Armed Forces Bill

Lord Mackay of Clashfern Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 23rd November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lancaster of Kimbolton (Con)]

My Lords, I have much sympathy with these amendments. Back in 2010, when I served in the Committee on the Bill, I proposed similar amendments, so noble Lords may ask why I now express some hesitancy about extending the remit. I suppose it comes from my experience as Minister for the Armed Forces and Minister for Defence Veterans, Reserves and Personnel. When we roll back the clock, if I am entirely honest, in the early days of implementing the Armed Forces covenant we struggled to get traction. It took some time to convince all the local authorities within the United Kingdom to sign up and indeed to get employers to sign up. I am delighted that now we have close to 2,000 signatories to the Armed Forces covenant.

My concern really lies around the fact that, as we continue to extend the width, we may struggle to get buy-in into this if we create yet more of a burden for local authorities in particular. Especially after Covid, as they have had a difficult couple of years, they might not see the benefit of this if we simply overburden them with yet more categories. My suggestion in Committee was not that we should not extend the categories but that we should do it incrementally over a period of time. In many ways, had that been suggested today, I would have been happy to accept this amendment, but that is not the case, which is a shame. During that early stage of the process, we also struggled to demonstrate the benefits of this to veterans.

It is a shame that we have an Armed Forces Bill only once every five years because I do not want to have to wait another five years to slowly extend the remit of the covenant. However, I simply feel that at this stage such a step would be a bit too much too soon, for the reasons that I have tried to explain.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

My Lords, I think it might be convenient for me to speak to my amendments in this group, Amendments 17 and 4. Something about Amendment 4 has been said already and I will not repeat that, but I shall attempt to elaborate on it somewhat.

On Amendment 17, when I was trying to consider this issue more carefully after the Minister’s argument in Committee, I happened to notice that this clause has a curious provision at the beginning: it is the same as the opening clause that was in the 2011 Bill on the Armed Forces covenant report. The only reference to “Armed Forces covenant” here is by dropping the word “report”. That struck me as rather strange in a Bill dealing with the Armed Forces covenant.

My noble friend may be able to put me right on this, but I have not found a definition of that covenant in the Bill. It is true that there is a definition on the website, but the website is not yet by law an Act of Parliament. We have to distinguish between these two. I am happy to think that what I have proposed in Amendment 17 is not very different from what is on the website, but it would at least be in the statute—in the part on definitions and principles that apply to England—and would apply through it.

My main argument, of course, is in relation to Amendment 4. It is right that central government in the form of the Secretary of State, who is responsible to Parliament for the Armed Forces, should be responsible for respecting the Armed Forces covenant. If he does not have a duty to respect it, it is difficult to put that duty on local authorities, health authorities and so on. In Committee, I referred to what I regard as an important example of where this was really necessary. In the first Gulf War, there was a feeling early on—of course, I have no detail on this that I could go into—that there might be poison gas coming from the opposition in Iraq. A possible protection against that gas was provided to some of our Armed Forces. Needless to say, I do not know what it contained, and I do not think local or health authorities knew either. Importantly, therefore, the illnesses of a neurological character contracted by some veterans were thought to be possibly connected to the protection against the poison gas.

As it happened, I do not think the poison gas ever emerged, but some veterans had had this protection and there was a question about that. I sent the Minister a copy of the Library report on this; there was an inquiry into it by one of my judicial colleagues. The eventual opinion expressed by Her Majesty’s Government was that the illness was not sufficiently definite to be called Gulf War syndrome—it was probable that it was due to a variety of things and, therefore, it was not to be classified in that way.

I cannot see how anybody other than the Secretary of State could be responsible for carrying out an investigation of that kind. It is therefore vital that he should have regard to the principles; of course, the areas that he has to have regard to are in the Bill now and not subject to the extensions of Amendment 3 and the other extensions that the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, referred to. It is a simple case of three zones, as it were, in which the Secretary of State has to have regard to the principles. If anybody has to have regard to the principles of the Armed Forces covenant, I should have thought that the Secretary of State responsible to Parliament for the Armed Forces would be the leading person in that capacity.

It is for this reason that I tabled Amendment 4—having benefited from the copyright very kindly given. I look forward to what my noble friend the Minister has to say. I am sure she will have a good answer which will not be good enough. Unless this is accepted by the Government, or some provisional point of view for the future is accepted, I therefore intend to test the opinion of the House on this matter.

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[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I am sure the noble Lord has been listening carefully to the argument that I have been advancing, but I have been trying to distinguish between identified, critical core services—in this case housing, education and health, which the Armed Forces community said mattered most to them—and how we address the delivery of these services. In the main, these services are not delivered by central government but by a range of other agencies, and may be the responsibility of devolved Administrations, in turn delivering them through their agencies. The point I am making is that adding an obligation to central government does not seem in any way to address the need that we have identified that has to be addressed: the current disparity in the delivery of services across the United Kingdom. That, quite simply, is what the Bill is seeking to rectify. That is why trying to attach a covenant obligation to central government is something of a red herring—I do not actually see what it is going to deliver.

Before the noble Lord interrupted me, I was simply explaining, by way of illustration, the point I have just been making: exactly what it has been possible for the Government to do without attaching any statutory obligation on them, and I am not even halfway through my list. At the risk of being tedious with your Lordships, I was also going to mention, finally, a new holistic transition policy that co-ordinates and manages the transition from military to civilian life for service personnel and their families when they leave the Armed Forces. The Defence Transition Services also supports those in that position. We have the Career Transition Partnership, and a range of initiatives and support packages covering a wide range of activity, all of which benefit our Armed Forces personnel. I merely adduce that list to illustrate how alternative processes allow areas of concern to be brought to light more readily and addressed more quickly through other means, if necessary, including action to be taken by central government departments and devolved Administrations, where appropriate.

I think it was the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, who specifically raised the evaluation process. This would feed into our existing commitment to review the overall performance of the covenant duty as part of our post-legislation scrutiny. That review will be submitted to the House of Commons Defence Select Committee and will also be covered in the covenant annual report. This is in addition to regular parliamentary scrutiny, such as Parliamentary Questions and regular reviews by the Select Committee, or whatever form of inquiry Members of the other place and of this House may wish to undertake. The detail of the evaluation process is still being worked on with our stakeholders, but I hope that this background and the outline of the process provides reassurance that it represents a better way forward and that we are committed to continuing our work to mitigate the impact of service life on the Armed Forces community, wherever it may occur.

Listening to some of the contributions, it occurred to me that there may be a misunderstanding of the role of the Armed Forces covenant. My noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern recalled an interesting and arguably disturbing situation, in which it is possible that Armed Forces personnel suffered harm. I undertake to look at that instance in detail; he provided a reference for where I can find more information.

However, I say to my noble and learned friend that central government, and the MoD in particular, are directly responsible for the Armed Forces, and the MoD has always looked after the welfare of service personnel. During the Bill’s passage through this House, we have heard how the support provided has improved, expanded and developed over time, particularly in relation to issues such as mental health. Central government and the MoD answer to Ministers, are held to account in Parliament, and may be held to account by the courts of this land. But the covenant is a separate concept: it is a promise by the nation as a whole to the Armed Forces community that they will not be disadvantaged because of their service. It brings in other organisations, such as health providers and local authorities, who are not directly responsible for the Armed Forces community but whose decisions undoubtedly affect them. It is this new duty that will ensure that these organisations consistently apply the principles of the covenant and can be confident of the legal basis for doing so. Based on this fairly lengthy explanation, I hope that my noble and learned friend will not press his amendment.

I turn to Amendment 17, also tabled by my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern. I know that he is motivated by the best and most honourable of intentions, but I am somewhat unclear about its purpose. The new definition contained in the amendment adds nothing to the duties already set out in the Bill. Indeed, perhaps disquietingly, it seems to decrease the scope of that duty, which I know is not my noble and learned friend’s intention.

We are clear that the Armed Forces covenant is a promise by the nation to support our Armed Forces community. The amendment characterises the scope and character of that promise as an agreement between the Secretary of State and servicepeople. But, with the greatest respect to my noble and learned friend, in doing so, it fails to capture its essence: it is a much broader and more widely embracing concept.

The covenant was framed during a time of great pressure on the Armed Forces community. As I have described at some length, it has been delivered highly successfully in the succeeding decade because it captures the spirit of appreciation and voluntary support for that community from people of every walk of life across the United Kingdom. This voluntary spirit is why it is called a covenant and framed as something far greater than the more transactional approach that this amendment could engender. To express the covenant in the way proposed by this amendment goes against the spirit of the covenant and the many successful initiatives that it has produced, built on the widespread admiration and support to which I have referred.

The Armed Forces covenant is described on the government website for the Armed Forces, and on the front of the annual report, as

“an Enduring Covenant Between the People of the United Kingdom, Her Majesty's Government—and—All those who serve or have served in the Armed Forces of the Crown and their Families.”

That definition is not in statue, but the principles of the covenant appear in the Armed Forces Act 2006. That is why this Bill has been taking forward greater detail, to try to assist the delivery of vital services for our Armed Forces community.

The description I have just given of the covenant far better captures its nature, which provides the framework through which support for our Armed Forces community can thrive and grow. I thank your Lordships for indulging me with patience and courtesy, as these were important points which had to be addressed at length. In view of the explanation I have given, I hope my noble and learned friend will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for her very detailed answer to my amendment. It was clear to me, from the beginning of this provision titled “Armed Forces Covenant Report” in the 2011 Act, that all that had been done to make any references to the Armed Forces covenant in this was to delete the word “report”. But it seemed to me that, in the ordinary course of statutory interpretation, you need to know what you are talking about, and I was surprised—I thought I must have missed something, though the Minister now confirms that I did not—that there was nothing in statute to define the Armed Forces of the Crown covenant. A covenant is a contract, and it is obvious that the people of the United Kingdom are represented in this agreement by the Secretary of State. Therefore, it seems to me odd that the Secretary of State is not prepared to have regard to the principles given at the opening of this provision. Of course, the term “Secretary of State” includes the Secretary of State for Defence and other Secretaries of State as well, if that is relevant to the provision in question. I find it hard to have the Government of the United Kingdom say that they are not prepared to be bound to have regard to the principles of the covenant.

If I should by any chance be successful, this will go back to the House of Commons, and the Commons will have to ask themselves whether it is reasonable that the Government of this country should refuse to be bound to have regard to the principles of the Armed Forces covenant. I do not think the Government intend that, but that is the effect of leaving this out. Having this on a website is not equivalent, as yet, to having it in law—the statute book is still distinct from a website. It rather comforts me that the definition on the website includes the Government. I think that something of this kind is necessary, and I had rather hoped that the Minister might think of Third Reading as a time to put in a definition, but there is no offer of that kind, and I understand why she is not a position to do that.

I thank all who have supported me, as I think all who have spoken apart from the Minister have, which is a very good situation so far as I am concerned. I am not concerned about anything except that the Armed Forces covenant should be as effective as possible in law in our country. I do not subscribe to the other extensions that were being suggested in amendments because I can see that there is power to do that and, as and when resources are available, it would be right to bring that in by regulation.

In the meantime, I very much regret to tell my noble friend that in all conscience I do not feel able to withdraw the amendment. It is a matter that has to be faced by those who are responsible for this if they are not prepared to subscribe to having regard to the principles of the Armed Forces covenant.

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Moved by

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

4: Clause 8, page 9, line 18, at end insert—
“(za) the Secretary of State;” Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would place the same legal responsibility to have “due regard” to the Armed Forces Covenant on central government as the Bill currently requires of local authorities and other public bodies.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

I move that the opinion of the House be taken.

