Nationality and Borders Bill

Lord Macdonald of River Glaven Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 2 & Committee stage
Thursday 27th January 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate (Con)]

My Lords, I want to say just a few words because I have listened very carefully, looked at all these amendments and heard some extremely good speeches from colleagues on all sides of the House. However, I am a former Immigration Minister and, looking back at legislation that I was involved in in the 1990s, there were certain Bills in which clauses came forward, we looked at amendments and, frankly, we concluded that, however good the amendments were, the clauses were unamendable and should be removed when they were not effective and where it had been clearly shown that they would have had bad effects.

I am grateful to those who have moved or spoken to their amendments, but I can think of few proposals that can offend as widely and as profoundly as the removal of people’s citizenship. Clause 9, sadly—to me, anyway, as a lawyer—is an affront to our common law, to international legal standards and understandings, and to our various human rights commitments. Critically, it could have appalling consequences for those affected.

As I stated at Second Reading, stripping people of their citizenship—secretly and unilaterally, on vaguely defined grounds such as “in the public interest”—exposes us to actions that fall short of our normal democratic standards, both at home and abroad. It also predicates many legal proceedings.

We all know that the first rule of government is to protect our citizens. I took that very seriously then, as I do know. Clause 9 would place already vulnerable people at greater risk. There are plenty of examples of this. A person may be deported to a country where capital punishment is practised, or where other inhumanities might present themselves. This proposal could hardly be described as protective, as it would open us up to accusations of double standards, which would undermine our efforts to speak out against issues such as the death penalty or cruel and inhumane practices elsewhere.

The UK has a very good and proud record of calling out injustice when it applies to other countries that show a lack of respect for human rights and international standards. At times—not often, but occasionally—we are also good at sporting spurious justifications to mask unsavoury policies. I fear that this clause would grant the UK the same sort of cover and ability to employ the same sorts of excuses to enforce policies that are otherwise indefensible and might be misused.

Citizenship is a valuable status and a clear constitutional right. The issue of revocation is, therefore, to be taken seriously. Any attempt by the state to withdraw an individual’s citizenship must have a clear and robust basis in law. It must assert the primacy of due process, including the right of appeal. Above all, it must be transparent, where the basic rights of notification of action to a subject are followed.

I fear that Clause 9 will create a process that is arbitrary and fundamentally unjust. That is why it should not be supported. I hope that my noble friend can rectify the situation before Report. I listened particularly to the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich. He was quite correct; it is very difficult to see that any form of amendment could put this clause right.

[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven (CB)]

My Lords, it is important to situate Clause 9 within the breadth of our immigration law as it stands. For obvious reasons, deprivation powers available to a Secretary of State to strip a person of their British citizenship were historically very tightly drawn indeed. In 2003, 2006, 2014 and 2018, these powers were significantly expanded. They may now be exercised in relation to any British citizen who is a dual national—including British citizens from birth—where the Secretary of State is satisfied that deprivation is conducive to the public good.

If we want to grasp how broad a power that is and how broad are its implications, we need only recall what the Supreme Court said in the Begum case last year—that this includes a situation where the person does not even know that they are a dual national and where they have little or no connection with the country of their second nationality.

The power can also be exercised in relation to naturalised British citizens even where they are not dual nationals if the Secretary of State is satisfied that the conducive to the public good test is passed because the person has acted in a manner seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the UK. If the Secretary of State has a reasonable belief that the person is able to become a national of another country and that belief turns out to be unfounded, the individual will become stateless.

The leading immigration law silk, Raza Husain, has said:

“This progressive extension over the last two decades has meant that it is no longer necessary to demonstrate that someone is a terrorist or a traitor before stripping them of British citizenship. Individuals may be deprived of citizenship on general public interest grounds of the sort usually invoked to justify deportation, rather than on the basis of their severing the bonds of allegiance that are the hallmark of nationality.”


It is no doubt because of the lowering of these procedural safeguards that the exercise of deprivation of citizenship is now relatively common. In the period from 1973 to 2002, there were no deprivation orders at all. I am told that, since 2011, the power has been used in at least 441 cases, with 104 in 2017 alone. Of course, Clause 9 has the potential very significantly to increase the use of this power. The noble Baroness, Lady Mobarik, has spoken very compellingly about the disproportionate impact that this will inevitably have on non-white British citizens.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Macdonald of River Glaven Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 17th January 2022 Lords Chamber

Finally, before I sit down, I will ask my noble friend, when she wraps up, to answer two questions. First, will the Home Office ensure that the College of Policing ceases the practice set out in its current guidance, so that no more incidents are recorded while the new guidance is pending? Alternatively, what does the Minister envisage for this period, when we are waiting for the new guidance? Secondly, when the new guidance comes into effect—presumably with different criteria from the current guidance—what will happen to existing historic cases of non-crime hate incident records? Will they be retained as they are, will they be extinguished or will they be reviewed and modified in the light of the new guidance?

[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven (CB)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, and to have put my name to his amendments both in Committee and here.

Those of us who put our names to these amendments, discussing the matter before Committee, had a number of concerns: first, the lack of any parliamentary oversight over a system in which the police were creating hate records against the names of people who had committed, it was agreed, no crime; secondly, that these records were categorised as hate incidents purely according to the perception of the complainant and that no other evidence or real inquiry was required; thirdly, that these records were disclosable in some circumstances, for example to potential employers, with all the damage that could imply for the subject of the record; and fourthly, and perhaps most importantly for some of us, that the creation of such records in such large numbers—some 120,000 over four years—without any effective oversight, and flowing from entirely lawful speech, would surely have a chilling effect on the exercise of free speech and therefore on public debate generally.

This is surely one of the most egregious potential consequences of such a process if it is not properly controlled. The case of Harry Miller demonstrates that, but there are many others, including that of a social worker called Rachel Meade who, the Times reported only last week, was facing disciplinary action and the sack for Facebook posts expressing gender-critical views. I observe that these have clearly been stated by the Court of Appeal to be protected beliefs under the Equality Act—so this is not a problem that has gone away.

The Minister mentioned the Harry Miller Court of Appeal judgment. I will quote from it briefly. The court said that

“the recording of non-crime hate incidents is plainly an interference with freedom of expression and knowledge that such matters are being recorded and stored in a police database is likely to have a serious ‘chilling effect’ on public debate.”

The court went on:

“The concept of a chilling effect in the context of freedom of expression is an extremely important one. It often arises in discussions about what if any restrictions on journalistic activity are lawful; but … it is equally important when considering the rights of private citizens to express their views within the limits of the law, including and one might say in particular, on controversial matters of public interest.”


