Critical Benchmarks (References and Administrators’ Liability) Bill [HL]

Lord Sharkey Excerpts

2nd reading
Wednesday 13th October 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister, the Economic Secretary to the Treasury and their teams for their engagement with us on this short but complex Bill. The input from the Ministers and their teams has unravelled a lot of that complexity and answered a lot of questions. We broadly support the Bill.

The need to replace Libor has been well flagged. As the Minister has noted, the FSB made it clear in 2014 that the continued use of Libor represented a potentially serious systemic risk. It made this judgement in response to cases of what it described as “attempted manipulation” of the rate

“and declining liquidity in key interbank unsecured funding markets.”

The imminent end of Libor has already been well flagged, at least to major players. Ideally, the Ibors would be replaced by risk-free rates, such as SONIA, but it has been obvious for some time that there would be existing, continuing contracts that would be unable to transition easily or in a timely fashion—or, perhaps, at all—to the new RFRs.

As the Minister has explained, the provisions of this Bill enable the FCA to address the problem. It gives powers to the FCA to allow, for some as yet unspecified categories of tough legacy contracts, continued use of synthetic Libor after the demise of the index at the end of this year. The Bill also provides some narrowly drawn legal protections for the administrators of the synthetic Libor.

It is worth noting that the Bill does not include in its scope the synthetic Libor mechanism itself. There has been no parliamentary scrutiny of this mechanism. Consultation is not the same as, or equivalent to, parliamentary scrutiny. It is regrettable that Parliament has not had the opportunity to scrutinise this mechanism and its likely consequences, or any alternative mechanisms, such as the linear transition mechanism mentioned in paragraph 28 of the FCA’s recent technical note. There is a very large gap in our scrutiny system where financial affairs are concerned. The exercise of unscrutinised power by the FCA illustrates the need, once again, for a dedicated financial affairs select committee.

The measures in the Bill are intended to produce an orderly end to the existing regime and to provide a temporary bridge for some exceptional contracts. I have been impressed by the depth and quality of the work that has gone into preparing for transition and for creating the synthetic Libor. I have no issues with the fundamentals of the proposals, but some questions remain, and I would welcome the Minister’s clarifications.

The first question is to do with timing. Why was the end of this year chosen as the cut-off point? What discussions have we had with the US authorities about synchronising our moves away from Libor? Would it not have been better and simpler to act together and give more time for contracts to be transitioned, reducing the number of those moving to a synthetic Libor substitute.

My second question is also to do with timing—in this case, the timing of the formal announcement of who may use synthetic Libor. As things stand, the FCA’s consultation on the matter does not close until the end of this month. Only after that will the FCA issue a formal policy paper setting out the rules for qualifying for the use of the synthetic Libor. That is two months before the general expiry of Libor—not long to prepare if the rules do not allow your contract to qualify. Why has it been left this late?

When I asked the Minister about this in our meeting on Monday, he pointed to the fact that the enabling powers in the Financial Services Act 2021 became active only in April. But we had been preparing this transition for long before that, and the Government cannot seriously have expected their proposals to have been overturned during the passage of that Bill. Surely, it would have been possible to at least have the consultation ready to go as soon as the Act was passed, or even to consult as it was being debated—something the Government have done in the past. I know the FCA has signalled that the rules may allow wide but time-limited scope, but can the Minister reassure us that it does not foresee the disruptive exclusion of significant tough legacy contracts from the synthetic regime?

My next question is about the absence of safe harbour provisions. The narrow immunity on offer to the administrator may not, of course, prevent an outbreak of lawsuits. New York has dealt with this problem more comprehensively than we propose to do by adopting safe harbour provisions.

During the Report stage of the Financial Services Bill 2021, the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, who I am glad to see in her place, proposed, in Amendment 6, such a safe harbour provision. The Government rejected the amendment, and the Minister explained why, saying:

“Amendment 6 may seem to solve those problems by seeking to give the Treasury powers to make regulations providing for contract continuity and safe harbour through secondary legislation, having had more time to consider these matters. The Government are of the view that, if legislation were needed to address this, it should be in the form of primary legislation. Further legislation providing for safe harbour, as proposed by these amendments, while consistent with the provisions already in the Bill, may be considered by some parties to represent a significant intervention in the contractual rights of parties using critical benchmarks. Primary legislation would therefore be preferable, to provide all parties with an appropriate level of transparency. Crucially, given the volume and value of contracts impacted, making such a provision in secondary legislation would carry a risk of legal challenge to the Government’s exercise of their powers. Any such challenge could bring further uncertainty and disruption, which is precisely what these amendments are seeking to mitigate.”—[Official Report, 24/3/21; col. 923.]


That was not a rebuttal of the notion of safe harbour. It was simply an explanation of why primary legislation would be a better way of achieving it. Well, we are now discussing primary legislation. Did we consider using safe harbour provisions similar to those adopted in New York and, if we did, why we chose not to use them? Did Her Majesty’s Government identify any benefits provided by the safe harbour approach that would not accrue under our scheme?

Next, there is the issue of a possible cliff edge at the end of the year. In the first Peers’ meeting with the Economic Secretary to the Treasury, we were told that there may be a difference of 10 basis points between the old Libor and the first runs of the new synthetic Libor. The very helpful FCA technical note on the end of year impact says in paragraph 23:

“We do not know precisely or with certainty what the difference between synthetic LIBOR on 4 January 2022 and panel bank LIBOR on 31 December 2021 will be.”


Does this not raise the possibility of significant market disturbances and disputes? The mechanisms proposed for generating synthetic Libor outputs have been published by the FCA in its draft notice of 29 September. Can the Minister say whether these mechanisms for determining synthetic Libor can be adjusted to produce a smoother, less step-like transition, if this looks to be desirable? If that cannot be done, can the Minister say what reactions he expects in the markets as a result of a variation of 10 basis points or more at the beginning of the new year. Can he also say what a realistic upper bound of this differential might be?

I have one further question: will there be some contracts which will never be able, or will decline, to transition to RFRs? If there are, what characterises them? Do we have any idea of how many there might be in number and value, and what does the FCA propose to do about them?

I realise that I have asked a lot of questions. I entirely understand if the Minister does not have time to answer them all this evening, but I would be very grateful for a written response before we get to Committee.

Financial Services Bill

Lord Sharkey Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 14th April 2021 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Sharkey]

15: After Clause 40, insert the following new Clause—
“Access to Sharia-compliant financial services including student finance
(1) Within six months of the passing of this Act, the Treasury must make provision by regulations to facilitate the availability of Sharia-compliant financial services in the United Kingdom, including availability to students who are eligible for the Government’s student finance provision of Sharia-compliant finance products for paying tuition fees and for student maintenance on equitable terms with students accessing the Government’s student finance provision.(2) Regulations under this section are subject to the negative procedure.”

[Lord Sharkey (LD) [V]]

My Lords, Amendment 15 is in my name and those of my noble friends Lady Sheehan and Lady Kramer, and I am grateful for their support.

The amendment addresses the issue of the provision of sharia-compliant student finance, of which there is none. Because Islam forbids interest-bearing loans, that prohibition is a barrier to our Muslim students going on to attend our universities. We debated this extensively in Grand Committee so I will not rehearse the arguments in detail, but I will remind the House of the timescale involved.

The problem became clear in 2012 when tuition fees were significantly increased, and it became worse when maintenance grants were replaced by maintenance loans. In 2014, the Government published their report on the consultation that they had undertaken. That consultation had attracted 20,000 respondents, a record at the time. The Government acknowledged that the lack of an alternative financial product to conventional student loans was a matter of major concern to many Muslims. The report also identified a solution: a takaful, a well-known and frequently used non-interest-bearing Muslim financial product. The Government explicitly supported the introduction of such a product.

That was seven years ago. There is still no sharia-compliant student finance available, nor have the Government ever offered a detailed reason for this long delay or indicated when it might come to an end. As I mentioned in Grand Committee, I have repeatedly asked the Government the reasons for this lack of action. I have never had a substantive response. There was no substantive response from the Minister in Grand Committee a month ago and no explanation for the delay nor any indication of a date by which the takaful would be available. There was absolutely no sense of urgency. It was as though the plight of these Muslim students was not really important or worth taking seriously.

I made the point that I had written to the Minister on 4 January this year asking for a report on progress and making some suggestions. There had been no response by then, and there was no response until 5.15 pm yesterday evening, 14 weeks after my email. The Minister of State for Universities apologised for the three-month delay without offering an excuse or an explanation and her reply was completely formulaic, containing no substantive answers. It contained no indication of when sharia-compliant student finance would be available. I was struck by the casual contempt for our Muslim community that this response so clearly signalled—an absurdly unfriendly and unfeeling response with no attempt to reassure or comfort the Muslim community. In fact, if you look at the Government’s record on all this, it is very hard to see it as anything other than discrimination against our Muslim community—not just discrimination but a failure to engage and to explain.

