which he made his remark.

I shall pick up on the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes. He was absolutely right to remind the Committee that in fact there are four Boundary Commissions responsible for Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and England. One of the issues that we will want to address in preparing the amendment which I indicated in the earlier debate is that of consistency. The important point is consistency, but it need not necessarily be one of exactness, which raises issues of how much should be set out in the Bill and what should be left to the guidance of the Boundary Commissions themselves. That is something we want to work through with them.

The noble and learned Lord asked whether the Boundary Commissions would provide guidance on how they will carry out the review. Prima facie this is a matter for the commissions, but the practice in the past has been for them to do so. It is my understanding that the secretary to the Boundary Commission for England confirmed for the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee of the other place that they intend to do so again for this review. However, the question of draft guidance is a matter for the Boundary Commissions. I do not think that it has been produced in the past, but if the noble and learned Lord has information to the contrary, I would be interested to hear it. Moreover, I am not aware of any being ready to be published at the moment. In fairness to the Boundary Commissions, it would be difficult for them to produce draft guidance given that we are still at the stage where changes are being made. Indeed, as I indicated in my responses to the amendment moved last week by the noble Lord, Lord Lipsey, and that moved by the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, on how long it would take to put these matters online, and indeed the matter that was debated earlier today regarding public hearings, it might be rather difficult for the Boundary Commissions to produce draft guidance ahead of the Report stage when your Lordships are still debating what the actual shape of the consultation will be.

I was asked when the initial recommendations would be published. That is entirely a matter for the commissions. I was also asked by the noble and learned Lord whether the commissions have to advertise in the same way for the initial and the revised recommendations. My information is that, yes, they would have to do that. I shall give a little more clarification on a point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes. It is certainly not the Government’s intention to issue guidance on how the commissions should interpret the legislation, but I understand that the commissions work together on issues that are of common interest and common practice. While not issuing them with guidance on how to do that, we would certainly give them every encouragement to work together. It is also my understanding that each Boundary Commission will produce a report, and certainly I do not think it is intended that there would be one UK report. What I could not be certain about is whether there would be separate reports produced at different intervals for each of the regions of England. I really do not know whether that has happened in the past. But, again, it is certainly not my understanding or anticipation that there would be one mega-UK report. There will be reports from Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland and, I assume, England, but I do not know whether the Boundary Commission for England would wish to break up its report into separate regions. At the moment, I am not in a position to say.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

The way it is done at the moment is that Boundary Commission reports are issued within England or Scotland covering a particular part, usually a county, because there are limits on being able to cross particular boundaries. You have to decide within a particular area which constituency will go where. We know that that is not going to be the position here, so while I understand completely that there will not be a UK-wide report, I am keen to try to ascertain the extent to which the countries of England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland will, as a matter of practice, be divided up between areas of, say, the eastern region, the East Midlands and the West Midlands. That is significant in terms of how resources are dealt with by political parties in looking at the particular issue, even though it may well be that the Boundary Commissions have not resolved how to do that at the moment. I would ask, therefore, whether they will produce guidance indicating how they are going to do it or does one just have to wait until a particular report covering, for example, the north-east or the south-west of England is produced so that resources can be put to dealing with the area at that particular point? That is what I was interested in.

The noble and learned Lord took my questions as relating to inquiries, but my question was really about the timing of the guidance. I have with me a document from the Parliamentary Boundary Commission for England covering the procedure at local inquiries. Of course the commission could not possibly have that ready yet because only this afternoon did we find that there are now going to be local inquiries. Having raised the matter, is it envisaged that further guidance relating to the whole consultation process, part of which will be in writing, will be issued? However, I am much more focused on the order of batting and the timing.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

The answer I gave was not intended to be specific to the issue of public hearings, but rather was meant to be illustrative of where there obviously will be changes from what is set out in the Bill at the moment as a result of amendments to be brought forward at the Report stage in response to the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Lipsey, about counter-representations. That is why I wanted to make the point that we cannot really expect the Boundary Commissions to produce draft guidance when they do not know what they are actually going to be asked to deliver. Clearly, we will have to examine what the issues of public hearings and counterproposals mean in terms of timing in the coming weeks. However, as I just indicated, it has been the practice in the past that, as the secretary to the Boundary Commission for England confirmed for the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee of the other place, the commissions again intend to issue guidance. The point I sought to make was that I did not think that they had issued draft guidance in the past, and I certainly would not anticipate any draft guidance before next week or whenever we debate the Bill on Report.

I am also advised that the Boundary Commission for England published its recommendations on a county basis, which coincides with what the noble and learned Lord said. It is certainly a matter for the Boundary Commission itself to determine how it will report. It could use regions, and I understand that it would be consistent with the powers in the Bill for it to do so. But I envisage that this matter will become much clearer when the Boundary Commissions get the Act of Parliament, as we hope, and they can respond. I have no doubt whatever that we will hear what the respective Boundary Commissions propose in terms of bringing forward reports.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, as I understood that question following on from the previous intervention from the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, we are now looking to the second review which we are looking towards publishing in October 2018. The answer does not vary, inasmuch as it will be a matter for the Boundary Commission to take into account the likelihood of any ramifications of its decisions at that point and the extent to which it publishes, either county by county or region by region. This is not a matter which, with the best will in the world, we could stipulate in legislation. We must leave that to the good sense and discretion of the Boundary Commissions.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for answering the questions. I was trying to get at two strands. The first, as I think everyone agrees, including the secretaries of the Boundary Commissions, is that it is going to be a testing timetable to deliver the first review by 31 October 2013. I agree with the noble and learned Lord that it is for the Boundary Commissions to determine how they will do that, including when they will make their announcements of provisional proposals; how they will divide up the four countries; and the method by which they will announce how representations will be made. When legislation is going through Parliament, it is not unreasonable or unusual in this House to ask that the body concerned, without in any way infringing its discretion, sets out its broad proposals. That helps us then determine the validity or otherwise of a timetable, particularly a timetable such as this. I ask the noble and learned Lord—

Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Debate between Lord Wallace of Tankerness and Lord Falconer of Thoroton

Wednesday 26th January 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, for introducing this amendment and for the very helpful and constructive spirit in which he proposed it. I also thank the other noble Lords who made important contributions to this relatively short but important debate.

The amendment seeks to introduce a public inquiry stage into the boundary review process, allowing the Boundary Commissions to hold a public inquiry where representations are received from any interested local authority or from 100 or more interested electors.

As we made clear in our response to the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Lipsey, in the previous debate, and in our responses on local government ward boundaries and existing parliamentary constituencies, the Government's position has been that we are open to considering reasonable improvements to the process, provided that they do not compromise the fundamental principles of the Bill, and that still remains our position.

It is not a fundamental principle of the Bill that there should be no oral inquiries. The decision to end the process of oral inquiries, which appears in this Bill, was in fact taken on the basis of the evidence before us, when we came to consider the most effective consultation process for boundary reviews, which is what we are all trying to achieve.

Among the many contributions that we have heard not just this evening but over a number of Committee sittings, the case has been made tonight that local inquiries are an important safety valve because they allow everyone, as we might put it, to have their day in court. The noble Lord, Lord Brooke of Alverthorpe, made that very point. It allows people to have their say. My view is that this is perhaps the only objective of local inquiries: for which any credible argument can be mounted in their favour. Evidence and academic opinion indicate that local inquiries are perhaps far more effective in principle than in practice.

Local inquiries do not as a rule consist of the general public having their say on boundary proposals. Professor Ron Johnston—whose namechecks in these debates are now getting quite considerable; the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer quoted him—and his colleagues have concluded that the public inquiry process is “dominated by political parties”, describing the process as,

“very largely an exercise in allowing the political parties to seek influence over the Commission's recommendations—in which their sole goal is to promote their own electoral interests”.

Of course, he is perfectly right; political parties play a vital role in our democracy, and there is nothing wrong with parties contributing fully to the boundary review process. It is inevitable that they are going to do that, but if we are considering what would be gained by the noble and learned Lord’s amendment, which would restore oral inquiries in some form, we should not imagine that we would necessarily be giving the public a better chance to have their say. We would be looking to restore a potentially long process to which parties will send Queen's Counsel in their attempts to secure the most favourable outcome for their electoral prospects, certainly if history is anything to go by. It may be that the quasi-judicial nature of the local inquiry process could act as a disincentive to public participation by ordinary people who hope to have their say.

Our intention is that a written consultation process, with the existing period for representations extended from one month to three, will actually amount to a much more effective way to allow a level playing field for the general public who wish to have their say. Whatever the merits of the cases that are made for exceptions in this Bill—for example, for the Isle of Wight—I do not think that anyone could doubt that the people involved were very successful in making their voices heard through petitions, campaigns and websites.

There is little evidence, too, that local inquiries bring to light evidence that would not otherwise be considered. In an earlier debate in Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Snape, gave us an example of when a public inquiry had changed the boundary of the West Bromwich East constituency to reflect local geography, using a dual carriageway in place of a defunct railway line as a point of orientation. I am sure that that was a sensible change, and I wholeheartedly agree with the noble Lord that local knowledge is immensely important in these matters, but I do not see why that could not have been raised as part of an extended consultation period, as proposed by this Bill.

That is why changes that are made following local inquiries are often minor. At the fifth general review in England, for example, only 2 per cent of wards in English counties where inquiries were held were moved between constituencies as a result. Robin Gray, a former boundary commissioner already quoted by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, told the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee that Professor Ron Johnston was,

“absolutely right about the impact that public inquiries had on the Commission’s initial recommendations. In a lot of cases there was no change”.

The evidence given by the Boundary Commission for Wales to the Welsh Affairs Committee is also instructive on this point. In evidence to the Welsh Affairs Committee, the secretary of the Welsh commission said that,

“during the fifth general review, there were four issues that the Commission changed its mind on as a result of the consultation process. Perhaps I should say that, while these issues were raised in the local inquiries they were also raised beforehand in the written representations. In one sense, the Commission, before the local inquiries, had in its mind that modifications were required in the draft proposals”.

That brings me to the evidence of Ron Johnston before the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, which was quoted by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer. Professor Johnston, as we have acknowledged, has been much quoted in these debates. I think that anyone reading his evidence and his previous work will reach the same conclusion that the committee reached in its report that the result of Professor Johnston’s extensive research into the topic, and oral inquiries in particular, led him to,

“generally welcome the abolition of public inquiries”.

I stress that, not because somehow Professor Johnston’s view is the only one that counts, but because it dispels the theory that only we on the government Benches somehow hold the view that oral inquiries are not necessarily the best way to achieve the objective that we all want, which is a robust consultation process at which everyone, including those who are not able to appoint legal counsel on their behalf, can have their say on a commission’s proposals.

However, in the same session, Robin Gray stated that he believed public inquiries added value because they provided assurance that the,

“issues have been looked at and debated”—

perhaps an echo of the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Brooke.

One charge that cannot be laid against oral inquiries in the past is that they were anything less than thorough in this regard. This lengthy process, however, goes to the heart of one of the key principles in the Bill, which was identified by the noble and learned Lord when he moved his amendment. If no action is taken the boundaries in force at the next general election will be 15 years out of date, if we do not proceed to get a boundary review and report by October 2013, as set out in the Bill. We believe that it is simply not fair to electors—most notably all those who have come on to the register in the past 15 years. I believe that noble Lords opposite share our concern about this. Indeed, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, made that very point. I readily acknowledge that the amendment attempts to address it by limiting the triggers for inquiries and placing a limit on their duration, and I very much welcome how that has been presented by the noble and learned Lord.

It is also important that we listen carefully and reflect on what was said by the noble and learned Lords, Lord Woolf and Lord Goldsmith, not least on the question of judicial review—judicial review if you do not have oral inquiries and judicial review if you do have oral inquiries. There is an argument that the proposal in the amendment to give the Boundary Commission the decision on whether to hold an inquiry in each constituency where the requirements in the amendment are met would also lead to a risk of judicial reviews of the Boundary Commission’s decisions on that point.

Important issues have been raised. I have indicated not just in this debate but in others that the principle should be that reviews must be conducted more quickly so that the pattern of representation in the other place represents the reality of where electors live now, not of history. That goes to the heart of fairer and more equally weighted votes throughout the United Kingdom, which is a core objective of the Bill. We will obviously want to consider the noble and learned Lord’s concerns on the issue of judicial reviews—as I have said, if you have them or if you do not have them. Subject to meeting the key principle, which I have indicated, I am content to take the noble and learned Lord’s amendment and consider the thinking behind it to see whether it offers a way in which the advantage that I acknowledge an inquiry can provide—a sense of “a day in court”—can be retained. On that basis, I urge the noble and learned Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

I am very grateful for a very positive response. I shall deal with a few points so that people can read them in Hansard.

