(2 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it is with pleasure that I support the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford. It has been a long campaign since I first initiated a series of debates following the case of Sergeant Blackman for murder. I also note, as the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, has said, the proposals of the Lord Chancellor to embed the right to trial by jury in his reforms, as was referred to this morning. It would be gravely inconsistent of the Government to declare this right in statute while denying it to service men and women.
The right to trial by jury—the right to trial by one’s peers—goes back to Magna Carta, with all the protections that have been hammered out over the years for majority verdicts, announced publicly, with everyone knowing exactly what is happening and the careful directions that are given to juries. It should be the right of every serviceman and every servicewoman, too.
I rise to support Motion A1 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford. The key issue is trial by jury. I completely accept the improvements in the service justice system—I saw them in my former role as Lord Chief Justice. However, the Minister does not grapple with the fundamental issue: why take away the right to trial by jury? It is important, because sometimes Ministers misspeak on the “Today” programme, to see what the Deputy Prime Minister wrote in this morning’s Times:
“Trial by jury is another ancient right, applied variably around the UK, that doesn’t feature in the ECHR, but will be in our bill of rights. We should be proud of our history of liberty—and preserve a human rights framework that promotes it.”
It seems inconsistent with that declared policy of Her Majesty’s Government that the Ministry of Defence opposes the fundamental right of trial by jury for those who put their lives at risk for our country. That is what this amendment has at its heart.
It seems to me that by their support of this amendment in the course of debate, the Opposition have accepted that a mistake was made in 2005 when the right to trial by jury was taken away from those in the armed services for these very serious offences. Why does the Ministry of Defence not have the courage to admit that a mistake was made and restore the fundamental right of every member of the Armed Forces to trial by jury for these most serious offences?
My Lords, I give a cautious but warm-hearted welcome to the remarks and undertakings from the Dispatch Box by the Minister about my amendment. She will recognise that the amendment last week required a report from the Secretary of State about why he, and so central government, should not have statutory authority or due regard. As the Government have stated in both Houses that they have reached the view that legislation is not necessary, it should not have been unduly onerous or difficult for them to explain why in a report to both Houses in the six-month timeframe. Now, however, I sense a changing view and the need for a longer period before making a report.
This change of view is most welcome. It has effectively been demonstrated since Report by the decision of the MoD to refer the case of the Hong Kong Military Service Corps to the Home Office, from one central department to another, dealing with a veterans issue that could not be gripped at devolved or local authority level. However, the MoD must continue to discharge its responsibilities to those veterans. It must continue to take an active interest in their plight until the Home Office responds. Will the Minister give that undertaking now? It should not need to wait for further consideration under the Nationality and Borders Bill when it comes to this House. My hope is that the Government will take “nonne” or a “ne” rather than a “num” approach in answering the request and reporting on why central government must have a legal covenant duty of due regard.
I am very conscious that time is pressing to gain Royal Assent, without which the Government have no statutory right to military forces. I was also somewhat reassured by the Minister’s statement in the other place, so I have not moved any further amendment. I thank the Government for conceding that the role of central government must be considered and reported upon to Parliament.
My Lords, I start by echoing the sentiments of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, because throughout the Bill’s progress in this House, we have genuinely had well-informed debates which have been extremely helpful in the scrutiny of the legislation. I again pay tribute to all who have facilitated that positive review of it. I also thank the noble Lord for his kind remarks.
Let me try to deal with some of the points which have arisen. In relation to the service justice system, there was a sense of reprise of previously presented arguments. I know they were presented in good faith. Some have now been addressed by the Government, but, as your Lordships will be aware, others they reject. We have a fundamental point of principle here, which is that some of your Lordships feel that there should be a bias and an explicit tilt towards the civilian system, while the Government are not convinced that that is in the interests of the service justice system or of those who would have to use it. What matters is that the service justice system is robust, which it is, and this Bill introduces many improvements to it.
I do not want to bore your Lordships by repeating the arguments I have previously adduced as to why the Government support the approach of concurrency of jurisdiction. I simply observe that trial by jury is not a part of the service justice system, but we require a system which works both overseas and across the United Kingdom, is professional and has capability and capacity. That is what this Bill provides.
The noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, asked me specifically about publishing the detail of the protocols. I would direct him to Clause 7, creating a new Section 320A, and to subsection (8) of that, which directs that the current version of the protocol must be published in whatever manner the directors think appropriate.
I thank the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig of Radley, for his kind remarks and his acknowledgement of the Government’s willingness to hear his concerns and to seek to address them. I am not a position to deal with the specific point that he raised, but he will know that announcements are likely in the near future.
The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, raised two issues. He asked what would happen if the publication of the more detailed data and statistics for the service justice system caused concern. I said that we are very clear as a Government that that additional data will help to inform us as to where we may need to make adjustments or where improvements may be necessary if issues arise which occasion concern.
On the covenant, the noble Lord asked a similarly aligned question about the reports: what if they suggest that the positive progress we all want is not being made as effectively as we would hope? First, that will inform the Government, but, secondly, as his honourable friend in the other place said, it is the job of opposition to hold the Government to account and to scrutinise. I absolutely agree with that; that is what the Opposition exist to do. I know that the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, is an exemplar of holding me as a Defence Minister to account, and I am sure that formidable and tenacious approach will continue.
What this Bill and our debates are all about, and what we try to do in improving this legislation, is of course for the benefit of our Armed Forces. All of us are very conscious not only of what they have done over time, of the sacrifices they make and of the commitment they give, but, perhaps very particularly at this time, of the extraordinary support they have been giving to the country during the pandemic. I know that your Lordships will want on behalf of this Chamber to express our unqualified appreciation—
Before the Minister sits down, I would be grateful if she could write at some point saying why trial by jury is not being conceded for members of the Armed Forces. It may require some legal argument. I would be delighted to read it.
I will address the noble and learned Lord’s point in a moment, but if I may continue with my tribute, it is very important for this House to send a message to our Armed Forces that we absolutely value everything they are doing. I am particularly conscious of that at this time. Their contribution is extraordinary and invaluable to the country, and we would want them to know just how much we appreciate that.
The noble and learned Lord will be aware that the jury system is not part of the service justice system. It is the view of the Government that the service justice system is robust, that this Bill will make distinct improvements to it and that it has to operate in a manner which makes it fit for purpose both overseas and across the United Kingdom. That is what this Bill does. I beg to move.
(2 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I will speak to Motion B1 in my name. It was a great disappointment that the other place was not prepared to accept this House’s well-supported amendment, originally proposed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, and to which I readily added my name. With his vast and rightly respected experience, he considered that the Secretary of State should have a statutory duty of due regard for veteran affairs. The telling example of Gulf War syndrome was mentioned. Noble Lords will recall that the Government of the day were reluctant to see or treat this issue with the seriousness it seemed to deserve. It affected a considerable number of service and ex-service personnel who had served in Operation Granby in the first Gulf War of 1991.
