Earl Howe
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(8 years, 9 months ago)
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Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)
My Lords, the first two groups for debate today discuss the generality of military law. The first group relates to how an individual is found guilty and sentenced, while the second group deals with the extent and scope of the body of military law. I make the point because I take a very different view about the extent to which we should consider changing the two groups, and hence these groups of amendments. We will come on to debate the second group, but I approach the first group from the point of view of the rights of the citizen who, as a member of the Armed Forces, has become the accused. I find the arguments put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, persuasive. With that individual having committed an offence and gone into a process which is now so analogous to that of a civil court, I find quite strong the idea that the individual should have the right to a trial that is analogous to that in a civil court.
The amendments before us would, first, create more of a jury of the individual’s peers and, secondly, produce a voting system that is much closer to that of a Crown Court, which seeks unanimity. The proposals put by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, are close to unanimity in their form. The reforms the noble Lord is suggesting would mean that the rights of the individual who has been accused would become increasingly similar to those of a normal civilian in a criminal case. Since 2006 we have developed the three bodies of law, brought them together and introduced civilian best practice—there is probably a better way of putting that, but it is essentially what we have done—so I find this next step very attractive.
As an alternative or as a supplement, the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, has suggested a minimum number of 12 on the board. That is an interesting suggestion which again is in step towards achieving similarity, and I would guess that he has suggested the figure on the basis that while such a revolutionary change might not appeal to the Government, there is also the idea of an inquiry to see how courts martial work to see if that could be a step towards reform.
Clearly, and I have sat on that side, these amendments will not work and there will be something wrong with them. However, that is irrelevant. What matters is: should we make steps in this direction using this quinquennial Act? We do it only every five years and I would find unconvincing the argument that it is not appropriate. I am putting a burden on the Government, today and perhaps in subsequent meetings and in writing, to argue the case for why we should not move in the general direction of these amendments and make the whole process for the defendant more analogous to that of a civil court.
The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Earl Howe) (Con)
My Lords, I am very conscious of the close interest taken by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, and my noble friend Lord Attlee, as well as by the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, in the operation of the court martial and I welcome the opportunity to discuss these matters today. The first amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, would amend Section 155 of the Armed Forces Act 2006, which makes provision with respect to the constitution of the court martial. It provides that only officers or warrant officers may be lay members of the court martial. As the noble Lord explained, Amendment 1 would change this; it would also provide that court martial rules may provide that lay members must,
“be drawn from each and every branch of the armed services”.
The noble Lord’s next amendment, Amendment 2, would insert a new Section 155A into the 2006 Act. The effect of proposed new Section 155A would be to allow serving personnel of any rank to be lay members.
The court martial consists of a judge advocate and between three and seven lay members. Lay members of a court martial, who are also referred to as the panel or the board, have a role in relation to findings on a charge and sentencing. The lay members for any proceedings are specified by or on behalf of the court administration officer. Only commissioned officers and warrant officers may be lay members. Amendments 1 and 2 would change this, as I have said, by allowing members of the Armed Forces of any rank to be lay members.
It will not surprise the Committee to hear that I am resistant to the proposals that the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, has put forward. The first point I wish to make in response is that the existing rules governing lay membership of the court martial result from the fact that the court martial is part of an overall system of justice and discipline. Those rules recognise the importance of experience of command and the exercise of service discipline at a sufficiently high level to enable lay members to assess the actions of those who appear before them in the court martial in the appropriate command and disciplinary context. The role of a lay member in the court martial differs from that of a juror in a Crown Court trial. In the Crown Court, the jury’s role is limited to findings of fact: sentencing is a matter solely for the judge. In the court martial, the lay members and the judge advocate vote on the sentence. In considering sentencing, they must have regard to the maintenance of discipline, so must have a strong understanding of what things affect discipline and what things do not.
All service courts have to apply the statutory principles set out in the Armed Forces Act 2006 as to the purpose of sentencing. These are closely based on the civilian sentencing principles but include, in addition, “the maintenance of discipline” and the reduction of “service offences”—that is, both service discipline offences, such as looting or absence without leave, and criminal offences.
These principles reflect four special aspects related to the service justice system. The first is the existence of disciplinary offences unknown to the general criminal law, such as absence without leave. The second is the fact that the military context of an offence may be relevant to sentencing—for example, an assault against a superior or an inferior may make an offence more serious, and then there is the well-known naval concern about the effect on morale and discipline of mess-deck theft.
Lord West of Spithead (Lab)
My Lords, if I may interject, I have been a president of a court martial board, I have sat on a court martial board and indeed I have been court-martialled, which most people here probably have not. What I wanted to say was that I agree completely with what the Minister has been saying, and it is really important. You could answer the question with the discipline aspect. The knowledge of what instils discipline, and what is important for it, is one of the crucial aspects of this, which makes it different from a case of someone being accused of murder, for example. So much is to do with the application of discipline.
Earl Howe
The noble Lord, as so often, has hit the nail right on the head. What he said encapsulates much of what I have been saying, and I am grateful to him.
Amendment 1 would enable court martial rules to provide that members must be drawn from each and every branch of the armed services. The current law allows for the appointment of members of any of the three services to a court martial panel. Before the 2006 Act, when each of the three services had its own separate system of service discipline, the panel almost always consisted of members of the same service as the accused. The current practice is to appoint lay members, the majority of whom come from the same service as the accused, but this is not set down in law. There is therefore nothing in law to prevent lay members in any particular case being drawn from any branch of the armed services, so I suggest it would not be necessary to amend legislation to achieve the effect required.
The composition of the panel was considered by the House of Commons Select Committee during the passage of the Bill that became the 2006 Act. General Sir Mike Jackson said to the committee at the time:
“For me the default setting would be that the soldier … on the face of it will be more comfortable being tried by members of his own Service”.
The committee considered that where a mixed panel of lay members was appointed, the senior lay member and the majority of members should come from the same service as the accused.
The noble Lord’s Amendment 3, on court martial findings and sentence, would change the law governing decisions of the court martial on findings of guilt or innocence, and sentence. The court martial system allows conviction or acquittal by a simple majority of the lay members of the court martial, with no need for a retrial in the event of a lack of unanimity or a qualified majority.