This is why Amendment 109E is before your Lordships’ House. It is to assert the primary importance of the Home Secretary’s code of conduct when it is drafted, stressing—and, indeed, insisting on—a proper respect for the fundamentals of free expression whenever the police are considering recording a non-crime hate incident. Those of us who support this amendment do so because we believe it is so important in the protection of public debate and free expression rights generally that your Lordships should insist that the principle is enshrined in terms in the legislation. The Minister may argue that this is taken as read and that this amendment is in some way otiose. I say in response that experience to date demonstrates the exact opposite.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 109D to remove the negative procedure for all subsequent revisions of this guidance. I shall do that in my capacity as chair of the Delegated Powers Committee, but first I want to make some brief comments in a personal capacity on this whole, in my view, iniquitous concept of innocent people being put on a criminal records database.

As other noble Lords have said, it seems that there are 120,000 people who have not committed any crime, have not been found guilty by a court of any description and yet are held on a database with other people who have been convicted of terrorism, paedophilia, rape, murder, armed robbery and every crime on our statute book. Some may argue that it is not really a criminal record, but if an employer asks for an enhanced criminal record check, the police hand over the names of innocent people whom the police have tried and convicted. I am not convinced that their system of control is as accurate as they claim it is.

If someone complains that they have encountered a hate incident—and we see a growing mountain of these bogus claims—the police investigate. Even when no crime has been committed, the police may decide that the person should be convicted of having done a non-crime hate incident—no magistrate, no proper judge, no jury, just the police.

I will now return to the amendment in front of us in my capacity as chair of the Delegated Powers Committee —your Lordships will be relieved to know that I am being relieved of that position on Wednesday of this week when a new chair is appointed. I welcome the Home Office taking responsibility for these guidelines. If we are going to put innocent people on a criminal records list, it must be done under regulations which have proper parliamentary scrutiny every time—as these will have, at least the first time they are made.

When the Court of Appeal in the Miller case announced that the College of Policing—not a statutory body but a private limited company, as we discussed last week—had produced and implemented partly unlawful guidance, the comment from an assistant chief constable at the college was:

“We will listen to, reflect on, and review this judgment carefully and make any changes that are necessary.”


That is all right then. There is no need to bother 650 MPs or 800 Peers; this assistant chief constable will write our laws. Thank goodness the Home Office realised that it is completely wrong for the liberty and reputation of the individual to be subject to rules written by a private limited company. Thus, I partly welcome—no, largely welcome—the Home Office amendment before us today, but I am afraid it adopts the usual ploy that the Delegated Powers Committee sees in so many Bills, namely the first-time affirmative ploy. This means that the Bill says that the first set of regulations will be made by the affirmative procedure but subsequent revisions will inevitably be minor and technical. Therefore, we need not worry our pretty little parliamentary heads about them and the negative procedure will suffice.

We have seen no evidence to suggest that any subsequent revisions to this guidance will be minor or technical. Indeed, they could be substantial. Suppose, in a hypothetical instance, that the first set of regulations stipulates that these records for non-crime shall be retained for two years. A year later the Home Office issues a revised set with just one word changed: delete “two years” and substitute “10 years” or “25 years”.

The Minister may say—we get this a lot from all departments—that Ministers have no intention whatever of doing that and in the Delegated Powers Committee we always say that the intention of the current Minister is irrelevant and what the law permits them to do is the only thing that matters.

This business of recording non-crimes is such a contentious matter that we suggest that the affirmative procedure must be used on every occasion. The net result of that will be that any time the guidance is revised a Minister—usually a Lords Minister as the Commons will probably bounce it through on the nod—may have to do a 90-minute debate in your Lordships’ House. It is not a very heavy burden to impose on the Government.

The Court of Appeal said:

“The net for ‘non-crime hate speech’ is an exceptionally wide one which is designed to capture speech which is perceived to be motivated by hostility ... regardless of whether there is evidence that the speech is motivated by such hostility … There is nothing in the guidance about excluding irrational complaints, including those where there is no evidence of hostility and little, if anything, to address the chilling effect which this may have on the legitimate exercise of freedom of expression.”


I simply say that so long as these rules remain, Parliament must approve all regulations on this matter, whether it is the first set of regulations, the second, the 10th or the 50th iteration of them.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven (CB)]

My Lords, I do not think that the Government are trying to destroy democracy or steal all our freeborn rights from us, but I do think they are being extremely foolish. The wording of these amendments will create an absolute nightmare for the courts. Sitting here a moment ago I was trying to imagine how a judge would sum up one of these offences to a jury, and what the jury would make of it. It would be a chaotic scenario.

I will say one further thing, on a personal note. I attended both the great demonstrations against the Iraq war in 2002. One of them comprised over a million people, the second around 600,000 people. Those demonstrations would have been in breach of several of these amendments—not just the noise amendment but the various inconvenience amendments on making it difficult for people to get to their bank machines, hospitals and places of work. Under these amendments, those demonstrations would have been illegal. Is that really what Ministers seek to achieve with these amendments? If they do not, this is an extraordinarily foolish piece of drafting.

[Lord Hendy (Lab)]

My Lords, no one likes pickets. Even pickets do not like picketing. However, these clauses impinge on the right to picket, the right to picket is a fundamental aspect of the right to strike, and the right to strike is a fundamental aspect of the right to bargain collectively, which is a fundamental aspect of democracy at work.

Picketing is a highly regulated area of the law in a very sensitive political area. It has been regulated by legislation since 1875 and the last statutory amendment was in the Trade Union Act 2016. There is also a code of practice regulating picketing. There are no exemptions for pickets from either the criminal or the civil law, but these clauses will restrict even further the limited right to picket.

On the issue of noise, other noble Lords have pointed out the vagueness of the concepts involved here, which will impose a great burden on the discretion of the police in deciding what is noisy and what is not. It is notable that legislation has—and workers are very familiar with this—imposed limits on noise by way of decibels and duration in many industries. Those scientific techniques are not used here.

The very purpose of a picket in a trade dispute is to cause

“disruption to the activities of an organisation which are carried on in the vicinity”—

namely, the employer. So pickets will be caught. I note that the amendment states that

“serious disruption to the life of the community”

may include two situations: first, the supply of

“a time-sensitive product to consumers”

and, secondly,

“prolonged disruption of access to … essential goods or any … service, including, in particular, access to … the supply of money, food, water, energy or fuel … a system of communication … a transport facility … an educational institution, or … a service related to health.”

It does not take an expert to know that picketing is put at risk in almost every sector of the economy by these clauses, and it is for that reason that I have added my name to those of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, my noble friend Lord Hain, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, in asking for these clauses to no longer stand part.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Macdonald of River Glaven Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 2 & Lords Hansard - part two & Report stage
Monday 10th January 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

My Lords, this group, particularly Amendment 97A, has become pertinent in light of the apparent situation whereby the Attorney-General has displayed something less than a full commitment to the principle of the right to a jury trial. Many commentators are sadly leaping on the Colston four verdict to question the jury system and apparently seek to undermine public confidence in the principle that every person has the right to be tried by their peers. This would be an ideal opportunity for the Minister to reassure your Lordships’ House—I hope he will—that, no matter how politically inconvenient it might be for the Government, trial by jury is fundamental to our justice system and the Government remain committed to it. As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said, Amendment 97CA is an important practical step to ensure that that remains a proper, full jury trial, with the kind of interactions that we have heard about.

