(3 years ago)
Lords ChamberThat this House do not insist on its Amendment 1, to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 1A.
My Lords, with the leave of the House, in moving Motion A I will address Motion A1, and then Motions B and B1. Obviously there will be a certain element of déjà vu in my remarks but I shall do my best to explain once again why the Government hold to the view they do on these issues.
Over the last 20 years, the service justice system has gone through many changes and been transformed for the better as a result of them. There have been numerous reviews and inquiries, some as a consequence of operations, but all of which have enabled the service justice system to develop and improve. It is no longer recognisable as the system existing 10 to 15 years ago with which many of your Lordships were familiar.
The service police, prosecutors and judiciary are fully independent and trained. They are skilled and have the experience to deal with all offending to the same standard as their counterparts in the civilian criminal justice system. In particular, prosecutors are trained for rape and serious sexual offences, and judges/judge advocates are “ticketed” to deal with particular offences. Our code of practice for victims reflects the same principles as that for civilians and we use many of the same arrangements as in the civilian justice system, such as special measures for vulnerable witnesses. Any visitor to a court martial centre will find it remarkably similar to any Crown Court in England and Wales. In fact, in some areas the court martial is ahead of the civilian system, such as in the use of video links. It is for these reasons that the service justice system is legitimately positioned as an alternative jurisdiction to the civilian criminal justice system in respect of any criminal offence in the UK.
The recently published review by the retired High Court judge Sir Richard Henriques QC and the earlier Service Justice System Review by His Honour Shaun Lyons both strongly supported the continued existence of the service justice system. Sir Richard fully agreed with the Government’s decision to retain unqualified concurrent jurisdiction for murder, manslaughter and rape. He recommended a number of proposals to further strengthen the service justice system so that it has the best expertise and capacity to deal with all crimes. We have prioritised his recommendation of creating a defence serious crime unit, headed by a new provost marshal for serious crime in the Bill. This is a major development for the service justice system and it demonstrates the Government’s commitment to achieving the highest investigative capabilities within it. The new unit will play a key role in our strategy to drive up conviction rates.
I know we all have a common aim, which is to ensure that every case is heard in the most appropriate jurisdiction. We also agree that in the event of disagreement about jurisdiction, a civilian prosecutor should have the final say. However, we maintain that rather than involving the Attorney-General as set out in this amendment and creating an in-built bias towards the civilian jurisdiction, a better approach is to strengthen the prosecutors’ protocols and clarify the role of the prosecutors—civilian and service—in decision-making on concurrent jurisdiction.
The service justice system cannot be half a justice system or a partial justice system. It has to handle all crimes committed by service personnel outside the UK. It makes sense for it to continue to be able to handle all crimes in the UK. In the UK, this will be subject to the operation of the prosecution protocols in respect of which the view of the civilian prosecutor, as I said, will prevail.
Just for the avoidance of doubt, I take this opportunity to reassure the House that the proposal in this Bill is not about increasing the number of serious cases to be dealt with by the service justice system; it will continue to be the case that a victim can choose whether to report a criminal offence to the service or the civilian police. Our proposal simply maintains the principle that both jurisdictions are capable of dealing with all offending, and asserts that qualified and experienced prosecutors are best placed to make decisions where there is concurrent jurisdiction. Removing crimes from the competence of the service justice system or introducing a presumption in favour of the civilian system for serious crimes, as in this amendment, inevitably calls into question the integrity of the service justice system, raising a perception by victims, witnesses, service personnel and the public that the service justice system is deficient. That is unacceptable to the Government. That weakening and fracture of the service justice system is impossible for them to defend.
Let me now address conviction rates in the service justice system for sexual offences, in particular for the offence of rape, because this is clearly important. In his report, Sir Richard Henriques makes the point at page 201 that the comparison of conviction rates between the service and civilian justice systems overlooks the fact that the service police refer, and the Service Prosecuting Authority prosecutes, cases that would have been discontinued in the civilian system.
The number of rape cases prosecuted in the civilian system stands at between 1.6% and 3% of those reported to Home Office police forces. The Crown Prosecution Service has announced an action plan to address this disparity. Noble Lords will recall that the Government are also working on a new strategy for the service justice system when dealing with cases of rape and other serious sexual assaults. In the service justice system, 55% of rape investigations carried out by the service police in the period from 2017 to 2019 led to a referral to the Service Prosecuting Authority, and 27% of rape investigations led to a suspect being charged. In 2020, 50% of rape investigations by the service police led to charges and prosecution. Viewed as a proportion of allegations reported, rather than of cases prosecuted, the conviction rate in the service justice system is around 8% compared to around 2% in the civilian system. Let me be clear that this rate is still too low but should not be used as a reason for departing from the current principle of concurrent jurisdiction. Your Lordships may be interested to know that more recent data about cases of rape prosecuted at the court martial in the last six months show a conviction rate of just under 50%. Clearly, the service justice system is capable of investigating and prosecuting these cases.