A number of noble Lords, dismayed by the Government’s decisions just to set up further studies, arranged an independent inquiry chaired pro bono by a distinguished Law Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick. He conducted a fair and exhaustive inquiry to which I, as Chief of the Defence Staff during the conflict, gave evidence. But no Government Minister was prepared to be interviewed, or even to attend any of the hearings. That was an example of impact on veterans that was not solvable at local level.
At Report, I quoted another example, that of the veterans of the Hong Kong Military Service Corps, whose long-outstanding case also could not be resolved at devolved or local-authority level. I understand that the MoD has passed this case back to the Home Office, but I hope that the MoD still sees it as a veteran case that deserves its continued interest and a responsibility to see it finally settled. It would be most unsatisfactory, when dealing with the concerns of veterans, for the MoD and the Secretary of State not to continue to be seen to be actively supportive of their veterans. A statutory requirement for the Secretary of State to pay due regard and be seen to discharge a duty of care for veterans seems more important than ever. Serving personnel, soon to be veterans, may well have been involved in live operations that, more than ever, are subject to active ministerial oversight and even direction. Looking to the future, assuming the media reports of hearing damage to soldiers testing the Ajax AFV to be true, this could become a veteran issue—an issue that needs a duty of care for all the veterans as a group, not just individually, where there might inevitably be differing outcomes causing lasting resentment.
This amendment therefore gives the Secretary of State time to consider his responsibility further and report to Parliament. As the amendment spells out, it requires the Secretary of State to detail
“the implications of not applying the same legal responsibility to have ‘due regard’ under the Armed Forces Covenant to central government as the Act requires of local authorities and other public bodies.”
It has been argued that the Secretary of State believes that he and central government already bear this responsibility. Why, then, is there this reluctance to spell it out closely in statute?
The Minister in the other place made the particular point that, because the Secretary of State makes a report to Parliament annually, he is fully discharging his duty of care for veterans. But it is not just a moral duty; the Armed Forces Act 2011 made reporting annually a statutory requirement, so it seems to follow that “due regard to” should be enacted; otherwise, the statutory responsibility is confined just to reporting.
The Minister in the other place said that,
“responsibility for the actual delivery of nuts-and-bolts frontline services and their impact … rests at local level”.—[Official Report, Commons, 6/12/21; col. 99.]
He made no mention of the heart of your Lordships’ case, that there were some issues that could not be dealt with at local level. Why was this not considered? All he said was that the inclusion of central government was simply unnecessary; he did not explain why. As I have just mentioned, the MoD has passed the case that I cited on Report of the Hong Kong veteran to the Home Office; one central department having due regard has passed it directly to another. I rest my case.
My Lords, I entirely support what the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig of Radley, has just said, but I want to add a word on Motion A1. It is clear that the overwhelming majority of people with real experience of the criminal and military justice systems support that Motion A1. The Minister is quite right: the service justice system has improved enormously over the past few years, but there is a fundamental respect in which it is different—that is, that there is no trial by jury. Trial by jury is the essence of our system. It gives confidence to the victims, which is critical in the very serious crimes that we are considering, and it is a fundamental right of the defendant. We should not do anything to take those rights away or to undermine confidence; that is the fallacy in the Minister’s argument.
My Lords, I intervene briefly to support the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, so ably supported by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris, the noble Lord, Lord Burnett, and my noble and learned friend. I have nothing usefully to add to what has been said by them in the context of Motion A1. They are huge authorities on this matter, and the House is right therefore to support them again and ask another place to think once more on that question.
I rise to support my noble and gallant friend Lord Craig of Radley on Motion B1, especially having spoken on this matter when we last considered it. He is right that some things cannot be settled at local level—and I say that as someone who has served in local government. Some things need to be settled centrally, and that should be spelled out in the Bill; that is so. He has made a compelling case as to why there should be some further consideration given to the duties that we have towards our armed servicemen and who has to implement those duties, specifically in the case of the Hong Kong ex-servicemen that was given as a very good example during Report and again by my noble and gallant friend.
The Minister has taken a great interest in this matter and knows that it concerns a very small number of people and that it is on a par with how we rightly dealt with the issue of the Gurkhas. We should do the same for these servants of the Crown, not least because of the developments in Hong Kong, where we have seen the destruction of democracy. Who would be more at risk than people who have served in our Armed Forces in Hong Kong?
If the noble Baroness cannot accept the amendment today and if it does not go back to another place, we will quite soon have before us the Nationality and Borders Bill. If she can do nothing else, she has heard what my noble and gallant friend has said about how this has now been referred back to the Home Office, which will have responsibility for that Bill. When the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, replies for the Government tonight, she will have the opportunity to say to us whether included within the provisions of that Bill will be, as was reported in the media earlier this week, the possibility that this glaring oversight and injustice will be rectified in the course of that legislation. I hope that she will take the opportunity when she comes to reply to say whether that is being seriously considered by the Government and whether she is able to allay some of our concerns, at least on that count.
(2 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am most grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon, for his support, and I congratulate him on the attempts that he has made over a long time to civilianise military law. I am pleased that he mentioned Lord Elwyn-Jones, who admitted me to the rank of Queen’s Counsel in the Moses Room rather a long time ago.
The issue in Amendment 2 is: should members of the Armed Forces accused of murder, manslaughter, rape or other sexual offences alleged to have been committed within the United Kingdom be tried by court martial or in ordinary courts? The Mutiny Act 1689, in the reigns of William and Mary, laid down the principle that there should be annual renewals of the Armed Forces Act. The recital to it said:
“No man may be forejudged of life or limb, or subjected … to any kind of punishment … by martial law, or in any other manner than by the judgment of his peers and according to the known and established laws of this realm.”
That is the sentiment that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon, has just enunciated, and it is a principle derived from the Magna Carta.
But this recital in the Act contained an exception to that stirring principle. In respect of
“every person being mustered and in pay as an officer or soldier in their Majesty’s service, who excited, caused or joined in any mutiny or sedition in the Army, or deserted their Majesty’s service”,
the punishment was death.
The other means of disciplining service personnel was under the Articles of War, issued under the King’s sign-manual, but only for the purpose of operations abroad, particularly in the colonies, not in the United Kingdom.
The Mutiny Act applied throughout Great Britain and Ireland, so that even in peacetime a soldier mutinying or deserting would be tried and punished under martial law, not civil law, and without the protections offered through civil law procedures.
The great jurist Sir William Blackstone, writing in 1765, was incensed that soldiers should be dealt with by court martial in peacetime and regretted that
“a set of men, whose bravery has so often preserved the liberties of their country, should be reduced to a state of servitude in the midst of a nation of freemen!”
When, in 2006, therefore, the Labour Government introduced into their Armed Forces Act a provision which permitted the trial of service personnel by court martial for serious offences committed in this country—a course which I strongly opposed at the time—they were going against centuries of history. The serviceman was now open to court martial for any offence, including murder, manslaughter and rape, even when committed in the United Kingdom. Importantly, he had lost the right to be tried by an ordinary jury of 12 of his peers and was subject to the verdict and punishment of up to seven officers, arrived at by a simple majority.