First, the noble and learned Lord is right to say that Professor Johnston, who is an expert in this field, has expressed scepticism from time to time about the public inquiries in some contexts, but he has said that the scale of the proposed changes in the first boundary review is an argument for having public inquiries this time because you are drawing a totally new map. Without being unfair, or selecting out of context, Professor Johnston is in favour in this context. He also referred to Robin Gray, the former chairman of a Boundary Commission, who has a rounded view of public inquiries and recognises problems with them. Robin Gray says:

“Particularly with this first round I can see there is a real need for public inquiries”.

Therefore, the two witnesses that the noble and learned Lord cites both unequivocally favour public inquiries in this context.

Secondly, the way that this amendment is put is not as an alternative to written submissions, because it accepts that in the appropriate case written submissions would be sufficient. I draw attention to subsection (3) in the amendment, which says that the Boundary Commission can say no to a public inquiry if it raises no substantive issue that might benefit from further comment or representation from other interested parties or individuals. So the Boundary Commission would have to decide that there is some specific benefit in an inquiry. In relation to the timing, we have dealt with that already.

It is, with respect to the noble and learned Lord, difficult to see—and I am not going to press this too hard—why an inquiry should not be in the armoury in the appropriate case. He mentioned the fact that it is often about political parties vying in their own political interest. I am sure that is true. One of the things that we have often discovered in our system is that hearing two competing parties often produces the right result more easily through oral representations than through any other process. It is the process—without in any way saying that this should be exactly the same as a court process—that many of our courts have found the most effective way to come to the right answer.

I very much hope that when the noble and learned Lord considers it, he will come back and either suggest how it might be improved or accept the amendment. On the basis of the helpful and constructive commitment to consider the amendment, I beg leave to withdraw it.

Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Debate between Lord Wallace of Tankerness and Lord Falconer of Thoroton

Tuesday 25th January 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

My Lords, we have had a tour around Britain right around the House since supper. Every place we have stopped at has been absolutely fantastic on the basis of the speeches that have been made, but Cornwall should be very proud of my noble friend Lord Myners, the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, the noble Lord, Lord Taylor, who is not in his place for reasons I cannot understand, and the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, who is also not in his place. They make not just a strong case for Cornwall, but a case that obviously catches the mood of the House.

There is an issue about precisely how the problem is to be dealt with. The first amendment that we are either debating or not debating at the moment states:

“Parliamentary constituencies shall not cross the county border of Cornwall”.

That amendment was not moved by my noble friend Lord Kennedy. My noble friend Lord Berkeley did not move his amendment, but it states that:

“No constituency shall include parts of both the counties of Devon and Cornwall”.

My noble friend Lord Myners has moved his amendment which states:

“There shall remain the current number of constituencies in Cornwall, and these constituencies shall be entirely within the county of Cornwall”.

The amendment that has least favour technically is the amendment moved by my noble friend Lord Myners. The one that plainly has universal support is the amendment that states that no constituency should cross the boundary between Cornwall and Devon.

It is interesting that the noble Lord, Lord Taylor of Goss Moor, who made an effective and forceful speech, made the point that was made in our earlier tour of Britain, which I know the noble Lord is sorry he missed. It is that communities are what matter in relation to this. There are two ways to give effect to “Thou shalt not cross the boundary between Devon and Cornwall”: either by a 10 per cent margin, which studies suggest would mean that the Devon/Cornwall boundary would not be crossed, or by making Cornwall an exception to the rule about county boundaries. I sense that the House wants to do something about Cornwall, and we need to consider between now and Report what is the best way to deal with that problem.

I specifically pay tribute to the contribution made by my noble friend Lord McAvoy in these debates. He has spoken with just as much elegance and eloquence as everybody else in relation to his community. He has made a substantial contribution to this debate and will make very substantial contributions to debates to come.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I am conscious that some hours ago I replied to a debate in which the issue was not crossing the rivers Tyne, Thames and Mersey, but I rather suspect that the Tamar is slightly wider in symbolic terms than those rivers. When I entered another place in 1983, my knowledge of things Cornish was not extensive. An acquaintanceship, I like to think also a friendship, with the late David Penhaligon soon put an end to that. He made very clear what the essence of being a Cornishman was. On numerous subsequent occasions I was able to visit Cornwall and I certainly recognise the passion with which noble Lords have expressed their affinity with Cornwall and the arguments they have presented today.

It is obvious—the case has been made for some time—that this part of the Bill seeks to address the significant differences in size between many parliamentary constituencies. Those differences make the effect of votes in some parts of the country more effective than others depending on where people live. We seek to address that with a parity rule which requires constituencies to be within 5 per cent of the United Kingdom electoral quota. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, said that the matter under discussion on the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Myners, could be addressed by a 10 per cent flexibility. While that would be a better bet, there is no guarantee that it would not result in one constituency crossing the Tamar.

The issue of what the exceptions should be has been well debated, both in previous sessions of the Committee and today, and the Government have made it clear that extreme geographical circumstances can make it necessary to do so, specifically with regard to Orkney and Shetland and the Western Isles—remote islands and communities which are not readily accessible for inclusion with a mainland constituency—and the House voted last week on the Isle of Wight. Aside from these specific exceptions, the Government do not feel that other features should detract from the fundamental principle of equality between constituencies and votes.

As I have indicated, I am well aware of the depth of feeling on the subject of the Cornish boundary. I have received numerous e-mails and letters on the subject and representations from my honourable friends, Andrew George, Stephen Gilbert and Dan Rogerson. I am under no illusions as to the strength of feeling and I recognise that Cornwall has a proud and unique history.

It was significant that my noble friends Lord Tyler and Lord Taylor of Goss Moor said that they may be prepared to accept underrepresentation, but the two amendments which might have provided for that were not moved. We have before the House today an amendment which does the opposite and would lead to overrepresentation. That would be a much more difficult position from which to make exceptions and it does not carry the same kind of moral force as the point argued by my noble friends.

The Government do not agree that an MP would not be capable of representing people effectively in both Cornwall and Devon at the same time. It was not fair to say, as was said in an earlier debate, that my noble friend Lord Strathclyde had been dismissive of Cornwall’s opinion because he made the factual statement that some people living in Cornwall work in Plymouth. That point was acknowledged by the noble Lord, Lord Myners, when he moved the amendment. It is of course the case—although it may not be instinctively what people think—that there is some community of interest between people living in one county and working in the other. I do not believe that a Member of Parliament could not represent a constituency effectively, wherever his constituents lived within Devon or Cornwall.

Several constituencies have widely varying cultural factors. I recognise the strength of the arguments but, given the parity that the Government seek and that exceptions should be limited to where there are extreme geographical considerations, it is not possible to accept the amendment. I therefore invite the noble Lord, Lord Myners, to withdraw it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I am tempted to say that perhaps the prime reason why the Government’s scheme is better is one of simplicity. With the two exceptions given in the Bill, we would divide the United Kingdom electorate by 598 to give us the electoral quota with a 5 per cent variation either way. However, I recognise that considerable work has gone into producing the noble and learned Lord’s alternative method of allocating constituencies to the nations of the United Kingdom.

Perhaps one of the most fundamental differences, and it is at the heart of the amendment, is that, whereas the Government’s proposal is for a Parliament of 600 Members in the House of Commons, the alternative scheme would seek to retain the present size of the House of Commons, since 650 would be used as a baseline for future reviews. I do not intend to open up all the arguments that we had at some hours of the morning last week on 650 versus 600.

The Government’s clear view is that there is a case for making a reduction in size. We have articulated it and had debates about it. Our proposal is simply to end the upward pressure on the number of Members of Parliament, which has seen an increase in every successive boundary review since 1950, with the exception of that which came immediately after Scottish devolution. However, in making that proposal, we have been mindful to reflect an existing range of experience. Six hundred gives a quota of around 76,000, which, if my memory serves me correctly from earlier debates, is within the 5 per cent-either-way range of a third of the constituencies in the other place. It also seeks to ensure that the reduction in number of seats is not wholly disruptive.

The amendment would limit any change in the number of seats in each nation to 10 per cent of the existing number. If the intention is therefore to allow a phased reduction—I think that that was the point which the noble and learned Lord was making, not least in respect of Wales—I ask the Committee to bear in mind that the secretary to the Boundary Commission for Scotland made it clear in evidence to the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee that there would be no advantage in doing that. He said that it would be better instead to reduce the number of seats in one go so that disruption was reduced in the longer run, rather than have successive disruptive boundary reviews. The Government agree with that.

Has the noble and learned Lord done any modelling on the 650-seat base, given the absence of a size limit on the House in his amendment and given that the Sainte-Lague formula could continue allocating seats? His amendment says 10 per cent more or 10 per cent less, so it could work in a way that the number of seats reached the absolute limit of 10 per cent above each nation’s current allocation and we could end up with a House of 715, which would be 10 per cent more than 650. I fully understand what the noble and learned Lord said about a phasing-down, but his amendment would allow also for the total to go up by 10 per cent. I suspect that that is not the intention of his amendment, but is he able to reassure us that that would not be the effect? I think that there is enough doubt and complexity in the amendment for me to invite him to withdraw it.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

Naturally I am disappointed by the response to my scheme. I am not sure what the answer is to the question of whether it can go up to 715, but that is only because of my mathematical inadequacy, not because the scheme is necessarily flawed in any way. However, I will consult my advisers closely on whether that very unlikely possibility could occur.

If I may, I will deal with the bit that is easier to deal with: phasing. With no disrespect to the boundary commissioners, it is perhaps not surprising that the people tasked with drawing the boundaries would say that it is much easier to get there in one go than in a series of phased goes. You would not expect the boundary commissioners to judge, or attempt to judge, the effect on the constitutional glue that holds our country together, because their job in effect is to apply particular rules that are obviously easier to apply if there is no phasing. Without in any way disrespecting the view that they express about the technical process, it is surely for Parliament to judge the effect of reducing the representation of one part of the United Kingdom by 25 per cent over a period of four years on the national glue that holds the country together.

Ultimately, I suspect that it is our view, not just the view that will prevail, which is constitutionally the position, that it is better to listen to than the Boundary Commission’s. I hear what the noble and learned Lord says about my maths, which may well be well judged. However, on the other more significant constitutional issue, I am not persuaded by a quote from the secretary of the Boundary Commission that that is the most authoritative voice on whether phasing is sensible. We will certainly come back to that second part on Report. Meanwhile, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, Amendment 89BZA deals with the unlikely, but nevertheless mathematically possible, scenario in which the Sainte-Lague formula results in a tie in entitlement between two or more nations as to the final seat. In the Bill as drafted, there is no way of resolving such a tie, so it would be unclear as to which of the four nations of the United Kingdom would have the final seat. The amendment proposes, in these circumstances, that the final seat be allocated to the nation with the smaller or smallest electorate. Although both nations would have equal mathematical entitlement to the seat, I hope noble Lords will agree that, in these perhaps highly unlikely circumstances—nevertheless, we have to take account of all possibilities—it would be fairer for the nation with the smallest electorate to have it, given that the nation with the larger electorate will almost certainly have a larger number of constituencies across which the extra electors could be spread. On that basis, I beg to move.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

I have just three questions. First, why will it apply only in the final seat? Why would it not be possible for there to be a tie on the way there? Secondly, when it says,

“smaller or smallest actual electorate”,

what is the difference between “smaller” or “smallest” actual electorate? Thirdly, does “smaller or smallest actual electorate” refer to the total electorate in that part of the United Kingdom, or to the electorate that is left? I am more than happy to repeat my questions if any of them are not clear. However, they are not alternative; they all have to be answered.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I hope I can answer them. My understanding of the amendment is that the tie would happen at the end with the last seat.

The noble and learned Lord asks me why it is the, “smaller or smallest … electorate”. It is a grammatical issue. My understanding is that it would be the actual electorate for Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland, and not the balance. I think that that must be right—and I think it is because of the possibility of a tie. For the sake of argument, if it was between Scotland and Northern Ireland, Northern Ireland would have a smaller electorate than Scotland. If it was between Scotland and Wales, Wales would have the smaller electorate.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

That is very helpful. So you could have a situation in which England, Scotland and Northern Ireland all tie for smallest electorate. and you would give the last and therefore additional seat to Northern Ireland because it has the smallest of the populations or registered electorates of those three countries. What is the logic of giving it to the smallest?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

The logic of giving it to the smallest is that there is a sense of fairness in that. Also, the larger country has more seats over which to spread the extra number of voters that would result from that; it would be much more difficult to spread them over the country with the smaller electorate.

Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Debate between Lord Wallace of Tankerness and Lord Falconer of Thoroton

Monday 24th January 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

My Lords, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Stamford, and very much with my noble friend Lord Lipsey. I agree with the important amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, which is in his name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Rennard. They obviously understand history. They know what happened in the 1950s when, as the second boundary review came around after the Second World War, MPs rebelled at the thought that there were going to be so many changes in constituencies. That was completely reflected in debates that we had earlier in this Chamber, in which ex-MPs and non-ex-MPs pointed out that, if you break the link between a Member of Parliament and his constituency, you undermine democracy and you create uncertain relationships. The then Conservative Government produced a Bill that, in effect, made the disruption much less. From this Front Bench, we support the principle underlying what the noble Lords, Lord Tyler and Lord Rennard, are seeking to achieve, which is to reduce the disruption.

