Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill

Lord Craig of Radley Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 5th January 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Craig of Radley]

1: Clause 1, page 1, line 7, at end insert
“, subject to subsection (2A).
(2A) Sections 2 to 4 of this Act come into force only when the Secretary of State has sought to negotiate an amendment to Article 11 of the Treaty to ensure that the United Kingdom would cease to make payments to the government of Mauritius in the event that the use of the Base for military purposes became impossible.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to ensure that, before the ratification of the Treaty, His Majesty's Government makes arrangements for the terms of payment should environmental or other issues make the military use of the Base permanently impossible.

[Lord Craig of Radley (CB)]

My Lords, happy new year to everyone. I will speak to Amendments 1 and 38. In an earlier debate on the Bill, I raised the concern that the UK is required, under Article 11 of the treaty, to continue to pay Mauritius even were the military base on Diego Garcia to become unusable. There seems to be no break or conditional clause agreeing any reasons why the UK may cease these payments before the 99-year date is reached.

Article 15 sets out how Mauritius may react should the UK cease payment, but this is a reason why Mauritius may terminate the treaty, not the UK. If the UK were to persist in not honouring its obligation to pay, the treaty would perforce be terminated by Mauritius. For the avoidance of doubt, would that mean that Article 1 of the treaty is still applicable and sovereignty would remain with Mauritius? Can the Minister confirm the Government’s view on this? I have forewarned her of this question.

In Committee on 18 November, the Minister said in response to my question about the base no longer being usable:

“I will reflect on this and try to come back to him with a more thorough response, because I can see that he … wants to know that the Government have given this the proper consideration that he would expect. I undertake to do that”.—[Official Report, 18/11/25; col. 772.]

If she has written with this further information, I have not yet received it. Fundamentally, does she feel that the environmental risks and the risks of other possible events, such as a major destructive attack on the base or even a decision by the United States that it has no further use for it, are sufficiently remote and unlikely for the UK to be able to accept—or have a possibly messy and even dishonourable termination, where considerable sums of taxpayers’ money may be involved?

As this is Report, I do not intend to do more than point this out without detail, but experience tells us that much can and does change over time. In well under the past 100 years, foes have become friends and friends, potential and real, have become foes. Weapon technology may well change and has frequently done so, as has how operations are mounted and security maintained. America could decide that it has no need for the base for operational reasons or even cease to act as a world police force and revert to isolationism. Is there any legally binding agreement between the UK and the United States that it will continue its use of the base or have need of its use for the 99-year duration of the treaty?

I do not wish to suggest any lack of importance of the base to national and international security at the present time. There is also the putative threat of the sea rising this century due to global warming, flooding the base. My Amendment 1 suggests one feasible way to correct this apparent lack of foresight. I shall listen with close interest to the Minister’s response, but unless the Government can reassure the House that the issue of non-usability of the base has been fully considered and a reasonable solution adopted, I may seek the views of the House. I beg to move.

[Lord Houghton of Richmond (CB)]

My Lords, I rise to speak in support of Amendment 1, to which I attach my name, and to reinforce the arguments made by my noble and gallant friend Lord Craig of Radley. This amendment is not moved by any wider purpose than common sense, and we trust that the Government will respond accordingly.

Currently, the Bill makes no provision for the circumstances under which the requirement to pay an annual fee for the use of the Diego Garcia base is revisited in the event of the base becoming unusable for military purposes. My noble and gallant friend has already mentioned the potential risks to the utility of the base arising from an extreme environmental event, the future potential for a policy change by the United States and the potential for the technical obsolescence of the base to come about. I argue that concerns regarding potential legal initiatives to constrain the use of the base, particularly partial constraints deriving from nuclear exclusion agreements or the question of Mauritius as the sovereign power having to honour obligations for the authorisation of offensive operations from the base, should be added to that list of concerns.

I fear that the greatest future concern should perhaps be the full or partial destruction of the base through military action by a hostile state. This might seem a surprising concern given the extremely remote nature of this base, but I have been to it. I argue quite strongly that the strategic importance of the base, its entirely militaristic purpose and its extreme remoteness from civilian life all combine to make it a highly vulnerable and attractive target.

The principal tenets for the use of force in warfare are distinction, military necessity, humanity and proportionality. Pause for a moment to imagine the early stages of a global conflict, when a desire for escalation dominance prompts a hostile nation to destroy a western strategic asset as a proportionate response, with no risk of collateral damage to a civilian population, attracting relatively minor moral opprobrium but resulting in huge military benefit. I cannot think of an obviously better or more considered target than Diego Garcia.

