(6 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I associate myself with the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and the noble Baroness, Lady Lister. I am unclear whether the Government accept, as I think they must, that the reason why they wish to disapply Section 3 of the Human Rights Act is because they recognise that, without such disapplication, the substantive provisions of this Bill would plainly contradict Britain’s obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights.
My Lords, Section 3 of the Human Rights Act requires courts to interpret legislation compatibly with rights under the European Convention on Human Rights as far as is possible. Clauses 49 to 52 would disapply Section 3 to prisoners as a group when it comes to legislation about their release. It is disappointing to see this Government wasting parliamentary time and public money to remove human rights from prisoners.
There is no evidence of the Human Rights Act 1998 limiting the Parole Board from making decisions about prisoners. These clauses appear to be trying to solve a problem that does not exist, while the Government ignore the many critical problems across our criminal justice system. We in the Labour Party are proud that it was a Labour Government who brought about the Human Rights Act in 1998, and a future Labour Government will continue to be a bastion of justice and hope, unlike this current Government, who cannot bring themselves to focus on the real issues affecting the public.
The noble Lord, Lord Marks, and my noble friend Lady Lister spoke about the lack of support from the Labour Party if he were to press this matter to a vote. He said—I wrote it down—that he thought this was “a sad portent for the future”. That is a harsh interpretation of our stance. I have just reiterated our commitment to the Human Rights Act. We would not have chosen to support him if he had pressed the matter, but the statement I have read out reaffirms the Labour Party’s commitment to the Human Rights Act. Having said that, I think the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has put his finger on the central question. If the Government see no diminution of the Human Rights Act, why are they disapplying Section 3 within this Bill? Do they believe that it would breach the Human Rights Act if they failed to disapply the Act in this case?
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, for his amendments, which seek to remove Clauses 49 to 52. I am extremely sorry to disappoint the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, and others, but the Government laid out their position in Committee and nothing the Government have heard since or this evening alters that position.
As I think I have said previously, Section 3 of the Human Rights Act is a procedural, not a substantive, provision. Clauses 49 to 51 effectively disapply Section 3 in relation to prisoner release legislation. Let me start by reiterating that nothing in these clauses removes or limits any convention rights enjoyed by prisoners. If I was asked, as I think I was, to confirm that the full range of substantive rights under the ECHR remain: yes, of course they do. Nothing in these clauses removes or limits any convention rights enjoyed by prisoners. A breach of human rights may still be pleaded before any domestic court or in Strasbourg in the usual way, and we would not want to prevent such action by prisoners where it is warranted.
I respectfully respond to the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, by saying that this provision does not represent either an invitation or still less an instruction to the courts to disapply the Human Rights Act; nor does it imply, as suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and perhaps by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, that the Government believe there is any breach of the European convention in relation to this legislation. That is not the case. The Government do not accept that there is any breach whatever in this legislation. It is the Government’s position that a matter as important as the public protection test should be for Parliament and that it should not be open to the so-called writing-in or reading-down provisions of Section 3, which is an interpretive position which means that the courts may be required to go further than usual in interpreting legislation that would otherwise be compatible with convention rights. Although this has happened less often in recent years, it can require courts to stray from Parliament’s original intention, and the Government do not think that that is appropriate in this context. The real issue is the balance between the courts and Parliament from a procedural point of view.
I am puzzled by this because it is an unusual thing in legislation to say that Section 3 is disapplied. Is it not the inevitable inference from the inclusion of that provision disapplying Section 3 in this legislation that the Government are seriously concerned, at the very least, that the substantive provisions would breach the substantive provisions of the Human Rights Act?
My Lords, that is not by any means the Government’s position; nor can that inference be drawn. The Government’s position on this clause is, as I understand it, in effect, that which the noble Lord himself is reported as expressing to the independent review on human rights because Section 3 requires the judge to perform a remedial function which legislation does not on its proper construction conform to convention rights. Such a role is inappropriate under our constitution and unnecessary because Section 4 provides an effective means by which Ministers and Parliament can amend the legislation. That is the Government’s position on this provision.
So, totally hypothetically, if anything in the legislation from which Section 3 has been disapplied was found to be incompatible, it would be for the court to make a declaration of incompatibility under Section 4. It would then be up to Parliament to decide how to rectify it, rather than the intermediate rewriting process of the courts. It does not remove or limit convention rights. It is simply saying that in this case that is the right balance between Parliament and the courts. That is the Government’s position on that.
This group of amendments also seeks to remove Clause 52, which sets out that, when considering a challenge, the court must give the greatest possible weight to the importance of reducing risk to the public from the offender. Of course, the courts already consider risk to the public. This clause does not mean that public protection will be the exclusive or only factor to be considered. The matter will be up to the judges, who are very capable of doing their independent part in construing the legislation. What the clause does is to ensure that due weight is given to the important consideration of public protection.
So, on behalf of the Government, I beg to move that Clauses 49 to 52 stand part of the Bill.
My Lords, I need some guidance. Today’s list indicates that in this group are contained the government amendments to Clauses 55 and 56, which are the amendments relating to marriage and civil partnership. Today’s list also indicates, in the next group, that we have already debated my opposition and that of other noble Lords to Clauses 55 and 56. I am very happy to delay my comments on Clauses 55 and 56 until the Minister deals with them, but I thought I should just mention where we are.
If I may help advance this, our understanding is that the Clauses 55 and 56 stand-part debates are the subject of group 6. I do not know whether that is the Minister’s understanding.
My Lords, that is my understanding. I am in a slight panic at the moment—the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, having raised this matter—and I hope I have not proceeded in the wrong order. I think this is group 6, according to my instructions.
I am simply referring to today’s list, which is what I am working from. If the Minister looks at today’s list, he will see that this group includes, for example, government Amendment 156ZB, which is an amendment to Clause 55, and government Amendments 156ZC, 156ZD, 156ZE and 156ZF. I do not mind at all whether my amendments are in another group, but I do not want to be told later that I have missed my opportunity.
My Lords, I associate myself with those remarks. I stayed late, expecting to debate the question of the marriage of long-term prisoners, and was a bit concerned to see that the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, appeared to be described as “already debated”, which I do not think it can possibly have been.
My Lords, I will try to help once again, because I have in front of me a copy of the groupings that were sent out. The noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Meston, are absolutely right that some of the consequential government amendments have been put into group 5, but group 6 certainly includes—as we were told by the Government Whips’ Office—Amendment 165ZDA and Amendment 156ZI, which is the prisoner marriage substantive stand-part amendment. If we could proceed, that would be most convenient.
I am very happy to proceed on the basis that group 6 will deal with these matters.
I have to say that I decided to ignore those and will discuss them in the next group, because they were in the wrong place.
We are now on what was group 6. In any event, the Government are bringing forward Amendments 156ZB to 156ZD and 156ZE to 156ZH. These are technical amendments and do not change the policy, which remains as set out on previous stages of the Bill. The amendments make minor revisions to the drafting of Clauses 55 and 56. Importantly, they ensure that registrars have all the information they need at the point they consider an application to marry or to enter into a civil partnership. The information needed is whether an applicant or their intended spouse or civil partner is a whole-life prisoner and, if so, whether they have been granted an exemption from the Secretary of State. They also make some minor changes to clarify the procedure and to update related legislation in line with the reforms. For the reasons that I have just given, I ask that Clauses 55 and 56 stand part of the Bill and invite noble Lords to support these government amendments.
My Lords, I have tabled my opposition to Clauses 55 and 56, which noble Lords know will prohibit a prisoner serving a whole-life tariff from entering into a marriage or a civil partnership with another person without the written permission of the Secretary of State, with that permission to be granted only if the Secretary of State is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances. I am very pleased to be joined in my opposition to these clauses by the noble Lords, Lord Bach and Lord German—the latter of whom unfortunately cannot be in his place tonight—both of whom spoke very powerfully on this topic in Committee.
I am also very pleased to be joined by the noble Lord, Lord Carter of Haslemere, whom I first met when he was a legal adviser at the Home Office from 1989 to 2006. We used to travel together to Strasbourg to defend the United Kingdom against allegations that it had breached the European Convention on Human Rights. Our record in court was mediocre at best, but the lunches were excellent, and I have great admiration for his expertise and judgment. I very much look forward to what he has to say on this subject.
Why have we brought this matter back on Report? It is not because I have any expectation of changing the Government’s mind, and it is not because I intend to divide the House, particularly at this late hour. My motive is simply to ensure that we record why this is an objectionable measure which has no conceivable justification. There are three reasons why I express such a critical view of these clauses. First, the Government’s reason for conferring this power on the Secretary of State and imposing this disability is so weak. In Committee, the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Roborough, suggested that these measures will
“drive up public confidence in the justice system”.—[Official Report, 25/3/24; col. 491.]
I can think of many reasons why confidence in the criminal justice system has been undermined: the unacceptable delays in hearing trials in which defendants are accused of serious offences; the fact that so many courtrooms cannot be used because of their poor state of repair; the low rates of pay for prosecutors; and the low rates of legal aid renumeration for criminal barristers and solicitors, which has substantially reduced the number of lawyers available in criminal cases. What I have never heard anyone say is, “My confidence in the criminal justice system has been undermined because whole life prisoners are able to marry”. It is preposterous.
My second reason for objecting to these provisions is that they are wrong in principle. We all know, and the Minister emphasised in Committee, that whole life orders are reserved for those who have committed the most serious crimes—awful crimes of serial or child murders involving premeditation or sexual or sadistic violence. However, this does not mean that we deny such prisoners basic rights. However repellent their crimes, whole life prisoners are allowed to eat more than a crust of bread; they are allowed to exercise; they are allowed to read books, to watch television and to send and receive letters. The right to marry another consenting adult is also a basic right. National law may limit the exercise of that right—you cannot marry your brother, a 12 year-old or your dog—but what the state cannot do, consistent with human rights, is impose restrictions so extreme that they impair the very essence of the right to marry. That is the test repeatedly stated in the consistent case law of the European Court of Human Rights.
The Minister in Committee suggested that the Government consider that Article 12 of the European convention allows for a restriction on the right to marry to be in the public interest. However, that does not assist the Government because there is a judgment of the Strasbourg court in a case concerned with prisoners. It is Frasik v Poland in 2010. The court recognised at paragraph 91:
“Imprisonment deprives a person of his liberty and… some civil rights and privileges. This does not, however, mean that persons in detention cannot, or can only very exceptionally, exercise their right to marry”.
The court added, at paragraph 93, that the state cannot prevent a prisoner exercising the right to marry because of the view of the authorities as to what
“might be acceptable to or what might offend public opinion”.
That is precisely the basis on which this Government purport to justify Clauses 55 and 56 of the Bill—public opinion, public confidence. I ask the Minister, how can the Government maintain the statement, made by the Secretary of State for Justice on the front of the Bill, that Clauses 55 and 56, like the rest of the Bill, are compatible with Convention rights?