However, the speech that my noble friend Lord Kinnock made has to be borne in mind, because we can reduce the disruption only by so much if we have what he described as the “eunuch” clauses. I anticipate that there will be those on the Benches on which the noble Lords, Lord Tyler and Lord Rennard, sit who think that the way to deal with the points made so persuasively by my noble friend Lord Kinnock would be by moving the 5 per cent up to 10 per cent; they think that that would make a substantial contribution to dealing with the point about the ongoing relationship with a Member of Parliament.

So, yes, I support the amendment proposed by the two noble Lords, but I also hope that they will engage in this debate properly. By that I mean that I hope that they will put forward arguments and amendments that they think will genuinely improve the Bill. I read the amendment that the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, has put forward as doing that, but I very much hope that they will feel able to express honestly their view as to whether the threshold should be 5 per cent or 10 per cent. If they did that, they would, I think, unlock one of the principal problems in the Bill.

I very much hope that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, whom I congratulate on dealing with the last amendment—he was rather given it beyond the last moment—will find it in his heart to support what the noble Lords, Lord Tyler and Lord Rennard, have proposed. However, I also hope that he will address the issue that the amendment goes only so far and that it is only if we add more discretion—5 per cent to 10 per cent—that we make it meaningful. It is important to take into account what has been said in these debates quite widely across the House—that it is not a good idea to have a constantly changing constituency with a constantly uncertain Member of Parliament.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, this amendment proposed by my noble friend—in a way that, I am sure, if I may take the words of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, he genuinely thinks will improve the Bill—would add existing constituency boundaries to the list of factors in rule 5 that the Boundary Commissions may take into account when drawing up their recommendations for new constituency boundaries. I think that it is a perfectly reasonable proposal and we certainly agree with noble Lords that this would aid the Boundary Commissions in drawing up their recommendations, not only in the first boundary review but obviously in the subsequent ones as well. As has been said, it is the case that, particularly in the first review, the Boundary Commissions expect that there will be a considerable change owing to the reduction in the number of seats from 650 to 600. Nevertheless, I believe that this amendment will allow for the merits of existing boundaries to be taken into account where appropriate, thereby ensuring that the boundary commissioners do not have to start with a blank page. Therefore, the Government are content to accept this amendment.

Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Debate between Lord Wallace of Tankerness and Lord Falconer of Thoroton

Monday 24th January 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I have tried to be patient.

Four out of the seven provisions in the amendment relate to wards and how they should be used in the Bill. I cannot accept that the Government have been dismissive—the word used by the noble and learned Lord—of wards. I certainly endorse what the noble Lord, Lord Graham of Edmonton, said, about the importance of the ward level. That is why, in response to the previous set of amendments, I stated our belief that wards are in many cases already the building blocks of constituencies. They are the level that can often reflect local community ties. The English Boundary Commission has confirmed that in the majority of cases in England, wards are used as the basic element of each constituency. For reasons that I have already given—that some wards might combine a large part of an urban area on the outskirts of the city and a rural hinterland—there might be reasons to give the Boundary Commission discretion to split boundaries. Therefore, an absolute prohibition, as proposed in the amendment, goes too far. I hope that the undertaking that I gave in response to the previous debate to look seriously at the issue of wards and to bring back our proposals on Report will satisfy the House at this stage. On that basis, I invite the noble and learned Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for the detail into which he went. I will very briefly deal with his points. First, he rightly says that the Bill states “may take into account”, rather than the commission being bound not to cross ward, unitary authority or other boundaries. If the noble and learned Lord cares—not now—to read my amendment, he will see that in some cases it is an absolute prohibition, for example in relation to European Parliamentary boundaries, district or borough wards. In others, it is not; it is a provision to “take into account”. I have sought to reflect the point that the noble and learned Lord makes.

Secondly, I think the Minister said that 187 constituencies cross both metropolitan and other local authority boundaries. He does not need to intervene on this; his point is broadly that 187 currently cross different sorts of local authority boundaries. I completely accept what the noble Lord, Lord Newton of Braintree, who has much influence in the House, said. I am sure that he completely and excellently represented his constituency. The point that is being made on the other side is that it is better if that is not the position. One assumes that if it is 187 now, it is bound to go up under the changes to be introduced under the Bill.

The noble and learned Lord’s third point was that he accepts as a matter of principle that the ward will be the building block. That was expressed explicitly by Nick Clegg when he appeared before the House of Lords Constitution Committee and when he spoke in answer to questions in the Commons. Why not put that into the Bill? My fourth and final point is to say how sad I was not to be in Edinburgh South—that is, Morningside, where I was born and brought up—to attend the noble and learned Lord’s Burns Night supper.

I am grateful that he said at the end that he will come back with some ideas. I am not taking that as him giving me any kind of assurances, but I shall wait to see what happens next before deciding what to do about this sort of amendment. In those circumstances, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Debate between Lord Wallace of Tankerness and Lord Falconer of Thoroton

Thursday 20th January 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

I agree with every word of that. The detailed point is that, if you were minded to have exceptions, surely the starting point would have been a public consultation in which people who thought that their area was entitled to special favours could have put their arguments, which could then at least have been seen by the public. However, because this Bill has had no public consultation and no pre-legislative scrutiny, that opportunity has not existed.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I come now to address the series of amendments that have been spoken to or moved. I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, about which amendments we are dealing with, except to say that the initial amendment, which was moved by my noble friend Lord Brooke of Sutton Mandeville, was Amendment 66C. Linked with that was the amendment that relates to the exceptions or the preserved constituencies, to which the noble and learned Lord devoted most of his remarks. However, we are on common ground as to which amendments we are discussing.

On numerous occasions during the Committee stage of this Bill, I have spoken about the principles behind the Government’s approach and our belief in equal votes—one vote, one value. As my noble friend Lord Tyler indicated, that is the principle and it is important that the exceptions to it are limited. I shall therefore deal with the exceptions first. They are the constituencies of Orkney and Shetland and what used to be referred to as the Western Isles—I am not a Gaelic speaker and I do not want to disgrace the Gaelic language by even attempting the Gaelic name.

The noble Lord, Lord Grocott, echoed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, again raised the question of hybridity. Noble Lords who were present at the outset of these debates, before Second Reading, will recall that that matter was thoroughly debated in this House. The Clerks gave the advice that the Bill was not hybrid and the House had its say on the matter, rejecting the argument, however eloquently and persuasively put by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, that the Bill was hybrid.

The noble and learned Lord asked why the Bill makes the exceptions of the two preserved constituencies. For anyone who has looked at a map, the reason is probably blindingly obvious. The constituencies are at the most extreme parts of our United Kingdom. If anyone has any doubt, let me say that Orkney and Shetland are at the very top and go far north; they are not in a box somewhere in the Moray Firth—my former constituents used to be very irritated when it looked as though the distance between Shetland and Aberdeen was very small. Indeed, the fact that they are so far away is a factor. We are talking not just about geography but about extreme geography, where the dispersed island groups cannot readily be combined with the mainland. It takes 12 hours by ferry from Lerwick in Shetland to Aberdeen on the Scottish mainland. By any stretch of the imagination, that situation is extreme.

We could contrast that with other islands that are already combined with mainland constituencies. Argyll and Bute is one example; it comprises a substantial mainland area together with islands. The constituency of St Ives, which is represented by my honourable friend Mr Andrew George, includes the Scilly Isles. The constituency of, I think, Cunninghame North, which includes Arran and, I suspect, the Cumbraes, is represented by—I am sorry, I cannot remember.

Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Debate between Lord Wallace of Tankerness and Lord Falconer of Thoroton

Wednesday 12th January 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

The amendment would mean that you would get the constituency boundary changes only if the AV vote was yes. I do not support that, but it is an inevitable consequence of the loose language in which the coalition puts this. On 20 December, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, said:

“Indeed, as my noble friend Lord McNally has said on a number of occasions, this Bill is about fair votes and fair boundaries. It shows that the two are, in fact, linked. It shows how the two will be linked because it will shape the way in which the other place will be elected in 2015”.—[Official Report, 20/12/10; col. 882.]

My understanding of this Bill is that, if the AV vote is no, you still get your constituency boundary changes. Am I wrong? Please confirm that. If I am right, why did the Minister say that on 20 December?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

Because we are going to win the referendum.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, for his amendment. I particularly thank all noble Lords opposite who have shown such concern for the interests of the Liberal Democrats and the Conservative Party. It has been very touching. On behalf of the Liberal Democrats and my Conservative colleagues, let me say how appreciated it is.

When we eventually got around to it, the motive behind this amendment was that it got us back to the supplementary vote, which was the product of what was, I am sure, a stimulating dinner party in 1989. To be fair to the noble Lord, he has persisted in this throughout these debates.

The amendment would provide that the first boundary review, which would create fewer and more equalised constituencies, would not have effect until the referendum had taken place and only then if the electorate had voted yes. As Members of the Committee will be aware, there are differences on these Benches on the merits of the alternative vote system and first past the post. We have made no secret of that. However, both parties in the coalition are agreed that the public should choose which system we use and should do so in a referendum.

Linking the boundary changes to the referendum would effectively mean asking more than that, as the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, said. If we change the Bill in the way proposed by the noble Lord, we effectively make a vote against the alternative vote a vote against the boundary changes, too. He described that as a way of incentivising the Conservatives to support the alternative vote. If the referendum result were to be no, it would prevent the modest and sensible reduction in the number of seats, for which the Bill provides, from taking effect. The amendment would see the existing constituency map, with its inequalities in electorate size based on data from, as far as England is concerned, 10 years ago, continue until those data were even older.

As a democrat, I would be bitterly disappointed if the people voted no in a referendum on the voting system, but I would accept that that was the vote expressed by the people. It would be wrong to use that as an excuse to break off an agreement.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Lipsey, for Amendment 58ZA. When I first read the amendment, I immediately identified what he was driving at and had some considerable sympathy for it. He is absolutely right that, if the Government could simply disregard a modification that the Boundary Commission suggested, that would not be acceptable.

I am afraid that the issue comes down to textual analysis. Amendment 58ZA proceeds on the assumption that Clause 10(6)(5B) confers a separate discretionary power whereby the Government may decide whether to include a modification that has been requested by a boundary commission. However, we do not consider that to be the effect of new subsection (5B) of the Parliamentary Constituencies Act 1986. Rather, new subsection (5B) explains how the modifications referred to in new subsection (5A)—the two subsections need to be read together—can come to be included in the order in council. On that basis, the inclusion of requested modifications is part and parcel of the requirement to give effect to the Boundary Commission’s recommendation, as provided for in new subsection (5A). Therefore, the Bill requires the Government to include such modifications in the order in council.

I should perhaps also point out that the noble Lord’s amendment might make it less clear that the Government are not permitted to make any modifications other than those requested by the boundary commissions.

I hope that the noble Lord is satisfied with that answer. I readily acknowledge that the matter is textual. After reading the subsection several times, I was persuaded that new subsections (5A) and (5B) need to be taken together and that there is nothing malign intended. No doubt the noble Lord will want to read what I have said, but I am certainly prepared to consider—although I am already satisfied with the wording, which we have discussed through—satisfying myself further on the matter. However, on that basis, I ask the noble Lord to reflect on what I have said and to withdraw the amendment.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

I completely understand the point that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, has made that the draft Order in Council can be modified only if the Boundary Commission requests a modification. However, is the implementation of the modification optional if such a request is made? The wording of the Bill appears to suggest that the Minister has discretion on whether to accept any modifications that have been requested.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

With respect, I think that the point that the noble Lord, Lord Lipsey, made was whether Ministers have such discretion. It is certainly my understanding that the power is not intended to be discretionary. The intention is that, if a boundary commission wants a modification, Ministers will be obliged to incorporate that modification in laying the Order in Council. The two new subsections (5A) and (5B) need to be taken together. New subsection (5B) describes the circumstances in which a modification would be made.

As I have indicated to the noble Lord, Lord Lipsey, and indeed to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, I will read this again. I have done so already and I am satisfied that there is no malign intent that would oblige Ministers to follow a request from one of the Boundary Commissions, but I am willing to give it further reconsideration and others will no doubt look at it and read it.

Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Debate between Lord Wallace of Tankerness and Lord Falconer of Thoroton

Wednesday 12th January 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, for tabling this amendment. At the outset, I will clarify that I agree with his interpretation of the rules. Perhaps I may put in the caveat that the rule with regard to taking into account inconvenience does not apply to the first review in 2013, but would apply thereafter. I thought that I had indicated that it was subject to the 5 per cent rule when I responded to the point of the noble Lord, Lord Lipsey. That is indeed the case. I was responding initially to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Gilbert, who talked about uprooting the whole system every time and starting again, which is not consistent with the discretion given to the Boundary Commission.

