The Earl of Minto (Con)
My Lords, on these Benches we wholeheartedly welcome the Government’s ironclad commitment to the nuclear deterrent and its modernisation. It is the backbone of our military deterrence capabilities and is so valuable to all our NATO allies. But we know that, historically, nuclear projects have eaten up enormous portions of the defence budget and—not unsurprisingly, due to the nature of the challenge—always tend towards overspending. With the raft of recommendations from the strategic defence review and the sheer number of projects that the Ministry of Defence will have to fund, is there not a possibility that the proposed increase in the defence budget could be consumed by the cost of the Dreadnought and nuclear warhead programmes? In light of this, can the Minister guarantee that there will be sufficient funds within the plans for the highly necessary renewal of the nuclear deterrent, as well as the equally necessary boost in what we now understand to be conventional capabilities?
The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Lord Coaker) (Lab)
My Lords, I first thank the noble Earl for the ironclad commitment that His Majesty’s Opposition have just given to the strategic nuclear deterrent. That is the most important point that has been made today, and I thank him for that. The co-operation between all of us on that has been a source of strength to this country for many decades and will continue.
On the question of funding, the Government make it absolutely clear they will fund the nuclear deterrent. On the Dreadnought successor programme to Vanguard, we have made commitments to the four submarines, and noble Lords have seen the Statement about the nuclear warhead programme. I remind the noble Earl that, in 2015, the last Government put a package out of £31 billion for the nuclear modernisation programme with a £10 billion contingency, and I can confirm that the budget is within those parameters.
Baroness Smith of Newnham (LD)
My Lords, the Urgent Question asked in the other place came from the chair of the Defence Committee. It came because there was speculation in the press that the SDR would propose not just renewing the continuous at-sea deterrent, which from these Benches we also support, but a move to a second platform for nuclear deterrence; that appears not to be the case. How does the Minister think such speculation came about? Would it not have been better if, rather than floating the SDR to the press, it came first to the other place and your Lordships’ House and we could have avoided unnecessary speculation?
Lord Coaker (Lab)
On the issue of nuclear weapons and the point that the noble Baroness makes, I will read the following for the purpose of clarity because she makes an important point. Neither the UK nor NATO talks about nuclear weapons being tactical. Any use of nuclear weapons would fundamentally change the nature of a conflict. I can say that the UK continues to view its nuclear deterrent as a political tool rather than a war-fighting capability, and it will remain the case that none of the UK’s nuclear weapons is designed for tactical use.
Lord Craig of Radley (CB)
My Lords, I was in command of the crew of a nuclear-armed Falcon on quick-reaction alert over a number of years, and I realise the cost of maintaining the V-Force on alert over many years as well. Will the Minister return to the first question as to whether the cost of maintaining new nuclear capability, which has been talked about, can be met with less than the 3% guaranteed for the defence budget?
Lord Coaker (Lab)
To be absolutely clear for the noble and gallant Lord, whatever the debate about the levels of funding for the defence budget, the nuclear deterrent will be funded both as it stands and for its renewal. That is a cast-iron guarantee from the Government.
Lord Beamish (Lab)
My Lords, I welcome my noble friend’s commitment to the nuclear deterrent, but does he agree that the problems we are facing now with the deterrent replacement are the failure to replace submarines in the 1990s by the Conservative Government, the delay from the coalition Government in ordering the replacement, and the movement of the actual finance for the replacement into the defence budget, whereas before it was always ring-fenced? Are not this Government trying now to play catch-up after the mistakes that were made in the past?
Lord Coaker (Lab)
I thank my noble friend for his question. We are trying to ensure that, whatever may have happened in the past, we move forward in a way which guarantees our strategic nuclear deterrent. That is the fundamental point that must ring out from this Chamber: there is unity of purpose across the Chamber that the strategic nuclear deterrent, particularly in the geopolitical times of today, will be maintained and renewed by this Government.
Lord Houghton of Richmond (CB)
My Lords, does not the Minister crystallise in what he says the stupidity of the situation in which we find ourselves? The declaration that at all costs, at any cost, the nuclear deterrent will be retained, must mean, under a time of fiscal pressure, that the balance of the MoD’s programme—the conventional methodology for deterring attacks—is further undermined. Is this not a ridiculous situation, and should we not return to the time when the nuclear enterprise was funded completely separately from the conventional requirements of defence?
Lord Coaker (Lab)
I thank the noble and gallant Lord for his question. Clearly, others will have heard the points that he made. All I am saying to this Chamber is that, at this geopolitical moment in history, it is particularly important that His Majesty’s Government, plus His Majesty’s Official Opposition and all parties, are united in saying to others that the nuclear deterrent will remain at the heart of our defence policy, whatever the debates about the budget.
Lord Balfe (Con)
My Lords, can the Minister confirm that it is an independent nuclear deterrent, or is it tied in? Would it work if we did not have support from the United States? One of the problems that we have had in the past is that it has not been an independent nuclear deterrent; it has been dependent on support from others. I would like to have an independent deterrent.
Lord Coaker (Lab)
I just say to the noble Lord that it is an independent nuclear deterrent. The person who decides whether, God forbid, that nuclear deterrent is ever used is the Prime Minister of our country. It is only the Prime Minister of our country who can determine whether, God forbid, that nuclear deterrent is used. That guarantees its independence.
Lord Trefgarne (Con)
Will the Minister confirm that our nuclear weapons will be used only when our supreme national interest so requires, and in no other circumstance?
Lord Coaker (Lab)
Of course it will be in the most extreme of circumstances that the nuclear deterrent would even be considered for use. I just say that the whole point of the nuclear deterrent—this is something I have said many times at the Dispatch Box—is to deter people. It is that whole concept that sometimes seems contradictory: that by preparing for war, you prevent war. The strategic nuclear deterrent is the most significant example of that.
Lord West of Spithead (Lab)
My Lords, it has always been the case that the nuclear programme has been at the very limits of our technological, industrial, scientific and cost profiles. The speed at which we produced Blue Danube bombs, for example, was excruciatingly slow, and so was the Beard process beyond that, and the other weapons. Now we have a lot of pressure from civil nuclear as well. Does my noble friend agree that we have to have a really national endeavour among all departments to pull together so that we can get the training of scientists and everyone focusing on this particular issue, because otherwise we will find it very hard to deliver—certainly within the cost parameters, but very hard to deliver anyway?
Just as an aside, when I was in government, the Prime Minister asked me to go and check on the independence of our deterrent. I was allowed access to all sorts of things, and the answer is that it is independent. Clearly, over time, over 20 or 30 years, that becomes more difficult, because of maintenance of missiles, for example.
Lord Coaker (Lab)
My noble friend makes a really good point with respect to the nuclear enterprise and the need for it to be a national endeavour. It is true of the defence nuclear enterprise, as it is true with many other aspects of defence, that the need for us to upskill, to have more apprentices and to have more of the systems available to us in order for us to be able to deliver the defence programmes and projects that we want is a challenge. Let me be clear that we will make sure that we have all the necessary skills and capabilities required to maintain our nuclear deterrent.