Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Lord Falconer of Thoroton Excerpts

Tuesday 25th January 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord McAvoy]

My Lords, I suspect that not for the last time in the debates this evening I take a different point of view from my noble friend Lady Ramsay of Cartvale. The relevance of that is to do with her comments on the record of the Scottish Constitutional Convention. She says that it is relevant to what we are discussing now because it has been quoted as an example or a way of working or because the information that came from it is relevant. I do not wear quite the same rose-tinted glasses in relation to that organisation. I did not intend to speak, but as usual I failed to resist my annoyance—no, that is too strong a word and I would not say it, or not in your Lordships' House—or my reaction to the jibe from the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, about the time that noble Lords are taking to revise and review the legislation. I hope that nobody on any side of the House is intimidated by these continual jibes. We are here to revise and, I hope, to improve the legislation.

I bring myself to the relevance of the Scottish convention’s record, to which my noble friend referred. Once again we had a situation where the great and the good got together and where everybody was all caught up in an atmosphere of being nice to each other and trying to work together for Scotland. I do not criticise that, as it was with the best of intentions, but in doing so they allowed the Liberals to sucker them because the Liberals gained more out of that system than anybody else. They gained an infamous list system—infamous is the right word—of electing MSPs in Scotland. It is not even just about electing them. These list MSPs, especially the Liberals, wander all over the Westminster and Scottish Parliament constituencies, plucking the cases that suit them for political purposes and ignoring the rest. Also, instead of concentrating on the regions which they supposedly represent, lo and behold, guess where they seem to spend most of their time? Again, this is especially the Liberals. It is in the constituency where they stood as a first past the post candidate. We should not let anyone get carried away, in my opinion, by the eloquent words of my noble friend Lady Ramsay of Cartvale because it is just not right.

I also tell my noble friend Lord Foulkes of Cumnock that I am still not quite sure about the primacy that his amendment would seek to give the Boundary Commission—advice or guidance on taking more account—because the Westminster constituencies are the true measures of how the commission should go about its work. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, made a relevant point. There are indeed many communities, or more communities than one, in a Westminster constituency. The one that I know best, Rutherglen and Hamilton West, has about five or six with the three core ones being, as I have said before, Rutherglen, Cambuslang and Halfway. I have to tell my noble friend that I am not convinced that the Scottish parliamentary constituencies are the real thing to take account of here. I remain to be convinced. I may come back in again once I hear from the noble Lord the Leader of the House, with the benefit of his experience, and my own Front Bench but at this stage I certainly reserve my position regarding my noble friend's amendment.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

My Lords, this amendment, put down by my noble friend Lord Foulkes of Cumnock, proposes that:

“The Boundary Commission for Scotland may take into account the boundaries of constituencies of the Scottish Parliament”.

Three specific points emerge from this amendment. First, it is worth while to look at the experience of the Boundary Commission for Scotland in dealing with the drawing of the boundaries for the Scottish Parliament. The experience of those involved in public inquiries was that the rules were “too rigid”. The rules, although much more rigid than previously, are less rigid than the current rules.

Sheriff Principal Kerr, who conducted a public inquiry into the West of Scotland constituencies, said that the Act,

“introduced a rigidity which had not previously existed”,

and, in the foreword to his report, said:

“Too little attention has been paid in my view to local authority boundaries, to geographical considerations, to inconveniences resulting from proposed constituency changes and to the sundering of local ties; and too much emphasis has been laid on the requirement (although qualified by the other rules)”—

which is not the position here—

“of Rule 2 that numerical proximity to the electoral quota be achieved. This consequence”,

the Sheriff Principal said,

“came out very clearly in the present inquiry and it is I think necessary to remedy it so far as reasonable, at least for the West of Scotland, in order to avoid the continuance of a sense of grievance which appears to be widely or even universally felt in some quarters”.

Point number one: the effect of too rigid rules is, in the view of Sheriff Principal Kerr, to create a sense of grievance.

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[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock]

Seventy.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

There are 70 in relation to the Scottish Parliament, so while they cannot be coterminous it must be sensible, as far as possible, not to try rigidly to make them coterminous but to have regard to them. I hope that the prescient words of the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, who said, “Shut up and listen and you might make some progress”, might mean that the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, will say that he will accept this amendment, because it seems sensible to me. Then we will regret not having followed the advice of the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, because it may be that talking too much has cost us the warm opinion and the change of the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde.

[The Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (Lord Strathclyde)]

My Lords, that was interesting and, by the standards of this Committee, a relatively short debate, so I will try to be as accommodating to the noble and learned Lord as the Government were to my noble friend Lord Tyler. I thought that the point which my noble friend was making, which was very sensible, was that we did not necessarily need to listen to everybody who had once represented a Scottish constituency to get the point being put forward—although it was useful to hear from other noble Lords. The noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, was right. He was indeed the MP for my part of the world for some years. We worked together but it was, on the whole, on opposite sides. He was rather more successful at it than I was, unfortunately.

The noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, asked a specific question about how the formula will work and how many seats there will be in each nation. It obviously depends on the estimates that will take place in each nation but if the calculation were to be run on the basis of the register as of 1 December 2009, Scotland would have 52 MPs, England would have 503, Wales would have 30, and Northern Ireland 15. However, I want to emphasise that these allocations may change, depending on the electorates in each nation. That is clearly understood.

What the noble Lord is after here is to add a fifth factor into the existing four in the Bill that the Boundary Commission may take into account. The Boundary Commission has indicated already that it takes into account issues which are brought to its attention as part of the public consultation process, if it believes them to be significant—that is the key. For example, the Boundary Commission for England said in its fifth general review, published in 2007, that, where practicable, it took into account district boundaries. The report noted:

“The Commission have previously recommended constituencies which recognise both metropolitan and non-metropolitan district boundaries, where it is practicable to do so, but often it is necessary to cross district boundaries in order to avoid excessive disparities. It is expected that this will be the situation during this general review but, of course, each review area will be treated on its merits”.

That was the Boundary Commission for England in 2007.

What this means, if I may translate, is that anyone could make a representation to the Scottish Boundary Commission arguing that an element of Scottish parliamentary constituency boundaries constituted a significant factor to take into account when settling Westminster constituency boundaries. There would be nothing to prevent the Scottish Boundary Commission taking that into account. In this sense—I am trying to be helpful to the noble Lord—the intention that underlies his amendment would be achieved by the way in which the Boundary Commission has always worked, without the need to amend the Bill. The significant change which the Bill makes, as the Committee now knows, is the requirement to prioritise the “5 per cent above or below electoral parity” rule over other factors. There is nothing in the Bill that we think would cause the Boundary Commission to change the way in which it considers any factors brought to its attention in representations from local authorities or members of the public, including precisely the kind of things raised in the noble Lord’s amendment.

I expect that I have disappointed the noble Lord in not accepting his amendment, but I hope that I have said enough for him to feel satisfied that it would not make very much difference if we did not accept it. I hope that he will withdraw it.

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Moved by

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

79A: Clause 11, page 10, leave out lines 23 to 30 and insert—
“Whole numbers of constituencies(1) The following shall be allocated whole numbers of constituencies by whichever Boundary Commission is responsible for them—
(a) Orkney Islands and Shetland Islands council areas;(b) Comhairle nan Eilean Siar council area;(c) Argyll and Bute council area;(d) the Isle of Anglesey county area;(e) the Isle of Wight county area; (f) the County of Cornwall and Isles of Scilly council areas;(g) the Highland council area.(2) The number of seats to be allocated to each area shall be determined by dividing the electorate of the area or areas concerned by the United Kingdom electoral quota and rounding to the nearest whole number, and each area must be allocated at least one whole seat.”

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

I apologise for arriving late. The Government have consistently argued that the core principle underpinning their proposed new rule for drawing parliamentary constituencies is equality. The Bill is designed within a very narrow tolerance to create equal-sized seats. We agree with the principle of creating more equally sized seats but, as we have consistently pointed out, the Bill sets about that objective in a way that we regard as in many respects clumsy and unfair. As we have heard—and, I think, we will continue to hear—the Bill’s aim to equalise seats will be done on the basis of an unequal electoral register and in a way that will override all other factors, such as geography, community and history, that ought to be taken into consideration when designing patterns of representation.

A curiosity about the Bill, however, is that, while the principle of numerical equalisation is deemed to be the trump card in almost all cases, there are some circumstances where the iron law of uniform statistics has been disregarded. For example, a new rule on the maximum territorial extent of a constituency has been set out in the Bill, accompanied by a clause to free at least one Scottish highland seat from the requirement to adhere to the electoral quota.

Alongside that, in the proposed new rule 6 in Clause 11, is a further exemption from the electoral quota. Two Scottish island seats, Orkney and Shetland and the Western Isles, are to be preserved in perpetuity. Despite having substantially fewer electors than the proposed new quota of 75,800—in the case of Orkney and Shetland, the electorate is around 37,000 and in the Western Isles just 21,000—these constituencies are deemed to warrant a special status in the Bill.

Some of your Lordships and Members of the other place have taken the view that this carve-out is unacceptable. We have already heard the view of Mr Andrew Tyrie, the Conservative MP who is often described as the brains behind the boundary review policy. He did not favour any exemptions when he produced his pamphlet on redrawing constituencies in 2004. In Pruning the Politicians, he wrote that,

“‘special geographical considerations’ ... should be abolished … The principle of equal representation is too important to be compromised by get-outs”.