I now wish to turn to specific details of the amendment, parts of the text of which cause concern. It seeks to introduce a consultation role for the Attorney-General in England and Wales only. The service justice system applies across the whole UK. That is why there is provision in the Bill for three separate protocols to ensure that the same approach is taken across the three legal jurisdictions of England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. As it stands, the application of the amendment to only England and Wales rather than the whole UK means that cases involving service personnel in those parts of the country would be handled differently from cases handled in Scotland or Northern Ireland. The amendment is unsuitable to be extended to Scotland or Northern Ireland. Consultation with the Attorney-General for England and Wales on prosecutorial decisions is entirely inappropriate for the devolved Administrations. For example, the independence of the Lord Advocate as head of the system of criminal prosecution and investigation of deaths in Scotland means that decisions are taken independently of any other person, and this includes not being subject to guidance or direction of another officeholder. It is my understanding that the Lord Advocate would be concerned about any extension of the proposed approach to Scotland.
Finally, I say with the greatest respect that it is not entirely clear to the Government what is meant by the condition of “naval or military complexity”, and how that will be defined, by whom and how it should be interpreted. This approach will lead to confusion and a lack of clarity about how and when the Attorney-General for England and Wales should be consulted.
On the other hand, Clause 7 of the Bill ensures that decisions on jurisdiction are left to the independent service justice prosecutors across the UK, and their respective civilian prosecutors, using guidance that they have agreed between them that will, no doubt, address the military dimension to be considered. Once in place, this new statutory guidance will be used to revise existing protocols between the service and the civilian police to bring much-needed clarity at all levels on how decisions on jurisdiction are made.
The Bill also makes it clear that where there is a disagreement on jurisdiction, the civilian prosecutor—be it the Director of Public Prosecutions for England and Wales, the Lord Advocate or the Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland—always has the final say. So the service justice system prosecutor cannot ignore the civilian prosecutor and railroad cases through the service justice system. In this way, the Government’s approach not only provides a solution which works UK-wide but provides ample safeguards to ensure that civilian prosecutors are involved and cases are dealt with in the most appropriate jurisdiction.
In these circumstances, I beg to move Motion A in my name, and I urge the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, not to press his Motion A1.
I will now move on to Motions B and B1, in relation to the Armed Forces covenant. The covenant is described as:
“An Enduring Covenant Between the People of the United Kingdom, Her Majesty’s Government and All those who serve or have served in the Armed Forces of the Crown and their Families.”
The covenant was rebuilt a decade ago during a time, like today, of great pressure on the Armed Forces community, and has since been delivered in a highly successful manner, because it captures the appreciation and support for the sacrifices of that community of people from every walk of life across the United Kingdom.
This embodies the spirit of the covenant, which of itself is not a legal obligation, and nor should it be. But that is not to say that legislation has not been important in helping its delivery. That began with the obligation on the Secretary of State for Defence to report to Parliament annually on how service life impacts on the lives of servicepeople and former servicepeople. By working with our service providers and key stakeholder groups, from this one measure the covenant has evolved into one of the key drivers of welfare support to our Armed Forces community today. We are now taking the next step to promote and further strengthen the legal basis of the covenant, as we committed, which is why we are taking forward the provisions in this Bill.
Ensuring that key policymakers have the right information about the Armed Forces community and are therefore better able to make the right decisions for their local populations has been fundamental to our current success. Building on this foundation, the new duty will therefore oblige specified public bodies exercising a relevant healthcare, education or housing function to pay due regard to the three principles of the covenant. We see this as a sure and effective way of raising awareness among providers of public services of how service life can disadvantage the Armed Forces community, thereby encouraging a more consistent approach around the country.
However, these provisions are breaking new ground, and it is important that we see how they work in practice so that we both establish an evidence base and allow time for review and assessment to inform future enlargement of this obligation to any new bodies or functions. The provisions in the Bill will allow that enlargement more easily by granting the Secretary of State the power to add to the scope of the duty through regulations, without the need to wait for another Armed Forces Bill.
I have already outlined in this place the work we are undertaking with covenant reference group stakeholders to establish a process to help the Secretary of State to identify and assess functions that it would be beneficial to add to the scope of the duty, including those that are the responsibility of central government. This process will feed into our existing commitment to review the overall performance of the covenant duty as part of our post-legislative scrutiny.