Many in the Chamber may think my concerns are drawn from the world of fantasy or nightmare, but do the last 72 hours not give serious cause for concern regarding our ability to predict with certainty the next two years of geopolitics, let alone the next 100? This treaty needs to cater far better for what the future might hold.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (Baroness Chapman of Darlington) (Lab)]

My Lords, I apologise to the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig of Radley, for not writing to him, but I hope that I can answer his concerns this afternoon.

Amendments 1 and 38, tabled by the noble and gallant Lord, relate to the termination of the treaty based on environmental degradation of Diego Garcia island. As I am sure that he will appreciate, given the importance of the base to both UK and US national security, we and the US are working hard to ensure that the base is protected from environmental damage. We have a programme to address coastal erosion and, while we cannot predict future erosion, specific studies have concluded that the overall land area of parts of the island that are not shaped by military construction decreased by less than a single percentage point over the last 50 years. However, I know that this is not really his point. He is using climate change and rising sea levels, but equally a significant pollution event, a meteor strike or something else could happen, so have the Government considered what they would do in an unpredicted and unpredictable situation that may arise and render the base unusable? That is the kernel of what he is getting at.

For obvious reasons, we do not want to get into a debate about other future hypothetical scenarios, whether they relate to the base becoming unusable or its no longer being needed. It is difficult to see that happening. The US, which has invested heavily in Diego Garcia, agrees that opening up the possibility of the agreement with Mauritius being terminated early is not helpful. However, I take the noble and gallant Lord’s point that, when dealing with a treaty over such a long period, we must at least be aware of the possibility that things can change. That is why we have included in the treaty the joint commission as a mechanism for agreeing between the UK, the US and Mauritius any developments relating to the base that we wish to raise. Should any of the hypothetical scenarios that I have referred to transpire, these are the sorts of issues that could be discussed in the joint commission, with decisions taken based on all the circumstances at the time. We have also included provision in the treaty for the matter to be raised up to prime ministerial level if necessary.

Using these mechanisms the UK and Mauritius would, in close consultation with the United States, agree a way forward. Ultimately, there is provision in the treaty for it to be terminated on two grounds, both of which depend on action by the UK. One is our failure to make payments. As noble Lords know, the UK abides by its international obligations, but in any particular case the Government of the day would need to consider their options in light of all the circumstances, looking at the terms of the treaty as well as wider international law. It is this wider international law, which we have not discussed previously, that I encourage the noble and gallant Lord to consider. He may wish to bear in mind that the international law of treaties permits the termination of a treaty when it becomes impossible for the treaty to be performed as a result of

“the permanent disappearance or destruction of an object indispensable for the execution of the treaty”.

That is wider international law; that is not something that is held within this treaty itself. That is helpful and I hope it reassures him about his concerns.

I hope that the noble and gallant Lord can see that we are taking steps that are necessary to prevent the base becoming unusable and that, however hard hypothetical situations might be for us to imagine today, there are processes in place established by the treaty to resolve them. Using these processes, based on the circumstances of the time, no doubt any future UK Government would do what was in the best interests of the UK.

In the same vein, Amendment 6 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, discusses the ability to extend the agreement at the end of its initial 99 years. I assure him that there is already provision for the treaty to be extended by 40 years and beyond with the agreement of both parties. Even if agreement is not reached, the UK has the right of first refusal during that first 40 years after the initial period expires, meaning that no other country can use Diego Garcia without the UK being offered use first. I cannot accept his amendment as it seeks to change a carefully negotiated aspect of the treaty.

Similarly, I cannot accept Amendment 40, also tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, which calls on the Secretary of State to publish a statement of the Government’s understanding of the legal status of the Chagos Archipelago should the agreement be terminated. The noble Lord is aware that the UK honours its international obligations and is committed to the treaty. The grounds for terminating the treaty are incredibly limited, as I have said, and entirely depend on the UK’s actions.

I thought it might be helpful to the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig, in particular, to outline a little more detail about from the law of treaties, which I am relying on in my attempts to persuade him this afternoon. Article 61 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which the UK and Mauritius are both parties to, provides that:

“A party may invoke the impossibility of performing a treaty as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from it if the impossibility results from the permanent disappearance or destruction of an object indispensable for the execution of the treaty. If the impossibility is temporary, it may be invoked only as a ground for suspending the operation of the treaty.


Impossibility of performance may not be invoked by a party as a ground for terminating, withdrawing from or suspending the operation of a treaty if the impossibility is the result of a breach by that party either of an obligation under the treaty or of any other international obligation owed to any other party to the treaty”.