I disagree with Mr Tyrie. I agree that we should create more equally sized seats, but we should do so in a way that continues to allow factors other than pure statistics to influence the shape of constituencies. There are occasions when the goal of equal numbers ought to be compromised in order to take into account other considerations such as geography, history and community. The two Scottish island seats that are specific exceptions in the rules are a case in point; I accept them as sensible exceptions. The question for this House is whether they should be the only case.

The Government do not think so. They have also made special allowances in the Bill for the Scottish highlands to escape the principle of equal numbers through the size exceptions. Your Lordships’ House does not think so either, as it demonstrated last week in the vote on the submission of the noble Lord, Lord Fowler, regarding the Isle of Wight. In addition, the Government have exempted the whole of Northern Ireland from the principle of equal representation. Rule 7(b) explicitly states that the Boundary Commission for Northern Ireland may disapply the electoral quota rule if it considers that the rule would “unreasonably impair” its ability to take into account factors including geographical concerns, local ties and so on, listed in rule 5(1) of the new proposals.

That said, Orkney and Shetland and the Western Isles are the only specific constituencies named in the Bill, as it originally came to this House, as having a preservation order. Mr Mark Harper, the Minister for Constitutional Affairs in the other place, said that they have been afforded that special status because they have “unique geography”. That seems to be a difficult and unsatisfactory basis for their inclusion in the Bill and for others’ exclusion. Many constituencies would argue that they, too, had “unique geography”.

Mr Harper was presumably referring to the fact that these constituencies are island seats. As such, they are separated from the mainland by the sea and have natural borders that arguably help to create and, over time, reinforce a particular sense of community. That certainly makes them unusual—I repeat that I accept their entitlement to special status—but it does not make them unique. For example, they are not the only island seats in the United Kingdom. What about Argyll and Bute? That constituency is comprised of 13 islands. What about Anglesey? It is not in exactly the same position as Orkney and Shetland or the Western Isles, but then Orkney and Shetland and the Western Isles are not in exactly the same position as each other. They are all islands; they are island communities; they have very obvious natural borders, which give rise to issues of accessibility; and they have powerful local ties and traditions. While the two Scottish island seats are to be preserved by this Bill, however, apart from the change made by your Lordships’ House, the other islands are not.

This House has rightly judged that the way in which the Bill would have split the Isle of Wight was not suitable. Tagging 40,000 Isle of Wight voters on to a part of Hampshire would have had a significant ripple effect throughout that county, as constituency boundaries were forced to be redrawn all over the place as a consequence of the influx of new voters. If a special case can be made for the two Scottish island seats, it can also be made for several other hard cases.

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[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

I am sorry to interrupt, but I do not think that the noble Lord's wife could have been seven months old at the time.

[Lord Crickhowell]

However, those who had organised it had foreseen that possibility and, luckily, there was someone watching with binoculars and we were brought ashore. In the case of Ynys Môn and the mainland, there is a short suspension bridge that you can walk across in a couple of minutes which, incidentally, bears an inscription that tells us that the grandfather of the present Chairman of Committees removed the tolls when he was Secretary of State for Transport. The other bridge, the great Brunel railway bridge, which was severely damaged by fire and, when it was reconstructed, had a road built on top of it, is again a perfectly comfortable walk across. I walked across it during its reopening ceremony.

The truth is that a great many people in Anglesey do their shopping not on the island but in Bangor. If they are going to hospital, they certainly go to Bangor, because that is where the district hospital is. When I used to travel up frequently as a director of Anglesey Mining, I usually got off the train at Bangor rather than Llangefni. The university obviously provides a hub of activity in Bangor, and great services are held in Bangor Cathedral. When my dear friend Kyffin Williams, the great Welsh artist, died, his service of commemoration was in the cathedral at Bangor, not on the island.

People say, “Ah, but history”. If you go back into the depths of history, the links between the mainland and the island had been very close. When Edward I launched his first assault on Llewelyn the Great, Llewelyn-ap-Gruffydd, the Prince of Wales, he sent the ships of the Cinque Ports to capture Anglesey. Immediately, they destroyed the grain harvest and Llewelyn capitulated. Since then, Anglesey has not been the granary of Gwynedd, but it has been the place to which the farmers of Snowdonia sent their sheep to fatten. Indeed, as my noble friend Lord Roberts of Conwy will recall, after the Chernobyl nuclear disaster, it became a central part of the agricultural activity of the area that lambs had to be sent down to the island for fattening. Indeed, I believe that some of them still are.