Armed Forces Bill

Lord Mackay of Clashfern Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 27th October 2021 Grand Committee

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

My Lords, I have put my name to the amendment because I think it is extremely important. The covenant with the Armed Forces is an agreement putting obligations on our country in favour of people serving in the Armed Forces and those who have served in the Armed Forces. The covenant therefore contains specific obligations, which have been listed. It is true that in practical terms most of those will be local; if one wanted some health help, normally one would get that locally. It is therefore quite natural that the local authorities have a responsibility, but there seem to be quite serious possibilities that veterans and acting members of the Armed Forces will want government help.

One illustration that came to my mind when thinking about this before Second Reading was in relation to the first Iraq war. Noble Lords may remember that there was serious concern before and as the war started that our troops might be subject to a form of poison gas that would be very damaging to them. It was suspected that it was a gas of a particular kind. Exactly what the basis was for that I did not know, but it certainly resulted in protection being handed out to many of those in our services taking part in the first Iraq war.

When the war was over, it was discovered that some people who had served in the Armed Forces were beginning to suffer from a strange, rather neurological type of disease. There was a question about whether the disease had been caused by the protection that had been given to them against the gas. The gas, I may say, never emerged, so the protection turned out not to be necessary, but the protection had been given and could have had its own effect on those to whom it was administered.

That problem, of whether it was a consequence of the prescription, was a difficult and very deep question of medical research. It took quite a long time, as your Lordships may remember, and there was some dispute among the medics as to whether it was so. That is a special illustration of the necessity for the Secretary of State for Health, for example, to be involved because you could not expect the local authority or the local health trust to be responsible for looking into that national problem.

As one approaches this covenant, one also has to remember that it has obligations. That is not just a sort of wishful thinking; it has specific obligations. When the Bill says, as I hope the Act will, “have regard to the covenant”, it means looking to see what obligations in the covenant affect me. If I am a local authority, a local health authority or a local education authority, it will be the obligations in the covenant which have bearing on my responsibility. I therefore regard it as a close legal obligation that is created by the Bill to support those in the Armed Forces presently serving, and the veterans.

As the Minister has said, of course, the nature of the help that veterans require may be rather different from the help that service people require. For example, on moving between areas, if you have medical care in one area and have to move you may well have problems registering. There are quite a lot of problems nowadays in some places for somebody coming into a district in getting on to the medical register of a practice. That kind of thing can readily arise in relation to the local authority.

I have no doubt whatever that if the local authority has an obligation in a particular way, the finance for that is required under the local authority financial provision because this is one of the statutory provisions that are binding on the local authority. I regard the Bill as putting quite a fixed and rather balanced obligation on local authorities, but I see no reason whatever why it should not include central government. It will put obligations on them only in respect of an obligation in the covenant which applies to them at a particular time. In the example I have given, it would apply to the Government when a question was raised as to whether what they had done in the way of seeking to protect our people against a gas had in fact caused such a neurological condition. You would not expect the local health authority to be able to deal with that sort of problem; it would require the considerable resources of research that this country can command to see whether it was a cause and, if so, how it could be cured.

It is extremely important that the Government—the Secretary of State, as our amendment says—should be responsible. This provision would not put any responsibility on him or her that is not already in the covenant, so far as it affects him or her. I am not obliged to do anything under the covenant, except where an obligation encompasses me. The Secretary of State would not be put under any obligation which it was not a proper reading of the covenant to allot to him or her. I very much support this amendment. I mentioned it to my noble friend the Minister in general terms, based on my example of the first war in Iraq. I hope that the sensible effect of this amendment will be appreciated and that we can get it into the Bill.

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[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My Lords, again this has been a fascinating debate and I arise with trepidation when one of the contributors is my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern. A number of significant points have been made and I will try to address them as best I can.

Amendment 9, as has been discussed, centres on the desire to make central government departments subject to the duty of due regard. Again, to provide some context, we designed the new duty to initially focus on the three core functions of healthcare, education and housing because, as I indicated in debating a previous amendment, these are prominent among the concerns of both Armed Forces personnel in service and veterans. They not only reflect issues that are already in statute, but also address the most commonly raised issues affecting the day-to-day lives of our Armed Forces community.

As our Armed Forces are a very mobile population, frequently moving from local authority to local authority, it is often the variation of service delivery across local areas that can inadvertently cause disadvantage. Consequently, it is vital that those delivering these key public services are sufficiently aware of the challenges faced by the Armed Forces community when accessing these services. It is right that we look at this area first.

We also took into account that central Government are responsible for the overall strategic direction for national policy and for delivering on the manifesto on which they were elected. However, the responsibility for the delivery of these functions and their impact rests at more local level. I would argue that Governments are answerable, ultimately, to an electorate when a general election comes round and, before that point, they are most certainly accountable to Parliament, and that is an accountability no Government would ever take lightly.

Senior engagement regularly takes place between the MoD, the Cabinet Office, other government departments and the devolved Administrations to drive an increase in covenant awareness across national healthcare, and housing and education policy to improve the lives of the Armed Forces community. Additionally, the Government’s delivery of the covenant is, as we all know, subject to parliamentary scrutiny through the existing annual legal obligation to report progress delivering the covenant across the UK to Parliament. This is in addition to regular parliamentary scrutiny through other channels, such as Parliamentary Questions, reviews by the House of Commons Defence Select Committee and debates called by Members with a particular interest in certain aspects of defence.

My noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern raised in support of his argument the certainly interesting event that occurred during the first Gulf War. As he explained, in anticipation that troops might be exposed to gas issues and had to be protected against that, protective equipment was handed out. As he indicated, people then suffered from a neurological type of disease on their return and tried to identify where it had come from. As my noble and learned friend said, they had not actually been exposed to any toxic gas, so the suspicion was that it was from the protective equipment. He adduced this instance in support of his argument that central government should be brought in.

I have two observations on that analogy. The emphasis on what the Government are doing in this Bill and what we have endeavoured to make possible is, first, to give the covenant a statutory impact, which is innovatory and very important; and secondly, to try to make it much clearer across the United Kingdom, for the whole panoply of services being delivered in respect of housing, education and health, how there needs to be greater awareness and understanding, and a much more universal approach to delivering these services to personnel who may be in service in the Armed Forces or veterans. That is about ensuring that, when they need services, they can access them.

The question that my noble and learned friend poses about the instance that he describes, with the reference to the first Gulf War and the particular situation that developed there, is a legitimate illustration to give the Committee. I accept that that was a serious situation, but the question running through my mind as he spoke was that surely the important thing there was remedy. This is not about people needing something, not being able to get it, and making sure that the providers of that service are much more alert to providing it; it is about a situation where, under orders of government, Armed Forces were sent abroad and then apparently—I do not know the facts myself—experienced neurological disorders when they returned, and considered that was attributable to protective equipment that was defective, with which they had been issued.

That is not a complete analogy with what the Bill is trying to do. If you ask what solution was needed, the answer, quite simply, is that those people who suffered in that way needed to be given advice and helped, and needed to find a legal solution, if that was what was available to them. I do not know what happened to that particular group of people, but I imagine that the first thing they needed was medical support, which I hope that they got. I imagine that, within the Armed Forces, there would be a concern about the manifestation of that situation and a desire to support, but the bottom line is that, if the culpable body were the Government and the MoD, if these individuals sought and obtained good legal advice the MoD would find itself, quite properly, the subject of litigation. That is how the solution would be sought. If the court was satisfied that the negligence alleged by those who had suffered was proved, remedies would follow.

I say with the greatest respect to my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay that I absolutely understand what he is driving at, but I still do not see a complete dovetail analogy with what we seek to deliver through the Bill. The situation that my noble and learned friend outlines is serious. It may very well happen in future, but the MoD is very vigilant and conscious that if it falls down on its duty to its own people it will expect to be sued—and it is. Not only is it sued and expected to provide redress but support is given to people who find themselves in that grouping. Including central government in the Bill is unnecessary. The Government are already subject to a legal obligation to report on the delivery of the covenant, and there are many and sufficient levels of public scrutiny.

Let us bear in mind that the Bill is about trying to improve the levels of awareness across the United Kingdom and a better and more universal provision of essential services for those members of our Armed Forces and veterans who need them. My problem with the amendment is that, were it accepted, we would create an obligation on central government. We cannot impose a comparable obligation on devolved Governments because that would be incompetent and not within the scope of the Bill. We would then once again create disparity rather than universality across the United Kingdom. We would have central government bound in one way but not devolved Administrations. That is not a desirable outcome.

I am not at all immune to the importance of the arguments advanced by my noble and learned friend. He makes an important point. The situation to which he refers was grave. I suggest that that can be addressed by existing means. It does not need the inclusion of central government in the covenant, which, indeed, would not necessarily have prevented the problem. The question is: how do we provide a remedy to people who have been affected by such an unfortunate development? My response would be: by providing support. Advice is available—legal advice if that is required—for people to follow through the remedies they seek. It is not necessary to bring central government into the legislation. It is much more important that we focus on what we are trying to do as a first step, make sure we get that working properly and then, as we have been discussing, consider whether there is a need to expand that provision of duty.

I am unable to agree that this amendment is either necessary or would help the situation; it could create a difficulty where one does not currently exist. In those circumstances, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

My Lords, I never mentioned negligence. I am not suggesting for a minute that there was necessarily any negligence. The Armed Forces put in requirements for the people who were taking part for protection against what they thought might come. That was a perfectly reasonable thing to do. Some of them took the treatment. The question was: what was the result of that? That was a question for the Secretary of State. It was him who had to look into that; it was a national question. It had nothing whatever to do with negligence or some other basis of claim. The claim was because the Government had approved a covenant, which I said should protect them in respect of their work in the Armed Forces and after they had left. That is what this was—nothing more, nothing less.

I am sorry to interrupt, but I have to make it clear that there is no suggestion in my argument that there was any negligence or any sort of enforcement available at the time. This is a new remedy, and it should be given.

Armed Forces Bill

Lord Mackay of Clashfern Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 7th September 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for the very clear way she introduced this very important Bill. I join those who have spoken already very eloquently in thanking the Armed Forces. Sometimes that is particularly important on issues that they may feel have not been particularly successful. I think of those who gave their lives in Afghanistan and those who suffered very serious injuries there. Today they sometimes wonder just exactly what it was for. I do not know whether your Lordships are always able to answer that question; I must say that I find it quite difficult to know, except in relation to the idea of keeping out of existence a safe place for the development of terrorist organisations.

I associate myself very much with all that has been said in appreciation of the Armed Forces. We are extraordinarily in debt to the Armed Forces of the Crown and those who support them in every possible way. The Armed Forces covenant is some token of that. It is important that it is sufficiently specific to make it really worth while. For example, it is questionable whether it will be successful without incorporating central government, with its policy responsibilities, into the three principles mentioned that apply to local authorities to come up with possible results. Why they should not apply also to central government and the devolved Administrations I do not feel confident to answer, but I look forward to hearing an answer from the Minister in due course.

This Bill is an important reminder of the principle of our constitution that the Armed Forces of the Crown are not authorised by a statute that has no end. The statute that authorises the existence of the Armed Forces is one that always has a terminus. That is an important part of our constitution, and the need for this particular Bill is a very important reminder of that.