That covers the situation that he refers to—sea level rise—but would also cover many of the other situations that, at this stage, we are able to envisage occurring in the future.

I hope that noble Lords feel able to not press their amendments.

[Lord Craig of Radley (CB)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness very much for the way in which she has attempted to deal with my and our concerns. She has certainly pointed to an alternative way, but I still feel that this is something which should and could be sorted out before we get into formal ratification, and therefore I would like to test the opinion of the House.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Foster of Aghadrumsee (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, my Amendment 32 would require a referendum of the Chagossian people, which we have heard about already, before any transfer of sovereignty of the British Indian Ocean Territory could take place. I thank those noble Lords who have added their names to the amendment. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord De Mauley, for bringing us the results from his committee; they have been very instructive to this debate. At its heart, the amendment is very simple. It asks whether a people who were shamefully removed by force from their homeland and who have been denied a voice that the rest of us enjoy should be finally allowed to speak for themselves. I believe the answer to that question is yes, absolutely.

Of course, the Chagossian community did not leave their islands by choice. They were removed by the British state and scattered across the world. Since that moment, decisions about their future, and about a homeland they were forbidden to return to, have been taken over their heads, in rooms to which they were not invited. If there was ever a community entitled to the clearest expression of self-determination, it is this one.

The Minister has argued that a referendum could not alter the terms of the treaty, but that is to misunderstand the purpose of this amendment, or indeed any other amendment which calls for the right of self-determination for the Chagossian community. The issue before us is not whether a referendum rewrites international law but whether Parliament is prepared to authorise the transfer of sovereignty without the consent of the people most directly affected by it. This House has both the historic right and the responsibility to insist that consent comes first.

We have already heard that the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination published its opinion on 8 December. That is something new in the international sphere that we hear so much referred to in this House. It gives its opinion on the process of this treaty and some of its contents, especially in relation to the explicit prevention of the return of the Chagossian people to their ancestral lands in Diego Garcia. In relation to the process which the Government have engaged in, the committee said that the lack of meaningful participation of the Chagossian people is

“affecting their rights and lands, restricting the exercise of their right to self-determination”.

The UN committee clearly believes, despite all that we were told in Committee, that Chagossians have a right of self-determination. I would be very much obliged to hear from the Minister on this specific point when she responds.

I also worry greatly that to proceed without consent from the Chagossian people would establish a deeply troubling precedent—one that I know is already feared by other populations across our cherished overseas territories. If sovereignty of one overseas territory can be transferred without the freely expressed will of its people, then no territory can be entirely reassured. Self-determination cannot be conditional on convenience or on the balance of diplomatic pressure exerted on the UK by a coalition of our adversaries, either through an international court issuing a non-binding advisory opinion or by other means.

In all other parts of our British Overseas Territories, there is a simple principle that is acknowledged by everyone: people get to decide their own future. But the Chagossians are told that this principle does not apply to them because they are not a permanent population. That argument cannot possibly stand because it was our Government who made them not a permanent population; the UK Government ensured that they could not be. To deny them self-determination on that basis is to compound a historic injustice with a present one.

Of course, the Government will be aware that there is now a Chagossian Government in exile. Denied a voice yet again by a Government who trumpet their respect for international law, the Chagossians have now elected their own leader here in the United Kingdom—a Government in exile, if you will. Surely our Government must now acknowledge that they have got it wrong in not seeking the views of Chagossians before handing away their homeland to Mauritius.

What is striking is that the Chagossian community are united in a call for a referendum. The Minister will refer to a broad range of views on sovereignty within the Chagossian community, and that is absolutely true, but the Chagossian community has consistently referred to the right to self-determination, whether they live in the UK, the Maldives or the Seychelles. The Chagos Refugees Group, which seems to be the only group that the UK Government engage with, has only ever called for self-determination. Similarly, the UK Chagossian groups, including Chagossian Voices, BIOT Citizens and others, have echoed that call. Across generations and across the diaspora, they are asking for the same thing: not special treatment but equal treatment; not a veto over foreign policy but a voice for their own destiny.

Taking that wide range of views into account—a point repeated frequently by the Minister in this place, and in the other place—it is clear that this amendment does not dictate the outcome of a referendum. It does not presume what the Chagossians will decide, as the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, has said. It simply says that they must be asked, and the answer must matter. If we are serious about self-determination and believe that it is a principle, not a slogan, then we cannot exempt the Chagossians from it. I urge the House to support this amendment in a cross-party spirit and affirm that no people, especially one wronged so grievously by the UK Government, should be denied the right to decide its own future.