My Lords, it is a real privilege to support my noble friend Lord Pannick in this debate on whether these clauses should stand part of the Bill. As he has said, back in the 1990s, in another life, he and I used to travel to Strasbourg together to fight prisoners’ cases on prisons law. It is no exaggeration at all to say that I acquired most of my public law knowledge from working with and learning from my noble friend on these and other issues.
Prisons issues back in the 1990s were at the very cutting edge of the development of human rights law. Here we are again, about 30 years later, discussing basic human rights for prisoners such as the right to marry and to form a civil partnership. But it is about much more than that. It is about how as a society we treat those we lock up. Someone said, it may have been Gandhi, that the way we treat those we imprison is a measure of how civilised we are—
It was Winston Churchill; I am corrected—both great names.
If we have progressed at all from the way prisoners were treated in the past, we should be enabling whole-life prisoners to find some meaning and purpose in a life that is certain to end in prison. This includes providing opportunities for them to have some social interaction and build relationships, even though they can never expect to be released—in fact, especially because they can never expect to be released. This reflects the long-standing legal position. It is trite law now that prisoners enjoy basic human rights, such as respect for their private and family life, their religion, freedom of expression and access to a lawyer etc. Under Article 12, prisoners have the right to marry and form a civil partnership.
My noble friend Lord Pannick has already referred to the case of Frasik. I will quote again that passage from the court’s judgement, because it is so powerful. Imprisonment, the court said, does not mean that those detained
“cannot, or can only very exceptionally, exercise their right to marry”.
Yet is that not exactly what Clauses 55 and 56 say? The ECHR memorandum conveniently sidesteps that by saying that marriage by whole-lifers
“undermines public confidence in the Criminal Justice System”.
We have just heard from my noble friend Lord Pannick on that one; it is, in effect, code for “offends public opinion”. But the Frasik judgment, as my noble friend said, says that the Bill cannot do that—it cannot automatically prevent prisoners forming marital relationships.
It is not all about the law either. Compelling legal points, such as those we have mentioned, often arise from a rotten policy, which is what we have here. The Government’s justification seems to be the case of Levi Bellfield. Awful as that is as an example of the right to marry being abused, it is one case of about 70 whole-lifers in the system. They have all committed terrible crimes, but their whole-life tariffs are the punishment for that. Even Ministers have recognised that we send people to prison as punishment, not for punishment. Automatically denying prisoners, even whole-life prisoners, the right to marry or enter a civil partnership amounts to nothing more than the state imposing additional, entirely gratuitous punishment on this cohort of prisoners for no reason other than to show the public that it is tough on crime.
The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, expressing his personal views at Second Reading, put it well when he described it as a “petty measure”. The noble Lord, Lord German, who unfortunately cannot be with us tonight, rightly called it cruel. It also punishes prisoners’ partners, who are entirely innocent in all this. It punishes them emotionally, of course, but it may also affect their entitlement to, for example, a widow’s pension on the death of a whole-life prisoner or a spouse’s exemption from inheritance tax. Has any consideration been given to the effects of this policy on partners? I would be most grateful to know the answer to that.
There is a simple solution to the Government’s wholly justified concern about the Levi Bellfield case, which would deal with all the legal and policy objections that have been mentioned. The existing law entitles a prison governor to refuse an application to marry or form a civil partnership only if it would create a security risk to the prison. Why not ditch Clauses 55 and 56 and legislate to widen the basis for refusing such applications to include cases where there are reasonable grounds for believing that the application is not made in good faith but from some improper motive? This could easily be made legally watertight to minimise the possibility of unfounded legal challenges.
In conclusion, and at this late hour, in the dying breaths of the Bill, I urge the Minister to ignore the word “reject”, which is in his briefing notes in capital letters, underlined, in bold type. Why not surprise everybody, not least his officials, by agreeing now to remove Clauses 55 and 56 and adopt the more proportionate, but no less effective, solution that I have just proposed?
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for tabling his amendments, and of course I thank the noble Lords, Lord Carter, Lord Meston, Lord Bach and others for their eloquence. I can well understand the feelings expressed. I of course recognise that the noble Lord, Lord Carter, together with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has spent many hours in Strasbourg defending the United Kingdom, and in that context, although the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, was modest enough—probably inaccurately—to say that his results had been mediocre, in fact the United Kingdom has, if not the best, at least one of the best records in Strasbourg of respecting human rights.
The question of the compatibility of this particular provision with Article 12 of the ECHR has been very carefully considered—otherwise the Secretary of State would never have given the certificate in the first place.
The Government’s arguments were set out in Committee and I am not sure it is particularly useful at this late hour—especially as it is 10.01 pm—to repeat them. In the Government’s view, the measures are proportionate and apply to a very small cohort of the most serious offenders who have committed the most serious crimes. As of last December, there were 67 whole-life prisoners in England. Because they will never be released, their ability to enjoy anything resembling normal married life is already lawfully and legitimately restricted in a very significant way.
In the Government’s view, the measures are justified on the basis of public interest, as already set out in Committee. The public’s confidence in, and respect for, the justice system is a matter for which any elected Government must have regard—and that of course includes the feelings of victims. The one cause célèbre that has been mentioned did have an important impact in that regard.
I would add only that the measures do not prevent whole-life prisoners benefiting from supportive relationships while in custody, in the same way as other prisoners. We are simply talking about being married or in a civil partnership, and not being able to do that does not have any practical impact on an individual’s ability to maintain a relationship with a prisoner, and does not provide any additional rights or detriments in terms of visits or communications.
I am very sorry to disappoint the noble Lord, Lord Carter, in particular. I do not have any authority to simply drop these clauses, nor am I able to indicate in any way what my personal views may or may not be. I hope I have provided at least some reassurance and I respectfully suggest that the noble Lord withdraws his amendment.
I thank the Minister. I also ask him to give a very modest undertaking this evening that, before Third Reading, he will ask the Secretary of State to consider the proposal from the noble Lord, Lord Carter, as a way of solving the perceived problem, without including in the Bill a clause that so many of us regard as objectionable. I ask him to kindly give that undertaking—with of course no commitment whatever.
I can and will and do give that undertaking.
Amendment 156ZB agreed.
Amendments 156ZC and 156ZD
(8 months, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it is a pleasure to support all three of these amendments. They were tabled by the penultimate Lord Chief Justice, and are supported by the most recent Lord Chief Justice and a distinguished recent Solicitor-General, who spoke just now. I am afraid I can only claim to have been shadow Attorney-General in what was, to use a cliché, a bad year, for a shortish time to make up the numbers. I cannot add to the arguments that have been so persuasively put.
It is wonderful to see the noble Earl the Minister in his place; I did not expect him to take this particular group. I invite him to talk to his noble friend from the Ministry of Justice, who I suspect—I hope the noble Earl does as well—privately has a lot of sympathy for these amendments, because they are commonsensical. I ask the noble Earl to ask the noble and learned Lord, Lord Bellamy, to speak to the Justice Secretary patiently and persuasively about these matters.
I start from the position that the Executive should interfere in individual sentencing as little as possible—preferably not at all. Under our constitutional arrangements, it is not the Executive’s responsibility, nor part of their functions. That is why the independence of the Parole Board is so important, as the noble and learned Lord just said. It is hard not to believe, I am afraid, that these proposals would actually have the effect of reducing that independence.
I have down on the amendment paper that I will oppose Clauses 53 and 54 standing part of the Bill. I will not press that at all tonight, but in this short speech I will talk about why I gave that notice; it may save a bit of time later on. It is really because I have two questions for the noble Earl. I asked the noble and learned Lord, Lord Bellamy, at Second Reading, but quite understandably he was so overwhelmed with the matters that he had to reply to in the minutes that he was allowed that he was unable to answer them at the time. I absolutely appreciate that.
The first question is to ask why, under the Bill, the Justice Secretary will send some cases where he has found the Parole Board has got it wrong to whichever body it is that he eventually sends them to, but not others. It was argued in this House in Committee, I think last week or the week before, that that should be not the Upper Tribunal but another body altogether. If he sends some cases where he thinks the Parole Board has got it wrong but not others, that will not make any sense at all. Surely he must send all of the case that he finds to be wrong to this judicial body or none of them. If he sends some then surely the position is not satisfactory. There may one day be a Lord Chancellor—certainly not the current one—who is less generous and would not send any that he felt was wrong to a court. If that position may develop, why on earth is this part of the Bill being proposed?
My second question is this, and the Committee deserves an answer to it: will the Justice Secretary himself make these decisions, or will they be passed down to junior Ministers or to senior civil servants? I have no objection at all to senior civil servants taking important decisions but it is not appropriate that they—or, in fact, junior Ministers in the department—should take these decisions. What is the answer: will they or will they not? If they will, the problems associated with the Executive interfering in sentencing become much more acute. Does the Minister agree? I would be grateful for an answer to both those questions.
My Lords, I agree with all three of the amendments in this group, and I do so for the reasons that have been powerfully explained by the other speakers. It seems that the issue here is very simple indeed. These clauses are designed to reduce the independence and authority of the Parole Board. New sub-paragraph (2C), in Clause 54(5), refers to the necessity of maintaining public confidence in the Parole Board. In my view, public confidence in the criminal justice system depends vitally on the independence and the authority of the Parole Board. I much regret that the Government should apparently think otherwise.
My Lords, I too support the amendments in this group, in particular the points made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas. As a former chairman of the Parole Board, albeit some years ago, I will underline a couple of practical issues, because I think this is a point of principle about its independence. The job of the chairman of the Parole Board is a very sensitive one, and they need protection, not a kind of sword hanging over their head that they can be dismissed. That is one point.
The second point is that it will be disastrous and have a very detrimental impact on the work of the Parole Board if its chair is not allowed to be involved in cases. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, said, involvement means you begin to understand how it is done because the core work of the Parole Board is risk assessment. I know how engaged I was in dealing with the cases, talking to prisoners and getting involved. To me, that was very important when it came to risk assessment. The practical impact of these provisions will be negative, apart from looking at the independence of the Parole Board.
(1 year, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, in March, the High Court held that the previous Secretary of State, Dominic Raab, had acted unlawfully by instructing probation officers not to give the Parole Board their view of the risks of release of particular prisoners if that conflicted with his views. Can the Minister assure me that the new Secretary of State for Justice, Alex Chalk, who I warmly welcome to his post, has a better understanding of the importance of the independence of the Parole Board and its processes?
The Secretary of State will of course abide by the recent decision of the High Court and will entirely respect the constitutional position of the Parole Board. I should add that what we are talking about today in relation to the 76 decisions is 32 prisoners serving a mandatory life sentence for murder, 11 serving a discretionary life sentence for rape and various other sexual offences, eight on an IPP sentence for serious sexual offences and another 25 for serious offences, all involving violence against the person.
(1 year, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the latest research was done by Professor Cheryl Thomas in 2020: 81% of those who had served on a jury said that they would be “happy to serve again”; 78% found it “interesting”. At the same time, it is quite true that 42% found the experience “stressful”. It is an issue, and the department is exploring options. What shape those options will take—whether there should be some sort of counselling service, whether it should be authorised by a judge and who would provide it—are all questions currently under consideration.