That is enough history; we must look at the position now, in 2021. We have before us the strong recommendation of His Honour Judge Lyons in his review. As it happens, his first recommendation is that the court martial jurisdiction should no longer include murder, manslaughter and rape when those offences are committed in the United Kingdom, except with the consent of the Attorney-General. The Defence Sub-committee under Sarah Atherton, Member of Parliament for Wrexham, published its report in July, entitled Protecting Those who Protect Us. That report calls urgently for the implementation of His Honour Judge Lyons’s recommendation.
It is true that, in his recent report, Sir Richard Henriques accepted concurrent jurisdiction, as it is called, but the reason he gives is that there may be cases which occur both abroad and in this country, and consequently a single trial would be preferable. That reason would not have any force in respect of murder cases, where there is universal jurisdiction.
I do not believe that a murder case, for a murder committed in the United Kingdom, has been dealt with by way of court martial since 2006. However, I have been able to trace two cases where charges of manslaughter by negligence occurring in this country were tried in that way, both relating to the Castlemartin range in west Wales. In the most recent case, in 2012, a soldier was killed during a live firing exercise. That case was about the planning, organisation and running of that range and required reconstruction of the scene, with accurate grid references and bearings to establish to the criminal standard the origin of the fatal round. Three were convicted and the officer was sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment, with the others receiving service punishments. It follows, and I do concede, that there may be cases involving complex military issues where a court martial may be appropriate, but these are very rare—two cases in some 14 years.
In reply to the Minister’s comments in Committee, I said that she had misinterpreted this amendment. I have used the word “normally”, which means what it says: that offences committed in the UK would be tried in the ordinary Crown Courts, or in their equivalents in Scotland and Northern Ireland. That would be part of the protocol of the DSP and the DPP. It would be in only exceptional cases of the nature to which I have referred that the Attorney-General would need to be approached. I am not suggesting that he should be involved in the decision-making process of venue ab initio. Incidentally, there is no bar to the Attorney-General making a decision on venue, just as he or she may do in deciding on the commencement of proceedings. The Minister suggested the contrary in her reply in Committee.
Much more common are cases of rape and sexual offences occurring in this country being tried by court martial. It is obvious from the report of Sarah Atherton’s Defence Sub-Committee that complainants, their families and the public simply do not have confidence in courts martial. We can argue about the figures, but if the level of conviction is so low then this perception will have an effect on recruitment and, more importantly, retention. There are many victims within the armed services who will wish to leave for a civilian life if their complaints are not upheld.
The noble Baroness also repeated the justification advanced in 2006 that public confidence can be maintained in the whole service justice system
“only if the service justice system not only has but can be shown to have the capability to deal with all offending fairly, efficiently and in a manner which respects and upholds the needs of victims.”—[Official Report, 27/10/21; col. GC 166.]
That was the justification in 2006 to give a boost to the status of the partly reformed system of courts martial.
I said at Second Reading that I generally welcome the reforms in this Bill. They nearly conclude the long journey since the Findlay human rights case in 1995 towards founding the service justice system on justice rather than, as it has been historically, on discipline. We have finally buried the Mutiny Act, under which General Braddock in the Seven Years’ War could issue the order of the day:
“Any Soldier who shall desert tho’ he return again will be hanged without mercy.”
This amendment is designed to complete the journey towards justice.
There is one brief reason that I would add to what has been so eloquently said by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris, and the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford. We have always tried, and marked the seriousness of, crimes set out in the amendment by trial by jury. Magna Carta conferred on defendants the right to trial by jury. Today, we take account of the interests of the victim of such crimes and they have confidence only in trial by jury, particularly as so many of these cases turn on credibility. On that, the judgment of ordinary men and women, drawn from a jury, is the only way to achieve justice. For those three reasons, we should not deprive people of trial by jury in these cases.
My Lords, I will speak very briefly, having attached my name to Amendment 2 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford. I did that because, as we came to the deadline, I noticed that there was a space, and I really felt that, given the level of support that the issue covered by this amendment achieved at Second Reading, it deserved the broadest cross-party and non-party support possible.
I will also reflect on what I said in Committee on this amendment. Much of our leadership on this has come from Members from legal backgrounds, who focused on the rights of the defendant. I understand that, but I also note that I am the only female Peer who has attached my name to the amendment. There is very much a gender aspect to this. Women currently make up 10% of our full-time military—about 15,000 in number. They are still a significant minority right across the forces.
As the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, just alluded to, we have a military culture stretching back many centuries that was, for most of that time, entirely male dominated. Offences such as domestic violence, child abuse, rape and sexual assault are disproportionately committed against women. Last night in this very Chamber on the policing Bill we were discussing how difficult it is to get our civilian justice arrangements to cater adequately for these offences. How much more difficult is it in the military context, with the culture we just heard outlined?
I commend the amendment to the House and, looking back to the Second Reading debate, note the breadth of support it achieved.
My Lords, I rise to move Amendment 23 and support Amendment 27. The issue addressed by Amendment 23 is quite clear: the adequacy of the statutory provisions to protect the independence of the Armed Forces police and, in particular, this new unit.
I do not think there is any difference about the constitutional principle. It was set out in one of the cases dealing with the Iraq war, Ali Zaki Mousa (No. 2), where it was said that the Armed Forces police
“must be able to make their decisions entirely independently of the Secretary of State for Defence, any civil servant in that Ministry and, even more importantly, of anyone in the hierarchy of the armed forces.”
That was the principle applied by Sir Richard Henriques in his report, which set out the practical way in which that principle could be given effect and applied.
This amendment seeks in particular to fill in the essential areas of protection needed to ensure independence. They are all set out in the proposed new subsections of the amendment. We went into these in Committee, but I will highlight three of them.
First, the deputy head must be a civilian. It is important to bear in mind that, in the cases that went into the independence of the investigations in Iraq—the Ali Zaki Mousa cases—IHAT had a civilian head, and he brought a different perspective. This is a very important point made by Sir Richard.
Secondly, there can be no watering down of the principle of the operational independence of the military command. I will come to the provision of the Bill which does water it down.
Thirdly, there is the establishment of the strategic police board. When you occupy a position where you can be put under pressure, it is very important to have the protection of someone. Within the Armed Forces, the Director of Service Prosecutions has the Attorney-General. The Judge Advocate-General has the Lord Chief Justice. There can be no reason for not putting into statute a very clear provision that the strategic policing board can support the head of the unit if he or she comes under pressure, which he or she no doubt will.
Why are these statutory provisions necessary? I am grateful to the Minister for her very careful letter, in which she sought to deal with the adequacy of what is in the Bill, which is, essentially, the appointment of the provost marshal of the tri-service unit, the method of his appointment and, if I may say so, a somewhat watered-down expression of the principle of independence, and in particular operational independence. There are three reasons why I urge your Lordships to consider this amendment as important in strengthening the position.
First, as the Minister, with the assistance of her lawyers, has set out, there are a number of cases, two of them in particular involving Ali Zaki Mousa, that looked at the independence of the way in which the investigation was made of the conduct of the Armed Forces police. But it is critical to remember that in those cases what was put under the microscope was the particular structure that had been carefully set up. There is no case that says that the current position is adequate. Indeed, that must be the position, otherwise would why would Sir Richard have gone to the trouble to which he went in making these recommendations? What is set out in the report, which I have already mentioned, is what is required.
