Defence: 2.5% GDP Spending Commitment

Lord Craig of Radley Excerpts

Tuesday 17th December 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I thank my noble friend Lord Harris for his question. It is not just me who is considering that; the whole of government is considering the need for homeland resilience. Indeed, my noble friend has asked me about this issue on a number of occasions. Part of the remit of the defence review is to look at what we should do about homeland resilience; that is an important step forward. What do we do to prepare the population for the threats we may face in future? What about hybrid warfare? What about, as we have seen in Ukraine, attacks on critical national infrastructure? What about some of the other data breaches we have seen? These are wholly important issues to which we have perhaps not given the priority needed. My noble friend is absolutely right, and the defence review is looking at this. Homeland resilience will have to be a proper part of how we take our defence and security further in future.

[Lord Craig of Radley (CB)]

My Lords, do the Government accept that there is a practical limit to the amount of additional funds that can be spent in one particular financial year? Do they agree that 3% is an amount which could be spent, and should be, in view of the situation in which we now find ourselves?

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig, makes the point about the additional money that he and other noble Lords believe is required. The Government’s commitment is to set a pathway to 2.5%. I remind the noble and gallant Lord that, on top of the money we have already provided for next year, we have an additional £3 billion in the Budget next year. We are setting a pathway to 2.5%. That is why the Government recognise the need to spend more on defence and security, and that is what we will do.

Drones: RAF Bases

Lord Craig of Radley Excerpts

Wednesday 27th November 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Lancaster, for the work he does as director of the Army Reserve. On national resilience, the threats and warfare of the future have been shown from Ukraine and elsewhere. It is not just tanks, it is not just aircraft—it is about national resilience to withstand hybrid attack, such as attacks on information and our critical national infrastructure. The ability to defend against physical and cyberattack is crucial to withstanding the threats that we will face in the future. That has to be a part of any future defence review, and it will be. Without it, we will leave our country weaker than it should be in the face of such threats.

[Lord Craig of Radley (CB)]

My Lords—

[Lord Naseby (Con)]

My Lords—

[Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab Co-op)]

My Lords, the House will hear from the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig.

[Lord Craig of Radley (CB)]

My Lords, does the deployment of Armed Forces personnel indicate that the local police forces do not have the ability to investigate drones, as required by the Air Traffic Management and Unmanned Aircraft Act 2021?

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

The Gold Command for the sites in East Anglia is the Ministry of Defence Police. That force has the ability, knowledge and expertise to deal with some of the threats that the noble and gallant Lord has pointed out. His question demonstrates the need for the Ministry of Defence Police to work closely with Home Office police forces and other agencies to defend those sites.

Defence Programmes Developments

Lord Craig of Radley Excerpts

Monday 25th November 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Craig of Radley (CB)]

My Lords, I wonder whether the chiefs would have been happy to accept these cuts, as the Minister says, if there had been 2.5% available now—it is against the amount of money that is available. In addition to the equipment that has been taken, there are serious shortfalls in personnel, particularly engineers. What steps are the Government taking to overcome these particular shortfalls?

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

That is a really good question. On the first point about spending, the noble and gallant Lord will know that, notwithstanding the amount in the budget—there is 2.3% at the moment, and we have laid out and talked about the pathway to 2.5%—whatever amount of money the defence chiefs have to spend, they will always want to spend it in the best possible way. We have discussed with them a way of doing that ensuring that we have the newest and best possible equipment available to our Armed Forces, and that at times will mean decommissioning older equipment.

On the noble and gallant Lord’s second point, in terms of retention payments for aircraft engineers, as part of the Government's commitments to renew the nation’s contract with those who have served, eligible tri-service aircraft engineers will be given £30,000 when they sign up for an additional three years of service. From April 2025, this will be applicable to around 5,000 personnel in total. That is one practical way we are trying to deal with the specific point the noble and gallant Lord raised.

Defence: 2.5% GDP Spending Commitment

Lord Craig of Radley Excerpts

Thursday 14th November 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I am not a Treasury Minister, but I know as a Defence Minister that 2.5% of GDP is an absolute commitment. I hope the Treasury is successful, because if we get the growth in the economy that we want, that 2.5% will be of a much larger amount.