Does the Minister agree that everything depends on the nature of the trial? If you are asking jurors to hear a case involving graphic evidence of sex abuse, it really is not good enough to say that, if they are troubled, they can go to their GP. The same is surely true of the judges who have to hear such cases on a regular basis, it is true of the court staff and it is also true of the counsel and solicitors who specialise in this area. Really, something needs to be done about this.
My Lords, as I say, the Government are exploring options. Sometimes a judge will warn jurors in advance that it is distressing and ask whether any of them wish to be discharged. There is a post-trial leaflet and an interesting video, which I watched yesterday, for jurors after the trial, which suggests what they should do if they feel stressed. Some courts of their own volition make references to local charities, and we are providing further guidance to courts on what to do in those circumstances.
(1 year, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberPerhaps I could press the Minister on this. He said that there will be a policy statement before Report. The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, was asking whether we can see the draft regulations. I entirely understand the Minister’s point that the final version of the regulations will need to await the passage of the statutory scheme, but why can the department not produce draft regulations which will inform discussion on Report?
At the moment I fear I cannot commit to providing draft regulations. It may be that there are some, but it may be that to draft regulations prior to Report would be too time-consuming.
My Lords, I have added my name to many of the amendments in these groups. I declare an interest as a practising barrister in public law cases, occasionally in cases concerning natural security.
I entirely agree with the powerful speech that the Committee just heard from the noble Lord, Lord Marks. The award of damages for civil wrongdoing is one of the primary means by which the court remedies the wrongdoing and deters future wrongdoing. That the award of damages is central to our system of justice is confirmed by Clause 83(6), which recognises that the court may not decide to reduce damages to a claimant under the Human Rights Act. By seeking to allow a reduction in damages for non-human rights cases, these clauses would introduce a lesser standard of justice.
I am very unclear why what is unacceptable for a human rights case should be thought acceptable for other civil litigation. That is especially so when the concerns which the Government have about paying damages when they are found to be liable are most likely to arise in cases which do concern human rights violations: cases where the allegation is made—and for the purpose of this clause we must assume is proved to the satisfaction of the court—that the state has been complicit in acts of torture or murder, perhaps by undercover officers. Such grave acts can be and are pleaded as human rights violations.
I appreciate that the Government are keen to remove legal liability, including human rights liability, for claims based, for example, on UK military action abroad, but if liability were to be excluded for such alleged conduct, there would be no need for provisions on damages. Why deal with this by reference to the remedy rather than to liability?
These clauses are not even concerned with a case where the terrorist’s wrongdoing had a causal connection with the Crown’s conduct, which forms the basis of the Crown’s liability for its wrongdoing. Clause 83(4)(a) makes it clear that there is no need for such a causal connection. In any event, as the noble Lord, Lord Marks, correctly explained to the Committee, existing legal principles would apply in such circumstances. Therefore, I need to be persuaded by the Minister that there is any principled basis for these clauses.
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and my noble friend have comprehensively outlined why both these clauses are unnecessary in law but also go far beyond what is necessary and will be damaging in practice. I need not add very much other than to say that I have put my name to the amendments that my noble and learned friend Lord Wallace of Tankerness, who was unable to be with us today, has put down with regard to Clauses 82 to 86 stand part and, as my noble friend indicated, the other amendments that would seek to reduce the impact.
The clauses undermine considerably mechanisms for holding government to account, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said, through civil claims. In addition to seeking a remedy, such claims have been positive in changing policy and practice. Therefore, the impact of the clauses, as Reprieve together with the other bodies referred to by my noble friend have indicated, could be to allow Ministers and officials to avoid paying damages to survivors of torture and other abuses overseas.
The question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, highlights the tension I referred to a moment ago. It is very difficult to say on the one hand, as is being said, that the courts have this power already and that they are perfectly capable of exercising it, whether under the 1945 Act or ex turpi causa, et cetera, and on the other hand to say that it puts them in a difficult position and that they will be criticised if they do not exercise it. I think I can say this: the overall intention of this legislation is not to alter or downgrade a principle of law that is already inherent in the common law and in our various jurisdictions; the purpose is to spell out that principle in this legislation so that no one has any doubt that it applies in terrorist cases. That is the main purpose of this clause. We are, to an extent, simply reflecting where we are, but clarifying where we are.
Can I press the Minister a bit further on this pivotal point? I respectfully suggest to him that he is asserting two conflicting principles. If I understand him correctly, he is saying, first, that the purpose of these provisions is to convey a message but, secondly, that we do not need to worry about it because it is all a matter of judicial discretion. But the judges will have to decide these cases. How are they to decide? How are they to apply their discretion? What message are they expected to convey? While I am on my feet, I remind the Minister that it was, I think, Samuel Goldwyn who said that if he wanted to convey a message, he used Western Union. That is perhaps a relevant principle for Ministers to bear in mind in relation to legislation.
The causal connection point is to do with whether there are national security factors in the first place. As to general question of what the court is to do, and whether we should have further guidance or precision in statute, that is perhaps a matter that we will need to come back to on Report to see whether we can get any further clarity.
May I test the Minister’s patience by asking him to reflect on one other matter? He said, rightly, that in assessing damages in human rights cases the court is entitled to have regard to the conduct of the claimant, yet this clause does not feel it necessary to provide any message or guidance to judges in human rights cases. I ask him to reflect on why the Government nevertheless think it necessary to send a message to provide guidance in non-human-rights cases.
I certainly undertake to reflect on what further guidance can be given on how the courts should go about this exercise.
I have taken up too much of your Lordships’ time and am conscious that I have not perhaps dealt with everything I should have. As I think I have said, the overall intention is not in any way to undermine mechanisms for holding the Government to account, or to allow Ministers and officials to evade scrutiny. I fully agree with the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, that we absolutely have to tread carefully. I hope that this package is a balanced one, and I invite noble Lords not to press their amendments.
I have added my name to the proposal from the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, that Clause 87 should not stand part of the Bill. I am very grateful to her for so clearly setting out objections to the clause. I declare my interest as a practising barrister acting in public law cases, including representing clients on legal aid.
Noble Lords will know that civil legal aid has been much reduced in scope over many years by successive Governments of different complexions, and many of us regret that that is the case. But where civil legal aid is still available, it helps to ensure the protection of the vital legal rights of individuals and their families; for example, in relation to community care, debt where your home is at risk, homelessness, domestic violence and welfare benefits. It therefore follows that a proposal by the Government to exclude eligibility for legal aid, for reasons that are wholly extraneous both to the nature and merits of the litigation you are seeking to bring and to the financial needs of the individual, need to be very carefully scrutinised.
Under Clause 87, a terrorist conviction, which is a very broad concept indeed, leads to the exclusion of eligibility for legal aid irrespective of whether the court that sentenced the terrorist conviction considered the offence sufficiently serious to merit a lengthy custodial sentence or, indeed, any custodial sentence at all. I appreciate that there are some exceptions in Clause 87, but not by reference to the gravity of the terrorist offence. Clause 87 would also exclude eligibility for legal aid irrespective of the relevance of the terrorist conviction to the legal proceedings for which the individual seeks legal aid.
Can the Minister explain to the Committee why the Government think it is appropriate that a woman who has, some years earlier, received either a non-custodial sentence or a short custodial sentence for a terrorist offence should thereafter be precluded from obtaining legal aid if she claims to be the victim of domestic abuse or if she is homeless? How can that possibly be justified? The Government have previously said that the provisions are justified because they impose consequences for people who have broken their bond with society—that is the phrase used by the Government. Murderers, rapists and paedophiles are not excluded from legal aid for their housing or domestic violence proceedings because of their previous conviction, so how can it be justified to exclude on this absolute basis a person who has been convicted of a terrorist offence, irrespective of the gravity of that offence?
There is a reason why murderers, rapists and paedophiles are not excluded from legal aid and it is very simple: we recognise, and have done so since the legal aid system was instituted by the Labour Government in 1949, that legal aid is vital to the effective protection of basic rights for individuals. I would not normally associate the Minister with crude gestures, because he is far too civilised for that, but this provision is a crude gesture which is inconsistent with basic concepts of the rule of law. It is quite indefensible and has no place in a government Bill.
(1 year, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, in January this year, the Ministry of Justice said in answer to a Parliamentary Question from the shadow Attorney-General, Emily Thornberry, that the typical delay between an offence of alleged rape occurring and the completion of the resulting criminal trial was 1,000 days. That is a shocking statistic. What is the Ministry of Justice doing about this?
There are several steps. There is the reference from the police to the CPS, the CPS charging decision, the CPS bringing a case, the delay in the court and so forth. Delays in the court are still a problem and have unfortunately been made worse by the barristers’ strike. Other delays have been reduced. All I can say to the noble Lord is that we are working as hard as we can to address this problem.
(2 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberPerhaps I might raise a point with the Minister. As I understand the scheme of Clause 3, this automatic online conviction procedure is going to apply only to those offences which are set out in regulations made by the Lord Chancellor, as in new Section 16H(3). The Lord Chancellor has a discretion as to which offences are here relevant. That is by contrast with the provisions set out in Chapter 2 for online procedures generally in relation to civil proceedings, where under Clause 21 the Lord Chancellor may make regulations determining which proceedings the online procedure applies to. But under Clause 21(6) he or she may make regulations only with the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice, or the Senior President of Tribunals.
Noble Lords in this Committee may recall—certainly the noble Lord, Lord Beith, will recall—that this was the consequence of amendments which we tabled as a result of a report from the Constitution Committee which stated that it was appropriate for the Lord Chancellor, in the civil context only, to provide for particular matters to be subject to the online procedure if there was the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice. My question to the Minister is whether it would not be more appropriate in this criminal context, in order to provide added protection for individuals for the sorts of reasons indicated by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, if the Lord Chancellor was required to have the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice before specifying the appropriate criminal offences. I say that with the understanding that we are talking only about summary offences, as in new Section 16H(4). Nevertheless, it may be more appropriate to require the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice.
I am struggling to remember as far back as Second Reading of this Bill, but I did say at the time that Clause 3 was designed to save money in the courts system, and that the main savings would arise from people who pleaded guilty but who should have pleaded not guilty. The risk is so obvious that I am surprised that there are no safeguards or legal protections included in Clause 3. People need to have legal advice; they need to know whether they have a valid legal defence prior to deciding whether to plead guilty or not guilty. Whether someone has a legal defence is not obvious or straightforward; if it were, we would not have lawyers and judges—including lawyers of the huge talent that we have here in your Lordships’ House. The mishandling of all those Covid prosecutions shows how badly the system can get it wrong when things are not clear: there were thousands of wrongly issued fines and wrongful convictions by magistrates.