I remind your Lordships of the current legal obligation on the Government to annually prepare and lay an Armed Forces covenant report. In the preparation of the annual report, the Secretary of State must have regard to the three principles of the covenant. He must obtain the views of relevant government departments and devolved Administrations in relation to the effects on servicepeople covered by the report. He must state in the report his assessment of whether servicepeople are facing disadvantage and, importantly, where he is of the opinion that there is disadvantage, what his response is to that, including consideration of whether the making of special provision would be justified. This means in essence that covenant delivery at a national level remains under continual review and, far from avoiding responsibility, demonstrates how this Government are committed to ensuring that the needs of the Armed Forces community are identified so that action can be taken.
My Lords, I will start with a quotation. In the Ministry of Defence
“there is one individual who is refusing to back down from the alleyway he has found himself in.”—[Official Report, Commons, 6/12/21; col. 105.]
Those are the words of the former Defence Minister Johnny Mercer, speaking in the debate in the other place on Monday night, on the amendment that we sent. He had earlier said:
“Unfortunately, I was in the room when this decision was made. The evidence did not support the Secretary of State at the time and the evidence does not support the Secretary of State today. I cannot vote against the Lords amendment; it is not the right thing to do. Let me be clear: when the Secretary of State made that decision”—
the issue that we are discussing today—
“it was against the advice of the officials in the Department and against the advice of his Ministers.”—[Official Report, Commons, 6/12/21; col. 104.]
Unusually, the veil is lifted. Mr Mercer clearly identifies Mr Ben Wallace, the Secretary of State for Defence, as the man in the alleyway who, against the advice of his officials and his Ministers, persists in resisting this amendment. The Minister knows that I have always assumed that she would not, in her personal capacity, back the Government’s position—but now we have direct evidence from Mr Mercer, her former colleague.
I could leave it at that. I could await the storm of protest from victims whose cases are dismissed at court martial, who will come forward brandishing the Judge Lyons review and the recommendations, after considerable investigation, contained in Sarah Atherton’s report, published last July, to which I have referred at every stage—Sarah Atherton being the only Conservative Member of Parliament ever for Wrexham.
I doubt that the controversy when those protests are made will improve Mr Wallace’s or the Government’s standing with the public on the highly sensitive issue of sexual offences, but I have a deep concern that the reputation of the service justice system in the UK should not be sullied.
On Monday afternoon, I took part in an international forum organised by my friend Professor Eugene Fidell of Yale University, founder and former president of the National Institute of Military Justice in the United States. The forum meets regularly. On this occasion, we considered the way that sexual offences are dealt with in the Canadian military. This is a live issue in many jurisdictions. I had hoped that the United Kingdom would show the way, but I will remind the House of some of the UK statistics that were before the other place.
The Atherton committee interviewed many in search of evidence. Some 64% of the more than 4,000 service- women who submitted evidence to the committee stated that they had experienced sexual harassment, rape, bullying or discrimination while serving in the Armed Forces. Over the past five years, the average conviction rate for rape in civilian courts, from Ministry of Justice data, is 34%. Over the same five years, from using the data of the MoD, it is just 16%. The Minister told us that it was 15% for courts martial over the last six months. If you use Crown Prosecution Service data, the figures are even worse.
I thank the noble Lord for taking this point of correction. The statistic I gave him for cases of rape prosecuted in courts martial in the last six months shows a conviction rate of just under 50%.
Obviously, I misheard the noble Baroness. I will continue. As I said on Report, I am not aware of any murders committed in the UK by service personnel that have been tried by court martial. Of course, that could have happened only since 2006, when the novel change to concurrent jurisdiction was introduced. I have noted two cases of manslaughter arising from deaths at the Castlemartin range in west Wales, in live firing exercises, which involved the organisation of training activities, but I am not aware of any trials of sexual offences at court martial in the UK where the victim was a civilian. If there were any, I shudder to think of the effect on a civilian complainant of giving her evidence in intimate detail, against a serviceman, to a panel of uniformed officers, at a court martial.
Until now, the verdict of a court martial in such a case would have been by a simple majority, but I welcome the changes in this Bill that lead to a different situation. Imagine the difficulty of a junior service woman or man making a complaint of rape to her or his commanding officer, particularly if the alleged offender is senior to them in the chain of command, as is often the case. In addition to all the stresses and strains that already dissuade many women in civilian life from complaining, she, a servicewoman, has to face the effect on her career, an appearance before a board of senior officers, very low chances of conviction and the possibility that, in the event of an acquittal, the terms of her service will keep her in contact with her attacker. At least in a civilian court, the jury, to whom she would give her sensitive and difficult evidence, is 12 anonymous people drawn from the public. They will have no effect on her career and she is most unlikely ever to see them again—contrast that with giving evidence of sexual offences before a court martial.
