European Union Bill

Lord Liddle Excerpts

Tuesday 17th May 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

My Lords, I think we all understand that Clause 6 is at the heart of the Bill. We have spent considerable time on Clause 6 and we will return to it on Report. No doubt we will have discussions between Committee and Report on aspects of it.

I will just say a few things on Clause 6, how it fits in the Bill, and where it fits in the coalition agreement and so on. The coalition agreement was, of course, a headline agreement, and on that basis the coalition partners negotiated the detail that came out of it. We have seen this evening—and those of you who read the debates in another place will be well aware—that this Bill is a compromise between incompatible positions. It is doing its utmost to draw a line underneath the long argument about keeping competence and centralisation in Brussels, which has run through British and other national politics for a long time.

It is our case, in putting forward this Bill, that the Lisbon treaty provides extensive competencies that we can use. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Lea of Crondall, that this is not in any sense an attempt to destroy the Lisbon treaty by the back door. It is based on the understanding that the Lisbon treaty does indeed provide a great deal of headroom for us all to achieve the objectives that we seek. As the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, was speaking, I had a quick look at Articles 191 and 192 of the Treaty on the European Union, because I wanted to check how much headroom the Lisbon treaty gives us on environmental policy. It is quite clear that EU carbon emissions targets are agreed under existing competencies, and largely under qualified majority voting. All the Bill does is to say that if the UK wants to give up its veto over the environmental matters listed in Article 192(2), including fiscal matters, town planning and the structure of our energy supply—that is to say, if we wish to move from unanimity to qualified majority voting—then we have to bring it back to Parliament, and, if necessary, for a referendum.

We are now going to move on to Articles 7 to 10, which will deal with a range of issues that will not be subject to referendums, where parliamentary scrutiny— parliamentary approval—is set down. That is very much an indication that we have done our utmost to distinguish between sensitive and significant issues and other issues on which we can move. However, I am not persuaded that we need endless flexibility, which we do not have, to be able to achieve the objectives which we as a constructive member of the Union wish to pursue over the next few years. The Lisbon treaty gives us that flexibility.

[Lord Liddle]

The Minister mentioned the coalition agreement, which is obviously a compromise between parties that have different views on Europe, but did not the Liberal Democrat party conceive of what it was signing up for in the coalition agreement in the following way? The Lisbon treaty had gone through and been ratified; the Liberal Democrats had supported that in Parliament. That is why the coalition agreement clearly states that the passerelles should be subject to proper parliamentary approval but not to referenda. The Liberal Democrat view was that the flexibilities contained within the Lisbon treaty should be subject to proper parliamentary scrutiny but not to referenda. New treaties of the conventional type were a different matter where the Liberal Democrats were prepared to accept a case for referenda. I am not speaking for the Liberal Democrats, but it seems to me on any objective reading of the coalition agreement that that is what was intended. However, that is not what this Bill says; this Bill is not what was agreed.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

My Lords, I do not wish to get into a lengthy disquisition either of passerelle or of the coalition agreement. We attempted to negotiate also with the Labour Party. I have no doubt that those negotiations, had they been pursued further, would also have led to a very carefully and painfully crafted coalition agreement with a party which itself has some divisions within it about Europe. I saw a Bruges Group advertisement last week which had Kelvin Hopkins, Mark Seddon and a number of other people speaking on the case for leaving the European Union. Let us all be a little realistic about the political circumstances under which we are all operating. Having answered some of the questions, I encourage the noble Lord, Lord Tomlinson, not to oppose the clause standing part.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Williams of Crosby]

I shall quickly follow the noble Lord, Lord Davies, but I shall not detain the Committee for more than a few moments. I plead particularly to those Members of the Committee who are women. Article 19, the provision to which the noble Lord, Lord Davies, referred, concerns discrimination on the grounds of sex, religion, sexual orientation and so forth. The effect of what we now see in Schedule 1 is that a referendum would be needed to move from unanimity to qualified majority voting. I ask my colleagues to give a moment’s thought to a position where the discriminator is one of the members of the Council.