The last thing I want to say is that in relation to the previous Bill—the veterans Bill—the noble Lord, Lord Dannatt, and his colleagues pointed out the very difficult situation that some members of the Armed Forces have encountered as a result of experiences they have had in the course of their service that raised issues of possible criminality. I was not alone in being very moved by that account, and I wish that we could have done something about it then, but it was obviously very important to get that Bill through and therefore the noble Lord, Lord Dannatt, and his colleagues graciously decided not to press that amendment at the end of the consideration here. I am glad that the Government have fulfilled their promise to bring it forward now, and I sincerely hope that the noble Lord, Lord Dannatt, who will follow me, is pleased with that.

Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill

Lord Mackay of Clashfern Excerpts

Report stage
Tuesday 13th April 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Boyce (CB) [V]]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 6. The Bill sets out to make better provision about legal proceedings for our Armed Forces when they are or have been engaged on overseas operations. The Bill’s significant emphasis on presumption against prosecution as a way of relieving some of the stress of legal proceedings implies that that solves the problem. However, it is the investigation and reinvestigation process that is so debilitating and wears people down. Prosecution may even come as a form of relief. It is important to bear in mind that even when the presumption is in place, there is no total lifting of the threat of prosecution after five years. This can still happen if the Attorney-General sees fit.

However, that is all by the way. As I have mentioned, the investigation process needs to be addressed to ensure that it remains relevant, that a watchful, supervisory eye is kept on the process so that it does not drift, that there are timelines with which investigators have to comply and that reinvestigations are launched only after the most careful judicial oversight. Amendment 6 sets out to cover all these points, as was so well articulated by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford. For that reason, it has my support.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con) [V]]

My Lords, I shall say something about Amendments 1 and 6. Before I do, I draw attention to a ministerial Statement that has been put in the Library about overseas operations in which the MoD indicates its support for service personnel in these situations. The Statement—I hope your Lordships have access to a copy of it—says that the Overseas Operations Bill was introduced

“to provide greater legal protections to Armed Forces personnel and veterans serving on military operations overseas. The Bill would provide a better … legal framework for dealing with allegations and claims arising from future overseas operations and recognising the unique burden and pressures placed on our service personnel.

As part of the debate on this Bill, there has rightly been a focus on the support which MoD provides to those personnel who may find themselves subject to investigations and prosecutions. We are grateful to right honourable and honourable Members of both Houses for the interest they have taken in this issue and their commitment to ensuring that service personnel and veterans who are impacted by historical allegations are properly supported.


As a matter of MoD policy, service personnel are entitled to legal guidance at public expense when they face criminal allegations that relate to actions taken during their service and where they were performing their duties. This principle is at the heart of the MOD’s approach to supporting our people and is enshrined in the relevant Defence Instruction Notices. It is a responsibility that the MOD takes extremely seriously, and we keep our policies under review to ensure that they are appropriate and tailored.


Since the early days of Iraq and Afghanistan, the Armed Forces have learned lessons on better resourcing and professionalising support to those involved in inquiries or investigations arising from operations, and the mechanisms for providing this support have been transformed in recent years. The way this is delivered and by whom will depend on the specific circumstances of the case, the point which has been reached in the proceedings and, most importantly, the needs of the individual concerned.


Any individual who is investigated by the Service Police is entitled to legal representation as well as the support of an Assisting Officer who can offer advice on the process and procedure and signpost welfare resources. The individual’s Commanding Officer and Chain of Command have overall responsibility for the person’s welfare and for ensuring access to the requisite support.


Individuals who are interviewed as suspects under caution will be entitled to free and independent legal advice for this stage of the investigation. Subsequently, legal funding for service personnel and veterans facing criminal allegations can either be provided through the Armed Forces Legal Aid Scheme (AFLAS) or through the Chain of Command.


Where the Chain of Command accepts funding responsibility this is means-test exempt and therefore no personal contribution will be required. The Armed Forces Criminal Legal Aid Authority (AFCLAA) will act as a conduit for the provision of publicly funded legal representation on behalf of the chain of command, including all aspects of financial and case management. However, if available evidence suggests the individual was doing something clearly outside the scope of their duty, then it would not be appropriate for that person to receive this Chain of Command funding.


All other serving personnel and veterans facing criminal proceedings prosecuted through the service justice system, and who are not covered by the Chain of Command funding, may apply for legal aid through the AFCLAA and may be required to make a personal contribution, determined by means testing, if funded through the Armed Forces Legal Aid Scheme. This is in line with civilian legal aid scheme.


There is an important exemption from the means testing requirement, which has been waived in criminal cases arising from our Iraq or Afghanistan operations heard in the Service Court. Separately, legal advice and support is also available whenever people are required to give evidence at inquests and inquiries and in litigation and this is co-ordinated by MOD.


We also recognise that for service personnel and veterans who are involved in these processes, legal guidance by itself is not enough. This is why we have developed a comprehensive package of welfare support to ensure we deliver on our commitment to offer ongoing support to veterans.


As part of delivering on this commitment, the Army Operational Legacy Branch (AOLB) was established in 2020 in order to coordinate the Army’s support to those involved in legacy cases. Fundamental to this is ensuring that welfare and legal support is provided to all service personnel and veterans involved in operational legacy processes. The AOLB provides a central point of contact and optimises the welfare network already in place through the Arms and Service Directorates and the network of Regimental Headquarters and Regimental Associations. Veterans UK are also closely engaged in providing support to veterans and, when required, the Veterans Welfare Service will allocate a welfare manager to support individual veterans. Although the AOLB has been established to provide an Army focus to legacy issues, the support it provides is extended to the other services.


This is provided in addition to the range of welfare and mental health support that is routinely offered to all our people. The potential impact of operations on a service person’s mental health is well recognised and there are policy and procedures in place to help manage and mitigate these impacts as far as possible. The MOD recognises that any operational deployment can result in the development of a medical or psychiatric condition and that service personnel may require help before, during and after deployment. All Armed Forces personnel are supported by dedicated and comprehensive mental health resources. Defence Mental Health Services are configured to provide community-based mental health care in line with national best practice.


In terms of support for those who have left the forces, veterans are able to access all NHS provided mental health services wherever they live in the country. As health is devolved and services have been developed according to local populations’ needs, service specification varies. This can mean bespoke veteran pathways or ensuring an awareness of veterans’ needs. All veterans will be seen on clinical need. What is important is that best practice is shared between the home nations and there are several forums in place to provide this.


The Office for Veterans’ Affairs works closely with the MOD and departments across government, the devolved Administrations, charities and academia to ensure the needs of veterans are met.”


I am sorry that that was a rather long but, I think, very comprehensive statement of what is required. Of course, it is not only applicable to operational situations overseas but is also important in reference to all the Armed Forces. It would therefore seem right that this kind of thing should be legislated for in the Armed Forces Bill when it comes along.

I turn briefly to Amendments 1 and 6 in light of that provision. In my submission, Amendment 1 departs from a very clear statement of the situation in which particular prosecutions should not start or be continued, towards a very vague one where the decision is put on the shoulders of the prosecutor, who must decide whether a fair trial is likely to be damaged by the delay.

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[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I will speak briefly in support of the collection of amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie of Downpatrick. It does not take me to remind your Lordships that this is a very difficult moment in Northern Ireland and not one to be doing anything to undermine, or anything that could be interpreted as undermining, the Good Friday agreement.

I hear the endorsement from the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, of the Government’s position: that the Bill must do nothing to jeopardise the ECHR and the agreement. With respect, however, that view is not shared by human rights analysts in the United Kingdom, in Northern Ireland and internationally. Of course, in this respect, even the perception of jeopardising the convention, and therefore the agreement, is a significant problem.

In the context of Northern Ireland, the problem stems from going down this road of de facto—or attempted—immunities and statutes of limitation in the first place. The amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, further demonstrates the difficulty with opening this Pandora’s box and going for limits on prosecution and on suits against the Government rather than bolstering the robustness and timeliness of investigations and providing adequate support for veterans and serving personnel.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con) [V]]

My Lords, all the amendments that the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie of Downpatrick, has put before your Lordships would delete from this Bill its application to Northern Ireland. In other words, the result of these amendments would be that this defence Bill would not affect Northern Ireland.

It is vital that all defence legislation for the United Kingdom applies to the United Kingdom because the purpose of that body of legislation is the protection and defence of the whole United Kingdom. Therefore, whatever solution may be necessary for what the noble Baroness speaks of, it certainly cannot be to delete from the defence legislation of Northern Ireland an Act that will affect the defence legislation of the rest of the United Kingdom. I strongly suggest that this is not a feasible way of proceeding. I am all in favour of her having a meeting with the Minister in early course— I hope that the Minister will have time for that—but I do not think that we in your Lordships’ House can possibly accept this solution.

So far as the amendment in the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, and the noble Lord, Lord Lexden, is concerned, the question of how to deal with this matter is very tricky indeed. I have been anxious about it for a long time, and I do not see it getting any easier to solve. I do not feel able to comment on the wisdom of that amendment at this time, but I would be happy to hear what the Minister has to say about it.

[Lord Hendy (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, it is a privilege to follow the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, although on this occasion I do not reach the same conclusion as he does. I support the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie of Downpatrick, for the reasons that she has eloquently given. I wish to add to that only by emphasising that it is not acceptable to undermine the commitment to the European Convention on Human Rights provided by the Belfast agreement. Recent events have emphasised the importance of upholding and, as my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti pointed out, being seen to uphold, both the letter and the spirit of that agreement.

Overseas Operations (Service Personnel and Veterans) Bill

Lord Mackay of Clashfern Excerpts

Committee stage & Lords Hansard
Tuesday 9th March 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Dubs (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow my noble friend Lady Massey, as a fellow member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. I appreciate that this House has a wealth of military experience. I am humbled by the knowledge that there is such experience in the House, and I fully respect the Members who have served so gallantly and at senior levels. I cannot match that, but I did once pay a very brief visit to Afghanistan, to Camp Bastion and Kandahar, during difficult times there, and saw for myself for just a few days the conditions there during a tense period. It hardly qualifies me to be an expert, but it means that I have some strong visual impressions of what the situation there was like.

My noble friend Lady Massey has already spoken to amendments that would have the effect that the presumption against prosecution would apply after 10 years instead of five. My amendment would remove the presumption against prosecution altogether, as recommended by the recent report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, although I am bound to say that many of the arguments used in relation to five or 10 years would also apply to removing the presumption altogether.

The Service Prosecuting Authority has been in charge of the prosecution process, and there is no suggestion of excessive or unjustified prosecutions. Indeed, there are already some safeguards. The Service Prosecuting Authority would bring a prosecution only, first, where there was sufficient evidence that the accused committed the offence and, secondly, where the prosecution was in the public interest. These seem to be pretty good safeguards and would prevent vexatious or unfounded prosecutions.

As they stand, Clauses 1 to 7 of the Bill would contravene the United Kingdom’s international obligations under international humanitarian law, specifically the law of armed conflict. They could also contravene the United Nations Convention against Torture. There would be the risk of prosecution of our armed forces under the laws of another state and, above all, the risk of prosecution under the terms of the International Criminal Court. That court has the jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide perpetrated by UK personnel if the UK is “unwilling or unable” to do so. It would be hazardous in the extreme to pass a Bill with measures in it that would run the risk of our service men and women being prosecuted by the International Criminal Court.