The second reason why statutory provision is needed is to protect the Armed Forces. Indeed, my principal reason for moving the amendment is to try to protect the Armed Forces from the risks of it being able to be argued that the position of the Armed Forces police is not independent. In the cases that related to IHAT, on which the Ministry of Defence relies, there was a very careful examination. For example, in the Ali Zaki Mousa case there were five days of hearings spread over a considerable period of time, a vast quantity of documents, statements from very senior people across the Armed Forces, and some cross-examination. It is obviously undesirable to have a repetition of that process and it is therefore essential that the position is made clear in statute.
Noble Lords might say that this is a one-off circumstance. I referred in Committee to something that happened during the Malaysia emergency in 1948 that came up for investigation in the courts many years later in 2011. One of the central issues there was that the investigation had not been independent. Again, issues arose during the course of the Blackman case as to the independence of the investigation. Much more recently, there have been reports in the Sunday Times, of which we are all well aware, that again cast doubt on the independence of the investigation. All I feel it necessary to say is that all these attacks on the independence of an investigation could and should be avoided by putting the matter beyond doubt in legislation. The current legislation simply does not go far enough.
The third reason for saying that the current legislation is not correct is that it does not reflect the proper constitutional position, and these matters ought to be put on a statutory basis. The duty set out in Clause 12(3), which is to try to ensure operational independence, is not enough. There must be operational independence, and that should be a statutory principle.
I am grateful to all noble Lords and noble and learned Lords who have spoken in this part of the debate. I will first say something briefly about Amendment 27. It is critical to a justice system that you have a properly defended and functioning defence service, and therefore I very much hope that, in the event that this amendment is not pursued, the undertaking given to keep the House closely informed of developments is greatly appreciated.
I turn to the main amendment, Amendment 23. I accept that the police in the armed services are capable of being independent, and indeed in most cases they are—but, as has been shown by recent cases, that has not always been the case, to the enormous damage of the Armed Forces. Therefore, with this amendment, I seek to put the principle and the protections on a clear basis to save future damage.
The Minister asked noble Lords to look at the difference between what is in the Bill and what is in the amendment. On the duties of the provost marshal, the Bill says that he owes
“to the Defence Council, to seek to ensure that all investigations carried out by the tri-service serious crime unit are free from improper interference.”
There is nothing there at all that reflects the proper constitutional position that they should be operationally independent of the military chain of command. That is what is set out in the amendment. I simply do not understand why this fundamental principle of the way in which the police operate in the Army, Navy and Air Force should have second best. It is in their own interests to ensure independence.
Then there is the quibble that you cannot, for some reason, fit a civilian into the structure. I do not begin to understand that. In the cases I did which involved this area, one of the principal reasons why the courts concluded that the Iraq Historic Allegations Team was independent was that it had a civilian head. I therefore do not understand what the objection is, not only for the reasons given by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, namely that civilians bring experience, but because they also bring an outside perspective.
The real issue in this case is the need for statutory protection. Perhaps the Ministry of Defence lawyers take the view that all that is required are the three provisions in the Bill. I accept that the Government want to proceed with the implementation, but our difference of opinion relates to whether Parliament should do its duty and specify this in the legislation and put a proper duty in relation to operational independence into the Bill, with the necessary vital safeguards. Without those safeguards, a duty will not work—or do you take the very narrow view that it is not required?
For the good of Her Majesty’s Armed Forces, we ought to stop speculation about investigations not being independent. We must make sure they are seen to be independent by Parliament itself providing on this occasion, as part of the five-year review, that there are sufficient safeguards for independence. Therefore, for the good of Armed Forces and the service police, I would like to take the opinion of the House on this issue.
(2 years, 9 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, it is a pleasure and privilege to follow the noble Lord, Lord Lancaster. I rise to deal with the key issue of independence. It is, as I said on the previous day in Committee, essential to two things. One is public confidence—one cannot overestimate the importance of that—but it is equally important to the morale and well-being of Her Majesty’s Armed Forces.
I think we have established a very clear structure for the independence of the Director of Service Prosecutions and the three distinguished holders of that office, Bruce Houlder, Andrew Cayley and Jonathan Rees, the current DSP, have ensured that it happens. Now, how do we deal with the independence of the police? It seems to me very important to look at the problems with the independence of an investigation. Many us will have forgotten—or were not alive at the time—when there were serious problems in the civilian police, particularly with watch committees and other mechanisms that were meant to ensure that the police were accountable and independent. It did not work. Various things were tried and eventually we came up with the police and crime commissioners, as Sir Richard notes in his report.
Looking at independence, and having had to fight for the independence of the judiciary from time to time, I can assure noble Lords that what you need is a structure behind you—someone independent to go to on whom you can rely. In the case of the judiciary, one can obviously come to Parliament. That is ultimately what is provided for. That is why, it seems to me, the independent strategic board proposed is absolutely the key part of this. There should be an absolute duty for an independent investigation, which should not be qualified in any way, but you need an institutional structure.
What I wholly fail to understand from the Minister’s observations is why that cannot now be put in place and, in the way that police and crime commissioners have been made part of the statutory mechanism that looks to the police, why we cannot have a statutory mechanism for the Armed Forces. Surely they are entitled to the same sort of protection as ordinary civilians—as us all. I do not understand why we always expect the Armed Forces to have second best. There can be no reason why these issues have not been fully considered and why the Government cannot go forward.
This has been a long-standing problem. One has to go back only to the awful problems of the Iraq and Afghan wars, with the sticking-plaster solutions—if I may be so bold as to describe them as that—of bodies such as IHAT, the Iraq Historic Allegations Team. If you lived through cases on that, you would appreciate the need for a structure and something that we can be proud of to protect independence.
Given the history of the way in which the Armed Forces from time to time behave, if you do not do something now, you will have a problem in the future. I urge the Government to grapple with this now and deal with it by putting in provisions, as Sir Richard recommended. If one reads his report carefully, one sees the importance of the strategic board as the guarantor of independence. As the noble Lord, Lord Lancaster, said, how is independence to be secured without some form of mechanism?
The second area on which I want to comment briefly is witness and victim care. This seems to me an important part of a statutory protection. If there is a witness or victims’ unit, there is someone to go to. Again, why are the Army, the Navy and the Air Force to have second best? Why is there not statutory provision, just as there is in the ordinary criminal justice system? I urge the Minister to look at this again with the objective of protecting the Armed Forces for the future and giving them what the rest of us have.
My Lords, it is a great privilege to follow the former Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales in making the valuable and very firm points that he made. The question he asks is far from rhetorical. Why should members of our Armed Forces settle for second best? Why should we expect them to be less entitled to systems of justice that ordinary citizens can access?