Defendants need independent, quality legal advice prior to deciding their plea, and the lack of any such safeguards in Clause 3 makes me wonder how it has got so far without this problem being exposed by the Minister, because the risks are even greater for vulnerable groups, such as those with learning disabilities. The pressure of avoiding going to court might make pleading guilty online feel like the safer option, and the cost of getting a lawyer might make the online guilty plea seem like the best option. There is nothing in these proposals to ensure that vulnerable people are supported in making informed decisions. So the potential for disaster is huge, and there should at the very least be signposting by the Government to independent legal advice, screening for vulnerabilities, and checking whether people are eligible for legal aid. I ask the Minister whether the Government are going to bring amendments along these lines on Report. It is potentially a sensible idea, but I would like to see it work well for defendants, and for that there will have to be some changes.
I am grateful to the Minister. That was the point that I was seeking to make. The last time the online procedure Bill came before Parliament, in 2019, this Committee debated very carefully whether it was appropriate to allow the Lord Chancellor to determine which civil matters should be dealt with online. Your Lordships’ Constitution Committee recommended that it was inappropriate for the Lord Chancellor to decide such matters. This House debated and the Government gave way. The Minister’s predecessor —not quite his predecessor—the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, who was speaking on behalf of the Government, accepted that it was appropriate for the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice to be required. Why does the Minister think it is different in the criminal context? I suggest that there is even greater sensitivity in the criminal context than in the civil context and that the concurrence of the head of the judiciary is required.
My Lords, I am grateful for that further explanation of the point and will happily reflect on it. At the moment, I stand by the point I made a moment ago, which is that it is right in principle for the Government to be able to decide which offences are included under the new procedure. Of course, we discuss with the Lord Chief Justice and other elements of the judiciary how these offences will be managed in practice. As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, knows, the operation of the courts is run essentially under a concordat agreement between the Lord Chancellor and the judiciary. I will look again at Hansard and go back to the discussion which somebody who was not quite my predecessor was involved in. For present purposes, that is my answer to the noble Lord.
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 36 in my name. I also support Amendment 36A in the name of my noble friend Lord Ponsonby. I declare an interest as a member of the council of JUSTICE, the all-party law reform organisation, and a British agent of the International Council of Jurists, along with many other Members of the Committee and your Lordships’ House.
Notwithstanding the praise that we all rightly heaped on my noble friend and his fellow magistrates in the earlier group, I am a passionate believer in the right to jury trial. I suspect I am not alone in that in this Committee. Juries are not perfect; however, I have defended jury trial, sometimes against Governments of both stripes, for at least 20 years. I hope I do not need to rehearse for too long why it is such an important right. It is not just because people believe in it. People want to be tried for serious matters that will send them to prison for a long time and destroy their reputations, and lives in many cases, not just because they want to be convicted by their peers; it is also important for trust and confidence in the justice system that it is not always seen as primarily about more-deprived and working people in the dock being adjudicated over by middle-class professionals like this Committee. As a third point, my experience of people who have served on juries is that it is a really important part of public service and engagement that people from a broad range of communities can ideally participate in. It is a very important glue for our country and the rule of law. I hope that did not need rehearsing, and I will stop on it there.
I note that in more controversial debates, for example around the Human Rights Act and its survival or not, some of the Minister’s colleagues—and indeed the current Justice Secretary—have said that one of the ways in which the Human Rights Act might be improved on would be with greater entrenchment of the right to jury trial. That is said on the one hand yet, on the other hand, provisions are taken to extend the sentencing powers of magistrates, which is ultimately a significantly broad back door to undermining jury trial.
I understand that the Government are concerned about the backlog. I certainly understand that the backlog in the system has been exacerbated by the pandemic. But if the Government did not share some of my concerns, they would not have added the so-called off switch in the other place that is now to be found in Clause 13. I am concerned not just in principle because of my belief in jury trial, but in practice as to whether the measures in the Bill will actually do what the Government are hoping. First, will these measures really save 1,700 sitting days in Crown Courts by enabling 500 jury trials to be switched to magistrates? Is that really a credible figure? Even if it is, we think that it would represent a saving of only 1.6% according to recent courts service estimates. Secondly, there is a presumption that defendants will not exercise their right to opt for a jury trial, which they are more likely to do if the benefit of a lesser sentence is not a temptation to take the magistrates’ court option. Thirdly, I am really concerned about whether there will be sufficient and appropriate training for magistrates if we are to double their sentencing powers. That is the rationale behind Amendment 36 and, quite possibly—I will not speak for my noble friend Lord Ponsonby—part of the rationale for Amendment 36A as well.
My Lords, I express my support for Amendment 36A. When I was a member of your Lordships’ Constitution Committee we looked into the impact of the pandemic on the criminal courts. What was striking about our activity was the difficulty we had in extracting from the Ministry of Justice any valuable, reliable statistics on what was happening in the criminal justice system. To have a specific statutory obligation to produce data on this important subject is essential if Parliament is to know what the impact of these new provisions will be.
My Lords, I support all the amendments in this group. My support comes from my experience as a magistrate, and I appreciate the endorsements of the role of the magistrate from all around the Committee. As those who frequent magistrates’ courts will know, they are places where invariably vulnerable and some other defendants are simply not able to understand or cope with the requirements of the legal system, as my noble friend Lord Ponsonby described, so effectively they do not have a fair trial. With regard to increasing the powers of magistrates in Clause 13, magistrates too are not experts, and that is partly the point of them. In my view, the safeguards in Amendments 35 and 36 would be very useful against inadvertent injustice.
I shall quickly speak to Amendment 39, in the name of my noble friend Lord Ponsonby, which seeks some assurances from the Minister on how this will work in practice. We accept the good intentions of the Government in this, and we welcome Ministers making it clear that they understand that not everyone is going to be able to use online procedures and some may feel that assistance in starting or progressing their case is needed. We support the extension of digital procedures, but we think it is very important that users receive an equal service no matter which channel they engage through.
We know that, despite the best intentions of everybody involved, everyday pressures on the ground can sometimes conspire to make unavailable the assistance that, ideally, we would all like to see, or to not deliver it in an appropriate way. We have tabled this amendment because we want assurances from the Minister about provision for digitally excluded people. Research from Lloyds Bank indicates that some 16% of the population do not have the skills to participate digitally. I have colleagues on the Labour Front Bench whom I frequently assist with Divisions, so I do hope they never find themselves subject to these procedures. It is not always obvious, though, who is going to need this support—I am not going to name names. Those who, ordinarily, might be able quite easily to access services online might struggle when dealing with complex issues because they are at a time of extreme crisis in their lives. Others, I am sure, could take great advantage of being able to complete processes digitally. We need to be confident that we are not putting in place systems that leave some individuals disadvantaged.
In Committee in the Commons, there was a long discussion about this issue, whether the definition in the Bill of those who need support was sufficient, and whether paper-based processes should be available on demand. Can the Minister assure us that a user-centred approach will be taken at every stage and in every case, so that the means of engagement is always appropriate to the individual and is offered, rather than that which may be most convenient for the service provider?
I am slightly nervous about the emphasis on the service seeking to direct as many users as possible through primary digital channels and this becoming the priority for the service, even when an individual may not feel completely comfortable with that approach. I know that during earlier stages of the Bill, Ministers have been as reassuring as possible on these points, but we still need more reassurances about the practical reality. Perhaps the Minister can say how he intends to monitor implementation of these measures, so that we can make appropriate interventions should the need arise.
My Lords, the Minister rightly said that his Amendment 38 is a modest one, but this group of amendments raises more general concerns, as the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman, has just explained.
The noble Lord, Lord Deben, may be interested to know, in the light of his earlier observations, that Clause 19 gives the Minister a power to make rules that require that specified kinds of legal proceedings “must” be conducted, progressed or disposed of by electronic means. The Minister could say, in principle, that all cases in the Court of Appeal of a civil nature will not be conducted by oral hearings; they will disposed of by pressing a button on the computer, and the judge will then decide. That is quite a remarkable power, the noble Lord may think.
The Minister draws my attention to subsection (6), which allows a person to choose to do so by non-electronic means, but that is not easy to reconcile with the provision I have just referred to in Clause 19(1)(b). If the Minister can assure me that the person who is the litigant—either the claimant or the defendant—can always choose in all cases to have an oral hearing in the court, then I would be very pleased indeed to hear that.
When we debated provisions in very similar form in 2019 in Committee and, I think, on Report, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, assured the House that the Government’s intention was to introduce online procedures only for civil money claims up to the value of £25,000. I ask the Minister whether that remains the intention of the Ministry of Justice. Does it have any plans to introduce these online procedures, including those covered by his Amendment 38, for any other civil proceedings?
In relation to that point, it is absolutely plain that the wording of Section 19 applies to any sort of civil proceedings, including family proceedings. So it is plainly envisaged that this goes beyond simply money claims. Can the Minister describe the sorts of family proceedings that will be dealt with by the Online Procedure Rules and online processes? In particular, is it envisaged that this is to be restricted to the actual process, for example of getting a divorce or judicial separation, as opposed to proceedings that relate to the division of assets upon judicial separation or divorce, proceedings in relation to wilful neglect to maintain and any proceedings—in both private and public law—relating to children?
Secondly, and separately, I want to make a much more minor point. I understand that one of the things the Master of the Rolls has in mind in relation to Amendment 38 is that dispute resolution services must be used before, or as part of, the online process. The services envisaged by the amendment will themselves be online, so purveyors of online dispute resolution services will become quite significant players in the civil justice system, and perhaps in the family justice system as well. The rules may include a provision that the goodness or quality of those services can be
“certified by a particular person as complying with particular standards.”
To be helpful, in a way, the amendment says that
“‘particular person’ and ‘particular standards’ include, respectively, a person of a particular description and standards of a particular description.”
Can the Minister indicate who will determine whether the online dispute resolution services, which may become something that you as a litigant must engage with, meet an adequate standard? Will it be a judge, an official or some independent body? I would be interested to know what the Government’s intentions are in relation to that.
My Lords, I am sorry to rise again, but I want to respond to what the Minister was indicating to me: that, under Clause 19(6), it would be open to a litigant in civil proceedings to choose not to proceed by electronic means even if the rules otherwise so required. What Clause 19(6) actually states is:
“Online Procedure Rules must also provide that, if the person is not legally represented, the person may instead choose to do so by non-electronic means.”
As I understand it, this means that, if the claimant or defendant is legally represented, they can be compelled to proceed by electronic means. So, if the Minister were ever to return to the Bar, which would of course be a great loss to Parliament, and were I to have the pleasure of appearing against him in a case in the High Court, the Court of Appeal or the Family Division, the Lord Chancellor could, by rules, specify that those proceedings are to be conducted by electronic means and that the normal course of advocacy in court—I of course declare my interest as a practising barrister—would not take place. That is why I am particularly concerned that the Minister can assure the House that the ministry has no intention of applying these rules to the Family Division, the High Court and the Court of Appeal other than in small claims cases—that is, cases involving sums of up to £25,000—which is what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, told the House in 2019.