As the noble and learned Lord—echoed by the noble Lord, Lord Lipsey—indicated, the intention is that there should be fixed-term Parliaments of five years with boundary reviews in sync. The intention of the amendment is to retain the relationship between the cycle of general elections and the boundary review reporting timetable if the cycle of fixed-term Parliaments shifted away from the pattern starting in May 2015. That would happen if the terms of the fixed-term Parliament were changed to something other than five years. I thought that that may have been the point of the noble and learned Lord’s amendment, but he made it clear that that is not the case. However, he indicated the possibility that there could be an extraordinary general election. We do not believe that it is possible to provide for every reason why an election might not occur at the exact five-year interval. Instead of such complexity, the Bill seeks to address the matter in a way that would not necessarily waste resources. At the same time, future Parliaments would be able to consider how best to address the issue of the reviews getting seriously out of sync. The commission's annual progress reports that are required by the Bill will increase Parliament's knowledge of each review and assist it in deciding how to act.

As the Bill stands, there would still be a broad alignment of boundary review and general election cycles. I will give an example. If the boundary review reporting cycles were realigned to be exactly 18 months before any general election, it is possible that the Boundary Commission would be forced to abandon a review midway and start again from scratch. For example, if there was an extraordinary general election in 2018, before the 2018 report was due out, the Boundary Commission would have been reviewing boundaries for three years on the basis of electorate figures for 2015, and that work would have to be scrapped and a new review cycle started on the basis of 2018 electorate figures. This would be a waste of resources.

I accept the constructive intent of the noble and learned Lord's amendment. It is not necessary, but I am willing to reflect on whether we have done the best we can to maintain sync. However, if issues became such that there was a serious mismatch, it would be open to a future Parliament to redress that. The amendment does not achieve the outcome it intends and could lead to an unnecessary waste of resources. With these comments, I hope that the noble and learned Lord will withdraw it.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

That was a helpful response. First, I thank the noble and learned Lord for confirming that my view of what the Bill meant was correct, which is obviously important. Secondly, he is in effect acknowledging that if there is a general election outside the fixed term—I say in parenthesis that if the fixed term were changed in the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill as it goes through this House, it might affect the cycle, but that would require an amendment to this Bill—the intention is that there should be an 18-month gap, and that may have to be dealt with by primary legislation after the general election. It is that eventuality that my amendment seeks to avoid. It is an unsatisfactory situation that every time there is a general election outside the cycle—none of us in the Chamber knows how regularly there will be general elections outside the cycle, and if one looks at history one can envisage circumstances where one has an early general election, for example because a coalition falls apart, and then there is an indecisive result and one ends up with considerable uncertainty—and one needs a boundary review, one has to wait for primary legislation, and the party that gets into power after a closely fought election is in the driving seat in relation to when the review takes place.

I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for saying that he will consider this. I, too, will consider it, and perhaps we could meet to think of a way in which some degree of certainty can be assured, because this is an important issue. I would also be grateful if the noble and learned Lord would write to me with the Government's estimate of the number of seats that might change their boundaries in the first of the five-yearly reviews, as opposed to the one that they envisage ending in October 2013. I agree with my noble friend Lord Lipsey that the facts are critical. On the basis of the helpful response of the noble and learned Lord, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

My Lords, this is well tilled territory. The position according to the Electoral Commission is that if you own your house outright, 93 per cent of you are on the electoral register; if you are buying on a mortgage, it is 86 per cent; if renting from a council, 79 per cent; if renting from a housing association, 75 per cent; and if renting from a private landlord, only 44 per cent. If you are “other”, it is 78 per cent. I do not know what “other” is. Perhaps it is living in a commune or in a tent somewhere or, indeed, in a caravan, as suggested by my noble friend Lord Graham. Why is this? The Electoral Commission report says:

“Taken as a whole, tenants in the private rented sector are significantly more likely to be absent from the electoral register than owner-occupiers or those in social housing. This pattern arises from the greater turnover of households in the private rental sector compared to other tenures as well as the associated concentrations of specific social groups in private rental accommodation, notably young people and students, and some BME groups”.

Again, I do not think that much of this is in dispute and that what we are looking for are proposals as to how it might be dealt with.

I endorse all that my noble friend Lord McKenzie has said about the private rented sector, but there is a further point to make. I turn to the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, to the effect that, “You do not want this review to take place using very out-of-date material. It is going to take place using material prepared in December 2010, so all your proposals that there should be an improvement in the number of young people and BMEs in the private rental sector will not apply unless you want to delay it”. That is the key answer. What is the hurry for this to take place by 2015? The obvious answer to the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, is that a period of time should go by, maybe a year, and then we should take the register at December 2011, but only if the sort of steps that my noble friends Lady Thornton and Lord McKenzie of Luton have been asking for have been taken.

If that is wrong, because we can delay the date until December 2011 and we can seek measures to be taken to the satisfaction of the Secretary of State or the Electoral Commission to ensure better representation of the three underrepresented groups, we can achieve both. I would therefore ask the noble and learned Lord to give answers to two questions. What is being done about the private rented sector to get more people on to the electoral register? What would be the problem in answering his oft-repeated song that we delay for a year or some other period the date at which we take the electoral register for the purposes of the boundary revision? What would the nation lose by that? There would be more people from these underrepresented groups on the electoral register.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, as has been indicated, this amendment is very similar in its terms to the previous amendment, although it focuses on the need to maximise the proportion of private sector tenants on the electoral register. It will therefore not come as a surprise if I indicate that the arguments are substantially the same. I will answer the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer. The difference is that what we are being invited to do with these amendments is put off the boundary review to some indeterminate time. No date is fixed in these amendments, although the noble and learned Lord said that it could be 1 December 2011. But we have heard the whingeing complaints that to do it in 2010 is going to make it tight for a boundary review to report by 2013. Given that, I rather suspect that using a review date for the electoral register in December 2011 is going to make it impossible for the 2015 election to be fought on new boundaries. That is the crucial difference.

The party opposite appears to wish the boundaries for the 2015 election to be fought on electoral data, so far as England is concerned, that go back to the year 2000. We have quoted on many occasions in these debates the report from the Electoral Commission published in March last year, when of course the party opposite was in power. These underregistrations have not suddenly materialised since May last year. I have indicated what we intend to do with regard to younger people in terms of data matching, so I found it rather breathtaking to hear the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, say that we should get on with it. I think that we are probably proposing to do more in our first eight months in office than all that happened during the past 13 years. I give credit for initiatives that were taken, like rolling the register, but all that would come to naught because any benefit that came from that if we hold the 2015 election on electoral data from 2000 would be lost. Any positive steps taken by the previous Administration will not have any effect.

The noble Lord, Lord McKenzie of Luton, mentioned Glasgow, and in previous exchanges the noble Lord, Lord McAvoy, has indicated what has been done there, and it is a positive example. But of course none of that would be taken into account if we had to use electoral data from 2000. I welcome back the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes of Cumnock, because I wondered where he was earlier.

Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Debate between Lord Wallace of Tankerness and Lord Falconer of Thoroton

Monday 10th January 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I think that I have made it clear that I have not asked any of my colleagues not to speak. I am not quite sure that I could make it any clearer than that.

With regard to the timetable, the indication we have given is that we wish the changes in Part 2 to be in effect for the election due to take place in May 2015. One could say that that is dependent on the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill, but in any event, even under our present constitutional arrangements for the timing of elections, the latest date would be May 2015. It is the wish of the Government that constituency sizes should be of an equal size in time for that election. That is why we are asking the Boundary Commissions to bring forward their reports by October 2013. That would give time between the reports—one for each constituent nation of the United Kingdom—being published and an opportunity for the parties, the importance of which I think someone mentioned, to gear up, as it were, to what will be different boundaries.

With regard to the issue that I think was raised by the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, about whether this is feasible, my noble friend Lord Phillips quoted from the Constitution Committee report where the Boundary Commission had indicated that it would be feasible. In giving evidence to the committee in another place, the secretary of the Boundary Commission for Wales said:

“I don’t think the timescales for Wales are going to be too challenging”.

The question was then directed to the secretary of the Boundary Commission for England, which is obviously much larger. He said:

“Taking a potential worst case scenario, based upon what is in the Bill in front of us, the initial view of myself and the Commission is that the timetable is achievable”.

The noble and learned Lord went on to ask why not do this in two and a half years every time, and why institute five-yearly reviews after that? The reason is that a five-yearly review would mean that there would be a boundary review in each Parliament. If he thinks about it, with a two and a half year or three-year review, you could have two reviews within one Parliament and a boundary review producing constituencies for an election that would not take place. I am sure he agrees that that would be farcical. That is the reason for the five-yearly review, and later we will debate other amendments regarding seven and eight year reviews. As was noted by the noble Lord, Lord McAvoy, the second part of the amendment has a six-yearly review. We believe that a review every five years would mean that in each Parliament, if the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill goes through, there is less likely to be disruption. The more frequent the reviews, the less the opportunity for wide divergence and therefore the less would be the likelihood of disruption.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

I wish to intervene very briefly on the quotations used by the noble and learned Lord from the secretaries of the Boundary Commissions for England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, when they gave evidence to the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee of the other place. The note I have confirms that the secretary of the Boundary Commission for England said that the timetable was “achievable but tight” and that,

“extra resources would certainly be needed”.

I do not know what date it is assumed that the process would start and what extra resources would be provided.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I am not making any presumption about the date it will start because it would depend on Royal Assent, and therefore I am not going to speculate on when that might be. I know that the noble and learned Lord has a later amendment regarding resources, tabled for the avoidance of doubt. When we come to it, he will see that it is not necessary because as the Bill stands, the resources ought to be there to be drawn on for the purposes of this review. If he thinks about it, given all the comments made by noble Lords opposite about the Government wishing to get this piece of legislation through, they are hardly likely to wish then to frustrate it through lack of resources. That is perhaps self-evident. We will have a better opportunity to discuss the level of resources when we come to that particular amendment, but I would assure him that we do not anticipate that the issue of resources will be a barrier to the timetable being delivered.

Perhaps we may move on to the other barrel of the amendment, which would have the effect of delaying the boundary reviews until such time as,

“the Electoral Commission has certified that every local authority has taken all reasonable steps to ensure that the electoral register is as complete and accurate as possible”.

That is quite a steep requirement. My noble friend Lord Tyler questioned whether it would be appropriate for the Electoral Commission to make subjective judgments in cases that could have major consequences for a boundary review, and the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, raised some of the practical difficulties that again were picked up in an exchange with my noble friend Lord Tyler. I would simply observe that if the Electoral Commission decided that, in its judgment, one local authority in the whole of the United Kingdom had not done this, a boundary review could be put off indefinitely. It certainly would not be in time for the 2015 election, it might not be in time for the 2020 election, and it might not even be in time for the 2025 election. That is the possible logical consequence of the amendment put forward by the noble and learned Lord.

If there was a problem with a boundary review where the baseline for the review would be 1 December 2010, if we held elections in 2020 or 2025 where the boundaries for England were based on a baseline of data from the year 2000, that really does not address the very legitimate issues he has raised with regard to people who might be eligible to vote but might not be on the electoral roll.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

The first point is, as I have indicated, a matter for the Electoral Commission. At least two noble Lords in this debate—the noble Lord, Lord Soley, and my noble friend Lord Tyler—have identified themselves as advisers to the Electoral Commission. These points will have been noted.

As I confirmed in a debate before the Christmas Recess, the base for this boundary review was this 1 December past and the next one will be 1 December 2015, if this Bill goes through in full. That is more likely to be able to take account of the information from these pilots, and, I hope, broaden that out. I understand that there are issues on the Benches opposite about individual registration. It is more likely that these will be taken into account quicker than were we to wait for the day when certification comes from the Electoral Commission, as is proposed in the noble and learned Lord’s amendment. I therefore invite the noble and learned Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

I am grateful for the trouble that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, has taken here. As he rightly says, there are two bits to this. The first part of my amendment questions the proposition that you could effectively complete a review of every constituency in this country by October 2013, which is what the Bill proposes, when there is agreement across the House that hitherto it has taken between six and seven years to complete such a review. I was looking for the reasons why that which hitherto has taken six to seven years can be dealt with between the date upon which this Bill gets Royal Assent—a date we know not but assume is some time in the next few months—and October 2013.

The evidence that the noble and learned Lord relied on was that the secretaries of the Boundary Commissions had said to the Political and Constitutional Committee that they think it can be done but—he might have disputed this—that the timetable would be tight. How will it be done? I do not know and it strikes me, from my knowledge of the way that such bodies operate, that to manage a much more complicated and difficult review than they have ever done before—it will touch every single constituency in the country—sounds unrealistic. I do not in any way criticise the noble and learned Lord for his answer but it did not really offer an explanation to me that provided any consistency on how this marvellous process could be done so much more quickly.