That was exactly the example in the case of the Czech Republic when it sought to join the European Union. It discriminated viciously against the Roma; in some cases they were assaulted in small Czech towns and, in one or two cases, burnt. The attempt to say to the Czech Republic that discrimination against the Roma must end would have been impossible had there been a requirement for unanimity—in other words, no movement towards qualified majority voting. In those European Union members where there is clearly discrimination against women—Romania is one example of that—it would be possible for that country effectively to veto an attempt to rule out such discrimination. I cannot believe that that is what the Committee wants to see.

Essentially, one of the great achievements of the European Union—one that the noble Lord, Lord Pearson of Rannoch, totally fails to recognise—was the extension of human rights and democracy to central and eastern Europe. It is an astonishing achievement. In any country except Britain it would be recognised as such. The consequence of that, in practice, is that the Copenhagen criteria—laid down in 1993 at the European Council meeting in the Danish capital—specifically said that for a country to join the European Union it must meet requirements about human rights, democracy, the independence of the courts and the proper, non-corrupt provision and maintenance of the rule of law, all of which are fundamental pillars of democracy. All of these depended on the wishes of these countries to join the European Union, and the requirement on them to meet those political conditions in order to do so.

The success, in extending democracy to that huge part of Europe, has a great deal to do with the respect that many of us have for the European Union. I spent nine years as the head of an organisation based in Harvard University called Project Liberty, which argued time and again with the Governments of eastern European countries that they could not join the European Union unless they put right laws that were discriminatory and corrupt. I know this because I was involved at first hand. It was an extraordinarily powerful weapon.

I conclude by saying, first, that nobody in this Committee should underestimate the astonishing impact that Europe has had on democracy in this continent and beyond it. Secondly, to try now to limit opposition to discrimination by obliging it to be unanimous would be a huge step back for the European Union, and one for which I, for one, would hate to see my country be responsible.

[Lord Liddle]

My Lords, we have heard many fine speeches in this short debate. I shall be brief and focus on what I regard as the central problem with Schedule 1. The Government need to accept that there is a central problem, and they have to agree to some amendment to the Bill that addresses this issue.

European Union Bill

Lord Liddle Excerpts

Monday 16th May 2011 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Liddle]

39A: Clause 6, page 5, line 6, leave out subsection (4) and insert—
“(4) The referendum condition is that—
(a) a joint committee of both Houses of Parliament publishes a report containing a recommendation about whether it is necessary for a referendum to be held in respect of a draft decision; and(b) the joint committee’s recommendation is approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.(4A) If both Houses—
(a) agree a referendum is necessary, a referendum shall be held; or(b) agree that a referendum is unnecessary, the referendum condition shall be satisfied without a referendum being held.(4B) If a referendum is held, the majority of those voting in the referendum must be in favour of the approval of the draft decision before a Minister of the Crown may vote in favour of it.”

[Lord Liddle]

My Lords, I shall also speak to Amendment 39B. These are probing amendments. We are not saying they are perfectly drafted but they are an attempt, as always from this side of the House, to be helpful to the Government. They are an attempt to substitute a parliamentary process for the Government’s attempt to define in the Bill every single circumstance and change of rule to which their referendum lock would apply. Instead of trying to define all the circumstances in the Bill, these amendments propose a parliamentary process by which the issues would be determined on a case-by-case basis. They represent a new subsection (4) to Clause 6. We put forward two options, which I will explain in a moment.

The basic difficulty with the Government’s approach to this Bill is that it requires an extraordinarily long list of issues to be codified in legislation that are subject to the so-called referendum lock. Heinz talked about its 57 varieties. This Bill has 56 varieties, we count, of referendum lock. These are not just major new treaties. It has become clear in our consideration of the Bill that a lot of changes within existing treaties would be subject to this lock.