That is the point I was going to come to. Here we are dealing with the rules set out by the Online Procedure Rules Committee. That is not the Lord Chancellor. I want to show the Committee that the Online Procedure Rule Committee is set out in Clause 22, and in the usual way it is a committee which is not run by the Government but is run in the way that the procedure rule committees are run, which is ultimately under the control of the judiciary. The central point is that ultimate control rests with the judiciary.
As I understood it, the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, was that two safeguards are in place in relation to the powers to make amendments in Clause 27, which states:
“The Lord Chancellor may by regulations amend, repeal or revoke any enactment to the extent that the Lord Chancellor considers necessary or desirable in consequence of, or in order to facilitate the making of, Online Procedure Rules.”
I cite—this goes back to a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, in relation to a different issue—subsection (3), which is a consultation requirement with the Lord Chief Justice and the Senior President of Tribunals, and subsection (5), which states:
“Regulations under this section that amend or repeal any provision of an Act are subject to affirmative resolution procedure”.
I suggest that that is very important. So the architecture here means that, ultimately, judges retain control, in practice, of what is heard online and what is heard in court.
However, there will be increasingly firm directions and defaults as to what is heard online and in court— I make no apologies for this. In my own area, the Commercial Court, although you can ask for an in-person hearing if there is a good reason, it is now the default that, if you have an application for half an hour or one hour in front of a judge, it will be online, because that saves time and money and provides access to justice.
On family courts, which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, asked about, I had discussions very recently with the President of the Family Division about this. Again, this is ultimately a matter for the judges, but he was saying that it is actually better to have certain hearings online. For example, if everything has been agreed between the parents and it is essentially a consent hearing, that will be done online. I am sure that it would be inconceivable that a public law family hearing, for example, where the court is taking a child away from parents, would be done online. But, ultimately, that is a matter for the judges.
I regret that, during the pandemic, there were cases where that had to be done, unfortunately, because of the need to protect children—because, when push comes to shove, protecting children is more important than having a face-to-face hearing. But, in normal circumstances, one would certainly expect that that sort of hearing would be face to face—but that is not a matter for Government Ministers or the Lord Chancellor.
These provisions seek to set up the Online Procedure Rule Committee, which will have the same sorts of powers for online procedures as the current rules committees have for the current procedures, whether that is the Family Procedure Rule Committee, the Civil Procedure Rule Committee, the Criminal Procedure Rule Committee or the rules committee for the Court of Protection—there are a number of different rules committees—
My concern is not about online hearings, because they do take place and may be convenient in some circumstances; it is that Chapter 2 allows for no hearings at all. It allows for legal disputes, if the Online Procedure Rule Committee so authorises, to be conducted entirely electronically, which means by the submission of arguments in writing. The Minister really needs to recognise that that is authorised by Clause 19. He says that this is only if the independent Online Procedure Rule Committee so decides, but will he accept that, under Clause 22, that committee consists of three people who are appointed by the Lord Chief Justice and three people who are appointed by the Lord Chancellor, so the Lord Chancellor has a very considerable influence over the composition of that committee?
The Minister may be coming to this question. Does it remain the intention of the Government—who clearly have a very influential role in this—that these provisions should be used only for money claims up to £25,000? The origin of that origin, as the Minister will confirm, was the report of Sir Michael Briggs, now Lord Justice Briggs. He investigated these matters and proposed a £25,000 limit which would always apply to this category of case. There would be no hearing. It would be conducted entirely electronically—although perhaps, in exceptional cases, the judge would have a discretion to decide that the matter would be conducted in an oral hearing.
I am grateful to the noble Lord. He is absolutely right about the three/three appointments, but I would respectfully direct his attention to two features of Clause 22. First, whom the Lord Chancellor can appoint is circumscribed by subsection (4). One of the three has to be a barrister, solicitor or legal executive. The second must have
“experience in, and knowledge of, the lay advice sector”.
The third is somebody
“who has experience in, and knowledge of, information technology relating to end-users’ experience of internet portals.”
The second safeguard is in subsection (7):
“Before appointing a person under subsection (4)(a)”
there is a requirement on the Lord Chancellor to consult with
“the Lord Chief Justice … the Senior President of Tribunals, and … the relevant authorised body.”
So this does not enable the Lord Chancellor just to appoint three friendly faces—although I am sure no Lord Chancellor would do so. They must be people with a particular expertise, and there is a consultation requirement. I accept that the Lord Chief Justice, the Senior President of Tribunals or the authorised body do not have a veto, but, in the real world, it will ensure that we have proper people on the committee.
If I may, I will come back to the £25,000 point in a moment. I am conscious that I want to finish giving the Committee an assurance about assistance, so I will finish this point and then come back to the £25,000 point.
The assistance currently provided by HMCTS is offered over the phone through our Courts and Tribunal Service Centres. HMCTS has also designed and tested a digital support service to ensure that access is available even for those who need more intense support. The contract was awarded to We Are Digital in late 2021. We expect full national coverage by the late spring of this year. Users will be able to attend in-person appointments. It will also be possible for a trainer to attend an applicant’s home for in-home, face-to-face support. If the noble Baroness passes to me confidentially the name of the relevant individual, I might even be able to arrange a home visit. One-to-one video appointments will also be available for those who already have access to online services, as well as the support over the phone. Therefore, I believe that this level of support, combined with the duty in the Bill, is enough to ensure that the digitally excluded receive the support that they need.
Finally, I turn to the outstanding question from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. I have been able to check while I have been on my feet. The position is that the legislation is not limited expressly to those claims. I am told that they are first in line to be used under these procedures. The noble Lord’s question went further and asked what was anticipated would be done after that. I will write to the noble Lord once I have an answer which I am satisfied is absolutely clear. I am concerned to make it very clear to the Committee that civil justice in particular is going to change. It has changed and it will change. For example, there does not seem to be any clear reason why a claim of £25,000 would be done online and not one of £26,000. One always has to have a limit but, once we accept that justice can be delivered online, the question then is what cases are suitable. I will write to the noble Lord on that.
That is not what Amendment 38 is aimed at. It is not about accrediting mediation services. It is about saying to mediation services, “If you want people who are using your services, if the case does not settle, to be able to integrate seamlessly into the online court space, these are the protocols to do it”. It is a process point, not a mediation accrediting point. There is a separate issue out there about accrediting mediators. The noble and learned Lord will be aware that there are a number of entities that seek to accredit mediators. There are also a number of bodies such as CEDA in that space. That is an important issue but a separate one to the point of Amendment 38.
I will write about what is online because this is a much bigger point than the Online Procedure Rule Committee. Ultimately judges—I emphasise this point—decide what is online and what is not. At the moment, judges decide whether you get a hearing at all. As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, will be aware—to give an example from my background, but it appears in other areas of the law as well—if you appeal an arbitration award to the commercial courts, the judge may say no without giving you a hearing at all, either because you do not pass the permission threshold or because you do but the judge decides to have the hearing on paper. There is therefore no substantive difference between that and what is proposed here.
As to what the Online Procedure Rule Committee will do, I am afraid I will not be able to assist the Committee because the Online Procedure Rule Committee has not been set up yet; there are no people on it and it does not exist. This legislation sets out what the Online Procedure Rule Committee will be looking at. I will, however, look again at what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has said, and I will write if I can.
I am very grateful to the noble Lord. He correctly points out that there are occasions where there is no oral hearing and the judge so decides. Would he not accept, however, that there is a fundamental difference between that and a decision being taken, at the encouragement of the Master of the Rolls and certain others in the legal profession, to do away with oral hearings in categories of case because it is quicker and cheaper to do so?
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, has made the point but I join with him; it would be a matter of policy and of great significance were a decision to be taken by the Online Procedure Rule Committee that, for example, all civil claims for money are no longer to have oral hearings but to be determined on paper. There need to be some criteria for the exercise of these very broad powers that Parliament is conferring. There is no parliamentary approval of these new rules as I understand it, so it is a matter of enormous concern.
With respect, of course I understand the point the noble Lord has made, and I will write to try to put a little more flesh on the bones. The last point he makes is in some ways perhaps the most important because I have seen two sides of this coin. The point the noble Lord has just made is that Parliament should have the final say on court procedures because, ultimately, it should not be for judges to decide whether you have a hearing; there should be a parliamentary override.
In a completely separate issue that I have been dealing with, child trust funds, I have sought to have a better procedure in the Court of Protection. It has been quite properly and very firmly pointed out to me that, ultimately, it is a matter for judges, not Ministers or even Parliament, to decide how the courts are run. This is a difficult topic. I take the point the noble Lord has made. I will write to him and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, and copy it generally to the Committee.
(2 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the reaction of most of your Lordships to Part 1 of this Bill at Second Reading was summed up in the memorable words of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, whom I am very pleased to see in her place:
“It is not as bad as I expected”.—[Official Report, 7/2/22; col. 1371.]
Part 1 could certainly have been worse, but that of course is no answer to the amendments that we are now debating.
I declare my interest as a barrister practising in the field of judicial review. My Amendments 1, 4 and 5 in this group are concerned with decisions of the court to quash a public law decision, whether in the form of a statutory instrument, a decision of a Minister or a decision of a local authority or any other public authority.
As your Lordships and the Committee know, when a public body is found to have acted unlawfully, the decision is usually—not always—quashed; that is, overturned. This is an important protection of the rights of the citizen and an important deterrent to unlawful action by public bodies.
Clause 1 gives the court a power to decide that the quashing order should not take effect until a date specified in the order—some later date—and a power to remove or limit any retrospective effect of the quashing. I am not troubled by the court being given a power to decide that the quashing order should take effect at a later date. That power was recommended by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks—who is in his place—and his team in their well-informed and wise conclusions in March 2021 after their independent review of administrative law which the former Lord Chancellor, Sir Robert Buckland, had asked the noble Lord to conduct. The noble Lord, Lord Faulks, explained in particular that there may be cases where the court considers it appropriate to suspend a quashing order to enable Parliament to decide whether it wishes to amend the law. That seems entirely acceptable, because it recognises the supremacy of Parliament in our constitution, so there is no difficulty about that.
What the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, and his committee did not recommend and what my Amendment 1 seeks to remove from this Bill is the power in new Section 29A(1)(b), set out in Clause 1, for the court to remove or limit “any retrospective effect” of a quashing order. New Sections 29A(4) and 29A(5) make clear that this would mean that the decision or policy which the court has found to be unlawful is nevertheless to be “upheld” and
“treated for all purposes as if its validity and force were, and always had been, unimpaired by the relevant defect.”
My Amendments 4 and 5 would remove those provisions.
What the Government are proposing would confer a remarkable power on our courts: a power for the court to say that what has been found to be unlawful shall be treated, and treated for all purposes, as having been lawful. Those adversely affected by the unlawful decision, including the claimant in the judicial review, would receive no remedy. If such a remarkable power is to be exercised, it should not be exercised by judges but by Parliament. Your Lordships will recall that one of the causes of the Civil War was Charles I’s use of a dispensing power. The monarch’s claim to such a power was abolished by the Bill of Rights 1689. I do not think it is wise to re-establish such a power in the hands of Her Majesty’s judiciary.