The second point is that we should really make efforts to ensure that people who are not registered are registered. The noble and learned Lord made the quite valid point that surely not every single local authority has to comply. Maybe we should have some rule or process that says “substantially all” local authorities should comply, but that was his only point. I am willing to be guided by him: he might produce some proposal if he thinks mine is too draconian. Let us give more room for manoeuvre. Every single person who has spoken in the debate has said that we should do something about under-registration. If our idea was too draconian, I would have expected the noble and learned Lord to have come forward with some idea about how we would achieve that which appears to be an aim shared by all Members of the Committee.

I thank the noble and learned Lord for taking the trouble to respond in the way that he did, but I have to say that his reply was disappointing. Of course I will not ask the Committee to divide at this time of night, but I will certainly come back on Report with an amendment to deal with the unrealistic timetable for the first review and to propose how one might deal with the issue of under-registration. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Debate between Lord Wallace of Tankerness and Lord Falconer of Thoroton

Monday 10th January 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

I apologise. I misunderstood what the noble Lord said. Obviously, further work would need to be done. I am happy to say that when I said further work was required, the noble Lord nodded—that is the point that I am making. First, what is the workload on a Member of Parliament and what is the right size for Parliament in relation to that consideration?

Secondly, what should be the basis of determining the constituencies? Of course, I think that it should be the electoral register, though there is an issue about population. There is a respectable view that says, where you have constituencies which have very significant populations which are much higher than the electoral register, those constituencies should, in some way, reflect that increase in the size of the population. For example, just as we have a geographical limit because we think it is too far for an MP to travel all around the constituency, is there a population limit above the electoral register which should have some effect on the size of constituencies?

Thirdly, the purpose of the deviation figure of 5 per cent from the electoral quota is to ensure that constituencies are broadly the same size. That would lead to a difference in the size of constituencies of about 7,000 if 76,000 is the average size of a constituency. The purpose is to get rid of what is described as the malproportion factor. Published work, in particular by Thrasher and Rallings, and by Lewis Baston, suggests that a deviation figure of 10 rather than 5 per cent would have the same effect in reducing the malproportion figure yet at the same time allow one, in determining constituencies, to keep communities together and not have the radical effect that the government proposals would have. What work have the Government done on whether 5 or 10 per cent would make a substantial difference to malproportion? Has any research been done on that? What effect on, for example, crossing county boundaries would a 10 per cent as opposed to a 5 per cent deviation have? The Government will not be able to answer all these questions; I am asking about the research that is being done on them.

Thirdly, what effect will this have on the Executive? Reducing the size of the House of Commons from 650 to 600 will increase the size of the Executive and reduce the number of Back-Benchers. Is it the intention of the Government to stick with that? If so, what effect will that have on Parliament as a place to hold the Executive to account?

Fourthly, what will be the effect of removing local boundary reviews that can be conducted in person? These reviews have had a 64 per cent effect on changing constituency boundaries. What work has been done to determine the effect on the reliability and acceptance of the boundaries that removal of the reviews will have?

If the Government will not answer those questions or have not done the work, the questions should be answered by somebody. This is not a great reform like the 1832 Act, as the Prime Minister said; it needs work doing on it. The effect of the amendment of my noble friend Lord Wills is that that work can be done. As my noble friend Lord Boateng said, our democracy is something that we rightly prize. The idea of rushing into this change, which has the support only of one side of the Houses of Parliament—let alone of either the country or the rest of the world—is wrong. It is not an acceptable justification to say that the Tory party agreed it with the Liberal Democrats between Friday and Tuesday after the latest general election. That looks like the worst sort of political gerrymandering. I ask the Government to reconsider and to give ground in relation to an independent look at the changes that they are making.

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Wallace of Tankerness)]

My Lords, first I thank the noble Lord, Lord Wills, for introducing a debate that has given rise to a considerable number of important contributions. I am not sure that I can address all of them, but I will do my best to pick up most of the salient points. It is clear that the debate on this amendment has touched on many issues that will inevitably come up as we go through the Bill. Future amendments have already been tabled that deal with some of them. I hope to explain the principles that underlie the proposals that we will debate further. I hope also to explain why the proposals are reasonable and why a committee of inquiry is unnecessary.

It is clear that the amendment would slow down the proposed reform of our political process and system. It is highly unlikely that the proposals in this amendment would be in place in time for the next election. There would be a three-year deadline to report, six months to draft measures giving effect to the recommendations, and then time to legislate. That would be only for the legislation that set new rules for conducting boundary reviews. The reviews themselves would then need to be carried out. Therefore, even if the rules were in place before the next election, the new boundaries could come into effect only at the election after that.

I do not want to suggest that the political purpose of this has been to kick the Government's proposals into touch, although my noble friend Lord Tyler referred to previous committees of inquiry that delayed and postponed for many years what were seen by many as desirable reforms, and there was a general groundswell of support for his point on this side of the House. I also want to knock on the head the idea that I have accused noble Lords opposite of filibustering. The only complaint I would make is about the time taken up by them complaining that I might accuse them of filibustering. I also take great exception to the suggestion that the proposal is partisan. I do not believe that the opposition case stacks up. The noble Baroness, Lady McDonagh, pointed out that the issue of the size of constituencies applied as much to Conservative constituencies as to Labour ones. One cannot on the one hand say that reform will have the same impact on Labour and Conservative constituencies and on the other say that what we are trying to do is partisan.

I will pick up a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Wills, about his freedom of information application. I apologise that the noble Lord has not yet received a reply to his request. I will seek to ensure that he receives one as soon as possible. However, my noble friend Lord McNally, who is sitting with me, has indicated that as far as we are aware no work has been done on any kind of partisan measurement of what a new size of 600 for the House of Commons would bring about. No modelling has been done on that basis. I also say at the outset that amid all the outrage that we have heard from the other side, one would think that it was a constitutional outrage to support the principle of one vote, one value. That is what is enshrined in this part of the Bill; one vote should have one value in all parts of the United Kingdom. I do not believe that to be a constitutional outrage, except in Orkney and Shetland and the Western Isles. I am happy to argue that, as the noble Lord's party did in the Scotland Act in the case of Orkney and Shetland.

My second point is that there would not only be a delay. If the 2015 election is to be fought in England on boundaries that took as their electoral registration base the year 2000—15 years previously—can anyone suggest that that is a constitutional principle that we should seek to uphold in this House? We wish to make progress with this so that we can have a boundary review that will deliver its report and be in effect by the 2015 election.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

The point that I was making about the exchange between the noble Lords, Lord Wills and Lord Foulkes, was that a point was made about the Senate having 100 members and the US House of Representatives having approximately 434. The noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, pointed out that there are also state legislatures in 50 states. We are not comparing like with like. I took the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Wills, that international comparisons take you only so far. The noble Lord, Lord Snape, made the point about the word “gerrymandering” coming from the United States and seemed to suggest, although I am sure he did not mean to, that the Boundary Commission would somehow be heavied by the Government of the day. In the United States, as the commentaries following the elections in November made clear, the new boundaries will be set by the state legislatures, not by an independent boundary commission. That is the fundamental difference. I hope that noble Lords will accept that.

To elaborate further, under our proposals, the 1 December 2009 register suggests that the electoral quota for the United Kingdom would be about 76,000. More than one-third of existing constituencies are already within 5 per cent either side of that illustrative quota, so the impact of our proposals will see constituencies of a size well within existing norms. However, if the House were to have, for example, 500 Members, that would push the size of the average UK seat above 90,000, and only three existing seats would be within 5 per cent of that quota. For that size to become commonplace would perhaps be too great a departure from what Members and the public are accustomed to. We therefore thought that 600 would seem to strike the right balance without reducing by too much and having regard to the fact that one-third of existing seats would be within 5 per cent either way of the existing norm. In addition, a slightly smaller House will mean that savings can be made without, in the Government's view, losing the capacity of individual Members or the Chamber as a whole to perform their functions.

Other points have been raised: for example, the fact that that should be linked to reform of your Lordships' House. I have no doubt that there will be ample opportunity to work out the implications for the reform of your Lordships' House when the draft Bill is brought forward. An important point was made first by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, and picked up by several other noble Lords, including the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton. That is the relationship between the Executive and the elected House, the other place, if the number of MPs is reduced but not the number of Ministers.

The Government indicated in the other place that we agree that that is indeed an issue to be considered, but we do not believe that it is one that needs to be resolved in the context of the Bill. Reduction in the size of the House will not take effect until 2015, and we should therefore consider that issue in the light of decisions on, among other things, the size and composition of a reformed second Chamber. Historically, there has not been a consistent relationship between the size of the House and the number of Ministers within it. The number of Ministers in the Commons will be determined by what is needed to carry out the Government’s parliamentary business, and will not be affected by the change in the size of the Chamber. It is not clear that legislation is the answer. If the issue is the size of the Government’s payroll vote, there are ways to address that without legislation—for example, a reduction in the number of PPSs.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

That was an absolutely riveting piece of information that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, dropped into the conversation—which is that, as I understand it, the size of this House will determine whether the Government are to reduce the number of Ministers. Have I misunderstood what the noble and learned Lord said? If I have, can he please explain it? Is it better if this House is bigger or smaller for the size of the Executive?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I indicated that an important factor would be the size of the reformed House, because if the overall number of Ministers is to be retained, it may be considered preferable to draw them from the elected House, with tested accountability mechanisms, rather than increasing the ministerial numbers elsewhere, including in this House.

The noble and learned Lord raised that issue, although the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, raised it first. It is an important issue. It is an issue which the Government have indicated needs to be addressed, but not in the Bill. There are other implications. For example, if Ministers were not to be in the other place, would they automatically be in this place? Would they have voting rights in this place? There are a whole host of issues which are perhaps more relevant to the debate about the constitution of the second Chamber in the context of a reduced House of Commons than to be dealt with in this debate.

Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Debate between Lord Wallace of Tankerness and Lord Falconer of Thoroton

Monday 20th December 2010 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

According to the terms of the Bill, I think that the second boundary review will report on 1 October 2018. The noble and learned Lord indicated that there were difficulties involved in rushing registration and we have taken that on board. However, I cannot be absolutely certain about the extent to which that will be fully fed in for the report that comes out in 2018, with, I think I am right in saying, a review date of 1 December 2015. I hope that my arithmetic is correct. We hope to make substantial progress with individual registration ahead of that date.

I hope to reassure the Committee that this is an important issue and that that is how the Government are treating it. We have put in train measures to try to increase voter registration but we do not believe that that should be a precondition for the introduction of the alternative vote system. However, I believe that such an increase is absolutely right in its own terms and that we should make a concerted effort to improve voter registration, not least so that those who are entitled to vote get the opportunity to do so in future elections and, indeed, in a future referendum.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

I express my gratitude to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, for his response to my amendment. It was gracious and detailed and dealt with the issue. Perhaps I may draw out a number of the points that he made. First, he said—in my view, rightly—that there is an obligation to address these issues. He said that he regarded it as right in its own terms that this issue is addressed, by which I take him to mean that, irrespective of the Bill, it is something that needs to be done. I have not noted his precise words on this but he also accepted that it is an important issue because it effectively disenfranchises the groups on which I think we agree—that is, those in the private rented sector, those in the BME community and young people. That is why it is important.

In effect, he confirmed that, as the Electoral Commission said, we are getting a registration level of 91 to 92 per cent, which means that about 8 to 9 per cent are not registered. Therefore, there is no dispute in relation to the position.

He made a point which had not occurred to me but which seems important—that a review two years and 10 months before the effective date means that the relevant date is 1 December 2010. That means that, if you want to make a difference to electoral registration, you need to move the review date a year forward at the very minimum to make it worth while.

The point that the noble and learned Lord did not deal with is that if, like me, he accepts the importance of dealing with these points, why is this not the obvious Bill in which to do it? If he is serious about dealing with these points, it is obvious that something else is required. The points he relied on to start with—for example, that the electoral registration officers have a duty and the Electoral Commission have an obligation to set a standard, the two particularly good points he relied on—are not only not improving the position but would appear from the comparison between the 1991 position of 7 to 8 per cent, and the 2001 position of 8 to 9 per cent. They are not to be leading to an improvement and therefore something else is required.

The coalition has taken the view that it would be wrong to introduce AV without first having equalised the constituencies. Why do the coalition regard the equalisation of the constituencies as more important than trying to get a substantial proportion of that 3.5 million who are not registered on the electoral register?

I am pleased to see the noble Lord, Lord McNally, in his place. I regard him as the public face of the coalition’s defence of this particular Bill. It is hard to imagine a more attractive and handsome public face. What he says in response to practically any complaint about this Bill, and what we are focusing on, is fairness and fair votes. Surely it is fair to the people who are not registered—3.5 million of them—that they get on to the electoral register?

I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, for his full answer, which was a genuine response to what I have said. I will come back with an amendment like this on Report which, because of what the noble and learned Lord has said about the review date, to be meaningful has to give enough time for the coalition to make improvements in relation to it.