The judge advocate does not vote on findings of guilt or innocence. In the case of an equality of votes on the finding, the court must acquit the defendant. The lay members are directed, if at all possible, to reach a unanimous verdict, and to decide by a majority only if they cannot all agree. That provides a considerable safeguard against the lay members moving too easily to a majority decision. As the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, indicated, this is a long-established process: the service discipline Acts of the 1950s, which preceded the Armed Forces Act 2006, also provided for majority decisions at court martial. The great advantage of reaching a decision by majority is that it avoids a “hung jury”: there is no need for a retrial in the event of a lack of unanimity or a qualified majority.
The Crown Court process is that unanimity or—with the judge’s permission—a qualified majority is required for any verdict: guilty or not guilty. If unanimity—or a qualified majority—is not achieved, there is a “hung jury”, and this produces a retrial, not an acquittal. Importantly, under the existing court martial process, the accused may be convicted by a simple majority, but he or she may also be acquitted by a simple majority. In the Crown Court, most of a jury may wish to acquit an accused but cannot achieve the necessary unanimity or qualified majority, yet the accused may be retried by a new jury, who may convict.
The court martial process also has the advantage that it allows a decision to be made without it being apparent whether the verdict is unanimous or by majority. As the panel must keep its voting secret and is not required to seek the court’s permission for a majority decision, there are no lingering doubts outside the court about whether an acquittal was correct. It is for these reasons that proposals for unanimous or qualified majority verdicts in the court martial have up to now been rejected.
My noble friend Lord Attlee suggested that we could not show that the current system is satisfactory. The Government have been successful in establishing both in the European Court of Human Rights and in the civilian courts that the court martial system is in principle safe, independent and impartial. The current system for majority verdicts has been considered twice by the Court Martial Appeal Court in the last five years and was on both occasions held to be fair and safe. The Court Martial Appeal Court, which is made up of the same judges as sit in the civilian Court of Appeal, has held that there is no ground for deciding that a verdict by a simple majority of the lay members of a court martial is inherently unfair or unsafe. They noted, among other points, that the overwhelming majority of criminal trials in England and Wales are decided in magistrates’ courts and the process of simple majority verdicts is long established in those courts.
The issue of majority verdicts was raised by Sergeant Blackman—as was referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas—in his appeal against conviction in 2014. He argued that it was discriminatory to apply trial by the court martial rather than trial by jury in the Crown Court because the court martial offered less protection to the accused than jury trial. The Court Martial Appeal Court again held that trial by the court martial on the basis of a simple majority was not unsafe or unfair; moreover it was not discriminatory.
I should add that Amendment 3 would make very different provision in the service system from that in the criminal justice system if it is the noble Lord’s intention that there must be a panel of at least five lay members in all cases in the court martial, even in cases equivalent to those which may be tried in the civilian system by a single magistrate or three lay magistrates, who may make decisions by simple majority. That difference in provision would in one respect be magnified yet further by the amendment tabled by my noble friend Lord Attlee to increase the size of the panel of lay members on court martial cases to 12.
Amendment 3 would also expose the deliberations of the lay members of the court martial. Proposed new subsection (3) would require the president of the lay members to state in open court the number of panel members dissenting where the majority finding is that the defendant is guilty. One important safeguard of the independence of the lay members of a court martial is the confidentiality of their deliberations. The question whether court martial verdicts are unanimous or by majority is not asked or investigated at all. This safeguard is in place to produce a fair trial process. For this reason, the Armed Forces Act 2006 makes provision about offences relating to members of the court martial and their deliberations. It contains provisions which mirror those in the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 which apply to jurors in the Crown Court. Under these provisions, it is an offence for a person intentionally to disclose information about statements made, opinions expressed, arguments advanced or votes cast by members of the court martial for proceedings in the course of their deliberations. It is also an offence to solicit or obtain such information. This is subject to exceptions but these are very limited. For example, the offence is not committed where information is disclosed for the purposes of an investigation into whether an offence of contempt of court has been committed by, or in relation to, a lay member.
In the Government’s view, the confidentiality of the deliberations of lay members should not be compromised unless there is a compelling case for doing so, such as for the purposes of an investigation into whether an offence of contempt of court has been committed. We are not convinced that there is a compelling case for requiring voting figures to be disclosed.
The effect of the proposed new subsection (4) would appear to be to expose whether conviction or acquittal was unanimous or by majority. In our view, it should never be known that a defendant has been acquitted by a majority decision. Consistent with the position which applies with jury verdicts in the Crown Court, we think that it would be wrong in principle for any request to be made of the lay members which identifies an acquittal by a majority where the defendant is acquitted. The acquitted defendant should not be exposed to public ignominy consequent on the recording of the fact that one or more lay members was convinced of his or her guilt. The same arguments may be made in response to my noble friend Lord Attlee’s Amendment 11, which would make provision for academic research into the workings of the board of lay members in court martial cases. We are not, therefore, convinced that there is a compelling case for compromising the confidentiality of the deliberations of lay members by allowing research of the kind proposed by this amendment.
Returning to Amendment 3, another effect of this amendment would be to change the role of the lay members in court martial trials. In response to Amendments 1 and 2, I explained how the role of a lay member in the court martial differs from that of a juror in a Crown Court trial. In the Crown Court, the jury’s role is limited to findings of fact and sentencing is a matter solely for the judge; in the court martial, the lay members and the judge advocate vote on the sentence. In the case of an equality of votes on the sentence, the judge advocate has a casting vote. The judge advocate advises the lay members on the appropriate sentencing guidelines for the offence.
Proposed new subsection (5) in Amendment 3 would change this by making the determination of sentence a matter for the judge advocate alone, although he or she would be required to consult the lay members. We would see that change as an erosion of an important difference between the civilian criminal justice system and the service justice system. The military context and service experience should be considered during sentencing as well as in findings of guilt or innocence. I submit that the input from the board members on sentencing is thus very important.
As I explained earlier, the existing provisions governing sentencing reflect the fact that the court martial is part of an overall system of justice and discipline. I spoke of how all service courts must apply statutory principles set out in the Armed Forces Act 2006 as to the purpose of sentencing. These include “the maintenance of discipline” and “the reduction of service offences”. These principles reflect special aspects relating to the service justice system, which explains why there is direct involvement of the panel in sentencing, and I remind noble Lords of those factors that I listed earlier.