Briefly, the other amendments in this group are important to protect children and other vulnerable court users. It seems like a basic issue of justice and common sense that the court should ensure that the people who appear by video link are still able to participate fully in the proceedings. I hope that the judiciary would never allow anything contrary to this, although I take the point from the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, that the practical sometimes has to override the ideal. None the less, it seems right that the legislation should offer these protections.

[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven (CB)]

My Lords, I strongly support both of these amendments but will focus on that tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. Something was said about the judge’s interaction with the jury and, of course, that is true. Judges have a close interaction with juries in the sense described; it is part of the process of building up their confidence to make what is going to be a very important decision at some stage towards the end of the trial.

I would like to say something about the position of a jury which finds itself in a separate place observing the proceedings on a screen. The point of the jury is to make determinations about fact in the case—to decide who is or is not telling the truth and who the jury is or is not persuaded by. Judges often say that one of the things juries should do is judge the demeanour of witnesses and defendants, looking at them giving their evidence, watching closely as they are asked questions, making allowances for inarticulacy, intelligence and so on, but making a judgment about them as human beings in the very human environment of a trial. That would be an impossibly difficult task to discharge adequately over what is, in effect, a Zoom meeting.

Some of us have had the experience during the pandemic of trying to chair meetings over Zoom, sometimes with relatively large numbers of people in the so-called virtual room. It is very difficult to read people over Zoom, judge the feel or mood of the meeting, read what people are thinking and see who is paying attention and who is not. In a criminal trial, these things become dangerous and render a deficiency at the heart of the trial which is to be avoided at all costs.

If there is no need for the power now, it is not a power which Ministers should be given. If it becomes necessary at some future date, then your Lordships’ House can debate it, but I agree very strongly with my noble friend Lord Pannick that such an extensive, broad power as this should not be gifted to Ministers in the absence of absolute need—and perhaps not even then.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Macdonald of River Glaven Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Lords Hansard - part one & Report stage
Monday 10th January 2022 Lords Chamber

In considering the issues relating to women’s justice and the commission I chaired on justice in Wales, it was plain that the Welsh Government were taking a separate and distinctive strategy towards female offending. The difficulty there, however, was delivery. It is delivery that has been the success of the Youth Justice Board and would, I believe, be the success of a women’s justice board. I therefore warmly support the amendment.

[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven (CB)]

My Lords, I too warmly support this amendment. Like most criminal lawyers, I have often visited women’s prisons and I must tell your Lordships that they are shattering and disturbing places. The sheer amount of human damage that one encounters in women’s prisons is very disturbing. My main reason for supporting this amendment as strongly as I do is precisely the delivery aspect to which my noble and learned friend Lord Thomas has just referred. Something has to be done to persuade the Government, and all of us, I suppose, to focus on the processes that are leading women—mostly damaged women, with children, who themselves are victims of serious crime—into these places. Without a way to focus on this as a public policy that can deliver some change, nothing will change. I strongly believe that the proposal in this amendment, if adopted by the Government, could lead to some desperately needed change.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I too support this amendment. It seems to me that the case for the amendment is made plain by the functions of the proposed board, as set out in subsection (5). The functions include meeting the particular needs of women in the criminal justice system; monitoring the provision of services for women; obtaining information from relevant authorities; publishing information; identifying, making known and promoting good practice; commissioning research in connection with such practice; and providing assistance to local authorities and other associated purposes. Is the Minister really disputing that there is a vital need for all of that to be done, and by a body dedicated to that purpose?

Investigatory Powers Bill

Lord Macdonald of River Glaven Excerpts

Monday 27th June 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven (LD)]

My Lords, I start by acknowledging the value of the work of our security services and its contribution to the security, prosperity and maintenance of freedom in our country.

During the five years that I worked closely with them, I found the security services to be well led by men and women who were clearly sensitive to the need to find an appropriate balance between security and liberty and thought deeply about these issues. In particular, I acknowledge the work of GCHQ, which is likely to be more impacted than most by this Bill. It is an extraordinarily important national asset and extremely well led by its director Robert Hannigan. He and his senior team seem sensitive to public concern and eager to find a legal framework that wins public confidence for their work.

I believe that it was a mistake for the Government to connive at a situation where some security programmes, such as Operation Tempora, the GCHQ programme, stretched the legal authorisation scheme then in force under RIPA to breaking point. So I welcome this present Bill as a serious attempt to create a framework of law in which the security services can do what is necessary to protect us, but within the context of a respect for civil liberties that is appropriately robust.

I want to address three areas. First, noble Lords have already spoken about future-proofing. This was a growing problem with RIPA. The speed of technological advance is quite extraordinary. The provisions that will be debated in detail by your Lordships’ House need to stand the test of time into at least the medium term, and should be judged against their capacity to do that.

Secondly, I encourage noble Lords to be realistic about the capacity of internet connection records to lay bare the most intimate details of a person’s life. This is not like telephone data; wholesale retention for 12 months means allowing access to more than raw data. It allows access to people’s lifestyles, beliefs, sexual practices, health and perfectly legal secrets. So we should consider this part of the Bill with that reality closely in mind. For my part, having seen the importance of communications data to serious criminal prosecutions—almost every serious criminal prosecution that was brought when I was chief prosecutor relied on data of this sort—I am inclined to support the clauses which refer to internet connection data. However, in debating these matters, we should recognise the significant concern outside Parliament in so far as this part of the Bill is concerned.

Thirdly, I will deal with protections against abuse. Foremost among these are the judicial commissioners. As someone who has been calling for a judicial role in the area of security practice for very many years, I strongly welcome the proposals in the Bill for judicial commissioners. There is a question as to whether they should be operating a judicial review test or a merit-based one. Some, including the noble Lord, Lord Campbell, say that it is for a politician to judge the merits and that a Secretary of State should be overturned only if his or her authorisation is irrational or unlawful. Others argue that a judicial confirmation of the merits would be an important protection against political abuse of these highly intrusive powers. I am inclined to agree, subject to debate, that security decisions are for the Minister and the lawfulness of the process is for a judge.

In making my final point about the judicial commissioners, I make clear that I yield to no one in my admiration for our retired judges. But it is very important that the judicial commissioners have, within their number, a majority who are active judges, adjudicating routinely, with full public confidence, in other areas of the law at the highest levels. This would encourage and underline a public view that the commissioners are independent and worthy of public confidence in their work. Let us have as many senior, working judges as possible among the judicial commissioners. In that way, we will avoid any hint or suggestion—however undeserved—that they are a club that can be won over by one side or another. Public confidence in the process of authorisation can only be enhanced if we ensure a majority of working judges within that important body of people.

Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

Lord Macdonald of River Glaven Excerpts

Wednesday 4th February 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Elystan-Morgan (CB)]

My Lords, there is no doubt that freedom of speech in universities is utterly essential. Without it, there can be no concept of a real university. Freedom of speech is of course a basic human right, but in a university it is the very bedrock on which its concept is founded.