Our amendment would oblige the Government at last to fulfil the promise they made to the Muslim community in 2013. It would oblige the Secretary of State to facilitate the availability of Sharia-compliant financial services for students who are eligible for conventional student finance on equitable terms with students accessing these conventional products, and to do so within six months of the passing of this Act so that the next Muslim student cohort did not have to face a conflict between faith and education.

I very much hope that when the Minister responds he will be able to do better than Minister Donelan. I hope he will be able to tell the House when the Government will introduce the sharia-compliant student financial product. I hope he will set a date that will allow the next cohort of devout young Muslims to go on to university. If the Minister cannot do that—if he cannot say when he will fulfil his Government’s 8 year-old promise to our Muslim community—I will seek to test the opinion of the House. I beg to move.

[The Deputy Speaker (Baroness Fookes) (Con)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara, has withdrawn so I call the noble Baroness, Lady Sheehan.

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[Lord True (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all those who have spoken in this short debate. As has been said, Amendment 15 seeks to require the Government to make regulations to facilitate the availability of sharia-compliant financial services in the UK, including a sharia-compliant student finance product, within six months of the passing of the Bill.

Institutions across the United Kingdom have been providing sharia-compliant financial services for nearly 40 years, and the United Kingdom is the leading western centre for Islamic finance. I do not believe that anyone would dispute that the United Kingdom is a world leader in this area. This Government continue to promote the growth of this sector, supporting domestic financial inclusion and our connections with key markets abroad. With respect, I think that, in this context, the charges from the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, of “casual contempt” for the Muslim community and of discrimination were a little misplaced.

Student finance is not regulated by the FCA. I did, however, listen very carefully and respectfully to the noble Baroness, Lady Sheehan, who spoke from a position of personal commitment. I can assure the noble Baroness and the noble Lords that the Government wish to extend the reach of the student finance system so that everyone with the ability to benefit from higher education can do so. That is why we have legislated to make a system of alternative payments that is compatible with Islamic finance principles possible.

As I said in my remarks in Committee, a range of complex policy, legal and systemic issues need to be resolved before a Sharia-compatible product can be launched. Despite these challenges, the Department for Education has been working with specialist advisers to establish an appropriate product specification that meets the requirements of Islamic finance.

I also heard the concerns raised in Committee, and by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, again today, that it is not clear enough when the Government will take the next step. Since Committee, when I was concerned to hear those criticisms, I have discussed the matter with the relevant Minister in the Department for Education. Based on this, I can report that this matter is being considered as part of the wider review of post-18 education and funding.

I hope, therefore, that noble Lords will appreciate that it is not the right time to act until the wider strategy on post-18 education has been settled. I appreciate that some noble Lords, including those who have spoken, would like to see faster progress here—the question of when was put. I am able to reassure the House that there will be an update on this work as part of the review of post-18 education and funding when it is published, which will be at the next multi-year spending review. The Government will conduct the next spending review later this year. Further details on the nature of that spending review will be set out in due course.

On that basis, and with the commitment to progress as part of the review, I hope that the noble Lord will accept the assurance that the Government are committed to making progress on this very important issue and feel able to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Sharkey (LD) [V]]

I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this brief debate and I thank the Minister for his response. I point out, however, that we legislated to take powers to do this four years ago. Nothing has happened since. I remind the Minister, too, that the Help to Buy system was up and running within five or six months—and that was Islamic finance.

I also note that references to the post-18 education review seem to me—and have always seemed to me, as I said in my letter to the Minister, to which I did not get a response—completely irrelevant. We want students, Muslim or not, to be treated equally. If there is a change, after the post-18 Augar review, to the way that student finance happens, it should apply to Muslim and non-Muslim students equally: there should be no need to wait to establish the principle that Muslim and non-Muslim students should have equal access to finance. There is no need to wait.

I note, finally, that the promise of an update is not a promise to do anything at all, and does not even come close to setting a date by which these cohorts of Muslim students can gain access to finance and go on to university. In the Minister’s response there was no promise and no clarity, just talk of commitment. But after 13 years of this promise, talk of commitment is not enough, and I wish to test the opinion of the House.

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[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, these amendments are all on the same broad theme. As the previous speaker mentioned, there is a broad consensus that something needs to be done to provide a formal role for parliamentary scrutiny in the work of financial regulators. I do not want to detain the House, but I will take the opportunity to emphasise points that I have made at earlier stages. The basic question, to me, is: who regulates the regulators? The question is why we should trust the regulators; the answer is openness and engagement. Clearly, we have a particular interest here but can, I believe, contribute massively to the work of the regulator.

For us to raise these issues is not to question the expertise or good will of the people who serve on the regulators’ boards or work in their offices. It is simply wrong to assume that, once appointed, they can be left to get on with the job. As is apparent in the debate, there is clear consensus about the need for scrutiny. That is not contested. Obviously, there are clear reasons why they would benefit—the expertise of this House is a factor—but my particular concern is to establish systems that minimise the risk of regulatory capture. This is the experience, widely found, whereby regulators tend to become dominated by the interests they regulate and not by public interest.

I emphasise that this is not about corruption; it is more, in my mind, a social and cultural problem. I do not think the concept, in theory, is contested. The answer is to strengthen and develop the widest possible involvement of all sorts of bodies in the work of the regulators. Clearly, Parliament has a particular role and these amendments explore possible approaches to it. I hope the Minister can say a bit more than what was in the letter. Does the Minister consider regulatory capture to be something that occurs, and where the systems that are established address it and minimise the risk?

[Lord Sharkey (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 18, 19 and 20 in this group. I support them all but prefer the more prescriptive Amendment 20. In these matters, it seems to me that ambiguity is not our friend. Wide latitude in interpretation can easily frustrate intent. As my noble friend Lady Bowles has so forcefully explained, that intent here is to ensure that Parliament has some effective scrutiny role in the activities and rule-making of the PRA and the FCA, by requiring that the information Parliament may need to do this is properly supplied. At present, this is absent or insufficient or likely to be post hoc and ineffective.

This is a specific example of a much larger problem in the relations between the Executive and the legislature. There is an increasing tendency for the Executive to bypass, or try to bypass, Parliament or to reduce scrutiny to formulaic rituals with no real influence on outcomes, such as our SI procedures. The seriousness of this tendency has been commented on fairly widely and frequently in the past few years.

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Moved by

[Lord Sharkey]

21: After Clause 40, insert the following new Clause—
“Interest rates for mortgage prisoners
(1) The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 is amended as follows.(2) After section 137FD insert—“137FE FCA general rules: interest rate for mortgage prisoners(1) The FCA must make general rules requiring authorised persons involved in regulated mortgage lending and regulated mortgage administration to introduce a cap on the Standard Variable Rates charged to mortgage prisoners and to ensure that mortgage prisoners can access new fixed interest rate deals at an interest rate equal to or lower than an interest rate specified by the FCA.(2) In subsection (1)— “mortgage prisoner” means a consumer who cannot switch to a different lender because of their characteristics and has a regulated mortgage contract with one of the following types of firms—(a) inactive lenders, or firms authorised for mortgage lending that are no longer lending; and(b) unregulated entities, or firms not authorised for mortgage lending and which contract with a regulated firm to undertake the regulated activity of mortgage administration;“new fixed interest rate deals” means the ability for the consumer to fix the rate of interest payable on a regulated mortgage contract for periods of 2 years and 5 years;“Standard Variable Rate” means the reversion rate which is a variable rate of interest charged under the regulated mortgage contract after the end of any initial introductory deal.(3) The general rules made under subsection (1) must set the level of the cap on the Standard Variable Rate at a level no more than 2 percentage points above the Bank of England base rate.(4) The general rules made under subsection (1) should make new fixed interest rate deals available to mortgage prisoners who meet the following criteria—(a) are up to date with payments or have aggregate arrears of no more than one monthly payment in the past 12 months,(b) have a remaining term of 2 years or more,(c) have an outstanding loan amount of at least £10,000, and(d) have not received consent to let the property.(5) When specifying the interest rates for new fixed interest rate deals required by subsection (1) the FCA should specify rates for a range of Loan-To-Valuation (LTV) ratios taking into account the average 2-year and 5-year fixed rates available to existing customers of active lenders through product transfers.(6) The FCA must ensure any rules that it is required to make as a result of subsection (1) are made not later than 31 July 2021.””Member’s explanatory statement
This new Clause would require the FCA to introduce a cap on the Standard Variable Rates charged to mortgage prisoners and, under specified circumstances, ensure their access to fixed rate interest deals.