Lord Tunnicliffe
My Lords, as I said earlier, I see this debate as being in two parts, of which this is the second part. The development of service law in this country has been going on for several hundred years and we have seen important movements in the past 10 years with the 2006 Act and now with these proposals. I am unsympathetic to what the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, proposes in this area, because it goes too deep into the body of military law. There is presumably an argument that you do not need military law on any offence that is covered by an equivalent piece of civil law, but we are not there yet in the minds of either the public or the military. We are on a journey and I think that we are at the right place in that journey, so to carve these offences out of the scope of military law at this point would be wrong. I shall read with great care the speeches that have been made and listen with great care to the Minister’s response. We will ponder on those views but, as a generality, the scope of military law is probably right at this time. I repeat that we should address the courts martial system to make the judgment process analogous but leave the scope substantially as it is.
Earl Howe
My Lords, these further amendments address other aspects of the service justice system about which the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, is exercised. I agree that it is right that this Committee should engage in close and careful scrutiny and assure ourselves of the rationale that underpins the system.
Amendment 4 would limit the jurisdiction of the court martial. It would prevent the court martial from trying certain offences: murder; manslaughter; the wide range of sexual offences under the Sexual Offences Act 2003; and any offence committed overseas that a civilian criminal court in the United Kingdom has jurisdiction to try.
The noble Lord, Lord Thomas, explained that his intention with Amendment 15 is to extend the jurisdiction of civilian criminal courts in England and Wales by giving them jurisdiction to try members of the Armed Forces and civilians subject to service discipline for acts overseas that, had they been committed here, would have constituted sexual offences under the Sexual Offences Act 2003. The Committee may be aware that service courts are able to exercise jurisdiction in respect of acts overseas. Section 42 of the Armed Forces Act 2006 provides that a member of the Armed Forces is guilty of an offence under service law if they do an act outside the United Kingdom that would constitute an offence under the law of England and Wales were it done here.
Amendment 16 would give members of the Armed Forces accused of committing certain crimes overseas a right to elect whether to be tried by the court martial or by a civilian criminal court. The crimes in question are those that the civilian criminal courts may try even if the events in question took place overseas. Those offences include murder and, although the noble Lord explained that this was an alternative to his previous proposal, would also include sexual offences if Amendment 15 were accepted as well.
I note one point in passing. Amendment 16 does not appear to propose that members of the Armed Forces should have a right to elect civilian criminal trial in respect of conduct in the United Kingdom or in respect of conduct overseas other than on active service in operational circumstances, yet it is not immediately apparent why such cases should be treated differently.
The noble Lord, Lord Thomas, may not be too surprised to hear that the Government do not support these amendments, which imply that there are problems with the court martial system. Yet the service justice system has been scrutinised by the UK courts and by Strasbourg, and has been held to be compliant with the European Convention on Human Rights for both investigations and prosecutions within the UK and abroad, where the civilian police do not have jurisdiction.
As regards the implication about the competence of the service police and prosecutors, the service police are trained and able to carry out investigations into the most serious offences, with members of the Special Investigations Branch having to pass the serious crime investigation course before being selected for that unit. In addition, selected members of the service police attend a range of specialist and advanced detective training at either the Defence College of Policing and Guarding or externally, with the College of Policing or training providers accredited by the college.
At the Service Prosecuting Authority, prosecutors are trained to effectively prosecute serious cases. For example, prosecution of serious sexual offences requires attendance on the CPS rape and serious sexual offences specialist training course, and the SPA ensures that decisions on charging in such cases are taken only by prosecutors who have completed that training. The Government believe that the service justice system is capable of dealing with the most serious of offences and should be able to continue to do so. In the case of offences which both the civilian criminal courts and service courts have jurisdiction to try, it is recognised that it is necessary for prosecutors to consider in each case whether the offence is more appropriately tried in the civilian criminal courts or in a service court. This applies not only to offences committed overseas in respect of which the civilian criminal courts have jurisdiction but to offences committed in the United Kingdom.
The existing protocol between service and civilian prosecutors recognises that some cases are more appropriately dealt with in the service system and some more appropriately in the civilian system, particularly those with civilian victims. The principles of the protocol were approved by the Attorney-General for England and Wales, and by the Ministry of Justice. The protocol recognises that any offence can be dealt with by the service authorities. The main principle in deciding who acts is whether the offence has any civilian context, especially a civilian victim. The protocol therefore provides that cases with a civilian context are dealt with by the civilian criminal justice system. However, where a case has a service context, it is important that the service justice system—which is specifically constructed to deal with that unique service dimension—is able to manage the case in question. But were we to create a right to elect of the kind contained in Amendment 16, I submit that it could undermine the service justice system, as an accused could make an election which would see the types of cases which civilian and service prosecutors currently consider should be dealt with in the service system—because of their service context—instead having to be dealt with by the civilian criminal courts.
The noble Lord, Lord West, referred to the importance of mitigation in certain cases. Partly for that reason but also for others, many cases which concern conduct outside the UK will have a service context such that both service and civilian prosecutors would consider that they would be more appropriately tried in the service system. That is significant because of the key point that I made on the previous group of amendments: court martial is part of an overall system of justice and discipline, and the existing provisions governing sentencing in the court martial reflect this.
As I mentioned earlier, all service courts have to apply statutory principles set out in the Armed Forces Act 2006 as to the purpose of sentencing. These are closely based on the civilian sentencing principles but include, in addition, “the maintenance of discipline” and the reduction of “service offences”. These principles reflect special aspects related to the service justice system, including those factors that I touched on earlier and shall repeat: first, in service courts the military context of an offence may be relevant to sentencing, and I mentioned an assault against a superior or an inferior; secondly, in service courts a heavier sentence may be justified by reference to the fact that the offender is in the Armed Forces, and I mentioned a drugs offence in that context; and, thirdly, certain penalties are available only to service courts, requiring an assessment of whether they are appropriate from a broadly disciplinary point of view—for example, service detention or dismissal. Allowing a case with a purely service context to be dealt with in the civilian system on the election of an accused therefore risks undermining the system of justice and discipline in the Armed Forces.
Lord Thomas of Gresford
My Lords, I am moved to join in this debate by the recitation by the noble Baroness, Lady Gould, of the figures for the past few years, which amount to hundreds. I should tell the Committee that in the investigation I was involved with in Washington in America, to the best of my recollection it was estimated that 32,000 sexual offences were committed in the United States armed forces, regarding which there were 5,000 complaints and prosecutions brought in the hundreds, with convictions a lower figure. It was a matter of very high political concern. There is a campaign regarding this by Senator Gillibrand, the junior senator for New York, assisted by Mr Ted Cruz, who has achieved some notoriety lately. So there are a Democrat and an ultra-right-winger and others all involved in dealing with this dreadful problem that they are facing. The issue really is the role of the CO in sexual offences, the very issue that Amendment 6 raises. I strongly urge it upon the Minister that sexual offences should be taken out of the purview of the CO altogether.