A week ago, in Committee, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Scott, reminded us that if a university loses freedom of speech—the right to discuss, examine, disseminate and comment on all manner of opinions in the widest possible range—it becomes an intellectual closed shop. I do not think that it could be better put than that. It is against that template that one has to consider all these matters.

I raise a point which follows very closely that of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead. It relates to Section 43 of the Education (No. 2) Act 1986. The question is whether what is proposed by the Minister in Amendment 15D goes far enough. The fact that “particular regard” has to be paid leaves an open question as to exactly how the two concepts can sit together: the concept in Section 43 of freedom of speech in a university and the concept of statutory guidance, around which the clauses of Part 5 are built. To my mind, it still leaves a dubiety. That is why I support Amendment 14.

I am not sure exactly what wording should be used to improve the situation—it is always dangerous to try to make legislation on the hoof—but I should have thought that one could look to a different precedent. In Section 1 of the Children Act 1989, a court is enjoined, in dealing with a child’s case, to consider seven or eight different situations, but it is stated that the welfare of the child shall be regarded as the “paramount consideration”. Whether the word used is paramount or prime it could so be made clear that, where the two matters—the principles of Section 43 and those set out in the statutory directive—are in conflict, Section 43 should remain paramount.

Section 43 does not stand alone. Another very relevant section is Section 202 of the Education Reform Act 1988. That protects the employment of a person who may be teaching out-of-the-way subjects. Section 202 states that university commissioners,

“shall have regard to the need … to ensure that academic staff have freedom within the law to question and test received wisdom, and to put forward new ideas and controversial or unpopular opinions, without placing themselves in jeopardy of losing their jobs or privileges they may have at their institutions”.

Why has Section 202 not been included in the same bounty as Section 43 of the 1986 Act in the Minister’s amendment? I am sure that he will pay close attention to that situation.

I also wish to raise a point which may or may not have relevance, which is the position of Wales. Like Scotland, Wales enjoys devolved powers in relation to higher education. Does the problem identified by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, apply to Wales? I do not think so, but I would like to be totally reassured on that point. These are not simple matters, but they are well worth our best and most detailed and concentrated attention at this very moment. I have very great respect for the Minister and indeed I have some sympathy with him, because 47 years ago—hard as that is to believe—I held exactly the same position in the other place as he does now, and dealt with the same subjects. These are matters which deserve our very best concentration.

[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven (LD)]

In speaking to my Amendment 14A, I again declare an interest as warden of Wadham College, Oxford. Last week in Committee I put my name to the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, the purpose of which was to remove universities entirely from the ambit of the Bill. I did so because of what seemed to me to be the self-evidently paramount importance of free speech in universities, and because the obligations that the Bill placed on universities appeared to conflict with their statutory duties under the Education Act 1986 to secure freedom of speech, not only in their institutions but for visiting speakers.

It is fair to say that in debate in Committee there was overwhelming support for the proposal that universities should be removed from the ambit of the Bill. I remain firmly of the view that the definition of “non-violent extremism”, which the Minister has recently set out again, is absolutely hopeless in its application to universities. This is because one can with the greatest of ease imagine all sorts of discussions, lectures and seminars taking place on topics which would be caught by the Government’s definition, and people in those lectures and seminars expressing intellectual views which would also fall under the definition. As far as I am concerned, it is hopeless for the Government to seek to apply such a definition to universities, which are particular places of debate, discussion and intellectual inquiry.

There was overwhelming support in debates—virtually every Peer who spoke did so in favour of the removal of universities from the scope of the Bill—yet, when winding up, those on the Opposition Front Bench made clear that they would be unable to support such a proposition, so last week I tabled a further amendment. The purpose of this Amendment 14A was to secure some reassurance that any risk that the Bill would undermine academic freedom would be mitigated, by placing in the Bill an obligation on universities to approach their duties under it in the light of their pre-existing free speech obligations under the Education Act. Like the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, obviously I was pleased when on Monday the Government tabled their own amendment, which in effect secures the same thing.

Like the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, I should have liked much more on this, for all the reasons which she articulated so ably. I should be delighted if the Government were minded to accede to her amendment. Nevertheless, it seems to me to be important that we secure the Government’s acknowledgment—and an acknowledgment on the face of the Bill—that these provisions apply to universities only within the critical context of their statutory freedom of expression duties. This is so that in future it cannot be argued that those duties are displaced by the passage of the Bill: they are not. The Government’s amendment seems to me to make explicit that they are not. I am grateful to the Minister for securing the Government’s movement, such as it is, on this important and fundamental issue.

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws (Lab)]

Today I found a piece of satire that said:

“Top universities a ‘breeding ground’ for Tories, warn Islamic groups”.

Accompanying this, there was a photograph of the Bullingdon Club from a certain era.

In my experience—and I, too, declare an interest as being the principal of Mansfield College, Oxford—universities are more or less breeding grounds for people who want to get a job. In fact, in many universities, there is not enough debate and sharing of ideas, because the real drama is around acquiring the kind of qualifications that will do well in the job market. Universities, as has been said, should and must be places for the exchange of ideas. Yet already there are concerns that, even as it stands, there are real pressures on universities around the issue of inviting speakers. For example, there was a piece in the Guardian’s online comment pages by Dr Karma Nabulsi, an academic at Oxford who speaks regularly at other universities, saying that constraints are already felt by universities—that if, for example, someone seeks to invite in a speaker on Islam, for comparative religion, some universities become very sensitive and anxious. If there is an invitation to a speaker on Islamic studies or the history of religion, anxiety is expressed and often the support of the police is encouraged and advice is sought from external sources. So the chilling effect is very worrying for the academic world.

When I chaired the British Council in that period from 1998 to 2004, we did a lot of work in eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. One of the great things about going to universities there, when we did various projects, was how academics talked about the iconic value of academic freedom, which they associated with Britain and of which they had been deprived for so long. That is something that we should feel proud of. In this Chamber, particularly, we often go back to this business of the pride that we take in British values and wax lyrical about the importance of freedom and liberty—yet, at the same time, here we are, when it comes to the bit, going into retreat.

I support the position taken by my noble friend Lady Lister. I feel that universities should not have been included in this legislation and that voluntarism is the way forward. We should not be creating a statutory duty because adult institutions of learning are different. They are where the great debates happen—the exchange of ideas—and they are the crucible in which people formulate ideas and in which ideas can be challenged. You could create a different set of arguments as to why you exclude universities. However, given that that is not going to be the direction of travel—and I greatly regret that my Front Bench is being required to retreat from taking that principled stand—I urge on this House to consider the amendments proposed by my noble friend Lady Lister. I welcome and pay tribute to the Minister for seeking to keep pushing this issue to a better place, and I thank the Home Office for doing that, and for the efforts of those involved. However, we are still not there. We are getting a parity as between the duties, when we should be saying that academic freedom has to be prioritised; it should be the duty which has primacy, because it is so important and something that we value so greatly when we talk about “British values”.