[Lord Sharkey (LD) [V]]

My Lords, Amendments 21 and 37B are in my name and those of the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara, and my noble friend Lady Kramer, and I am very grateful for their support. I declare an interest as co-chair of the APPG on Mortgage Prisoners. The plight of these mortgage prisoners was discussed extensively—

[Baroness Penn (Con)]

My Lords, due to the technical issues that the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, is having, I suggest that we adjourn for five minutes until a convenient moment after 8.28 pm.

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[Lord Sharkey (LD) [V]]

I was saying that we have made no progress in Committee on the mortgage prisoners problem, and the situation seems frozen. On the one hand, there are 250,000 mortgage prisoners, subject to real, undeserved and unwarranted financial pressure, which is likely to increase when Covid concessions lapse or are withdrawn. On the other hand, the Government and the FCA seem intent on minimizing the problem and are engaged in what seem to me to be futile and unproductive arguments with the mortgage prisoners over exact figures.

The alleged 0.4% premium paid by mortgage prisoners above the average SVR illustrates the point. We do not only believe the figure to be wrong for the reasons that I set out in Committee, which were not refuted by government; we also believe that such discussions are very largely a distraction and lead nowhere. SVRs are not the norm in mortgage lending but are the literally inescapable norm for most mortgage prisoners. Only around 10% of customers with active lenders pay these high SVRs, and more than 75% of those who do switch to new and much lower fixed rate deals within six months of moving to an SVR. Mortgage prisoners have been stuck with usurious SVRs for over 10 years.

Solving the mortgage prisoner problem certainly requires reducing this usurious SVR, but it also requires giving the mortgage prisoners access to normal fixed-rate mortgage deals. I regret to say that there has been no real progress in either of these areas. In all the discussions about the problem, I have never heard the Government admit responsibility for causing it in the first place. I have heard repeated assertions that the Government are trying to find a solution. I have heard John Glen, the Economic Secretary to the Treasury, say that he remains open to considering practical solutions, and I know that the Chancellor told Martin Lewis that he would keep working on the issue and was committed to finding a workable solution.

However, I have heard no admission from the Government that they caused the problem in the first place—and no admission of moral responsibility for devising a proper, just and timely solution. Certainly, nothing so far proposed or actioned has delivered effective relief to the 250,000 prisoners. I again make the point that these people are not the authors of their own misfortunes: the Government are.

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[Baroness Penn (Con)]

My Lords, once more we will need a brief adjournment due to technical issues. I beg to move that we adjourn until 8.30 pm. Or do we have the noble Lord?

[Lord Sharkey (LD) [V]]

Yes.

[Baroness Penn (Con)]

Ignore me. Please go on, Lord Sharkey.

[Lord Sharkey (LD) [V]]

Thank you. I think I was talking about Amendment 21 being prescriptive; it sets out exactly what must be done and by whom.

It has two sections. The first reduces the currently usurious SVR paid by mortgage prisoners by capping it at two percentage points above the bank rate. This is what, in the end, Martin Lewis thought was necessary. He said:

“Yet in lieu of anything else, I believe for those on closed-book mortgages it is a good stopgap while other detailed solutions are worked up, and I’m very happy the All-Party Parliamentary Group on mortgage prisoners is pushing it.”


He also said:

“This would provide immediate emergency relief to those most at risk of financial ruin … No one should underestimate the threat to wellbeing and even lives if this doesn’t happen, and happen soon.”


This is all necessary, but not sufficient. SVRs are not the normal basis for mortgages, as I have already mentioned. What is needed is access to fixed-rate mortgages, as provided by normal active lenders to 90% of mortgagees. The second part of Amendment 21 sets out how that is to be done.

This is, of course, all very prescriptive, and we understand the Government’s reluctance to write such details into the Bill. That is why we have also tabled Amendment 37B. This amendment takes a simpler and non-prescriptive approach. It places the obligation to fix the problem squarely on those who caused it—the Treasury. It is explicitly fuelled by the overwhelming and undeniable moral responsibility that the Treasury has for the terrible situation in which mortgage prisoners have long found themselves. The amendment sets out what must be achieved to relieve mortgage prisoners, by whom and by when, but it does not say how. It leaves that entirely for the Government to work out.

Amendments 21 and 37B give the Government a clear choice. Amendment 21 prescribes a detailed method of solution; Amendment 37B says what the Government must achieve but leaves the mechanism to them. The Government caused the mortgage prisoner problem, which has caused and continues to cause much suffering to many families. I hope that the Government will recognise their moral responsibility and adopt Amendment 21 or Amendment 37B.

This has all gone on much too long, and it has caused, and continues to cause, far too much misery and desperation. If the Minister is not able to adopt either amendment, or give equivalent assurances, I will test the opinion of the House. I beg to move Amendment 21.

[Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I speak in support of the amendments just proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, which I have signed. One’s heart goes out to him—it must be very difficult to make a speech of this complexity and passion with all these breaks. Despite the technical difficulties, however, he has made the case for action very well, and as co-chair of the all-party parliamentary group on these issues he is very well briefed on the situation faced by these fellow citizens of ours, and the extra costs that they face. It is indeed a very difficult situation, and one hears a lot of despair when one talks to these people.

I am sure that when he responds the Minister will, as the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, hinted, dwell at length on the numbers of this group in various categories. There is of course a debate on how the prisoners can be split up—I think that the only thing that we agree on is that the total is probably about 250,000. As with the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, however, my argument is not about the numbers. Simply put, it is clear that a significant number of people, through no fault of their own, cannot exercise the choices about their mortgage that the rest of us can. While some would argue that this is the direct fault of the Government, I think that someone needs to take responsibility for providing a fair outcome for those who are in a position to take advantage of it.

As the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, says, this group of amendments offers two options: one that focuses on what the FCA might do within the parameters set by the Bill and another—37B, a late amendment that we drafted for Report—that suggests that the Treasury might wish to take powers to act in the way that is most suitable for it. Both have merits, in their ways. As the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, said, they have detailed implications that need to be followed through carefully. My preference would be for Amendment 37B, for the very good reasons set out by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey. If, as he said he might, the noble Lord decides to test the opinion of the House, we will support him.

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[Lord Sharkey (LD) [V]]

I thank everybody who has taken part in this extensive debate. I particularly thank the noble Baroness, Lady Bryan, for her powerful contribution and her clear understanding of the problems that mortgage prisoners suffer, and have suffered for so very long.

I was sorry to hear the Minister again talk about the 0.4 percentage points and assert that it was a meaningful figure. At this point in the debate and at this time of the night, all I can do is say that we disagree fundamentally with his analysis. We think it is completely wrong and we think we have the evidence to show it is.

In some ways, more important than all that is that the tenor of the debate, or the tenor of the contributions made by the Minister and the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, was notable for the fact that they do not assume any kind of responsibility on the part of the Government for the situation these people find themselves in. There is no hint of moral responsibility and no sense that, really, it is up to government to find the solution. As it happens, the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, finished her speech, I think, by recommending that we leave all this to the FCA and the Treasury to find a solution. The fact is that we have left it to the Treasury and the FCA to find a solution, and they have not found a solution at all.

Nothing in the Minister’s speech suggests that a solution is on the horizon. He talked about the loosening of the affordability checks, but I repeat what I said in my speech: so far, the loosening of those affordability checks has helped 40 households. He had the opportunity to try to correct that figure; he did not take it. It is 40 households so far. This is not the solution, and nothing else is proposed by the FCA or the Treasury to solve the problem that still exists.

I conclude by saying that it is the Government who have caused this problem; it is the Treasury. There is a moral responsibility. People’s lives are ruined, have been ruined and will be ruined if this situation continues. It may be that the proposals we have put forward are not perfect—although I certainly dispute that they amount to significant market distortion, if any—but, nevertheless, they would bring relief to these people. There are a lot of them, they are in bad shape and their lives are difficult, and it is no fault of their own. I would like to test the opinion of the House.

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Moved by

[Lord Sharkey]

25: After Clause 40, after “business,” insert “consumer protection,”

[Lord Sharkey (LD) [V]]

I will be brief. Amendment 24 continues the themes underlying Amendments 18, 19 and 20, proposed by my noble friend Lady Bowles. The amendment concerns the provision of vital information, as did those amendments. The noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, has explained the purpose of her amendment with her usual force and clarity, and I agree with every word she said.

The assessment of impact is essential to proper scrutiny, but it seems to me that there is an omission in the noble Baroness’s amendment. Amendment 24 requires the Treasury to

“publish an annual report on the impact of measures taken by the FCA, PRA and the Government … particularly on small business, innovation and competitiveness.”

The amendment does not include consumer protection in this list. My Amendment 25 simply inserts this alongside the other particularised areas.

Consumer protection is already an objective of the FCA. The Financial Services Act 2012 inserted new Section 1C, which sets out that the “consumer protection objective is”, rather unsurprisingly,

“securing an appropriate degree of protection for consumers.”

