Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Lord Falconer of Thoroton Excerpts

Monday 10th January 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Gilbert]

Oh yes it was. The centre of Dudley was a part of Worcestershire that was wholly surrounded by Staffordshire. I represented a constituency called Dudley, but which was actually and simultaneously Dudley and Stourbridge. The country got by quite well with that, except rather inconveniently at electioneering time when my wife and I swapped ends. In the mornings, I was in Dudley while she was in Stourbridge, and vice versa in the afternoons and evenings. However, the principle was exactly the same as that adumbrated by my noble friend. Surely to god this country is big enough to accept a few minor anomalies and have something like the Isle of Wight with a much bigger electorate, if it wants that. The idea that we should try to produce equivalence in numbers of constituents—with all the consequences that it produces—is quite absurd.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

My Lords, this is a very important amendment and is the inevitable consequence of doing what the constitutional committees in both Houses of this Parliament have complained about.

The chairman of the Political and Constitutional Reform Select Committee in the Commons issued a report on 2 August which stated:

“Your legislative timetable has put me and my committee in an extremely difficult position. When the House agreed to establish the committee, it did so, in the words of the Deputy Leader of the House, ‘to ensure that the House is able to scrutinise the work of the Deputy Prime Minister’. In the case of these two bills”—

one of them is this Bill—

“you have denied us any adequate opportunity to”,

scrutinise. Our own Constitution Committee said:

“In general we regard it as a matter of principle that proposals for major constitutional reform should be subject to prior public consultation and pre-legislative scrutiny. We recognise that there may exceptionally be good reasons for departing from this principle, but the perils of doing so are well illustrated in the present Bill. The case for proceeding rapidly with one Part of this Bill is far stronger than for the other”.

It is possible that the effect of Part 1 of the Bill as drafted will have no effect on our constitution. There is no doubt that if Part 2 in its current form goes through, it will have a substantial effect on our constitution. I very strongly empathise with the very powerful speech by my noble friend Lord Boateng. What would we say to a country that said, “We are going to reduce the number of Members of Parliament in our country by 50 by using our majority to do so”? We would say, “It may well be sensible to reduce or increase the number of Members of Parliament in your country, but presumably there is some sort of independent process by which the number is to be assessed”.

The number of Members of Parliament in this country has fluctuated over a period of 60 or 70 years. That fluctuation has always been as a result of recommendations of the Boundary Commission. It is a very dangerous precedent for a majority in the House of Commons, and then a practical political majority in this House, to push forward a change in the number of Members of the House of Commons.

Even if there was not some independent justification for the reduction from 650 to 600, is there some intellectual justification for the reduction from 650 to 600? How many of your Lordships were present when the Leader of this House, the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, gave as the justification that it was a nice, round number? There is no intellectual justification and no independent justification of any sort whatsoever. The noble Lord, Lord Maclennan, whom I respect for the work he did in pioneering the way for constitutional change, says sometimes you just have to bite the bullet and go for it; it is leadership that matters. We have never done that in this country since 1944 in relation to how our democracy is based.

In 1944 a Speaker’s Conference set up the current method for determining constituencies and the number of Members of Parliament. That was given effect in an Act of 1949. There was a further Act in 1954 which gave effect to a consensus that there should not be too radical changes in the number of Members of Parliament. There were further changes in 1986 by a Government led by Mrs Thatcher—the noble Baroness, Lady Thatcher—which we, the Labour Party, broadly supported. Further changes were introduced in 1992 by a Government led by Mr John Major, which we broadly supported. There was one occasion in which jiggery-pokery was attempted by a Government and that was in 1969 by a Government led by Harold Wilson and the Labour Party. What happened was that this House rejected the Bill that sought to tamper with a boundary revision.

So do not tell us that Parliament has not proceeded by way of consensus; Parliament has behaved exceptionally well. I think that it is a disgrace that there is absolute silence from the other side, as without independent justification and without intellectual justification a Leader of this House treats this House and the parliamentary system with contempt by saying it is a nice, round number. I see Back-Benchers nodding that it is a perfectly respectable argument, but it is not; it is a disgraceful argument.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Mawhinney]

Just for the record, I made no such implication as the noble and learned Lord has attributed to me. The point that I was seeking to make was that, whether the number of constituents is 65,000 or 90,000, it is perfectly possible for a Member of Parliament to handle that level of workload.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

I apologise. I misunderstood what the noble Lord said. Obviously, further work would need to be done. I am happy to say that when I said further work was required, the noble Lord nodded—that is the point that I am making. First, what is the workload on a Member of Parliament and what is the right size for Parliament in relation to that consideration?

