(12 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, we have had an important debate. As the noble Lord, Lord Alton, said, it is no surprise that the amendment was moved by my noble friend Lord Avebury, whose record over the best part of half a century in standing up for the rights of Gypsies and Travelling people is well recorded. As I understand it, he continues to be the secretary of the All-Party Parliamentary Group for Gypsy Roma Travellers. I understand that the noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker, is vice-chairman of that group. We have heard important views on wider issues, not exclusively on legal aid. The noble Earl, Lord Listowel, raised the important educational issues relating to Gypsies and Travelling people.
I will focus on the amendments and the impact on legal aid. Amendments 73, 74, 75 and 76 go together as a package. They would ensure that legal aid remains available in relation to possession and eviction matters for persons who are clearly trespassers on the property or land where they reside. As has been pointed out, the Bill currently excludes such persons from receiving legal aid under paragraph 28.
While we are generally retaining legal aid where a person is at immediate risk of losing their home, the Government do not consider it appropriate for the taxpayer to provide funding for individuals to try to resist removal where they unarguably entered and have remained on the property or site as a trespasser. On a point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, paragraph 28 states:
“if there are no grounds on which it can be argued … that the individual is occupying the vehicle or structure otherwise than as a trespasser, and … that the individual’s occupation of the vehicle or structure began otherwise than as a trespasser”.
I hope the noble Lord will be reassured that Gypsies and Travellers will have access to legal aid under paragraph 28 in relation to loss of home if there are any grounds to argue that they are not trespassers. That is certainly the intention. It is quite clear that that is what will be delivered.
I emphasise again that legal aid will remain available for eviction and possession cases where there are any grounds to argue that the client has not entered and remained as a trespasser. On the other point, we are also retaining legal aid for most judicial review cases as set in out the Bill, and also—as the noble Lord asked—with regard to breach of convention rights by public authorities. I can confirm that Gypsies and Travellers will continue to have access to legal aid in terms of that particular paragraph of the schedule, along with others.
My noble friend also referred in his amendment to the Mobile Homes Act cases. Amendment 77 seeks to bring into scope legally aided advice for all matters arising from the Mobile Homes Act 1983. That Act gives rights to residents who have agreements with site owners to live in their own mobile homes on site. As I have explained, we have generally retained legal aid where the individual is at immediate risk of homelessness. This includes possession and eviction from a mobile home site. However, the consequence of the amendment would be to extend legal aid to cover all matters under the Mobile Homes Act 1983. It would make legal aid available for what we regard as lower priority matters where legal aid is not in our view justified, for example disputes about the sale or inheritance of mobile homes.
The point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker, was on the more important issue of harassment. I hope I can reassure her that legal aid is available for harassment injunctions under Sections 3 or 3A of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 and, by extension, under paragraph 32 of Part 1 of the schedule.
I am grateful to the Minister for that point, but perhaps I may refer back to his remarks about judicial review, in response to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. I am still not exactly clear what happens when it is not quite an eviction but a matter that would lead to an eviction. For instance, would judicial review be available to defend a county court possession action or a failure by a local authority to follow or have regard to relevant government guidance? It is those cases that lead to eviction but are not exactly eviction actions—and indeed the Gypsy is a trespasser on the prima facie case but, after judicial review, might be found not to be a trespasser.
My Lords, I will double-check on that. I would in no way wish to mislead, but on judicial review paragraph 17 indicates that,
“civil legal services are to be provided in respect of an enactment, decision, act or omission”.
It is certainly my understanding that that is the case, but I shall conclude my speech and double-check that. That paragraph of Schedule 1 will apply and entitle Gypsies and Travellers in the same way as it entitles others. I am as certain as I can be that that is the case, but the noble Baroness gave some very specific examples. Perhaps the best thing for me to do would be to set out in writing to her, and circulate it to those who have taken part in our debate, precisely the position in regard to the very specific cases that she raised in her intervention. I hope that she will accept that. There is certainly a general power or provision to bring within scope judicial review cases, and I believe that that addresses the point, but I want to be absolutely certain with regard to the specific issues that she raised. Obviously, other Members of the Committee who have contributed to the debate will be copied into that letter.
Amendment 79 relates to this and brings in issues of planning. I hope that I can reassure the Committee, and my noble friend in particular, that it is unnecessary. Planning matters that concern eviction from home will remain in scope under paragraph 28 of Part 1 of Schedule 1. Accordingly, legal aid will, for example, remain available to defend an application for an injunction to evict a person from a site under Section 187B of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 or for a planning appeal under Sections 288 and 289 that might result in the individual being legally required to leave their home, including the land where the home is located.
The noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, and my noble friend in moving his amendment raised the Dale Farm-type situations. To look at the legal issue that arises in relation to the amendment, we are retaining legal aid for eviction cases, including eviction from a mobile home or a caravan site. Legal aid will remain available for eviction from an unauthorised development, subject to the means and merits tests, as apply in other cases. It is important to distinguish those cases from situations where people have set up unauthorised encampments. So there is a difference between an unauthorised development and an unauthorised encampment on a site that they neither own nor have permission to enter. In these circumstances, they would be outwith the scope, as I have indicated; but if the issue is one of an unauthorised development on property that they own and have a legitimate right to be there, legal aid would be available.
Amendments 87 and 88 refer to “trespass to land” in Part 2 of Schedule 1. Amendment 88 concerns cases where the client is trespassing on land, including land surrounding a building, but is not trespassing in the building itself. I recall in a debate that we had last week under an amendment moved by my noble friend Lord Carlile of Berriew that we sought to reiterate that the reference in this part of Schedule 1, specifically to “trespass to land”, is not intended to generally exclude matters falling within Part 1 of Schedule 1 that involve trespass to land but to generally prevent funding for the tort of trespass to land. I indicated during last week’s Committee debate that we are giving active consideration to the exclusions in Part 2 of Schedule 1 generally to ensure that the drafting fully delivers on that particular intention. Clearly, we will look at the particular issue raised in regard to the specifics of trespass to land in this context when looking at whether the Bill as drafted delivers what is intended.
Part 2 of Schedule 1 generally excludes funding for tort claims, because they are primarily concerned with money and alternative funding arrangements can be made available through conditional fee agreements. However, tort claims for trespass to land are not excluded under the Bill where they concern allegations of the abuse of position or power or a significant breach of human rights by a public authority.
The debate has ranged more widely, and I am sure that if the House has not debated the wider issues in recent times, they merit a debate sooner rather than later. The Government understand the issues here and consulted on their new draft planning policy for Traveller sites over last summer. The Department for Communities and Local Government is considering all the consultation responses and intends to publish the new policy as soon as possible. Let me just put on the record that the Government are taking measures to ensure fair and effective provision of authorised sites for Travellers more generally, which seemed to be one of the issues being raised, including providing £60 million in England over the current spending period to help local authorities and other registered providers to build new Traveller sites in consultation with local communities. Councils will also be given incentives to deliver new housing, including Traveller sites, through the new homes bonus scheme.
For the reasons given, and with some of the reassurances that I have given on the scope being not quite as narrow as has perhaps been thought, I hope that my noble friend will agree to withdraw his amendment. As I have indicated, I will certainly respond—
Before the noble and learned Lord completes his remarks, I asked him a couple of specific questions. I realise that he may not have the answers to them now, but they would help us to keep this issue in context, especially when we get to Report. He has just given some information about the amount of money that the Government are going to spend, and that is welcome. However, could he in due course tell us more about the numbers of unauthorised sites and how many such cases using legal aid there have been—perhaps over the past decade, and certainly in the course of the past year—and what that has cost the public purse?
I apologise to the noble Lord for omitting to address that. When writing I cannot be certain either that the information is available in the form that he wishes or how easy it might be to extract what the specific nature of some of those cases was, but to the extent that we are able to provide the relevant information I will certainly do so at the same time as I respond to the noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker.
My Lords, first, I must express deep gratitude to all those noble Lords who spoke in favour of this amendment: the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, the noble Lords, Lord Howarth and Lord Alton, the noble Baroness, Lady Turner, the noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan, the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and, finally, the noble Lord, Lord Bach. There was not a single contrary voice in the whole debate and your Lordships have demonstrated the concern which arises from these amendments and from the situation of Gypsies and Travellers in general.
In answer to the noble Lord, Lord Alton, there are in fact 2,000 caravans on unauthorised sites, which are therefore legally homeless at the moment. As the noble Lord, Lord Bach, said, the problem is that they have no option but to trespass. The answer that my noble and learned friend the Minister gave to the first of these amendments, the ones which deal with legal aid for persons liable to eviction, was not satisfactory because that was the whole point of the amendments. It is all very well to say that they will have access to legal aid under paragraph 28 if they are not trespassers, but all of those 2,000 caravans, except those which are on sites owned by the Gypsies and Travellers themselves, are in fact trespassers and have no option.
When people are thrown off a site such as Dale Farm—there is another one at the moment in Meriden, where the local authority is similarly kicking people off a site that they own and have developed themselves—they will have no alternative but to camp on the roadside or to try to sandwich themselves into an authorised site where there happens to be a little space left on one of the pitches, only to find that the local authority there takes steps to secure their removal immediately.
(12 years, 10 months ago)
Lords Chamber
That it be an instruction to the Committee of the Whole House to which the Scotland Bill has been committed that they consider the Bill in the following order:
Clauses 1 to 9, Clauses 11 to 44, Clause 10, Schedules 1 to 5.
My Lords, the usual channels have agreed that it would be desirable for the Committee-stage debate on the question of a referendum on independence to take place after the Government’s consultation has closed on 9 March. This Motion enables our debates on Clause 10 of the Bill to be taken last, and I suggest that any amendments relating to a referendum are best placed “before Clause 10”. I respectfully encourage noble Lords to table referendum-related amendments as “before Clause 10” rather than to other parts of the Bill. If the House agrees to this Motion, I understand that the Chief Whip will ensure that the last day in Committee is scheduled for the week of 12 March.
My Lords, the Minister will recall that on 10 January I raised this with him when he made the statement and asked that the whole Committee stage be held over until after the consultation. My intention was to ensure that there should be no discussion on the referendum and all aspects of it while the consultation was under way. I therefore thank the Minister very much indeed for finding a solution that enables that to be put into effect.
I refer to the letter from the Scottish judges asking for additional clauses to be put into the Scotland Bill. Where does that fit into the Minister’s programme? How do we handle that?
My Lords, first, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, for welcoming this. We recognised the issue and found a way to resolve it. On the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Neill, I certainly recognise the importance of the letter sent by the Lord President of the Court of Session. It is likely, although one can never be sure, that the clause to which that relates in Part 2 of the Bill will be debated on Thursday 2 February. I hope that copies of the letter will be available in the Printed Paper Office for our consideration. There are both government amendments and amendments in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey, which I am sure will allow us to have a very full and informed debate on that issue.
(12 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, indicated when speaking to her amendments that they were the last two that she had in this section. None the less, in dealing with vulnerable people, their importance was obvious by the end of the debate that they engendered. The more that I have learnt about human trafficking over the years, the more appalled and outraged I am by some of the abuses that go on. Various conventions have been acknowledged, such as the Council of Europe Action against the Trafficking of Human Beings, to which the previous Administration quite properly signed up.
Amendments 61A and 90A intend to bring into scope particular areas of legal aid for victims of human trafficking. Amendment 61A would give the victims of such trafficking legal aid for immigration matters as well as for damages in compensation claims in relation to the experiences of trafficking before the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority, the civil courts and the Employment Tribunal. Amendment 90A would allow for publicly funded advocacy for victims of human trafficking in cases that they bring before the Employment Appeal Tribunal.
On the immigration element of Amendment 61A, the first point to make is a general one that was reflected in one or two contributions. In many cases, victims of trafficking want to return home. In some cases, though, they wish to claim asylum, and, for that, legal aid will remain. It is important that that point is made clear. There may be other occasions where they need to remain in the country, perhaps to help police with their investigations or on compassionate grounds if there are compelling reasons for that. There are provisions for victims to remain in these circumstances.
As the Committee will know, the Government provide funding of some £2 million per year to the Salvation Army to provide support to victims of trafficking so that they can rebuild their lives. This includes signposting and informing victims of their rights to stay in the country, whether in the short or long term. However, we believe that specialist legal advice in respect of immigration on top of that is not required. Nevertheless, the Salvation Amy and its subcontractors signpost and inform victims of their legal rights.
Government funding also helps to inform people about their options regarding compensation as a result of trafficking, whether through the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority, the civil courts or the Employment Tribunal. Compensation orders, too, can be made at the end of a criminal trial.
For the civil routes to compensation, which a number of contributions have revolved around, the Government made it clear in their response to the consultation on legal aid reform that the route for funding in these cases would be the exceptional funding scheme, and published guidance will reflect that. In fairness, the noble Lord, Lord Bach, acknowledged the Government’s position, although he did not agree with it, and it would be unfortunate if this debate gave the impression that all avenues of funding have been cut off or withdrawn.
The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, asked whether it would be possible to make claims against traffickers and whether those claims would be funded. The answer is yes—they are capable of being funded through exceptional funding. This is because the right to legal support for compensation claims, as set out in the convention, is with reference to the requirements of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights and is therefore very much in line with the exceptional funding test. It is important to recognise that there is a route for funding for people who find themselves in these circumstances.
Amendment 90A would allow for advocacy for victims of trafficking in employment appeal tribunals. The noble and learned Baroness raised the question of the consultation on visas for domestic workers, a point picked up by my noble friend Lord Avebury. My understanding is that a Home Office consultation has taken place; as far as I am aware, no response has yet been published, but I will certainly ask officials to ensure that the comments made on that important point are drawn to the attention of those at the Home Office who are dealing with the consultation.
With regard to the Employment Appeal Tribunal, it has been observed that some very large awards can be made. Again, however, such cases would in principle be funded through the exceptional funding scheme if required by not only the European Convention on Human Rights but European Union law. The exceptional funding scheme is available in these cases—it is not the case that support has been withdrawn. There are other means of support for those who have been trafficked. As I have said, the Salvation Army has made efforts to support and assist them. Therefore, I ask the noble and learned Baroness to withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, I speak in support of the amendments and thank my noble friend Lady Gould for speaking to this group in such a comprehensive manner. What we are discussing today is not whether we should have more or fewer immigrants; rather, the matter at hand is whether legitimate migrants are able to exert their rights.
Amendments 62 to 67 work together to extend the availability of legal aid for immigration matters. The Government have proposed that legal aid will be available to a person seeking indefinite leave to remain after suffering domestic abuse by their partner. Furthermore, their partner must be present and settled in the United Kingdom. My noble friend Lady Gould's amendments would extend that to someone who is seeking any form of leave to remain, and their partner would not necessarily need to be present and settled in the United Kingdom. So they only fractionally extend the coverage to ensure that all women who suffer domestic abuse and try to escape will be given the protection they need. A failure to accept the amendments would mean that some women might feel trapped in an abusive relationship, wanting to escape from it but knowing that, because they slip through the Ministry of Justice's legislative cracks, they would not get the help that they would need.