Earl Howe
My Lords, I understand the concerns which underlie these amendments. However, the case that I shall put to the Committee will show that I am not convinced that it is necessary or appropriate to make changes. The first amendment in this group would create a legal obligation to publish data about allegations of sexual offences. It would impose an obligation which, it is worth saying, is not currently imposed on other civilian authorities, although they do publish such information on a regular basis.
It may be helpful if I briefly set out the existing arrangements within the service justice system for the collection and publication of crime statistics. The Service Police Crime Bureau records, for all three services, allegations of rape and sexual assault that are made to the service police. That information is released regularly in response to Parliamentary Questions and freedom of information requests. In the case of the latter, the information is uploaded to the MoD’s online publication scheme where it can be freely accessed. Noble Lords have said that they do not regard that in itself as sufficient, but let me continue as there is more to say on this.
The noble Baroness, Lady Gould, said that the system of recording offences needs to be made more robust. In an effort to improve our recording of crime, the Service Police Crime Bureau has been liaising with the Home Office police forces to analyse their crime-recording practices and rules. I am pleased to say that, as a result, the bureau is to establish a post of crime registrar, similar to that found in Home Office police forces, with a remit to scrutinise and audit the recording of crimes on the service police investigation management system. That will undoubtedly improve the accuracy and consistency of the information and, in due course, lead to the production of useful management information about patterns and trends. I very much agree with the argument that it is highly desirable to have an accurate picture of the extent of sexual offending.
My noble friend Lord Attlee asked whether the service police are recording every case referred to them. I will reflect on that issue but, in doing so, I suggest that we need to bear in mind that an unproven complaint should not blight a person’s career. This is a very sensitive issue and it is one on which I suggest that we must be very careful.
Baroness Gould of Potternewton
The noble Earl has talked about the question of allegation, which is always a problem. Would he be prepared to say that a comprehensive list should be produced of the number of proven cases within the Armed Forces?
Earl Howe
I shall address both points. I shall certainly factor in the last point that my noble friend made about the need to have, where this occurs, a record of a pattern of behaviour to guide the authorities if need be.
In answer to the noble Baroness, Lady Gould, the Service Prosecuting Authority records, for each year, the number of cases referred to it, the number of cases in which charges are preferred and the number of cases where a conviction is secured. The Military Court Service publishes on the internet, on a regular basis, details of every case heard at courts martial, including offences, outcomes and punishments. Therefore, the Ministry of Defence already collects and publishes a range of information about sexual offending within the Armed Forces.
However, I do not want to sound in the least complacent on this. As my honourable friend Mr Lancaster made clear in another place, we recognise that we could improve on what we are currently doing. The MoD is now working to ensure that the necessary policies and procedures can be put in place so that the finished product meets the necessary standards of an official statistic. It is a question of ensuring that any statistics that are published can be relied upon to present a true and consistent picture.
Amendment 5 would impose a legal obligation to publish data about allegations of sexual offences. I am more than a little concerned about that because of the point that I made earlier about unfounded allegations but also because no such obligation is imposed on civilian authorities. One has to ask why the military context should be any different.
Amendment 6 would remove from commanding officers any discretion as to whether to report to the service police allegations of the sexual offences to which the amendment relates. Those offences are sexual assault, exposure, voyeurism and sexual activity in a public lavatory. The amendment would mean that the commanding officer was required, by law, to report to the service police every allegation which would indicate to a reasonable person that one of these offences may have been committed. This obligation would apply regardless of the wishes of the victim.
I do not think that this amendment is necessary and I shall explain why. Commanding officers are under a statutory duty under the Armed Forces Act 2006 to ensure that allegations of any offences, including those covered by the amendment, are handled appropriately. The commanding officer’s duties in this respect are crystal clear. If a commanding officer becomes aware of an allegation or circumstances which would indicate to a reasonable person that any service offence may have been committed by someone under his command, he must ensure that it is investigated “appropriately”. The commanding officer must therefore report an allegation to the service police if this would be appropriate.
However, if a commanding officer becomes aware of an allegation or circumstances which would indicate to a reasonable person that a Schedule 2 offence had or may have been committed, he must report this to the service police. Schedule 2 offences are those inherently serious offences listed in Schedule 2 to the Armed Forces Act 2006. Almost all offences under Part 1 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 are Schedule 2 offences, including rape, assault by penetration and a large number of other serious sexual offences. This amendment would make sexual assault, exposure, voyeurism and sexual activity in a public lavatory Schedule 2 offences. A commanding officer would therefore have no discretion as to whether to report allegations to the service police.
In considering this issue, it is important to remember that before a commanding officer takes command he has training to teach him how to exercise his powers under the Armed Forces Act 2006, and he has access to legal advice 24 hours a day, seven days a week.
I should also mention that comprehensive guidance on handling serious offences, including sexual offences, has been issued to commanding officers, as has a comprehensive guide for victims of such offences. It is also important to note that there is a specific requirement in the Manual of Service Law that a commanding officer is to take legal advice where the offences covered by this amendment are alleged. The manual makes specific mention of these offences in the section on deciding how to investigate. It also states that there is to be a presumption that the commanding officer should normally ensure that allegations of such offences are reported to the service police.
Lord Touhig
My Lords, we have had a good short debate and I am grateful to all noble Lords who have taken part, but I have to say to the noble Earl, Lord Howe, that I am so disappointed with his response. My noble friend Lady Gould spoke from a lifetime of experience of campaigning on matters of this kind, and some of the statistics that she afforded us are staggering. She mentioned that 20 soldiers are on the sex offenders register. Is that uploaded on to the MoD website, in which the noble Earl seems to put a great deal of faith? I do not know, so perhaps he can enlighten us.
My noble friend Lord West of Spithead spoke with the authority of experience as someone who has faced up to this, not quite realising what a big problem it is, and learned a great deal. He said that we have to change, and that is coming from someone who has served his country heroically and has taken great responsibility for the people under his command. He believes that we really do need to do something about this.
I could not improve on the remarks just made by the noble Earl, Lord Attlee. There will be inhibitions and people will not take things forward because of all sorts of consequences that they might face, so it simply is not good enough. In his earlier remarks he also asked the Minister whether the service police are recording all complaints. I hope that he will be able to tell us at some stage whether that is the case. The noble Baroness, Lady Jolly, was spot on. Parents need to be reassured. Later in Committee we will be considering issues affecting youngsters under the age of 18 joining the Armed Forces.