The same Act also imposes an obligation on the FCA to promote competitiveness, one of the specified categories in Amendment 24 of the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe. This obligation is qualified and, in some ways, secondary to the consumer protection objective. The Act says that the promoting competitiveness requirement has to be “compatible with the advancement” of consumer protection. Both are important and seem to me to merit the same standing in Amendment 24.

I recognise that the PRA has no such direct obligation to consumer protection. However, its general objective is set out in Section 2B inserted by the 2012 Act, and it clearly implies an element of consumer protection. The Government themselves have a clear interest and involvement in consumer protection directly, if they consider it necessary.

Consumers need protection, perhaps now more than ever: scams multiply, malfeasance grows and people lose their pensions and life savings. The resourcefulness and inventiveness of the dishonest seems to know no bounds. Just as it is important to know the impact of measures taken to regulate financial services in general, and on small businesses, innovation and competitiveness in particular, so it is important to know the impact of measures taken to protect consumers. There are already many of these measures and there will be more as new ways of fleecing consumers are devised. We need to know what we are doing in combating them all—what works and what does not. Amendment 25 would enable this in the way proposed by Amendment 24. I beg to move.

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All the topics raised in these amendments are ones that the Treasury and the regulators consider every single day when making financial services policy. I can also assure the House that the Government are committed to ensuring that the sector has a positive impact, not only for consumers but for the economy as a whole. Given all this, I ask that these amendments be withdrawn.

[Lord Sharkey (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I find myself agreeing with both the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, and the noble Earl, Lord Howe, and so I have nothing more to say except to beg leave to withdraw Amendment 25.

Amendment 25 (to Amendment 24) withdrawn.

Financial Services Bill

Lord Sharkey Excerpts

2nd reading & 2nd reading (Hansard) & 2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Thursday 28th January 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharkey (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I shall focus my remarks chiefly on Clauses 3 and 5, and on Schedule 3. Before I do so, I should congratulate the Government on the speed with which they are addressing the matter of Gibraltar’s financial services industry. The Bill has 183 pages, and over 50 of them are devoted to Gibraltar.

With two important and welcome exceptions—debt respite and Help to Save—the rest of the Bill deals with technical and complex matters. In doing so, it raises profound questions about parliamentary scrutiny and the desirability of embodying an international competitive element in our financial services regimes.

Clauses 3 and 5 contain provisions to allow the PRA and the FCA effectively to make law by making rules without any parliamentary scrutiny. Clause 3 lists the provisions of the CRR that the Treasury may revoke by regulation. The list runs to 42 items, all of them significant. Clause 3(4) makes these revocations conditional on their being or having been adequately replaced by general rules made or to be made by the PRA, or to be replaced by nothing at all if the Treasury thinks that is okay. As things stand, it looks as though the Treasury is the sole judge of what may or may not be an adequate replacement. In any event, Parliament is bypassed. There is no provision for parliamentary scrutiny of these new rules, which have the force of law, but these rules can and will reshape critically important parts of our financial services regimes. Clause 5 takes the same lawmaking-by-rule approach to the regulation of credit institutions. Again, there will be no parliamentary scrutiny of these rules.

The Government have acknowledged the need for a discussion about the role of parliamentary scrutiny in the post-Brexit repatriation of powers previously exercised by the EU directly to our regulators without stopping en route at our Parliament. In March of last year, the EU Sub-Committee on financial services, of which I was chair, wrote to the Government about the issue, as the Minister has mentioned. In his response, the Economic Secretary to the Treasury noted that we had highlighted that

“delegating more powers to the financial regulators will require enhanced parliamentary oversight of their activities.”

There is now an open Treasury consultation on the future of financial services. The call for evidence in this consultation contains 17 key questions. Three of these relate to the issue of parliamentary scrutiny. They are: through what legislative mechanism should new financial regulations be made?; what role does Parliament have to play in influencing new financial services regulations?; how should new UK financial regulations be scrutinised? The consultation closes on 18 February. In practice, it means that the Bill will have left this House by the time the consultation results are available to us. In any case, HMT has indicated that the results will inform yet another consultation, later in 2021, in which the Government will set out a package of proposals. By that time, of course, the provisions in this Bill will have become law and there will no longer be an opportunity for real parliamentary scrutiny of the legally binding rules they will generate.

The Minister emphasised in his closing remarks on Report in the Commons that this Bill is

“just one part of the wider long-term strategy for financial services.”—[Official Report, Commons, 13/1/2021; col. 398.]

Given the narrow and technical scope of the current contents of this Bill, I was glad to hear that, and take it to mean that a second and more comprehensive financial services Bill is in prospect. But the fact is that, by the time we get round to that, the “making laws by rulemaking” procedure will have passed into law. Parliamentary scrutiny of the new rules as laws will have been avoided. We will want to return at later stages to the question of what we can do about this bypassing of Parliament in such critical areas.

I turn briefly to Schedule 3 and the insertion of new Part 9D into the already overloaded and much-amended FSMA 2000, and in particular to new subsection 1(b) of Clause 144C. This seemingly innocuous subsection could bring about radical change in our regulatory regimes. It introduces as a “have regard” in the PRA’s making of CRR rules the notion of international competitiveness for our regimes. This is a highly contested area and the idea has been opposed by many leading figures, including from the party opposite, as being likely to promote conflicts of interest. We will want to examine this in detail at later stages.

During the passage of the Bill through the Commons, there was some discussion of more directly consumer-facing measures. These included imposing a duty of care on the financial services industry and providing significantly more relief for those mortgage prisoners trapped by the Treasury’s dereliction and carelessness in selling on mortgage books to unregulated entities. We will want to return to these issues later in our consideration of the Bill.

We will also want to discuss extending the FCA’s perimeter to take in more of the SME lending market. This is particularly urgent given the terrible position that many SMEs find themselves in as a result of Brexit and Covid-19. We will also want to debate the issue of preserving access to cash in the Covid and post-Covid world. I look forward to the Minister’s reply and to our future debates.

European Union (Future Relationship) Bill

Lord Sharkey Excerpts

3rd reading & 2nd reading & Committee negatived & 2nd reading (Hansard) & 2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords & 3rd reading (Hansard) & 3rd reading (Hansard): House of Lords & Committee negatived (Hansard) & Committee negatived (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 30th December 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharkey (LD) [V]]

My Lords, this is a bad deal, a bad Bill and a bad way of dealing with Parliament. The deal and the Bill do not address the major component of our national commercial life, our service industries, as was pointed out by the noble Baroness, Lady Donaghy. The Bill is hastily put together and contains at least one howler about IT systems, as was pointed out by the Times. There will be others buried in the detail—detail we are not allowed to scrutinise.

The Bill also contains the mother of all Henry VIII powers in Clause 29. This gives Ministers carte blanche to amend laws without going anywhere near Parliament. The time given to parliamentary scrutiny of this Bill is effectively zero. We could easily have extended the transition period to allow proper consideration. Choosing not to do this was a deliberate political decision to bypass Parliament.

The Hansard Society, of which I am a former chair, published a note on the Bill this morning. It describes Parliament’s role in scrutinising the Bill and the TCA as a “farce”. It concludes that:

“Parliament’s role around the end of the Brexit transition and conclusion of the EU future relationship treaty is a constitutional failure to properly scrutinise the executive and the law.”


This matters not just because the devil is in the detail, as always; it matters because this bypassing of Parliament is directly contrary to the professed aim of Brexit to take back control of our laws—for laws to be determined by the UK Parliament.

As things stand, the Bill will receive Royal Assent today without any effective scrutiny at all. This is an exercise in executive power and not parliamentary lawmaking. It is hard to see who really gains from the Bill and agreement, apart from a faction within the Conservative Party. Certainly, the country as a whole will not gain; the economy will shrink. Our fishing industry feels betrayed. Our car makers will struggle, as cumulation becomes more difficult to work around. And our vital services industries, the engines of our prosperity, will lose out.

The Government have pointed to the tariff-free and quota-free access to EU markets as a sign of success, but that takes no account of the huge additional burden of red tape that will fall upon our businesses. Anyway, all this access is conditional. If the EU does not like our regulatory regimes, it can impose tariffs as it chooses. If sovereignty is to have any real meaning, it must mean parliamentary sovereignty and not executive fiat. If it is to mean that, Parliament must reassert its right and duty to scrutinise and amend. We need to decide how we do that.

Inflation

Lord Sharkey Excerpts

Monday 1st July 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, I was until today a member of the committee that produced this report. I record my thanks to the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, for his wise and tolerant chairmanship, and also join him in thanking our clerk, our committee assistant and in particular the departing policy analyst, Ben McNamee.