The links between both sides are extremely close. The natural constituency is therefore Anglesey linked to Bangor. Dividing the Arfon constituency so that Caernarfon is linked with the neighbouring constituency of Dwyfor Meirionnydd fulfils pretty closely the general objectives of the Government, and I cannot see that in the case of Anglesey a strong case can be made out for special treatment. Therefore, on this occasion—I think for the first time during my activities on the Bill—I find myself supporting the Government.

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[Lord Strathclyde]

My Lords, there is no evidence to suggest that that would be the likely result. The review might result in more marginal constituencies: I have not the faintest idea. The people who decide whether a seat is safe or marginal are the electors in that constituency, not the Boundary Commission.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

My Lords, I will reply and then the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, will reply. That was a debate from a golden age in the House of Lords. It had three particular characteristics. We focused on the issue, we heard brilliant speeches from all sides of the House and we had a fabulously attractive speech from the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, in which he pretended that the argument was about one thing and answered that.

I will speak first about individual places. The noble Lords, Lord Crickhowell and Lord Roberts, made powerful speeches about why Anglesey should not be treated separately because of its relationship with Bangor. My noble friend Lord Touhig made an equally powerful speech about why it should be treated separately. It is inevitable in the light of the way that the Bill was drafted that this is what must be done. The noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, stated that we say that there should be other factors and Government say that the issue is numbers. I am afraid that that is not what the debate on this amendment is about. The Government have accepted that there should be exceptions. We accept the principle of equality. There should be a small number of exceptions: the question is what they should be. Because there is no independent process to decide this, it must be done in the way that the noble Lord, Lord Fowler, managed with the Isle of Wight, and in the way that has been done tonight. With the greatest respect to the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, and in admiration for the attractive way in which he can distract us from the real point, the question is: what should the exceptions be?

The powerful speeches made by the noble Lords, Lord Roberts and Lord Crickhowell, show that we need to think about whether Anglesey should be an exception. In relation to Cornwall, I hope that I will not make the same mistake as the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, by saying, “This is what I think the people of Cornwall want”. We must listen to what they have to say. The noble Baroness, Lady O'Cathain, rightly placed her finger on the point; we are seeking to determine the way in which we elect people to a national forum. However, that does not answer the question about how we select the units within which they will select those national representatives. I am very conscious of that, having spoken to people from Cornwall and having heard what they said to me. As the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, was good enough to acknowledge, Cornwall appears united on the issue. If I was allowed to refer to the Public Gallery, which I am not—I am conscious of the fact that the noble Earl, Lord Ferrers, is not here—I would imagine that any elected representatives there would have nodded vigorously when I said that the people of Cornwall were united in this respect. I am conscious of the fact that there is strong feeling on this issue.

The amendment has given us the opportunity to consider a range of possible exceptions. There is agreement in this House on three of the exceptions: the two Scottish island constituencies and the Isle of Wight. There is a division of view about the Isle of Anglesey. There has been broad support for Argyll and Bute, but we have not had a detailed debate on it, nor in relation to the Highland Council. The striking thing about this debate has been the position of Cornwall, which everyone has acknowledged. We cannot vote on this compendious amendment because it covers too many constituencies and there are different views in relation to it. However, it is perfectly obvious that we will have to revisit the issue of Cornwall.

On the question of Cumbria, I do not necessarily agree with my noble friend Lord Liddle that it was not included in our amendment simply because he did not get to me in time, although, having heard what he and my noble friend Lord Campbell-Savours said, one can see that there is a case for Cumbria. I say with respect and tentatively that it does not appear to have the same universal support as Cornwall.

We note very carefully what has been said in the course of what has been a very good debate, and we will obviously come back at Report with what may be a more honed amendment.

[Lord Teverson]

My Lords, I thank the Leader of the House for least going through the arguments. I must admit that I find them difficult to follow on this amendment. These small exceptions—exceptions have already been made—do not make a fundamental difference to the Bill, nor to the way that the solution for constituencies and democracy in this country would work. I find that response disappointing. I accept that not every area in that list may be correct, and that it is perhaps therefore not right to vote on the amendment this evening, but I strongly believe that community matters. Although what the noble Baroness, Lady O'Cathain, said, was absolutely right—this is a national forum—we sometimes forget in this House a thing called casework, which comes to Members of the other place. That is hugely community-based.

I have to make one last admission. When I was an MEP, I was MEP for the Isles of Scilly, for Cornwall and for West Plymouth, and the constituency covered the River Tamar. It was not a good solution and did not necessarily work well for the city of Plymouth—although I felt that I did a fantastic job. The difference between those communities was huge, and the practical outcome was that that was not the right solution. I hope that the Government—whom I support in every other way—will reconsider this important area for the future. We live to fight another day for Cornwall in another argument. That is important.