Sir Robert Neill, with all his experience and wisdom, pointed out in the other place on Monday that the normal safeguards that apply in these cases in civilian courts are not yet available in the courts martial, in both the investigatory and procedural stages. Again, I draw the Minister’s attention to the effect upon the recruitment and retention of women in the Armed Forces. Would you expose your daughter to the probability that she will be subject to sexual harassment and worse, without the protection of a satisfactory service justice system?
I listened to the debate in the other place, and my amendment in lieu has changes. Objection was made to the role ascribed to the Attorney-General. The Minister has made a similar objection in this House, and I have to admit that I had assumed that the Ministry of Defence and the Members in another place appreciated the constitutional position of the Attorney-General. It is one of his functions to supervise the Director of Public Prosecutions and the Director of Service Prosecutions and to be answerable in Parliament for them and their decisions. Hence it was Judge Lyons’ recommendation that the AG’s consent should be sought for the trial by a court martial of murder, manslaughter, rape and serious sexual offences committed in the UK. I agreed with his position: it represents the correct status of the Attorney-General in this country.
However, if the consent of the Attorney-General is the problem, this amendment in lieu leaves decisions about trial venue in the hands of the Director of Public Prosecutions—but only after consultation with the Attorney-General. The DPP would naturally consult the DSP, but, as the Minister, Mr Leo Docherty, made clear on Monday evening, it is the DPP’s decision in the end.
I say to the Conservative Benches that, if they vote against my amendment, they would be voting merely for the stubborn man in the alleyway, in Johnny Mercer’s words. They would be voting against the views of the officials in the Ministry of Defence and the departmental Ministers at the time that this was first considered, against the leading recommendation—number 1—of Judge Lyons and, above all, against the passionate findings of the Conservative Member of Parliament and her cross-party committee. Sarah Atherton—the only women in history to have risen from the ranks of the Armed Forces to become a Member of the House of Commons—knows what she is talking about. I ask those opposite not to vote against this amendment. I beg to move.
My Lords, first, I thank your Lordships for, as ever, interesting and thoughtful contributions on both issues being debated this afternoon, particularly Motions A1 and B1. I will first address the comments made in relation to Motion A1. By way of preface, it is worth noting that this matter was debated and decided in the other place by an authoritative and substantial majority. Notwithstanding that, I will endeavour in my remarks to engage your Lordships and repeat why the Government hold to the position they do. I am grateful for the further comments made.
Perhaps I should clarify to the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, who seemed to doubt my commitment to the matters of the service justice system, that I and the Government are convinced of the wisdom of retaining unqualified concurrent jurisdiction for murder, manslaughter and rape—I want to make that crystal clear. I remind your Lordships that, contrary to what some contributions indicated, that view is supported by a distinguished former High Court judge, Sir Richard Henriques.
I was also interested to note that remarks from a number of your Lordships with very senior and impressive legal backgrounds seemed to be addressed exclusively to England and Wales. With all respect, the service justice system that we all admire and revere has to extend across the whole of the UK and must reflect the different systems within it. Military justice must be universal across the UK and the proposal in the Bill achieves that end in a way in which the noble Lord’s amendment does not.
Perhaps I might challenge the Minister on that. If the civil jurisdiction is to be used for an offence committed in Scotland or Northern Ireland, court martials then become immaterial—so there is no problem, as the Minister seems to think. This point has not been raised at any stage of the Bill until today. There is no problem if the ordinary courts of Scotland and Northern Ireland are to deal with offences which occur within that jurisdiction. The question of whether a person is in the military or not is then irrelevant; the offences will be dealt with as usual.
Yes, but with all respect, I say to the noble Lord that that is not the essence of the issue. The essence is instead how you create a service justice system which can operate across the United Kingdom and ensure that, when discussions take place with the appropriate civilian prosecutors, appropriate decisions are reached on the correct jurisdiction for the case. That might be, within the service justice system, convening in Scotland, but under the noble Lord’s amendment there is clearly a desire to bias the whole service justice system in respect of England and Wales to the civilian system, and I am saying that that introduces a disparity or fracture of the United Kingdom service justice system. That is what the Government find unacceptable.