The decision on whether to validate what a court has found to be unlawful raises all sorts of policy considerations which are not for the judiciary to weigh up and determine. Indeed, to confer such an extraordinary power on our judges is, I suggest, inconsistent with this Government’s repeated expressions of concern that judges have or are exercising too much power. As my colleague at Blackstone Chambers, Tom Hickman QC, has pointed out, for the court to have this power to deny retrospective effect for its ruling and to do so permanently, not even only where the defect is technical, would be for the court to exercise a quasi-legislative power, including a power to override primary legislation —that is, the statutory provision which makes the impugned decision or policy unlawful.
Such a judicial power would undermine one of the key functions of judicial review, which is to encourage government to do its best to ensure that it behaves lawfully because it knows that illegality has consequences. It would deter judicial review applications: why bother to complain that the public body has acted unlawfully if the court may say that what was unlawful shall be treated as lawful? New Section 29A(1)(b) would have the effect—indeed, I suspect it has the intention—of seeking to protect government and other public authorities from the basic consequences of their own unlawful actions. I think that is a matter for Parliament and Parliament alone. I beg to move.
My Lords, I am slightly more relaxed than my noble friend Lord Pannick about the prospective-only quashing power in the new Section 29A(1)(b)—it is, in its essentials, already acknowledged in our law—but only so long as the courts are free to use it without constraint or presumption. In the Spectrum case of 2005, Lord Nicholls thought a prospective-only quashing order might be appropriate in some cases where a decision on an issue of law was unavoidable but a retrospective decision would have gravely unfair and disruptive consequences for past transactions. Each of his six colleagues agreed that it would be unwise to rule out the existence of such exceptional cases, even though Spectrum itself was not one of them.
I am very grateful to the Minister and to all those who have spoken in this interesting debate. It is important to emphasise that this is not a technical legal issue. We are concerned here about the integrity of judicial review—a vital safeguard of the rights of all citizens.
I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, that what is objectionable about Clause 1 is the power of judges to wave a judicial wand and to say that what they have found to be unlawful shall be treated—the word emphasised by the Minister—as if it were lawful.
If there are cases of concern—the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, said that there are or may be—a suspended order is quite sufficient to give Parliament time to act. Those in Parliament, not judges, are the appropriate people to validate that which the court has found to be unlawful. New Section 29A(1)(a) meets that need. Indeed, that was the issue in the Ahmed case, where the noble and learned Lords, Lord Hope and Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, had, as judges say, the misfortune to disagree with each other. It was what the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, recommended in his review.
My noble friend Lord Anderson mentioned the comments of Lord Nicholls for the Appellate Committee in the Spectrum case that prospective overruling might—I emphasise “might”—be appropriate, although not in that case. That was in June 2005. Such a power has never been exercised or come close to being exercised in any case since.
There is an important difference between the common law not ruling out the possibility of prospective overruling and Parliament including such a power in this Bill. I cannot understand why this provision is in the Bill. As I said, it was not recommended by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks. What has provoked the need for new Section 29A(1)(b)? The Minister said that the Government want to put new tools in the judicial toolbox—but why this tool? What case has provoked the need for this provision? When have judges ever lamented the absence of such a power?
My noble and learned friend Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood emphasised the need for flexibility, but Clause 1 is not flexible in an important respect. If this power in new Section 29A(1)(b) is exercised, then under new Section 29A(5), as the Committee has heard, the impugned act
“is to be treated for all purposes as if its validity and force were, and always had been, unimpaired by the relevant defect.”
There is nothing flexible about that. With all due respect, the Minister’s reliance on “treated” is a matter of pure semantics; “for all purposes” means always and for all persons, whatever their circumstances, and even though they have not been represented before the court.
Therefore, I say to the Committee that there is no need for this power in new Section 29A(1)(b). It is inappropriate in principle. But for today, of course I beg leave to withdraw this amendment.
My noble friend just said that no case has come close to applying a prospective-only quashing order since a unanimous House of Lords said in the Spectrum case that they could imagine such cases. How does he explain the British Academy of Songwriters case, which he has heard both the Minister and I develop, and in which Mr Justice Green, as I read his judgment, gave precisely such an order? I should say that that is not the only case.
If he gave such an order, why is there a need for Parliament to step in and deal with the matter? In any event, such an order is more appropriately dealt with by a suspended quashing order so that Parliament, the appropriate authority, can deal with the matter if it sees fit to do so.
First, they may not apply at all, because there may, in a particular case, not be any person who would benefit from, or has relied on, the quashing. Secondly, the court must have regard to it, but only having regard to it, the court can give it such weight as it deems appropriate. Absolutely, some of these matters may be in conflict. That, as we have heard, is nothing novel in the field of judicial review when the court must consider what remedy to issue in every case. Indeed, it goes beyond judicial review. There is nothing new in principle here at all. What we are doing is setting out factors which the court should have regard to. The court can place such weight as it wants on any of these, and the court can have regard to any other factors as well.
I am very grateful to the Minister. He emphasises that the court can have regard to other factors. Does he accept that it would be permissible for the court to ask itself the question set out in Amendment 2? Is it satisfied that it is in the interests of justice to make one of these orders? Is it permissible for the court to say that it would not be in the interests of justice in the circumstances of this case, therefore it will not make one of these orders?
I am grateful to the noble Lord. I was going to come to interests of justice slightly later, but let me take the point now. I do not want to drift into the presumption, but these issues are related to an extent. If it is not in the interests of justice to make the order, there would be good reason not to do so in new subsection (9). Therefore, the noble Lord’s question answers itself.
Amendments 2 and 9 add further factors to the list, including a condition that the court may use the new remedies only where it is satisfied that their use will be in the interests of justice. In addition to the point I have just made to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick—perhaps I am putting his question in reverse—I struggle to foresee a situation where the court, having considered new subsection (8) and the presumption, would think it appropriate to apply one of the new powers where the court none the less considered it against the interests of justice to do so. Indeed, I am making the same point: you do not get there, because if it is against the interests of justice, there must be “good reason” not to use one of the orders.
Furthermore, coming back to the amendments, if timeliness is relevant to the case, the court can consider that under the current drafting, in particular the factors set out in new paragraphs (c) and (f).
Those amendments sought to add some factors. Amendments 8 and 11 seek to remove a factor from the list and remove an important provision—the need for the court to consider
“any detriment to good administration that would result from exercising or failing to exercise the power”
and the need for the court to consider actions that a public body proposes or intends to take but has not yet taken. The point of clearly specifying that the court should have regard, not only to actions taken but to actions proposed to be taken, is that actions a public body proposes to take could sometimes be a relevant factor. For example, let us say that a government department recognises that regulations may be quashed but has already stated its intention to make new regulations and has announced the date by which they will be in force. This could help a court to reach a decision on whether a suspended quashing order is appropriate in principle and to determine how long the suspension period should be.
Amendment 10 seeks to modify the fourth criterion, paragraph (d), making it so that the defendant is responsible for identifying the interests of those who rely on legislation being quashed. I suggest this amendment is unnecessary. If a suspended quashing order, or a quashing order with limited retrospective effect or none, might be appropriate, it will always be in the interests of the defendant to set out why that is the case. The defendant would want to encourage the court to use that remedy rather than the ab initio quashing order. So, in effect, the onus is already on the defendant or respondent to demonstrate who will be affected if the impugned act is quashed immediately, ab initio; and that would obviously include identifying who has relied or is relying on the impugned act.
Amendment 12 seeks to modify the same factor in paragraph (d) by providing that the principle of good administration includes the need for administration to be lawful. I think I said in the previous group that that really is, if I may say so, motherhood and apple pie. Good administration is lawful administration. We all expect our Government and all decision-makers to abide by a set of lawful principles and duties that are conducive to effective administration. I am therefore not persuaded that legislating to say that good administration is lawful administration adds anything that is not already obvious or, indeed, inherent in the drafting.
Amendment 15 seeks to remove the requirement in subsection (10) for the court to take “particular” account of any action taken or proposed to be taken, or any undertaking given by a person with responsibility, in connection with the impugned act. This is intended to draw the court’s attention to any response the defendant may have already provided, or be in the process of providing, to the relevant defect. We see this subsection as a positive measure which could encourage a defendant to consider how to resolve matters proactively by offering suitable redress where it is appropriate, before the court need order it. It is also aimed at ensuring that the court takes particular care in considering any redress already provided so that defendants do not feel that they have to provide redress twice.
Finally, I come back to the point I was making about tax. I think the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, asked me whether I was satisfied with the phrase “offer adequate redress”. I certainly am satisfied with that phrase, and I think the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, has an amendment in the next group that focuses on it. He certainly raised it at Second Reading, and I will be coming back to that. When I was referring to tax in the previous group, I was saying it would be very unlikely that a court would want to use a prospective remedy in that situation. I did not say “never” for two reasons. First, it is always up to the judge in any particular case. Secondly, one has to consider other effects even in tax cases. There could be cases where, for example, under tax legislation, somebody has not paid, but they have been given a refund, or they have a rebate or a tax credit. In those situations, it may be right, if it is positive to the taxpayer, so to speak, to use a prospective remedy even in tax cases. That is why I do not say “never” but in the case the noble and learned Lord was putting in the previous group, of when people have paid, in no circumstances does it seem likely that a prospective remedy would be appropriate.
I hope I have dealt with all the points raised. For the reasons I have set out, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I agree with those who have spoken, and particularly with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, who said that these provisions will provoke litigation. Speaking as counsel practising in judicial review, these provisions will give ample opportunity for those representing disappointed litigants to bring appeal proceedings based on failures by judges to apply the provisions in a proper way.
I have added my name to Amendment 13, moved by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, because, if judges are to be given the powers set out in proposed new Clause 29A(1)(a) and (b), it is because Parliament has decided that judges can be trusted to exercise the new functions widely and justly. The Minister emphasised at Second Reading and again today that the exercise of the new powers should cause Parliament no concern because it will be for judges to decide. If Parliament follows that approach, it is then surely unnecessary and inappropriate for Ministers to seek to tilt the balance by creating presumptions to try to influence the judges as to which tools from the toolbox—to use the Minister’s expression—it is appropriate for them to pull out and use. The more the Minister seeks to suggest—as I think he will in replying to this debate—that the presumption is weak, the less clear it is why it is included at all.
I make one other general point. We are considering an important Bill and the amendments we are debating this evening are significant. The Minister, as always, is addressing all relevant points in a most constructive and helpful manner, but it is, at least to me, surprising and regrettable that there are now, and have been for almost all of our debate this afternoon, no noble Lords on the government Back Benches.
The position would still be that proper case management can deal with all of this. The point that the noble and learned Lord makes is no different from the proposition that could apply now. You could have two judicial reviews where one court decides to give a quashing order and the other does not. That point is already out there, so to speak. There is nothing new conceptually added by this Bill.