I have vivid memories of the overseas operations Bill from this Session of Parliament. That was another Bill that came from the House of Commons, where the debates were dominated by a Minister demanding total obedience to every dot and comma of the Bill on the grounds that if you were against it, you were against the British Army, thereby allowing through provisions that might well have led to British soldiers and other members of Britain’s Armed Forces appearing before the International Criminal Court. Eventually, the Government woke up, but not without huge pressure and a lot of distinguished Members of this House making sure they got a very firm message. I do not want to embarrass the Minister too much, but I know that she played a role in getting common sense seen in that debate.
When we look at legislation being brought forward by the Government, we are wise to be cautious about what the Government say in their own defence. Therefore, when the Minister says that there are elements in the Henriques report which require attention and I ask which of those have policy implications, I would expect the department to be able to tell us. I recognise the phrase “when parliamentary time allows”, because I am sure I used it during my ministerial career. There is usually very little parliamentary time available for primary legislation, which is what would be required to enact the remaining aspects of the Henriques recommendations.
I follow my noble friend Lord Coaker in what he says and his detailed questions. The key question concerns the fact that, while Henriques made a number of recommendations, 13 of them have not appeared in the amendments to the Bill in this Committee. He is right to ask this question, which I repeat: which of these require policy consideration, because that could take a very considerable period to come forward as well?
The stories in the Sunday Times, both last Sunday and the Sunday before, should, frankly, horrify all of us. What is described there is disgraceful, disgusting and completely indefensible. I am not a lawyer or a soldier, but I cannot understand why action is not being taken and investigations into this particular incident are not taking place. We are being told that only if the Kenyan authorities start to make their inquiries will anything happen in this country, when there seems to be clear evidence around, involving British citizens and members of the British Armed Forces involved in this. Why has there not been some investigation? Just as members of the Armed Forces are perfectly entitled to be treated like other citizens in this country, victims also have a right to the kind of justice and investigation that we would expect for anyone else in the country.
We should not allow the Sunday Times to develop this story, week after week, with hugely damaging effects on the reputation of our Armed Forces, the recruitment of people into them and the country as a whole. Although it is not, strictly speaking, the business of this Committee, it is a matter of public concern. It has alerted the public in general to the whole question of service discipline. Therefore, the business of this Committee and Bill, detailed and arcane as it is in some ways, has now become a matter of public attention. It is up to the Government and Ministers in the Ministry of Defence to pay attention to that and resolve it so that they protect the reputation of the country and our distinguished Armed Forces.
I say to the noble Lord—and I do not want to reprise everything that I have said—that we recognise the different characteristics within the service justice system that are not necessarily a part of the civilian system. We have to acknowledge that, as I indicated, it is not easy to just place things in silos. If something happens on an overseas operation, the chain of command may have to take action. That is why we talk about “improper interference”. I think that is an important distinction. What we are placing upon the provost marshal and the Defence Serious Crime Unit is the obligation to be independent and to seek to ensure the independence of the investigation.
However, we also have to acknowledge the reality of the environment in which these individuals are operating. That is why the Government have deliberately chosen the phrasing they have. I said earlier that there is nothing innovative about that phrasing; it deploys existing text from previous Acts. But I suggest to the noble and learned Lord that it would be unwise to place on the provost marshal obligations that are beyond the wit of the provost marshal to discharge. Equally, it would be wrong to condemn the chain of command for taking action in the early stages of an incident which the chain of command may have had no alternative but to take to protect personnel, to look after safety, to preserve evidence or whatever. That is why the Government prefer the phrasing they have adopted.
May I ask one question? I asked: why does the Bill contain no institutional provisions to protect the independence? Maybe the Minister needs a little more time to think about this and look at what protection is given in relation to the civilian police. I would be grateful if she could write with an answer about the institutional support that backs up independence.
I hear the noble and learned Lord. I think there is an acceptance within the service justice system that there is operational independence. I have had that confirmed to me by military police officers, particularly those investigating senior ranks and above their rank. They have not felt inhibited. They have not felt constrained. They have absolutely done the work they have needed to do. But I will reflect on the noble and learned Lord’s remarks and see whether I can offer any comfort.
(2 years, 10 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I thank the Minister for seeing me and my noble friend Lady Smith yesterday, when we had a full and fruitful discussion of these issues. I very much support the thrust of this Bill, in particular, bringing the service justice system up to date and having majority verdicts at the heart of it.
Sentencing is a difficult and technical business. I suspect that I am the only person in this Room who has actually seen the judge in a case in which I was appearing put on a black cap and sentence my client to death. That was in Hong Kong. He was not actually executed but it is a solemn moment. Sentencing in the old days used to follow the verdict but not anymore. In any serious case there is an adjournment for sentencing to enable the judge to consider the sentencing guidelines, the pre-sentence reports, the technicalities which he or she must say in the sentencing remarks, the statements of relatives and the public interest in the whole matter. A balancing exercise is carried out.
Importantly, the guidelines may give the recommended range of the sentence, but the judge has to consider the aggravating and mitigating features of the case, which will increase or decrease the recommended sentence in the sentencing guidelines. If I can give an illustration, because it is apposite for next Saturday when Wales play the All Blacks, in rugby, a referee, with his touch judges or assistant referees and the television match official, will discuss something that might have happened. They talk together and they have the advantage of a replay of an incident from various angles so that they can actually see what happened, which does not happen in a court. But it is the referee who takes the decision, not the people who assist him in his decision.
In the court martial system, it is the panel that takes the decision on the sentence with the judge participating and advising. It is only if the board are equally divided that the judge has the casting vote. To take another example, in the magistrates’ court it is the decision of the magistrates, as advised by the clerk, who may or may not be legally qualified. The judge advocate is not a clerk advising; he is central to a trial. He controls the proceedings. He gives directions to the board and rulings, including dismissing the charges altogether, as happened in the 3 Para case in Colchester in 2005. There is an anomaly as well: if the defendant is a civilian subject to service discipline and thereby liable to court martial, the judge advocate sentences alone.
Of course, the panel could and should advise on any particular military facet of the case, but from my experience it should not be assumed that the members of the panel have any direct front-line operational experience comparable to that of the defendant before them. They might have, but there are many units and many roles in which modern British forces are involved. Very frequently, the officers on a court martial do not have anything like the same experience as the defendant and the pressures he has been under. On the other hand, the judge, who sits regularly as judge advocate in a military court, has considerable experience of the operational conditions from the cases that come before him.
Under the current system, an officer or warrant officer is summoned to be a member of the board, probably with no or limited experience of courts martial, save for the president. He might never have been near a court or a court martial, but he becomes a judge with very considerable powers. He will be given the responsibility of determining sentence in a difficult case. That is a power that has never been given to civilian juries in the history of the common law. But it can be only history which retains this unique power for the board in courts martial. Perhaps it is a throwback to when there were no civilian professional judges, but, as I said in opening in my remarks, we have advanced so far. The civilian judge advocate is so important to the system.
My Lords, in the light of the very full observations made by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, I want to add three observations. First, over the years the practice of sentencing has become much more complicated and difficult. From the early 1980s onward, the way in which you sentence in the criminal courts has been the subject of guidance from the Lord Chief Justice and the Court of Appeal Criminal Division. It was then followed by the Sentencing Advisory Panel and the Sentencing Guidelines Council. Now it is contained in very complicated and detailed documents drafted by the Sentencing Council.