In closing, I refer to Amendment 33 on “Referendum No. 2” in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Purvis. While, of course, I believe my amendment is better as it is a condition precedent to the treaty being implemented, I will also support his amendment because, as we say in Ulster, half a loaf is better than no bread. Despite that, I hope noble Lords will support Amendment 32.

[Lord Craig of Radley (CB)]

My Lords, I regret that I missed the opportunity to add my name in support of Amendment 32 from the noble Baroness. It is remarkable and significant that there is sufficient interest in the Chagossian community, after so many years since they and their forebears were evicted, to form with due process a Government in exile. I have already exchanged emails with the nominated First Minister, Mr Misley Mandarin.

The Minister was perhaps too optimistically dismissive in Committee when she suggested that there was insufficient Chagossian presence on the atoll to form or justify an independent authority. There is none there; they were evicted in the 1970s. There is also the recent finding of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination to consider. Have the Government considered whether this might influence the thinking and advisory findings of the international court, which triggered this Government’s search for a long-term arrangement for Diego Garcia as a military base?

I note that the other far neighbour of the Chagos Archipelago, the Maldives, has raised seemingly legitimate human rights concerns about the Government’s methods of rushing these matters through this House. The number of amendments on Report is a reasonable measure of the many concerns held in this House. Though the treaty has been agreed, I urge the Government to proceed at a measured pace to allow these many concerns to be properly and fully considered. Will they reassure the House that there is no set time limit for these national procedures to be considered, as, if they were to be conceded, it might invalidate the treaty as signed on 22 May 2025?

[Baroness Hoey (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, before I speak to my Amendments 33A and 18, I totally support the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, in her Amendment 32 and hope that noble Lords will accept that it is a really sensible way forward. So much has happened even since we started talking about this issue a while ago. We have heard about the committee report. I thank the noble Lord, Lord De Mauley, for a very good report which ends up saying what many of us thought: obviously we cannot say it of every single Chagossian but, overall, they feel that they want to stay part of a British island archipelago. We would not be here if there had been no forced removal originally and the people of the Chagos Islands had been afforded a self-determination referendum back in 1965, as the Ellice Islands were prior to their detachment from the Gilbert Islands.

The report of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination is new. I do not understand why the Government are pushing this so quickly. Why is it being rushed through? Why are we having Report and Third Reading all in the same week, when there is so much controversy over this issue? It seems very strange.

Lithuania: Balloon Incursions

Lord Craig of Radley Excerpts

Thursday 18th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

The Lithuanian intelligence is that the vast majority of the balloons in the drone incursions to which I have referred are for criminal activity and relate mainly to tobacco and cigarettes. Of course, that does not alter that Lithuania believes, with some credibility, that this is part of Belarus weaponising that sort of activity in order to destabilise and disrupt Lithuania and elsewhere.

[Lord Craig of Radley (CB)]

My Lords, have any Royal Air Force flights been affected by these balloons? More serious even than that, this type of activity could become more widespread. What attempt are the Government making to deal with the possibility of further attacks? For example, have they tasked the Advanced Research + Invention Agency with working on this problem?

Ajax Armoured Vehicle

Lord Craig of Radley Excerpts

Wednesday 10th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I thank the noble Lord for the question. Clearly, Ministers from all Governments make decisions on the basis of the advice they receive. Let us see what the investigation tells us about that advice. He will know that there are four different aspects to the investigations. There are the defence, Army and ministerial aspects, then alongside that, which I think the noble Lord will appreciate, we are looking to people outside the MoD—some independent consultants—to look at what is happening so that we get independent advice. I think that was something the former Minister in the other place, James Cartlidge MP, asked for. When we get the result of those investigations we will take the decisions that are necessary at that point, but we need to wait for the results.

[Lord Craig of Radley (CB)]

My Lords, has any foreign interest been expressed in purchasing Ajax at any stage? If it is not going to be purchased, will it be a UK-only piece of equipment?

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I am not aware of any foreign interest in it, but I will check my facts and come back to the noble and gallant Lord if I am incorrect.

Russian Ship “Yantar”

Lord Craig of Radley Excerpts

Tuesday 25th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

That is another very important question. The whole House will recognise the significance of what the noble Baronesses have said. The UK Government are constantly talking to the Russian ambassador, constantly making the Russians aware of what we are doing, and we are constantly monitoring those ships that seek to monitor our underwater cables, potentially for purposes in future. We have Royal Navy ships monitoring that and P-8 Poseidons from Lossiemouth —we have a fleet of nine now—looking at that. But I say to the noble Baroness and to all noble Lords—and I am sorry to repeat it, but it is just to make it clear, because the implications of what I am saying are obvious—that to surface a Royal Navy submarine close to the “Yantar”, as was done towards the end of last year, is an unprecedented way of demonstrating to Russia and the “Yantar” how seriously we take what they are doing. I know that that is supported by all Members of your Lordships’ House, but that signifies the importance of the deterrence and the importance and significance of the activity that we are undertaking to try to deter such activity.