Inflation may be—although I doubt it after listening to this debate—a simple concept. However, as this debate has demonstrated and as the committee very soon learned, measuring it is a far from simple exercise. Discussion of what these measures should be and of their relative merits can quite quickly become highly technical and apparently abstract, but what we agree inflation to be obviously has an enormous impact in the real world. That is why it is important to try to maintain some common-sense understanding of what is going on. Decisions made about how to measure inflation should be widely accessible to scrutiny and debate, not just confined to a priestly caste of economists, bankers and statisticians. Our report tried to help with that, and I will focus on just a couple of the major issues we discussed.

The first is whether the RPI is irretrievably flawed and should be abandoned, as the UKSA and the ONS had decided. As we have heard, the committee thought not. We acknowledged, as had the UKSA and the ONS, that the index was clearly flawed as a result of an untested and underplanned methodological change introduced by the ONS in 2010. I should say in passing that I was very surprised by the apparently casual way in which this change was implemented, and even more surprised that there was not an early attempt to rectify an obvious mistake. After all, the impact of the change was more or less immediately obvious. In December 2009, the RPI was about half a percentage point higher than the CPI, and in December 2010 it was nearly 0.9 percentage points higher. Nowadays, the RPI continues to run between 0.8 and one percentage point above the CPI.

This matters not only because it is the wrong number but because this wrong number has very significant real-world consequences. It has been a gift, as we have heard, to the holders of RPI index-linked bonds—a gift of around £1 billion in extra interest every year—and it has punished those people whose payments are linked to the RPI. Annual rail fare increases and the interest on student loans are examples of this.

You might reasonably have thought that it would be obvious that the mistake in calculating RPI should be fixed, but listening to the arguments for and against repairing the index was at times like listening to a theological dispute between medieval schoolmen. One of our colleagues, who is no longer in his place—the noble Lord, Lord Lamont—compared the whole thing unfavourably to listening to the arguments in the Council of Trent.

It seemed clear to us that some of the technical arguments, about the use of the Carli formula, for example, had been going on for a very long time and were unresolved—and perhaps even unresolvable. However, it seemed that the arguments in favour of repair carried significantly more weight than those against. This was in part because the arguments against seemed based very largely on a misreading by the ONS of its statutory duty and on its reluctance to take into account the widespread and continued use of the RPI.

The noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, explained our collective view of the ongoing misinterpretation by the ONS of its statutory duties under the Statistics and Registration Service Act 2007, and I will not repeat his arguments. However, I will say that the UKSA/ONS position on this strikes me as simultaneously cowardly and ludicrous. In essence, the ONS is saying that it will not ask the Bank for permission to repair the RPI because it thinks, correctly, that the Bank would have to ask the Chancellor and that he would say no. The Chancellor himself dealt with that when he gave evidence to us, as the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, recounted. We believe that the ONS has a legal duty to ask for authority to repair, and we strongly believe that, when asked, the Chancellor should agree.

The second major issue we focused on was whether there was a need for multiple indices to measure consumer price inflation. We thought not. Some witnesses, including the UKSA and the RSS, defended the practice. Others, including the Bank of England, saw the case for a single index. They felt that it was not obvious why two were needed and that having multiple indices caused confusion and was counterproductive. In addition, of course, the existence of two indices has allowed the Government to indulge in the rather disgraceful game of index shopping, using the lower CPI for payments out and the higher RPI for receipts in. This is, at the very least, inconsistent and incoherent, as well as obviously unfair and, unfortunately, widespread. I am glad to see that the Government have made some moves towards fairness and consistency and we encourage them to go further and faster. In fact, I urge the Government to move as quickly as possible towards the use of a single consumer price index. As we recommended in our report, we believe that the Government should eventually choose between a repaired RPI and the updated CPI.

As the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, explained, there has been no formal response to our report, which was published six months ago. The National Statistician, who retired yesterday, without a proper successor in place, said in March that UKSA would respond in April—and it did, on 30 April, as did the Treasury on the same day. They both said that this was an important issue which required further consideration—in the same words—and that they would respond,

“as soon as it is practicable to do so”.

Not “in due course”, “shortly” or “soon”, which are the usual qualifications, but an entirely unexplained new kind of delay: as soon as it is “practicable” to do so. Can I ask the Minister—well, perhaps not. I wanted to ask what this means. What is making a response impracticable? How long is this impracticability expected to last? We currently have no idea when we might expect the usual formal written response.

So, in the absence of a response, and while the UKSA and the Treasury are considering how to respond, could I ask the Minister a couple of questions? First, does the Minister agree that the ONS has a legal duty to request the repair of RPI? The Minister will know that the Chief Secretary to the Treasury, talking of the proposal to repair RPI, told the committee:

“I am suggesting it is the role of the ONS to put forward that proposal”.


My second question, therefore, is: in light of this, what can be done to avoid this damaging and faintly ridiculous impasse caused by Sir David Norgrove’s assertion that he can read the Chancellor’s mind?

Small and Medium-sized Enterprises: Mistreatment

Lord Sharkey Excerpts

Thursday 27th June 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, the report we are considering has already attracted a lot of comment—all of it unfavourable. The chair of the TSC said:

“This long overdue report will offer no solace to those who suffered from the disgraceful actions of RBS’s GRG”.


Kevin Hollinrake, co-chair of the APPG on Fair Business Banking, said that the report is a,

“complete whitewash and another demonstrable failure of the regulator to perform its role”.

The SME Alliance said that it was deeply disappointed with the regulator. The Times of Friday 14 June said that the report was,

“a masterful study in pointlessness”,

an insult to victims, and that it demonstrated a,

“sloppiness that underlines the paucity of the FCA’s investigation”.

Last Friday’s Financial Times was also critical. It said that the,

“report into the GRG scandal at Royal Bank of Scotland, which found that nobody was to blame, is a scandal in itself”.

None of this criticism is surprising or ill-founded. The whole sorry history of the GRG and RBS is littered with failures. The first failure was within the GRG. My noble friend Lady Bowles listed these failures and their dreadful consequences. The second failure was within RBS, and extends to board level. Promontory, talking about the issues of malpractice and mistreatment, says explicitly that,

“we view these issues as part of an intentional and coordinated strategy … to focus on GRG’s commercial objective and to place inadequate weight on the interests of its SME customers”.

Promontory explicitly implicates the bank itself—RBS—in these failings. It concludes:

“It is clear that the bank was aware, at least in part, of some of these failures but, it would appear, chose not to prioritise action to overcome them”.


In other words, the GRG was systematically ripping off some of its vulnerable customers and the bank knew this but did not intervene.

This is a gross failure of responsibility on the part of RBS, or at least very clear evidence of complete incompetence—and it gets worse. From April 2009, RBS had adopted a group-wide policy on the FCA’s treating customers fairly principle. This applied to GRG. Promontory notes:

“Despite this, we did not see how GRG management would have been able to satisfy itself that the TCF had been properly implemented and embedded in GRG. In our view, it was not”.


Presumably, either RBS was aware of the failure and did nothing, or it was unaware of it. Either way, there are surely grounds for resignations or sackings.

The third failure is therefore that of the regulator, the FCA. I say this with some reluctance. I have been an admirer of Andrew Bailey and believe that the FCA has become a significantly improved regulator under his leadership, but this belief has been tested of late, what with the LCF and the Neil Woodford affairs on top of the GRG debacle. Now we have the FCA’s report on the GRG affair, which reads as a rather desperate attempt at exculpation. It is clear that the FCA has acted late, reluctantly, defensively and very weakly. I agree with Kevin Hollinrake that the report is a whitewash. It is also an evasion of responsibility. The FCA report fails to discover—or declines to name if it has discovered— those in the GRG in RBS responsible for the malpractice and mistreatment of SMEs and the breaching of the TCF principle.

It is clear, on the one hand, that terrible things happened and, on the other, that nobody was named, punished or sanctioned. Then there is the question of the fit and proper test. The FCA report states on fitness and propriety:

“While those directly affected might think the conduct of senior management was deficient in GRG, we do not believe we would have reasonable prospects of bringing successful prohibition proceedings against any member of senior management”.


That is not only weak but unevidenced. It is either false or, if true, a perfectly clear illustration of the gulf between ordinary, common-sense language and its interpretation by the FCA. The proven persistence, scale and damage of GRG’s malpractice must surely be evidence that those responsible are absolutely not fit and proper persons in any reasonable sense of the words. If the FCA persists in its refusal to use its fit and proper person powers, the Government should ask it to rethink the whole regime. Does the Minister agree?

Perhaps the most worrying aspect of the FCA’s report is on page 73, where it discusses what, had the SM&CR been in place, it could have done about GRG. It reaches the feeble conclusion:

“We cannot say whether we would have been able to bring successful cases against RBS senior management had the SM&CR been in force”.


What does this say about the effectiveness of the SM&CR? Does it mean that the equivalent of GRG’s malpractices, if carried on now, could not lead to the punishment of individuals? What is the Government’s view on that?

