Lord Craig of Radley
Main Page: Lord Craig of Radley (Crossbench - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Craig of Radley's debates with the Ministry of Defence
(2 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I draw attention to my entries in the register of interests and declare that I had the honour to serve in the Royal Marines. I will make a short contribution to this debate. I have only recently discovered that Sir Richard Henriques has made mention of and quoted from speeches I and others made during the progress earlier this year of the now Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Act. I put on record my thanks to him for his thorough and compelling report.
I also support this amendment in the name of my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford, who has a wealth of knowledge and experience in these matters. If the Government remain unconvinced of the merits of Motion A1, they should commission further research into whether the hierarchical nature of service life is imported into the court martial system or if there is a perception that it is. In other words, are panel members influenced by the hierarchy’s view or what they perceive is the hierarchy’s view?
This concerned me in the Sergeant Blackman case; I played a minor role in the campaign to exonerate him. He served in 42 Commando Royal Marines, had an exemplary record and had been deployed on active service six times in Iraq and Afghanistan. This amounted to six six-month tours of intensive combat operations in seven years. This is not a complaint but an explanation. I always believed that the philosophy of a court martial was that the individual service man or woman should be tried by their peers. In other words, the panel should be comprised of individuals who had experienced the same horrors and dangers of the battlefield with which Sergeant Blackman was only too familiar. In his case, it was an allegation of murdering a mortally wounded enemy operator on the battlefield. The court martial conviction for murder was rightly quashed at the behest of the Criminal Cases Review Commission. A terrible miscarriage of justice was partly righted.
There were seven members of Sergeant Blackman’s court martial panel, five of whom had very little or no experience of combat soldiering in the most dangerous, arduous and exhausting conditions. These conditions were exacerbated by being in mortal danger most of the time, in the full knowledge that at any time Sergeant Blackman or any of the Marines under his command could have set off an improvised explosive device which could have killed or maimed any one or more of them. Two members of that panel had shared that experience, and Sergeant Blackman was convicted by a vote of 5:2 This was an insufficient ratio for a civilian criminal court to convict.
There are other disparities between court martials and civilian criminal court trials that I and others have mentioned in previous debates; they have already been aired here, in part. These disparities do not flatter the court martial system. The further research that I have suggested should also encompass service rivalry, battle fatigue—which can affect the strongest and bravest of men or women—the effects of provocation, and being in continuous mortal danger for months without a break, often in extreme weather conditions. It should also consider the impact of misogyny, sexism and racism in the court martial system, and whether civilian criminal courts would provide a more balanced and equitable system of justice.
Finally, in chapter 8 of Sir Richard’s admirable review, headed, “Legal support and the Defence Representation Unit”, he makes six recommendations, numbered 47 to 52 inclusive. I ask the Minister the following questions. First, have the Government accepted these recommendations? Secondly, will the Government consult on them? Thirdly, will there be a debate in this House on the results of that consultation? Finally, what is the Government’s timetable for their implementation?
My Lords, I will speak to Motion B1 in my name. It was a great disappointment that the other place was not prepared to accept this House’s well-supported amendment, originally proposed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, and to which I readily added my name. With his vast and rightly respected experience, he considered that the Secretary of State should have a statutory duty of due regard for veteran affairs. The telling example of Gulf War syndrome was mentioned. Noble Lords will recall that the Government of the day were reluctant to see or treat this issue with the seriousness it seemed to deserve. It affected a considerable number of service and ex-service personnel who had served in Operation Granby in the first Gulf War of 1991.
A number of noble Lords, dismayed by the Government’s decisions just to set up further studies, arranged an independent inquiry chaired pro bono by a distinguished Law Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick. He conducted a fair and exhaustive inquiry to which I, as Chief of the Defence Staff during the conflict, gave evidence. But no Government Minister was prepared to be interviewed, or even to attend any of the hearings. That was an example of impact on veterans that was not solvable at local level.