[Lord Craig of Radley (CB)]

My Lords, the defence review is due to report early in the new year. If that is the case, it will report before the figures on the years affected by the 2.5% increase are announced. Does that not make the whole defence review unbelievable, because it will not have the figures to hand?

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I thank the noble and gallant Lord for his question. As I suggested in an earlier answer, the sequencing of all of this is extremely important. Of course, we need the defence review, which is taking place within the context of the 2.5% budget figure that the Treasury has set. As I said, we will make an announcement about the pathway to that and how we intend to reach that point at a future fiscal event in the spring. The noble and gallant Lord is right to point out the importance of sequencing.

Ukraine

Lord Craig of Radley Excerpts

Friday 25th October 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Craig of Radley (CB)]

My Lords, a remarkable aspect of the bitter fight between the Russian aggressor and Ukraine is that the latter has not been overwhelmed by now, as it was in Crimea. The Ukrainians are admired for their national commitment to this fight. Western nations have greatly aided their ability to withstand the Russian assaults.

But it is surprising that the Russians, so much stronger on paper than the Ukrainians, have still not emerged victorious—far from it. The Ukrainians’ Kursk push into Russia earlier this summer is still not repelled. Why has Russia not proved to be the overwhelming master of the battlefield? Why has it not used all its air power to establish air superiority over Ukraine? Ukraine started with very few fighters. Its ground-based air defences and drones have proved a challenge for the Russian air forces, but that alone should not have been the deciding factor. Why have the Russians come up so short against Ukraine?

One reason, as suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Tugendhat, is that Russia itself is fearful of what it sees as the advances of NATO, now closer than ever to the very borders of Mother Russia. NATO is a defensive, not an offensive, alliance. That was true at its formation in 1949 and is just as true today. But Moscow may believe that its truth about NATO is a very different one. Far from remaining a treaty of the original transatlantic and west European nations—at first 12—it has expanded, grown and advanced east. There are now 32 member countries. Old Warsaw Pact countries have been signed up into its grasp. Most recently, Sweden and Finland have become members.

Now, from Norway in the far north and all the way down to Turkey, NATO borders Russia itself. It is said that Ukraine will be welcomed into NATO when the time is right, and it has pushed into Russian territory, now less than 350 miles from Moscow. Russia has also seen NATO operating for two decades from 2001 in Afghanistan. Its perception of NATO must be as an offensive threat of great concern.

Add to that its military doctrine of maskirovka, the concept of masking one’s intentions by disguise and deception, which is well practised in many fields by Russia. It was exploited by assurances before Russia’s special operation in Ukraine in February 2022 that it had no intention of attacking. Lying to conceal the truth is sound doctrine for the Russians. They must assume it to be good doctrine too for NATO and the West. After all, surprise is one of our key principles of war. Perhaps they might even fear a real nightmare, a secret Article 5A—not, as in Article 5, that an attack on one is an attack on all, but that an attack by one is an attack by all.

Does the Kremlin believe that NATO tells lies too and acts to deceive and surprise it? If that is its assessment, surely it will be fearful of committing all its forces against Ukraine and being too weak against what it fears from NATO. Is that an explanation for why it relies so much on North Korea and Iran for war-fighting support, and is seen to be using old Soviet-generation tanks and bombs and dated weapons in its fight with Ukraine? It must face the threat of NATO, as it sees it, with adequate capability and war stocks.

I postulate these thoughts not in any way to defend Russia’s recent actions against Ukraine, or earlier in Crimea. These actions are against international law. They must be called out on that basis and the right of any country to live in peace behind its borders. But if one is to have one’s own successful strategic thinking, how the opposition may think is important too. NATO is right to stress its defensive posture and its key reliance on Article 5 of the treaty. The importance of that as a deterrent to any Russian desire to push back against so successful a NATO cannot be overstated. Putin’s position is not as strong or as lasting as he once may have hoped.

Combat Air Capability

Lord Craig of Radley Excerpts

Thursday 10th October 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I thank the noble Lord; that is a good question. We have made as firm a commitment as we can, although I have said that it is also part of the ongoing review that the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, is undertaking. We have made a commitment to Italy and Japan and the noble Lord will know that the GCAP International Government Organisation was set up to run that programme. Its headquarters are in the UK. On 2 October, just a week or so ago, the King ratified the final part of the SI to ensure that the treaty was put in place. That shows that the Government are making progress with respect to the GCAP programme.