Lord Touhig
I appreciate that, and am grateful to the Minister for clarifying it. However, he spoke earlier about all this information being uploaded to the MoD’s website, and my point is whether or not that is on there.
The noble Baroness, Lady Jolly, talked about the training of officers, but that is not an answer. Many of us have been involved in training, in all our walks of life, but practical experience shows that you need exposure to deal with problems like this, and the evidence suggests that commanding officers do not have that kind of experience and so are not always the right people. The noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, said that the United States is looking at this matter, so it is not just something peculiar to our country.
The Minister said that he was not convinced that these amendments were necessary, saying that their provisions do not exist in a civilian context. However, I think we all agree that the Armed Forces is not like any civilian organisation. When you join the British Armed Forces, you are joining an organisation in which you might put your life on the line—it is not like joining Tesco or Barclays Bank. The circumstances and living arrangements are different: they do not go home at 5 pm; they live as a community. We cannot really compare the two.
The Minister also said that some progress had been made and that there is to be a crime registrar. Is this another bureaucrat? How much will it cost? Why not just publish the information? If it is there, why not report it? If the information is being uploaded to the MoD’s website, why not put it in a report? It seems to me that this is another way of pushing things aside and not really facing up to the difficulties. We have a duty of care for the people who serve in our Armed Forces, and I am sure we all recognise that.
The Minister said that he had certain doubts about removing the CO’s ability not to progress a complaint. I think that there are real problems here. I am sorry that the noble Viscount, Lord Slim, feels that this might be perceived to be an attack on the chain of command. That is not the case at all: we have to respect the fact that we need a thorough and well-organised chain of command. However, if you are a “victim”, you are not in a position, as the noble Viscount was able to do, to call somebody in and get the CO sorted out because he has decided that he is not going to progress a particular complaint. There is going to be real disappointment that the Government do not feel able to publish the information that they are collecting. If it is on the website, why not produce it as a report? At the very least, I had hoped that the Minister would have said that although there are deficiencies in these amendments, the Government will go away and see whether they can come forward with their own amendment, having worked with people on all sides to make a better job if it, rather than just shutting it down. I shall not press the amendments, but I tell noble Lords that we will come back to them.
Baroness Jolly
My Lords, I am happy to support the amendment. Future Reserves 2020 relies upon a significant build-up of our Reserve Forces, and at a pace. Employers and reservists have both rights and responsibilities. I am sure that noble Lords would agree that a wise would-be reservist would talk their plans through with their employer, but they need not. The first the employer could hear about them is the receipt of a letter from the MoD. Similarly this can happen at the change of a job. When you apply for a job you are not under any obligation to tell your would-be employer that you are a reservist, which probably chimes with the point just made by the noble Lord, Lord Empey. It is therefore really important that there should be no discrimination. Noble Lords might wonder whether an employer would feel anxious and somewhat disappointed about the lack of confidence that the employee has in him that he has not been told, but clearly there are many reasons here. Also, what employees do in their own time is very much their own business.
There are ways around this on a temporary basis. A reservist employee can ask for a waiver from the MoD lasting a year not to tell the employer, but that aside, there is evidence of discrimination by employers. There is no protection against such discrimination in employment in the normal course of events. This probing amendment seeks to draw out from the Minister the various issues around how this might be handled and ask whether we are aware of the scale of the problem. But as with Amendment 5, recording and publishing the information gives the Government and indeed the public the opportunity to measure progress year on year and creates a fairer environment for reservists in which they are to work.
Earl Howe
My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Lord for raising this issue and I understand entirely why he felt it appropriate to do so. Nevertheless, I am not convinced at the moment that it is necessary or appropriate to set out a requirement in the Armed Forces Bill for commanding officers to collect and for the Ministry of Defence to publish the kinds of data that he has referred to.
We fully recognise and value the contribution of reservists and the need to ensure that their interests are properly protected. Part of that is making sure that their reserve service does not negatively affect their employment prospects. I completely accept that principle. But that is precisely why there is protection in place to ensure that reservists are not dismissed as a result of any duties or liabilities that they have to undertake; for example, as a result of being mobilised. This protection is provided by the Reserve Forces (Safeguard of Employment) Act 1985, Section 1 of which gives a reservist who is called out for reserve service the right to apply to his or her former employer to be reinstated after they return from mobilised service. In addition, Section 17 of the 1985 Act makes it a criminal offence for an employer to dismiss an employee solely or mainly by reason of any duties or liabilities that may arise as a result of being called out.
Further, Section 48 of the Defence Reform Act 2014 amended the Employment Rights Act 1996 to remove the current two-year qualifying period for claims of unfair dismissal where the reason for dismissal is or is primarily because the individual is a reservist. However, we are not aware of any cases having been brought as a result of this change. In addition, as proposed in the Reserves in the Future Force 2020: Valuable and Valued White Paper, we have established a website that allows reservists to alert the Ministry of Defence if they believe that they have been disadvantaged in employment as a result of their reserve service. These cases are of course investigated if the complainant agrees. There have been only 13 contacts from reservists since we established the website in July 2013. Those are the facts as they currently stand.
The amendment proposed by the noble Lord seeks to place a legal duty on commanding officers to collect statistics on how many reservists have reported employment discrimination on account of their reserve service and for the Ministry of Defence to collect and publish statistics on the number of complaints regarding discrimination. There are more than 300 reserve units in the UK. Given the very low incidence of reported complaints, I submit that a requirement of that kind would be disproportionate and burdensome.
However, there is another difficulty with the proposed amendment—it may be unnecessary for me to point this out, but I hope that noble Lords will forgive me for doing so. It refers to “discrimination” in the context of employment, but it is important to be clear that, despite the protections that I have referred to for reservists in the civilian workplace, being a reservist is not a “protected” characteristic under the Equality Act 2010, unlike characteristics such as age, disability, race, religion or belief, sex or sexual orientation. I would like to make a further point. It does not follow that an allegation of discrimination means that an individual has been discriminated against. One need only think of a simple example, such as someone who says that they have not been promoted because of their reservist status and that that needs investigation. Clearly when an allegation like that is made, it is quite a complex situation. While on the face of it the amendment appears simple, I suggest that there are significant difficulties below the surface.