The reputation of our Armed Forces has traditionally been second to none. I am concerned that, all over the world, people are looking at this legislation and wondering whether there is not some constraint on the reputation of our Armed Forces or, indeed, whether that reputation might not suffer through this legislation. I very much hope that, when we come to it, we shall be able to amend the Bill so as to strengthen the position of our Armed Forces, either by getting rid of Clauses 1 to 7 altogether or at least increasing the time period from five to 10 years. I am happy to be a member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, and our report has set a very good basis for the debate that is to follow.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con) [V]]

My Lords, I wish to discuss only the question of whether it should be five or 10 years. It has to be remembered that this is in relation to a prosecution, so the only outcome of this is a criminal sanction. It does not of itself do any good to anyone else but, of course, gives a feeling of justice when the sanction is in accordance with what the people who have complained have suffered. Against this, it has to be remembered that the strain that comes with waiting under a dark shadow of a possible prosecution is quite considerable.

I have two experiences that I remember very well in relation to the feeling of strain associated with the possibility of a prosecution. The first was shortly after I became Lord Chancellor, when there was a huge allegation of fraud in relation to a company group. The number of people in the prosecution was quite large. The learned judge who presided decided that the case was too big to be dealt with by a single jury, and therefore decided that a good part of the case should be postponed until the first part had been tried. I received a considerable number of complaints that the pressure of waiting—it was not five years, but it was quite a long time—was sufficient to make it very difficult for people who were ultimately found innocent. The delay is something that has to be taken into account as an addition to the strain on the people involved.

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[Baroness Massey of Darwen (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, again I am speaking as a member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, and the amendments are again based on the views of expert witnesses who contributed to its report. I shall speak to Amendments 4, 7 and 8. They relate to Clause 3 and would delete the requirement to give “particular weight” in any prosecution decision after five years to a person having an impaired ability to exercise self-control or to exercise sound judgment while being deployed on operations overseas. The amendments would omit Clause 3(2)(a), (3) and (4). Their concern is similar to concerns in Clause 11 in relation to limitations on bringing proceedings under the Human Rights Act.

The Joint Committee on Human Rights report on the Bill explains in chapter 3 that:

“In domestic law the prosecution would take into account a person’s mental health as part of the decision as to whether a prosecution is in the public interest—and this is a factor that would currently already apply to prosecutions of members of the Armed Forces. Moreover, a person who is not fit to plead at the time of trial would not be assessed for the … mental element … of an offence. A defendant could raise a plea of insanity as a defence if at the time of the offence their mental condition was so impaired that they were unable to understand the act they were doing or that it was wrong.”


Paragraph 77 of the report states:

“The MoD should not be sending Armed Forces personnel on deployment who are unable to make ‘sound judgements’, who cannot ‘exercise self-control’ or whose mental health is so severely affected that the MoD does not consider that they should be responsible for their criminal actions. Moreover, if a member of the Armed Forces becomes unable to make ‘sound judgements’, can no longer ‘exercise self-control’ or where there are significant concerns about their mental health, then there should be adequate systems in place to relieve that person of their operational duties, remove them from the conflict situation (where appropriate) and give them the support that they need.”


The Joint Committee on Human Rights expressed concern at paragraph 76 that,

“the Bill does not provide any incentives for the military hierarchy to ensure that members of the Armed Forces who are mentally unfit to be deployed get removed from operational duties and given the support that they need. Instead it includes an impediment to prosecuting a person whose judgement may be impaired, who lacks adequate self-control or whose mental health may have been affected”.

Service personnel are trained to deal with complex situations, and there are undoubtedly high-stress situations in combat. Due account must be taken of these complexities as part of any decision on whether to bring a prosecution. However, it should not be part of a statutory barrier to bringing prosecutions when they are in the public interest.

The Joint Committee on Human Rights does not consider that there is any solid basis for including additional requirements that could risk granting de facto impunity to those who have committed crimes on the grounds that the perpetrator lacked sound judgment or could not exercise self-control beyond the threshold already established in criminal law. For that reason, the committee recommends deleting Clause 3(2)(a), (3) and (4). I beg to move.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con) [V]]

My Lords, the question is when this condition intervenes. It would be one thing to send a person over to a foreign assignment with that condition at that time, but there must be a risk that the impetus of foreign work in certain conditions would bring about these conditions in the person in question. There is therefore a real question as to whether or not the matter of the investigation discloses that the person in question became subject to that condition as a result of his being in the operation abroad. It does not necessarily mean that a person is sent into the work with that kind of condition. I would have thought that that distinction was quite important since the idea of the clause seems to be that they look to see whether or not the conditions under which the military man or woman has been working have produced these results, so far as their mental health is concerned.

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[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I am pleased, as always, to speak after the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie of Downpatrick, in support of her amendment, supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, and my noble friend Lord Hain, who is of course a former Northern Ireland Secretary.

I need not repeat the point about the importance of the Belfast agreement—it is well known to everyone in your Lordships’ House—or explain the matters that the noble Baroness in self-deprecating fashion referred to as “technical”. These are not of course just technical matters, because the Belfast agreement is an international treaty. However, I will pre-empt any doubts that some sceptics may have about the importance of these rather neat amendments.

The Belfast agreement is not just about what happens in Northern Ireland but about the law and the values in relation to all communities in Northern Ireland and indeed on the island of Ireland. That is why it is so important that, even though the Bill is about overseas operations—not about operations in Northern Ireland itself—it is about the law and the values as they apply to people who may seek redress in the Northern Ireland courts, even if it is in relation to overseas operations in which they served or potentially argued they were otherwise victims.

I urge noble Lords to take these amendments extremely seriously, not least in the context of the group we have just heard about. The Minister and I may disagree about such things as whether I am right or wrong in my plain view that many aspects of the Bill violate the ECHR, but at least these amendments would allow where possible any wriggle room to be used for interpretation so that we do not fall foul of that precious agreement that has been so vital to maintaining relative peace for such a long time.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con) [V]]

My Lords, these amendments are designed on the assumption that provisions in the Bill might be contrary to the human rights convention and, of course, the Human Rights Act. I regard it as 110% essential that the Belfast agreement is fully respected and implemented. I have therefore supported this amendment on the view that, since a question has been raised about it, it is right that it should be thoroughly checked and that, if necessary, these amendments should be inserted to make sure. I have my doubts as to whether it is necessary but I am all in favour of it being checked in detail by those who drafted the Bill, to make sure that, whatever happens, the Belfast agreement is not damaged in any way by the provisions in the Bill.

[Baroness Suttie (LD) [V]]

This has been an interesting and important short debate. It has previously been made clear that the Bill does not deal with matters relating to Northern Ireland, but I trust that in her concluding remarks the Minister will none the less give full responses to the many important issues raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie, this evening. I believe that it is equally important that the Minister acknowledges that these amendments stem from several very real fears and anxieties.

The first of these fears is that, in their actions and behaviour over recent months, the Government have given cause for concern that they are seeking to water down or reinterpret the Belfast/Good Friday agreement. In her response to these amendments, I hope that the Minister can give some firm reassurances this evening that this is not the case. The second anxiety at the heart of these amendments is that it is somewhat unclear that the Government remain fully committed to the balanced and well-considered approach to legacy issues as set out in the Stormont House agreement. Given that it is now well over a year since New Decade, New Approach was published, can the Minister update the Committee this evening on the Government’s approach to legacy issues in Northern Ireland?

Given that the Minister is not from the Northern Ireland Office, I suspect that she may not be able to give a full response to my question on legacy, so I would be extremely grateful if it would be possible to receive a letter setting down in detail the answer to that question and arrange a meeting to discuss these matters on legacy in more detail.

Investigatory Powers Bill

Lord Mackay of Clashfern Excerpts

Ping Pong (Lords Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 16th November 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord King of Bridgwater (Con)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, said that a majority in this House supported the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, in her amendment, but there is an even bigger majority in this House for ensuring that the Bill becomes law. We are now dealing with a very serious threat, a very serious situation, in which the provisions in the Investigatory Powers Bill are important. As your Lordships know, if the Bill does not make progress now, with the sunset clause on the present arrangements we would be naked in having no provision in law to govern the working of investigatory powers. There is absolutely no doubt that the noble Baroness has done the right thing. We could not possibly go on with this and provoke that risk at this time. Whatever the merits of these amendments—and I have not gone deeply into their merits—there is no doubt that I speak for the overwhelming majority in this House when I say that the Bill has got to become an Act soon so that we have proper provisions in place to defend our country and our citizens against the risks they might otherwise face.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

I express my gratitude for the responsible attitude the noble Baroness has taken in this respect. I know how deeply she feels about the amendment she put forward. Of course, there is good journalism and less good journalism. I am glad to see the noble Lord, Lord Myners, in his place. It is possible to distinguish between what he was talking about and the feeling in respect of Section 40. I particularly want to emphasise the Minister’s words—that this is to be a genuine consultation; in other words, I take it that the Government have not yet made up their mind on this question and therefore, it will be worth while for anyone who has a point of view to express it. Even though the consultation period is slightly shorter than before, it is over Christmas and the New Year, which is perhaps the best time to generate good feelings.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, on pressing this issue over a lengthy period with such determination and vigour. I ought to set out our position. There is inevitably a strong feeling that the Government are seeking a means to go back on the cross-party agreement, the undertakings given to victims and their commitment to implement Section 40 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013. In the Commons yesterday, the Solicitor-General rather gave the game away when he said that the consultation will ask whether Section 40 should be fully commenced, repealed or kept under review. Many fear that the consultation will prove to be a sham. Governments do not suddenly decide to hold a consultation on repealing recent legislation that has not yet been implemented unless that is something they would be happy to do. I suggest that the Minister knows that only too well. I suspect he may well choose to deny that, but the proof of the pudding will be in the outcome of this hastily organised consultation.

The question today is about the stance to take on the Government’s Motion. The noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, has indicated her position—at least, the Minister has done it for her—and it is one with which we agree. Two matters in particular need to be considered. One is the impact on the progress of the Bill. In our most recent discussion of this issue, the Government sought to argue that carrying the amendments concerned could place national security at risk, because it would delay the implementation of the Bill when there is a deadline, in a few weeks’ time, by which it needs to be passed. However, the Government destroyed their argument about a risk to national security by taking longer than they needed over scheduling consideration of our amendments in the Commons. If the Government seriously thought that national security was being put at risk, they would have had the Lords’ amendments considered by the Commons much sooner than they did. However, we are now that much closer to the deadline. Since we support the Bill we do not wish to start raising credible doubts over whether it will become an Act within the required timescale.

The second matter concerns the role of this House. This is usually described as inviting the Commons, the elected House, where deemed appropriate, to think again about aspects of or gaps in proposed legislation. We have done that twice in respect of the issue we are considering again today, and the Commons has twice declined to accept our view. This House has carried out its role and its responsibility.

In view of that, while we will continue to pursue this matter and the Government’s actions, like the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, we do not believe that we should continue to do so through the medium of insisting on the amendments to the Bill that have previously been carried.

Investigatory Powers Bill

Lord Mackay of Clashfern Excerpts

Report: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 11th October 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

My Lords, it seems to me that the Government have a responsibility to implement the section in the Act that has been referred to. They have the power to commence that provision, and the reason for such delays is normally to make the necessary provision to enable it to be put into force. On this occasion, it looks as though there may be other reasons. I have to hope that those reasons do not include anything like succumbing to any particular influence that might be contrary to implementing what has been enacted—with the agreement, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, pointed out from his personal experience, of all the political parties at the highest level at the time. I think it is the right thing to do for the Government to implement that provision. I am not at all sure that it is wise to enact some less effective provision in the hope that it will stir the Government up to enact the better one.