Amendments 69A and 70A would extend legal aid to immigration matters relating to entering or remaining in the country for three classes of persons: those under 18; those who have been subjected to gender-based violence; and those unable to represent themselves due to a physiological or psychological condition. Amendments 69B and 70B would extend legal aid to immigration matters relating to entering or remaining in the country for those under 18.
We support all the amendments. I am pleased that my party's position is that immigration matters should remain in the scope of legal aid to the same extent that they are now. That forms part of our overall commitment to keeping social welfare legal aid fully in scope by re- tendering criminal legal aid contracts in line with our 22 March 2010 paper, Restructuring the Delivery of Criminal Defence Services. Unamended, the Government's approach means that significant cracks will form in the provision of immigration law legal aid. Many claimants with very good cases will fail to exert their rights legitimately because of the current proposals’ failures. My noble friend Lady Gould's package of amendments clearly demonstrates one of these cracks.
A failure to accept the amendments might mean that people could be forced into accepting domestic abuse for fear of losing their children, their friends and the life they live in the United Kingdom. It could be regarded as a charter for abusers because of the difficulties that women will face in removing themselves from an abusive relationship. It will lead to chaos in the immigration system. Legal aid advice and representation oil the system, allowing interactions to occur professional to professional. Our system, which some would regard as creaking under the weight of poor decision-making and a high volume of cases, cannot afford this kind of radical deprofessionalisation.
I have one final, quite specific question for the Minister. Will Clause 9 funding be available for vulnerable children in complex immigration cases? The Government’s long-standing position is that Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights does not apply to immigration, and I believe that that would prevent these cases ever being funded under Clause 9. This ties in somewhat with Monday’s debate on the needs of young people.
I urge the Minister to listen to what has been said tonight. Earlier, the noble Lord, Lord McNally, proved to be in a listening mood when he replied to the debate on domestic violence and child abuse. The aim of this amendment is perhaps of a similar nature in that it deals with women suffering from domestic abuse. Therefore, I urge the Minister to continue in the vein of the noble Lord, Lord McNally, this afternoon when he said that he was prepared to listen—and indeed it seemed to me from his responses that he was listening. I hope that the Minister will continue to listen tonight. Noble Lords who have put their names to this group of amendments should be confident that if the Minister does not listen, we would support the amendments if they were brought forward at a future date, and we would take our own position on the provision of immigration law legal aid.
My Lords, first, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Gould of Potternewton, for introducing the amendments, and I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Gale, who encouraged me to listen. I hope to indicate later that in some respects we have already been listening.
Amendments 62 to 67 propose to make an amendment to paragraph 25 of Part 1 of Schedule 1. This paragraph provides for those applying for indefinite leave to remain on the grounds that they have limited leave to enter or remain as a partner of another individual present and settled in the United Kingdom and that the relationship has broken down permanently as a result of abuse. Such matters are to be within the scope of legal aid. The arguments regarding partnerships which have broken up and the power relationship that can result were very well made.
Amendment 62 seeks to extend the scope of legal aid to those applying for “leave to remain” as opposed to “indefinite leave to remain”. Amendment 65 seeks to remove the need for a person’s partner to be present and settled in the United Kingdom, and Amendments 66 and 67 are consequential amendments, removing the definitions of “indefinite leave to remain” and “present and settled in the United Kingdom”. We do not believe that these amendments are necessary. The provision as currently worded in the Bill is directly linked to Rule 289A of the Immigration Rules, which deals with applications for indefinite leave to remain by victims of domestic violence on a limited spousal visa. This is deliberate: other than via the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2006, the appropriate route for someone to apply would be through the Immigration Rules. Where the person’s partner has only a temporary form of residence, it is not clear that they intend, or indeed whether they would have a right, to reside more permanently in the country. As such, we do not believe that these cases require funding.
Amendments 63 and 64 relate to partners of EEA nationals, known as third-country nationals, and are similar to an amendment raised in the House of Commons—I think that the noble Baroness mentioned the debate that took place there either in Committee or on Report. These amendments are intended to bring within the scope of civil legal aid services applications from partners of EEA nationals who require confirmation of their right to reside in the United Kingdom where their relationship has broken down permanently as a result of domestic violence, as well as any subsequent appeal. EEA nationals and their family members, if from a third country, have a long-term right to reside in the United Kingdom if they are economically active or are able to support themselves without becoming an unreasonable burden on public funds.
The Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2006 make provision for family members to remain in the United Kingdom; that is that their right to reside can continue if they cease to be a family member of an EEA national because their marriage or civil partnership, on the basis of which they are a family member of an EEA national, breaks down as a result of domestic violence. The application is different for those people who apply for indefinite leave to remain under the domestic violence provisions in the Immigration Rules, where the rules that apply are different.
Nevertheless, as has been pointed out, and as my honourable friend, Mr Djanogly, has said, we will look further at this point. I indicated earlier that we believe that some of the initial concerns raised are covered and we do not believe that the amendments are necessary. However, it is only reasonable, in the light of what was said by the noble Baroness, Lady Gale, that we ensure that we have addressed the points which she made in that regard.
Amendments 69A and 70A deal with making legal aid available to certain categories of vulnerable persons for immigration matters. I think there are another two amendments in this group which have not been moved but I shall try to deal with them. Part of Amendment 70A —that which seeks to cover those persons who have suffered domestic violence at the hands of spouses or partners—is already covered by the Bill at paragraph 25 of Part 1 of Schedule 1, where the application for indefinite leave to remain in the United Kingdom meets the requirements of that paragraph. We decided that, on reflection, the issues faced by those facing domestic violence were such that special provision should be made for them. Without legal aid, there is a real risk that such people will remain trapped in an abusive relationship for fear of jeopardising their immigration status. Furthermore, they have only a limited window in which to submit their immigration application when they leave their partners and after that period their access to public funds ceases. However, these factors do not apply to other categories of vulnerable persons that have been suggested in the amendments.
As we have indicated on numerous occasions in these debates, we believe that we should target legal aid on those who need it most. In general, we want to prioritise asylum cases, which can be about life and death, over immigration cases. I do not deny for a moment the importance of such cases to the individuals concerned, but they do not raise the same issues.
Children will not normally be applicants in asylum and immigration cases, as they are usually considered as part of their parents’ application. Child applicants are much more likely in asylum cases, for which, of course, legal aid will remain available. Most immigration claims are straightforward and, in the majority of cases, we expect the child, with the help of a guardian, to be able to complete the process without recourse to specialist help. The noble Baroness, Lady Gale, asked about children's applications, their interaction with Article 6 and whether exceptional funding would be available. The answer, as I think she anticipated, is that it would not. The position in the Bill is that exceptional funding should be granted only where it is required by law; that is that denying legal aid would risk a breach of an individual's rights under EU law or the ECHR. Case law has been consistent: that immigration cases do not, as she indicated, involve such a determination and, as such, exceptional funding would not be available.
I have sought to try to give some reassurances and I urge the noble Baroness, Lady Gould, to withdraw her amendment.
I thank the Minister for his reply. In some ways, I am partially encouraged by the reply but I also find it extremely complex. I need to go away and read it very carefully and then I shall be able to answer whether I am satisfied or not. In the light of that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, has made a very powerful case for the amendment that he has so ably moved. We support it from the opposition Front Bench, very much for the reason that he was arguing in the latter part of his speech: the complete mismatch between being allowed to get legal aid to get advice on detention but not being able to get any advice as to the underlying reasons why an individual is detained.
The Government are quite right to have recognised that legal aid is crucial when an individual’s liberty is at stake, and we see that principle in existence here in their preparedness to allow someone who is in detention to get legal advice to challenge that detention. However, how on earth can they challenge that detention—and this is the point the noble Lord was making—without also getting legal advice as to the underlying cause of that detention? It does not look as though this could work properly in practice. The Government are trying to hold fast to two principles: that an individual’s liberty demands legal aid advice; but, when that matter is looked into, the reason behind their loss of liberty cannot be advised on in the same way. The noble Lord, Lord Avebury, is quite right: some really serious mistakes will go uncorrected if this provision goes through.
To make the point absolutely clearly—and this is the point that ILPA seems to have made—challenging immigration detention is inextricably linked to challenging the immigration decision that forms the justification for detention. If the Government want to help those detained wrongly—presumably they do; no one wants to have people detained wrongly—it is pretty self-evident that they should deal with the underlying problems. A failure to do so will simply mean a return to detention—a complete waste, frankly, of public money.
Although I have been brief, we on this side believe that the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, and the others who signed the amendment have a very good point. I would like the Minister to explain to the Committee how these provisions can actually work in practice. It looks as though there is a serious mismatch between what they will and will not allow legal aid for in this field.
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Avebury for moving his amendment, which relates to issues of immigration and detention. Amendments 68 and 70 would bring into scope of legal aid several legal services in relation to rights to enter and remain in the United Kingdom for anyone who is liable to be detained under the immigration powers.
As a preliminary to his arguments my noble friend suggested that, if the Government wished to save money, we should tackle the UKBA’s decision-making. The UKBA already has a wide-ranging improvement programme under way to continue to improve the quality of its decision-making in asylum and entry claims and in points-based systems, although I would be the first to acknowledge that in any programme like that there is always scope for improvement.
I warmly support my noble friend in this amendment. I reinforce what he has already said by reference to a note issued by the UNHCR dated November 2011, which I presume has been drawn to the attention of my noble and learned friend the Minister. Has he been approached directly by the UNHCR on these matters? If so, what was his response? I very much look forward to hearing from him. He is nodding, which I presume means—
I was trying to indicate that I did not pick up what my noble friend said. I would be grateful if he could he repeat the question.
I was saying that I hope that this note, which we have all received from the UNHCR, has been sent by the UNHCR representative in the United Kingdom to noble Lords on the Front Bench. I look forward very much to knowing how they have replied.
As my noble friend has already pointed out, the UNHCR is concerned because, although the safeguarding of asylum seekers’ access to legal aid is being retained, it is worried about the way in which the Bill limits access to legal aid for families of refugees who seek to rejoin their family members in the United Kingdom. The UNHCR notes with concern that,
“the current proposals exclude legal aid for family members of persons who have been recognised as refugees or people who have been granted humanitarian protection”.
I cannot think of a more powerful agency to make representations of this kind than the UNHCR. It almost goes as far as to say that it is a breach of the refugee convention to deny legal aid to the family members. As my noble friend pointed out, the UNHCR believes that,
“reunification of the family unit plays an important role in ensuring the protection and well-being of individual members of a refugee family”.
It goes on to describe the adverse consequences that may follow from the denial of legal aid for these purposes.
One point on which I think I should add to my noble friend’s comments is on disputed family relationships, which are frequently a matter of continued difference between the UKBA and the applicant and which have to be resolved by reference to, for example, DNA evidence. The UNHCR asks how the costs of evidence gathering and the private legal fees that have to be borne in connection with this process can be borne by the refugee and his family. It notes that,
“the Government’s response during the consultation stage was that family reunion applications are ‘generally straightforward’ and that an alternative for family members is to claim asylum in their own right”.
However, the UNHCR points out that, since a refugee family are still outside the United Kingdom, they are not able to claim asylum in their own right—they would have to travel illegally to the United Kingdom to make such an application. Is that what the Government want them to do? It seems to me that, by denying them legal aid, the Government are inciting them to break our immigration laws and enter by some other means in order that they can claim asylum here in their own right. This cannot be right, and I hope that my noble friend will consider these amendments very seriously.
My Lords, Amendment 69, moved by my noble friend, seeks to bring family reunion cases into the scope of legal aid. In recognising the purpose of the amendment, I also wish to indicate that the anticipated cost of that would be around £5 million a year.
Such cases involve a person who has been granted asylum and sponsors the applications of the immediate family to join them here in the United Kingdom. Applications to join family members are immigration applications rather than asylum ones. This may to some extent respond to the point made by my noble friend Lord Avebury when he indicated that there was an encouragement to people to come in as illegal immigrants and to be asylum seekers. I have repeated on many occasions that asylum will come within the scope of legal aid, but it is widely recognised that navigating the laws is far more complex than is intended to be the case with regard to immigration applications in such cases.
I may have misled my noble friend. What I was pointing out was that it was the Government’s own suggestion that family members should claim asylum in their own right and that the only method by which they could do so was to enter the United Kingdom by some unlawful means so that they could claim asylum.
I hear what my noble friend says. I will check, but I was not aware that the Government had encouraged people to come in in those circumstances. The point that I was about to make was that UK Border Agency guidance in these cases, when people are coming in under an immigration route, is that it sets out presumption of a grant of an application if the relevant criteria are met. The evidence required, such as marriage and birth certificates, should not require specialist legal assistance to collate. Indeed, the entry clearance officer may on occasion ask for DNA testing to prove a family relationship, but in these circumstances the test will be free of charge to the applicant.
These cases do not require specialist legal advice and, as we have indicated with other immigration cases, it is not necessary for them to remain within the scope of civil legal aid. Nevertheless, I recognise what my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford said in moving his amendment. In spite of the fact that most cases should be relatively straightforward, as my honourable friend the parliamentary under-secretary Mr Djanogly indicated, there are some cases which are complex—I would certainly repeat what he indicated in the other place—so we will look at this again. I say this without wanting to raise an expectation, but it is important that we look at the issues where there are complex cases, and I undertake to look at that aspect again.
On Amendment 71, as my noble friend indicated we have dealt with most of these issues in the course of the evening. I am prepared to elaborate on the answers again, but perhaps he could just take as read the answers given in respect of those cases. Again, the issue relates to the fact that, as a general rule, we have taken the view that, unlike cases of asylum, where legal aid will be in scope, in cases of immigration the number of cases that turn on a point of law are relatively low and the cost of funding them is one that we believe can be better applied and applied in a more focused way on cases where the needs are greater.
On the question asked by my noble friend Lord Avebury about the UNHCR letter, I do not recall seeing the letter and nor does my noble friend Lord McNally. However, it is my understanding that Mr Djanogly has not only seen it but replied to it and has done so in the terms in which I have replied to the debate. In those circumstances, I ask my noble friend to withdraw his amendment.
I am grateful for the assurance that the Minister has given that he will look at this matter again and consider what the attitude of the Government should be in complex cases involving family reunification.
I would point out that, on the question of claiming asylum, the Government said in their response to the consultation:
“Applications to join family members are treated as immigration cases, and are generally straightforward because they follow a grant of asylum”.
That is what my noble and learned friend told us just now. The Government’s response went on:
“Respondents argued that these cases are akin to claims for asylum … if a person wishes to claim asylum it is open to that person to do so either as a dependant of a primary asylum claimant or to do so in his or her own right. Legal aid for any such asylum claim will be in scope”.
As my noble friend Lord Avebury has said, the family members with which this amendment is concerned are outside the United Kingdom and cannot claim asylum unless they get here. The only way that they can get here would be through some hazardous and clandestine journey to get to this country and make a claim. It would be unlawful under the Immigration Act 1971 for a person in this country, including a person who has been granted asylum, to assist them in any way but if they can get here and claim asylum, they then apparently get legal aid to fight their claim. That seems ludicrous. I am sure that my noble and learned friend, in considering the matter further as he has promised to do, will take that into account, but for the moment I beg leave to withdraw this amendment.