The Bill allows Ministers but not Parliament some very limited discretion to decide that the referendum lock does not apply in limited circumstances that we have debated in our earlier sessions: the exemption clause under which Ministers can decide that the matter does not affect Britain or is simply a codification of existing treaties; and the significance clause, which is very narrowly applied to paragraphs (i) and (j) of Clause 4(1).

A better form of exercising discretion and judging whether a referendum is required would be to put the matter in the hands of Parliament and not in the hands of the Government. In these amendments we sketch out two possible ways of doing this. Amendment 39A suggests the establishment of,

“a joint committee of both Houses”.

This was proposed in roughly similar terms by the Opposition in the other place. Amendment 39B, which the noble Lord, Lord Triesman, and I think is a more interesting amendment, proposes the establishment of “an independent review committee”, which would advise Parliament on what matters it regarded as requiring a referendum. We can all envisage what the composition of such an independent review committee would be. It would definitely contain constitutional lawyers, judges and constitutional experts such as the noble Lords, Lord Norton of Louth and Lord Hennessy of Nympsfield—they are plentiful in our House. It might contain a business person, a trade unionist, a representative of civil society and people from the nations and regions of Britain. Its purpose would be to advise Parliament on whether, in the particular circumstances that arise, a referendum would be a proportionate way of dealing with the issue in question. It would be given criteria such as whether it was a significant issue, an urgent issue that had to be dealt with in a short period, or an issue of national interest that required to be carried through swiftly.

These issues would be discussed by the independent review committee, which would advise both Houses of Parliament on whether a referendum was justified. This idea is in keeping with the spirit of the Lords Constitution Committee’s recommendations in its report on referenda. It stated that referenda should be confined to fundamental constitutional issues, but acknowledged the difficulty of defining in a full list what those issues were. At the end of its list of recommendations, the committee stated:

“This is not a definitive list of fundamental constitutional issues, nor is it intended to be”.

It seems that it is a very difficult thing to decide in advance. Therefore, it is right that there should be some kind of parliamentary mechanism that would decide what issues are of fundamental constitutional importance. On the question of how we do this, and the detailed set-up of a committee on such a process, we on this side of the House do not have a dogmatic view. However, we would seriously like the Government to consider this point as an alternative to the incredible complexity of putting in the Bill all the different varieties of referendum lock.

That is the logic of our amendment. In my remaining time, I will say why this is a better way for the House to proceed. In the debate about whether referenda are required, a judgment should be made about proportionality. Is the issue really of fundamental constitutional significance, or is it a relatively minor issue that does not justify a referendum? The value of the judgment on proportionality was brought home to me when I listened to the very thoughtful reply that the noble Lord, Lord Howell of Guildford, gave at the end of last week's debate. I will try to summarise the Minister's argument without traducing him. He said that it was all very well for us on this side of the House and on the Cross Benches and other parts of the House to say that we were in favour of a referendum on the euro, but why then should we not have a referendum on common European defence, on participation in the office of a public prosecutor or on border controls? These issues, he argued, were as significant as whether Britain should join the euro.

There is a point here of fundamental importance. The reason why we have to have a referendum on the euro is that one is either in it or out of it; it is a fundamental choice about whether one joins or not. However, issues such as a common European defence are much more subtle and require a judgment about proportionality. I do not want to criticise the Minister, for whom I have the greatest respect. However, in his argument on a common European defence policy, he stated:

“Allow me to elaborate on some of my remarks. A decision on whether to join a common EU defence is fundamental, as it could result in a common EU army”.—[Official Report, 9/5/11; col. 759.]

That is a total straw man in the debate about a European defence. Certainly it would be a fundamental constitutional issue if we were to set up European military forces. However, if one thinks about the realistic development of European defence in the next 10 or 20 years, we are talking about better rules for the harmonisation of defence procurement, which is a very practical matter. Does something like defence procurement really require a referendum? In the parlous state of our defence budget—we have heard today about how the Government are planning further cuts in defence—a practical man or woman would say, “We have to have more practical co-operation in Europe on defence procurement”. Do we really think that this is an issue on which the British people think they should be voting in a referendum rather than that the people they chose to represent them in Parliament should decide?