I know that we are getting towards the closing days of this Parliament and that there is anxiety about not spilling over in our time, but I urge the Minister to go back before Third Reading and see whether we cannot have a formulation that gives primacy to academic freedom. The complaints and anxieties of the many academics as well as others in the academic world who have expressed concern are not trivial; they are being expressed for a reason. That is one reason why our institutions of higher and further education are respected around the world. We have to be the protectors of this, and I hope that we can find a formulation that is better than the one that we currently have.

Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

Lord Macdonald of River Glaven Excerpts

Wednesday 28th January 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven (LD)]

My Lords, I put my name to Amendments 110 and 112, along with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and I declare an interest as the warden of Wadham College, Oxford.

Under the terms of the Education (No. 2) Act 1986, universities are under a statutory duty to,

“take such steps as are reasonably practicable to ensure that freedom of speech within the law is secured for members, students and employees of the establishment and for visiting speakers”.

The Act goes on to say that this includes the duty,

“to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, that the use of any premises of the establishment is not denied to any individual or body of persons on any ground connected with … the beliefs or views of that individual or of any member of that body; or … the policy or objectives of that body”.

Universities are required under this statute to have a code of practice in place to facilitate the discharge of these important duties. We might contrast the terms of that statute with the relevant clauses of the Bill and the proposed guidance associated with it.

It is very easy to understand why Parliament should have passed those parts of the Education Act. It was to underline not just the importance of free speech as a public good in itself, but to highlight its particular relevance—its inescapable importance—to institutions of higher learning. That is to say, you cannot have one without the other. Noble Lords will remember the context in which that legislation was passed. Speakers were being howled down in some of our universities, to the shame of those institutions. Some were being refused facilities to speak—the so-called “no platform policies” that some institutions adopted, again, to their shame. An institution that shouts down a speaker with unpopular views or bans arguments that cause offence is not really a university at all: it is an intellectual closed shop. That is something very different and much less attractive.

Under the proposed guidance accompanying this Bill, which universities will be under a duty to have regard to in discharging their new policing obligations—for that is what they are—academics must devise processes to exclude from those universities people who intend to speak or give presentations in a way that may be guilty in some way of exhibiting traits of what the guidance terms “non-violent extremism”. The definition of non-violent extremism has already been drawn to the attention of the Committee. I suppose in the sense of non-violent extremism, it must, if we extract it from the proposed guidance accurately, be,

“vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs”.

It is those things that must be banished from British universities.

The patent lack of understanding in this Bill about how universities work—and some noble Lords have already alluded to this—becomes very clear when one considers the processes that the guidance mandates our universities to follow in order to discharge their new speech-policing obligations under the Bill. They are to be found in the guidance. The proposed guidance states that, in order to comply with the duty,

“all universities should have policies and procedures in place for the management of events on campus and use of all university premises”.

The guidance goes on:

“We would expect the policies and procedures on speakers and events to include at least the following … Sufficient notice of booking (generally at least 14 days) to allow for checks to be made and cancellation to take place if necessary … Advance notice of the content of the event, including an outline of the topics to be discussed and sight of any presentations, footage to be broadcast etc … A system for assessing and rating risks associated with any planned events, providing evidence to suggest whether an event should proceed, be cancelled or whether mitigating action is”,

to be contemplated or required.

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

I am sorry to interrupt my noble friend. I was under the impression that the noble Lord, Lord Bates, indicated in his letter dated 27 January that the Government would now withdraw paragraph 66 from the proposed guidance. It might save an awful lot of consideration in this Chamber if that is indeed the case.

[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven]

If that is the case, no doubt my noble friend the Minister will make that clear.

The greater point is that universities are not places of surveillance in the sense intended in this Bill, and they cannot become so without fracturing what is best about them. As far as I can tell, no concern at all appears to be expressed in the legislation or in the guidance that what is being proposed is a form of institutionalised censorship with academics at its heart.

If the guidance means what it says, and we must assume that it does, it calls into question a situation in which people in British universities would not be allowed to argue, with Plato perhaps, that democracy is flawed. It is not a crime to argue that democracy is flawed. No one in a British university could deliver a lecture that evinced a lack of respect for someone else’s religion. It is not, thank goodness, a crime in this country to demonstrate a lack of respect for someone else’s religion. Perhaps no one in a British university would be allowed to decry individual liberty in favour of, say, collective empowerment—a notion with a long intellectual pedigree. Again, it is not a crime to express that view in the United Kingdom. Obviously, the point is not whether noble Lords agree or disagree with any of these propositions, or whether any noble Lord would wish to advance any of them—for my part, I would not particularly. The question is rather whether we have really reached a state of affairs in this country in which it is now necessary for a senior politician, even a politician as senior as the Home Secretary, to be granted the power to influence, by power of direction if necessary, what can and what cannot be said in a university in the absence of any crime being committed. That is the point. This legislation seeks to control not only violent extremism but also speech in universities even where that speech is not otherwise a crime. This is its central failing and it is the reason I have put my name to the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick.

The role of surveillance and control is one that is entirely inimical to the purpose of a university as we have understood it, which is to analyse, to explain and to discover. In that sense, open debate is the lifeblood of an institution of higher learning. Of course, as noble Lords have recognised, universities do not have immunity in the face of the criminal law—and they should not be immune to it. Indeed, like everyone else and every other body, they have existing obligations under anti-terrorism legislation, including the obligation to disclose to the authorities information they have about terrorism activities. But no one is suggesting that they are failing to discharge those obligations, and this Bill neither defines nor seeks to address any such failing. That is because there is none.

Let me conclude by pointing out one striking omission from the proposed guidance that is to accompany the Bill. Nowhere within it is there any attempt to explain how its terms are consistent with the entirely appropriate and laudable legal obligation placed upon universities to secure freedom of speech. There is no attempt to square that circle. This may be because no one in the Home Office considered the Education Act properly before deciding to legislate for our universities in this way, or it may be because it is simply obvious that the freedom of speech duty mandated in the Education Act is in conflict with the Bill, so any attempt to argue that they can coexist is doomed to failure.

These proposals may spring from the best of intentions. They doubtless spring from a desire to do something, perhaps anything, about the real problems we face around radicalisation. However, in practice they will inevitably undermine the place of freedom of speech in our universities. They are wrong in principle and they are unworkable in practice.

[Baroness Brinton]

My Lords, I have added my name to Amendments 112A, 112B and 112D. I shall start by speaking to those amendments and then to the others in the group. It is a matter of serendipity that I follow my noble friend Lord Macdonald because Amendments 112A, 112B and 112D try to address the exact points that he has raised and insist that the two duties must be examined together in order to balance the right to freedom of speech. I defy officers of universities and colleges to achieve that and I think that it would be a tall task for civil servants. One of the reasons I have been keen to table these amendments is that, as a senior university administrator, I have sat with two codes of practice and two different sets of statutory guidance which are completely in conflict with one another. We have to make it clear to those who will try to deliver the legislation on the front line exactly how it would happen. That is why the first part of the amendment talks about the recognition of the duty on free speech and the second part makes it clear that any guidance must be produced in the form of a single document so that staff do not have to trawl through parallel sets of guidance and codes of practice to try to find out which trumps the other.