(12 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I welcome this debate and in particular thank my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones for introducing an important amendment that would seek to make a change to paragraph 2 of Part 1 of Schedule 1 to the Bill. This is the paragraph that brings special educational needs within the scope of the new scheme.
The Government, in response to our consultation on this package of reforms, recognised the compelling arguments that stakeholders made concerning special educational needs cases. As a result, we altered our position on special educational needs, which has been recognised in the contributions to the debate. The Bill included provision for these cases when it was published.
Our intention is to cover all matters that can legitimately be classed as special educational needs issues. It has been brought to our attention by stakeholders, particularly the Special Educational Consortium, that the current wording in paragraph 2 does not cover all SEN matters—in particular, learning difficulty assessments under the Learning and Skills Act 2000 for 16 to 25 year-olds. My noble friend and others made a very compelling case on that point. Although I have no reason to doubt the drafting skills of my noble friends, I hope that they will understand if I do not accept their amendment at this time. The focus on Section 140 of the 2000 Act would include Wales only. That might be because of the hand of my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford—that is no criticism—but I can assure the Committee that my officials are working closely with the Department for Education to ensure that the issue that noble Lords have raised is addressed and that the contents of paragraph 2 encompass all SEN matters. I assure noble Lords that the Government in principle accept the point and that we will table a technical amendment on Report to ensure that SEN matters are fully within the Bill’s scope.
The noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara, spoke to Amendment 82ZA, which, as he indicated, would bring into scope all education matters not already covered by Schedule 1. As he said, we have retained legal aid for any education case that involves a contravention of the Equality Act 2010, such as cases concerning disability discrimination, and current legal aid funding for appeals on special educational needs matters, as we have just discussed. We have also retained legal aid for education judicial reviews.
In practice, the amendment would retain legal aid for all education matters, including advice on admissions and exclusion decisions and for educational negligence damage claims, and would mean lost savings of approximately £1 million. The judgment that we have had to make has been to prioritise funding on the most important education cases, which are special educational needs, discrimination and judicial review. We believe that those are of the highest priority, and that advice on, for example, admissions, exclusions and damages claims are not. Of course, those are not unimportant, but where parents are not satisfied with an admissions refusal they can appeal to an independent panel. That requires them to set out in writing why they disagree with the admissions decision, and why they think that the admissions arrangements have not been followed correctly. Those are not usually legal arguments, and the local authority choice adviser can assist parents and attend the appeal hearing with them.
Parents who wish to challenge a temporary or permanent exclusion may do so by writing a letter to the school governors, setting out their reasons for challenging the exclusion. Again, if they are unhappy with the decision permanently to exclude their child, they can appeal—currently to an independent appeal panel, but from September this year to an independent review panel. The Department for Education will fund the Children’s Legal Centre to provide advice to parents on appeals to the independent review panel both online and through a telephone advice line.
Parents can also appeal to the First-tier Tribunal if the appeal concerns disability discrimination, and legal aid is being retained for advice and assistance in such cases. Advice is also available on admission and exclusion matters, although I recognise that the organisations involved, such as the Advisory Centre for Education and the Children’s Legal Centre, face the same difficulties as others in the current financial climate.
The other tier or category is education negligence claims, which have been excluded from scope, along with most other damages claims, because we do not consider that claims for money will generally be of the highest priority. We have therefore focused legal aid only on money claims that concern a significant breach of human rights or abuse of position or power by a public authority, an abuse of a child or vulnerable adult, or sexual assault. The vast majority of education negligence claims will not fall under one of these three headings and will be removed from scope. For many meritorious cases, a conditional fee agreement will provide a suitable alternative funding arrangement.
I have heard my noble friend Lord McNally say from this Dispatch Box on a number of occasions that very difficult tough choices have had to be made on these issues and that there has had to be prioritisation. We believe that we have focused resources on education cases of the highest priority. I hope that the House will recognise that, and I urge my noble friend to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I propose simply to respond on Amendment 36, so if those on the opposition Front Bench wish to respond on Amendment 82ZA, I shall briefly pause. I see that they do not.
First, I should have declared an interest as the president of Ambitious about Autism, the education and special needs charity for autistic children. I know that both it and the Special Educational Consortium will be delighted by the Minister's response. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, and the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, for their contributions. The noble Lord, Lord Howarth, used a very felicitous phrase, “something of a cliff edge”, about the 16-to-25 period. Of course, the experience of the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, in this area is enormous, and I particularly welcome her contribution.
I very much welcome the Minister’s response and the fact that he has recognised the compelling arguments that have been made to him and to the Department for Education not only for the phase up to 16 but for the 16 to 25 year-old phase. I recognise that the amendment might not be fully technically correct but it might cover other sections—Section 139A is a possibility—that may need to be covered in the drafting.
I think that many noble Lords around the Committee are hoping that this is but the first swallow of summer as we progress through the Bill, but I am very content with the response today and beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, we have come to an important part of Schedule 1, relating generally to immigration, asylum, removal directions and judicial review, although the amendment moved by my noble friend Lord Carlile of Berriew was of much more general application to judicial review, which is an important part of our legal system, as he very clearly and eloquently set out. Amendment 54 seeks to disapply certain exclusions set out in Part 2 of the Bill for judicial review claims. It would appear to be aimed at ensuring that funding for judicial review is available for judicial reviews concerning, for example, breaches of statutory duty.
Our position is that we believe the amendment largely to be unnecessary, because the exclusions at paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 8 of Part 2 of Schedule 1 are not intended to prevent funding for judicial review. Rather, the exclusions are intended to prevent the funding of, for example, tortious causes of action, typically for damages. While I hope that that would reassure, perhaps I can follow it by making it clear that our intention is to retain legal aid for most judicial review claims, including those relating to personal injury or death and breach of a statutory duty. I assure the Committee, and indeed my noble friend, that because we have obviously had representations on this point, we are actively and seriously considering whether in the light of this amendment and the points which my noble friend has made in moving it, we need to bring forward amendments of our own to clarify the position and to give proper effect to the intention.
I am most grateful to my noble and learned friend. He has been extremely helpful. Can he clarify one point? Sometimes when judicial review claims are brought there is included in the claim a claim for damages, which can be awarded under judicial review. I take it from what he said that if a claim for damages is part of a judicial review, that part of the claim would also have legal aid available to it. It is one legal aid order.
This is quite important. As my noble friend will recognise, the overall structure of what is proposed to be in scope does not provide for legal aid for damages. However, I recognise what he says about damages being part of an overall judicial review claim. It is important that we look at this and ensure that what appears in the Bill delivers the intention. I am sure that we will return to this matter on Report.
My noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford spoke to Amendments 55 to 59, which concern the exclusions from legal aid which we have made for some immigration judicial reviews. Before I turn to the specific amendments, it might be helpful if I briefly remind the Committee of the Government’s reasoning on this matter. My noble friend raised the question of the lack of consultation—as did the noble Lord, Lord Bach, who I am delighted to engage with again at the Dispatch Box. I think that the last time we did so was in the debate on the fixed-term Parliaments legislation. It has been six months but seems like a year.
My noble friend and the noble Lord raised the question of a lack of consultation. However, in response to our consultation on legal aid the Judges’ Council of England and Wales highlighted the large number of immigration judicial reviews that were without merit. That point was raised in the consultation and my noble friend has accepted in speaking to his amendments that there are a number of unmeritorious cases taking up time. This change was made against that background. Although only a minority of those cases would currently receive legal aid, the Government’s view is nevertheless that it is wrong in principle for such cases to remain within the scope of funding. We are therefore seeking to remove two classes of immigration judicial review from the scope of legal aid, again subject to certain exceptions which I will come on to discuss.
The noble Lord, Lord Bach, asked whether I would double-check the figures on taking these parts of judicial review out of scope. Of course we will double-check them, and if there is further information we will make it available not only to the noble Lord but to all those participating in our proceedings.
The first category of case that we seek to exclude is one where there has already been at least one appeal before the tribunal or another judicial review within the past year on the same or a substantially similar issue. The second category concerns judicial reviews of removal directions rather than the underlying immigration decision. Such proceedings are often brought at the last minute—sometimes literally as people are being put on to a plane. We recognise that there will be some genuine, if unusual, cases within these categories that could still warrant legal aid. That is why we have made exceptions to our proposed exclusions—if the Committee will bear with the double negatives, which seem to be quite frequent in this part of the Bill. These are intended to take into account the potential for changes in an individual’s circumstances over time. In both categories, the exclusion is subject to a one-year time limit. We have also made exceptions for judicial reviews of decisions by the Home Office to certify under Section 94 or Section 96 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. These provisions curtail asylum appeal rights in certain circumstances and so maintaining legal aid for a potential judicial review is, we believe, an important safeguard.
We are therefore keeping judicial reviews of a decision by the Home Office to refuse to treat further submissions as a fresh claim for asylum. Again, this maintains the availability of legal aid for judicial review asylum cases where there may not have been an appeal to the tribunal. It has been suggested that most types of immigration cases will not be able to get legal aid, but most types of immigration judicial review will still be in scope. The provisions in the Bill remove only two relatively limited types of judicial review, and even these provisions are subject to the exceptions that I have outlined.
On the specific amendments spoken to by my noble friend Lord Thomas, Amendment 55 seeks to keep all immigration judicial reviews within the scope of legal aid. From what I have said, noble Lords will see why the Government do not agree with that amendment.
Amendments 56 and 57 relate to the operation of the exclusion of judicial reviews on removal directions. The Government seek to exclude judicial reviews of removal directions from the scope of legal aid because there will already have been a chance to appeal the underlying decision. More specifically, Amendment 56 would in effect retain legal aid for these judicial reviews in circumstances where there had been no appeal of the original underlying decision, or at least no appeal before the removal had been effected.
It is true that some decisions to remove can be challenged only by appeal from overseas, as Parliament decided. While judicial review can still be used as a means of challenging this, it does not follow that legal aid should be available in all these cases. As I explained earlier, in asylum cases where there is no right of appeal or where, as in Section 94 cases, any right of appeal arises only outside the UK, legal aid will remain available for judicial review. However, we believe that choosing not to exercise this appeal right should not bring someone within the scope of legal aid.
Amendment 57 raises a technical point, as my noble friend recognised. It is based on the belief that the provision around the “leave to appeal” in paragraph 17(6)(b) is unnecessary because there is no provision to appeal to the First-tier Tribunal in these cases. However, there is a leave-to-appeal stage to the Upper Tribunal, so we think that the current drafting is sound, albeit that this is a very fine technical point.
The intention of Amendment 58, as I understand it and as was stated by my noble friend, is to avoid a potential definitional problem to do with the meaning of asylum across the 1951 refugee convention, the EU procedures directive and the qualification directive. Again, it is recognised that this is technical but of course important, and it is about the definition of protection cases—that is, non-refugee convention cases.
The Government understand the concerns but on balance we think that they are misplaced. Our view is that the reference in paragraph 17(7)(a) of Schedule 1 to an asylum application within the meaning of the EU procedures directive is sufficient to cover all applications for international protection. I am happy to put it on the record that that is our intention. However, the amendment goes further than the Government intend; it seems to provide legal aid in all judicial reviews connected with asylum matters, not just those where there has been no previous opportunity to appeal. I believe that it would be wrong to retain legal aid for judicial review cases that are very likely to be without merit, regardless of whether they are asylum cases. Nevertheless, I express my appreciation to my noble friend for raising this issue and regarding the specific points that he made, we will certainly look at whether anything further is required here.
Amendment 59 seeks to add two further exceptions to the exclusions. The first is to make an exception for cases that have not previously benefited from legal aid. I understand the logic: without legal assistance, someone may not have put the right arguments forward first time around, so when it comes to potential judicial review, should they not have legal aid to ensure that they get it right? Our response is that if legal assistance means that they can put new arguments forward—sufficiently new that the court or tribunal is considering a different issue—they would still be eligible for legal aid for the judicial review. This is because exclusion applies only where the judicial review is in respect of the same or substantially similar issue. However, if they are still raising the same or substantially similar issue, even with the potential benefit of a lawyer, we do not believe that they should be eligible for legal aid.
The second exception, as sought by Amendment 59, relates to cases where the appellants have been successful in their previous appeal for judicial review. We think that there is an issue here and we will certainly look at that.
I hope that we have given a satisfactory explanation. This is a technical matter but I do not for a moment deny that these are serious issues. In asking my noble friend Lord Carlile to withdraw the amendment in the light of the assurances that I have given, let me give him a further assurance. He asked whether judicial review funding would cover the damages remedy sought through the judicial review, and the answer is yes. If we can find the right words, we will give proper effect to our intention.
Before my noble friend Lord Carlile replies regarding his amendment, I thank the Minister for his reply to my amendments, which raised difficult technical points. I hope that he will forgive me if I read what he has said with some care, as no doubt he will read the whole debate with some care. I look forward to seeing what technical amendments he may feel are necessary to deal with the points that I raised. I am also grateful to him for the assurances that he has given, certainly in relation to part of the amendments.
That certainly must be a risk, and the need for the assistance of the Court of Protection is therefore enhanced. I am grateful to my noble friend for allowing that point to be emphasised. It is therefore essential that legal aid is available so that the court can be approached and the Official Solicitor can represent the person in question. Otherwise, he would be unable to do so because there would be no provision for costs.
I hope that despite the odd location of our amendment the Minister might look at it with some sympathy, and that if he cannot come to a conclusion on it, given that it was tabled very late, he will at least agree that he will take this matter back to look at before we reach Report.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, for introducing this group of amendments. Arguably, there is nothing more fundamental for a parliament to discuss than the relationship between the state and the citizen. His amendments have given rise to an important debate, with contributions from my noble friend Lord Phillips, the noble Earl, Lord Sandwich, and the noble Lords, Lord Judd and Lord Howarth. I hope that I can reassure Members of the Committee in my response.
Amendment 60 seeks to make civil legal aid available for claims in relation to any alleged unlawful act by a public authority that causes reasonably foreseeable harm. In general terms, Schedule 1 makes legal aid available for the most serious cases and for proceedings that seek to hold public bodies to account for their decisions. This includes civil legal services for judicial review of an act, decision or omission, and provides a means for people to challenge the lawfulness of a public authority’s actions on public grounds.
In terms of private law claims primarily for damages, while we consider that such claims do not generally justify funding, an important exception to the rule provided for in the Bill is for the most serious claims against public authorities. The Bill ensures that funding may be made available for tort and other damages claims against public authorities for an abuse of position or powers, a significant breach of human rights, allegations of the abuse of a child or vulnerable adult, or allegations of a sexual offence. The definition—about which I shall say more—of:
“Abuse of position or power by public authority”,
is intended to cover the most serious misuses of state power. That is why it is defined in the Bill as an alleged act that is deliberate or dishonest, and that causes reasonably foreseeable harm to a person or property. Our definition would exclude from scope a range of less serious cases against public authorities—a point made by my noble friend Lord Phillips—including simple negligence claims such as “slipping” or “tripping”. He asked if “deliberate” abuse of position or power is the same as “intentional”. The answer is yes. As to the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, who asked whether “deliberate” referred to a deliberate act or deliberate consequences, the word refers to the act or omission that is complained of and for which legal aid is sought. Legal aid would therefore be available for deliberate or dishonest acts or omissions by a public authority that cause reasonably foreseeable harm.