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[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

My Lords, we have had a tour around Britain right around the House since supper. Every place we have stopped at has been absolutely fantastic on the basis of the speeches that have been made, but Cornwall should be very proud of my noble friend Lord Myners, the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, the noble Lord, Lord Taylor, who is not in his place for reasons I cannot understand, and the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, who is also not in his place. They make not just a strong case for Cornwall, but a case that obviously catches the mood of the House.

There is an issue about precisely how the problem is to be dealt with. The first amendment that we are either debating or not debating at the moment states:

“Parliamentary constituencies shall not cross the county border of Cornwall”.

That amendment was not moved by my noble friend Lord Kennedy. My noble friend Lord Berkeley did not move his amendment, but it states that:

“No constituency shall include parts of both the counties of Devon and Cornwall”.

My noble friend Lord Myners has moved his amendment which states:

“There shall remain the current number of constituencies in Cornwall, and these constituencies shall be entirely within the county of Cornwall”.

The amendment that has least favour technically is the amendment moved by my noble friend Lord Myners. The one that plainly has universal support is the amendment that states that no constituency should cross the boundary between Cornwall and Devon.

It is interesting that the noble Lord, Lord Taylor of Goss Moor, who made an effective and forceful speech, made the point that was made in our earlier tour of Britain, which I know the noble Lord is sorry he missed. It is that communities are what matter in relation to this. There are two ways to give effect to “Thou shalt not cross the boundary between Devon and Cornwall”: either by a 10 per cent margin, which studies suggest would mean that the Devon/Cornwall boundary would not be crossed, or by making Cornwall an exception to the rule about county boundaries. I sense that the House wants to do something about Cornwall, and we need to consider between now and Report what is the best way to deal with that problem.

I specifically pay tribute to the contribution made by my noble friend Lord McAvoy in these debates. He has spoken with just as much elegance and eloquence as everybody else in relation to his community. He has made a substantial contribution to this debate and will make very substantial contributions to debates to come.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I am conscious that some hours ago I replied to a debate in which the issue was not crossing the rivers Tyne, Thames and Mersey, but I rather suspect that the Tamar is slightly wider in symbolic terms than those rivers. When I entered another place in 1983, my knowledge of things Cornish was not extensive. An acquaintanceship, I like to think also a friendship, with the late David Penhaligon soon put an end to that. He made very clear what the essence of being a Cornishman was. On numerous subsequent occasions I was able to visit Cornwall and I certainly recognise the passion with which noble Lords have expressed their affinity with Cornwall and the arguments they have presented today.

It is obvious—the case has been made for some time—that this part of the Bill seeks to address the significant differences in size between many parliamentary constituencies. Those differences make the effect of votes in some parts of the country more effective than others depending on where people live. We seek to address that with a parity rule which requires constituencies to be within 5 per cent of the United Kingdom electoral quota. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, said that the matter under discussion on the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Myners, could be addressed by a 10 per cent flexibility. While that would be a better bet, there is no guarantee that it would not result in one constituency crossing the Tamar.

The issue of what the exceptions should be has been well debated, both in previous sessions of the Committee and today, and the Government have made it clear that extreme geographical circumstances can make it necessary to do so, specifically with regard to Orkney and Shetland and the Western Isles—remote islands and communities which are not readily accessible for inclusion with a mainland constituency—and the House voted last week on the Isle of Wight. Aside from these specific exceptions, the Government do not feel that other features should detract from the fundamental principle of equality between constituencies and votes.

As I have indicated, I am well aware of the depth of feeling on the subject of the Cornish boundary. I have received numerous e-mails and letters on the subject and representations from my honourable friends, Andrew George, Stephen Gilbert and Dan Rogerson. I am under no illusions as to the strength of feeling and I recognise that Cornwall has a proud and unique history.

It was significant that my noble friends Lord Tyler and Lord Taylor of Goss Moor said that they may be prepared to accept underrepresentation, but the two amendments which might have provided for that were not moved. We have before the House today an amendment which does the opposite and would lead to overrepresentation. That would be a much more difficult position from which to make exceptions and it does not carry the same kind of moral force as the point argued by my noble friends.

The Government do not agree that an MP would not be capable of representing people effectively in both Cornwall and Devon at the same time. It was not fair to say, as was said in an earlier debate, that my noble friend Lord Strathclyde had been dismissive of Cornwall’s opinion because he made the factual statement that some people living in Cornwall work in Plymouth. That point was acknowledged by the noble Lord, Lord Myners, when he moved the amendment. It is of course the case—although it may not be instinctively what people think—that there is some community of interest between people living in one county and working in the other. I do not believe that a Member of Parliament could not represent a constituency effectively, wherever his constituents lived within Devon or Cornwall.

Several constituencies have widely varying cultural factors. I recognise the strength of the arguments but, given the parity that the Government seek and that exceptions should be limited to where there are extreme geographical considerations, it is not possible to accept the amendment. I therefore invite the noble Lord, Lord Myners, to withdraw it.