Remember that what I am asking for is not a complete and accurate register in every respect but simply a conclusion from the Electoral Commission that it is satisfied, in substance, that all efforts have been taken to get as many people as possible on to the electoral register.

I will not, therefore, press my amendment tonight but I will come back, taking into account the points that the noble and learned Lord made in his response.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

Does the drafting work? Is it appropriate? Why is it not in there? These are the questions for the Government. It might not necessarily be in the form or in the shape that the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, put it, but as an alternative that the Government can select, after a proper consultation. Ultimately, one way of dealing with this issue would be for there to be a simple referendum on replacing first past the post with AV. Assuming that there was a yes vote—ignore the complications that we talked about earlier on—choosing which of the three systems was best could be done by the Government. There could still be compulsion in introducing AV, but there could be a proper debate with the public and in Parliament as to which is the best system, rather than the way it is done at the moment, which is that the Government have selected a particular system of AV, about which there has been no consultation and no explanation to the public. There are two questions. First, is the drafting right? Secondly, why not incorporate in the Bill the three options and allow Parliament to decide after a public consultation which is the best?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I appreciate the fact that, in introducing the amendment, the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, said that he did not wish to re-rehearse the issues on the supplementary vote, which we have already been through. Was it on day three of Committee? He gave us the Hansard references. Indeed, I do not want to rehearse again the reasons why the Government do not support the supplementary vote for the purposes of the Bill that were outlined by my noble friend Lord Strathclyde. I do not think that the House would welcome being detained at present.

We believe that the noble Lord’s amendments would limit voters’ choice in expressing preferences for the candidates who would be standing for election, as they would be able to express a preference for only two candidates. Our preference, if I may put it that way, is that there should be more optional preferences that can be exercised by voters without any compulsion to vote for each candidate.

There is clearly a difference of view about the type of system that should be used. I note that the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, said that it was not the classic supplementary vote but perhaps the supplementary vote with cosmetic—

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

There now appears to be agreement that we all want an X against one name only to count as the first preference. The only issue appears to be whether or not one puts that in the Bill or in guidance. If one is changing the system and saying that the way you vote is by marking a 1, I should have thought that the sensible way to do that was by making it clear in the Bill. I support the noble Lord, Lord Norton, the noble Lord, Lord Hamilton, and, above all, the noble Lord, Lord Lipsey. I hope, although I accept that redrafting is required, that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, who has proved to be a gem, if I may say so, can see that.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

In response to the amendment, the noble Lord, Lord Lipsey, has indicated that I might send him home happy. I hope that in the spirit of the remarks I am about to make he will still go to his Christmas retreat a happy man. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, said, the amendment as drafted would not necessarily meet the point, but I hope that I can give the noble Lord, Lord Lipsey, and other noble Lords who have supported him, some clear reassurance.

The amendment is unnecessary because in Schedule 10 to the Bill, on page 294—which I hope we will get to one day—it is stated at paragraph 6(2C) that under rule 47:

“A ballot paper on which the voter makes any mark which … is clearly intended to indicate a particular preference for a particular candidate, but … is not a number (or is a number written otherwise than as an arabic numeral), shall be treated in the same way as if the appropriate number (written as an arabic numeral) had been marked instead”.

I hope that that addresses the issue. If there is one X, it will be very clear.

The important point is that the returning officer has discretion to make a judgment as to whether a clear intention has been made. That is why two Xs would not demonstrate a clear intention. I believe that one X would demonstrate a clear intention and that is provided for in the rules.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

It is a matter for the returning officers to determine ultimately whether they believe an intention has been indicated.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

I thought that the general agreement around the House was that if there is an X against only one name, we want the returning officer to say yes. That is a vote for a first preference. If you are saying that X is okay, but you are leaving it to the returning officer, that seems to be inconsistent. Why not put it in the Bill?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

There may have been a misunderstanding. I wanted to make a particular point to the noble Lord, Lord McAvoy, who said that an X had been put through a name, rather than against it. There was a suggestion that in such cases, far from wanting a candidate, the voter did not want them. Those are circumstances where it would be invidious to suggest what would happen. Certainly when an X is marked against a name, it is clear from the provision in the Bill that the vote would be valid.

The noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, is concerned —and I understand his concern—that this might lead to undermining the system. I think it was the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, who indicated that if there was a yes vote in the referendum, in the run-up to a general election in 2015 there would be advertising making the position clear. There were indications that that actually happened in the Scottish elections where a single transferrable vote requiring numbered preferences was used.

The night is drawing on but perhaps I may relate one small anecdote. I stood in the first ever European election in the south of Scotland and I have the dubious distinction of being the first person ever to lose their deposit in a European election. I have no doubt that my noble friend Lord Alderdice will recall that the 1979 European elections in Northern Ireland were carried out on the basis of the single transferable vote, whereas in the rest of the United Kingdom they were carried out on the basis of first past the post. A corner of Galloway in the south of Scotland received Ulster TV, on which the advertising encouraged people to use their vote by marking 1, 2 and 3. In several polling stations in that part of Galloway a number of ballot papers were marked with a 1, 2 and 3, although the election was on the basis of first past the post. However, there was agreement that the number 1 on a ballot paper would be accepted as a valid vote.

Let us not underestimate the voters. There will be ample advertising to indicate that the nature of the election will be a preferential vote system. I do not believe that that will undermine the election or that it will give rise to the concerns raised by the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

It is a matter of saying, “How much do you like me?” and being told, “Not enough to give you the whole of my vote”. The answer could be maybe a quarter, a fifth or a sixth. The candidate says, “Unfortunately, there are only four candidates in this, so you can’t give me a sixth”. I do not think that it is realistic. I recognise the problem, but I do not favour the solution. I described the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, as a gem but what I meant was a pearl.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I am not quite sure how to take that. I start by reassuring the House that although I have an interest in electoral systems, I cannot recall ever going to bed thinking about them. I doubt I will even do so tonight.

The noble Lord, Lord Rooker, has put forward a system that would involve some fractional vote. As I read his amendment, at first I thought, as the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours understood it, that the second preference got half of a vote, the third preference got a third of a vote, the fourth preference a quarter of a vote, and so on. However, in the light of the comments the noble Lord made on 8 December, his intention may instead be that where there is no winner in the first round of counting, and a further round of counting is necessary, the value of any votes reallocated from the eliminated candidates to the candidates who are still in the count would be determined by the position the eliminated candidate had in the first round of counting. In other words, if the eliminated candidate finished fifth, the value of the reallocated vote would be one-fifth and so on. The fact that there is that dubiety in the amendment—when I first read it, I took it to mean the same as the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, obviously did—underlines the complexity that arises.

My noble friend Lord Lamont said that the important thing, in terms of simplicity for the voters, is that they are invited to number their candidates 1, 2, 3 and 4 and, if there is complexity, that is for the counters to work out. If we went down the road proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, there would be some complexity when we were being interviewed by Jeremy Paxman and we were trying to explain where the one-quarter vote and the one-fifth vote came into it. However, I also take the point that the noble Lords, Lord McAvoy and Lord Lipsey, and others made, that although at one level voters are invited to order their preferences as 1, 2, 3 and 4 so far as they wish, there nevertheless is a requirement that they have some understanding. They do not need to know all the complex details, but they need to have some understanding of how the system will work.

The purpose of the alternative vote with the system that we are proposing is that it gives equal weight to votes that are still in the count. That meets the clear, simple and practical tests that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, suggested that there should be. The amendment goes against that; it says that some votes should count for less. Where some would say that people “part company”, I would suggest instead that there is a misunderstanding of the position in failing to make the distinction between a preference and a vote, or in somehow suggesting that if, for the sake of argument, the BNP came last and were first to be eliminated, it would be the second preferences of the BNP’s vote that determined the outcome. In fact, it would be the voters’ second preferences that determined it.

It was said that everyone should have two votes and it is not right that, at the second count, someone has only one vote, whereas the person whose second preference has been transferred has two votes. In fact, at the second count, the person who expressed the first preference and who is still leading has a vote again. The vote still counts as a full vote in the second count.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

That is the way that particular system works. It is the system we have used in this House for electing the Lord Speaker. I do not recall anyone challenging the validity of the system working for that purpose. It is the system that works in Scottish local government by-elections and I have never heard any suggestion that it is perverting the result.

What it could do is potentially dissuade voters from exercising the wider choice that is offered by the alternative vote. If it may be suggested that their subsequent preferences are somehow not going to have any weight at all, they may be deemed to be wasted votes. I would hope there was some degree of consensus that, whatever system you wish to adopt, the idea of having a wasted vote is one we should seek to avoid. By the proposal put forward in this amendment, some votes, if they are down to fractions, cease to have the value which I should like to see—

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

What if you have wasted a vote and vote for a candidate who does not succeed?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

We could go into the merits of the first past the post system and there are a considerable number of wasted votes for candidates who do not succeed. In some cases it can be up to 40, 50 or 60 per cent of votes for candidates who do not win. Under the present system, anyone who votes for a candidate who wins, which is more than a majority of one, is technically described as a wasted vote, too. We are getting into the debate of the first past the post system against the alternative system. That is a matter for the referendum campaign. We could go round the houses debating the relative merits of the system, as I will do during the referendum campaign, but what I am seeking to do for the purposes of this amendment is to indicate that the reallocated votes of the fractional votes imports a degree of complexity and it means that votes do not have full value in subsequent counts, which would happen under the system proposed in the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, is again rehearsing the kind of arguments that we will no doubt exchange in some television or radio studio in the coming weeks and months. I thank him for giving me forewarning of the arguments that he proposes to adopt. With regard to the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, as I have indicated, we do not favour an approach that would involve a reallocation of votes on a fractional basis. There are practical considerations. Nor, I understand, does the Front Bench opposite. There could be complications for voters in understanding it. I take the point that all the voter has to do is go into the polling station and write 1, 2, 3, 4. Nevertheless, understanding is required. I am not aware of anywhere else that uses the system proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Rooker. Therefore, I urge him to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

The noble and learned Lord is right that I do not support this amendment but he is completely wrong to say that we should not debate the anomalies in the AV system that is being proposed. As we keep saying, this is a compulsory referendum so the system that is being adopted must be subject to rigorous scrutiny to see what its shortcomings and anomalies are. The points that the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, is making are inevitable when you are looking at the detail of a system.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

The amendment of my noble friend Lord Beecham basically says that, if a candidate gets 5 per cent or less of the vote, the second preference votes for that candidate are not reallocated. I do not think that it necessarily follows that, if you get a low vote, your second preference votes should be any less valid than if you get a higher percentage of the vote. In certain circumstances, one can imagine Green Party candidates, for example, getting a very low vote—well below 5 per cent. The noble Lord, Lord Deben, in regarding Green Party candidates as more worthy than those of the Official Monster Raving Loony Party, is effectively making a value judgment about parties based only on the number of votes that they receive. It seems to me that it is very difficult to see a logical or intellectual basis for saying that 5 per cent or below is not an acceptable figure. Is there a political argument that says that 5 per cent or less is the sort of figure that extremist parties get? Possibly there is but, again, I believe that in relation to an electoral system it is dangerous to start characterising people whom you do not like as “extremist”. Of course, we all regard the BNP as extremist but there are other parties that some of us would regard as extremist and others would not. Therefore, although I understand the purpose of my noble friend’s amendment, I do not think that it stacks up, so I am afraid we will not support it.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I agree with much of the analysis of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer. Just because the total is a small figure, there is no reason why the second preference votes should carry any less value. It is also important to reflect, as the noble Lord, Lord Lipsey, said, that the purpose of a system is to provide a wide choice for voters. Under this system, every vote has equal value and is allocated to the candidate who is ranked highest in the preferences marked on the ballot paper and who is still in the contest. It is only fair to assume that in a second round the person marked as the first preference is the one whom the voter wishes to see come first, and it is important that that vote has full value.

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock]

Can the Minister help me? I have had a quick look through the Bill and I cannot find any provision, although it is probably carried over from existing legislation, where candidates have to pay deposits and, if they get less than a percentage of the vote, they will lose that deposit. Is that provision still there? If that is the case, I am afraid my noble and learned friend, Lord Falconer, might have to rethink because, if someone is going to lose their deposit, why should the votes be transferred? The threshold for losing the deposit was set at that level for a particular reason. I do not remember when it was set and what the reason was, but presumably it was that the candidate had failed to convince enough electors.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

Where you take someone’s deposit away because they get less than 5 per cent, you are in effect “punishing” the candidate for standing because he could not get enough support. You would be wrong to punish the people who vote for him.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

The noble and learned Lord virtually took the words out of my mouth. There is a difference in that, if there is a penalty on the candidate, it does not follow that the penalty should then be on the voter who has in all good faith expressed a second preference. The noble Lord, Lord Lipsey, made the point that it could be a way to penalise smaller parties, or indeed, as he put it, local campaigns. Let us remember that at recent general elections in this country and at a Scottish election in 2003 a candidate opposing hospital closures won. It might not necessarily have been obvious at the outset that these people were going to get far more than 5 per cent, but the fact that they are perhaps not mainstream in no way means that they should be devalued. It may well put people off from voting for candidates who appear to be coming from a local campaign, or let us say a non-mainstream party, if it was thought in some way that the second preference was not going to count. The object, as the noble Lord, Lord Lipsey, said, is to broaden choice, and I fear that the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, would not contribute to that broader choice. I therefore urge him to withdraw his amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

A lot of information is given to candidates and their representatives at the moment that is not leaked, entirely legitimately, and not made public. I would like to hear the Government’s position on this.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, as the noble and learned Lord has indicated, these amendments provide that if no candidate is elected at the first stage of counting—that is, if no candidate secures more than 50 per cent of first-preference votes—the returning officer would not make publicly available certain specified information about the state of play at that stage, including the number of first preference votes obtained by each candidate and which candidate was eliminated, but would make the information available to candidates and their representatives only. I have a lot of sympathy with the intervention by the noble Lord, Lord King. It would soon leak out, and I think it is far better that it is done publicly.