Amendment 60 would widen the scope of paragraph 19 of Part 1 of Schedule 1 to make legal aid available for claims in tort or other damages claims for any alleged unlawful act by a public authority that causes harm. Noble Lords will be interested to know that unlawful acts are already covered by paragraph 19, which covers situations where an act is deliberate and dishonest, and results in foreseeable harm. However, the concern is that the amendment as tabled would widen the coverage beyond what we believe should be within scope.
Alternatively, public law challenges to the lawfulness of a public authority’s action can be brought by judicial review, which is in scope under the Bill. We have focused limited resources on those who need them most and the most serious cases, in which legal advice or representation is justified. I accept that that approach means that public funding will not be available for each and every claim involving a public authority, but it is intended to be available for the most serious cases and to address serious abuses.
Although paragraph 26(1)(a) allows claimants to be granted legal aid in respect of asylum, it does not extend to the families of refugees who seek to rejoin the principal member of the family in the United Kingdom. Anxiety concerning that omission has been expressed by the UNHCR. Can my noble and learned friend say anything on that?
It is an important point, which has been raised before in the context of the Bill. I think that Amendments 69 and 71 in the name of my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford—to which we will come, dare I say, sooner rather than later—raise the point about families of asylum seekers. I hope that when we come to that, we will have a proper debate on the important issue that my noble friend raises.
The Minister is defending the Bill’s drafting against the proposal of the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, in Amendment 60. Is he therefore saying that if someone is the victim of a mistake by a public authority—not a deliberate mistake or one dishonestly intended but none the less an egregious error arising from ignorance of the law, which ought to be known by the people working in the public authority—there is to be no legally aided redress for the citizen, even if the harm is considerable?
As I said to my noble friend Lord Phillips, the Bill does not include negligent actions of a public authority. I made very clear that it is intended for the serious-end range of abuse of power and the harm that results. It is not intended to include all that lies by way of negligence.
I am sorry to interrupt the Minister’s flow, but this is a valuable opportunity to get to the bottom of this. From what he is saying, a reckless act on behalf of the state would be neither deliberate nor dishonest. If it was reckless, there would be no redress. Can that be right?
My noble friend well knows that where recklessness goes into intent is not always very clear. I very much hear the point that he is making; I want to reflect on it. There is a continuum, but I have made it clear that it certainly does not include negligence. That is why we are concerned about “unlawful”, because that opens the provision beyond what is intended and could lead to cases of damages for what are not by any stretch of the imagination serious consequences or serious harm for the individual.
On Paragraph 19(6), the Minister said that the word deliberate would not cover negligence. What is a deliberate act intended to cover? Most people, when they do things, do them deliberately. Is that what it means, or anything beyond that?
As I said earlier, when my noble friend asked whether deliberate meant intentional, that is what it means: it is an intentional act of a public authority. The question is: if it is a mistake that leads to considerable harm but is not deliberate or dishonest, will legal aid not be available? I hope that I have indicated that no, under paragraph 19 it would not be available but, as I said, paragraph 20, which covers a significant breach of human rights, might nevertheless allow for funding in those circumstances, or cases might be taken forward by way of judicial review, which might be available for funding.
There is a range of provision in Schedule 1 for cases to be taken forward against public authorities, not solely on the particular part of the schedule to which the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, is directed.
We quite understand the point that the noble and learned Lord is making: that the intention of Ministers is to restrict legal aid to serious cases and that that is the measure. Would he reflect on the position of someone whose liberty has been wrongfully denied and whether it would be any consolation to know that that resulted not from a deliberate act but from some oversight—a mistake, to use the words already employed, of an egregious kind? It does not seem to me that it makes much difference, if you are unlawfully detained, whether it was just by mistake.
I recognise what my noble and learned friend is saying. I said at the outset that we intend to focus on those areas where there is serious abuse by the state and where serious harm has resulted. It is an effort to target limited resources—I think that there is recognition that resources are limited—where there is the greatest abuse of power or position by the state. In those circumstances, we believe, as I have tried to explain, that abuse does not cover negligence. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Neill, asked what it covers. The paragraph covers the most serious abuses, which may not include mistakes but could include abuses such as misfeasance in public office. I think that that would fall within the definition here.
Why should it be only the most serious abuses that allow the victim to get legal aid? There are all kinds of abuses. We know that there are some petty abuses and perhaps I would agree with the Minister that not every petty abuse should allow the victim to get legal aid. There are very serious abuses, which the noble and learned Lord says his Bill intends to cover, but what about medium-sized abuses? I am talking about abuses that are pretty severe for the victim. Should the state be stopped from dealing with those? Why should the victim not be able to get legal aid in order to get a remedy in such a case? Why are the Government saying that the abuse has to be really serious?
My Lords, as I have sought to explain, we are trying to recognise in the Bill that there are limited resources and to ensure that those limited resources are best and most fairly targeted. I think that in asking the question the noble Lord, Lord Bach, accepted that not all abuse should lead to a claim. That is what we are seeking to do: we are trying to strike a balance between where it would and would not be appropriate for legal aid to be made available. That is why, along that continuum, it is at the serious end where we have sought—
Did the Minister really say that in no circumstances would legal aid be available where the infringement immediately appeared to be minor? Does he not recognise that lawyers often come across cases that appear to be minor but later become rather more serious? What remedy is available in such an instance? Is the Minister really arguing that, once it is decreed that a situation is minimal, there is no possible remedy?
It is not that there is no possible remedy; it is a question of whether legal aid would be available—whether it is within scope. I do not shy away from the fact that these are difficult judgments to make, but the resources are not unlimited. The noble Lord, Lord Clinton-Davis, refers to a minimal infringement. If the resources are limited, it is very difficult to see why a minimal infringement, which may be one of error, should attract the same level of resources as a case where there has clearly been a misuse or abuse of power on the part of a public authority.
I am talking about the solicitor who originally investigates a case being not very competent. He concludes that the case is minimal but he might be wrong. Why should legal aid not be available later?
I am not sure that I fully understand the point that the noble Lord is making. Obviously, if at a later stage a case clearly qualifies for legal aid under the definition here, one would expect legal aid to be available. Furthermore, in many of the cases that we are talking about where legal aid might not be available, conditional fee agreements might provide a viable alternative where there is clearly merit in the case but it would not qualify under the definition here.
I am sorry to intervene and I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. Are the Government approaching this matter as though it is to deal only with claims for damages? Of course, other forms of relief might be sought—injunctive relief, declarations and so on—that might bring a spotlight to bear on the alleged abuse that has occurred. That might be the most powerful way of dealing with the error in the first place. Is that not something for which legal aid should be available?
My Lords, I have tried to identify the other parts of Schedule 1 where other remedies are indicated to be within scope. If I can find the place in my notes, I shall be able to make them very clear. I think I made it clear that judicial review, referred to in paragraph 17 of Part 1 of Schedule 1, is within scope of legal aid. I entirely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, that there may be many cases where that is the most appropriate route to go down and it would be within scope. However, I have indicated that, where damages are concerned, the criteria that I have tried to set out are the ones that would apply at the serious end of abuse. I gave specific examples of things that are within scope within the schedule, judicial review being possibly the most obvious.
Will the noble and learned Lord consider very carefully whether he is really content that through the Bill the Government are in effect carving out a significant area of immunity for their agents where they might have acted incompetently or irresponsibly—not deliberately or dishonestly but incompetently and irresponsibly—and, in so doing, have caused considerable damage to individuals? In stipulating that legal aid should not be available to enable individuals to secure redress and damages in such a situation, surely the Government are acting to protect themselves in a way that is simply wrong when one considers what the proper relationship between the state and the individual should be.
My Lords, at the risk of repetition, I have already said that numerous routes within scope, other than a damages claim, might be open to an individual and might be even more appropriate in addressing the situation where a public authority or the state acts in a way that the individual citizen wishes to challenge. Indeed, as I have indicated, other means, such as conditional fee agreements, might also be appropriate in some cases that are not at the serious end.
Part 1 of Schedule 1 indicates a number of remedies that are available and within scope. We have sought to make available a range of remedies, particularly with regard to the protection of the liberty of the subject. A deliberate policy choice was made to try to ensure that legal aid would be available to safeguard the liberty of the subject. No doubt the noble Lord, Lord Judd, is being patient.
I am very grateful to the Minister for giving way. He is being given quite a cross-examination at this stage in our considerations. Before Report, when he is considering what has been said in this debate, I plead with him to remember that this is not just a private matter between the individual concerned and the authorities. In this very sensitive area of public policy there are bound to be much wider ramifications. Ultimately, this is about the credibility of the Home Office and its policies and how they operate. If there appears to be a reluctance to put right generously what has been done indefensibly, that will hardly help to achieve public confidence in the general policies as they are applied. I hope that the Minister will take away that general point, because it is crucial to our deliberations.
I recognise the important point that the noble Lord, Lord Judd, makes. I assure him that, in trying to allocate limited resources, we have sought to ensure that a proper balance is struck. As I indicated, it is of course a balance, and we will weigh in what has been said in this debate. However, I have sought to indicate that we are dealing here not just with claims for damages; we have deliberately included a whole range of remedies within scope in Schedule 1 because we recognise the importance of proper safeguards in the citizen’s relationship with the state. I hope that the noble Lord will recognise that a whole range of remedies will be eligible for legal aid.
The noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, has no doubt been waiting for a response to his Amendment 61ZA, which would include within the definition of “public authority” the Crown Estate and the Duchy of Cornwall. The position is that paragraph 19(7) uses a definition of “public authority” that is used in Section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998. At Section 6(3) of that Act, the definition of a public authority includes,
“(a) a court or tribunal, and
(b) any person certain of whose functions are functions of a public nature,
but does not include either House of Parliament or a person exercising functions in connection with proceedings in Parliament”.
Section 6(5) of the Human Rights Act goes on to provide that,
“In relation to a particular act, a person is not a public authority by virtue only of subsection (3)(b) if the nature of the act is private”.
Therefore, the point is that this is not so much about the name of the body but about determining whether the function is of a public nature. It is the nature of the service or function that is determinative, rather than the legal status of a body that is performing the function. One noble Lord asked whether we could have a definition of that. Ultimately, it must be for the courts to determine whether a body is a public authority, given that definition for the purposes of the Human Rights Act.
The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, said that there may be another time and place to discuss the Crown Estate and the Duchy of Cornwall. I know that the Scottish Affairs Committee in the House of Commons is currently looking at the work of the Crown Estate. It is an issue that has attracted more attention, but as regards this amendment and this Bill the definition is used in the Human Rights Act and is a proper definition to import into this Bill.
I will briefly address a number of government amendments in this group. Amendments 79A and 79C address predecessor claims under the pre-Equality Act 2010 legislation to ensure that legal aid continues to be available to people who have live claims under predecessor equalities legislation, and not just in relation to a contravention of the Equality Act 2010.
At present, paragraph 38 of Part 1 of Schedule 1 limits legal aid cases to cases where the Equality Act 2010 has been contravened. The 2010 Act presents a new unified legal framework for addressing harassment, victimisation and discrimination based on any of eight protected characteristics. Where previous equality enactments have been repealed, we recognise that certain claims will continue to be capable of being brought under these enactments by virtue of the transitional arrangements introduced by the 2010 Act. For this reason, we seek to amend paragraph 38 to allow funding for predecessor claims that might still need the benefit of public funding. This amendment will also amend paragraph 38 to put beyond doubt our intention to retain funding for civil legal services relating to the breach of equality clauses and rules and non-discrimination rules.
Government Amendments 78C, 78D and 78E ensure that civil legal services are provided in circumstances where a sexual offence has actually been committed or is alleged to have been committed. They also ensure that civil legal services are provided in circumstances where a sexual offence has not actually been committed but there has been: an incitement to commit a sexual offence; an offence committed by a person under Part 2 of the Serious Crime Act 2007, in relation to which a sexual offence is the offence which the person intended or believed would be committed; conspiracy to commit a sexual offence; and an attempt to commit a sexual offence.
Additionally, the amendment to paragraph 34 of Part 1 of Schedule 1 will ensure that civil legal services are capable of being provided in relation to conduct that would be an offence mentioned in sub-paragraph (3)(a) or (b) of the existing definition of “sexual offence” but that is not considered an offence under the present definition because it took place before the relevant provision came into force. At present, paragraph 34 limits legal aid to cases where a sexual offence has been committed under the provision of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 and to cases where an offence has been committed under Section 1 of the Protection of Children Act 1978, which deals with indecent photographs of children. We recognise that it is possible that offences committed before the present legislation came into force might need the benefit of public funding, and for this reason we have amended paragraph 34 to allow for funding.
I am not sure why Amendment 90ZZA is in this group, but I hope the Committee will recognise that this is a serious attempt to ensure that where there have perhaps been gaps due to prior legislation, we seek to fill them. Amendment 90ZZA would bring into scope advocacy within the Court of Protection where a person’s mental or psychological safety is concerned. This echoes debates on Amendment 53. The current position is that advice is available for any mental capacity matter and that representation is available for the Court of Protection in limited circumstances where there is to be an oral hearing and the case will determine the vital interests of the individual.
Paragraph 4 of Part 3 provides for advocacy before the Court of Protection where there is to be an oral hearing and the case will determine the vital interests of the individual—for example, medical treatment, life, liberty, physical safety, the capacity to marry or enter into a civil partnership, and the capacity to enter into sexual relations or the right to family life. The amendments go beyond what is currently provided through legal representation by the civil legal aid scheme. We have had to focus our limited resources on the most serious cases and on the interests of the individual that are vital. We do not seek to go beyond what is already the present position. I hope that the noble Lord will reflect on that and, when the time comes, not move his amendment.
It is some time since the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, moved his original amendment, but I hope he is assured that the serious issues involving state public authorities and the citizen are addressed by this. With regard to the liberty of the individual, there are a number of specific provisions, quite apart from the more general provision that loss of liberty is seen as a harm to the individual. I hope, on the basis of these reassurances, that the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble and learned Lord for summing up in a very complicated summing-up situation. I am also extremely grateful for the many powerful interventions that were made both immediately after the amendment was moved and during the Minister's summing up. I think that their content has increased understanding and has pointed out many more aspects of the problem than I was able to point out in moving the amendment. Some very serious points have been raised and I think it behoves us all to read very carefully in Hansard what has been said in the House this evening. I think and I hope that it will be possible, having done that, to have a discussion with the Minister and with the officials concerned with this issue before we bring it back on Report. Issues involving people who are in the hands of the state should not be allowed to be dropped until we are absolutely certain that the legislation is clear and protects the most vulnerable who are up against the state. Meanwhile, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(12 years, 10 months ago)
Lords Chamber
To ask Her Majesty’s Government what measures they propose to take to consult the whole of the United Kingdom about the future of the Union.