I sincerely hope that the new Secretary of State and the new Prime Minister will see the obligation that rests on them to carry out what had been undertaken by their predecessors. Indeed, the Prime Minister was a party to that agreement at the time as the Home Secretary of a Government who consented to the operation.

On the basis that the amendment is different from and less effective than the section in the enacted Bill, it is not particularly wise to put the amendment forward for enactment, but I hope that the new Secretary of State, having had a chance to consider the matter, and the Prime Minister, in her new role, will ensure that the agreement—so fully come to some years ago, after an amendment to another Bill had been passed in this House—will be honoured, and enact that moral obligation without further delay.

[Lord Rosser]

I will be brief, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, and other noble Lords, including my noble friend Lord Prescott, have set out the case for and reasoning behind the wording of the amendment in very clear terms. Section 40 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013 was part of the cross-party agreement, which included the royal charter, which was signed by the then leaders of the Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat parties. As a result, amendments were withdrawn both in the Commons and in this House. Ministers subsequently continued to make explicit commitments in both Houses to bring in Section 40. They have, however, failed to honour that commitment, and have thus not implemented this part of the 2013 Act, in accordance with the wishes of both Houses and indeed, the previously declared intention of the Government. We will support the amendment if the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, having heard the Government’s response, decides that she still needs to test the opinion of the House.

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[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

My Lords, it may be convenient for me to speak about my Amendment 55A, which seeks to amend the new clause proposed in Amendment 55. I approach the Bill on the basis that the security services should get what they require in order to perform their duties adequately for the safety of our country, but the degree to which those powers are given should affect only to a minimum the rights of citizens apart from the Bill. That seems a reasonable approach in looking at these provisions.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, said, we are all grateful to the Minister for the amount of consideration he has given to this. I am sure that among the luminaries who were at the meeting yesterday, the noble Baroness would be included. I was not there, I am glad to say; I was at a separate meeting of less luminous people this afternoon.

There are two stages of dealing with privileged information. The first is the decision to make the interception. The provisions that have been put in place in that connection have been referred to, and I have no comment on them. There is a second stage, though, when the material produced by the interception is considered. There is room for a closer use of scrutiny in connection with that. Legal privilege extends to an application to a lawyer for advice and the advice given in consequence of that application. It is possible that, intertwined with those two, other material should arise. For example, the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, spoke in Committee about a lawyer who was handed a letter by a suspect to deliver, and the result of that was rather damaging to the investigation. I think it is clear that the delivery of a letter and the acceptance of that letter by the lawyer was not part of the application for advice or indeed of the advice given, and therefore it would not be covered by legal professional privilege.

I regard legal professional privilege as a fundamental right in our system, enabling a client to consult his solicitor with perfect freedom in relation to any matter on which he requires legal advice. The privilege applies to the application for advice and the advice given, but it extends no further. Therefore, once the interception has taken place, the material is there for consideration. I consider that however difficult it may be to judge in advance before you get the intercepted material, once you get the intercepted material there is scope for deciding to what extent legal professional privilege covers it. I consider that the Interception Commissioner has a very special position and power in relation to that. I therefore believe it is possible for him or her to separate out from the total material intercepted what is truly covered by legal professional privilege. My amendment is intended to permit that and to require that the matter covered by legal professional privilege should not be further used. That should be the principle that preserves our right to legal professional privilege.

The agencies and the Minister have explained that surrounding that may be factual material that is vital to the investigation. The example given is someone who says, “I’m going to Greece. Could I be extradited from Greece?”. The request for information is, “Could I be extradited from Greece?”, while the factual information is that he is going to Greece. If that is the case, I consider that the information about whether or not he can be extradited from Greece is covered by legal professional privilege but the information that says he is going to Greece is not. Therefore, in an edited version of the material, the Interception Commissioner could take out all that was covered by legal professional privilege and decide what use, if any, the remainder could be put to. That is perfectly in accordance with the doctrine of legal professional privilege.

To refer again to a point that the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, made in Committee, it is important that a lawyer should be able to tell his client about the protection. He should be able to tell him that, subject to the iniquity provision, the conference in connection with the request for advice and the giving of that advice is absolutely privileged, but of course it does not cover anything that might be said in addition to that.

It is also possible that the Interception Commissioner might be able, in addition to that kind of separation and editing, to consider whether inferences can be drawn from the way in which the advice was sought. For example, if the client says, without indicating that he is going to Greece, “Can a person be extradited from Greece?”, it could be inferred that he might well be going to Greece and the security services could use that inference as a subject for their investigation, which might help that investigation considerably.

It is therefore possible to use this system at the second stage, the stage at which the material is available to study, to ensure that legal professional privilege is not breached but that the maximum information that is useful to the security services can be extracted from the material that has been intercepted without breaching that principle. That is what I want to achieve with this amendment. I believe it could be better phrased—we had some problem with reception, which I need not go into—but what is required is a power for the commissioner, which could be well expressed by parliamentary counsel, allowing the genuine privilege to apply at the same time as giving to the security services all possible information that they could reasonably use from the material collected. That is the purpose of my Amendment 55A. I am conscious that the draughtsmanship could be improved upon and I would be happy to see that happen, but the principle that I want to achieve is very clear and I think it is well supported by common sense.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

My Lords, I would like to make three points. The first is a general point. I am sure the whole House is grateful to Ministers and all others who have been involved in trying to produce a safe system that provides a public interest exception in relation to legal professional privilege. There was an argument running until a few days ago that there should be no public interest exception, but I do not believe that position is now going to be put forward in this House—certainly not voted upon. Indeed, we can think of examples that may or may not fall within legal professional privilege but could, which would properly be exceptions to which the authority should have regard.

My second point is about Amendment 27 and the proposal that there should be a new standard of proof— new to the criminal law or criminal procedure as far as I know it—containing the phrase “clearly outweighs”. “Clearly outweighs” means no more than the existing civil standard of proof, the balance of probabilities. There is no doubt that those who decide that the balance of probabilities, however expressed, applies will give their reasons in writing. With great respect, because I share the aspiration behind Amendment 27, I think it muddies the waters in an unwelcome way.

I turn with trepidation to Amendment 55A, spoken to with such eloquence by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern. Again, I am sympathetic to what he is trying to achieve, which is to narrow the area for removal or breach of legal professional privilege. It is something which we lawyers regard as near sacrosanct as any concept in the law. My concern is with the word “must” in his amendment. I am happy for an attempt to be made to redraft it, as he recognised might be necessary, but I would not be content to see “must” in any redraft for the following reasons.

When the procedure now set out in Amendment 55 is followed by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, he—or she—may direct that the item is destroyed or impose conditions as to disclosure, but in making that decision he will be considering a number of contextual issues. Obviously, he will be considering the context at the time when he is making the immediate judgment, but he may also be considering another context. It may well be that it is envisaged that a criminal trial will ensue later.

The rules of disclosure for criminal trials are founded on the notion that the authorities retain material, except in wholly exceptional circumstances. For example, the material retained may materially undermine the prosecution case when a trial takes place, and it is required that evidence that materially undermines the prosecution case should be disclosed to the defence. At the moment when the interception takes place, it may not appear that that might be the result of the material, but it could happen, and the commissioner may well envisage that.

We should not have a provision in which that disclosure cannot occur. One reason why we have had such difficulty making intercept material admissible in court is because of the problems about disclosure. In the case of intercept, the issue is not destruction but huge volume, which makes the normal English and Welsh—and, I believe, Scottish—law requirements for disclosure very difficult to fulfil. There is a risk that the same might happen if there was compulsion of any kind to destroy material.

Answering, as I said, with great trepidation, what has been said by the noble and learned Lord, I oppose any form of compulsion in such a clause. I hope that the Minister will carefully consider that issue before determining whether or not to accept the advice of someone who I know is one of his most esteemed Scottish colleagues.

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[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I am obliged to noble Lords. I begin by looking at Amendments 27 and 88, which seek to insert the word “clearly” in the public interest test. On this point I concur with the observations of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, that there is a danger that this would simply muddy the waters and not clarify.

The test as set out in the government amendment is straightforward. The public interest in obtaining the information sought either outweighs the public interest in maintaining the confidentiality of privilege or it does not. If the word “clearly” were inserted, that certainty would be lost. We would have to try to define what we mean by “clearly”. Logic suggests that it means that one public interest test should outweigh the other by a certain amount, as indicated by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, but it is not apparent what that amount would be. This would undoubtedly lead to confusion and uncertainty. Given that such a warrant can be sought only in exceptional and compelling circumstances, where national security or life and limb are at risk, confusion and uncertainty are one thing that we cannot afford.

The government amendments set out in detail what is intended by “exceptional and compelling”. The test is explicit on the face of the Bill and it is one that works. We are also introducing a requirement for the codes to include additional information about when circumstances are to be considered exceptional and compelling, and requiring the Investigatory Powers Commissioner to keep that language under review. It is in these circumstances that I invite the noble Baroness not to press her amendments.

The second set of amendments in this group—Amendments 56, 57, 192 and 193—seek to change the power of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner to determine what happens to legally privileged material when it has been obtained by an agency and the agency wishes to retain it. First, they would provide that the commissioner has the power to impose conditions on the use of the item as well as its disclosure. Secondly, they would also require the commissioner to direct that any privileged material that has been obtained must be destroyed unless there are exceptional and compelling circumstances that justify its retention. These amendments raise important issues in respect of legally privileged material that is inadvertently obtained and where the agency wishes to retain it. I would like to reflect further on our consideration of these points today and to return to this issue at Third Reading.

Amendment 107 deals with communications data and seeks to provide for judicial approval of authorisations for the communications data of a person who is or is likely to be a practising legal professional. It seeks to reflect the protections provided in Part 3 of the Bill for the identity of a journalistic source, but in practice this amendment goes much further by attaching the protections to the profession rather than to the sensitive information they manage. The debates in the House of Commons and at previous stages in this House have been clear that Parliament’s view is that protection should attach to the sensitive communication or to the function being carried out and should not simply apply to the person because they are a member of some profession. For example, there was consensus that protection should apply to the journalist’s communications with a source or the client’s communications with a lawyer. This amendment would go against that consensus by providing protection to a lawyer simply because he is a lawyer.

The Bill takes a reasoned and balanced approach. It applies additional protections where appropriate; provides for judicial authorisation of the most intrusive powers and for the use of less intrusive powers in the most sensitive circumstances; and provides a powerful and robust oversight regime to ensure that powers cannot be misused. The protections provided are specific to each power under the Bill, applying protection which is appropriate to the level of intrusion represented by each power. The draft Communications Data Code of Practice sets out the additional considerations that must be taken into account when any data relate to a member of a profession which routinely holds items subject to legal provision. Indeed, Schedule 7 to the Bill requires that the code shall include such detail. In addition, the current amendment to Clause 2 puts beyond doubt the importance of taking particular care in relation to sensitive information, such as items subject to legal privilege.

Our debate has already shown the importance that the Government place on the protection of legally privileged material, but I would suggest that it is not appropriate to introduce these additional protections within the context of authorisations for communications data. I invite the noble Baroness not to press Amendment 107.

Amendment 55A, tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, seeks to amend government Amendment 55. This amendment would require the Investigatory Powers Commissioner to direct that any material obtained that is subject to legal privilege must be destroyed and allow the agency to retain only material that is incidental to that which is privileged.

I have already indicated in response to Amendment 57, proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, that I am minded to look again at whether there is more we might provide on the face of the Bill regarding the test that the commissioner should apply when making a decision about whether material can be retained. However, I would respectfully suggest that what the noble and learned Lord proposes with this amendment is not appropriate in the circumstances. It is the case that the vital intelligence that an agency may require could intrude not only on incidental material in a legally privileged communication but on the legally privileged communication in general.