[Lord Craig of Radley (CB)]

My Lords, with the greatest respect to the Minister, is this not much more than a simple defence matter? If the laser used was a weapons system, not just laser torching by a member of the “Yantar” crew, is this not a serious disregard of the 1980 UN protocol and its convention on certain conventional weapons? What steps have the Government taken with the Russians? Has the Russian ambassador been called to a meeting in the FCDO, to be informed of the UK’s disapproval?

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

Nobody can be in any doubt about the seriousness with which we take the incident that has happened. As the noble and gallant Lord has pointed out, it was not a weapons system, but that does not alter the fact that a handheld laser was pointed into the cockpit of one of our planes. That is of huge significance and importance, and the Russians are in no doubt about how seriously we take that incident. We have made sure that they are aware of that and we will continue to make sure that they are aware of it. Indeed, the noble and gallant Lord’s question—with those from the noble Baronesses from the other Benches —has helped to signify to the Russians, again, quite how seriously we take the incident which occurred.

Ukraine

Lord Craig of Radley Excerpts

Friday 31st October 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Craig of Radley (CB)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lady, Baroness Pidding. As widely acknowledged, far from crumbling, Ukraine under President Zelensky’s inspiring leadership and with western help has held off all Russia has unleashed over nearly four years of combat. Putin’s 2022 special operation assumed that there would be sufficient support for it throughout Ukraine and that Russian forces would quickly achieve a decisive result; time has shown that this was a complete miscalculation. So, after yet another summer of combat, with heavy losses in equipment and manpower, Russia seems little nearer to achieving its strategic aims. Why?

Despite Russia’s numerical advantage in manpower, technology and operational strength, has it really committed to an all-out effort to win but lacked the right operational tactics? Was its whole strategy just that inept? While some in the West might agree, it is naive to think that the Russians are such a basket case.

Certainly, and rightly, the West considers Russia a real threat to NATO. Although maybe not with quite the same expansionist fervour of the communist regime of the old Soviet Union, but with a mix of attack capabilities and nuclear, Russia would be a formidable foe for NATO.

Let us take a look at NATO through a Kremlin telescope. Far from being the defensive alliance it claims, NATO has advanced further and further east across Europe, having now advanced, with ever-greater capability, right up to the very borders of western Mother Russia. America and Canada could threaten eastern Russia across the north Pacific and from the far north in a large-scale NATO pincer movement. Themselves past masters of deception and falsehood, the Russians must presume on this evidence that NATO’s defensive claim is as false a claim as any that Russia makes.

Oleg Gordievsky, the highly rated KGB colonel run so successfully by MI6, gave us massive high-grade intelligence. We should particularly recall one piece of it. He said that the Kremlin’s then abiding fear was that NATO would attack Russia. Is that perhaps even now its abiding fear? Has Russia not committed itself fully against Ukraine to ensure that its response to any NATO action would be robust and, if need be, even nuclear?

We rightly acknowledge that there are still too many weaknesses in NATO’s defence and deterrent posture, for which more money must be found, but rather than descend into some further arms race abyss, surely the time for diplomacy and peaceful resolution of the existing tensions and warfare has never been greater. Is this achievable with Putin in the Kremlin? The Wagner Group revolt against Putin in 2023 fizzled out and its leader, Prigozhin, was eliminated. Since then, some high-ranking military commanders have been disgraced, accused of failure or corruption. Are they a pool of resentment, even of revolt?

The impact of sanctions, albeit slow, is increasing. Fuel rationing is being introduced. The large numbers of battlefield casualties, to which reference has been made, will become more widely known. All these are strong downsides for Putin, but will he accept a ceasefire or frontier freeze if he does not have under Russian control not only the Ukrainian regions annexed prior to February 2022 but at least all the Donbass and some neighbouring cities as well, and, of course, a guarantee that there is no chance of Ukraine ever joining NATO or the EU? Anything less would look like failure. He would be a goner. To make real progress, must a less intransigent individual or Government first take over? Time will tell.

Defence Industrial Strategy

Lord Craig of Radley Excerpts

Wednesday 10th September 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I will put that in writing for the noble Lord.

The “always on” pipeline is about trying to ensure that we have a situation where we can always, if we need to, step up our production much more quickly, rather than be in a situation where we have to wait two years before we can do this or that. An “always on” pipeline means, in essence, that we can get the equipment and munitions we need quickly.