Our approach, which I hope that noble Lords will agree with, is to develop open relationships with employers and to encourage and support reservists in their individual relationships with their employers. We encourage reservists to raise employer issues with their chain of command and to resolve issues through the improved relationship management process that we have put in place. I would like to think that those processes have borne fruit, in the light of the very small number of contacts with the website that I referred to earlier. Good relationships with employers are absolutely central to the Government’s programme for the Reserve Forces, but I believe that our resources in this area are better spent in strengthening these relationships than in creating and fuelling a reporting process.
The improved relationship with employers is increasingly evident from the number signing the Armed Forces covenant and the very strong examples of those employers up and down the country who have been recognised for their support to our Armed Forces. The issue raised by my noble friend Lord Attlee is slightly different, as I am sure he recognises, and I undertake to write to him about it.
I hope that the Committee will understand why I cannot support the proposal that the Bill should be amended. For that reason I hope that the noble Lord will agree to withdraw the amendment.
Earl Attlee
My Lords, when the noble Lord, Lord Touhig, moved his amendment, he said that it was a probing amendment. However, I support the general position and tone of my noble friend’s response. He mentioned the Reserve Forces (Safeguard of Employment) Act. I must say that post-Operation TELIC, the MoD’s support for reservists who found themselves in difficulties was absolutely pathetic. Reservists were on their own. I used to fondly think that if I found myself in difficulty I would have the big bad main-building MoD on my side. The reality was that reservists got no support from the Ministry of Defence at all. They had the protection of the legislation, but they had to fight the case on their own. Whereas if the MoD had rung up to say, “This is the Ministry of Defence, why aren’t you re-engaging the reservists?”, it would have saved an awful lot of difficulty. But the MoD was, frankly, pathetic. It is not the Minister’s fault, but that is what happened after TELIC.
Earl Attlee
My Lords, it was on the ability of all reservists to get their jobs back. It was not well handled by the MoD at the time. Let us just hope that we do not have to mobilise large numbers of reservists. We should remember that a lot of them had not volunteered to be mobilised, so it was not what they expected.
Lord Touhig
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who took part in this debate. The noble Earl, Lord Attlee, raised an issue which, as the Minister said, was not quite in line with the intentions behind the amendment. Nevertheless, it shows a degree of discrimination because somebody served in the Reserve Forces, and that is something that we need to be put right.
The noble Earl’s second intervention was rather eye-opening. I do not know whether the Minister can come back at some stage and give us some more information about what went wrong at that time, but it is certainly a failure when people come back from an operation like that to find that they do not get help and support to return to their full-time employment.
The noble Lord, Lord Empey, made a very important point in his second intervention, and it is one that the amendment does not really consider. The Minister’s response would be very helpful should we return to this matter at a later stage.
The noble Baroness, Lady Jolly, made the point that there is endless discrimination against reservists. Surely, where we discover this, it is our job to try to do something about it. That is why we are here. What are we here for if not to right a wrong? Is that not what Parliament is supposed to be about?
I am sorry that the Minister is not convinced about the merits of the amendment. He said that there is a website and that only 13 people have contacted it, but is it not possible for the Government to include something in the annual covenant report on this matter to highlight it? It may well be that 13 is the top number and that the problem is not as great as perhaps people fear, but under the surface, below the radar, there may be many more such cases, and if we highlight the matter then we will at least get to know. If we do not open this up and get some transparency, we will not know to what extent the problem exists or whether it does not exist.
Reservists are certainly facing difficulties, and I am full of admiration for companies and employers. Some of them are very small scale—I met them when I was a Minister—employing just two or three people, but they are prepared to co-operate and help, allowing their staff to serve in the Reserve Forces. I have nothing but admiration and respect for them. However, if there are difficulties, surely it is our job to do something about them, and perhaps the Minister will reflect a little more before we reach Report. For now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Tyler of Enfield (LD)
My Lords, I add my support for Amendment 14 and apologise for my very croaky voice. I do not normally engage in these discussions, but I have a very strong interest in mental health. As other noble Lords have said, with so much focus on mental health now, it really has gone up the agenda. We have had a succession of extremely important reports, most recently the mental health task force report. Parity of esteem between mental health and physical health runs right the way through that report and all the thinking behind it. If we accept that report—certainly in the debates that I have recently taken part in on this subject, the Government have shown their strong support for the reports and the principles behind them, and that is welcome—it is absolutely vital that parity of esteem between physical and mental health is applied equally to members of our Armed Forces, who do the very difficult jobs that they are asked to take on, as it is to the rest of the civilian population. I simply add my support.
Earl Howe
My Lords, I hope that it will not surprise noble Lords to hear that I fully share the sense of importance that they attach to mental health and parity of esteem in the way that mental and physical health are treated by our health services. Both these amendments seek to address provision for the care and support of members of the Armed Forces who suffer from mental health conditions while in service. This is something that we take very seriously, as I will go on to explain.
Taking first the issue of compensation for those who suffer from mental health conditions, I should explain that the Armed Forces Compensation Scheme already makes awards for injuries and disorders predominantly caused by service, including mental health conditions. The scheme is tariff based and aims to make full and final awards as early as possible so that individuals can have financial security and focus on getting on with life and living. Claims can be made while in service or when an individual has left.
The AFCS tariff has nine tables of categories of injury relevant to military service, and these include mental health disorders. While the scheme does have time limits for claims, there is also a provision for the delayed onset of mental disorders. The Ministry of Defence recognises that owing to stigma and perceived impact on career, people may delay seeking help. The practical effect of this is that if a person who left the Armed Forces some time ago is diagnosed with a mental disorder as a result of his or her service and makes a claim under the AFCS, a compensation award will be paid as soon as the claim is accepted.
Noble Lords may recall that, having been asked to review the AFCS, including the associated tariffs, the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Boyce, made his recommendations in February 2010. As a result, the Ministry of Defence increased the maximum lump sum award for mental illness from £48,875 to £140,000. This was to accurately reflect the impact of the most serious mental health conditions. In addition to the lump sum, those with the most serious conditions with likely adverse functional effects on civilian employability receive a tax-free guaranteed income payment for life on discharge from the services or from the date on which the claim is accepted. A lump sum of £140,000 attracts a GIP based on 75% of military salary with enhancements for service length, age, rank and lost promotions.
Another of the noble and gallant Lord’s recommendations led to the Independent Medical Expert Group, a non-departmental public body, being established. It advises Ministers on the scientific and medical aspects of the scheme. The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Boyce, identified mental health as an area requiring further investigation. The subsequent IMEG review involved a literature search and discussions with civilian and military experts, as well as with veterans’ organisations. The findings were published in its second report on 17 May 2013. The conclusions and recommendations on diagnosis, causation, assessment of disorder severity and the use of interim awards were accepted and subsequently incorporated into the scheme.