[Lord Craig of Radley (CB)]

My Lords, is the Minister satisfied that there are sufficient war stocks for our front-line aircraft at the present time?

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

The noble and gallant Lord will know that we have concerns about the supply of ammunition and missiles. That is why this Government are introducing a national armaments director and working with industry. We want to ensure that the stockpiles of weapons we have are replenishable quickly, and we will look to see whether we have the necessary quantity as well. That will also form part of the review led by the noble Lord, Lord Robertson.

Strategic Defence Review

Lord Craig of Radley Excerpts

Wednesday 9th October 2024 Grand Committee

[Lord Craig of Radley (CB)]

My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, mentioned, his team has already received much guidance and many suggestions on force size and mix. I am sure that the first-responder contribution of the Royal Air Force front line, which gives the Government choice and strength in facing and dealing promptly with crises worldwide, will have been mentioned. It will be of key importance to sustain and enhance this capability in years ahead. As mentioned by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, front-line fighter strength is too low to sustain even moderate attrition in war.

Above all, the review must concentrate on the men and women who, either in uniform or civilian appointments, are essential to the strength and capabilities of each service. The comprehensive Agency and Agility Haythornthwaite report, published last year with considerable fanfare and senior leadership approval, ran to 67 recommendations. Considerable time and effort will be required to get even some of them, let alone all, into decision and implementation, and many are not cost free. I expect that some progress has been achieved, although it has not been widely publicised.

One would have hoped already to see some positive response within the services themselves, but the most recent continuous attitude survey shows no indication that morale, recruitment or retention has improved. The year-on-year failure to recruit and retain front-line personnel strength is cumulative and now extremely alarming. It will take at least five years of fully successful and increased annual intakes to correct these growing imbalances. This is a most serious issue. It must be grasped or the services will fail and fall short.

Those with long memories of attempts to improve working and living conditions at officer and other rank levels have seen them inadequately funded and suffer from short-term savings or other issues. Plans, let alone aspirations, have not lived up to expectations. This is a major reason given for premature retirements. The defence review must treat this aspect of its work with maximum attention and seriousness. Funding must be met. A further aspect causing difficulty with retention applies to pensions. Surely, special consideration should be given to the Armed Forces to reflect their distinct career patterns, and to others employed by government.

Fundamental to this review is the definition of what the Armed Forces may be required to do. In simple terms, they contribute to the defence of the nation. One glaring and widely acknowledged weakness is the air defence of the UK base itself. For far too long, this has taken second place to the demands of operations overseas. As more modern threats emerge, it is essential that our home base is more adequately protected. A Wedgetail fleet with only three airborne radar airframes is surely not enough.

But can the review meet its objectives without further top-level political guidance on our national defence strategy? How much of a global capability force is there to be, and with what reach? What sustainability is it to be equipped and manned for? How long will it be able to sustain such operations? A nuclear deterrent seems to be a given, but will the submarine force sustain the four boats and warheads required for continuous at-sea patrol? What other givens are there, or should there be? We know that 2.5% of GDP has been promised, but when? We should know that for planning assumptions at least. Would it be reasonable to presume that NATO’s operational strength, both conventional and nuclear, will effectively deter any possible Russian aggression while Russia is fighting Ukraine?

Such scene-setting assumptions will need to be examined and spelled out. Or is it, for all the depth of this review and guidance, that the outcome will once again be entirely financially governed and limited? My experience of reviews goes back to Denis Healey’s in 1966. All fell short of full funding—will this SDR prove to be the exception?

King’s Speech

Lord Craig of Radley Excerpts

Thursday 25th July 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Craig of Radley (CB)]

My Lords, I congratulate the Government on their successful election strategy and, in particular, the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, on his well-merited appointment as the Minister of State.

Recent media reports of MoD officials saying that our Armed Forces cannot successfully defend the UK itself are seriously troubling. We should not be in such a parlous state. The defence of the home base, particularly in maritime, air and space terms, has been sidestepped, taking second place to overseas operations for far too long. Yes, there were pressures to contribute overseas, along with messianic enthusiasm at times to do so. After the Cold War, there were worries that if our Armed Forces were not on live operations, they could be further reduced as too expensive and unneeded. Our home base is inadequately defended against the types of threat that we see and hear of today.