I hope that the amendment is straightforward and simple, but it is included in a group which seeks to tackle the absolute, fundamental problems around the duty and how it conflicts with the duty on freedom of speech. I want to make two points. The first goes back to the Education (No. 2) Act 1986, which many noble Lords have quoted. Clause 43(4) states,

“(including where appropriate the initiation of disciplinary measures) to secure”,

those rights, but that is a two-way right, and universities have certainly used it where there might be either radicalisation or something close to the infringement of personal liberties or, worse than that, the possible incitement of a crime. On 20 September 2013, the Guardian reported that a number of our universities and students unions across the UK had banned the song “Blurred Lines”, a song that is degrading to women and which encourages rape. That demonstrates that the current boundaries for freedom of speech are well understood in our universities and are applied by them and by the student bodies. I come back to this. I do not understand why we need a duty when it is absolutely evident that this is already working in practice. I repeat my request for specific recent examples of where this has not succeeded and has not been followed through.

The other point I want to make on academic freedom moves away from the purist freedom-of-speech argument. Much of our debate has been about societies, students and academies talking outside the normal framework. Recently I was talking to a postgraduate student who is working on Middle East peace studies. He and his colleagues have just completed a module in a Masters course on suicide bombers. How free will they be to access information on that issue and thus actually help this country and the wider world to understand what motivates these people to become so radicalised that they are prepared to give up their lives? Would accessing videos online to try and understand the linguistic and pedagogic emotions behind those decisions be caught as radicalisation, would it require a special exemption in order to have that debate, or would it just be banned completely? We need to understand how the pure academic freedom to research would be affected by this duty.

Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

Lord Macdonald of River Glaven Excerpts

Monday 26th January 2015 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, my support for the noble and learned Lord’s amendment is for real, to use his own term. I was reading a little—obviously I do not have the experience of other noble Lords, including my noble friend—about control orders at the time they were to be abolished and TPIMs introduced. One could not help but feel quite disturbed by some of the experiences undergone and the impact, as has been said, not only on the individuals subject to the orders but on members of their families so, as I say, I support this amendment.

I have just one question for the noble and learned Lord. It is about whether it is necessary—he must consider it is because he has included them—to have the words about the individual having “no connection”. As I read it, but I might have missed something, the amendment to Schedule 1 to the 2011 Act takes out the references to having a connection with a locality because the 200-mile limit is being introduced. If that is so, and we are losing references to there being a connection in the Schedule, is that reference necessary in the amendment?

[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven (LD)]

My Lords, I think noble Lords on all sides of the Committee have acknowledged that, because of the situation in which we presently find ourselves, powers of this sort are regrettably necessary. However, as noble Lords have said, their legitimacy is critical, and the rigour with which conditions are examined before they are imposed and the nature of that imposition itself are of the utmost importance. For all those reasons, I support the noble and learned Lord’s amendment.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, I apologise that I was not here at the beginning of the noble and learned Lord’s remarks. I support the amendment and the remarks made by my noble friend Lady Kennedy of The Shaws. I have a question for the Minister. Members of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, of which I am one, with heavy heart agreed that we had to agree with the independent reviewer, but we said:

“We look to the Government to be proactive in bringing forward ideas about how to mitigate the alienation and resentment likely to be caused in some minority communities”,

by relocation. I would be very grateful if the Minister could give the Committee some idea of what ideas might be brought forward by the Government.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I rise to oppose the amendments for many of the reasons outlined here today. First, they are unnecessary. We have heard a lot about gaps, targeted and not blanket surveillance and bringing things up to date. This is, of course, absolute nonsense. As the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, said, the Met and presumably the other agencies already have the powers they need—powers that, I suggest, go far beyond what they need. We heard a lot today about Paris and Lee Rigby, but in fact all my information says that the shortcomings of the pre-investigation in Paris and in the Lee Rigby tragic murder were due not to a lack of surveillance but to a lack of good police work. That is what was fundamentally missing. It was not about not having enough recordings or surveillance. It was about a lack of information and a lack of talking to marginalised community groups. The cross-party committee which reported in November on the handling of the Lee Rigby killers exposed major internal failings in the way that agencies pursue leads. It found that both men had been known to the agencies for years—one had even been considered a priority—but basic issues such as delays, poor communication and bad record-keeping caused the problems, not the surveillance of the suspects.

Although these amendments are obviously within the letter of the law, they seem to me to be fundamentally undemocratic in the way that they are being brutally pushed into our parliamentary process. This seems to me a way of short-circuiting real scrutiny. It is great that they were looked at before, but they still need looking at again; if they are—I hope the Minister is listening—they absolutely must be looked at by the Joint Committee on Human Rights. It should look at these amendments before there is any more discussion in either of these Houses.

For me, this snoopers’ charter reduces our rights, and surely that is exactly what the terrorists are after. Terrorists want to impact on our society and on every single person who does not believe the way that they do. That is what we are letting happen here. It is absolutely mad. The Mayor of London recently referred to “this civil liberties stuff” in the most dismissive way, as if that is negotiable—that civil liberties are not terribly important when we compare them with the threat of terrorism. That is exactly when we need our civil liberties. That is what we in the West should be known for.

There is also the cost. My experience of the Met over the past 15 years is that it cannot deal with the data that it already has. I have asked many questions about its databases and the information that it gets from them. The Met does not know how many databases it has—it cannot tell me how many to the nearest hundred. Also, it often cannot search its databases. For example, I had the dubious pleasure of being on its domestic extremist database, I think under the regime of the noble Lord, Lord Blair, and I hope that I am not on the database anymore—the Met has changed its definition of what a domestic extremist is—but who knows because I cannot get the information. However, the Met cannot search that database for serious criminal activity. Because the definition was changed to relate to serious criminals, if you ask, “Can you look through the database and find out how many serious criminals you have?”, you will be told, “Oh, we haven’t logged that, so we can’t do that”.

Not only are we expecting the Met staff to deal with more data when they cannot sort and file the data that they already have, but, I would argue, they have enough powers. The noble Lord, Lord Blair, talked about some very tragic incidents where more surveillance might actually solve a crime or find a lost child. In fact, the police already have these powers. They have them under RIPA and, in my view, they are already misusing them. Under RIPA they do not have to go to a judge to ask if they can put surveillance on somebody; they just have to go to a chief inspector in a nearby unit and ask, “Could you sign this for me? It’s surveillance on somebody or other”.

We should not be thinking about giving more powers to our spies and to the police. We should be very careful about this. We should think about taking back some of those powers and making sure that we persist in keeping our civil liberties and human rights and do not let the terrorists take them away from us.