My Lords, following the outcome of the 2011 Scottish Parliament elections, the Government accept that there is a case for holding a referendum in Scotland. If there is to be a referendum, we believe that it should be legal, fair and decisive. Therefore, we are consulting on the best way to achieve this. I can reassure the noble Baroness that the Government look forward to receiving views from across the United Kingdom during the consultation process.
My Lords, does the Minister agree that the break-up of the United Kingdom will affect us all throughout the UK? If so, will we all have an equal right to make our views known, and why not through a referendum? We have had an equal right to express our views on AV; we are told that we will have an equal right if competences move from this country to the EU, so why is there not an equal right throughout this country to vote on the most important constitutional issue to face any of us in our lifetime?
My Lords, I am sure that most, if not all, of your Lordships would find it very grievous indeed if the United Kingdom were to break up. Nevertheless, in the 11 referendums that have taken place since 1973, only two were held nationwide. Indeed, previous referendums have been held in only one nation of the United Kingdom—in London and in the north-east of England. We believe that whether or not Scotland should leave the United Kingdom and become a separate independent state is a matter for the people of Scotland. It would not be good for relationships within the United Kingdom if it were felt that some parts of the UK had been prevented from doing so by others. Our sincere belief, which I am sure we share, is that that will not happen—that those of us who believe that the values which we share across these islands are to be upheld will win a comprehensive victory, and that Scotland has contributed to the United Kingdom in the same way as the United Kingdom has contributed to the good of Scotland.
Does my noble and learned friend not agree that if the separatists in Scotland wish to leave the United Kingdom, that is a matter that needs to be settled in Scotland? If, on the other hand, the so-called devo-max option is being considered, whereby matters other than foreign affairs and defence are considered in Scotland, that is a matter for the United Kingdom as a whole. It would effectively create an English Parliament and a federal Parliament, and that would have to be settled by a UK-wide referendum.
I agree with my noble friend that if the separatists were to have their way and Scotland were to vote to leave the United Kingdom, that should be determined by the people of Scotland. I also agree with him that the so-called devo-max proposal, as far as one can understand what it is—in our exchanges last week, noble Lords suggested that it was a product without a brand or a brand without a product; I cannot remember which way round it was—has implications for other parts of the UK, and we are certainly well seized of that fact.
My Lords, as a Scot, I do not want separation. I feel strongly that there should be only one question in the referendum, and one question alone. I ask the Minister to give some advice to the Prime Minister: the best thing that he can do would be to stop appearing arrogant in his interventions. It does not help those of us who want to retain the United Kingdom.
My Lords, one of the issues in the consultation to which I referred is the number of questions in a referendum, although the United Kingdom Government have made it clear that our preference would be for a single question on whether Scotland should remain part of the United Kingdom. To do otherwise and to import questions such as devo-max would only muddy the waters and lead to a very indecisive outcome. We want a referendum that is not only legal and fair but decisive as well.
The Government this week announced the establishment of the new Commission on the Consequences of Devolution for the House of Commons. There are some excellent members on it, but why was there no consultation on the membership with the Official Opposition? Who will be looking at the consequences of devolution for the House of Lords?
My Lords, the noble Baroness is right to draw attention to the fact that, as was announced yesterday, there will be a Commission on the Consequences of Devolution for the House of Commons. It is important to point out that the panel, which will be chaired by Sir William McKay, a former Clerk of the House, comprises six independent, non-partisan experts. There is no question over party balance in this. With regard to the consequences for the House of Lords, I am conscious that, although a Scot, I am a Peer of the United Kingdom.
Would the Government support a broad-based British organised public discussion of the United Kingdom, in the manner of the Scottish convention, to help inform the debate that should lead to the decision on whether to dismember the United Kingdom? Is it not critically important that people’s opinions are sought not just in a snap decision but having had an extensive discussion in which they can all be involved?
My Lords, I do not think that there is any chance of it being a snap decision. I am very conscious that, in your Lordships’ House, many Lordships bring to bear from their respective experience examples of where Scotland has made a contribution as part of the United Kingdom to the common good of Scotland and of where Scotland has in turn made a valuable contribution to the United Kingdom. In the debates that take place on this I hope that people will be prepared to speak out and show that our shared values are of great importance, and that it would be a backward step to break up our United Kingdom.
(12 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, with permission, I shall now repeat a Statement made by the Secretary of State for Scotland in the House of Commons.
“In May 2011 the Scottish National Party won a significant electoral victory—a victory this Government have openly acknowledged. The SNP has consistently campaigned for Scottish independence and its 2011 manifesto included a pledge to hold an independence referendum. As a Scot, I think it is vital that the Scottish people make a clear decision about our future within the United Kingdom—a decision made in Scotland, by the people of Scotland—but at present there is a lack of clarity about the referendum, its outcome and what the implications of that outcome would be. All of this creates economic uncertainty and that is bad for jobs and investment.
Since last year’s election, we have been asking the Scottish Government to set out their plans for a referendum but so far they have not done so. In particular, they have not said anything more about their legal power to deliver a referendum. This is not an issue that can be ducked. To legislate for a referendum on independence, the Scottish Parliament must have the legal power to do so. It is the Government’s clear view that the Scottish Parliament does not have that legal power.
Scotland’s future within the United Kingdom will be the most important decision we, as Scots, take in our lifetime. It is essential that the referendum is legal, fair and decisive. As a Government, we have been clear since May 2011 that we will not stand in the way of a referendum on independence. But neither will we stand on the sidelines and let uncertainty continue. Any referendum must let all of us in Scotland determine our future clearly and decide whether to stay part of the longest and most successful partnership of nations in history. That is why we are publishing a consultation to seek views on how to deliver a legal, fair and decisive referendum.
For a referendum to take place, legislation is required. This ensures that any referendum—on any issue—is subject to detailed consideration, debate and clear and consistent regulation. In 2010 the Scottish Government published plans to legislate for a referendum on independence. We have considered those plans carefully against the devolution settlement in Scotland as set out in the Scotland Act 1998. The 1998 Act is clear: the Scottish Parliament cannot legislate on matters reserved to this Parliament. Among the issues that are reserved is the constitution, including “the Union of the Kingdoms of Scotland and England”. Any Act of the Scottish Parliament that “relates to” a reserved matter is quite simply “not law”. Whether or not a Bill “relates to” a reserved matter depends on its purpose and effect.
We are clear that the Scottish Government’s purpose in bringing forward a referendum is to secure independence. Their intended effect is to secure a mandate for negotiating this. Both purpose and effect relate directly to the reserved matter of the union. Any distinction between a binding or advisory referendum is artificial. As the law stands, an independence referendum Bill is outside the competence of the Scottish Parliament. A Bill could be challenged in court and it is our view that the Scottish Government would lose.
So the consultation paper I am publishing today sets out different ways to deliver a legal, fair and decisive referendum. It explains how the powers for a referendum could be devolved under the Section 30 order-making provisions in the Scotland Act 1998— our preferred approach. It also invites views on devolving the powers using other legislation, including the current Scotland Bill, and for opinions on the possibility of running the referendum directly.
Given the clear legal problem that exists, we want to work with the Scottish Government to provide the answer. This is not about the mandates of Scotland’s two Governments or who calls the shots. It is about empowering the people of Scotland to participate in a legal referendum. That means that the UK Government are willing to give the Scottish Parliament the powers to hold a referendum which it otherwise cannot do legally.
But as well as being legal, a referendum must be fair and it must be decisive. For those reasons, the rules of the referendum must be demonstrably above board. The referendum should be overseen by those who have neutrality and the proven expertise to inspire confidence in the fairness of the process, such as the Electoral Commission.
But these issues are not for politicians alone to consider. That is why the consultation process that starts today will let people express their views on when a referendum should be held, what question should be asked, who should be entitled to vote and how the campaign should be run.
It will be open to all people in Scotland—and indeed outwith Scotland—to make their views clear, rather than rely on the opinions of politicians. It is in everyone’s interests that the two Governments take on board the needs of Scotland and the opinions of its people, work together and deliver the legal, fair and decisive referendum that is in our common interests.
This Government believe passionately in the United Kingdom. For over 300 years, our country has brought people together in the most successful multinational state the world has known. This Government are clear that independence is not in the interests of Scotland. The United Kingdom brings strength to Scotland and Scotland brings strength to the United Kingdom.
We recognise that this is not a view shared by all. But politicians from both sides of the debate owe it to everyone in Scotland to ensure that the referendum is delivered in a legal, fair and decisive way. The future of Scotland must not be worked out in secret, behind closed doors, nor determined by wrangling in the courts. It is my task to ensure that this referendum is made in Scotland, by the people of Scotland, for the future of Scotland. I commend this Statement to the House”.
My Lords, that concludes the Statement.
I thank the noble and learned Lord for repeating the Statement and add my gratitude for its notice. I trust that this will be a precedent for future practice.
The Statement is welcome, clear and, up to a point, informative. It opens discussion of what for too long has been either ignored or suppressed—namely, the legality of the Scottish Government’s proposals for a referendum. It should also have the benefit of obliging the Scottish Government to engage in open discussion on this important constitutional issue. It appears already to be succeeding at least in getting the First Minister to say that he will reveal within days his constitutional plans, which people have been asking him to reveal for quite some time. There is no doubt that the referendum will take place and what we must now do in all parties is work together to ensure that it is fair, legal and commands the respect of people in Scotland.
The democratic rights of people resident in Scotland have recently been prayed in aid by the Deputy First Minister. Democratic rights throughout the UK of course rest on the rule of law. That such an important issue be dealt with in a clear and lawful manner is something that all interested in democracy have a right to expect. The legal position should surely have been clear to all for some time but this has apparently not been accepted in certain quarters. On such an issue, frank and open discussion is the lifeblood of democracy. Secrecy and obfuscation may be clever gamesmanship, but they help no one, least of all the Scottish electorate, to understand complex constitutional issues.
The Government are to be congratulated on expressing their legal understanding openly and clearly, and we wait to see whether that openness is reciprocated by the Scottish Government. What, it may be asked, is the position of the Scottish Government on the legality of the Scottish Parliament proposing a referendum? There have been curious twists and turns as to how a referendum might be likened to an opinion poll and somehow have nothing to do with the constitution. That has been recognised as obvious nonsense.
The Scottish Government have a duty to make clear their position in relation to the legality of their own referendum, opinion poll or whatever. Anything less leaves them open to accusations of dissembling and trickery. The Government have made clear the view of UK law officers on this issue. Surely we are now entitled to know the view of Scottish law officers. If there were any genuine dispute, the issue might be taken to the Supreme Court for resolution. If there is no such genuine dispute, we can all get on with discussing, in a mature and less rancorous manner, how the referendum is to be organised for the benefit of all concerned.
I have five questions for the noble and learned Lord. First, if the Scottish Government produce contrary legal advice regarding the legality of the referendum, will the Government take the issue to the Supreme Court?
Secondly, Her Majesty's Government propose a Section 30 process to devolve powers for a referendum as their preferred option. But that, as with a Legislative Consent Motion, might give the Scottish Parliament a veto. Are the Government not anxious to avoid any such veto and has that been considered? Thirdly, as the noble and learned Lord will be aware, the First Minister says that he wishes to extend the franchise for his referendum—but only that—to 16 and 17 year-olds. Will the proposed consultation look at this issue and at whether only those resident in Scotland may vote?
Fourthly, the time limit within which the referendum was to be held appears to have been dropped. This seemed important. The Prime Minister said on Sunday that 18 months was to be the time limit, but during the week that appears to have been departed from. Why was that?
Finally, on the consultation itself, it surely has to be done properly rather than quickly. Eight weeks seems to be a somewhat abbreviated period for consultation on such an important issue. Why was that period chosen? As the Minister knows well, Calman provided a good model for consultation. Will Her Majesty's Government follow that model?
I am very grateful to the noble and learned Lord for his welcome of this consultation. I share many of the views that he expressed, not least that any Government of any Parliament on any mandate must operate within the rule of law. That is one of the fundamentals of our democracy. Clearly, too, simply having a straw poll on the day of someone's choosing would not amount to what we understand properly to be a referendum. That is why the Government take the view that any proper referendum is outwith the competence of the Scottish Parliament. That is why we have set out our view on how we might move forward.
I certainly agree with the noble and learned Lord that it would be in everyone's interests, particularly in Scotland but also in the wider United Kingdom, if these matters could now progress, in his words, “in a mature and less rancorous way”. That is certainly our hope and our intention by publishing this consultation.
The noble and learned Lord asked whether, if the Scottish Government produce conflicting legal advice, it would be referred to the Supreme Court. As he knows, the reference to the Supreme Court would fall on any legislation. The whole purpose of this consultation is to try to avoid that situation so that any legislation passed by the Scottish Parliament is within the competence of the Parliament because provision will have been made for it. That is the way of progressing in a mature and less rancorous way. It is in everyone's interest to avoid any legal uncertainty. In White Papers that were produced during the previous term, the Scottish Government themselves recognised that there was some uncertainty. What we are proposing in the consultation with our preferred Section 30 order is a way of ending that legal uncertainty.
The noble and learned Lord asked whether we had considered the possibility that the Scottish Parliament could veto our Section 30 order. That is obviously the case. A Section 30 order must be passed by both Houses of this Parliament and by the Scottish Parliament before being presented to Her Majesty in Council. Clearly, there would be an opportunity for that not to be passed by the Scottish Parliament. However, the whole point of having the consultation and of engaging not just with the Scottish Government and Scottish Parliament but with wider interests in Scotland is to try to avoid that situation, so that if a Section 30 order is brought forward it is one that can command consent and support.
With regard to the franchise, the noble and learned Lord will note that in the consultation document a question is raised about the franchise. It has been suggested by the First Minister that 16 and 17 year-olds may vote. The view of the Government is that the preferred franchise for the referendum is the one that we currently use to elect the Scottish Parliament. It seems perfectly reasonable, if that is the franchise to elect the Scottish Parliament, that it should be the franchise used for a referendum. Obviously, there are wider issues about whether 16 and 17 year-olds should have the vote. No doubt they will be properly debated in time, but it is not a matter to be debated in the context of this referendum. We asked the question but our view is that the franchise for the Scottish parliamentary elections makes the best franchise for a referendum.
With regard to time, the Government have always said that the referendum should happen sooner rather than later. If the Scottish Government work with us during the consultation process and we go down the route of the Section 30 order, it is possible that these powers can be used to deliver a legal referendum sooner rather than later. But this is a consultation and we are seeking the views of people about how best to deliver a legal, fair and decisive referendum, including when the referendum should take place.