At Report, I quoted another example, that of the veterans of the Hong Kong Military Service Corps, whose long-outstanding case also could not be resolved at devolved or local-authority level. I understand that the MoD has passed this case back to the Home Office, but I hope that the MoD still sees it as a veteran case that deserves its continued interest and a responsibility to see it finally settled. It would be most unsatisfactory, when dealing with the concerns of veterans, for the MoD and the Secretary of State not to continue to be seen to be actively supportive of their veterans. A statutory requirement for the Secretary of State to pay due regard and be seen to discharge a duty of care for veterans seems more important than ever. Serving personnel, soon to be veterans, may well have been involved in live operations that, more than ever, are subject to active ministerial oversight and even direction. Looking to the future, assuming the media reports of hearing damage to soldiers testing the Ajax AFV to be true, this could become a veteran issue—an issue that needs a duty of care for all the veterans as a group, not just individually, where there might inevitably be differing outcomes causing lasting resentment.
This amendment therefore gives the Secretary of State time to consider his responsibility further and report to Parliament. As the amendment spells out, it requires the Secretary of State to detail
“the implications of not applying the same legal responsibility to have ‘due regard’ under the Armed Forces Covenant to central government as the Act requires of local authorities and other public bodies.”
It has been argued that the Secretary of State believes that he and central government already bear this responsibility. Why, then, is there this reluctance to spell it out closely in statute?
The Minister in the other place made the particular point that, because the Secretary of State makes a report to Parliament annually, he is fully discharging his duty of care for veterans. But it is not just a moral duty; the Armed Forces Act 2011 made reporting annually a statutory requirement, so it seems to follow that “due regard to” should be enacted; otherwise, the statutory responsibility is confined just to reporting.
The Minister in the other place said that,
“responsibility for the actual delivery of nuts-and-bolts frontline services and their impact … rests at local level”.—[Official Report, Commons, 6/12/21; col. 99.]
He made no mention of the heart of your Lordships’ case, that there were some issues that could not be dealt with at local level. Why was this not considered? All he said was that the inclusion of central government was simply unnecessary; he did not explain why. As I have just mentioned, the MoD has passed the case that I cited on Report of the Hong Kong veteran to the Home Office; one central department having due regard has passed it directly to another. I rest my case.
My Lords, I entirely support what the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig of Radley, has just said, but I want to add a word on Motion A1. It is clear that the overwhelming majority of people with real experience of the criminal and military justice systems support that Motion A1. The Minister is quite right: the service justice system has improved enormously over the past few years, but there is a fundamental respect in which it is different—that is, that there is no trial by jury. Trial by jury is the essence of our system. It gives confidence to the victims, which is critical in the very serious crimes that we are considering, and it is a fundamental right of the defendant. We should not do anything to take those rights away or to undermine confidence; that is the fallacy in the Minister’s argument.
Before the Minister sits down, the big issue that came from this House is where local authorities cannot deal with the veteran issue. We produced some examples of that; it was not discussed at all in the other place. Could she explain why? This is not acceptable at this stage, bearing in mind that, in effect, it is already being carried out. I do not see why there should be any difficulty in incorporating the Secretary of State “having due regard” as the form of words, to show that it is a matter for central government. The veteran issue cannot be dealt with at local level.
Central government, as I have indicated previously, is bound by a wide spectrum of obligations. Some of these obligations exist because of parliamentary and government obligations, some exist because the MoD is an employer of the Armed Forces, and some exist because, under the covenant—which is a concept, as I have said—we want to do the best we can.
What I did explain was that to make this work—I hope it is clear from the text of the Bill in relation to the three functions we have identified—you need to have an identified body and detailed functions. That is why the Government feel that it is premature to take this step at this time. I appreciate that the noble and gallant Lord disagrees with that interpretation. He feels that the Government should absolutely accept that they are bound under the covenant. I would say that they are bound under the covenant as a concept in terms of a moral responsibility, and they are certainly accountable not just to Parliament, as they rightly should be, but to their own Armed Forces and to their veterans, and to public opinion.
I have tried to explain why we feel that to take this step at this stage is both precipitate and premature. I appreciate that there is not agreement on that view, and that is what democracy exists to serve. But I have endeavoured to explain to your Lordships the position of the Government and why they hold to their views in these circumstances. Again, I respectfully ask the noble Lords to withdraw their Motions A1 and B1.
The Question is that Motion B1 be agreed to. I am content to have an electronic Division to settle this. I instruct the clerks to plug in the machine.