[Lord Craig of Radley (CB)]

My Lords, this is a very welcome strategy; I give it my full support. I will give it even more support when its theory and proposals have been turned into practicalities. The problems and delays that we have experienced in replacing war stocks that have been passed to the Ukrainians are well known and underline the need for proper resupply and resilience. One of the issues is around the recently announced building of six new munitions factories. Is the Minister in a position yet to say where they will be and when they will come on stream? Also, who is going to meet the cost of setting them up?

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

The state will work with others to support the establishment of those munitions factories. I am not in a position at the moment to say to the noble and gallant Lord where those six places will be; that is still a matter for discussion. As far as I am aware, that has not been resolved yet, but, if I am wrong, I will write to the noble and gallant Lord. As of this evening, I believe that there is no news on exactly where those six places will be; if I am wrong, I will write to him and put a copy of the letter in the Library to correct the record.

On the noble and gallant Lord’s more general point about munitions, he is right—this goes back to a point that a number of noble Lords have made—that we have to be in a situation where we can manufacture the equipment and munitions that we need. We must be in a position where, if we need to fight, we can fight because we have the sovereign industrial capability to do it. We are not in that situation at the moment. We are not in the place where we need to be, particularly given the current situation. The entire industrial strategy is about ensuring that the UK has the military industrial capability and capacity to do the things it needs and to fight the wars it might have to fight. I hope—I know that the noble and gallant Lord supports this—that we reach a situation where, by preparing for war, we deter war.

Strategic Defence Review 2025

Lord Craig of Radley Excerpts

Friday 18th July 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Craig of Radley (CB)]

My Lords, like other noble Lords, I commend the authors on a major and wide-embracing review. It looks well into the future, but draws the obvious conclusion that, without guaranteed funding and being strong enough with allies to deter aggression, our security is suspect. We are not safe—or, at least, we are not yet safe.

This must be the 12th major review I have been personally involved in, or followed from the sidelines. In 1952, a Chiefs of Staff defence review concentrated on the Soviet Russian threat, and how best to deter it in the depths of the Cold War. Here we are again, facing an angry Russia. It were spreading communism 75 years ago; today it chooses to fear and threaten NATO. In 1957, Defence Secretary Duncan Sandys was relying on the nuclear deterrent and had decided that the days of the manned fighter were rapidly ending. Getting it right is no easy task.

In the time available, I shall concentrate on two major issues covered in this review. The first is people. Recruitment has already been mentioned; it is showing improvement, but is well below needs. It must be sustained and enhanced over the whole of a decade and more. Recruitment success of course depends not only on getting the recruit signed up but on the training effort that can be made available over a decade-plus, and the trainers found to turn the recruits into front-line performers. Recruiting targets will take even longer to reach if there are many premature retirements. This aspect is well recognised by this review. All improvements that sustain retention must be fully funded. People are the sine qua non of the forces. It should be remembered that the senior military leaders of the 2050s and 2060s are today’s recent recruits, or are about to join. The calibre of that 2050s and 2060s leadership will depend on the ability to retain and reward the most able of these new arrivals at every stage of their career.

Various proposals, both in this review and in the 2023 Haythornethwaite one, will be considered, but the respect for and status of rank, as well as special rates of pay, must not be forgotten. The present pay review body for the Armed Forces needs new guidelines that will encourage and sustain full careers for the brightest, and that attract and retain the types and range of skills now so urgently required.

The second major issue, also fully recognised in this review, is the “broken” nature of defence procurement. Regrettably, it is a recurring issue in just about every single one of the reviews of the past 75 years. Each new Government have a review and usually point to the procurement failures of their predecessor. New procedures are devised and trumpeted, only to prove ultimately as inadequate as before.

While new procedures may well be necessary, lessons to be learnt from past failure do not seem to be so fully analysed. For me, it is the Treasury’s mandate to spend wisely and be averse to risk. This seems to be one reason why just about every expenditure is not solely the responsibility of the budget-holder; it must be signed off, and at its own measured pace, by the Treasury.

The experience of procuring and financing urgent operational requirements, shortening or bypassing the Treasury’s more measured tread, may have lessons for the future; but setting shortened all-MoD procurement procedure target dates—maybe proving unrealistic for cross-government approvals—is not likely on past experience to be the right answer.

The failure of past reviews to deliver on their authors’ proposals was largely due to an inability to finance and deliver to time on the outcomes proposed and originally accepted. I wish this review a better legacy.