I take up the example which the noble and learned Lord gave of the individual communicating with a lawyer and asking, “Can I be extradited from Greece?”. One might say, in a very straightforward fashion, that the relevant intelligence there is Greece, not that he may or may not be extradited. But what if the communication goes like this: “Can I be extradited from Greece or Albania?”, and the answer is, “You can be extradited from Greece but you cannot be extradited from Albania”. Just giving them Greece and Albania will not assist the intelligence services very much. On the other hand, the legally privileged information that he can be extradited from Greece but cannot be extradited from Albania might lead the reasonable intelligence officer to infer that the individual was more likely to be found in Albania than in Greece. It is in those circumstances that I suggest that one cannot easily divide between the two. As I have indicated, we are conscious that in these areas we can look again to see whether we can strengthen these matters. At this stage I would invite the noble and learned Lord not to press his amendment.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

My Lords, I am extremely happy that the noble and learned Lord should look at this matter further. To take his example on Greece and Albania, I think the correct way to deal with that would be to say that it was an inference from the legal advice that he might be going to Albania and you could separate that out from the advice itself as a matter of edit, allowing for inferences from the nature of the arrangement. I think that a little bit of, shall I say, creative editing would make this possible. I am very keen to conserve the idea that legal professional privilege is absolute—that is the purpose of my amendment. I believe that with a bit of ingenuity the Government could devise a formula that would allow that to happen. In the meantime, I am happy not to press my amendment on the basis that it will be considered by the Government, and if necessary, I can return to it at Third Reading.

Amendment 22 agreed.

Investigatory Powers Bill

Lord Mackay of Clashfern Excerpts

Wednesday 13th July 2016 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)]

My Lords, I will not dare to try to better the arguments already made in this debate but will only emphasise two things with regard to the amendments to which I have added my name.

The first, which has already been mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, is that this so-called privilege is of the utmost importance to clients—the description always sounds as if it is your privilege rather than ours. I speak as the former chair of the Legal Services Consumer Panel, where we represented the interests of those who—often in times of trouble—need the help and advice of a lawyer.

We know that very many people who could do with legal assistance do not go, partly because they do not know that they need it, partly because they do not know how to get it, partly due to cost, but also because it is all a bit too intimidating. It often falls to the lawyer to reassure them not just about the particular case, but that what passes between them will be absolutely confidential and—for example, in the case of a domestic break-up or a child’s custody—will never be revealed to their former partner or others involved, including agencies of the state.

Therefore, this confidential relationship is key to people getting good advice and advocacy and a fair hearing, as well as being key, as we have already heard, to the role of our lawyers and the rule of law. However, we also understand that there will be occasions when some details of this relationship might be caught by powers included in the Bill. We look for some assurance that the maintenance of clients’ confidence is absolutely understood, and that any such occasions will be as limited as we have heard, and only after proper due process.

We look forward to hearing in the Minister’s response the Government’s current thinking and perhaps some indication of what they will be willing to bring forward on Report.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

My Lords, I put my name to these amendments. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for the clear exposition he has given of the reasons for them, and I have listened to the anecdotal evidence provided by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile.

I think we are all agreed that proper legal professional privilege is vital to the rule of law. It is not a privilege of the legal profession but of the client, as the noble Baroness said. However, the illustrations show that some other factor may be buried in proper legal confidentiality. The example of information being passed on innocently is one such. It was not part of the legal professional privilege conversation but an adjunct to it—“Please pass this on to my girlfriend”. Another possible illustration, which I have discussed with the Minister, is that the location of the client might be mentioned incidentally. Where he happens to be is not crucial to the advice he gets or the information he gives in order to get it, which is, of course, the real reason the conversation is protected.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

The first thing I did was to instruct a solicitor to go and see him.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

One possible approach would be to consider what is meant by legal professional privilege. It is a privilege of the account that the client gives to the solicitor of the facts on which the client wishes to be advised, and the advice that the solicitor gives in return to that application. A statement of where, for example, the client is at that particular time is not part of either of those. Therefore, that is not, strictly speaking, covered by legal professional privilege at all. This is a way of looking at this matter that is slightly differently from trying to make conditions on legal professional privilege.

[Lord Pannick]

I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this debate, particularly those who have provided anecdotes as to their previous experience. I also thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, because I think the whole Committee recognises that he and the Government are striving to find the right answers to what are undoubtedly very difficult problems. There is a balance between maintaining legal professional privilege and ensuring the security of this country.

I start from the same place as the Minister: legal professional privilege is absolutely fundamental to the rule of law; there is no dispute about that. It seems to me, therefore, that there has to be a compelling justification for allowing intrusion by the authorities into matters that are genuinely covered—not iniquity—by legal professional privilege. The Minister has been very frank: in the past 16 years, there has been no experience of the ability to intrude into genuine legal discussions being of any value to the security forces. I therefore wonder whether it is necessary to have such a power. Its existence, particularly if we were to enshrine it in this Bill, would have—it does have—a damaging effect on clients’ confidence that they are speaking to their lawyers in genuine confidence.

The example the Minister gives—it is a real example, at least in principle—is that the authorities may learn the location of the client, which may tip them off and enable them to prevent a terrorist outrage. It seems to me that that is not part of the privileged material but incidental to it. An acceptable way forward may be that the authorities would have to show and satisfy the judicial commissioner—and maybe the Secretary of State as well—that there is compelling and exceptional evidence of a real threat to life, such that they should be able to listen in so as to obtain this incidental material, and that the authorities would be obliged immediately to dispose of, not retain, any information that is not incidental to legal advice but is the actual legal advice. I remain doubtful but I will wait to see what the Government bring forward at Report stage. No doubt we will return to the subject—we will have to discuss it again—but this has been a helpful debate. I am grateful to noble Lords and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Armed Forces Bill

Lord Mackay of Clashfern Excerpts

Tuesday 1st March 2016 Grand Committee

Moved by

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

9: After Clause 14, insert the following new Clause—
“Limited disapplication of the Human Rights Act 1998
The provisions of the Human Rights Act 1998 shall not apply to any member of the armed forces engaged in military operations outside the United Kingdom, with the exception of those rights protected by the Geneva Conventions of 1949.”

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

My Lords, this amendment seeks to explore the result of a case known as Smith and others v Ministry of Defence, which has provoked a good deal of concern among those experienced in the military and in service. I feel that it is right to try to deal with it in the course of this Bill. It is therefore necessary for me to explain as quickly as I can what the judgment entails. There was a fairly sharp difference of opinion within the Supreme Court about the rule that should apply.

It was a case before seven judges concerning claims arising out of the deaths of three young men and the suffering by two other young men of serious injuries while serving in the British Army in Iraq. The claims related to the training given to the soldiers before their engagement with the enemy, the provision of suitable equipment and the selection made of available equipment for a particular operation. They fell into two groups. The first, the Challenger claim, was the result of a “friendly fire” incident that occurred during combat when Iraq was being invaded by the coalition forces in 2003. The second was the result of a series of attacks using roadside bombs on personnel travelling in Snatch Land Rovers in 2005 and 2006 when combat was over and had been replaced by a period of military occupation. The British forces were assisting the civil power in Iraq, which at the time had an interim Government.

It is very important to understand that, at least in substance, the claims were not against those involved in the operations. The report of the Supreme Court concerns a stage in the proceedings when the question was whether the pleadings disclosed a case that should proceed to a full trial of the facts. The claims concerned the European Convention on Human Rights and the common law of England. Article 1 provides that:

“The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention”.

All the judges of the court agreed unanimously that the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom extends to securing the protection of Article 2 of the convention to members of the Armed Forces when they are serving outside the territory of the United Kingdom. That was an important point because, until then, there had been a general feeling that jurisdiction depended on the territorial extent of the state in question.

Article 2.1 was brought into play by that unanimous decision. It provides that:

“Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law”.

After detailed consideration of the relevant decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, summed up the position in this way:

“The guidance which I would draw from the Court’s jurisprudence in this area is that the court must avoid imposing positive obligations on the state in connection with the planning for and conduct of military operations in situations of armed conflict which are unrealistic or disproportionate. But it must give effect to those obligations where it would be reasonable to expect the individual to be afforded the protection of the article. It will be easy to find that allegations are beyond the reach of article 2 if the decisions that were or ought to have been taken about training, procurement or the conduct of operations were at a high level of command and closely linked to the exercise of political judgment and issues of policy”.

That is a reflection of a line of authority that indicates that, for example, the chief constable of a police force does not have a specific duty enforceable in the law of negligence in respect of individual members of the public in his area. The noble and learned Lord went on:

“So too if they relate to things done or not done when those who might be thought to be responsible for avoiding the risk of death or injury to others were actively engaged in direct contact with the enemy”.

That is the important point to think about in relation to the decision—that it did not impute any liability to those who were directly or actively engaged in direct contact with the enemy. He continued:

“But finding whether there is room for claims to be brought in the middle ground”—

that is, between the two—

“so that the wide margin of appreciation which must be given to the authorities or to those actively engaged in armed conflict is fully recognised without depriving the article of content, is much more difficult. No hard and fast rules can be laid down. It will require the exercise of judgment. This can only be done in the light of the facts of each case”.

That is one result of the analysis in the case of Smith.

I should mention that the convention is modified by a protocol which provides for a modification of convention obligations where a member of the convention is threatened by war. However, this was deemed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, to have no application to the circumstances that he was considering, as the operations in Iraq were not the result of a threat of war against the United Kingdom. It is interesting to consider whether the United Kingdom can engage in war against Iraq when Iraq is not at war with the United Kingdom.

The other basis of the claim was a duty of care laid upon the body responsible for the safety of the soldiers by the common law of England. This is a consideration completely separate from the Human Rights Act. As an exception to the general application of that duty, the courts have developed the concept of “combat immunity”. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, used as a formulation of this concept a statement by Mr Justice Dixon in an Australian case. He said:

“To concede that any civil liability can rest upon a member of the armed forces for supposedly negligent acts or omissions in the course of an actual engagement with the enemy is opposed alike to reason and to policy. But the principle cannot be limited to the presence of the enemy or to occasions when contact with the enemy has been established. Warfare perhaps never did admit of such a distinction, but now it would be quite absurd. The development of the speed of ships and the range of guns were enough to show it to be an impracticable refinement, but it has been put out of question by the bomber, the submarine and the floating mine. The principle must extend to all active operations against the enemy”.

In discussing this subsequent development, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, pointed out that, being an immunity, it has to be strictly construed. He concluded on both grounds that an application of these views to the case before the court required a close consideration of the facts and that it should proceed to a full trial. With that conclusion, three of his colleagues agreed, but Lord Carnwath, who was in the minority on the claims in the first group, agreed with the other four that the claims in the second group should go to trial—that is, where it was no longer a combat situation but a peacekeeping situation.

The minority judgment was first given by Lord Mance. He disagreed for a reason which he stated thus as far as the common law basis of the claim was concerned:

“I consider that the Challenger claims, which are only in common law negligence, should be struck out in their entirety on the basis that the state owes no such duty of care as alleged with regard to the provision of technology, equipment or training to avoid death or injury in the course of an active military operation”.