Secondly, what should be the basis of determining the constituencies? Of course, I think that it should be the electoral register, though there is an issue about population. There is a respectable view that says, where you have constituencies which have very significant populations which are much higher than the electoral register, those constituencies should, in some way, reflect that increase in the size of the population. For example, just as we have a geographical limit because we think it is too far for an MP to travel all around the constituency, is there a population limit above the electoral register which should have some effect on the size of constituencies?

Thirdly, the purpose of the deviation figure of 5 per cent from the electoral quota is to ensure that constituencies are broadly the same size. That would lead to a difference in the size of constituencies of about 7,000 if 76,000 is the average size of a constituency. The purpose is to get rid of what is described as the malproportion factor. Published work, in particular by Thrasher and Rallings, and by Lewis Baston, suggests that a deviation figure of 10 rather than 5 per cent would have the same effect in reducing the malproportion figure yet at the same time allow one, in determining constituencies, to keep communities together and not have the radical effect that the government proposals would have. What work have the Government done on whether 5 or 10 per cent would make a substantial difference to malproportion? Has any research been done on that? What effect on, for example, crossing county boundaries would a 10 per cent as opposed to a 5 per cent deviation have? The Government will not be able to answer all these questions; I am asking about the research that is being done on them.

Thirdly, what effect will this have on the Executive? Reducing the size of the House of Commons from 650 to 600 will increase the size of the Executive and reduce the number of Back-Benchers. Is it the intention of the Government to stick with that? If so, what effect will that have on Parliament as a place to hold the Executive to account?

Fourthly, what will be the effect of removing local boundary reviews that can be conducted in person? These reviews have had a 64 per cent effect on changing constituency boundaries. What work has been done to determine the effect on the reliability and acceptance of the boundaries that removal of the reviews will have?

If the Government will not answer those questions or have not done the work, the questions should be answered by somebody. This is not a great reform like the 1832 Act, as the Prime Minister said; it needs work doing on it. The effect of the amendment of my noble friend Lord Wills is that that work can be done. As my noble friend Lord Boateng said, our democracy is something that we rightly prize. The idea of rushing into this change, which has the support only of one side of the Houses of Parliament—let alone of either the country or the rest of the world—is wrong. It is not an acceptable justification to say that the Tory party agreed it with the Liberal Democrats between Friday and Tuesday after the latest general election. That looks like the worst sort of political gerrymandering. I ask the Government to reconsider and to give ground in relation to an independent look at the changes that they are making.

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Wallace of Tankerness)]

My Lords, first I thank the noble Lord, Lord Wills, for introducing a debate that has given rise to a considerable number of important contributions. I am not sure that I can address all of them, but I will do my best to pick up most of the salient points. It is clear that the debate on this amendment has touched on many issues that will inevitably come up as we go through the Bill. Future amendments have already been tabled that deal with some of them. I hope to explain the principles that underlie the proposals that we will debate further. I hope also to explain why the proposals are reasonable and why a committee of inquiry is unnecessary.

It is clear that the amendment would slow down the proposed reform of our political process and system. It is highly unlikely that the proposals in this amendment would be in place in time for the next election. There would be a three-year deadline to report, six months to draft measures giving effect to the recommendations, and then time to legislate. That would be only for the legislation that set new rules for conducting boundary reviews. The reviews themselves would then need to be carried out. Therefore, even if the rules were in place before the next election, the new boundaries could come into effect only at the election after that.

I do not want to suggest that the political purpose of this has been to kick the Government's proposals into touch, although my noble friend Lord Tyler referred to previous committees of inquiry that delayed and postponed for many years what were seen by many as desirable reforms, and there was a general groundswell of support for his point on this side of the House. I also want to knock on the head the idea that I have accused noble Lords opposite of filibustering. The only complaint I would make is about the time taken up by them complaining that I might accuse them of filibustering. I also take great exception to the suggestion that the proposal is partisan. I do not believe that the opposition case stacks up. The noble Baroness, Lady McDonagh, pointed out that the issue of the size of constituencies applied as much to Conservative constituencies as to Labour ones. One cannot on the one hand say that reform will have the same impact on Labour and Conservative constituencies and on the other say that what we are trying to do is partisan.