The second amendment in this group would create a specific obligation on the Government to have particular regard in their annual report on the covenant to,
“parity of esteem between mental and physical healthcare”.
As I have said previously, the Government are committed to meeting the healthcare needs of the Armed Forces community. For this reason, the Armed Forces Act 2011 already requires the Secretary of State to include in his annual Armed Forces covenant report to Parliament the effects of membership, or former membership, of the Armed Forces on service people in the field of healthcare under the covenant.
I was grateful for the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Empey, and I agree with his general point about managing expectations. However, I agree with him only up to a point in this context because I think that the healthcare which we provide to our armed services personnel, both at home and when deployed on operations, is now truly world-class. Last year the principles of the covenant were enshrined into the NHS Constitution for England. That gives a commitment to ensuring that those in the Armed Forces, reservists, their families and veterans are not disadvantaged in accessing health services in the area where they reside. Indeed, we have made several improvements, including: the provision of some £6 million a year to support the provision of enhanced prosthetic devices and services for veterans who have lost a limb as a result of service; the launch of the hearWELL programme to look at hearing loss among the service community; and the allocation of £10 million to address service-related hearing issues among veterans. I know that these are related to physical injuries; nevertheless, I hope that they show the appropriate intent.
With increasing awareness of the issues, we have taken steps to meet the mental health needs of our Armed Forces community. On this specifically, we now have a network of 16 departments of community mental health across the UK, providing out-patient care to the service community. When in-patient care is necessary, it is provided in eight dedicated psychiatric units. Additionally, the Armed Forces covenant gives a commitment that veterans should be able to access mental health professionals who have an understanding of Armed Forces culture, while NHS England is currently completing an audit of veterans mental services, put in place following the Fighting Fit report by my honourable friend Dr Andrew Murrison MP in 2010.
I can therefore assure the noble Baroness that the Government are committed to meeting the health needs of the service community, that we will continue to report on the provision of healthcare in the Armed Forces covenant annual report, and that our work to address mental health needs will be an integral part of that report. However, the principles of the covenant are to ensure that the Armed Forces community are treated fairly in comparison to the civilian population. Parity of esteem is there to ensure that all health services treat mental health with the same importance as physical health, and it applies to everyone accessing NHS services, not just the Armed Forces community. For this reason, it does not need to be legislated for under the covenant.
Given our clear commitment to support those who suffer from mental health conditions and the tangible steps we are taking to do so, I ask that the noble Lord and the noble Baroness withdraw or do not move their amendments—hopefully, reassured.
Lord Touhig
My Lords, the Minister rightly makes a very important point about the commitment that we as a country have made to helping people with mental health problems. The work being done for those who have served in our Armed Forces is first class. We have had some very good contributions to this short debate. The noble Baroness, Lady Jolly, made a powerful case on Amendment 14 and I am sure that she is disappointed that the Minister does not feel it necessary to include it in the covenant report. He says that he shares our sense of the importance of this issue but the point of my amendments, which have attracted widespread support, is that people who have served in our Armed Forces and have a mental health problem receive no compensation or financial support at all until after diagnosis. That can take five years; in the case that I raised, it was eight years. That is a time when people are trying to support their families. Sometimes they cannot work properly, so this can cause all sorts of financial difficulty.
Before we reach Report, can the Minister provide the Committee with statistics showing whether this is a widespread problem and how many years people have to wait before they get a diagnosis? As I say, my information suggests that in many cases they wait for at least five years. If you are in financial difficulties and cannot get back to work, that is pretty devastating for someone who has served in the British Armed Forces, especially in the reserves. I hope that the Minister will feel able to do that at the very least. Whether we return to this on Report is another matter, but the information would be helpful because then we would know the extent of the problem and whether there is a need for us to press further for the Government to act. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Earl Attlee
My Lords, I strongly support my noble and learned friend and his noble and gallant supporters. I have deployed on two military operations, in addition to aid operations. One was peacekeeping and one was war-fighting but for our purposes there was no difference because a peacekeeping operation can deteriorate into a war-fighting or combat operation.
On both operations I willingly put my life, limb and security at the disposal of Her Majesty. “Her Majesty” might sound an old-fashioned term but to me it is all-encompassing. It means the nation, its citizens, the Government, the CDS—who at the time was the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Boyce—and the chain of command.
In return, the nation regards such service as highly commendable. If I did not come back or I was badly injured, it would be jolly hard luck. Statistically, it was actually unlikely. Whenever you deploy on military operations, it is a sad fact that it is not likely that everyone is going to come back intact, and you have to accept that if you are prepared to authorise military action. Obviously, my family would mourn my demise, but what I would not have wanted is the chain of command and the staff wasting their time on inquiries or litigation about my bad luck when they are trying to prosecute a campaign and to secure the absolute minimum number of casualties overall. I suspect that all of the cause célèbre cases that I have read about have been either misreported or misleadingly reported in order to make a good story. In some cases, I know this to be the case because at the relevant time I was in the headquarters handling the issue. If noble Lords want to be briefed privately on that, I am quite willing to do so.
It seems to me that there are several difficulties with involving the legal system when there appears to be a failure in an operation, the planning of it, the resourcing of it or the training for it. The first issue I am certain about because I have seen it myself. Sadly, in a few cases the deceased or those around him or her are the authors of their own misfortune. Sometimes, there is a failure to adhere to the training. I have read news reports where I have had to conclude that for one reason or another the training was not adhered to. Obviously, the MoD is not going to use any of these defences against a claim or misleading news report. We would be shocked if it did so, and I think that some Members of the Committee are a little bit shocked that I am taking this line.
The second issue is that there may be a very good technical reason why some equipment is not used. There could be intelligence to suggest that it is not a good idea. For instance, the capability could have been compromised in some way or using that equipment might be of benefit to opponents. There might be a military judgment to be made about which technology or capability is the highest priority to deploy to theatre. The Committee needs to recognise that in an operation logistic capacity is neither infinite nor perfect.
In about May or June 2003, I was running around in Basra province in southern Iraq in a soft-skin Land Rover. I was heavily armed with a Browning 9 millimetre pistol. My body armour was somewhere in the back of the Land Rover and I am reasonably confident that my driver had his SA80 rifle. It was a benign environment and I did not need protected mobility. But then the situation changed for reasons that the useless Chilcot inquiry may eventually tell us. Following tours had to adopt a much higher state of readiness and needed better equipment, and this was not anticipatable.