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Moved by

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

89A: Clause 11, page 11, leave out lines 12 to 26 and insert—
“Allocation of constituencies
(1) The adjusted UK electoral quota shall then be calculated as the total electorate of the United Kingdom less the areas listed in rule 4(1) divided by 650 minus the total number of seats allocated to the areas listed in rule 4(1).(2) Each part of the United Kingdom shall then be allocated a whole number of seats as follows.(3) The first seat shall be allocated to the part of the United Kingdom with the largest electorate.(4) The second and subsequent constituencies shall be allocated in the same way, except that the electorate of a part of the United Kingdom to which one or more constituencies have already been allocated is to be divided by—2C+1where C is the number of constituencies already allocated to that part.(5) An electoral quota shall then be calculated for each of the four parts of the United Kingdom by dividing the electorate of each part of the United Kingdom by the number of seats allocated as described in rules 5(3) and 5(4).(6) The total number of seats to be allocated to any part of the United Kingdom shall not be more than 10% above or below the current number of constituencies, and if the number of seats allocated by the process described in rules 5(3) and 5(4) exceeds that limit, then additional or fewer seats shall be allocated as appropriate sufficient to bring the allocation within 10% of the current number of seats in the part of the United Kingdom concerned.(7) This adjusted number of seats shall be the allocation for that part of the United Kingdom for the purposes of rule 5(5).”

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

My Lords, disappointingly for Members of the House, this is not part of our tour of Great Britain. This is about the maths of the proposals made in the Bill. The practical purpose of this particular amendment is to create an adjusted electoral quota for each of the four parts of the United Kingdom, having first discounted the whole constituencies that we suggest should be allocated to certain parts of the country including Cornwall and the Isle of Wight. It also prevents any part of the UK having an increase or decrease in representation of more than 10 per cent of its seats at any one boundary review.

As noble Lords who have studied this amendment will appreciate, and I imagine that there are many of you who have, it is a rather technical revision which is easier to understand and easier to explain in the context of the other amendments we have tabled to Clause 11 of the Bill. This is because these amendments, when added together, would comprise an alternative set of rules for drawing parliamentary constituency boundaries. However, because we have tried to follow the chronology of the Bill when tabling our amendments, we have been forced to split our alternative scheme into individual elements. To use a motoring analogy: if our full set of amendments adds up to a car, Amendment 89A on its own only represents the spark plugs. However, because it would be difficult to describe a car if one was only allowed to refer to the spark plugs, I hope the House will allow me to explain the reasoning behind this specific amendment with reference to the others that we have tabled to the same clause.

Our amendments to Clause 11 would, if taken together, establish a new basis for drawing boundaries that would anchor the House of Commons at around 650 seats. They would create more equal-sized seats—reducing the disparities between electorates that the Government are anxious to tackle—while providing the Boundary Commissions with adequate room for manoeuvre to take account of wider factors including geography, community and history. Our rules would also ensure that in a limited number of cases, certain parts of the UK would be guaranteed an allocation of whole constituencies, to preserve the particular geographic or historic integrity that marks them out.

As your Lordships are no doubt tired of hearing, the proposed new rules for drawing constituencies put forward in the Bill are, we say, overly rigid and inflexible. They start from the premise that the Commons should be fixed forever at 600 seats. Two Scottish island constituencies are then discounted and a United Kingdom-wide electoral quota is calculated by dividing the rest of the UK electorate by 598. The Bill then employs the Sainte-Lague method for allocating seats to the four parts of the UK. Once those calculations are made, the Boundary Commissions are tasked with constructing the electoral map according to a strict electoral parity rule. Every seat must fit within 5 per cent either side of an estimated electoral quota of approximately 75,800.

In separate amendments, we have sought to inject greater flexibility into that parity rule, so that proper consideration can be given to concerns about geography, community ties and so forth. We have also tabled amendments to replace the Government’s rule for a 600-seat House of Commons with a “fixed divisor” that would anchor the House at around 650 seats but allow a small margin of leeway which would be of practical use to Boundary Commissions. Amendment 89A, the central focus of this debate, follows on from those amendments.

Under our scheme, an initial UK electoral quota would be calculated by dividing the total electorate of the UK by 650. That quota would then be used to calculate the number of whole constituencies that would be allocated to the areas listed in our Amendment 79A —which in our scheme would be the rule 4(1) referenced in Amendment 89A. Once that had been done, an adjusted UK electoral quota would be produced by the method outlined in Amendment 89A, which would become rule 5 in our scheme, reading:

“The total electorate of the United Kingdom less the areas listed in rule 4(1)”—

that is our Amendment 79A—

“divided by 650 minus the total number of seats allocated to the areas listed in rule 4(1)”.