My Lords, prior to 2006, charges of murder, manslaughter and rape committed in the United Kingdom were tried in the ordinary courts, rather than by court martial, when a person subject to service discipline was involved. At that time, in 2006, the Labour Government gave concurrent jurisdiction to courts martial to try these matters. The Conservatives opposed the change, as did the Liberal Democrats. I suggested at the time that the purpose was merely to bolster the credibility of the new courts martial system, which was being totally reformed.
I am not aware of any murder or manslaughter case involving a person subject to service discipline that has been tried by court martial arising out of incidents in the United Kingdom, but rape and sexual offences are very different. A significant disparity in conviction rates in rape cases where courts martial have been employed was found by the statistics before Judge Lyons: 16% were convicted in a court martial, as opposed to 34% of defendants in the ordinary courts. That is an unacceptable disparity.
It was referred to in Sarah Atherton MP’s Defence Sub-Committee report published in July and entitled Protecting Those Who Protect Us. Paragraph 175 of that report, which is now only three or four months old, says:
“We do not believe that the problems highlighted by the Lyons Review in the handling of sexual offences in the Service Justice System have been fully resolved. While we accept there is a limited set of circumstances where it may be appropriate for the Service Justice System to be used for UK-based sexual offences (for example when there are offences both in the UK and overseas), this must require the Attorney General’s consent. There may be other compelling reasons, such as the young age and vulnerability of the victim, when it is more appropriate for the civilian justice system to hear these cases. In our view, the fact that a UK case may involve a victim and a perpetrator who are both Service personnel is not a sufficient reason for the Service Justice System to be used.”
Sarah Atherton’s report went on to call for the implementation of the very first recommendation of Judge Lyons’s review—he made a large number of recommendations—in which he said:
“It is … recommended that the Court Martial jurisdiction should no longer include murder, manslaughter and rape when these offences are committed in the UK, except when the consent of the Attorney General is given.”
The Atherton report also called for the implementation of the Lyons recommendations to place all domestic violence and child abuse cases in the civil jurisdiction when committed in the UK.
Why is that recommendation from Judge Lyons, repeated by the Defence Sub-Committee chaired by Sarah Atherton, a Conservative Member, resisted? The Government may now feel that reverting to the pre-2006 position may be seen as a vote of no confidence in the court martial system. I do not believe that to be so, and I do not think it a proper justification. In 2006 it was not seen by the Conservative Party to be a sufficient reason to support the Labour amendment of this historical common-law position that service personnel who commit offences in the United Kingdom will be tried in the ordinary courts.
It is a breach of the basic principles that a person subject to service law is still a citizen and that a British citizen has a right to be tried for serious offences by a randomly selected jury of 12 ordinary fellow citizens. That was a point strongly urged by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, at Second Reading and in the extension of that in his amendment linked to this, which I fully support. I shall leave it to him to explain the purposes of that. I beg to move.
I fully support the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, on the first of these amendments but, before explaining my reasons, my primary purpose in tabling these amendments is to try to ensure the proper morale of Her Majesty’s Armed Forces and the standing in which they are held by the public. One has to bear in mind always that in the modern criminal justice system, where successive Governments have ensured that the victim or complainant —I will use the words interchangeably—is put at the heart of the system, that is taken fully into account. One can see this so often. For example, recently, the public look at the way in which the police investigate and they will look at the way in which people are tried. Are they being tried fairly and is there a proper balance?
It is important to realise that what I seek is, first, to achieve a much greater degree of certainty in relation to these matters and, secondly, to try to ensure that the Armed Forces are not subjected to yet more complaints about the nature of the justice system. It is evident from the report of Judge Shaun Lyons, a most distinguished Naval Judge Advocate—and a judge who is in charge of a major London criminal court—that there ought to be the change which the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, has so carefully gone through. I fully support his amendment but, in view of the difficulties that arise, it is necessary to go a little further.
If I may explain, I want to deal with two issues, one of which, the position of crimes committed overseas, I regret to say the Minister was not happy about last time. However, there is a serious issue and I shall take a moment or two to refer in detail to the law on this subject. The other is in relation to crimes outside the ambit of the proposal to deal with sexual offences, murder and other serious offences.
It is right to begin by recording that, particularly in relation to the most terrible crimes that have occurred, one can go back a very long way. I have seen many of these crimes myself, although the first of them occurred one year after I was born. It concerned the involvement of a battalion of the Scots Guards in an event at a place called Batang Kali during the Malayan emergency. That case was not investigated properly at the time; it is now abundantly clear and there remained a residue, which went right down to the early 2000s, about the way in which it had been approached.
In more recent times, there were the cases involving Baha Mousa and others in Iraq. There was the Blackman case, to which I regret I will have to return, and there were the points raised by one newspaper last Sunday. From what I have seen in each case, regrettably, one has to be sanguine about the fact that such conduct may well occur again. We have to deal with it in a way that is fair and just, while maintaining the morale of the Armed Forces.
We shall turn to looking at investigation when we come to consider the report of Sir Richard Henriques but, on this amendment, we are concerned with jurisdiction. Who has jurisdiction to try a case? Jurisdiction is not like deciding whether you prosecute. It goes to the fundamental position of the court and, over the centuries, it has always been the position that Parliament controls the jurisdiction of the courts. As I mentioned at Second Reading, it is also a fundamental principle that for certain offences there is a right to trial by a jury of 12 people. It is very difficult to see any justification whatever for taking that right away from one of Her Majesty’s citizens. It is fundamental; one has only to read Lord Devlin’s classic work on the jury to realise how core this principle is to our justice system.
The noble and learned Lord makes a good point. Obviously at the heart of this is making the service justice system as good as it can be. Clearly I cannot give a specific undertaking as to what criteria would be adopted in making such a selection, but I hear what he says and it will be given careful consideration. I cannot be more specific about that just now.
I was saying that I hope the noble and learned Lord is reassured that we have considered this matter in detail, having regard, as we have been discussing this afternoon, to the military and operational environment in which our armed services function. In these circumstances, I hope he will not press the amendment.
I omitted to answer a specific question posed by the noble and learned Lord about the most junior member of the court martial voting first. I am informed that the most junior member of the court martial does vote first.
I want to ask about two matters. First, I raised the point about judicial review but I also raised the serious issue of concurrent jurisdiction relating to murder committed overseas, and I gave the references. I would be grateful if the Minister could reply. I would not expect her to do that now but I would be grateful if she could write and deal with these two rather important points.
I certainly undertake to look at Hansard and endeavour to frame a response to the noble and learned Lord.
(2 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I too welcome this Bill. I wish to speak about the service justice system, and in particular the courts martial. It is important that we put this on a firm and clear basis, because the bravery of our Armed Forces, shown recently in particular in Afghanistan, demands no less. I therefore welcome the recommendations and their acceptance by Judge Lyons in matters such as the type of majority that is required for a court martial jury to convict, and also the slip rule. These are welcome and have been long advocated by Judge Jeff Blackett, who did so much to bring the courts martial system into line with the ordinary courts.