This has been a sorry tale of malpractice. There has been wrongdoing but no consequences for the wrongdoers. There has been some compensation for victims, but not nearly enough. There is no clarity about whether our regulatory regime could have prevented this malpractice or could in future prevent such malpractice. There are questions as to whether the fit and proper test is in itself fit for purpose.

Promontory recommended that the FCA should work with the Government to extend the protections available to SME customers. Is that in fact happening and, if so, what progress has been made? Finally, does the Minister agree with the chairman of the Treasury Select Committee, who said that the FCA’s ruling showed that the regulators should be given powers to regulate commercial lending:

“Otherwise, scandalous events such as those at GRG could recur”?

Breathing Space Scheme: Consultation Response

Lord Sharkey Excerpts

Wednesday 19th June 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Lab)]

My Lords, I declare my previous interest as a former chair of StepChange, the debt charity. I thank the Minister for repeating this Statement, and I am very happy to hear what he had to say. I have campaigned for both these changes in policy for a number of years, and it is astonishing to hear them being announced today. What on earth will I do with my time?

The Minister will recall the discussions we had during the passage of the Financial Guidance and Claims Bill when he was the co-pilot, as he described it. We worked closely with the Government to try to get a breathing space scheme into scope. We did not succeed then, and the worry was that although these two measures were in the Conservative Party manifesto, they might, like so many other good and necessary policies in recent years, fall under the Brexit behemoth, but here we are. I welcome the excellent progress made on this issue.

I was interested to hear that the Minister making the announcement in the other place revealed that this is an issue close to his heart. I think everyone who has seen at first hand the hardship that problem debt can cause realises that it places a heavy burden on households and can lead to family breakdown, stress and mental health issues. It was good to hear the Government accept that it is wrong to assume that overindebtedness is simply a product of feckless people taking out too much credit. Many hard-working families struggle to meet essential bills and can end up owing money to multiple creditors in the public and private sectors. My experience in StepChange was that the majority of the 500,000 or so people who contacted the charity each year had successfully managed their finances for many years before illness or another unexpected factor tipped them into unmanageable debt, which they desperately wanted to repay.

With this announcement today, the Government have taken a significant step which will do a huge amount to encourage people to seek the free professional advice they need timeously when problem debt occurs. The combination of the breathing space and the statutory debt recovery scheme will support those who have the capacity to repay their debts but lack the knowledge and expertise to deal with their multiple creditors. It will allow them to do so in a way that will repay much more to creditors and in a shorter time. This system has worked for many years in Scotland, and it is good to see that pioneering approach being extended to England and Wales, and hopefully to Northern Ireland in due course.

The detail of the government response has only just gone up on the website and there is a lot to take in, but I would like to make a few points. I worry that the breathing space period of 60 days may not be long enough in practice, and I am sure that this will be something we will need to come back to, but I think the best thing is to begin with that length and review it in the light of experience. It is good that the protections include the freezing of further default interest, charges and enforcement action once somebody has taken the first step of seeking debt advice. We are delighted that government debt will be included in both schemes. In particular, this should give some protection to many people against the rather aggressive action that is sometimes taken by bailiffs collecting council tax arrears.

The introduction of a special version of the breathing space for people experiencing a mental health crisis is most welcome. It is good that there is not going to be a public register, with all that that might bring in terms of unsolicited approaches to those on it from unscrupulous third parties. I think the Government have taken the right decision about a private register. We are sad that we will not see the breathing space scheme until 2020 and will not see the statutory debt management recovery scheme until 2021 or later, but I hope that HMT will do what it can to expedite both schemes. We certainly stand ready to help if that is required.

I have some reservations about the suggested level of the statutory fair share element in the SDRP. The current scheme agreed with large creditors is much higher than the 9% suggested in the Treasury’s response. However, I am aware that there is a broader discussion on comprehensive debt advice funding being worked on by the new Money and Pensions Service.

I will conclude by discussing two other issues. Unmanageable personal debt is a by-product of many factors, but most are linked to the health of the economy. Lack of affordable credit, slow wage growth, growth in zero-hours contracts and changes brought in by the gig economy all play a part. In addition, it is incontestable that the introduction of universal credit is causing strain and stress here. While this new policy is welcome—and it is—other issues need to be addressed. Does the Minister agree?

Finally, while it is true that the Government have acted to correct abuses in the consumer credit market, high-interest loans are still being made to people who cannot afford to repay them. Banks are not averse to making punitive charges for temporary overdrafts. Guarantor loans are a current concern, and it is a matter of considerable regret that the Government have not taken action to outlaw logbook loans. In relation to the latter, will the Minister agree to meet me to discuss how we might progress the Law Commission draft Bill on goods mortgages, which would inter alia have the effect of repealing the Victorian legislation that gives rise to these bans?

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for repeating the Statement. We on these Benches very much welcome the introduction of the breathing space and the statutory debt repayment schemes, although we do have a few questions about execution.

To debtors, this reform may seem to have been quite a long time coming: I can recall discussions in Parliament in 2015, as well as outside long before that. The proposal was, of course, included in the Conservative Party’s 2017 manifesto. Many people and organisations have played a part in getting us to this stage. I particularly want to mention StepChange and the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara. The critical point in getting the Government to do something arose during the passage through this House of what is now the Financial Guidance and Claims Act 2018. The amendment to the Bill by the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, about breathing space now appears as Section 6 of the Act. This section encouraged and enabled the Government to do what they have announced today.

Turning to the schemes themselves, we are pleased that the Government have in most cases followed the advice they were given in the consultation—which seemed to be a model of its kind, unlike some of the other consultations that the Minister and I have had to discuss in this Chamber. We believe that the eligibility criteria for the breathing space scheme are broadly right, although we have doubts about the restriction to only once in 12 months. We encourage the Government to think again about this and—as they say they are minded to—to include provision for joint debts to qualify for inclusion in the scheme.

We are also happy to see that local and central government debts are to be included in the new scheme and very pleased to see the inclusion of small sole-trader debts, which we think is a vital element. We especially welcome the unlimited extension and repeated entry to the scheme for those in mental health crisis.

The Government’s very helpful consultation and policy response paper does qualify the inclusion of universal credit advances and third-party deductions from universal credit. The document is very vague about the timing of their eventual inclusion. I ask the Minister to give the House a little more detail and encourage him to speed up the process of including these two elements.

When it comes to which ongoing bills should be paid during the breathing space, I think that the Government have it about right in giving debt advice agencies the discretion over whether to remove people who do not keep up specified ongoing payments from the scheme.

Debt and debt repayment continue to be severe problems for millions of people in this country. As the Minister noted, the Money and Pensions Service has estimated that around 9 million people are overburdened with debt. We also now know that real incomes have started to fall again.

The Government’s proposals are a significant step forward in addressing problem debt, and we welcome them. However, we are disappointed with the timetable for the introduction of these measures. Early 2021 seems a very long way off—probably an intolerably long way off if you have unmanageable debt. All the Government’s proposed measures can be introduced by SI. Parliament is not currently overpressed with business. Why can we not use some of that time to bring forward the implementation date?

[Lord Young of Cookham]

I thank both noble Lords for their generous welcome to the announcement, in particular the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson. I remember the forceful case he made during the passage of the Financial Guidance and Claims Bill, drawing on his experience in StepChange, which drew on research showing that schemes such as this stop people getting into a cycle of debt and end up with the creditors getting more than they would, had such a scheme not been available. As the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, said, his amendments to the Bill enable us to make progress. As he said, I was a co-pilot with my noble friend Lord Freud on the Bill—the two intellectuals Freud and Young took that Bill through the House.

I take the point from the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, about 60 days possibly being not long enough. He will know that that is more than the six weeks pledged in our manifesto and more than the six weeks available in Scotland. We believe we have that right. I agree entirely with what he said about the Insolvency Service’s register being private and not public. I take his point, which was also made by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, about trying to speed things up.

I take the point that the 9% top slice that the agencies will get is less than the 13% currently available, but by contrast this is guaranteed in a way the 13% might not be. Also, we believe it will be on a much broader base. Of course we will keep the revenue stream under regular review, but we think we have it about right.

On loans, the FCA has announced a tough new package of measures on high-cost credit. It has the powers to introduce caps, but perhaps I can make more inquiries about that specific point. I have no hesitation in agreeing to a meeting with the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, which I welcome. Perhaps it would make sense to involve the Economic Secretary to the Treasury, who has prime policy responsibility for the subject matter.

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, for his welcome of the scheme. The once-only ability to go into the breathing space does not apply to those with mental health problems. We wanted the first time to have a sustainable, long-term solution to the debt problems and there was an anxiety about the possibility of abuse if people could go on applying. We will look at that. He has a valid point about joint debts. Likewise, often a small trader’s personal finances are inextricably involved with the business. It makes sense to have eligibility for small traders up to the VAT limit.