So I imagine that that is very clear.

Once that calculation had been made, we would employ the Sainte-Lague method to work out the allocation of seats for the four parts of the United Kingdom. It would then be down to the Boundary Commissions to draw the constituency maps within those areas, guided by an electoral parity rule which states that constituencies would contain broadly the same number of electors. In our scheme, the level of tolerance in respect of the electoral quota would be 5 per cent in most cases but with a maximum level of disparity of 10 per cent where Boundary Commissions deemed it necessary to take account of significant other factors.

The Bill states that the electoral quota, which forms the basis of the parity law, should be universal across the UK. In other words, there should be a single UK electoral quota. However, our scheme would allow—once the initial calculations about whole constituencies had been made and discounted, and the Sainte-Lague formula used to allocate numbers of seats to England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland—for a slight variation in the electoral quota between the four parts of the UK. That would be done by dividing the electorate of each part of the United Kingdom by the number of seats allocated to each part through the Sainte-Lague method. This would be only a very slight variation and would not cause any significant distortion. It would simply be a practical measure to give boundary commissions a little flexibility to cope with any awkward roundings up or down they might otherwise encounter when trying to impose a uniform UK electoral quota everywhere.

That could be a genuine problem in Northern Ireland and Wales which, given their smaller size, may struggle to construct an electoral map on which every seat is able to meet the narrow tolerances that the Bill sets around the proposed uniform electoral quota. Indeed the Bill already recognises this potential problem in the case of Northern Ireland, which is why rule 7 enables the Boundary Commission in that part of the UK to disapply the electoral parity rule when it feels that is necessary. We believe that our overall scheme provides a more sensible way of tackling these problems. As I made clear at the beginning, it would deliver more equal-sized seats but would inject more common sense and practicality into the process.

Finally, Amendment 89A would ensure that the total number of seats to be allocated to any country shall not be more than 10 per cent above or below the current number of constituencies, and if the number of seats allocated by the process I have outlined exceeds that limit, additional or fewer seats would need to be allocated as appropriate to bring the allocation into line with this rule. That is particularly pertinent in the case of Wales, which under the Bill would see a reduction of 25 per cent in its parliamentary representation, from 40 to 30 seats. That is too great a reduction in one review. I remind noble Lords of the speech of my noble friend Lord Touhig about what the effect of such a sharp reduction might be on the union. It would cause massive disruption to long-established patterns of representation, producing one seat that would be almost half the landmass of Wales, and others that would divide valleys irrespective of community ties and problems of accessibility.

Perhaps even more significantly, that sudden reduction, which would cut the number of Welsh parliamentary seats below the current legal minimum of 35, could alter the way in which the UK Parliament is viewed in Wales. I think the Government need to think quite carefully about introducing major political and administrative changes that could undermine the union. The Conservative Party historically adopted a sensitive approach to issues concerning the union, but in this Bill that is less evident than previously. That is an important point.

Overall, this is a quite technical amendment which, as I explained at the beginning, cannot be viewed in isolation. However, when seen in the round I hope that it illustrates that there is an alternative to the scheme set out in the Bill which would nonetheless deliver more equal seats, which is the Government's central objective. I hope that it is symbolic of the fact that we have thought very carefully and deeply about this matter and have endeavoured to propose a scheme that would improve the Bill. Our alternative goes with the grain of the Bill’s main aim, which is to create more equal seats, but it does so more practically and sensitively than the plan which the Government have put forward. I ask the noble and learned Lord, a man of great practicality and sensitivity, to explain why his scheme is better than ours. I beg to move.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I am tempted to say that perhaps the prime reason why the Government’s scheme is better is one of simplicity. With the two exceptions given in the Bill, we would divide the United Kingdom electorate by 598 to give us the electoral quota with a 5 per cent variation either way. However, I recognise that considerable work has gone into producing the noble and learned Lord’s alternative method of allocating constituencies to the nations of the United Kingdom.

Perhaps one of the most fundamental differences, and it is at the heart of the amendment, is that, whereas the Government’s proposal is for a Parliament of 600 Members in the House of Commons, the alternative scheme would seek to retain the present size of the House of Commons, since 650 would be used as a baseline for future reviews. I do not intend to open up all the arguments that we had at some hours of the morning last week on 650 versus 600.

The Government’s clear view is that there is a case for making a reduction in size. We have articulated it and had debates about it. Our proposal is simply to end the upward pressure on the number of Members of Parliament, which has seen an increase in every successive boundary review since 1950, with the exception of that which came immediately after Scottish devolution. However, in making that proposal, we have been mindful to reflect an existing range of experience. Six hundred gives a quota of around 76,000, which, if my memory serves me correctly from earlier debates, is within the 5 per cent-either-way range of a third of the constituencies in the other place. It also seeks to ensure that the reduction in number of seats is not wholly disruptive.