The noble Lord, Lord Burnett, raised an important point—
If there is any technical difficulty regarding the extension of the jurisdiction to include Northern Ireland and Scotland, surely it would not be beyond the wit of the Government, if they accepted the principle of civilianisation, to deal with that matter in an appropriate way.
I say to the noble and learned Lord that, as I understand it, the difficulty is that constitutionally we cannot extend this amendment to cover Scotland and Northern Ireland. That gets right to the heart of whether we have a service justice system for the United Kingdom, operating across it, or we do not. That is the difficulty with this amendment.
Turning to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Burnett, on the Richard Henriques recommendations, I know he was particularly interested in a defence representation unit. In recognition of the remarks I made in Grand Committee when I undertook to keep the House informed of progress on these Henriques matters, I explained then and when the amendment was tabled on Report that we have to analyse and assess these recommendations. We are not yet sure how they could be implemented and what measures would be necessary to implement them, but I am very happy to repeat my assurance to the noble Lord that I will keep the Chamber informed of progress.
Before the Minister sits down, the big issue that came from this House is where local authorities cannot deal with the veteran issue. We produced some examples of that; it was not discussed at all in the other place. Could she explain why? This is not acceptable at this stage, bearing in mind that, in effect, it is already being carried out. I do not see why there should be any difficulty in incorporating the Secretary of State “having due regard” as the form of words, to show that it is a matter for central government. The veteran issue cannot be dealt with at local level.
Central government, as I have indicated previously, is bound by a wide spectrum of obligations. Some of these obligations exist because of parliamentary and government obligations, some exist because the MoD is an employer of the Armed Forces, and some exist because, under the covenant—which is a concept, as I have said—we want to do the best we can.
What I did explain was that to make this work—I hope it is clear from the text of the Bill in relation to the three functions we have identified—you need to have an identified body and detailed functions. That is why the Government feel that it is premature to take this step at this time. I appreciate that the noble and gallant Lord disagrees with that interpretation. He feels that the Government should absolutely accept that they are bound under the covenant. I would say that they are bound under the covenant as a concept in terms of a moral responsibility, and they are certainly accountable not just to Parliament, as they rightly should be, but to their own Armed Forces and to their veterans, and to public opinion.
I have tried to explain why we feel that to take this step at this stage is both precipitate and premature. I appreciate that there is not agreement on that view, and that is what democracy exists to serve. But I have endeavoured to explain to your Lordships the position of the Government and why they hold to their views in these circumstances. Again, I respectfully ask the noble Lords to withdraw their Motions A1 and B1.
Before the Minister sits down—I hope she will forgive me—I asked specifically about the size of the sample for rape cases, an issue which my noble friend Lord Coaker also raised. The figures are quite different and much more encouraging than those given by Mr Johnny Mercer in the other place. Can the Minister tell me—I did give notice of this in the course of my short remarks—what is the size of the sample?
I have to say to the noble and learned Lord that I am afraid I do not have information available. I gave him the statistics provided to me, but I will undertake to ascertain that information and write to him.
My Lords, I will pursue that for a moment. The number of cases heard in courts martial is probably fewer than 10 for sexual offences, or at least fewer than 20. I cannot imagine that in six months, we deal with more than four or five cases, but no doubt we will be told in due course. Over a five-year period, the figure is 16% for convictions, as opposed to the civil conviction rate of 34%—shocking as that conviction rate is in any event.
On the point about Scotland and Northern Ireland—never raised before Monday night in the course of this Bill, either here or in the other place—the principle that this amendment sets down is quite simple:
“Guidance … must provide that where offences of murder, manslaughter, domestic violence, child abuse, rape or sexual assault with penetration are alleged to have been committed in the United Kingdom, any charges brought against a person subject to service law shall normally be tried in a civilian court”—
it does not say “in the Crown Court” in this country—
“unless by reason of the circumstances … the Director of Public Prosecutions, after consultation with the Attorney General, directs trial by court martial.”
If it is necessary to cover that by putting “after consultation with the Lord Advocate in Scotland” or whoever is the chief authority in Northern Ireland, that can be done in 30 seconds—if you let me loose for that period of time.
No answer has been given, and we are faced with what Johnny Mercer said:
“there is one individual who is refusing to back down from the alleyway”.—[Official Report, Commons, 6/12/21; col. 105.]
This is not proper policy for the Conservative Party. It will face, as a party, the complaints of people who have been subjected to sexual violence but whose cases have not been upheld. It will arise, and it will be to the advantage of other parties. So, I plead that the amendment be supported in this case. I beg to move.
That this House do not insist on its Amendment 2, to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 2A.
I beg to move.
Motion B1 (as an amendment to Motion B)