Again, that is a reflection of the principle that I mentioned in relation to, for example, the police. On the human rights basis, Lord Mance said:

“In my opinion therefore this Court should proceed on the basis that the policy considerations which guide its domestic law in the present area of national interest will find an echo in Strasbourg, and not invade a field which would involve, in the context of claims for civil compensation, extensive and highly sensitive review with the benefit of hindsight the United Kingdom’s country’s policies, strategy and tactics relating to the deployment and use of its armed forces in combat. The United Kingdom’s performance of its investigatory and procedural duties under article 2 is not in doubt”—

and he mentions a few inquiries, including the Chilcot inquiry, lamenting that it was rather late, although that was in 2013. He concludes:

“The issue with which this judgment is concerned is whether deaths and (at common law) injuries in combat fall to be investigated in the civil courts, at whatever level in the armed forces, Whitehall or the government responsibility for them is suggested to arise. The answer I would give is, no”.

Lord Carnwath agreed to a large extent with Lord Mance, but he took the view that as some of the claims related to what amounted to peacekeeping operations, a joint approach did not apply.

That is a short analysis of the judgment and the issues involved. As I said, my amendment is simply phrased to allow this matter to be considered. I suggest that it is for your Lordships to consider what should be done in the light of this judgment, which is an important one with strong differences of opinion echoed at the highest level in our legal system.

One possibility is to do nothing and just leave the issue as unresolved. It has been resolved by a majority of the Supreme Court and that would stand, but due to the fact that there is such a sharp difference of opinion I thought that it was worth finding out whether your Lordships would consider legislation on this point. I suggest that the first option for legislation is to provide that no action for negligence will be available when injury or death occurs in combat or in military peacekeeping operations to the personnel involved in those operations. That is the minority judgment—that if the injury occurs in the course of a military operation, combat or peacekeeping, there should be no claim in negligence. The second is that it would apply only in combat operations and that, if it were a peacekeeping operation, a claim would arise.

The major option, if one goes along with the judgment of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, and those who agreed with him, would be that no action for negligence will be available when injury or death occurs in combat or military peacekeeping operations against anyone involved in these operations but it will be available against others if that is realistic and proportionate. That seems to me to be what is said about the Human Rights Act. Again, the question would be whether that applies only in combat operations or whether peacekeeping operations are also included.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

Before he finishes, may I ask the noble Lord about claims against the Armed Forces? For example, Iraqi claims have been brought forward that rely, to some extent, on the Human Rights Act. What is the impact of his amendment on that?

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

This applies only to the injury or death of those serving in the military on behalf of the British Crown. As the noble Lord, Lord Campbell, pointed out to me just before we came in, operations nowadays may not be on behalf of only the British Crown. They may be carried out, for example, in combination with the Americans, the French or some other nation. That is a further complication which did not arise in the case of Smith. The same principles could possibly apply in that situation. However, it does not deal at all with actions against, for example, Iraqis or any other people among whom our Armed Forces might be serving. The jurisdiction applies, in this particular case, to the injury or death of those serving. There would be implications of other kinds, not dealt with in Smith, so far as people who are not members of the Armed Forces are affected by actions of the Armed Forces.

[Lord Craig of Radley]

My Lords, it was a privilege to put my name to the amendment of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay. I have looked upon it very much as a probing amendment to give the Government an opportunity to indicate how their thinking is going. We have a problem with the Human Rights Act and Armed Forces legislation. Indeed, when the Human Rights Act was debated here in 1998 I drew attention to the potential problems that might arise. My concerns were dismissed then by the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Chancellor. I quote what he said then:

“I urge your Lordships to be of the view that the convention is a flexible instrument. It poses no threat to the effectiveness of the Armed Forces”.—[Official Report, 5/2/98; col. 768.]

Whatever flexibilities the noble and learned Lord had in mind, they have I fear proved to be valueless and ephemeral. Cases against the MoD and individual service personnel affecting our forces on operations overseas have proliferated. Some were settled out of court. Others made the prolonged and tortuous passage up through the courts, with the MoD appealing a couple to the Supreme Court in 2013. The Committee has had a good exposition of what happened in the Supreme Court. It was a thorough and nuanced finding but there was a 4/3 split and they did not really resolve the issue.

Later that year, in a debate led very admirably by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, I suggested that the Armed Forces Bill before the Committee today would be a suitable vehicle for legislating to ease the problems faced by the MoD and the Armed Forces on operational activity overseas. So, as I made quite clear at Second Reading, I was dismayed to find that no attempt has been made to tackle the problem in this Bill. The Government have had the better part of three years since the Supreme Court judgment to consider what form legislation should take. I have pointed out in debates on this issue that it was not going to go away —it had legs—and that it would be a failure of political leadership not to tackle it.

In recent weeks, the much-heralded Bill of Rights has been mentioned as shortly to be published. Indeed the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, indicated as much in his response to the second Oral Question this afternoon. I thought that the noble Lord also confirmed that it will incorporate legislation to help to resolve the problems created for the Armed Forces by the incompatible legislation that affects them. If so, I very much hope that whatever detailed form the legislation takes, it will introduce further amendment to this Armed Forces Bill when it is enacted. It would be preferable to contain any new legislation within the principal Armed Forces Act, rather than once again having two separate pieces of legislation about the behavioural discipline of the Armed Forces. Indeed, in the debates on the then Human Rights Bill in 1998, I suggested that while the Armed Forces were of course a public body, it was acceptable that they were, and indeed should be, treated separately in legislation. I suggested that any aspects of human rights that were to apply to the Armed Forces should be incorporated into that Armed Forces legislation. If this approach had been adopted then, we might not be facing the present difficulties.

The comments of the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, on the second Oral Question this afternoon seemed to imply that the clauses affecting the Armed Forces were already drafted. If so, surely the Bill before the Committee this afternoon could be an appropriate vehicle for getting this legislation enacted, particularly if the Bill of Rights is to be delayed, and may, as a whole, have some considerable difficulty in reaching the statute book. Has this been considered? If so, can we expect government amendments to this Bill on Report?

--- Later in debate ---

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, I am extremely grateful to my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay for having given the Committee the opportunity to examine the set of issues that are of fundamental importance for our Armed Forces and indeed for the Government. As my noble and learned friend explained, the amendment would end the application of the Human Rights Act 1998 to service personnel engaged in military operations outside the United Kingdom. I have very great sympathy with the intention behind the amendment. Recent legal developments have raised justifiable fears in many quarters that service personnel could be unwilling in future to take the rapid and high-risk decisions essential for operational effectiveness, due to the fear of litigation. The Government fully believe that international humanitarian law, as embodied in the Geneva conventions, should have primacy over human rights law in the field of armed conflict. Addressing that issue was a manifesto commitment for this Government.

None the less, for reasons that I shall explain, I cannot invite the Committee to press this amendment. The Government are concerned about and determined to address the risks arising from developments in international human rights law, which have the potential to impose ever greater constraints on the ability of the Armed Forces and the MoD to operate effectively while defending the UK and its interests. As pledged in my party’s manifesto, the Government are absolutely committed to replacing the Human Rights Act, and will be consulting in due course on our proposals for a Bill of Rights. It is only right that that consultation should include the important question of how the Bill of Rights should apply outside the UK, and will ensure that all aspects of the change are properly and fully considered, not least its implications for the rights of our own Armed Forces, which would be affected by this measure. So I suggest that it is in the broader context of a Bill of Rights that these important issues are best considered. We are working closely with the Ministry of Justice as it develops its proposals.

I was very grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, for his intervention. When we speak about combat immunity, there are two issues that need to be distinguished, as he made clear. There are negligence claims and common law, where service personnel believe that the MoD or the Government have put them at undue risk—for example, due to decisions on procurements—and then there are human rights claims under the Human Rights Act or the ECHR, which are claims against the MoD brought either by service personnel in respect of injury or death or by civilians.

On the first of those categories, the negligence claims, I was grateful for the comments of the noble Lord, Lord West. We are concerned that the Smith judgment has left the position on liability for events on the battlefield unclear. That is why we are considering legislation to bring about the necessary clarity. The noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, asked me what harm could result from the Smith case. My response is that, as my noble and learned friend explained, in the Smith case—with no disrespect to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope—there were such strong differences of opinion between members of the Supreme Court that it is reasonable for thought to be given to legislating.

We recognise that there is a concern about UK court decisions eroding the doctrine of combat immunity, which prevents legal claims being brought against the Government for negligence in the course of duty in armed conflict. However, my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay has indicated that his amendment would make provision only with respect to the second category that I mentioned, injury or death of members of the Armed Forces. It would not deal at all with claims brought against the MoD under human rights law in respect of the actions of members of the Armed Forces—for example, by Iraqi nationals. The Government are concerned about both classes of case, and our ongoing work relates to both.

I should make clear that my noble and learned friend’s amendment relates to human rights claims and those claims brought under the ECHR. We are concerned about both types of case and are examining them in the context of our work on the Bill of Rights.

The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig, asked, in effect, why we could not legislate more speedily, perhaps through this Bill. I am as keen to make speed with this as he is but, alas, we are not quite yet ready. There are a number of areas that we are looking into, including examining different areas of legislation where changes could be made and what more we could do to support our Armed Forces personnel and their families. Work is under way, and we will be announcing further detail in due course.

I am most grateful to my noble and learned friend for raising this important issue today. It has been a truly excellent debate. I am confident that when we come to introduce our proposals for the Bill of Rights, we will address effectively the problem that is rightly of concern to him, and we will do so in the context of a much needed and thorough overhaul of our domestic human rights law. On that basis, I hope that my noble and learned friend will agree to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

My Lords, it was never my intention to press this amendment. It was simply intended to raise these issues, which are extremely complicated. For example, in the case of Smith, Lord Mance pointed out that it is alleged that the major under whose command the firing tank was operating was told of the situation, and that there was a question in relation to the Snatch claims about whether the commander on the ground had chosen the particular vehicle that was involved in the incident. Although there is no question of anyone who was serving being involved in the claim against him, there is difficulty in finding out whether or not there has been a breach—for example, in relation to procurement or supply. You have to investigate the facts on the ground and the decisions of the commanders.

Perhaps I may take the example that the noble Lord, Lord West, gave of his own situation in the Falklands. My understanding is that, if there were a claim in relation to that by someone who had been severely injured and if the application of these principles that are being adumbrated came into play, the question of whether, for example, the anti-aircraft provision on the ship was adequate might have depended on where it was thought the ship would have gone. As I understand it, the difficulty was that when the ship got very closely inshore, the anti-aircraft provision was not adequate. If the ministry were being sued for failure to provide better anti-aircraft equipment—I am thinking of this as a possible scenario—there might be a question as to whether, in the circumstances of the engagement, the commander of the ship was required to go to a place where the anti-aircraft guns would not work properly or whether he could have operated effectively somewhere else. I do not imagine for a minute—

[Lord West of Spithead]

Perhaps I may interject for a moment. I could not possibly have gone anywhere else. I just want to make that clear.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

That is the question.

[Lord Tunnicliffe]

Surely the judgment given by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, makes that absolutely clear. The issue of the operational decisions in combat could not, in the view of the Supreme Court, be prayed in aid of negligence. The issue is those decisions not taken in a combat environment.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

I entirely agree. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, made that as clear as he could. However, as Lord Mance pointed out, the problem is that, while that is the principle, it is quite difficult to apply in practice. If you are trying to sue the ministry, the question may be whether what happened on the ground followed what from the ministry had done. The Snatch case is the easiest one, in a way. I used the case of the noble Lord, Lord West, only because he mentioned it himself, but the Snatch case is perhaps the best example of where it is possible to say that the ministry provided the right equipment but the right vehicle was not picked. There are three vehicles waiting and you pick one. It is not the right one; the other two are somewhat different. I am not suggesting for a minute that the people who made the choice could be sued for negligence, but the question of whether or not the claim against the higher authority is made out may depend on the investigation of these things. That is what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, was talking about.