Armed Forces Act 2006 (Continuation) Order 2025

Lord Craig of Radley Excerpts

Tuesday 15th July 2025 Grand Committee

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Lord Coaker) (Lab)]

My Lords, the purpose of this order is to continue into force, for another year, the legislation that governs the Armed Forces—the Armed Forces Act 2006. By way of background, Parliament renews the Armed Forces Act every five years through primary legislation. This first happened in 2011, then in 2016 and most recently in 2021. It will next be renewed in 2026. However, in the intervening years, an annual Order in Council, such as the one before us today, must be approved by both Houses. This will keep the Act in force for a further year, but for no later than 14 December 2026, when the present Act is due to expire. A new Armed Forces Act will therefore be required to be in place by December 2026 to renew the 2006 Act for a further five years, and then we will resume the practice of yearly renewals.

Having detailed the legislative framework for the draft order, I wish to turn to some of what lies at the heart of our Armed Forces. After announcing the largest sustained increase in defence spending since the Cold War, we recently unveiled our comprehensive strategic defence review, which declares clearly this Government’s intent to meet the threats we are facing and return the UK’s Armed Forces to a state of war- fighting readiness. This is why we are putting people at the heart of our defence plans. As set out in the strategic defence review, there will need to be a whole-of-society approach—wider participation in national resilience and renewing the nation’s contract with those who serve. In support of that approach, it is therefore essential that we improve the recruitment and retention of our personnel. This is why the Government have made the largest pay increase for serving personnel in more than two decades.

We will expand opportunities for young people to experience more of what the Armed Forces have to offer, delivering a 30% increase in cadets and introducing a voluntary gap year scheme. Further to this, we have brought back 36,000 military homes from the private sector as part of plans to transform Armed Forces accommodation, while we will also deliver a generational renewal of military accommodation with at least £7 billion of funding this Parliament, including over £1.5 billion of new investment for rapid work to fix the poor state of forces family housing. We are intensifying efforts to root out bullying and harassment, which have, as we all know, no place in our Armed Forces.

Against the backdrop of improving support for veterans, as exemplified by the new VALOUR programme, which will see VALOUR regional field officers working closely with local services and local government bodies on the application of the principles of the Armed Forces covenant for the betterment of our veterans. We will be updating kit and equipment across all three services to ensure that our nation and those who serve and will be serving in the future are ready to fight the war of tomorrow. That will mean harnessing artificial intelligence, drones, cyber technologies and other innovations alongside more traditional approaches to land, sea and air warfare to make us stronger and safer, because tomorrow’s conflicts will belong to the smartest and most innovative, as the war in Ukraine has shown and is showing.

The defence review sets out a path for the next decade to transform defence and help make it an engine for growth, boosting prosperity and jobs across the whole of the UK while continuing to lead within NATO, ensuring our security is protected through collective power and capabilities. To achieve this, we need to ensure that we maintain a strong and effective discipline framework for our Armed Forces, which the Armed Forces Act 2006 provides and which this order maintains for a further year. The 2006 Act contains nearly all the required provisions for command, discipline, justice, enlistment, pay and redress of complaints. It provides the legal basis and associated powers for offices such as the Judge Advocate-General and the Director of Service Prosecutions, as well as the various service courts. Further, it establishes the Service Police Complaints Commissioner and the tri-service Defence Serious Crime Unit, and contains the legislation for the Armed Forces covenant. In short, the 2006 Act is a vital piece of legislation that our Armed Forces cannot function without.

Those in service protect the nation, our allies and partners and global stability wherever in the world they serve. It is only right, as I know all Members of the Committee will agree, that in this debate we honour their bravery, courage and unflinching duty through the small token of providing consent today. To that end, all of us here pay tribute to their public service. I beg to move.

[Lord Craig of Radley (CB)]

My Lords, I support this continuation order. As has been explained, it keeps His Majesty’s Armed Forces legal until after the Armed Forces Bill in 2026 is enacted. The Minister has given a good trailer for the debate that we will have on Friday on the strategic defence review, so I will not respond on that.

I would like to make just one point. When the 2021 Act was being debated, I, Lord Mackay of Clashfern and other noble Lords pressed for the obligation to have “due regard” to the Armed Forces covenant to be extended from local authorities to include central government departments. We quoted, as examples in need of central government consideration, Gulf War syndrome and the right of abode in the UK for Hong Kong Military Service Corps veterans who had served full time in the Armed Forces. A compromise was reached, and the issue was set aside for further examination.

The present Government have made it clear from the outset that they would extend the responsibility for supporting the covenant to central government. This is most welcome—it will, I assume, be legally formalised when the 2026 Bill is being considered—but the importance and reach of the Armed Forces covenant has had a very long incubation. I was one of the first to raise an amendment to the covenant legislation, which I tabled to the 2011 Bill nearly 15 years ago.