I will pick up a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Wills, about his freedom of information application. I apologise that the noble Lord has not yet received a reply to his request. I will seek to ensure that he receives one as soon as possible. However, my noble friend Lord McNally, who is sitting with me, has indicated that as far as we are aware no work has been done on any kind of partisan measurement of what a new size of 600 for the House of Commons would bring about. No modelling has been done on that basis. I also say at the outset that amid all the outrage that we have heard from the other side, one would think that it was a constitutional outrage to support the principle of one vote, one value. That is what is enshrined in this part of the Bill; one vote should have one value in all parts of the United Kingdom. I do not believe that to be a constitutional outrage, except in Orkney and Shetland and the Western Isles. I am happy to argue that, as the noble Lord's party did in the Scotland Act in the case of Orkney and Shetland.

My second point is that there would not only be a delay. If the 2015 election is to be fought in England on boundaries that took as their electoral registration base the year 2000—15 years previously—can anyone suggest that that is a constitutional principle that we should seek to uphold in this House? We wish to make progress with this so that we can have a boundary review that will deliver its report and be in effect by the 2015 election.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

The point that I was making about the exchange between the noble Lords, Lord Wills and Lord Foulkes, was that a point was made about the Senate having 100 members and the US House of Representatives having approximately 434. The noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, pointed out that there are also state legislatures in 50 states. We are not comparing like with like. I took the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Wills, that international comparisons take you only so far. The noble Lord, Lord Snape, made the point about the word “gerrymandering” coming from the United States and seemed to suggest, although I am sure he did not mean to, that the Boundary Commission would somehow be heavied by the Government of the day. In the United States, as the commentaries following the elections in November made clear, the new boundaries will be set by the state legislatures, not by an independent boundary commission. That is the fundamental difference. I hope that noble Lords will accept that.

To elaborate further, under our proposals, the 1 December 2009 register suggests that the electoral quota for the United Kingdom would be about 76,000. More than one-third of existing constituencies are already within 5 per cent either side of that illustrative quota, so the impact of our proposals will see constituencies of a size well within existing norms. However, if the House were to have, for example, 500 Members, that would push the size of the average UK seat above 90,000, and only three existing seats would be within 5 per cent of that quota. For that size to become commonplace would perhaps be too great a departure from what Members and the public are accustomed to. We therefore thought that 600 would seem to strike the right balance without reducing by too much and having regard to the fact that one-third of existing seats would be within 5 per cent either way of the existing norm. In addition, a slightly smaller House will mean that savings can be made without, in the Government's view, losing the capacity of individual Members or the Chamber as a whole to perform their functions.

Other points have been raised: for example, the fact that that should be linked to reform of your Lordships' House. I have no doubt that there will be ample opportunity to work out the implications for the reform of your Lordships' House when the draft Bill is brought forward. An important point was made first by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, and picked up by several other noble Lords, including the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton. That is the relationship between the Executive and the elected House, the other place, if the number of MPs is reduced but not the number of Ministers.

The Government indicated in the other place that we agree that that is indeed an issue to be considered, but we do not believe that it is one that needs to be resolved in the context of the Bill. Reduction in the size of the House will not take effect until 2015, and we should therefore consider that issue in the light of decisions on, among other things, the size and composition of a reformed second Chamber. Historically, there has not been a consistent relationship between the size of the House and the number of Ministers within it. The number of Ministers in the Commons will be determined by what is needed to carry out the Government’s parliamentary business, and will not be affected by the change in the size of the Chamber. It is not clear that legislation is the answer. If the issue is the size of the Government’s payroll vote, there are ways to address that without legislation—for example, a reduction in the number of PPSs.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

That was an absolutely riveting piece of information that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, dropped into the conversation—which is that, as I understand it, the size of this House will determine whether the Government are to reduce the number of Ministers. Have I misunderstood what the noble and learned Lord said? If I have, can he please explain it? Is it better if this House is bigger or smaller for the size of the Executive?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I indicated that an important factor would be the size of the reformed House, because if the overall number of Ministers is to be retained, it may be considered preferable to draw them from the elected House, with tested accountability mechanisms, rather than increasing the ministerial numbers elsewhere, including in this House.

The noble and learned Lord raised that issue, although the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, raised it first. It is an important issue. It is an issue which the Government have indicated needs to be addressed, but not in the Bill. There are other implications. For example, if Ministers were not to be in the other place, would they automatically be in this place? Would they have voting rights in this place? There are a whole host of issues which are perhaps more relevant to the debate about the constitution of the second Chamber in the context of a reduced House of Commons than to be dealt with in this debate.