Finally, it is explained in the eight-week consultation document that it is eight weeks because while our preferred option would certainly be to use a Section 30 order there is also the possibility of using primary legislation. The obvious vehicle for primary legislation is the Scotland Bill currently before your Lordships’ House. The House will recognise that there are time constraints on that, but we think that the issues here are very clear. It is not as if the points brought together in the consultation document are ones that nobody has been discussing, although the Scottish Government have perhaps not contributed too much until now. If they are about to produce their own response to this, that is a good outcome already from the consultation document. I think that the issues are clear and one would hope that we could get a wide range of Scottish opinion within the eight weeks and still allow the opportunity, if that should be the case, for the Scotland Bill to be used.
My Lords, I accept absolutely the sovereignty of the people of Scotland on this issue, but I hope that they will exercise their choice to stay part of a multinational and multicultural United Kingdom. I agree also that there is a need to end the uncertainty and clarify fair rules around any referendum on independence for Scotland. However, I counsel the Government against falling into a nationalist trap, as they will wish to portray the Prime Minister—to amend a phrase used elsewhere in recent years—as going from Mr Bean to Stalin in relation to Scotland. It is vital that all of us ask both Governments to get around a table and agree the rules for the referendum and agree them properly and fairly. Will the Minister address his colleagues in Government on that issue and urge them to get involved not in a shouting match but in practical and concrete discussions that produce an end result? Does he agree that the 1979 referendum result in Scotland was not accepted by everyone in part because it was created in a divisive manner and the campaigns were executed in a divisive manner? The 1997 referendum result was accepted by everybody, including by everybody who opposed it, because the rules were agreed fairly and there was consensus about how it was done. Does the Minister agree that that is the way forward for Scotland, and that we have a result that is clear but accepted afterwards because every party and everyone involved has been engaged in the discussions about the creation of that referendum in the first place?
I thank the noble Lord for that contribution. I certainly entirely endorse the latter part of what he has just said. Having campaigned in both the 1979 and the 1997 referendums, I am certainly clear that the fact that in the 1997 referendum the campaigns and the rules were very clear and nobody had any cause to say that there was any jiggery-pokery, or that the goalposts were being shifted, meant that those on the losing side nevertheless felt able to accept the outcome. That is the goal that we all want to see in this. I say that in terms of the earlier part of his question, too. Anyone who reads the consultation paper will see that it is by far and away not a Stalinist document but one that invites consensus and provides a route map towards consensus. That is the spirit in which it is offered to the people of Scotland.
My Lords, I congratulate the Prime Minister and my noble friend on this initiative. Could he help me with something that is causing me some bewilderment? The SNP manifesto, on which it got 45 per cent of the vote, says:
“We will give Scots the opportunity to decide our nation's future in an independence referendum”.
In that case, why is this initiative by the Government so unpopular with the Scottish nationalists?
That is a very fair question. I cannot understand why they would not wish to have the proposal to allow them to achieve their manifesto goal in a legal way, given that back in 2009 the First Minister was calling for a referendum in November 2010. Here we are providing a legal route. But the means of making it fair and decisive are perfectly reasonable proposals on which we are consulting, and I very much hope that on reflection the Scottish Government will agree that this is a proper way forward and will enter into the consultation in that spirit. This is not just a consultation for Governments; we hope that people from all walks of life, in Scotland and furth of Scotland, will also respond.
As one of those who sat for many hours and nights and days and months—it sometimes felt like years—trying to secure the passage of the original Scotland Bill through your Lordships' House, I welcome this bold Statement by the Government. It is absolutely right; if anything, it is slightly overdue.
On two particular issues, first, can I observe that it is important that there is a time limit to the referendum? It is absolutely vital for the future of Scotland that the matter of independence is settled quickly and clearly without doubt. It is holding back the whole progress of Scotland economically and socially, and that must be resolved.
Secondly, on the franchise, I would have thought that the answer was simple. If you want effectively to replace or modify the Scotland Bill, the franchise ought to be the same as the one that was used to secure the proposals on the referendum in the White Paper at that time.
One great advantage of the Government’s proposal is that it will avoid the dreadful situation and ultimate catastrophe whereby, if the Scottish Parliament played the matter long and it reached a stage where a referendum was about to be called, any individual could take the Parliament to the courts on the basis that the proposal was outwith the vires of the Parliament. That would be a most unsatisfactory situation. It is important to make the vires issue absolutely clear, and I think that the Government are absolutely right in drawing attention to the vires being decided on purpose and effect. That deals with the whole vires issue. If the constitution is reserved, anything to do with constitutional change, because it is purpose and effect, must also be reserved.
I come on to a slightly sensitive issue—
Does the Minister recognise that one problem is that for too long all the political parties in Scotland have refused to confront the issue and failed to challenge the fact that the present First Minister in Scotland has asserted that this is a function of the Scottish Parliament when clearly it is not?
My Lords, I certainly am very grateful and appreciate the support and welcome that the noble Lord has given, not least because of the very important role that he played in delivering the Scotland Act 1998 through many sittings in your Lordships' House. He asked about the timing, and clearly one could pray in aid comments from professional bodies, including the CBI Scotland. However, it is almost common sense and self-evident that at a time of otherwise considerable economic turmoil and concern, businesses, which in making investment decisions look to the long term, will factor in questions of uncertainty as to whether Scotland will or will not be part of the United Kingdom and, if not, whether it will have the euro or the pound. Clearly there are uncertainties there, which is why the Government, including a number of my ministerial colleagues, have expressed a view that we would prefer to see this referendum sooner rather than later.
The consultation paper sets out some of those factors and invites comment from people in Scotland as to the timing for the referendum. I hope that not only the United Kingdom Government but the Scottish Government will have regard to those responses.
I will not follow the noble Lord down his final path, because I do not believe that while we are trying to move forward and get a legal, decisive and fair basis for a referendum, and to have a campaign which those of us who firmly believe in Scotland's future in the United Kingdom want to co-ordinate and act on together, it is the moment for criticising parties north of the border.
My noble and learned friend knows that I did not take any part in the last Scottish elections, because I was following the advice of the late Lord Weatherill and the noble Baroness, Lady Boothroyd, that as a former Presiding Officer I should not take part in party political activity, but that did not mean that I was not watching what was going on. Does the Minister agree that what happened was that the SNP leaflets, and indeed the ballot paper, did not say, “Vote SNP for independence”? They did not even say, “Vote SNP for a referendum”. They said, “Vote SNP for Alex Salmond as First Minister.” Objectively, I thought that was rather successful. However, the idea now that there was some kind of mandate and that people were rushing into the polling booths to authorise the SNP to organise a referendum—and to decide who should vote in it, what the question is and when it should be held—is complete nonsense. Their manifesto did not even refer to the timing coinciding with Bannockburn, so let us get rid of this mandate theory.
The Government are right to come forward with a consultation paper. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord McConnell, that what will scunner the people of Scotland is if we spend the next three years discussing these issues instead of getting on with getting the two Governments together to work out a sensible way of letting the people of Scotland decide their future as soon as possible.
I certainly know why my noble friend did not participate, having been a former Presiding Officer. I had some participation in the Scottish elections as an observer, and it is probably right to say that whether or not Mr Salmond was the best of the party leaders to be First Minister seemed to resonate in the debates more than the question of independence. Nevertheless, it has been the policy over many years for the Scottish National Party to have a referendum on independence. That clearly was in its manifesto and the United Kingdom Government have, since May last year, indicated that we recognise that. The timing was certainly not in its manifesto but, as I think my noble friends Lord Forsyth and Lord Steel said, the SNP said that it wanted a referendum on independence and we are trying to ensure that it gets one. What could be fairer than that?
My Lords, we should all welcome this decisive action by the Government, which has helped to fill a vacuum that was there in putting the unionist case. However, in the consultative document there is one matter that causes me some doubt. Why is there any question about who should oversee the referendum? Surely, it must be the Electoral Commission that decides the wording of the question, how much money should be spent by each side and all the other aspects. Surely, that does not need consultation.
Perhaps I may ask a practical question in relation to the consideration by this House. Since the consultation finishes on 9 March and we are due to go into Committee on 26 January to consider the Scotland Bill, and since some of us have put down a number of amendments—indeed, I have put down one in relation to Section 30 that is exactly what the Government are proposing—are we really going to go ahead with the Committee stage on 26 January? It will really be a false debate that is taking place when we know that this consultation is under way. It will be going through the motions without any real substance to the debate. I hope that the Government will now consider postponing consideration in Committee as a result of that.
My Lords, with regard to the noble Lord’s first question, it is very clear on page 16 of the consultation document that the United Kingdom Government believe that the Electoral Commission should oversee any referendum on Scottish independence. Indeed, we have included provision in the draft Section 30 order which is appended to the consultation document. However, we put the question because this is an issue which the Scottish Government have called into question. It is something that should be consulted on, but the UK Government make it very clear that we believe that the body best equipped to oversee this, with a track record of overseeing impartially and fairly, is the Electoral Commission.
With regard to the timing of business, as a non-business manager it is always very difficult to embark into that territory. However, the consultation will be current because there are issues other than the question of the noble Lord’s amendments, and amendments tabled by other noble Lords, with regard to independence. There are other issues to be debated in Committee. Also, it would not necessarily do any harm to air some of the issues—perhaps in more detail, which we have in this consultation—and of course there will still be the Report stage to come back to, by which time we will have had the outcome of the consultation.
My Lords, I add my welcome to this Statement, which is absolutely excellent. I welcome its clarity and its tone. I welcome its firm and fair sense of purpose, particularly with regard to the timing. I hope that the absence of a reference to an 18-month time limit in no way suggests that the enthusiasm for speed has diminished in the hands of my noble and learned friend and my colleagues in Government.
However, whatever became of Braveheart? Last February, the Scottish National Party put out a policy document, which I am told said that it would hold a referendum as soon as possible. Now, less than a year later, it seems to have disappeared into the mists of time, so it is Braveheart to shrinking violet in less than one year. I hope that my noble and learned friend will press on, for the reasons that the noble Lord, Lord Sewel, gave. The Scottish economy is undoubtedly suffering and will continue to suffer as a result of the uncertainty which is happening. Investment is falling, inward investment is low and company formation is very low. Unemployment is rising faster in Scotland than elsewhere in the United Kingdom. We need firmness, clarity and a modicum of speed, provided always that we can ensure that all the facts and reality of the figures and consequences for Scotland are laid clearly before the people before a vote is taken. That requires independent verification by some kind of body, as my noble friend Lord Forsyth has suggested in the past.
My Lords, I am very grateful to my noble friend for his welcome for the approach which we are taking. As I indicated in my response to the noble Lord, Lord Sewel, it seems to be self-evidently the case that a question of Scotland's future within the United Kingdom is a cause for uncertainty as long as it remains unresolved. That indeed is why my ministerial colleagues and I are of the view that a referendum held sooner rather than later would be better. That is stated in the consultation but we thought it important that other people in Scotland, and indeed outwith Scotland, get the opportunity to express their position on the view.
My noble friend referred to Braveheart and shrinking violets. I note that in the Scottish Government's White Paper, Your Scotland, Your Voice, published in November 2009, the First Minister said:
“It is now time for the voice of the people to be heard—in the referendum on Scotland’s future we intend to hold in November 2010”.
Their manifesto for the 2010 elections said:
“We are taking forward a Referendum Bill in the Scottish Parliament this year”.
I just observe that it seems rather odd that when they were in the Scottish Parliament without a majority, they were wanting a quick referendum but when they can actually deliver it they want to delay it.
My Lords, it is self-evidently right that there should be a referendum that is legal, fair and decisive. The worst possible outcome for Scotland and for the union would be to have a conclusion that was narrow and that people believed had been rigged in some way. For that reason, I welcome this Statement and the consultation document. However, the rather intemperate response that we have seen from the Scottish Administration really gives one cause to question whether there had been any discussions with the Scottish Government prior to the publication of this document. If not, why not, and if it should prove to be true that the First Minister has said that he would boycott this process, what then would be the view of the Government?
My Lords, all I can say is that there has been ongoing discussion between Ministers of this Government and the Scottish Government since May of last year on a whole range of issues, including those relating to the Scotland Bill and UK Ministers trying to ensure that they can get some information from the Scottish Government about the referendum. I do not think that the details of this specific consultation document were discussed in detail but we have certainly been challenging the Scottish Government to indicate to us how they think that they could deliver on their manifesto commitment.
On the boycott, I very much hope that that will not happen and that people will realise in Scotland that what is being proposed here is a way forward. My noble friend Lord Forsyth expressed it absolutely succinctly: what is happening is a way forward for them to have their policy delivered in a legal way without it being challenged in the courts, which would be in no one's interest. That would lead to uncertainties and bad feelings, and perhaps be an indecisive outcome. That would be in no one's interests. Perhaps, in the cold light of day, it will be seen that what is proposed here is a sensible and very reasonable way forward. I hope that sense and reason will prevail.
My Lords, I would like to probe further the fury of the SNP on this issue. Will the Minister confirm that these proposals merely aim to create a fair, appropriate and legal framework that will allow a referendum on independence to take place—a referendum that will in fact be organised by the Scottish Government on terms fixed by the Scottish Parliament, all as promised by the SNP? Will he confirm that Alex Salmond and his Ministers will be able to set the wording of the referendum question, provided that the Electoral Commission agrees that it is not biased, rigged or gerrymandered in any way?
What is the SNP moaning about? As the consultation document makes clear, the most recent Scottish Government document on all this said that they wanted to have a referendum as soon as possible—and a referendum on independence, not on devo-max or on anything else. That is not, I remind the House, SNP policy. Is it not the truth that Alex Salmond is now desperate to have a second question to give him and his party an emergency escape route from the political meltdown that he will face when he loses a vote on independence? We should not give him that lifeline.
The simple answer to that is that we want a decisive referendum, and one of the key means of delivering that is to have one question. That is why the draft order that we propose makes provision for just one question. It would allow for provisions in relation to the UK Parliament for UK-run referendums to be applied to the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Government, but we believe that that one question will resolve matters and we should not be muddying the water with devo-max—whatever that means. No one has a clue what it means; it was not in the SNP manifesto. What was in that party’s manifesto was a question about Scottish independence, and that is what we believe we are assisting the Scottish Parliament to deliver. I hope that the SNP will recognise that this Government are being very fair and reasonable in trying to achieve that end.
(12 years, 11 months ago)
Lords Chamber
To ask Her Majesty’s Government why they are proposing that personal injury claimants pay part of their legal costs.
My Lords, the Government are reforming no-win no-fee conditional fee arrangements to return them to the basis on which they were first introduced in the 1990s. CFAs worked well then, and personal injury claimants were liable to contribute to their lawyer’s success fee if the lawyer charged one. However, CFA claimants no longer have an interest in the costs run up on their behalf. Our reforms will bring proportion to civil litigation costs while preserving access to justice.
Does the Minister not understand that many people who have suffered serious and maybe life-threatening injuries will be deterred from seeking compensation? Far from saving £50 million, as has been suggested, recent Parliamentary Answers have shown that this measure will cost the Government over £100 million, which comprises legal fees, additional compensation and loss of income from recovered treatment fees from insurers? This is a folly. It will deter ordinary people from going forward to seek the compensation that is due to them.