[Lord Lancaster of Kimbolton (Con)]

My Lords, I support this continuation order. I start by declaring my interests as a director of the Army Reserve and the chairman of the Reserve Forces review in 2030. I will ask a couple of questions but, in looking forward to next year’s Armed Forces Act, I also want to make a couple of suggestions.

Historically, we have always focused on our obligations under Article 5 of the NATO treaty. This is why we have a relatively small regular Army but one that is at high readiness and is expeditionary in nature: we always plan to fight a relatively short war in continental Europe. Equally, it is why we have a relatively small reserve. However, our planning assumptions have been called into question as a result of the war in Ukraine, which has been an extended campaign, meaning that we have to look carefully at both regeneration and reconstitution. It is also, in effect, a war between two reserve armies.

I absolutely welcome the SDR because it has, for the first time, forced us to look seriously at Article 3 and homeland defence—something where, in the past, we have perhaps not paid attention to the detail in the way we should have done. It is clear that, with the focus now on both Article 5 and Article 3, the demand on the workforce is going to increase significantly. That is recognised in the SDR. I was pleased to see that one of the recommendations was that the size of the reserves should increase by 20%—albeit with the caveat of “when we can afford it”—but, looking forward, I have some concerns.

First, we have the most wonderful department in the Ministry of Defence, as well as wonderful civil servants, but it is not a department that is set up for legislation. I wish to share my own experiences, having been the Minister responsible for two of the previous Armed Forces Acts. When the time came, we sometimes struggled to make some of the provisions we wanted to make, because we simply ran out of time. So my first plea to the Minister is this: can we get ahead of this and make sure that the work is done? The last principal muscle move was in 2006, when the single services used to have three different sets of service law. We combined those into a single Armed Forces Act in 2006 and I am sensing, from where we are today, that the next Armed Forces Act will also have to be a significant piece of work. As your Lordships are probably aware, the regular Army and the Army Reserve are dealt with through two separate pieces of legislation, and delivering a whole-force solution adds complication. I fear that what we will have to do in the next Armed Forces Act is combine those two pieces of legislation into a single Act, which will be a lot of work.

If the department does not necessarily like legislation, one thing it absolutely loves is policy. Every time we face a challenge, we seem to wrap around yet another piece of policy. We now have something of a Gordian knot of policy and I rather hope that, come the next Act, the Minister will adopt the role of Alexander and slice through much of it, because it prevents us having the flexibility to access society through the reserve and the regular force to deliver all the skill sets that we need. We have great aspirations to deliver zig-zag careers, enticing people to come into the Armed Forces, leave, go into civilian life and potentially come back. We have great aspirations from a regular reserve perspective for people to dial up or dial down their military service, but our policy makes that quite complicated, particularly our terms and conditions of service.

Defence Industrial Base

Lord Craig of Radley Excerpts

Monday 16th June 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Craig of Radley (CB)]

My Lords, what steps have the Government taken recently to reconcile the possible risk of failures in developing novel defence capabilities against the need to ensure that government funds are paid out with due care and avoidance of unnecessary risk?

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

The noble and gallant Lord asks a good question. We have reinvigorated and put more money into the defence innovation fund. With respect to defence, you cannot move forward without innovation, challenge, new technology and new ideas. One of the lessons from Ukraine is that sometimes, for not an awful lot of money, innovators—those who think for themselves—provide the defence equipment and security that we need. Of course, we must be sensible and not throw money away and waste it, but innovation is an important part of any defence industrial strategy, which is why it was mentioned in the defence review and why the Government are putting more money into it.

UK Nuclear Deterrent

Lord Craig of Radley Excerpts

Tuesday 3rd June 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Craig of Radley (CB)]

My Lords—

[Lord Trefgarne (Con)]

My Lords—

[Baroness in Waiting/Government Whip (Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent) (Lab)]

We will hear from the noble and gallant Lord.

[Lord Craig of Radley (CB)]

My Lords, I was in command of the crew of a nuclear-armed Falcon on quick-reaction alert over a number of years, and I realise the cost of maintaining the V-Force on alert over many years as well. Will the Minister return to the first question as to whether the cost of maintaining new nuclear capability, which has been talked about, can be met with less than the 3% guaranteed for the defence budget?

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

To be absolutely clear for the noble and gallant Lord, whatever the debate about the levels of funding for the defence budget, the nuclear deterrent will be funded both as it stands and for its renewal. That is a cast-iron guarantee from the Government.