However, I too take the view that the best solution would have been to adopt the recommendation of Judge Lyons in relation to the concurrent jurisdiction point. I will say nothing about two factors which are important, namely the independence of the investigation and the experience of prosecutors, until we have the report of Sir Richard Henriques. That is crucial to these issues and I would be grateful if the Minister could indicate when it might become available.
Two critical matters do arise at this stage. First, why do we retain special juries in serious cases in respect of murder and sexual offending for the military? These were abolished in the rest of our justice system many years ago and it is difficult to see why they should be retained, save in exceptional circumstances. Why is a member of the Armed Forces not entitled to the protections that the rest of us have? It will be interesting to hear what the Minister has to say about that fundamental point. Secondly, I assure the House that sentencing is an incredibly difficult exercise that requires a great deal of experience. There is therefore no reason for differentiating the court martial system from the ordinary justice system. I very much hope that the Minister will think again on these points, and I look forward to speaking in support of what it has been indicated that the Opposition might move in relation to Judge Lyons’s recommendation.
Perhaps I may say two words about the proposed solution to the concurrent jurisdiction issue. First, if this is the route we go down, it will be easier to see whether the details have been got right when we see the report of Sir Richard Henriques on the matters. There are three matters that I will briefly mention. The first is the question of supervision or the provision of factors that should influence the protocol. We are delegating very considerable powers to two law officers. Should Parliament consider setting into the Bill the factors that they should take into account, or should Parliament approve the protocol? Secondly, the choice of jurisdiction is quite unlike the choice of a prosecutor as to whether to prosecute or not. I respectfully ask the Minister to consider whether there should not be a right of appeal to a judge of the Court Martial Appeal Court if the defendant or the complainant feels that the wrong choice has been made. This seems to be a far preferable route to seeking judicial review of the prosecutor’s decisions.
The third point, which is possibly a technical mistake in the Bill, is that the protocol will deal only with offences committed in the United Kingdom. However, there is concurrent jurisdiction for certain offences, wherever they are committed, murder being the clearest example. Therefore, if we are to go down the protocol route, it seems to be a technical error to have left out dealing with the issues in relation to the commission of serious offences overseas. I merely put on the record that this was one of the issues that arose in the Blackman case, and it is accepted that that trial could have been conducted if a different decision had been made in the ordinary courts of the land—just as any British citizen accused of murder can be tried here. This is a problem that should not be left out of the Bill. It is not dealt with satisfactorily at present.
(3 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I speak briefly in support of Amendments 1 and 6. There is little I need to add to the words of my noble friend who moved Amendment 1 and the particularly forceful speech of the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford.
As a criminal law practitioner all my professional life, I spell out my concern that, whatever the circumstances, there must be a fair trial in accordance with the principles of our criminal law. Defendants can be materially prejudiced by the passage of time and, as my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti said, prosecutors take this into account every day in their decisions. Certainly, in authorising prosecutions that came within my particular field as Attorney-General, I took this into account as a prosecutor. This is my concern. I hope it is the concern of Her Majesty’s Government regarding the current backlog of criminal trials in our courts.
I will give a simple illustration of what can happen in practice. First, memories fail. Secondly, circumstances are embroidered, sometimes innocently. Ask two or three people for their recollection of a fairly simple set of circumstances, and they frequently vary. I have spent many happy hours in our courts pointing out discrepancies in the accounts of different witnesses of very simple circumstances. The deeper one dug, the greater the rewards. They were frequently meat and drink to a defence lawyer who did not have much greater ammunition.
I will mention rape trials as an example. Whenever the defences consent, in my experience, the chances of a London jury convicting when no complaint is made within three weeks are not high. This is a very serious matter, which we will have to address at some stage. Time is of the essence in seeing that justice is done to both complainant and defendant.
I hope that the drafters of the Bill, in particular this clause, have sufficient experience of the dangers of justice not being done when there has been a passage of time. I support these amendments and believe that they are sufficiently important to be put in the Bill.
I support both Amendments 1 and 6. In the light of all that has been said, I need not add anything in respect of Amendment 1, but will make some brief remarks on Amendment 6. Investigating offences and prosecuting them are inextricably intertwined. To ensure fairness to all concerned—complainants, victims, defendants and prospective defendants—an integrated approach is essential.
By and large, in our civilian justice system, the CPS and police forces have, over the years, come to work very closely together to the benefit of all. In the military justice system, there can be no doubt that the creation of the post of DSP has, particularly through the work of the highly respected holders of that independent office, greatly improved the quality and fairness of service prosecutions. It is now clear that the conduct of investigations has given rise to most of the issues and, in that respect, reform is needed. This amendment is therefore greatly to be welcomed.
The amendment does not deal with instances in which there has been an error in failing to identify cases where there is evidence of criminal conduct but nothing has been done. It is not appropriate to address that at this stage; no doubt it can be covered when Sir Richard Henry Henriques has reported. However, in cases where the investigator has concluded that there is evidence of criminal conduct, the interposition and proposed role of the Director of Service Prosecutions should bring significant improvement.
In my experience of the military justice system, there are many reasons why delays in prosecution occur, but often the causes are lack of focus, insufficient concern about timeliness, and a lack of accountability—particularly the latter. It is clear that the delays that occurred in relation to Iraq arose in large part from these factors, although, as the Minister pointed out in Committee, there have been great improvements since and in the work of IHAT. The risks of a lack of focus, a failure to act with expedition and timeliness, and a lack of accountability remain, as they are endemic to any system. This clause should address those issues.
I will make one last observation. I particularly welcome the provision for the Judge Advocate-General to give practice directions to investigations of overseas operations. Although that would not be usual for a judge in the civilian system, the Judge Advocate-General has a unique role. This was particularly demonstrated by the highly successful and distinguished tenure of that office by Judge Blackett. When holder, he ensured that changes were made to keep the service justice system in line with modern procedure. The power to make practice directions for investigations is consistent with the Judge Advocate-General’s unique role and, I hope, will ensure that problems are promptly addressed as the way in which cases are investigated changes, with changes to the way in which matters should be done as well as the advent of technology.
My Lords, I support both amendments, but in particular Amendment 6 in the name of my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford. Both seek to focus on prosecution, but also deal with the issue that the Government stated at the outset that they wanted to deal with; that is, as my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford pointed out, vexatious claims. The way the Bill is presently drafted does little to deal with repeated investigations. These amendments, in particular Amendment 6, are intended to deal with precisely the problem that the Government say that they wish to deal with. I would be grateful if the Minister could explain to us how she feels that the Bill, as drafted, is going to do what the Government claim that they want to do, because nothing in the Bill is going to stop vexatious investigations.
These amendments are not intended to undermine the Bill. In moving Amendment 1, the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, said that the Government would perhaps think that it would rip the heart out of the Bill. Neither is intended to do that; they are intended to be helpful and ensure that vexatious and unnecessary prosecutions cease and that prosecutions are dealt with expeditiously, where appropriate. Unlike the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, these Benches do not think that prosecutors will find it too difficult to do the job outlined for them in Amendment 1. I support the amendments, and we will call a vote on Amendment 6, as my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford pointed out earlier.