I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. He expresses the hope that these provisions will enable the judiciary to build up a body of precedent in this area. Can he direct the Committee to any other statutory context which sets out in the way we see here a list of factors that judges are obliged to take into account, and then directs them by way of a presumption as to how discretion should be exercised? I cannot think of any. While I am on my feet, I thank him for being here tonight to deal with these amendments and giving up what would otherwise, I am sure, be an important date in his diary.
I know that my right honourable friend the Prime Minister is still recovering from my absence from the dinner, but I am sure he will provide the usual entertainment and speech that my colleagues would expect.
On the wording of the new clause, there are two separate points. First: do we have statutes with presumptions? Well, of course we do. Secondly, do we have statutes which set out a list of factors to which the court must have regard on either an exhaustive—rare, I think—or, much more commonly, non-exhaustive basis? Yes, of course we do. My noble friend Lord Faulks gave the example of the Limitation Act—in Section 33, I think, from memory. The noble Lord’s real question is, therefore, do we have an instance where those two are put together? There is a short answer and a longer one. The short answer is that I cannot think of one off the top of my head, but I will have a look. The longer answer, however, is, with great respect: so what? If a presumption is not objectionable in itself, and if a list of factors on a non-exhaustive basis is not objectionable in itself, what, I ask rhetorically, makes it objectionable when those two features are put together? There is nothing objectionable about it.
I suggest that the real point put to me is not that this is objectionable, wrong or sinister, but that it is unnecessary. The answer to that is that it is beneficial for two reasons. First, to repeat the point, the court’s considering these powers will encourage the growth of the jurisprudence. Secondly, as I said to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, the fact that the court has to consider them means that they will be considered in all cases, because there may well be cases where it is not in the interests of the party to the case that they be used, but it could be in the interest of third parties.
That ties into the point I was coming to on Amendment 14 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. I heard what she said—that she would prefer the other amendment but tabled this one on a probing basis—but let me respond to it. In addition to removing the presumption, it would replace it with a precondition that, before exercising the new remedial powers, the court must be satisfied that the modified quashing order would offer an effective remedy to the claimant and any other person materially affected by the impugned act. This proposed precondition is superfluous, because the remedies available in the Bill are more effective and tailored, taking into account the interests of both claimant and third parties. The problem with the wording of her amendment is, as the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, pointed out, the copyright case. The wording used is not very good for third parties.
However, in that context, I should pick up a point made by the noble Baroness and by the noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Beith, concerning the phrase “adequate redress”, which was first made by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, at Second Reading, if I remember correctly. We have heard the argument that we should replace that phrase with the phrase “effective remedy”, as also used in Amendment 14. I said in my closing speech at Second Reading, in response to the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, that I would reflect on this point with officials, and, of course, we have. I hope I can take a moment to explain the rationale behind the drafting.
There is a fundamental misunderstanding there. Of course, Parliament can reverse a judicial review on its substance. If the courts conclude that some social security regulations do not meet a particular provision, they can change those regulations and come to the same result they wanted to all along, which is fine. I am talking about the fundamental role of the court in relation to determining whether the Government are acting lawfully. In relation to that, namely the ambit in which the court will operate Anisminic onwards, as it were, do not interfere with it. Let the courts determine that. Ultimately, the limits of that have to be set by the courts and not Parliament.
The noble and learned Lord has raised a number of very valid points in opposition to Clause 2. I offer another, in response to the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, who emphasises that there must be finality in litigation. The problem with that argument is that Clause 2 itself recognises the need for exceptions. New Section 11A(4) specifies exceptions, in particular for a
“fundamental breach of the principles of natural justice.”
In my Amendment 19, I suggest we need a further exception for where the Upper Tribunal has made a fundamental error of law. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, gave a number of examples where there may be important areas of law that raise fundamental issues that go to the safety of the individual who is going to be removed to a place where they may face persecution or torture. I for my part do not understand why a fundamentally unfair procedure is a greater mischief in this context than a fundamental error of law by the tribunal system. In each case, the Upper Tribunal and the Court of Appeal will have declined to intervene. If the judicial review route is nevertheless to remain open, as Clause 2 recognises, for fundamental procedural defects, surely it should remain open for fundamental substantive defects.
I accept of course, as again the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, emphasised, that there will be claimants with no legitimate point who seek to argue that they fall within the exception, but that is equally true of an exception for fundamental procedural defects. In any event, the answer to that concern is to ensure that any application for judicial review, whether of substance or procedure, is looked at and addressed by the judge on the papers and within a very brief time period.
May I just ask a question about the middle way proposed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton? Would the bar he is proposing—which would, as it were, place a lid over the High Court so that matters could not travel from the High Court to the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court—operate even in a case where the High Court judge who had heard the point that arose in relation to the other tribunal’s refusal to grant permission to appeal considered that it raised an issue of general importance which ought, in fact, to travel upwards for consideration by the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court? Should there perhaps not be a proviso in the middle-way amendment that would permit the High Court judge, if he or she thought it appropriate, to grant permission so that the matter could go upwards?
That is a very important point. If the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, brings back his amendment on Report, as I hope he will, he may wish to add in a provision along the lines of what we see in relation to criminal matters and under the Administration of Justice Act: that if the judge or the Supreme Court certified that it was a matter of public importance, either the judge or the Supreme Court could give permission for the matter to go straight to the Supreme Court. The judge at first instance may throw out the point, but may nevertheless recognise that it is a point of some significance that perhaps the Supreme Court may wish to consider.
My Lords, I apologise for the croak in my voice. As two noble Lords have already recognised, the ultimate issue in this batch of amendments is whether Clause 2 remains part of the Bill. Therefore, we should look with some precision at the Bill. Proposed new Section 11A(2) states in respect of the decision of the Upper Tribunal:
“The decision is final, and not liable to be questioned or set aside in any other court.”
That means that any appeal from the Upper Tribunal will now be forbidden. There is a proviso a little further down, in new subsection (4), which can be summarised as “if the Upper Tribunal has behaved improperly or ultra vires”, and there lies an exception, but it is a very strong provision in new subsection (2), as inserted by Clause 2.
At Second Reading, which was the first time I addressed this House after 22 years, I made two points on that issue. I said that, as a matter of principle, it was wrong to shut this out of the judicial process, because no appeals would actually go into the judicial process of our law courts. I argued that it was as a matter of principle wrong, because many of the applicants concerned—and this provision will absorb all the asylum applicants—are among the most vulnerable people who will ever want access to our courts. I argued, secondly, that the processes already in existence were good enough to pick out the unmeritorious applications, which far exceed in number the meritorious applications and which will find no further favour through the judicial process.
Therefore, we should look quite precisely at the decision-making as it now stands. We move from the Home Office decision—asylum or not asylum—to the First-tier Tribunal, then to the Upper Tribunal and then, in limited circumstances, to the single judge, who will make a decision on paper. We then move to an oral hearing, which I think will be in front of the Court of Appeal, and a journey, or a door, into our judicial process. What are the limitations in the present system, which I say are sufficient to sort out the difference between the meritorious and the unmeritorious application?
On the first issue, on the rules relating to the first tier, all issues of fact and law are to be considered by the First-tier Tribunal—but once it has made its decision, there are great limitations on the rights of appeal, and the right to appeal from the First-tier Tribunal is only on errors of law and on the permission of the Upper Tribunal. Of course, that throws out something that is very important, which is any further consideration of the merits of the application. When the matter goes to the Upper Tribunal, there are much more severe restrictions; it is only a paper application and only on the grounds of important principles of law and practice, or for some other compelling reasons. That then brings us, if that can be satisfied, and the law courts accept it, to a single judge—and then it is very limited, with only a paper application and only on the grounds of important principles of law and practice, or for some other compelling reason.
(2 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I declare my interest as a barrister who has practised in the field of judicial review for 40 years, representing clients as diverse as asylum seekers, the Reverend Moon and the noble Lord, Lord Howard. I fear I am at least partly responsible, wearing that hat, for what the noble Lord described in his most entertaining and provocative speech as the discordant note he expressed about judicial review. I had the pleasure, though rarely the success, of frequently acting on his behalf when he served as Home Secretary in the 1990s and was—how shall I put it—a regular customer in the judicial review courts.
Your Lordships will recall that the Government announced in last year’s Queen’s Speech that they would be bringing forward legislation to
“restore the balance of power between the executive, legislature and the courts.”—[Official Report, 11/5/21; col. 3.]
I am therefore surprised that Clause 1 seeks now to confer on the judiciary a very wide new power to absolve unlawful acts. This includes, as expressly stated in proposed new Section 29A(4) and (5), a power for the court to say that an act unlawful when it was carried out shall be treated as if it were lawful at that time. This is a remarkable power to confer on the judiciary.
I am not sure about the metaphysics of nullity to which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, referred. I am more concerned about the nuts and bolts of this. If exercised, this power would mean that people who have suffered loss and damage by reason of unlawful government action would be denied compensation or damages for that wrong. It would mean, as the organisation Justice has pointed out in its very helpful briefing paper, that people who have had to pay tax under an unlawful regulation would be unable to require a refund. It would mean that people who had been prosecuted under an invalid statutory instrument, perhaps for a driving offence or a breach of the coronavirus regulations, would be unable to have their criminal record altered.
It cannot be right that a court should have a power to decide that something that is unlawful shall be treated as lawful despite such implications. That is why the Faulks committee, to which the Minister rightly paid tribute, recommended only what would be new Section 29A(1)(a)—that is, a power for the court to suspend a quashing order for the purpose of allowing time for Parliament to intervene if it thinks fit; no constitutional vandalism there.
By contrast, to give the judge a discretion to say that what was unlawful shall be treated as lawful is to encourage judges to enter into very treacherous waters. It requires the judge to assess the merits of competing policy factors that it is entirely inappropriate for the judiciary to assess. In his opening speech, the Minister rightly emphasised that judicial review is not concerned with judges deciding the merits of a decision or a policy. This new power will encourage and require judges to do precisely that. All of this is even more objectionable when one takes into account the fact that there is to be a presumption of “no retrospective effect” for the quashing, as some noble Lords have mentioned.
I say to my noble friend Lord Anderson of Ipswich that I am not minded to look more favourably at this “no retrospective effect” power, because, as he rightly points out, the Court of Justice of the European Union has claimed, and sometimes exercised, such a power. I have less experience of that court than my noble friend Lord Anderson, but I have enough experience to know that its practices are far from a model to be copied.
I look forward to debating the Bill, Clause 1 and other points that have been raised with the Minister and other noble Lords in Committee.
(2 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I do not share the concerns that have just been expressed. It seems to me that Amendment 104E makes it very clear what the mischief is; it is making it a condition of access to accommodation that sexual services are provided. We all know what that means, and juries will know what it means. It is a real mischief and it needs to be addressed. If the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, divides the House on Amendments 104E and 104F, he will certainly have my support.