The final difficulty is morale. It does not improve morale anywhere in defence to have to endure all this completely unfair and inaccurate criticism. For instance, imagine that you are an expert in the DSTL and read a report suggesting that the very clever equipment you are developing and deploying is in some way inadequate. I have made this point before and I will make it again. I think that trying to pin responsibility for an individual fatality arising from Operation TELIC 1 against the then Labour defence Ministers is outrageous. There may well be questions about the legality, necessity, grand strategy and post-conflict planning of TELIC 1. However, the operation was militarily brilliant. We are one of the few nations in the world that could have undertaken it at all. Most nations cannot even get close to what we can do. We deployed a division out of theatre. We helped to get a regime to collapse at the cost of a mercifully low number of casualties, tragic though they were. The reality of military operations is that one never has all the training or equipment that one would desire or that could be made available in time. What you need is far better training and equipment than your opponent has, and that is exactly what happened on Operation TELIC 1. Noble Lords should make no mistake: in a deployed headquarters every fatality hurts like hell. I know; I have been there.
My final point is that there is a perverse inverse law that the level of scrutiny attached to each fatality on an operation is inversely proportionate to the number of fatalities taken. Proof of this is that if we had taken 1,000 fatalities on Operation TELIC 1, would anyone be worried about the ones who are currently a cause célèbre? I think that the Committee knows the answer.
Earl Howe
My Lords, I am extremely grateful to my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay for having given the Committee the opportunity to examine the set of issues that are of fundamental importance for our Armed Forces and indeed for the Government. As my noble and learned friend explained, the amendment would end the application of the Human Rights Act 1998 to service personnel engaged in military operations outside the United Kingdom. I have very great sympathy with the intention behind the amendment. Recent legal developments have raised justifiable fears in many quarters that service personnel could be unwilling in future to take the rapid and high-risk decisions essential for operational effectiveness, due to the fear of litigation. The Government fully believe that international humanitarian law, as embodied in the Geneva conventions, should have primacy over human rights law in the field of armed conflict. Addressing that issue was a manifesto commitment for this Government.
None the less, for reasons that I shall explain, I cannot invite the Committee to press this amendment. The Government are concerned about and determined to address the risks arising from developments in international human rights law, which have the potential to impose ever greater constraints on the ability of the Armed Forces and the MoD to operate effectively while defending the UK and its interests. As pledged in my party’s manifesto, the Government are absolutely committed to replacing the Human Rights Act, and will be consulting in due course on our proposals for a Bill of Rights. It is only right that that consultation should include the important question of how the Bill of Rights should apply outside the UK, and will ensure that all aspects of the change are properly and fully considered, not least its implications for the rights of our own Armed Forces, which would be affected by this measure. So I suggest that it is in the broader context of a Bill of Rights that these important issues are best considered. We are working closely with the Ministry of Justice as it develops its proposals.
I was very grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, for his intervention. When we speak about combat immunity, there are two issues that need to be distinguished, as he made clear. There are negligence claims and common law, where service personnel believe that the MoD or the Government have put them at undue risk—for example, due to decisions on procurements—and then there are human rights claims under the Human Rights Act or the ECHR, which are claims against the MoD brought either by service personnel in respect of injury or death or by civilians.
On the first of those categories, the negligence claims, I was grateful for the comments of the noble Lord, Lord West. We are concerned that the Smith judgment has left the position on liability for events on the battlefield unclear. That is why we are considering legislation to bring about the necessary clarity. The noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, asked me what harm could result from the Smith case. My response is that, as my noble and learned friend explained, in the Smith case—with no disrespect to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope—there were such strong differences of opinion between members of the Supreme Court that it is reasonable for thought to be given to legislating.
We recognise that there is a concern about UK court decisions eroding the doctrine of combat immunity, which prevents legal claims being brought against the Government for negligence in the course of duty in armed conflict. However, my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay has indicated that his amendment would make provision only with respect to the second category that I mentioned, injury or death of members of the Armed Forces. It would not deal at all with claims brought against the MoD under human rights law in respect of the actions of members of the Armed Forces—for example, by Iraqi nationals. The Government are concerned about both classes of case, and our ongoing work relates to both.
I should make clear that my noble and learned friend’s amendment relates to human rights claims and those claims brought under the ECHR. We are concerned about both types of case and are examining them in the context of our work on the Bill of Rights.
The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig, asked, in effect, why we could not legislate more speedily, perhaps through this Bill. I am as keen to make speed with this as he is but, alas, we are not quite yet ready. There are a number of areas that we are looking into, including examining different areas of legislation where changes could be made and what more we could do to support our Armed Forces personnel and their families. Work is under way, and we will be announcing further detail in due course.
I am most grateful to my noble and learned friend for raising this important issue today. It has been a truly excellent debate. I am confident that when we come to introduce our proposals for the Bill of Rights, we will address effectively the problem that is rightly of concern to him, and we will do so in the context of a much needed and thorough overhaul of our domestic human rights law. On that basis, I hope that my noble and learned friend will agree to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern
My Lords, it was never my intention to press this amendment. It was simply intended to raise these issues, which are extremely complicated. For example, in the case of Smith, Lord Mance pointed out that it is alleged that the major under whose command the firing tank was operating was told of the situation, and that there was a question in relation to the Snatch claims about whether the commander on the ground had chosen the particular vehicle that was involved in the incident. Although there is no question of anyone who was serving being involved in the claim against him, there is difficulty in finding out whether or not there has been a breach—for example, in relation to procurement or supply. You have to investigate the facts on the ground and the decisions of the commanders.
Perhaps I may take the example that the noble Lord, Lord West, gave of his own situation in the Falklands. My understanding is that, if there were a claim in relation to that by someone who had been severely injured and if the application of these principles that are being adumbrated came into play, the question of whether, for example, the anti-aircraft provision on the ship was adequate might have depended on where it was thought the ship would have gone. As I understand it, the difficulty was that when the ship got very closely inshore, the anti-aircraft provision was not adequate. If the ministry were being sued for failure to provide better anti-aircraft equipment—I am thinking of this as a possible scenario—there might be a question as to whether, in the circumstances of the engagement, the commander of the ship was required to go to a place where the anti-aircraft guns would not work properly or whether he could have operated effectively somewhere else. I do not imagine for a minute—