[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven]

My Lords, I was surprised that at an early stage in his speech the noble Lord, Lord West, suggested—until he revised the figure—that communications data were employed in some 95% of criminal cases. My experience from the years when I was responsible for prosecuting serious crime and terrorism was that the figure was 100%. I cannot remember a serious criminal case, and I certainly cannot remember a terrorism case, in which communications data were not used. Of course, there is a difference between data which are employed to detect terrorism and data which are then used as part of a prosecution to convict terrorists. Certainly, so far as the latter is concerned, there was a vast amount in every case.

The noble Lord, Lord Evans, will remember some of those cases which occurred when he was director-general of the Security Service. The men who tried to commit mass murder on London’s Underground are serving long prison sentences. The men who wanted to detonate a bomb containing radioactive material in Oxford Street are serving long prison sentences. The men who wanted to put a bomb in Bluewater shopping centre at half-term when it would be particularly busy are serving long prison sentences. In the case of the men who wanted to put a bomb in a nightclub—the Ministry of Sound—two were recorded by members of the noble Lord’s service. The leader of the gang said to one of his colleagues, “No one will be able to criticise us for blowing up a nightclub; all those slags dancing around”. This is material which is of the utmost importance in criminal prosecutions.

It is also true, of course, that technology is changing and our capacity to monitor this sort of material must change with it. I accept that, but I do not believe that these amendments are the right vehicle for achieving that change. These amendments suffer from the deficiencies which the original Bill suffered from; in particular, they are insufficiently specific. I agree with everything that the noble Lord said in his compelling speech a few minutes ago. These amendments are deficient for the same reasons that the original Bill was deficient and I shall not support them. This is not, as my noble friend Lord Carlile said, a party political matter. It is a matter of analysing the material and determining whether it is fit for purpose. With respect, I do not agree with my noble friend Lady Neville-Jones that we must do something. We must do the right thing and I do not think that this is the right thing. In everything, we must maintain balance and proportionality. No one has argued in this debate that we should not have a mechanism whereby the security services can access material of this sort. The question is what sort of mechanism.

The security services in recent years, and perhaps in years long gone by, have been led by people who understand the tension between security and rights. When I was DPP and the noble Lord was the director-general of the Security Service, I enjoyed the discussions we had on this topic. Sometimes we disagreed about precisely where the line was drawn, but we agreed that there was a line. One of my fears about these amendments, as with the draft Communications Data Bill, is that they draw the line in the wrong place. One result of that would be an adverse impact on our great security institutions. There is no doubt that the security services in this country enjoy enormous public support, which is unfamiliar even in democracies such as France. It is clearly understood by people in this country that the security services are after “them and not us”. In other words, they are interested in targeting those individuals who are trying to do us wrong rather than the rest of us. The danger of breadth in legislation of this sort is that, if the idea gets about that the security services are interested in everybody’s communications, not just the material of those subject to investigation who are being targeted because it is believed that they are involved in crime, then the sense which the British people have of their security institutions will begin to alter in subtle ways, and not for the good. I would caution those who argue that legislation of this breadth is needed because it is future-proof. We must take great care with legislation that is enacted in the context of the sort of public confidence issues that the noble Baroness, Lady Lane-Fox, indicated.

People are interested in these issues. They express their interest in different ways, but there is a feeling abroad that the Government and the security services are becoming nosy. I do not believe that that is true, but if we enact legislation that appears to people to be unnaturally broad, we run the risk of feeding that monster. I shall oppose the amendment.

Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

Lord Macdonald of River Glaven Excerpts

Tuesday 20th January 2015 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Warsi (Con)]

My Lords, perhaps I may start by seeking the leave of the Committee to speak. I did not speak at Second Reading because I was suffering from a kidney infection and therefore was not able to be in the Chamber for the whole day. I have given notice to my noble friend the Minister and he is content for me to speak in Committee. I hope that noble Lords will allow me the same leave.

I rise to support both Amendments 2 and 55 and the comments of the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Hannay. I do not intend to make a Second Reading speech at this stage. The issues in relation to the concerns about this legislation are well known. I accept that we are in incredibly difficult times at the moment, and the more so in the light of what has happened over the past few weeks. We have seen the situation change again in relation to ISIL this morning. These are indeed difficult and troubled times, and I therefore understand the need for the Government to respond in order to protect our citizens.

However, I would dispute the comments made earlier that we need to send out a strong message to terrorists that we are serious about this. The message to send out to terrorists is that we hold our civil and individual liberties incredibly strongly, we value them hugely and we will not put forward legislation that permanently takes away the very liberties that terrorists would like to take from us. Putting a sunset clause into the Bill sends out a clear message that these are difficult times and we are responding to them, but that we are not going to change the way we do things in the United Kingdom permanently by giving away those liberties which terrorists would like us to give away. I therefore support the need for a sunset clause.

Amendment 55 gives comfort to those of us who are concerned about how this legislation will play out. We can all accept that there will be many individual cases where these powers will be used in subsequent years but it will turn out to be the case that they have been used incorrectly. The fact is that we as a Parliament should be able to say that at a certain time, whatever colour of Government we have at that point, we will reconsider these matters in light of how the powers have been applied and in the light of how we find the world at that time. An indication that this is not a permanent change would give some comfort to those of us who are concerned about these powers.

[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven (LD)]

My Lords, I agree that we should not give away our freedoms in response to terrorism. However, I am satisfied that, properly crafted, this legislation need not do so. It would be a good idea if part of that crafting were to include a sunset clause, primarily for the reasons set out by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. It is the practicalities of this measure—how it will work in practice—that are most in doubt. Those practicalities will significantly impact on the rights of people on whom the orders are imposed. So a sunset clause is a good idea. It is also a good idea for the reason set out by my noble friend a moment ago.

Two years is too short. The threat will be with us for much longer than two years, so that will be too short a time to assess the workings of this legislation. However, I support the idea of a sunset clause so that the House can thoroughly review how the legislation is working in practice.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I will add briefly to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. It relates to Amendment 7, to which I hope to return later, and concerns the problem of humanitarian assistance.

I do not want to elaborate just now, but there are concerns about people who offer humanitarian assistance in difficult areas such as Somalia, Syria and possibly Gaza. The way in which terrorism is defined in the Terrorism Act 2000 has a chilling effect on their activities, because of the risk that they might be caught up in what is thought to be a terrorist offence when they are actually trying to co-operate with the bodies there to provide humanitarian assistance. Of course, a prosecution—or a conviction—is a very different matter. However, the way that this measure is proposing to adopt in the fight against terrorism is a decision taken by a constable. It is a much easier thing to take at that stage.

The chilling effect of the threat of that kind of measure being taken against people who seek to provide humanitarian assistance may be quite considerable; it is difficult to assess at the moment. There is, however, considerable force in the point that the House should be able to look again at the way the measure is operating once we know what the effect is on those trying to carry out humanitarian efforts in these difficult areas.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws (Lab)]

My Lords, I declare an interest as a member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights.