The clause is not prescriptive, so it is up to the returning officer in each case how he or she will make that information public. The purpose is so that there is transparency. There is no requirement for an announcement to be made, although the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Snape, that was recently not moved would have required a public announcement to have been made, and the specified information, which would include the details of the number of votes obtained by each candidate and the candidate who had been eliminated, could well be displayed, for example at the end of each counting stage, in written form or could be relayed on television screens at a count venue.

I was not present at any count on the morning of the last Scottish election because I was in radio studios with the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, but I understand that at least at one count that my wife attended in Orkney the votes—based on a slightly different system—were being shown on a screen as they were being counted, so it is possible for that information to be made available. I can make it very clear that this is to ensure that the candidate, the media, accredited observers and other persons present at the count are aware of the state of play at the end of the counting stage and that the count is conducted in an open and transparent manner. I hope with that reassurance that it is intended to promote transparency, that it is not prescriptive, that it is a matter for the returning officer as to how that information is made public and that there are ways of doing it in written form as well as by making an announcement, that the noble and learned Lord will not press his amendment.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

I found that a helpful and clear description which, from the sound of it, is a sensible way of doing this. However, I shall read in Hansard what he has said before making a final decision.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

Clause 9(4) reads:

“The Minister may by order make any amendments to primary or secondary legislation (whenever passed or made) that are consequential on amendments made by this section or Schedule 10”.

It gives the Government a power to amend any section of primary legislation or secondary legislation in order to give effect to these provisions. Normally, we would expect to see the provisions that are being amended so that Parliament has an opportunity to consider them. Why are we not seeing the respective provisions that are being amended, and does this include the power to amend Acts of Parliament made after the passage of this Act? I beg to move.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I can reassure the noble and learned Lord and the Committee that the breadth of the power is limited to amendments that are consequential to the changes being made by Clause 9 and Schedule 10. It is envisaged that in order to introduce the alternative vote system, should that be the wish of the referendum, amendments will be required to provisions in existing secondary legislation which concern the conduct of United Kingdom parliamentary elections. For example, changes will need to be made to certain forms that are prescribed for use at a UK parliamentary election including the poll card issued to electors prior to polling day to provide them with information on how to exercise their vote at the election, and the postal voting statement which postal voters must complete and return with their postal vote, and which again includes information about casting their votes. These forms are set out in secondary legislation. While we believe that all the necessary primary legislative provisions are in the Bill, it seems sensible not to have our hands tied. This power therefore covers any possible consequential changes to primary legislation that may be deemed necessary to implement the alternative vote.

I can offer a reassurance to your Lordships’ House that, as Clause 9 is currently drafted, before making an order under subsection (4), the Minister would be required to consult the Electoral Commission, which would give an independent view on any change. Such an order would be subject to the affirmative resolution procedure and would therefore have to be debated and approved in each House. I can confirm that it could allow amendments to be made to Acts passed before and after the Bill, but as I have indicated, this is for technical issues and not to change any matters of policy. In our memorandum concerning the delegated powers in the Bill for the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, we covered the order-making power in Clause 9.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I do not think that that would be an appropriate use of the power. It is important that when Parliament determines what the system should be, that is the system which is put to the people in the referendum and should not be tweaked. As I have indicated, this makes provision for amendments to primary or secondary legislation to be made that are consequential and necessitated by this clause or by Schedule 10. As I have indicated, they are related to things like the poll card or the information that goes with postal votes.

Just before the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, intervened, I was going to end by saying that we have not been made aware that the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee has made any critical or adverse comments in respect of these provisions. We believe that they are necessary and appropriate. In the event of a yes vote in the referendum, they will facilitate the implementation of the alternative vote.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

I quite understand the noble and learned Lord’s position in relation to secondary legislation. Clause 9(7) states:

“An order under subsection (4) may not be made unless a draft of the order has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, each House of Parliament”.

So we will get an opportunity to debate it.

Does the noble and learned Lord have in mind some provisions of primary legislation? He rather glossed over primary legislation. If changes in primary legislation are envisaged, why are we not being told what they are so that we can address them head on?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

As I indicated—perhaps I did not make it clear enough—we believe that the necessary primary legislative provisions are in the Bill and therefore we do not have anything in mind. I have indicated some of the provisions which are in secondary legislation, but we believe that the primary legislative provisions are already in the Bill. However, it seemed sensible to ensure that we did not have our hands tied if something was to arise.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

That is an interesting answer. Does the noble and learned Lord think it would be sensible not to include this power in relation to primary legislation? It is dangerous to include in a Bill a power to amend primary legislation when you have no primary legislation in mind but think it might be useful later on—particularly in relation to future legislation where you think you might have made a mistake and you then want to use the power to amend it. It appears to circumvent the important scrutiny that this House and the other place give to primary legislation. Will the noble and learned Lord think again about primary legislation? I am happy with secondary legislation.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

My Lords, the effect of the amendment is that before making an order under Clause 9(4), which allows the Government to,

“make any amendments to primary or secondary legislation … that are consequential on amendments made by this section or Schedule 10”.

At the moment, the Minister has to consult the Electoral Commission. Inevitably, amendments made under Clause 9(4) could affect the position in relation to the Welsh Assembly or the Scottish Parliament. As to how they might affect primary legislation—I see the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, looking troubled by that. He has just said very candidly that he has no idea what primary legislation might be amended by using Clause 9(4). His inability to understand that it might affect the Scottish Parliament or the Welsh Assembly is surprising, I have to say.

Before you produce an order that amends primary legislation, which currently cannot be identified—I am not criticising the noble and learned Lord for that—and which may not even be passed, because it may include future legislation, what is wrong with consulting the Scottish Parliament or the Welsh Assembly? We have had read to us the views of the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly on a number of occasions about the fact that they were not consulted about the date of the referendum, which is taking place on the same day as the Scottish Parliament or Welsh Assembly elections. They were plainly upset by that. What is the purpose of not consulting? What is the anxiety about consulting? We are talking about a national electoral system here, and a national vote. Surely the Scottish Parliament might have views that could be taken into account. I ask the noble and learned Lord to take that position into account. Points have been made about what has happened this evening. It is four minutes past one now. My understanding of how the House operates is that the Government Whip and Leader consult and then decide what to do. The Leader of the House today appeared not even to consult his own Chief Whip about sitting until four minutes past one. The reason I say that is because I am told by the Opposition Chief Whip that the noble Baroness was proposing that we went on for one more amendment. It might well have been sensible to go on to four minutes past one, but we have done it without, for example, giving the staff warning in advance and without there being proper consultation. All I say to the Leader of the House, who is much liked in the House, is please consult before going on till five past one.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, has invited me to give a description of the working of the Scottish Parliament voting system. I will resist that. I do not think that it is necessary. He came to be elected, I suspect, because more Labour members lost their first past the post seats than he had anticipated in the Lothian region. If he has any queries about the system, it is a system which of course he agreed in the constitutional convention. He was a member of the Government that brought it forward and passed it as indeed that Government proposed in primary legislation separate seats for Orkney and Shetland, which I certainly supported, but it was of course a measure which was brought forward in a Bill from a Labour Government. What we are dealing with—

Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Debate between Lord Wallace of Tankerness and Lord Falconer of Thoroton

Monday 13th December 2010 Lords Chamber

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

My Lords, in this group there are two amendments and the clause stand part debate. The first, Amendment 39, is in the name of my noble friend Lord Foulkes of Cumnock, and seeks to delete Clause 4(3) on taking,

“The polls for the referendum and the Scottish parliamentary general election”,

together. The second amendment, Amendment 39A, is in the name of the noble Lord, Lord McNally. I have also given notice of my intention to oppose the Question that Clause 4 stand part of the Bill. I will come back on anything that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, says about Amendment 39A. That might be the fairest way to deal with it, unless the noble and learned Lord wants to speak before me on Amendment 39A. I am entirely in his hands.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

If the noble and learned Lord thinks it would be helpful for me to speak to Amendment 39A, I will also deal with the other points that have been made and perhaps come back to him after he has had an opportunity to speak.

This has been an interesting debate. Some of the arguments have been well rehearsed before. In a debate a week ago tonight in Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes of Cumnock, sought in a very similar amendment not to have the referendum on 5 May. My noble friend Lord Strathclyde, the Leader of the House, responded, and the House took the view quite clearly that the amendment should not pass. I am always slightly wary of this position. I can understand the noble Lords, Lord Lipsey and Lord Campbell-Savours, who I think are basically in favour of some form of electoral reform, counselling against the date, but when the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, who I know wants a no vote, tries to tell Liberal Democrats what is in their best interests, Greeks bearing gifts tend to come to mind. It is also interesting that the two sides of the argument—the one side that wants no and the other side that wants yes—think that there are equally good reasons for not having the referendum on 5 May. In some respects, they cancel each other out.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I know that the noble Lord is always willing to give advice to Liberal Democrats. It is for Liberal Democrats to judge when and when not to accept his advice.

We rehearsed some of these arguments with the noble Lord, Lord Browne of Ladyton, during the debate in the House last Thursday on the order relating to the Scottish elections in 2011. The point about this debate on the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, which indeed relates to Scotland, in combination with the clause stand part debate on local elections and perhaps some mayoralty elections in England, elections to the Welsh National Assembly, and a series of elections and other local referendums in Northern Ireland on the same day, is that the effect of the noble Lord’s amendment—

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

What the Government are doing in the Bill is saying that the polls to be taken together are local authority elections in England, local referendums in England not Northern Ireland, and mayoral elections in England, as well as the Welsh Assembly general election, the Scottish parliamentary general election, the general election of Members of the Northern Ireland Assembly, and the Northern Ireland local elections.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

That is correct. I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for setting that out ad longam. However, the point about the amendment, or indeed the clause failing to pass, is not that the poll for the referendum on the electoral system for the alternative vote could not take place on 5 May; it is, rather, that two polls could take place but would not be combined. It is important that we recognise just what the impact would be either of not letting this clause stand part or of passing the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

That is an interesting point. Clause 4(1) states:

“Where the date of the poll for one or more of the following is the same as the date of the poll for the referendum, the polls are to be taken together”.

That refers to,

“a local authority election in England … a local referendum in England … a mayoral election in England”.

What the noble and learned Lord has said in relation to that is right; that is, if they are on the same day, they can all take place in the same polling station. However, Clause 4(2) to (4) appear to be different. They state that it is compulsory for the polls to be taken together, so they have to be on the same day.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

That point was raised on Report in another place. In fact, it does not need necessarily to be the referendum. I think that I am right in saying that the Scottish Parliament, the Welsh National Assembly and the Northern Ireland Assembly have the powers themselves to move the date. Therefore, if they were to use those powers, it would not make sense that they should be stuck together. Amendment 39A seeks to address that point.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

Will the noble and learned Lord confirm what I am saying? Under Clause 4(1), it is permissive, if they are on the same day, for the three named elections to be dealt with together—for example, in the same polling station. Subsections (2) to (4) refer to the Welsh Assembly elections, the Scottish parliamentary elections and the Northern Ireland Assembly elections. As a result of this wording, they have to take place on the same day.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

If that is taken along with Amendment 39A, which provides:

“If any of the elections referred to in subsections (2) to (4) are not held on the same day as the referendum, this Part has effect with any necessary adaptations and in particular … if the Welsh Assembly general election in 2011 is not held on that day, subsection (2) and Schedule 6 do not apply”.

There is a similar provision for the Scottish parliamentary election. Paragraph (c) to be inserted under Amendment 39A states that,

“if any of the elections referred to in subsection (4) are not held on that day, that subsection and Schedule 8 either do not apply or apply only in relation to the elections that are held on that day”.