On universal credit, any overpayments will be stopped immediately, although there is an IT issue that prevents the same process being applied to other payments. Perhaps I could write to the noble Lord, but the objective is to address those IT problems as soon as possible.

Finally, the noble Lord mentioned the timetable. This was raised in the other place. He might have followed the exchanges. The Economic Secretary said that he had had discussions with his officials to try to drive the timetable through as quickly as possible. There are some IT issues about making sure the public sector interface with the Insolvency Service can react to people entering and leaving the breathing space. We want to get it right, but I will certainly tell the Economic Secretary that both noble Lords expressed anxiety about the timetable and asked whether it could possibly be accelerated.

Banks: Cash Withdrawals

Lord Sharkey Excerpts

Tuesday 11th June 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Young of Cookham]

My noble friend is quite right; they are used not just for cash withdrawals but often for deposits or balance queries. I very much hope that banks respond to my noble friend’s suggestion that if they have to close the last branch in a town or village, they ensure that they leave behind a free-to-use ATM that will replace at least some of the facilities that it used to provide.

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, at the end of March there were 924 deprived areas without access to free-to-use ATMs, and this was a 12-month high. On 1 April LINK promised to address the problem by increasing payments to operators. It also said that if that did not fix the problem in two months, it could directly commission free-to-use ATMs in these deprived areas. The two months are up. Have the increased payments worked? Has LINK commissioned any free-to-use machines in these 924 deprived areas?

[Lord Young of Cookham]

The noble Lord is quite correct that LINK is directly commissioning ATMs in areas that do not have one but need one. If he has a particular area in mind that needs an ATM but does not have one, I am sure he will let LINK know. The company has tried to ensure the viability of free-to-use ATMs in deprived areas by increasing the transaction fee that the ATM owner gets to £2.75 per transaction, against the standard fee of 25.9p. LINK’s policy is that where it has to shrink the estate, it does so by removing ATMs that are close to another one—73% are within five minutes’ walk of another one—but maintaining free-to-use ATMs in remote or deprived areas.

Securitisation (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019

Lord Sharkey Excerpts

Monday 25th February 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Young of Cookham (Con)]

My Lords, on behalf of my noble friend Lord Bates, I beg to move that the House approves the Securitisation (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019. As this instrument is grouped, I will also speak to the Transparency of Securities Financing Transactions and of Reuse (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019.

As with the instrument debated earlier, these SIs are part of the programme of legislation under the European Union (Withdrawal) Act that aims to ensure that, if the UK leaves the EU without a deal or an implementation period, there continues to be a functioning legislative and regulatory regime for financial services in the UK. These SIs will fix deficiencies in EU law on securitisation and securities financing transactions to ensure that they can continue to operate effectively after the UK leaves the EU.

The Transparency of Securities Financing Transactions and of Reuse (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 concern securities financing transactions, or SFTs. Broadly speaking, SFTs are transactions where securities such as equities are used to borrow cash or vice versa. A common type of SFT is a repo, or repurchase transaction, in which one party sells an asset to another at one price and commits to repurchase the asset from the other party at a different price on a later date. SFTs were not regulated before 2015 and there were major concerns around their effects on the economy, especially given the experience during the financial crisis where repurchase transactions were associated with increases in leverage, while exacerbating boom and bust cycles in the economy. After the Financial Stability Board identified significant risks associated with these instruments, the EU securities financing transactions regulation introduced a framework under which details of SFTs must be reported to trade repositories. Trade repositories are effectively databases for reporting transactions. Under the regulation, this information must then be disclosed to investors and national regulators are required to act where they identify risky practices by firms.

The Securitisation (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 concern securitisation: the practice of pooling financial assets such as loans into financial instruments called securities, which can then be sold to investors. Securitisation allows banks to transfer some of the risk associated with the assets they hold to investors. This frees up regulatory capital to facilitate further lending. Securitisations can themselves be used to finance business activities and reduce the concentration of financial stability risks. To respond to concerns around the opaqueness and complexity of securitisation programmes, the EU adopted the securitisation regulation, which is based on international standards agreed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. The EU securitisation regulation simplifies and consolidates a patchwork of earlier rules, and introduces the concept of a securitisation that is “simple, transparent and standardised”, also referred to as an STS securitisation, whose use is to be incentivised.

Both regulations are therefore crucial to protecting financial stability while ensuring that the benefits of these instruments to firms and the wider economy remain available. They will be transferred to the UK statute book by operation of the EU withdrawal Act on exit day, but in a no-deal scenario the UK would be outside the EEA and outside the EU’s legal, supervisory and financial regulatory framework, so this legislation would no longer be operative. These SIs make the necessary amendments to ensure that the provisions continue to work properly in a no-deal scenario.

The transparency of securities financing transactions and of reuse regulations amend, first, the treatment of EEA branches of financial services firms in the UK so that after the UK leaves the EU, EEA branches operating in the UK must report their transactions to a UK trade repository. This means that EEA branches will be treated in the same way as other third-country branches operating in the UK, which is consistent with the approach adopted under other financial services SIs laid under the EU withdrawal Act.

Secondly, this SI amends the list of entities that will have access to data on securities financing transactions reported to UK trade repositories. EU bodies are removed, making the list UK-specific, to reflect the UK’s status as a third country outside the EU in a no-deal scenario. This does not, however, preclude UK entities from co-operating with EU entities in future.

Finally, this SI transfers the European Securities and Markets Authority’s responsibilities relating to the requirements for the registration of trade repositories to the FCA, and amends these rules so they continue to work in a domestic context. This is appropriate given the FCA’s current role in supervising and regulating securities financing transactions.

It is worth mentioning that one of the main provisions of the securities financing transactions regulation cannot be domesticated at this stage, due to limitations in the powers under the European Union (Withdrawal) Act. This provision is the requirement on firms to report details of SFTs to trade repositories. Depending on the type of institution concerned, this requirement does not apply until 12 to 21 months after the publication of relevant regulatory technical standards by the EU. However, these have not yet been published and the requirement could therefore not be included in this SI, as it is not, in the wording of that Act,

“operative immediately before exit day”.

The Government have introduced separate legislation, in the form of the Financial Services (Implementation of Legislation) Bill, to enable us to make sure that this requirement applies in a domestic context in due course.

Turning to the draft Securitisation (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, this SI amends, first, the geographical scope of the EU regulation under which, currently, all parties involved in an STS transaction must be located in the EU. The SI amends this to allow UK counterparties to continue to participate in cross-border STS securitisations where some of the parties are located in third countries, expanding the current scope. This approach is appropriate because most securitisations are structured across borders, and it ensures that third countries are treated equally in the event of a no-deal scenario. For the UK securitisation markets to have maximum depth and liquidity while being subject to the same strict requirements introduced by the regulation, it was important not to constrain the UK market by requiring all parties to be located in the UK. None the less, this SI requires at least one of the parties to a securitisation to be located in the UK. The overall effect of this change in scope is to support liquidity in domestic securitisation markets, while ensuring that UK supervisors retain effective oversight of the securitisation as a whole.

Secondly, this SI introduces a transitional regime for the recognition of EU STS securitisations in the UK during a two-year period after the UK leaves the EU. This ensures that UK investors can continue to participate in the EU market for STS securitisations for that limited period. Any STS recognised by the EU during this two-year period will continue to be recognised in the UK until its maturity. This ensures that UK firms will continue to have access to a major market for STS securitisations.

The draft SI also clarifies the definition of “sponsor” in the securitisation regulation to ensure that where a sponsor wishes to delegate day-to-day portfolio management to a third party, that third party can be located anywhere in the world—not just in the EU. The regulation currently limits the location of the delegated firm to the EU. The EU Commission has acknowledged that this is an unintended consequence and is currently seeking to resolve the issue itself.

Finally, this SI transfers several functions currently carried out by the European supervisory authorities to the Financial Conduct Authority and the Prudential Regulation Authority. Most importantly, the SI transfers responsibilities relating to the authorisation and supervision of trade repositories and the publication of STS notifications to the Financial Conduct Authority. This is appropriate given the FCA’s considerable experience in supervising securitisations. The Treasury has been working closely with the Prudential Regulation Authority and the Financial Conduct Authority in drafting these instruments. It has also engaged the financial services industry on these SIs, and will continue to do so going forward. On 19 December the Treasury published both instruments in draft, along with explanatory policy notes to maximise transparency to Parliament and industry; prior to publication, it also shared drafts with industry for technical analysis. The Treasury has incorporated this feedback into the final draft of the SIs.

In summary, the Government believe that the proposed legislation is necessary to ensure that the UK has workable regimes regulating securitisations and securities financing transactions, and that the legislation will continue to function appropriately if the UK leaves the EU without a deal or an implementation period. I hope that noble Lords will join me in supporting the regulations. I beg to move.