I have a number of amendments in this group and they all relate to judicial oversight of the powers to remove passports and travel documents. They are all ways of giving weight to the right to a fair hearing, as provided by Article 6 of the European convention. Basically, they are ways of making the oversight of the power procedurally fair and it is on procedural fairness that I want to make this contribution.

The relevant parts of Schedule 1 provide for a judicial role and are modelled to some extent on the provision made for warrants for further detention in Schedule 8 to the Terrorism Act 2000. That governs the detention of a person arrested on reasonable suspicion of being a terrorist. If you make a close comparison of the two schedules, it becomes clear that the procedural safeguards that were introduced into the Terrorism Act are not present in this Bill. This makes it significantly weaker as a result.

When Schedule 8 to the Terrorism Act was procedurally strengthened it was as a result of some of the recommendations of the previous Joint Committee that I was not on. That kind of coherence should be there in legislation of this sort. At the moment Schedule 1 is not compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights; the requirements on fair hearing are certainly not. I want to outline where the weaknesses lie, which is why I have tabled my amendments.

Amendment 24 refers specifically to,

“a warrant of further retention”,

to draw that analogy with the warrant for further detention that exists in the previous terrorism legislation. I have an amendment relating to gisting too. I repeat what others have said: a person who is having this power exercised against them really should know the basis on which the documents have been taken and there is the need for an extension. It is just not good enough to say, as it does in the Bill, that we should be preventing people dragging their feet or not being diligent enough. While we want to ensure that people are acting diligently and expeditiously, there has to be more to it. There should be some requirement to consider the grounds for the retention of the documents, so I have inserted that into my Amendment 27.

This is all drawing on the report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. With regard to Amendment 29, I urge the Committee to recognise how important it is to have oral argument in something as important as this. To have it done just in writing is not good enough. This is all fair hearing stuff. I really urge the Government to have regard to the ways in which this has been done in previous legislation.

With regard to Amendment 30, I am very concerned that while the Bill provides for a closed material proceeding at the extension hearing, there is no provision for special advocates. I am no great fan of special advocates— that process of having secret hearings—but I certainly feel that if you are going to have a closed material proceeding, you really must have protections for the person who is having their documents taken. I urge the Government to look at this again because I do not think that Strasbourg is going to think that it is compliant. Strasbourg has accepted the procedure that we have introduced here but one of the things it sees as being an important element is the role of the special advocate. There is a case waiting to come up in Strasbourg—Duffy—but I think we will find that this is going to fall foul of our obligations. Having special advocates involved is a very important element here.

Amendment 31 is really just tidying up in order to make the procedures parallel with those in Schedule 8. Amendment 32 says that if the court allows closed material proceedings, the state must provide a summary. Of course, if the state does not want to do that and there are special reasons why the intelligence agencies do not want it to be in the public domain, it is open to the state to withdraw. I think it is important that we use the model of other legislation that we have to help us get the best kind of legislation that the Government are seeking in this set of circumstances.

Those are the reasons for my amendments. I support the reduction to seven days that is being proposed by the noble Baronesses, Lady Hamwee and Lady Ludford, and the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford. I hope that the Government will see why it is important that we create fair proceedings around this special set of powers.

[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven]

My Lords, I support what the noble Baroness has said. There cannot be any doubt that the power to exclude British citizens from their own country is a wholly exceptional power of the sort that we have not seen before. In fact, it is warranted by the threat that emanates from the globalisation of terror and the ease with which young men in particular, but some young women as well, can pass in and out of parts of the world that are controlled by terrorists, and of course the threat that they represent to us when they return from those zones.

However, it is the exceptional, drastic nature of this power, warranted though it is, that requires that procedural fairness is absolutely guaranteed by the processes under which the power is exercised. It is because the power is so extraordinary that it is so important, in order to avoid the scenario that the noble Baroness was talking about at the outset of this debate, that we observe the highest degree of procedural fairness. To that extent, I support what she has been saying.

Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Bill

Lord Macdonald of River Glaven Excerpts

Wednesday 16th July 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven (LD)]

My Lords, I am not going to labour the importance of communications data in serious criminal trials. That has been widely acknowledged. However, I cannot think of a single major terrorist trial in recent years in which this material has not been deployed to significant and sometimes determinative effect. As the central purpose of the Bill is simply to preserve a situation in which this material may be accessed and used under appropriate lawful authority, I support it.

Of course, the ambit of the Bill goes far beyond phone calls. The world has changed, bringing with it the internet, e-mails and social media. I listened with great interest to what was said a few moments ago by the noble Lord, Lord Knight. However, I do not believe that any sane rule of law jurisdiction can confer on the internet a form of immunity so that what occurs there cannot be used as evidence of criminal wrongdoing if it is such evidence. As for extraterritoriality, it is difficult for me to understand why e-mails to and from individuals in the UK should be accessible if they are routed through a UK server but somehow inaccessible if they are routed through the United States. For my part, I prefer these matters to be resolved by legislation, which can be debated, amended, repealed and improved, rather than by nods and winks between our authorities on the one hand and overseas providers on the other, which is what may have happened too frequently in the past.

The point surely is the means by which the state obtains access to the preserved material. If these means are proportionate and prescribed by law, the process is consistent with the rule of law. There is nothing in the Bill that alters the mechanisms by which this preserved material may be accessed by the state. It remains, in criminal cases, by warrant following suspicion. The Bill has nothing to do with a snoopers’ charter or with Operation Tempura. It mandates the limited preservation of data so that, where real suspicion exists, they may be accessed by lawful authority. It is not the bulk collection of data for random mining by the security agencies or the police. It is not a snoopers’ charter.

I make two other points. First, since the Snowden revelations first appeared in the Guardian and since we first learnt about Operation Tempura, many people have called for a wholesale review of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act. I have been one of them. We have argued that RIPA is hardly capable of regulating this sort of activity in 2014 and that the technological means of communication have altered so dramatically since the year 2000, when it was passed, that we need fresh legislation. The Bill brings that review in its wake. I welcome that very strongly. Secondly, many of us have looked with some admiration at the work of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, which was set up following a recommendation by the 9/11 Commission in the United States, and have called for the establishment of a similar board in our country. It seems, and I would welcome the Minister’s confirmation, that we will also have a privacy and civil rights oversight board in the United Kingdom.

From my perspective, these are powerful reforms, both coming in the wake of the Bill. My noble friend Lord Paddick referred to others. These powerful reforms show balance and the advantages of coalition. With respect to some of my noble friends, I very much doubt that we would have had these reforms without coalition. In combination, the Bill and these reforms seem to herald an environment with more respect for the appropriate relationship between national law enforcement imperatives and the prize of personal freedom. The Bill, set out as it is with clarity about extraterritoriality, in combination with these reforms will place us in a better environment than we have hitherto seen in this area. I welcome and support it.