My Lords, the Government do not accept that the measure will deter people from coming forward. As I indicated, the reforms brought in by my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern in the 1990s, which introduced the no-win no-fee conditional fee agreements, allowed people suffering from personal injuries to come forward and pursue their claims. We are not satisfied that at present there is a proper proportion with regard to the amount of fees charged, particularly where the claimant has no interest in ensuring that they are kept within modest means. The system has got out of proportion; our reforms seek to bring it back into proportion.
Is the Minister satisfied that there will be equality of access to justice for the very poorest victims of clinical negligence in circumstances in which they must bring their action against public authorities, whose defence will be funded by the state?
My Lords, I perfectly recognise that the issue of clinical negligence is one that many Members of your Lordships’ House raised during Second Reading, and I am sure that it will be fully debated when we reach the relevant stage in Committee. We say that “after the event” insurance premiums should be allowable in cases of clinical negligence. Indeed, we are seeking through the NHS and those who represent claimants to try to ensure that, where there can be joint reports and better agreements between the two sides, that should be done. I hope that we can make progress on that but no doubt it will be fully debated in the weeks to come.
Does not the Minister think it very unfair that somebody who has been injured through somebody else’s fault, and is suing on the basis that someone else is at fault, should lose some of their compensation even though it is not their fault?
My Lords, success fees are intended to cover the risk of not winning and the lawyers not being paid. In many cases where there is personal injury there is a very low risk of that happening. Indeed, it begs the question whether it is necessary for solicitors to charge success fees at all in these situations. However, as my noble friend Lord Gold pointed out at Second Reading, claimants who fund themselves often do not receive the full amount of their compensation. It seems rather odd, to put it mildly, that those who are funded by the taxpayer should get the full amount back but those who fund themselves do not recover the full amount of their compensation.
My Lords, I understand that there is an intention to bring in damages-based agreements whereby a claimant will have to pay some of their costs out of the damages they receive. The compensation factor is that there will be a 10 per cent increase in general damages for pain and suffering and loss of amenity, which is currently assessed by judges on an ad hoc basis and according to the Judicial Studies Board guidelines. However, bereavement damages have long troubled people as being far too low. They are £11,800, which can be split between all those who are bereaved as a result of an accident. Do the Government have any plans to increase the size of bereavement awards, particularly in view of the fact that other awards may be increased by 10 per cent under the new regime?
My Lords, my noble friend raises the important point about damages in respect of bereavement. As he noted in his question, conventionally these matters have been dealt with by the judiciary. Certainly, the proposed 10 per cent increase will be taken forward by the senior judiciary. I will ensure that the important point my noble friend makes regarding damages for bereavement is drawn to its attention.
My Lords, the Minister will know that the NHSLA—that is, the legal arm of the NHS—opposes these changes and desired that legal aid should continue in clinical negligence cases. That was its answer to the consultation process. What is its current position?
My Lords, I am not aware that it has made any further pronouncements on the matter. However, the Government believe that a conditional fee arrangement backed by ATE insurance will ensure that the vast majority of clinical negligence claims will be able to be investigated and that the ATE insurance market will adapt to the new arrangements. It is also important to point out that in Clause 9 of the Bill there is an exceptional funding scheme, which may well be relevant in profoundly serious cases where clinical negligence arises. However, I am sure that my noble friend will make a contribution on these matters when this is debated, I hope next month.
My Lords, does my noble friend agree that people in minor accidents are sometimes encouraged to find that they have whiplash, which encourages a lawyer to say that they must be legally represented?
My Lords, I made the point earlier that there is little or no risk involved in many cases, but I also think—and this relates to my noble friend’s point—that some cases in which a claimant is funding their own legal costs may well never come to court, whereas if all their fees are paid for them it may be easier to pursue the claim.
(12 years, 12 months ago)
Lords Chamber
That the draft order laid before the House on 24 October be approved.
Relevant documents: 31st Report from the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments, considered in Grand Committee on 22 November
(13 years ago)
Grand Committee
That the Grand Committee do report to the House that it has considered the Parliamentary Constituencies and Assembly Electoral Regions (Wales) (Amendment) Order 2011.
Relevant document: 31st Report from the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments.
My Lords, the purpose of this draft order is to implement the recommendations made by the Boundary Commission for Wales in four interim review reports in relation to the boundaries of certain constituencies and electoral regions of the National Assembly for Wales. If approved, these changes will alter seven of the existing 40 constituencies for the next Welsh Assembly elections, which are scheduled to take place in 2016. This is, however, subject to the commitment that my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Wales has given to look carefully at the implications of having different boundaries for Assembly constituencies and parliamentary constituencies in Wales.
I should perhaps clarify at the outset that the order affects Welsh Assembly boundaries only and has no impact on the boundaries of any Welsh parliamentary constituencies at Westminster.
I wish to put on the record thanks to the Boundary Commission for Wales and its secretariat for its work in carrying out these reviews. As always, the commission has carried out its duties thoroughly and conscientiously. I particularly thank the deputy chair of the commission, Mr Justice Lloyd Jones, for overseeing this work.
I apologise for interrupting the Minister but he said that this order did not have anything to do with the parliamentary boundaries, so why does it have the words “Parliamentary Constituencies and Assembly Electoral Regions” in its title?
That is a very good question and I hope that the answer I give will satisfy the noble Lord. He will know that this is an amendment order and it is amending the Parliamentary Constituencies and Assembly Electoral Regions (Wales) Order 2006. However, I think we are clear that it will affect only the Assembly constituencies. A smaller number of people are affected. Nevertheless, for the electors and the relevant Assembly Members concerned, these are important. I am sure that MPs in the other place whose constituencies cover the areas affected will have been interested in the changes; indeed, they were debated there yesterday.
If I am right, I have those details and will come to them in my remarks. The position is that the Boundary Commission for Wales is an independent body that is responsible for reviewing parliamentary constituency boundaries in Wales. Prior to the Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Act 2011, Welsh Assembly constituencies were coterminous with United Kingdom parliamentary constituency boundaries. Formerly, as well as carrying out general reviews of all parliamentary constituencies every eight to 12 years, each of the four boundary commissions in the UK was empowered to carry out interim reviews of particular constituencies in between those general reviews, if that was thought necessary. Such reviews could, for example, take account of changes to local government boundaries that affected the boundaries of parliamentary constituencies.
The 2011 Act provides for more frequent general boundary reviews—they will now take place every five years—which will help to ensure that general reviews are better able to take account of changes in the electorate or changes in local government boundaries. This makes it less important and less practicable to have interim reviews, and the Act removes the provision for the boundary commissions to undertake interim reviews in between general reviews.
The Boundary Commission for Wales was the only boundary commission to be engaged in interim reviews while the PVSC Act was going through Parliament. That Act provides for any interim reviews of parliamentary constituencies by the Boundary Commission for Wales that were pending at the time of the passing of the 2011 Act to be completed and implemented, though the recommendations arising from the reviews will apply only to Welsh Assembly purposes. As the 2011 Act requires the Boundary Commission for Wales to carry out a general review of all Welsh parliamentary constituencies by October 2013, there is no need for the recommendations arising from the interim reviews to be applied to Welsh parliamentary constituencies as they will soon be overtaken by the general review.
The draft order implements the recommendations of four such pending reviews by the Boundary Commission for Wales. The reviews make recommendations regarding the boundaries between the following constituencies: Brecon and Radnorshire, and Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney; Ogmore and Pontypridd; Cardiff North, and Cardiff South and Penarth; Cardiff South and Penarth, and Vale of Glamorgan. The Boundary Commission for Wales carried out the reviews as a result of four orders made by Welsh Ministers during the period 2008 to 2010 that made changes to the boundaries to local government areas in Wales. As a result, the boundaries between certain parliamentary constituencies in the areas covered by the local government boundary changes no longer followed the new local government boundaries.
In each review, the boundary commission proposed that the boundary between the parliamentary constituencies covered by the review should be altered to conform to the new local government boundaries. It also proposed that there should be a corresponding change to the boundary between the Assembly electoral regions in the areas concerned, where this was affected by the new local government boundaries. As I have said, these changes involve relatively small changes on the map and relatively few electors—approximately 900 in total; in answer to my noble friend’s question, I will shortly come on to a breakdown of some of those figures—but obviously they are significant for electors locally. For example, with regard to Brecon and Radnorshire, and Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney, a number of electors have been transferred to a local authority since the review transfers the constituency, and indeed the region, for the purposes of elections to the Welsh Assembly. The order addresses misalignments between Assembly and local authority boundaries.
As I said, in total four representations were received on the proposals in the four reviews. They included one from Mr Owen Smith, the honourable Member for Pontypridd, who I understand wrote to support the recommendations in relation to the Ogmore and Pontypridd seats. In each review, no objections were received and the commission therefore confirmed its recommendations in its final report to the Deputy Prime Minister.
As I said, the draft order gives effect to the recommendations made in the four Boundary Commission reviews without modifications by amending the earlier Parliamentary Constituencies and Assembly Electoral Regions (Wales) Order 2006. The core of the order is Articles 3 and 4, which implement the recommendations by inserting new provisions into the 2006 order which will fix the Assembly constituencies by reference to local government areas as they stood on 1 December 2010.
Eighteen electors move from the Brecon and Radnorshire constituency to the Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney constituency and, in doing so, they move from the Mid and West Wales Assembly regions to the South Wales East region. In the review concerning the Ogmore and Pontypridd constituencies, 733 electors move from parts of the Ogmore constituency to the Pontypridd constituency, while 96 move in the opposite direction, meaning that a net total of 637 electors move to the Pontypridd constituency. Again, that is a net figure of those who move from the South Wales West Assembly region to the South Wales Central region. Forty-six electors move from Cardiff South and Penarth constituency to the Cardiff North constituency, and, as they are both in the same South Wales Central region, that does not make any difference to the regions. Three electors are transferred from Cardiff South and Penarth to the Vale of Glamorgan constituency, and, again, both seats fall within the South Wales Central electoral region. I hope that that answers the detailed question posed by my noble friend.
Articles 5 and 6 make consequential changes to other provisions in the 2006 order, and Article 7 requires the relevant electoral registration officers for the affected areas to make the necessary alterations to their electoral registers. These are standard provisions in orders about boundary changes.
It is perhaps important to point out that the draft order will have no practical effect until the next Welsh Assembly general election scheduled for 2016. In the mean time, any by-elections for the Assembly which might occur in the areas affected will take place on the existing boundaries.
These changes are relatively small updates to the existing boundaries. The Government recognise that a wider debate has begun in Wales about future arrangements for the Assembly in the light of the forthcoming reduction in the number of UK parliamentary seats in Wales. We are looking at the implications of this reduction on the Assembly, and I can assure noble Lords that any decision in favour of change would be taken only following thorough public consultation.
I hope that that has given an explanation of the draft order. I commend it to the Committee and hope that we will be able to agree that this order should proceed. I beg to move.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for giving his explanation of the order. He said that the numbers were small and that it was more or less a tidying-up operation in terms of the boundaries.
In October 2010, the Boundary Commission for Wales submitted a report that affected the constituencies of Brecon and Radnorshire, where 18 electors were affected. In January 2011, the Boundary Commission submitted a further three reports. Those affected the boundaries of Ogmore, Pontypridd, Cardiff North, Cardiff South and Penarth, and the Vale of Glamorgan. Again, small numbers are affected, except in Pontypridd, where the number is 600-odd. By that time, we were in the run-up to the Assembly elections, so there was no time to implement the changes, but we hope that the changes in the order before us today will be ready for the 2016 Welsh Assembly elections.
Paragraph 7.3 of the Explanatory Notes says that,
“the Order is being brought forward in good time for the next Welsh Assembly elections”.
Paragraph 9.1 says:
“The changes being made … will be applicable for the next elections for the National Assembly for Wales, currently scheduled for 2016”.
Although this all seems very straightforward, I am sure the Minister, who mentioned it briefly, is aware that there is a big row brewing over this. We need clarification.
As I say, it seems straightforward enough but I need to ask whether the Minister is aware of the differences between this order and what the Secretary of State for Wales said, on record in the House of Commons, in answer to a question on 11 May 2011 from the Member of Parliament for Carmarthen East and Dynevor. He asked:
“Given the Labour party’s opposition to decoupling Westminster and National Assembly constituency boundaries, would it not make sense to base the make-up of the fifth National Assembly on 30 regional and 30 constituency Assembly Members?”.
The Secretary of State’s response was:
“That is a very interesting thought. Hon. Members are well aware that the Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Act 2011 broke the link between Assembly constituencies and parliamentary constituencies. I have agreed that we need to look carefully at the implications of having constituency boundaries relating to different areas and regions for UK and Assembly elections … I am taking the hon. Gentleman’s question as a recommendation that we have 30 first-past-the-post seats and 30 elected on a list system”.—[Official Report, Commons, 11/5/11; col. 1148.]
She said that she is looking at that suggestion. That response is a little different from what we have before us today.
On 30 July the Secretary of State, again answering questions relating to the boundaries, had a meeting with the Welsh Affairs Committee, at which my honourable friend Owen Smith asked her whether it was true that Welsh officials had,
“recently met the Boundary Commission and political parties in Wales and said at that meeting that they were looking for a legislative vehicle to address changing the boundaries of the Assembly constituencies in Wales?”.
In her reply the Secretary of State said:
“As far as I am concerned, we will have to look at that”.
This is very confusing. I do not know whether the Minister has had time to look at the Western Mail this morning. I am glad to see that he has. He will have read the headline:
“First Minister’s startling appeal to David Cameron bypasses Cheryl Gillan”.
The Western Mail says:
“First Minister Carwyn Jones has bypassed Welsh Secretary Cheryl Gillan and gone directly to the Prime Minister in a bid to defuse an explosive row over how AMs are elected”.
The Minister mentioned that briefly at the end of his speech. What we need in Wales is clarification that the order before us will be used for the election in 2016, and for the Minister to confirm that any changes to any of the systems in Wales will be as a result of the wishes of the Welsh people. This is a big row in Wales. I hope that the Minister appreciates how important these issues are, and that he will confirm that our arrangements today will be met in the 2016 elections.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his exposition and the noble Baroness, Lady Gale, for hers and for the information that she gave to your Lordships. I heard the Minister’s stentorian Scottish brogue as he outlined his Welsh intentions, so I drew the appropriate conclusions.
As the draft SI says, the Boundary Commission for Wales has submitted to the Lord President of the Council, Mr Clegg, reports recommending alterations to the boundaries of the parliamentary constituencies into which Wales is divided and of the constituencies of the National Assembly for Wales. Paragraph 4.3 of the Explanatory Memorandum to the order states baldly that,
“the Assembly constituencies will no longer be the same as the parliamentary constituencies”.
In some respects, it is not an exaggeration to say that in stating that fact in these papers, some history is being made. There is to be a disjoint between the boundaries of the Assembly and of the mother of Parliaments where Wales is concerned. I do not see in the Explanatory Memorandum or in the draft order any explanation as to the intent of the Government with regard to the parliamentary boundaries.