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, I have only one brief question, which is to do with the transparency SI. I accept that we should approve both the SIs before us, but I regret that there has been no consultation on either instrument. As I remarked earlier, the engagement noted in both EMs is not a satisfactory substitute. However, I was happy to hear the Minister’s response to my suggestion of a more informative account of engagement becoming part of future EMs.

Reading the EM and the impact assessment for the transparency SI highlights one issue: the usual question of reciprocity. The EM for the transparency SI makes it clear that the Treasury can decide which third-country entities can access data on SFTs held in UK trade repositories. I assume that this provision means that all EEA entities currently with access will be allowed continued access. But what about the other way round? As things stand, if we crash out of the EU with no deal, will the UK still have access to data held in the three EEA trade repositories? If not, would it have significant implications for our financial services industry? Have the Government made any estimate of what the consequences of non-reciprocity might be? What assurance have the Government had from the EU, if any, that the UK would be allowed continued access after 29 March?

[Lord Deben (Con)]

My Lords, in the absence of the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, I want to declare my interest as chairman of PIMFA, the organisation representing wealth managers and independent financial advisers, and to say to my noble friend that these are two very important SIs which we have to have—there is no doubt about that. This is a branch of our financial industry which was not, as my noble friend said, properly cared for. It did not have the transparency which it needed and it now does. Very sensibly, that was done over the whole European Union, because that is the area over which much of this—not all of it—is served.

It is crucial that we get reciprocity; it would be a serious blow to the industry if we did not. My noble friend reminded us with such elegance that this measure is here only should we crash out of the European Union. Every day, we recognise what a nonsense that would be and how unaware of the facts those who seem to want it really are, but we should not miss the opportunity of reminding the House of this fact.

My noble friend mentioned that all these powers will go largely to the Financial Conduct Authority but that some will go to the Prudential Regulation Authority. Yet again, we have a series of jobs being given to people without any price on them. I am sure that my noble friend will say what he has said on other occasions, which is that the authorities concerned are perfectly aware that they are able to cover this within their current budgets. I am beginning to wonder whether their budgets are not too generous, because they appear to be able to cover so many things without any extra costs. I merely say to my noble friend that it is becoming difficult for the House to recognise how this can be. If those authorities manage to get by for a relatively short period, I have no doubt that they will then ask the industry to pay the cost thereafter.

Again, it is perfectly reasonable to say that the industry is paying the cost towards the European Union at the moment and it will be in much the same place if we bring this to a British system. I have two things to say about that. First, I would rather like to know what that place is, because we do not seem to be told. Secondly, the industry is not in the same place. At present, it is paying towards a system which gives it access to the whole of the European Union. We are now suggesting that it should pay for one which will only give it access to itself. It would have been valuable to see what the difference in cost was there.

Uncertificated Securities (Amendment and EU Exit) Regulations 2019

Lord Sharkey Excerpts

Monday 25th February 2019 Lords Chamber

In summary, the Government believe that the proposed legislation is necessary to ensure the smooth functioning of financial markets in the UK if the UK leaves the EU without a deal or an implementation period. In the case of the USR SI, relevant parts are needed in any scenario to ensure the effective functioning of the CSDR. I hope that noble Lords will join me in supporting these regulations, and I beg to move.

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, I accept that the two regulations in this group are closely linked and I have only one question and one comment. The question relates to the waivers that the Treasury may issue under the terms of the investment exchanges, CCPs and CSDs SI. Paragraph 117 of the impact assessment to this SI explains that, if the Treasury makes an equivalence decision on a third country jurisdiction and the Bank has recognised a third country CSD, this will mean that the third country CSD will be subject to Part 18 of FSMA. As the Minister has said, this will give the Bank the power to make rules requiring information about events specified in those rules and to require the third country CSD to give written notice to a regulator of a change to its own rules or guidance.

The Bank could also require a third-country CSD to give reports on the CSD services it provides in the UK and related statistical information. As the Minister said, the Bank may also inspect any branch of a third country CSD in the UK. There is also the rather threatening addition, “enforceable by injunction”. All of this seems eminently sensible. However, the impact assessment includes a provision which qualifies the use of these powers. It means that, for instance,

“the Bank may waive the above rules in respect of a third country CSD where it is satisfied that compliance with those rules would be unduly burdensome and the waiver would not result in undue risk”.

I take it that this waiver power is intended primarily to help the continued co-operation of CSDs within the EEA. My question is whether, if the Bank does make such waivers, they be will in the public domain and whether the Bank will explain the reasons for supposing the rules to be unduly burdensome and for supposing that exercising the waiver will not result in undue risk—whatever “undue” may mean in this context.

My comment has to do with paragraph 10 of the EM to this instrument. The paragraph explains in some detail, and with the appropriate references, the outcome of the consultation on the implementation of the CSDR. This was extremely helpful, and it illustrates a key difference between consultation and engagement. Noble Lords will know that many of the Brexit SIs laid by the Treasury have not been consulted on. The Explanatory Memorandums say when this is the case, and frequently follow this by noting that there has instead been extensive engagement with stakeholders. But in no case that I can recall have the EMs given any detail about the questions that arose in these engagements, the no doubt various views expressed by stakeholders or any modifications that may have been made to the draft as a result of these engagements. By contrast, as the current EM demonstrates, consultation gives a clearer, well-defined, comprehensive outcome and even demonstrates how government thinking has been changed. In this case, the three respondents were obviously very persuasive.

Engagement with no detail is a very unsatisfactory substitute for consultation. I realise that it is now too late to conduct consultations on the no-deal Brexit SIs that are before us and on those that will come before us. I think that we have only one more Treasury SI to consider—or at least very few. I ask the Government in general to be much more informative about engagement. I ask them to consider providing in the Explanatory Memorandums at least a list of stakeholders engaged with and a summary of what issues were raised by the Government and the stakeholders, what opinions were expressed and what changes were made as a result of these engagements.

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I declare my interest, as in the register, as a director of London Stock Exchange plc. I am glad that we are debating these two instruments together, because they seem to go together and to form a continuum. Indeed, in some ways it is rather strange. The first says that it would not be appropriate to give the Bank of England powers pre Brexit, but then in the second the powers are being given to the Bank of England. That arises largely because the uncertified securities regulations are largely about transposing EU legislation under the European Communities Act.

I too was interested in the consultation done in 2015 and noted that there seemed to be variably one, two or three comments on various sections. That certainly determined me to step up my rate of response to consultations. The report says that changes have been made, but it leaves you having to compare the before and after. All that was getting a bit too much on a sunny Sunday, as the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, said. What struck me particularly was the explanation on page 6 of the Explanatory Memorandum to the uncertified securities regulations, which said that,

“the Treasury is taking a proportionate approach to implementing Article 49(1)”.

Given that they are regulations, and you cannot change what is in the regulation done by the EU, I am curious as to what this more proportionate approach entails. Does it imply that the first draft had been gold-plated in some way? What was in and has been taken out? I did not find a great deal of guidance in the documents.

My next comment is a very general one. In both of these statutory instruments, and in particular in the second one dealing with exchanges and so forth, there is a large number of changes to the Financial Services and Markets Act. As we have discussed at some length before, that is not up to date on legislation.gov.uk— although, of course, it does give you a list of the things you might want to go and explore, to see if you can work out what an up-to-date version might be, or you may be thrust into the hands of one of the commercial organisations that will do that for you. However, by the time we have ploughed through all 60 statutory instruments that we are told we have to deal with, and then whatever other number we may get regarding corrections and re-workings—some of which are coming along now—FSMA will be even more incomprehensible on the legislation website, and so too will be any sensible comparison of how EU legislation has been retained with regard to the EU originals.

That might be relevant. If we are ever trying to argue for equivalence, the first thing we will be asked to do is to show it. Page 3 of the Explanatory Memorandum for the investment exchanges SI names six other SIs involved in the onshoring of the Securities Financing Transactions Regulation—so one regulation goes to seven SIs, each of which further redistributes powers and requirements over a range of other instruments. As I have said, we are also getting into second-order corrections and additions, with further SIs winging their way through the system.

It is not my idea of a lawful democracy for laws to be so obscure and inaccessible. It is actually quite a mockery to make a fuss about the accessibility and clarity of wording in individual documents while it remains impossible to find out their cumulative effect. I have long been shocked at this unwholesome situation, but Brexit is making it far worse. What is the Treasury going to do about it? Clearly, check tables have to be used in the Treasury. I am coming to the view that we are reaching a stage at which Parliament should refuse to amend law that is not available in an up-to-date format. At the very least, could the Treasury share the various schedules that point out what has been put where, so that those of us who are expected to scrutinise this do not have to spend an awful lot of time getting frustrated as we try to work out the true current state of the law? If we cannot do it, and we are responsible for it, how is the ordinary citizen supposed to know what is the law, when ignorance is no defence?