The same sort of argument about proportionality can be applied to other aspects of this Bill, such as the public prosecutor. We heard a lot from the Minister about how it is a fundamental issue in how we organise our legal system, but is it really? For instance, if it were limited purely to tackling financial fraud in the EU, surely this would be just practical common sense. In terms of proportionality, it is not a matter that would require a referendum, and nor would changes in Schengen. As a result of what is happening in north Africa, we may have to take steps towards much stronger rules on asylum, but is that something that fundamentally challenges our border controls? We need to make judgments about the proportionality of what is proposed, and in our opinion that can usually be done only by a parliamentary committee, ideally an independent committee, that looks at these matters.

[Lord Pearson of Rannoch]

The noble Lord seems to be saying that referendums should be held only on really important issues, such as whether we join the euro. Would he therefore agree that we should hold a referendum on something even more important: whether we stay in the European Union at all?

[Lord Liddle]

We all know the noble Lord’s views on this matter. The experience of the 1975 referendum was that it did not resolve the issue of whether we stayed in the European Union. We won a yes vote, but it did not resolve the fundamental issue. However, on issues such as the euro, there is a fundamental constitutional principle at stake, and it is right to have a referendum, so there are circumstances in which referenda are the right thing to do.

In the light of the AV referendum result, which I regard as the betrayal of the Liberal Democrats in the AV referendum by their partners, when I looked at the coalition agreement I was surprised by what it said. We are now told that the Liberal Democrats are going to adopt a much more muscular, robust relationship with their coalition partners. Well, on this Bill, let us have a look at what the coalition agreement says. It says:

“We will amend the 1972 European Communities Act so that any proposed future treaty that transferred areas of power, or competences, would be subject to a referendum on that treaty”.

In other words, you would have a referendum on a big treaty, but the agreement continues:

“We will amend the 1972 European Communities Act so that the use of any passerelle would require primary legislation”.

Yet every page of this Bill fully and directly contradicts that coalition agreement where the agreement says that passerelles and other matters should be subject to referenda.

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine]

I, too, have a copy of the coalition agreement in front of me. While the noble Lord is right in what he says about bullet point three, he is very selective in his interpretation of what to pick and choose, because he does not notice that bullet point four says:

“We will examine the case for a United Kingdom Sovereignty Bill to make it clear that ultimate authority remains in Parliament”.

If the noble Lord had been watching the news, and was aware of government statements in the year since the coalition agreement was made, he would know that no sovereignty Bill is about to be introduced into either House of Parliament but that the areas where there might be changes in sovereignty—in other words, a transfer of power and competencies—might be covered for the use of referendums.

[Lord Liddle]

I have the greatest affection for the noble Baroness, but I think that her attempt to justify the fact that the terms of the coalition agreement have not been met in this case is neither muscular nor robust. I think, therefore, that our friends on those Benches have something to think about. What I am suggesting that our friends on those Benches think about is the merits of the amendments that this side is putting forward. We are offering a mechanism by which a lot of the unacceptable trivia in the Bill could be assessed in a proper way by an independent committee that would advise Parliament about whether they were fundamental or matters that would not require a referendum.

I suggest that there is possibly a germ of consensus in the coalition agreement. We on this side have moved our position from when Labour was in government because we now believe that matters such as passerelle clauses and simplified revisions of the treaty should be approved by a proper Act of Parliament. That is a significant move on this side of the House towards greater parliamentary accountability. I should have thought that the Lib Dems ought to seize that as an advance in accountability. We should confine referenda to these fundamental issues that your Lordships’ Constitution Committee said needed to be defined. An independent committee would be a good way of doing this.