However, I have concerns about the drafting of Amendment 104F. My concern is that in several places it uses the concept of “arranging” an offence—not simply facilitating the offence but arranging or facilitating it. I do not really understand what the difference is and what is added by “arranging an offence”. I am not myself aware of other contexts where that concept has been used. It is a very vague concept and, I think, a rather undesirable one.
I am also troubled by proposed new subsection (3)(c) of Amendment 104F, which makes it an offence if a publisher is informed that its actions
“had enabled the arrangement of or facilitated an offence”
and it then
“failed to take remedial action within a reasonable time.”
All that is extremely unclear and uncertain as to the ingredients of the offence. No doubt that can be dealt with at Third Reading if others share my view. I emphasise that I support the amendments, but I draw attention to those matters that cause me concern.
My Lords, I have one point to add to what has been said by my noble friend Lord Pannick. The word “publisher” troubles me a bit. It is not defined in the amendment, and I am not quite sure what that word is directed to. Is it somebody in business as a publisher or somebody who simply publishes something, describing the activity rather than the trade? The amendment would be improved if something was said in it as to what exactly is meant by the word “publisher”.
My Lords, I respectfully agree with everything the noble Lord, Lord Bach, said. I will add just one point. The problem is not simply the unfairness to the individuals concerned, although that is bad enough, but the damage to the public interest that otherwise eligible and fine candidates are prevented from serving. It is a basic principle of our constitutional law that Parliament can do anything it likes, but there are limits, and we ought to get rid of this manifest absurdity.
Before the noble Lord sits down, may I ask him this question? Why is it that public confidence requires, in his view, this absolute rule, when I can serve as a Supreme Court Justice even if I was convicted of an imprisonable offence at the age of 17 or 18?
With regard to public confidence, I go back to what I said earlier: this was originally designed with cross-party support and with the assistance and advice of police chiefs.
My Lords, I remind the House of my interests as vice-president of the Chartered Institute of Linguists and co-chair of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Modern Languages.
I am very grateful indeed to the Minister for the interest he has taken in the issue of court interpreters and my concerns about the weaknesses of the present system, as well as for his willingness to meet several times and discuss candidly the detail of my amendment. This dialogue has been very constructive and leads me to be hopeful that we can reach a positive outcome.
My amendment seeks to establish minimum standards for court interpreters based on their qualifications, experience and registration with the National Register of Public Service Interpreters—NRPSI. Obviously, I am not going to repeat the detail of the case I set out in Committee, but perhaps I could just comment on the response I had at that stage from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart of Dirleton.
There seemed to be three main reasons for rejecting my amendment. The first was that the MoJ system is already fit for purpose. For example, the noble and learned Lord said:
“All interpreters are required to complete a justice system-specific training course before they are permitted to join the register.”—[Official Report, 22/11/21; col. 659.]
This refers to the MoJ’s register. My understanding, however, is that that course takes four hours to complete, which does not strike me as remotely adequate for such potentially demanding and specialist work. It remains the case that the current MoJ register will admit people who would not be considered sufficiently qualified or experienced to be on the NRPSI—nor, indeed, on the Police Approved Interpreters and Translators scheme. The DPSI at level 6 is considered by all the specialist professional bodies in the field to be the correct minimum qualification for any court interpreting work.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart, also claimed that the MoJ system is fit for purpose because the complaint rate is less than 1%. I had claimed that the failure rate following spot checks was 50% but, in our subsequent meetings and correspondence, the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, has clarified that the 50% figure I quoted in Committee applied only to referrals of quality-based complaints, and that the overall failure rate is actually 5% of all assessments. I still think that a failure rate of 50% after a referral from a court or mystery shop is unacceptably high. I would also contend that even an overall rate of 5% out of hundreds of thousands of assignments each year could potentially lead to a significant drain on the public purse through the costs of rescheduling adjourned hearings or keeping defendants in custody for longer—not to mention the avoidable stress and confusion for victims, defendants and witnesses.
Secondly, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart, thought that my amendment fell short because it would not be right to take a one-size-fits-all approach, given that there are various levels of case complexity. But I agree with that: the point is explicitly acknowledged in my amendment, which specifies that the number of hours’ experience required should reflect case complexity and, crucially, should be agreed between the department and “relevant professional bodies”. In discussions with the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, over the past few weeks, it has been repeatedly pointed out to those of us supporting this amendment that there are no fewer than 1,000 different types of assignment. The mind boggles—well, mine does anyway. I would certainly love to see a list spelling out exactly what those 1,000 different categories are.
Thirdly, the obstacle of the rules on public procurement was raised as a reason why my amendment’s provision for the NRPSI registration was unacceptable. I still find this a bit odd and confusing as an argument, as the NRPSI is not a membership organisation, nor a supplier. It is worth remembering that it was established at the request of the judiciary in the first place after the interpreting calamity of the Begum case. It is surely just akin to the professional registers in many other fields, such as teaching, medicine or law, from which we would always expect and require practitioners to be drawn. There appears to be at least one significant precedent in that the Metropolitan Police Service mandates that all its listed interpreters must have continuous NRPSI registration. Of its annual 25,000 face-to-face assigned interpreters, only 2.5% are not NRPSI registered, and then for a very good reason—for example, to do with the need for a rare language speaker or the need for a super-speedy appointment in highly urgent or dangerous situations.
I accept, of course, that this whole system is complex and that there are inherent challenges to any solution that I have not touched on today, such as the supply chain of interpreters. I also acknowledge that the wording of my amendment may not be perfect, although I have tweaked it since Committee to try to build in a transition period, as suggested in Committee by the noble Lord, Lord Marks. But I have been encouraged by the approach of the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, in our discussions in that he acknowledges that if there are improvements that could or should be made, it would be sensible for them to be made before the current contract is due to be retendered in 2023. The challenge, of course, is to get to the bottom of precisely what those improvements are, and I am extremely concerned that there should be no more delay in establishing and achieving them than absolutely necessary. The current contract expires in October 2023, so presumably a revised tender will need to be issued some months before that in order to achieve a seamless transition.
With this in mind, we raised with the Minister the possible option of conducting a detailed and independent inquiry into exactly what the standards of qualifications and experience and other matters should be. I am hopeful that the Minister might be able to say something about that proposal when he comes to reply today. Such an inquiry would need to be conducted on a genuinely independent basis and cover all aspects of the MoJ’s responsibility for interpreting services, with a commitment to apply its findings to the next contract. I believe that such an independent inquiry would also have the credibility to help attract back into public service the many hundreds of professional interpreters who have left because of low pay, bad conditions or a lack of acknowledgement of their professional status. This exercise would have the potential to make a long-term strategic impact on the service, as well as knocking into shape the terms of the next contract. I look forward to the Minister’s response and beg to move.
My Lords, I pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, for pursuing this important matter, and to the Minister for his engagement on a number of occasions with those of us who support the noble Baroness and are concerned about this. During those discussions, I expressed the view that it is striking that there is such a radical difference of view between the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, with her enormous expertise in this area, and civil servants as to how the system is working in practice. I therefore suggested to the Minister that one way forward in this important area would be for him to agree that there should be an independent assessment—an independent inquiry—of an outfacing nature that can rely on the expertise of the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, and others in order to inform the department as to the way forward. That seems to be a constructive way forward, and I very much hope that the Minister will be able to say that the department is prepared to do that.
My Lords, I too pay tribute to my noble friend Lady Coussins for the determination with which she has pursued this argument. As a user of the court, it is crucial to have complete confidence in the interpreter. Most of us do not have the complete gift of language—which perhaps my noble friend has—over a wide range of languages. You have to rely on the interpreter; confidence in what the interpreter is doing is crucial to the way the proceedings are conducted, so the highest standards should be aimed for. I must say, I am surprised that it is taking so long for the advice my noble friend has offered to be accepted and put into practice.
My Lords, as my noble friend Lord Beith explained, the amendment would extend the position of trust to include people who coach, teach, train or instruct on a regular basis in dance, drama and music.
I am sure the Minister will correct me if I am wrong, but I seem to remember him saying in Committee that the Government wanted evidence that these amendments were necessary before they were able to accept them. On 20 October 2021, the Guardian reported that a former ballet teacher and principal dancer at the English National Ballet had been sentenced to nine years in prison for more than a dozen counts of sexual assault against his students—I think that is dance. On 30 September last year the Sun reported that a drama teacher had been convicted of sexually abusing girls as young as 15 over five years, abusing his position of power and targeting teens who wanted to become actresses by sexually assaulting them at the theatre group he had set up in Northamptonshire—I think that is drama. The Edinburgh Evening News reported on 22 December, just last month, that a retired music teacher in Scotland had been sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment for raping and sexually abusing former pupils—I think that is music.
There is the evidence. What is stopping the Government now? We strongly support my noble friend’s amendments.
My Lords, the noble Lords, Lord Beith and Lord Paddick, make a very strong case. Clause 46 addresses a serious mischief: abuse of trust to gain sexual advantage. Like them, I cannot understand why this is to be addressed only in the context of sport and religion and not in the context of dance, drama and music.
I have one other question for the Minister. I also cannot understand why sport is only to be covered in relation to games in which physical skill is the predominant factor. What if there is an abuse of trust by someone who is training young people in chess or bridge? Why is it not equally objectionable if they take sexual advantage of those young people? Why should that not be included within the scope of the offence?
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for giving those very good and relevant examples of abuses of trust in dance, music and drama. I remember the points that the Minister made when we had this debate in Committee: he did indeed ask for examples, and I thank the noble Lord for providing them.
Surely, the similarity in everything that we are talking about is the nature of the relationship. It is a trusting relationship where a lot of time may well be spent alone with the young person, and it is open to abuse. The Minister had other arguments about why dance, music and drama should not be included, and I would be interested to hear how he rehearses them, given that there is unanimity in the views expressed in today’s debate. I do not know whether the noble Lord will press his amendment to a vote—I think probably not—nevertheless, I will listen to the Minister’s answer.
As the Minister said, the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, is unable to be in her place tonight. She has asked me to say that she joins me in thanking the Minister, who has engaged with us sympathetically on this topic and secured this welcome change in the law. That is a tribute to his persuasive powers not just in this House but in government.
I hope that the Minister’s remarks tonight will receive as much publicity as his speech in Committee, which, as he said, featured not just in Hansard but elsewhere. He mentioned his appearance—or his remarks’ appearance—on “Have I Got News for You”; well, the news tonight is that this amendment has achieved a welcome change in the law that will be appreciated not just by breastfeeding women but by their partners and relatives.
My Lords, I intervene to ask my noble friend a question. I listened carefully to what he said and I completely support the amendment, but does it go far enough? I cannot find any excuse or justification for anyone who is not a family member to take any photographs of a woman breastfeeding. It would seem from what my noble friend said on the amendment that mens rea has to be proved—there has to be a proven intent to get sexual gratification from it—but why should that be the case? In my view, there can be no justification for anyone outside the family—a stranger—to want to photograph a woman doing this. This is a simple question from my simple little mind.