So there is provision for a separation.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

To come back on that, I found the drafting of Amendment 39A extraordinary. Under Clause 4(2) to (4), there is a requirement, as the noble and learned Lord has just confirmed, to have the Welsh Assembly, the Scottish Parliament and the Northern Ireland Assembly elections on the same day. But if they are not held on the same day—for a hurricane or something like that—then provision is made. Surely, subsections (2) to (4) would need to be amended as well in order to give meaning to Amendment 39A.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

The purpose of the combination is that if the elections take place on the same day and are not, for some other reason, separated, they should be combined. If they are not combined, the amendment would have the polls being conducted on the same day, but separately. For example, there would be no effective provision for administrators to use the same ballot boxes. There would have to be separate polling stations, which, technically could be within the same building, but they would have to be separate, or they might not necessarily be in the same building. As I am sure that the noble and learned Lord realises, that is the purpose of the combination.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

I am sorry, but if the noble and learned Lord looks at the wording, there is a distinction. Clause 4(1) refers to the fact that where they are on the same day they can be held together, which is plainly the point about not having to be in separate polling stations. Subsections (2), (3) and (4), as I thought the noble and learned Lord had confirmed, are drafted in different terms and are put on the basis that:

“The polls for the referendum and the Welsh Assembly general election … are to be taken together”.

So there is a requirement that they must be taken together, which means that they must be on the same day.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

The noble and learned Lord will recall—he is stating the obvious—that when this Bill was brought to this House from the other place the referendum, prior to the successful amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, would have been on the same day. Therefore, as they were going to be on the same day, it made good sense, as I hope the House would agree, that the polls should be combined. I do not think that the Government should stand accused because there has been an amendment—the consequential amendment was not necessarily made here. In the debate last Wednesday, the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, was encouraging the Government to bring forward an order which would make it 5 May but could be subject to change as long as it was before 31 October.

So, when the Bill came to this House it stated that the referendum would be held on 5 May. That is the date for elections to the Scottish Parliament, the National Assembly for Wales and the Northern Ireland Assembly. Therefore it makes sense, if the referendum is still to be held on 5 May, and indeed it is still the Government’s position that they can achieve a referendum on that date. The Bill that was passed by the other place, published and brought to this House provided that the referendum would take place on the same day. I hope the noble and learned Lord and other Members of the Committee would agree that if they are held on the same day, it makes eminent common sense to combine the polls, and that is what is sought in Clause 4.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

What the noble and learned Lord says is correct. If they are to be held on the same day, it is wholly sensible to combine them. Why are subsections (2), (3) and (4) set out in different terms from subsection (1)? If the reason for Amendment 39A is the result of my noble friend Lord Rooker’s amendment, why not just amend it and say that if the polls for the referendum and the Welsh Assembly take place on the same day, which is the effect of subsection (1), then they are to be taken together?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I think that I have explained this. It has been a matter of some debate, but nevertheless it was expected that the elections to the Scottish Parliament would be held on 5 May 2011. It was expected that the elections to the Welsh Assembly would also be held on that day. Therefore, given that that was the date originally set out in the Bill as it came to the House prior to amendment, it makes sense to combine them. But before I sit down I will try to set out why the terms are somewhat different for the polls that will be taking place in England on that date. It could be that a particular date has not yet been set for a particular local referendum. That could be a possible explanation, but before I conclude, I hope there may be some explanation as to why the terminology is somewhat different.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

Given that one part of the Government is likely to be supporting the yes campaign and one part, as likely as not, will be supporting the no campaign, I rather think that that might encourage people to look at the merits rather than find the best way to take it out on the Government. If there are two parties in a coalition and they are on either side of the argument, it is difficult for that argument to hold as much water as I accept that perhaps it has in the past. I am sure that the referendum on 1 March 1979 was not helped by coming immediately on the back of the winter of discontent. Nevertheless, that allowed a fair amount of cross-party support to try to get the yes vote out, and indeed the no vote. It is up to those of us who want to campaign to ensure that we are campaigning on the issues and not on some test of the parties in power. The fact that the poll is being held on the same day as other elections may mean that some of the more partisan effects that referendums—or referenda, whichever is your preference—may have on the question could be channelled into the elections being held that day. It may mean that we can have a proper debate on the relative merits of changing to the alternative vote system or of sticking with first past the post.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

The Minister is giving a very helpful explanation of why he has put this amendment forward. In the light of what he has said, I now understand why he has done so, but the amendment does not seem to achieve its end. I understand him to be saying that the Scottish Parliament, the Welsh Assembly and the Northern Ireland Assembly have the power to change the date of their elections and that, if they did so, the Government would not seek to move the date of the referendum. So the Government’s position is that if the polls are on the same day, they should be combined.

Clause 4(1) says precisely that. Why on earth are the Government drafting the Bill in the terms in which it appears to be drafted—that the polls for the referendum, the Welsh Assembly, the Scottish Parliament and the Northern Ireland Assembly have to be held on the same day? Why are they not drafting it on the basis that, if the polls for the referendum and the Welsh Assembly are on the same day, they are to be taken together?

We do not agree with combination—we will come to that later when we say that Clause 4 should not stand part—but I cannot understand why the Minister is being advised that this is the way to achieve what he so clearly describes. Why are the Government not just saying that if the polls are on the same day, they are to be taken together?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

As I have already explained, 5 May was the date originally set out in the Bill. I do not think that anyone is disputing that. It was the date set down for the elections for the Scottish Parliament, the Welsh Assembly and the Northern Ireland Assembly. I shall speculate, and I hope that I can get confirmation for this, that there could be a local authority election in England that may not necessarily be on 5 May, whereas the Scottish parliamentary election has been set for 5 May.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

But it could be changed.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

The noble and learned Lord says that it could be changed. That is why we have brought forward the amendment. I do not believe that it contradicts at all.

I shall recapitulate. There could be a local authority election in England that need not be on 5 May. When the Bill was brought to this House, having been passed by the other place, it had been agreed in the other place that the referendum should be on 5 May. That was the date set for the Scottish election, the Welsh Assembly election and the Northern Ireland Assembly election. It therefore makes sense, and I think that this has been widely conceded, that if the elections were to be held on the same day, as was anticipated when the Bill was brought to this House, the polls should be combined for a host of good, sound administrative reasons. Subsequently there has been a change.

It was drawn to our attention on Report in another place that there was a potential problem. Because of the inherent powers in the statutes establishing the three devolved institutions, the election might not be on 5 May if they chose, for whatever reason, to exercise those powers. That is why Amendment 39A has been tabled. The noble and learned Lord may wish to debate whether it achieves its purpose. I think I have explained what its purpose is; it is to ensure that there was no dubiety and that the powers given to the Assemblies and the Parliament were not in any way infringed by the provisions.

That is it, very simply. I think it is relatively simple. The dates were anticipated, because of the way the Bill stood, to be the same. There could be a local authority election in England that did not necessarily fall on 5 May. The purpose of the government amendment is to provide that, if the Scottish Parliament—for the sake of argument—wished to change the date, it would be allowed to do so. It would not be inhibited from doing so by these provisions.

That is why the political arguments around whether the date is right or wrong are not relevant to this clause, which is, in some respects, a technical clause. It links to the various schedules. I pick up the point of the noble Lord, Lord Lipsey, who pointed to all the schedules when my noble friend Lord McNally said that this is a simple Bill. The schedules have been put into primary legislation, making provision for combining polls in England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. There are four separate schedules, covering matters that, in many cases, would be put into secondary legislation. However, for simplicity and given the nature of this matter, it made more sense for them to appear in primary legislation in the Bill. This led to extending the length of the Bill considerably, but that is why the schedules are there: it was thought better to have the combination of provisions in the Bill.

I rather hope the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, will accept that the consequence of his amendment—this is why I ask him to withdraw it—would not necessarily be to change the date of the poll. He has already lost an amendment specifically on that. It would, however, mean that if the two polls were held on the same date, they could not be formally combined. Therefore, there might be people who would have to go to two separate polling stations. That is not in anyone’s interests.

I know that this is perhaps more technical than I anticipated but it is not a political argument about the date of the poll. It is a technical one, which says that if the polls fall on the same date—it is still the Government’s intention that we should achieve that on 5 May—it is in the interests of those who would take part, not least those who are administering it, such as the returning officers, that the situation should be simplified as far as possible. I recall a Question in the House, asked by the noble Lord, Lord McAvoy, in July, about a letter from the convenor for the Interim Electoral Management Board for Scotland. He asked formally for the polls to be combined if the election and the referendum took place on the same day. This is our response to the spirit of that request.

No doubt we will come back to this if issues are raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, but I hope the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, will appreciate that, whatever the political argument—there has been plenty of political debate—the technical argument means that it makes much more sense to combine the polls, as proposed in this clause. His amendment would have the rather unfortunate effect of splitting them, should they take place on the same day.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

It is important to see what Clause 4 says. That is why it is worth taking some time over these things. Clause 4(1) says:

“Where the date of … a local authority election … a local referendum”,

and,

“a mayoral election in England”,

is the same as that of a referendum, the polls can be combined. That does not commit the Government to having them on the same day. It is expressly conditional on their being on the same date.

The drafting of subsections (2), (3) and (4) is in different terms for reasons that are inexplicable, unless their purpose is to make it compulsory to have the polls on the same day. As far as that is concerned, although I completely accept that the Government intend that the Welsh Assembly, the Scottish Parliament and the Northern Ireland Assembly should be able to exercise their powers to move the date, the fact that you have what appears on the face of it to be compulsion to hold the relevant polls on the same day appears to me, constitutionally, to lead to a situation whereby subsections (2), (3) and (4) would override the power of the Scottish Parliament to do that. The Government do not intend that outcome and therefore they should amend subsections (2), (3) and (4) to make them the same as subsection (1).

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

The American experience, which is part of the evidence relied on in these debates, suggests that in the polls in November, either in mid-term or general election years, the tendency of the public is not to focus on the proposition but to focus primarily on the people they are electing. In the coverage in November I did not spot the result of the proposition in California; all I spotted, which is where all the coverage was in America, was who was going to win in California. So the American experience tends to confirm what the Select Committee said—that the referendum question gets swamped in the question, for example, of who you want to be your Government in Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland.

Why is it being done like this? Is it only to save money or are there other reasons? The amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, to which we have all agreed, has given the Government the opportunity to hold the referendum on a different day. In answer to my opposition to Clause 4 standing part, it is necessary for the Government to say why they think it is right that this critical question should be dealt with on a day when there are other polls; when it has never before been done in our history; when experience in other jurisdictions suggests that the referendum question gets swamped; when anyone who has any care for our constitution wants the result to be decisive. I do not want a situation where whichever Government are in power seek to change the electoral system; I want something that is settled as far as the people are concerned. That has always been the purpose of referenda in the past. Furthermore, quite separately from those points of principle, there is inevitably scope for confusion with so many elections going on with different electorates.

I shall listen very carefully to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, justifying why an issue as important as this is being dealt with in a way which seems to make it harder to come to a legitimate result than easier.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, as I indicated when I spoke earlier in dealing with these amendments, the nature of Clause 4 is of a technical combination; it is not one of the political arguments. The political argument was debated in this House quite thoroughly last Monday evening in Committee and, indeed, my noble friend Lord Strathclyde gave the answers to the questions of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer. He may not have liked the answers, but that is a different matter. The House then came to a view and endorsed the argument put forward by my noble friend Lord Strathclyde. The amendment seeking not to have the referendum on 5 May—which I think was tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes; he will correct me if I am wrong—was defeated.

The purpose of Clause 4, as I have indicated, is of a technical nature. It ensures that if the polls take place on the same day they are combined. That makes good sense for the voter—who I hope is still the most important person in this—and it makes good sense for those administering the elections. The Opposition have acknowledged and conceded that that is the case and that the technical arguments are very strong.

The London mayoral referendum took place on the same day as London elections, so the idea that having a referendum on the same day as elections is unprecedented does not hold water. As that was brought forward by the party of the noble and learned Lord when it was in government, one assumes it thought that it was quite an important referendum. Given that we have had only one UK-wide referendum in our history, I do not think we can use it to set a precedent. As I said, the arguments on the politics have already been made in a previous debate. This is very much a debate on the technical nature of combination.

The reason why the terms are different in subsection (1) is that the elections to the Scottish Parliament, the Welsh National Assembly and the Northern Ireland Assembly are fixed by statute. The particular local elections are not necessarily fixed by statute, hence the different wording. The amendment of my noble friend Lord McNally has the same effect.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

Why does the fact that it is fixed by statute but can be changed make a difference?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

Sorry, I do not follow the noble and learned Lord’s point. In the Bill as it originally stood prior to any amendment, the date was to coincide with the statutory dates for the other elections—hence the wording of these proposals. My noble friend’s amendment makes provision that, if the referendum was not on the same day as a poll for the Scottish Parliament, the Welsh National Assembly or Northern Ireland Assembly, the relevant schedule will not apply and, therefore, they will not be combination. That is what this clause is about and what this amendment is about. I ask the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, to withdraw his amendment, as it could have an unfortunate effect, which I am sure is not what he intends. I ask the Committee to support the clause, which is important from a technical point of view, not least in the interests of voters.