Nor should we envisage only a formal interstate conflict, with the expectation that our own resistance would be supported and bolstered by our NATO allies. The Wagner-type group and others show how threateningly capable such mercenary proxy forces become. Ship-based drones or guided missiles, funded by a hostile state, could be targeted directly on the UK base itself, perhaps in self-justified retaliation. Where is our iron dome over London, say, or a sizeable fleet to patrol and protect our island base and guard our ever-growing interconnectors and communications links, on which all modern life depends?

A single missile exploding in Parliament Square would cause no end of fear, death and public outrage that such an attack was not forestalled. The strategic deterrent would not be an appropriate response. There is much of pressing urgency to review.

Another vital aspect is how to integrate AI with military operations and decision-making. A human in the loop seems essential if kinetic force is to be used and death or destruction follows. Perhaps achievable in the usual types of exchange of fire, how will it transfer to operations involving cyber or space activity, or even hypersonic missiles, when the time for human consideration and decision-taking are collapsed to mini-seconds?

Reports of Israeli use of AI to track Hamas operatives and then kill them at home, even with their immediate family or friends, show how AI integration of many features and details of an individual—their daily routine, phone, car number plate or whatever—can now provide real-time information and the location of a targeted individual, let alone that of an operational unit. There is much to learn from these Israeli efforts, and how they relate to the laws of conflict and humanitarian law.

Happily, Conservative and Labour seem on the same page when dealing with our nuclear deterrent and with NATO, in ongoing support of Ukraine and on the need, sooner or later, to increase annual defence expenditure to 2.5% of GDP. Such a cross-party approach to national defence is good. The intention to seek input to the SDR work widely and with more of a national as opposed to party approach is thus most welcome.

Tempest Global Combat Air Programme

Lord Craig of Radley Excerpts

Tuesday 23rd July 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

Of course, the defence review will look at defence in the round, but it is really important that this country looks at what the next generation fighter should be. That is an important step. Looking back in history, the Typhoon was at one time a project on a research board and, before that, it was the Tornado. If memory serves me correctly, the Phantom was the fighter programme before that. Our industry and research programmes are the envy of the world. Of course these programmes need to come in on budget, make sense and meet the threats of the future, but looking at what the global combat aircraft of the future should be is an important part of any defence review.

[Lord Craig of Radley (CB)]

My Lords, the Prime Minister must have selected his words extremely carefully when he spoke at Farnborough yesterday, but the press coverage in this country as a result of the interpretation of what he said has been depressing, to say the least. What reaction have the Government had from Japanese and Italian partners to what the Prime Minister said yesterday?

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I certainly know that everyone has been reassured by the Prime Minister and others saying that progress on these programmes will continue. The Global Combat Air Programme continues as we speak. As I said to my noble friend Lord West, the defence review will look at defence in the round, but we will not allow it to paralyse any work that is going on with respect to defence. We are looking at it all in the round, as the noble and gallant Lord would expect, so that we get value for money, deal with some of the problems we have had and get the capabilities we need to tackle the threats that we are going to face in future.

Red Sea Telecommunication Cables

Lord Craig of Radley Excerpts

Thursday 14th March 2024 Lords Chamber

[The Earl of Minto (Con)]

The noble Lord is right that proliferation is an issue. As has been mentioned, the amount of data that travels through these cables is so significant that it requires all the protection it can get. The question of landing sites is very much part of the overall security resilience that we have been talking about. I can only imagine that they are going to become more and more important as we continue to suffer such an unstable global situation.

[Lord Craig of Radley (CB)]

My Lords, the Minister mentioned the Houthis. What assessment have the Government made of the ability of the Houthis to replace the weapons they have used or those that have been destroyed by Royal Air Force and other allied attacks? It is important to know whether the Houthis will be able to continue the sorts of attacks that they started some months ago.

[The Earl of Minto (Con)]

The noble and gallant Lord is right. The Government’s approach to addressing the issue of the Houthis has not really changed. It is all about increasing diplomatic engagement, ending the illegal flow of arms—I think we are all fully in support of that—cutting off the financial resources of the Houthis and helping the people of Yemen, who need support.