The amendment would limit any change in the number of seats in each nation to 10 per cent of the existing number. If the intention is therefore to allow a phased reduction—I think that that was the point which the noble and learned Lord was making, not least in respect of Wales—I ask the Committee to bear in mind that the secretary to the Boundary Commission for Scotland made it clear in evidence to the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee that there would be no advantage in doing that. He said that it would be better instead to reduce the number of seats in one go so that disruption was reduced in the longer run, rather than have successive disruptive boundary reviews. The Government agree with that.

Has the noble and learned Lord done any modelling on the 650-seat base, given the absence of a size limit on the House in his amendment and given that the Sainte-Lague formula could continue allocating seats? His amendment says 10 per cent more or 10 per cent less, so it could work in a way that the number of seats reached the absolute limit of 10 per cent above each nation’s current allocation and we could end up with a House of 715, which would be 10 per cent more than 650. I fully understand what the noble and learned Lord said about a phasing-down, but his amendment would allow also for the total to go up by 10 per cent. I suspect that that is not the intention of his amendment, but is he able to reassure us that that would not be the effect? I think that there is enough doubt and complexity in the amendment for me to invite him to withdraw it.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

Naturally I am disappointed by the response to my scheme. I am not sure what the answer is to the question of whether it can go up to 715, but that is only because of my mathematical inadequacy, not because the scheme is necessarily flawed in any way. However, I will consult my advisers closely on whether that very unlikely possibility could occur.

If I may, I will deal with the bit that is easier to deal with: phasing. With no disrespect to the boundary commissioners, it is perhaps not surprising that the people tasked with drawing the boundaries would say that it is much easier to get there in one go than in a series of phased goes. You would not expect the boundary commissioners to judge, or attempt to judge, the effect on the constitutional glue that holds our country together, because their job in effect is to apply particular rules that are obviously easier to apply if there is no phasing. Without in any way disrespecting the view that they express about the technical process, it is surely for Parliament to judge the effect of reducing the representation of one part of the United Kingdom by 25 per cent over a period of four years on the national glue that holds the country together.

Ultimately, I suspect that it is our view, not just the view that will prevail, which is constitutionally the position, that it is better to listen to than the Boundary Commission’s. I hear what the noble and learned Lord says about my maths, which may well be well judged. However, on the other more significant constitutional issue, I am not persuaded by a quote from the secretary of the Boundary Commission that that is the most authoritative voice on whether phasing is sensible. We will certainly come back to that second part on Report. Meanwhile, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 89A withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, Amendment 89BZA deals with the unlikely, but nevertheless mathematically possible, scenario in which the Sainte-Lague formula results in a tie in entitlement between two or more nations as to the final seat. In the Bill as drafted, there is no way of resolving such a tie, so it would be unclear as to which of the four nations of the United Kingdom would have the final seat. The amendment proposes, in these circumstances, that the final seat be allocated to the nation with the smaller or smallest electorate. Although both nations would have equal mathematical entitlement to the seat, I hope noble Lords will agree that, in these perhaps highly unlikely circumstances—nevertheless, we have to take account of all possibilities—it would be fairer for the nation with the smallest electorate to have it, given that the nation with the larger electorate will almost certainly have a larger number of constituencies across which the extra electors could be spread. On that basis, I beg to move.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

I have just three questions. First, why will it apply only in the final seat? Why would it not be possible for there to be a tie on the way there? Secondly, when it says,

“smaller or smallest actual electorate”,

what is the difference between “smaller” or “smallest” actual electorate? Thirdly, does “smaller or smallest actual electorate” refer to the total electorate in that part of the United Kingdom, or to the electorate that is left? I am more than happy to repeat my questions if any of them are not clear. However, they are not alternative; they all have to be answered.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I hope I can answer them. My understanding of the amendment is that the tie would happen at the end with the last seat.

The noble and learned Lord asks me why it is the, “smaller or smallest … electorate”. It is a grammatical issue. My understanding is that it would be the actual electorate for Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland, and not the balance. I think that that must be right—and I think it is because of the possibility of a tie. For the sake of argument, if it was between Scotland and Northern Ireland, Northern Ireland would have a smaller electorate than Scotland. If it was between Scotland and Wales, Wales would have the smaller electorate.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

That is very helpful. So you could have a situation in which England, Scotland and Northern Ireland all tie for smallest electorate. and you would give the last and therefore additional seat to Northern Ireland because it has the smallest of the populations or registered electorates of those three countries. What is the logic of giving it to the smallest?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

The logic of giving it to the smallest is that there is a sense of fairness in that. Also, the larger country has more seats over which to spread the extra number of voters that would result from that; it would be much more difficult to spread them over the country with the smaller electorate.