I am sorry to have gone on at such length—

[Lord Dykes]

I intervene only briefly and thank the noble Lord for giving way. Is he not perfectly correct in general and in the specifics he mentioned? There is no apparent transfer of power, notion or concept built into the EPPO proposals. That is the European Union being allowed by the sovereign member Governments to deal with matters to do with any financial misdemeanours affecting Union finances. There is no extra transfer of power there at the margin at all. Why are the Government so obsessed? My noble friend the Minister kindly and co-operatively said at the end of the previous Committee session that he would focus on the important areas that the noble Lord has emphasised today in his remarks. However, he then goes back to say, “Ah, we must have the whole list as well. They are important as well”. There is no logic to it, particularly with the EPPO proposals.

[Lord Liddle]

I think the noble Lord, Lord Dykes, is right on that subject. The problem is the people who believe in the thin end of the wedge, but the way to deal with that is to have a proper process for deciding what is significant and requires a referendum and what does not in the form of an independent process that people will respect. That is what we are proposing in these amendments. It is a sensible compromise for the way forward that I hope the Government will consider seriously. It would resolve an awful lot of the big problems that people have with this Bill. I beg to move.

[Lord Waddington]

My Lords, the noble Lord referred to the two amendments as probing amendments. I think that they could better be described as tongue-in-cheek amendments. Similar amendments were moved in the House of Commons, but at least they applied to Clauses 3, 4 and 6. These amendments mysteriously apply only to matters dealt with in Clause 6. For the life of me I cannot understand why, as I am sure others will not either, if Parliament is to be involved in these matters, Parliament as a whole should not be involved. Quite obviously, members of the public will wonder what this mysterious body is. At least if Parliament as a whole was involved, they would know what was going on.

[Lord Liddle]

The noble Lord has made two points which reflect a misunderstanding of what this side is trying to propose. Parliament would be involved because it would be Parliament that would take the decision on whether a referendum was necessary on the basis of advice from either a Joint Committee of both Houses or some kind of independent committee which had real expertise on it. This is not being proposed tongue in cheek, but makes a serious point.

[Lord Waddington]

Of course I accept what the noble Lord says about the proposal not being tongue in cheek, but I certainly do not accept his argument. The fact remains that if you put in a Bill that a mysterious committee is going to have some say in the matter, you are moving even further away from a situation where the general public has any confidence at all that its views are considered when vital decisions are made. I fail entirely to see how giving a Joint Committee of both Houses a key role in deciding whether there should be a referendum will help to restore trust in the EU. I am bound to say—obviously this will not find favour with everyone in the House—that the House of Commons, controlled by the Whips, has never proved to be an effective check on the ambitions of the Europhiles, and this House, I have to say, seems to suffer from a built-in Europhiliac tendency. The idea of having a Joint Committee and expecting it to come up with a unanimous recommendation for a referendum is just pie in the sky, and I suspect that the noble Lord knows that perfectly well.

I remind the House that on 9 May, the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, implied in an unguarded moment that it was inconceivable that a Government would just give everything away for no gain. But the public are of the view that we have made a habit of giving things away. Sometimes Ministers have listened to anguished cries from the Guardian that if we do not agree with our partners we are going to be isolated, when it really would not be the end of the world if the others went ahead without us and, for instance, wasted their money on empire building like the setting up of the European External Action Service while we continue to benefit from the single market. I think that that would be a good idea.

Let us face it: sometimes peer pressure has got to work on the vain and on those who wish to be thought good members of the club with disastrous consequences like Mr Blair’s surrender over the rebate. I listened very carefully to what the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, had to say about that matter at Question Time today. I invite him to read with care various contributions made in this House on 4 February 2008 when we had a debate on the European budget. Every action of Mr Blair was dissected and examined with great care. All his convolutions, distortions and changes of front were brought out into the open. I do not think that any impartial person could honestly say that it is a very happy story. Governments are often not very good at saying no and Parliaments have gone along with them. That makes this Bill as it stands very necessary and overdue and makes the amendments very dangerous.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