My Lords, I too thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, for his persistence with this, and I especially thank the Minister, for her gracious concession.
It was just a few weeks ago that the former Prime Minister Mrs May warned the Government, in another place, of what she described as the
“fine line between being popular and populist”.—[Official Report, Commons, 15/3/21; col. 78.]
I wonder whether that line is quite so fine. To be more explicit than the noble and learned Lord, dog whistles are bad enough in politics, but they are a lot worse in legislation and worse still when they are by way of legislative amendment to the Human Rights Act—our modern Bill of Rights. To turn the power to consider derogation into an express statutory duty, but not to import the appropriate legal test for such a derogation, was a very dangerous dog whistle indeed. I am very glad that it has been withdrawn. Like the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, I hope that the Government continue in this positive vein and consider other fundamental concerns about the Bill in general.
I do not want to be churlish. This is an important concession from the Government; to treat the Human Rights Act in this way, and to set a precedent for creating duties to derogate and put them in the Act, would have been very dangerous and would have sent a bad signal about the Government’s commitment to human rights at home and internationally.
I thank the Minister for her pragmatic approach to this. I entirely agree with the analysis of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, that the real issue was Article 5 and the right and ability to detain on the battlefield. There was a real problem there and, with respect to the Government, they were right to consider it. The unfortunate thing is that they chose the wrong route. I do not think that they considered carefully enough the decisions of the Supreme Court in Al-Waheed and Serdar Mohammed. But, if a problem remains, I am sure that it will be looked at sympathetically because, for the protection of our troops, it is necessary to take a realistic view of the ability to detain on the battlefield or in close proximity to it. Again, I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, for his clear analysis of this, and the Minister, for her wise decision.
My Lords, like others, I welcome the Government’s concession on this amendment and thank the noble Baroness for having listened, gone away and come back with a helpful proposal. Like the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, I suggest that it would be good if Ministers talk to their colleagues in another place and consider whether, rather than insisting that amendments that have passed through your Lordships’ House today have to be subjected to votes in the other place and brought back and forth for ping-pong, the Government could perhaps consider their own amendments to deal with the views that have been put forward on genocide and other matters. I do not expect an immediate concession on that from the noble Baroness, but I at least put it out there.
While my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford has clearly made his views known to the House—to kill the Bill—I do not expect that to happen. I do not expect my colleagues to push for a vote to kill the Bill, but, if we could amend it significantly to deal with the real concerns of our service men and women and veterans, it would be all the better for it.
(3 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I speak to Amendment 6. Its purpose is simple—that the decision that the prosecutor makes takes into account the quality, thoroughness, independence and accountability of the investigation. It may be said—as appears from the Minister’s letter—that these matters are being looked at by Sir Richard Henriques in the review that he is conducting. No doubt the detail of all this can be gone into at that time—for example, how independence is to be safeguarded and accountability achieved. No doubt we will need to look at the position in other states. All that is for the future.
However, this Bill is being brought forward now. One matter that must be addressed now is that prosecutors, in deciding whether to continue, have to take into account the quality of the investigation in the respects I have set out in the amendment. I have put this forward based on my own experience of three cases that came before me when I was a judge. In the military context—and the civilian context is exactly the same—they pointed to the importance of thorough, well-resourced investigations.
The first case related to the deaths of 24 people in what is now Malaysia during the communist insurgency in 1948, which came back to the courts in 2011. That very unhappy series of events came back because the initial investigation was not thorough, a subsequent investigation was stopped before it was completed and, by the time the matter came before the courts, there was clear evidence that the original explanation of what had happened—namely, that these persons killed had been shot trying to escape—had been given by soldiers on instructions and that 24 people were killed in cold blood.
The second illustration relates to invents in Iraq and what happened in numerous cases, the most significant of which is the death of Baha Mousa. That is a paradigm example of how a poor investigation can be so terrible that it sometimes takes a very long time to see what went wrong.
The third and perhaps more surprising example is the conviction of Sergeant Blackman for shooting a member of the Taliban. When it originally came before the court martial, there had not been a sufficiently proper investigation of the circumstances, the stresses he underwent and his perception of the support he got from his command. That came out only afterwards and was one of the matters that, as appears from the judgment of the Court of Appeal, led to his conviction being reduced to manslaughter.
The thoroughness and independence of the investigation are critical in any decision to prosecute. A similar reflection can be obtained from ordinary cases; where things have gone wrong or there is a problem, it is the investigation. It is important that an investigation is fair—that is why it is listed—and thorough. And it should be fair in both senses: to the accused and to those who say a crime has been committed.
Independence is of equal importance. Any detailed consideration of the Malay case to which I referred and of the judgment of the Court of Appeal in the Blackman case shows how independence and accountability are also important. Therefore, what must be taken into account as a matter of principle—not of detail, that is for later—are these matters relating to the investigation. It may be said, “Well, things have got a lot better”. However, we all know that even the most well-organised body can make mistakes in the conduct of an investigation, and accountability and independence need to be of a very high level in certain types of case.
I am putting forward this amendment to show that this nation has regard to the covenant and the support it is necessary to give to our Armed Forces, but also to show that we must be seen to do justice, because the doing of justice is equally important. The quality, thoroughness, independence and accountability of the original investigation, if there has been one, or of the more recent one, should be at the forefront of the prosecutor’s decision.
My Lords, as I said in my comments on the first group of amendments, the vagaries of parliamentary procedure mean that in some ways the groups of amendments are being debated in a less than helpful order. I hope that this group of amendments and the suite of proposals will reassure the noble Lords, Lord West of Spithead and Lord Lancaster, and others who had any concerns that perhaps supporters of the first group might be seeking to eviscerate the Bill in its entirety.
This suite of amendments is intended to be constructive. I will speak predominantly to Amendment 17, in the name of my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford and myself, and Amendment 28. They are both about investigations. If the purpose of the Bill is to stop unnecessary investigations and investigations being brought many years later, these two amendments in particular seek in clear and specific ways to give substance to the Government’s stated aims.
Amendment 17 gives a very clear outline of what could be done in terms of investigations: how they should be taken forward and, after they are completed, moved to prosecution. We have not heard huge numbers of veterans saying they have been prosecuted many times, but we have heard concerns about people being investigated and never getting closure. Amendment 17 gives a very clear outline of how investigations could be dealt with.
Amendment 28, in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, and the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Boyce, puts limitations on reinvestigation. That surely goes to the heart of what the Government say that they wish to do. If the Government really wish to have the best legislation to serve their own stated aims and fulfil the needs and expectations of current service personnel and veterans, could they please consider these amendments?
In your Lordships’ House, the Minister often feels the need to say that, however laudable the goals of the amendments are, they do not quite fit the approach that the Government want to take. If the Minister does not feel able to support the detail of the amendments, might she consider coming back with some government proposals on how investigations and reinvestigations could be dealt with in a way that would enable the Bill to do what it says on the tin?