As I said, I never intended to press this amendment at a later stage; I simply tabled it to raise the issues and to see what can be done. My approach would be that we should see what we want the final situation to be. We should forget what the human rights convention has to say. We should look at what we want and consider legislation. We should believe that if it is suitable legislation it will be covered by the margin of appreciation and that the human rights convention, which of course we cannot alter ourselves, will not be affected in any way. With great respect, as a result of all this debate, that is the approach that I would commend.

I am sorry that we have gone beyond the time when we were supposed to finish, but I regard myself as not completely responsible for that because things depend on what went before. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment and I do not propose to raise it on Report.

Amendment 9 withdrawn.

Tax Credits (Income Thresholds and Determination of Rates) (Amendment) Regulations 2015

Lord Mackay of Clashfern Excerpts

Monday 26th October 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

My Lords, we have just heard some very moving speeches on this matter. I have no doubt that, as the Leader of the House has said, the Chancellor of the Exchequer will consider these matters very carefully. I know that it is extremely difficult to analyse the precise effect of income tax or tax credit changes in individual circumstances. Your Lordships will remember that when Mr Gordon Brown, as Chancellor, thought to take out of the tax system the 10% tax band that had previously existed, finding out precisely who was affected and how they were affected turned out to be extremely difficult. I believe that there are difficulties in this connection also. It may well be that the information that arises in the course of the attempt to deliver this will show what in detail is required if changes should be made.

I am intending to deal only with the constitutional question as I see it. These draft regulations are made under the Tax Credits Act, which sets up mechanisms for the payment of tax credits of two types: children’s tax credits and working tax credits. The arrangements were under the control of the Board of Inland Revenue which was entitled under Section 2 to deduct the sums paid for tax credits from the income of the board raised by taxation. So it is perfectly clear that these tax credits are a charge on the taxes raised by the Board of Inland Revenue, as it was then. The details of the credits and the machinery necessary for their administration were set out in the later sections of the Act. Section 66 of the Act provides:

“1) No regulations to which this subsection applies may be made unless a draft of the instrument containing them (whether or not together with other provisions) has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, each House of Parliament.

(2) Subsection (1) applies to … (a) regulations prescribing monetary amounts that are required to be reviewed under section 41”.

That is the system under which this statutory instrument has been made. Accordingly the statutory instrument before the House requires to be approved by each House of Parliament before it can be made. The instrument, as we know, was approved by the other place and a Motion to reverse it was defeated in the other place. So it has come to us as a matter which has been fully considered so far as the other place is concerned until now.

In considering this, regard must be had to the financial privileges of the other place. It is not a question of the conventions of this House, it has nothing to do with them; it is to do with the financial privileges that belong to the House of Commons. So far as I understand it, there is nothing to prevent a Motion along the lines proposed here being considered by this House, but the question is whether that consideration can properly interfere with the financial primacy of the elected Chamber. Erskine May says that the practice is ruled today by resolutions which were made in the 1670s. The last one of these, the clearest and fullest, states that,

“all aids and supplies and aids to his majesty in Parliament, are the sole gift of the commons; and all bills for the granting of any such aids and supplies ought to begin with the commons: and that it is the undoubted and sole right of the commons to direct, limit, and appoint in such bills the ends, purposes, considerations, conditions, limitations, and qualifications of such grants; which ought not to be changed or altered by the House of Lords”.

It is clear that these tax credit payments are made out of the supply raised by taxation and that the other place has decided that the Tax Credits Act 2002 should be amended in terms of the approved draft. I am clearly of the opinion that a failure on the part of this House to approve the draft of this instrument would be a breach of the fundamental privileges of the elected Chamber.

It may be asked why the approval of this House is required. I believe that it is as a courtesy to the House, just as it is asked to agree to the passing of money Bills on their way to becoming Acts of Parliament. The House never seeks to delay them as it is obliged to respect the financial privileges of the elected Chamber and how it deals with those matters; it should deal with this matter in the same way. To decline to approve these draft regulations or to decline to deal with them until certain conditions are met is a refusal to accept that the decision of the elected House on a matter of financial privilege is the final authority for it. It has to be noted that this is a matter of the privilege of the elected Chamber, not of the Government. The Motions other than that in the name of the right reverend Primate—

[A noble Lord]

The right reverend Prelate.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

I am sorry, the right reverend Prelate. That was a bit of a promotion because we are in the presence of the two Primates. The Motions mark a refusal to accept a decision of the elected House on a matter of financial privilege as the final authority for it. That is what they amount to. It has to be noted, as I have said, that this is the privilege of the elected Chamber, not of the Government.

The amendment proposed by the right reverend Prelate—I shall try to get it right this time—is entirely in accordance with the arrangements of this House and with the financial privileges of the House of Commons. Therefore from the point of view of the powers of this House, it is by far the safest of the Motions that have been put forward. In light of what the Leader of the House said in opening, I believe that the Chancellor of the Exchequer is very open to considering the detail—

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

My Lords, does the noble and learned Lord not agree that the conventions to which he has referred, going back to the 17th century, were so uncertain that in 1908 the Conservative Party defeated Lloyd George’s People’s Budget in which he sought to give money to the poor people of this country? Does he also not agree that the 1911 Act set out a mechanism whereby the Speaker would certify that a money Bill was a money Bill, and that would remove from us our powers of consideration? Is he not going back to an argument that failed more than 100 years ago?

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

Not at all. I am stating the present practice, according to Erskine May, in relation to matters of financial privilege. As I said, it is not a matter of the conventions of this House, but of the rights of the other place in this matter. My clear submission to your Lordships is that these amendments challenge the final authority of the elected House on a matter of financial privilege. It is true that the Liberal Democrats—I suppose they were the Liberal Party then, but the succession is probably allowable—found it necessary to take further action to ensure that the practice that had been built up in the 17th century applied in the 20th century and beyond. They put mechanisms in place to prevent financial privileges being in any way transgressed again.

[Lord Snape]

Does the noble and learned Lord think that a statutory instrument that cannot be amended is a suitable vehicle for passing legislation that will adversely affect hundreds of thousands of people?

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

That is the arrangement that was proposed in the Tax Credits Act, which was passed by the Labour Government in 2002. It was thought to be the right way to do this particular thing, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Government have followed that. It is not a necessary consequence that the Commons or the Government should use a different procedure in order to secure the financial privilege of the House of Commons. The procedure was laid down in the Tax Credits Act, which is the main statute on this matter. For the Government to do anything other than use that course would be offensive to the way in which the system was set up.

The Leader of the House mentioned the Chancellor of the Exchequer’s attitude to considering more detailed material when it becomes available. That is a considerable consolation to me in light of what the right reverend Prelate said. I believe the right reverend Prelate’s approach to be the safest way to secure what a number of your Lordships have asked for.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, I have several points to make about the substance of these regulations. First, this represents a lamentable example of non-evidence-based policy-making, the victims of which are going to suffer greatly. Secondly, the arguments used to justify the policy—by reference to other policy changes and to how people could or even should work harder—betray a lack of understanding of policy and of people’s lives.

In its letter to the Financial Secretary to the Treasury, the Social Security Advisory Committee criticised the “scant” evidence to support the policy changes. It thus encouraged the Government to make available to Parliament,

“more detailed information that clearly explains the changes and potential impacts to ensure that they can be subject to effective scrutiny”.

With due respect to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, SSAC clearly believed it possible to provide such information. Its advice was ignored, leading the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee to observe that the explanatory memorandum laid in September “contained minimal information”.

Getting an impact assessment out of the Government has been like pulling teeth. That which finally emerged is a travesty; much of it simply reiterates repetitively the rationale behind the policy. It certainly does not provide the information about potential impacts that SSAC sought. There is no information on the impact on different groups affected, including the self-employed, who, as we have heard, cannot benefit from an increase in the minimum wage. The information about the impact on protected groups is simply laughable. When I asked in a Written Question,

“how many people in receipt of Carer’s Allowance are also in receipt of Working Tax Credit”,

and are therefore vulnerable, I was told that the information,

“could only be provided at disproportionate cost”.

I know that Carers UK is very worried about the likely impact on all carers receiving working tax credit.

In the letter accompanying the impact assessment the Chancellor excused the delay on the grounds that the Government do not usually publish an IA for statutory instruments of this kind. I found this statement very revealing. It suggests that the Government made no attempt to assess the impact for themselves before going ahead with such significant cuts and that they see an IA simply as a tick-box exercise to pacify pesky parliamentary committees. Surely, given the Prime Minister’s pledge at his party conference of an “all-out assault on poverty”, the Government would want to know the impact on poverty. But no: it was left to the Resolution Foundation to point out that it could mean an additional 200,000 children falling into poverty next year, rising to 600,000 by 2020 when other summer Budget measures have taken effect.

Surely a Government who have promised to apply the family test to every measure would want to know the impact on low-income families—a point made by Heidi Allen MP in her passionate maiden speech demolishing her own Government’s policy. Surely a Government who go on constantly about making work pay would want to know the impact on low-paid workers. But we had to look to the IFS for that. In effect, the Government appear to be contracting out to the voluntary sector genuine assessment of impact. Of course, that is assessment after, rather than as part of, the policy-making process. That is one reason why it is so important that your Lordships’ House asks the Government to think again in the light of the evidence that has emerged of the damaging impact that the cuts will have.

I am grateful to all organisations that have exposed how the overall policy package that the Government constantly cite does not amount to an adequate defence of the policy, particularly in the case of lone parents, who will be disproportionately affected, according to Gingerbread. A key reason why the overall policy package does not provide adequate protection is that with the exception of childcare, which applies to only a very limited age range, the other policies—the increase in the minimum wage, welcome as it is, and in personal tax allowances, which is less welcome because it is wasteful and poorly targeted—cannot take account of the presence of children, a point made by my noble friend Lady Hollis. All the talk about tax credits subsidising low pay ignores the fact that child tax credits were introduced primarily as a child poverty measure. Wages cannot take account of the presence of children. That was one reason why family allowances were originally introduced and why an increase in child benefit, which also helps families below the tax threshold and is currently frozen, would provide more effective mitigation than further increases in tax allowances.

Finally, according to the Health Secretary, the cuts are intended to send a “very important cultural signal” about hard work. Leaving aside his denigrating suggestion that receipt of tax credits is somehow incompatible with “independence, self-respect and dignity”, he does not appear to understand that reducing the income threshold and the universal credit work allowances while increasing the taper rate penalises what he calls “hard work”. Likewise, the Work and Pensions Secretary suggested that the problem can be solved if those hardest hit are encouraged to work a few extra hours. Even if extra hours were feasible and available, the gain from doing so will be reduced by the very changes that they are supposed to mitigate. As the Children’s Society points out, every extra £1 in wages will provide a net income increase of only 3p for those also in receipt of housing benefit and only 20p for those not. What about those with family responsibilities, particularly lone parents and carers, for whom working extra hours could impact negatively on their and their families’ lives?

It is our job to scrutinise legislation. This legislation does not stand up to scrutiny. The policy-making process from which it has emerged does not stand up to scrutiny. It is not noble Lords, or Government Ministers, who will bear the cost of this. It will be people like the low-paid worker who emailed me to say that he was very scared about how he will manage next year. Hundreds of thousands of children will be pushed into poverty. We have a duty to defend them, our fellow citizens.