I am not qualified to pronounce upon details concerning Brecon and Radnor, Rhymney, Ogmore, Cardiff, Merthyr Tydfil, the vale and Penarth, but I presume that the consultations were scrupulous and that, in terms of these being ward boundaries for the Assembly, things went reasonably well. The order mentions parliamentary boundaries, and although the Minister mentioned them he does not appear to know about the extreme disquiet about the details of the proposed boundaries, which mean that there will be 10 fewer Members of Parliament in Wales. To cut away 10 parliamentary seats from Wales is unjust; Wales’s MPs now are serving their constituents extremely well, and MPs of all parties have never worked so hard, so effectively and so visibly. Their constituents get a fine service, and MPs make their offices and staff readily available throughout Wales to give that excellent service. That service is of more than high quality, and I regret the coalition’s decision to expunge 10 seats. The reasons for this are not given in the draft or the Explanatory Memorandum.
This is a historic blunder, against the grain of public opinion. Are Westminster MPs expected to wither on the vine in the years ahead? Why does the coalition hugely increase, by over 100, the membership of an overcrowded House of Lords when it proposes to cut severely the number of MPs? Ten parliamentary seats are to go in Wales in the coalition’s approach. Even at this late stage, I would hope that Downing Street will decide that it is going too far and will dump such a measure. It seems that we will have more and more Barons and Baronesses and fewer MPs in Wales, but we are not told in the papers before this Committee the reasons why. I do not think that this is the time to denude Wales of its Westminster champions—champions of reform, of the underprivileged and, increasingly, of the unemployed.
There is a birthright here, a parliamentary birthright, and the Government of the day are taking much of it away from the people of Wales. The Government promulgate the merits of what you may call community and yet are hacking away at an established value and historic provision in Wales. So far we have not heard why the Government intend this.
My Lords, first, I thank all noble Lords who took part in this debate. I think it is fair to say that there is very little contention over the detail of the order, and indeed I think that was the response to the recommendations of the Boundary Commission for Wales when it produced its preliminary findings. As I indicated in my opening remarks, we are not aware of anyone objecting to these provisions.
Perhaps I may start with the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Jones. The reason why there is nothing about the reduction in the number of Members of Parliament in Wales in either the order or the Explanatory Memorandum is that that is not what the order is about. It is about boundaries which will be relevant to the Welsh Assembly. I say to the noble Lord that I certainly am aware of the furore that this has caused. It was not for nothing that I dealt with the relevant parts in the amendments both in Committee and on Report when the Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill went through your Lordships’ House.
The Minister is helpful and kindly, notwithstanding his brief, but the draft order contains the words “Representation of the People, Wales” and “Parliamentary Constituencies”. There it is. There is no answer from the Government as to why Wales must suffer this huge penalty. One hopes that one day a Minister who represents the coalition will tell us why.
My Lords, as I explained to the noble Lord’s noble friend Lord Rowlands, the words “Parliamentary Constituencies” appear in the order because they are in the name of the order being amended by this order. However, the detail of the order affects only boundaries for constituencies for the Welsh Assembly and the regions for which additional Members are elected.
I absolutely share the noble Lord’s view; I would hate to see Welsh MPs wither on the vine. As someone who believes in the integrity of our United Kingdom, I hope that for generations to come there will be Members of Parliament from Wales, Scotland, England and Northern Ireland. If the noble Lord is looking for an explanation, the reason why I am not going to rehearse all the arguments that we had in the Chamber during the Committee and Report stages of the Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill is that in these elections Members will be elected by equal numbers in Scotland, Wales, England and Northern Ireland. That was the goal of the provisions in the 2011 legislation.
The noble and learned Lord knows that Scotland has taken a hit but he has not given the reason why Wales should take a hit.
The reason is that, following the proposals by the Boundary Commission for Scotland, the Boundary Commission for Wales, the Boundary Commission for Northern Ireland and the Boundary Commission for England, there will roughly be equality, within 5 per cent, in the number of electors per constituency. That does not exist at the moment, and the intention is to achieve that equality so that a vote in Cardiff has the same value as a vote in Coleraine, Edinburgh and Manchester. The intention is to ensure that throughout our United Kingdom votes are of equal value, and nothing in that minimises or detracts from the value of a vote in Wales.
We have been through the arguments and I do not think that we are going to advance much further. I suspect that this argument is going to come around again when the Boundary Commission for Wales publishes its provisional proposals for the Westminster seats. As I indicated to the noble Baroness, Lady Gale, I was aware of the interview with the First Minister in today’s Western Mail. I think that it was also on WalesOnline. Very early in my remarks in moving the order, I said that the Explanatory Memorandum says, as a matter of legal explanation of what the order is about, that these changes will come into effect for the election to the Assembly in 2016. However, I did say that that was subject to the commitment given by the Secretary of State for Wales to look carefully at the implications of having different boundaries for Assembly constituencies and parliamentary constituencies in Wales.
If the noble Baroness had not done so, I would have quoted the reply that my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Wales gave in the House of Commons back in May, when she gave that commitment seriously to consider the implications. However, I assure noble Lords here today that nothing will be done without full and proper consultation. It would have been improper if, having brought forward the recommendations on these interim changes, we had not moved to implement them. I think that it would have been very presumptuous on our part not to have done so, given that we knew that the Boundary Commission for Wales had the proposals under consideration when we passed the 2011 legislation.
Is the Minister saying that there could be changes before 2016? That is the concern in Wales and what the row is about at the moment—that the order is saying that this will happen in 2016. However, the Minister is now saying that there could be changes before 2016. Will he please clarify that for me?
Perhaps I could just repeat what the noble Baroness quoted to me: my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Wales said at Oral Questions that she would seriously consider the point that was made. It would be wrong for us to prejudge the outcome of any consultation that could take place, but I assure the noble Baroness and the Committee that no change will be made without proper consultation. The Secretary of State has given a commitment to consider the point that was made to her in exchanges in the Commons, and that consideration is what she is currently doing.
Why, therefore, is no such qualification included in the Explanatory Memorandum to the order? Why is there nothing saying, “Oh yes, but there may now be changes of the kind that the Minister is saying might happen”?
Quite simply because the Explanatory Memorandum is a statement of the effect of the order as the law currently stands, not a statement of policy. I hope that in presenting the order I made it very clear—I think I have repeated it twice now—that that is subject to the commitment that my right honourable friend has made. Just to be clear, the Explanatory Memorandum is a statement of what the effect of the order would be as a matter of law; it is not intended to be a statement of policy. I hope that clarifies the position. The Secretary of State is doing what she said in that exchange that she would do and considering what the effect is of the fact that there are implications of the disjunction.
My noble friend Lady Randerson asked me to confirm that that was the case in Scotland. It is indeed the position that the UK parliamentary constituencies do not match the Scottish parliamentary constituencies. I would be brave to say that the political parties necessarily find it easy but I rather suspect that individual members of the public, who at the end of the day matter most, have little difficulty in identifying their Member of the Scottish Parliament and their Member of the UK Parliament.
Perhaps for clarity, I should say that there is nothing at the moment in law or in any arrangements that would look at how Welsh Assembly constituencies would change. I say purely as a matter of fact that when the disjunction took place in Scotland, primary legislation was brought in in Scotland to make provision for a separate boundary review of the Scottish parliamentary constituencies. Let us not interpret that as in any way a commitment that we are about to bring forward legislation, but that is factually how that position has been addressed in the longer term in Scotland.
I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace. The question that arises is how we ensure a mechanism for setting the constituency boundaries for the Assembly within the context of the rules and values on which they are based, which are more community values, in that there are more individual seats and they are geared to the old communities that they used to represent. At the same time, the boundaries for Westminster are based on the totally different principle—what might be called a republican principle—that it is from the people up that the rights and legitimacy of Parliament come. That is an old established principle; whether it works well in other countries is another question. Those two sets of values and analysis are totally different.
What I am really asking is: are we going to have two boundary commissions to do this or different people in the same commission? Are we going to have more resources to enable us to do it?
My Lords, I cannot answer that question because there is no answer to it at the moment, other than that, having established boundaries, clearly they cannot go on for ever. The very nature of our system is that the boundaries should be regularly updated. We now say that UK boundaries should be done on a regular basis every five years; previously, as I have indicated, it was done every eight to 12 years. It is clear that at some stage some mechanism will need to be put in place to allow an update of the boundaries, but it would be presumptuous and premature of me to speculate now on when that would be, and indeed on whether we will use the same people to do it and what the criteria would be for these boundaries. That is a debate for another day. There are no proposals. However, the noble Lord was right to identify the fact that, as there is a disjunction, there has to be a mechanism at some point for updating the boundaries for the Assembly.
I apologise, but if there are changes of the kind that are being foreshadowed, would they require legislation and where would that legislation take place?
I am almost certain that it would require legislation and it would be Westminster legislation, just as with Scotland when as a result of a disjunction there was primary legislation in 2004. I am as certain as I can be that that is what the position would be.
This debate has been useful because it has brought out a number of important issues, and I am sure that there will be further discussions when the Boundary Commission for Wales produces its proposals for the Welsh parliamentary constituencies. I very much valued the historic insight into the boundaries between Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney, where the noble Lord served with distinction when he and I were colleagues in the Commons. Since then, people have come and gone over a number of years, and this is perhaps just the latest instalment; I am sure that there will be many in years to come when our successors are sitting here or in the other place—with whatever role this place has in a century’s time. On the basis that in the terms of the order there does not need to be any dispute, I commend the order to the Committee.
(13 years ago)
Lords Chamber
To ask Her Majesty’s Government whether they have any proposals to inform the public about the advantages of maintaining the union of the United Kingdom.
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Soley, said at Second Reading of the Scotland Bill that the United Kingdom,
“is one of the most effective political and economic unions that the world has ever seen”.—[Official Report, 6/9/11; col. 234.]
The Government wholeheartedly agree, and my ministerial colleagues and I will do all that we can to make the case for the United Kingdom. I also urge those who support this unique partnership to join the debate and promote its benefits.
I am very grateful for that Answer. Does the noble and learned Lord agree that this message needs to go out not just in Scotland but in England too? There is a very real danger to our nationalism and we need to get out the message that many states around the world envy our stable system, which has brought peace and prosperity to the United Kingdom and is a model for other countries. Does he also agree that this issue is not for any one party or any one part of the United Kingdom?
My Lords, I certainly agree that this is not for any one party or any one part of the United Kingdom. Judging by the response to my Answer and to the noble Lord’s Question, we all share a common interest in spelling out the merits for the union, which is of 304 years’ duration. I think the question the separatists have to answer is: why separate?
My Lords, if the Greeks can organise a referendum in four weeks, why should it take four years to organise one in Scotland? Is not the idea of the Scottish national Administration in Edinburgh organising a referendum on independence a bit like a plaintiff presiding over their own case in court when seeking a divorce? Would it not be more appropriate for the British Government and the British Parliament to take hold of this issue and to hold the referendum soon with one simple question: do you want Scotland to leave the United Kingdom?
My Lords, I certainly think that one simple question that focuses on whether Scotland should or should not be a part of the United Kingdom is key. We should avoid any attempt to muddy the waters—as I think one rather influential academic put it last week—in suggesting a second question. That is spot on. I do not think that that would bring the clarity that we need on an issue such as this. I assure my noble friend that United Kingdom government Ministers have been pressing the Scottish Government to come clean as to their timings and, more specifically, what they mean by independence. My right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Scotland has posed a number of questions and we are still waiting for answers.
My Lords, does the noble and learned Lord accept that a point will come shortly where the uncertainty created by the Scottish situation will impact negatively on investment opportunities in Scotland? When will a proper pro-union argument be put firmly not only to people in Scotland but to people throughout the rest of the United Kingdom?
It is interesting that the noble Lord should mention the economic impact of the uncertainty. He may have seen a report published earlier this week by Citigroup on the very important issue of renewable energy, which made the point about the dangers of investing in Scotland while there is uncertainty about the future of the constitutional position of Scotland. The other side of that coin is that there are considerable benefits of a united kingdom in taking forward that agenda to ensure that we meet our climate change targets. It is not often that I have the opportunity to quote with approval a Daily Record editorial, but today it says:
“In the meantime, it's hard to disagree with pro-UK politicians who claim green energy is a great example of Scotland and the rest of the Britain working together”.
Does the Minister accept that one of the great strengths of the union of the United Kingdom is the way in which the Scots, the English, the Welsh and the Northern Irish have moved throughout that kingdom over the last three centuries? Do the Government take a position on Scots who do not currently live inside the boundaries of Scotland but may have an interest in a referendum that will determine their country’s future?
My Lords, the noble Lord is absolutely right to indicate that the flow of people throughout the United Kingdom is important. Many families in England have relations in Scotland and vice versa. That only underlines the important cultural and social ties as well as the economic and social benefits that flow from our United Kingdom. However, we have made it clear in the past that a referendum would be on the basis of the people living in Scotland at the time of that referendum.
Does my noble and learned friend agree that rather than being for the UK Government it should be for Alex Salmond and the SNP to spend some of their own time and money explaining what full independence really means? For example, is it not time that Alex Salmond told us how many military bases would remain in Scotland? How would he split the Scottish pension system from the UK system? Would he create an entirely new tax and benefits system for Scotland; and if, as he says, he wishes to retain sterling as Scotland’s currency, would EU membership allow this? If it would, what powers would he intend to have to instruct Mervyn King and the Bank of England on monetary issues, or would he just leave that to George Osborne?
By asking that question, my noble friend makes it very clear that the First Minister of Scotland and his party have a host of questions to answer, not least on the currency because there are even those who think that if Scotland wished to join the European Union it would be obliged to adopt the euro. Andrew Hughes Hallett, who is on the First Minister’s Council of Economic Advisers, indicated that, as was reported earlier this week. It would be rather odd. Some countries, but not many, adopt the currency of a foreign country but have no powers. It just underlines what a weak position Scotland would be in.
Could my noble and learned friend consider the idea of establishing an independent commission to look at the benefits of the union to the United Kingdom as a whole and the consequences of separation, given that the nationalists are determined to hold a referendum on independence, so that everyone can see what the consequences could be and what the facts are?
My noble friend makes a very interesting and very constructive suggestion. He will understand that I am not in a position to accede to it from this Dispatch Box, although I will consider it. In the mean time we will not wait for the setting up of any commission that might come along. We will continue to make the case for the United Kingdom.
My Lords, I can see that I am in a minority in this House. I want to press the Minister on the reply he gave a little earlier that he was fully in support of a single-question referendum in Scotland. If that was the case and there were a single-question referendum in Scotland and the people of Scotland voted yes, would his Government accept that as the outcome?
Well, my Lords, it would depend on what the question was. It is important that we have clarity on this. There is an idea that you could have two questions. For example, the First Minister has indicated that if what he describes as “devo max”—perhaps even less defined than independence—was to get 98 per cent of the vote and “independence” got 51 per cent, independence would trump devo max. I do not think that that is the sort of basis on which we should go into any referendum campaign.