My difficulty in answering that question is due to the difficulty that the Opposition have in stating why they want particular treaty amendments and expansions of the powers and competences of the European Union. When we have pressed on this matter, it has been a bit like “King Lear”: the Opposition seem to want to do “such things” and there will be uncertain futures in which new powers will somehow be needed for the European Union. Therefore, they want to amend the Bill by removing areas where the Bill would prevent the surrender of the veto. That would not prevent activity, because a huge range of competences accorded to the European Union allow it to be highly active in all these areas. However, the Opposition want to remove the vetoes on the big decisions. I think that they want a referendum on the euro, although I am not at all sure about the others and I want to go through them as we discuss these matters. The Opposition have not answered that. Why do they want these huge treaty changes, and why do they want the vetoes removed? It seems to me beyond understanding that they should want vetoes removed when so many powers and competences are now accorded to the European Union, and they can do all sorts of things to achieve the kind of Europe that we want in the future. If the Opposition have some new ideas for expanding the powers of the European Union, let them state them, otherwise we are left with a kind of “King Lear” situation—they will do “such things” as it is too difficult to mention at this time.

I want to turn to the 12 decisions in Clause 6, which cover highly sensitive areas. When I heard the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, call some of them trivial, it made me, in the words of Hilaire Belloc, gasp and stretch my eyes. When one looks at the reality of them—their real-world implications—they are anything but trivial. The big five decisions under Clause 6 include joining the eurozone, and there seems to be a general consensus that there should be a referendum on that. Incidentally, I reassure my noble friend Lord Lamont that there is not really a problem there at all. The referendum would take place before the UK took the decision, and the exchange rate would then be struck at a certain point in the middle of the night or whenever it was technically advisable to do so. I think that my noble friend put that in perfect perspective.

On the provisions relating to EU common defence, I think I heard the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, say such decisions could not necessarily lead to anything too serious—I do not want to parody him—because it was a complex issue and it might be desirable, I suppose he was saying, to give up the veto or decide to join without a referendum because not too much harm could come from it. That is miles from reality. In fact, under an EU common defence policy—on which we would urge there should be a referendum—we would no longer be able to decide independently which situations and developments we should respond to and which situations represented a threat to our national security, we would lose our ability to decide unilaterally which operations we would mount and it would no longer be our choice alone whether we should act independently or with whom we should act in concert. Of course, in this modern world we will always be acting in concert, but we decide. To say that is in the trivial category seems to me to be taking off to another planet.

[Lord Liddle]

I cannot recollect using the word “trivial”, to be quite honest. The key point we were trying to make is that, when he talks about a common defence as though we were going to pool all our military and have a common air force and a common army and all the rest, that is a complete straw man. That is not what anyone on the continent is proposing. The real issues in European defence are ones such as why we have—I cannot remember the precise figure—400,000 people under arms yet we can manage to mobilise only 5,000 for a particular operation and why, in terms of bang for the buck, Europe is so unbelievably inefficient, given all the different national procurement systems. When we are up against it on the defence budget, the Government are saying they are not interested in common procurement and how we make that work. What we are talking about is very small-scale, step-by-step, gradual changes that would be useful, not suddenly deciding that we want to have a common army and a common air force. It is ludicrous to say that the Opposition are in favour of that.

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

The Maastricht treaty and other treaties make clear that common defence means common control and common finance. There may be all sorts of arrangements short of that with some aspects of existing competencies already available to the European Union for all kinds of co-operation. I am going to come particularly to the question of enhanced co-operation and other military aspects in a moment. The noble Lord is splitting hairs. In the treaty it is perfectly clear what this step would involve. He says that there might be just one small step and it will be all right because we can have adjustments later on; that is not how it really works and certainly not how it works in law and under the treaties.

Let me move on, as I have plenty more to say on the other areas that were apparently described as trivial. Those included abolishing border controls—I feel it absolutely extraordinary to put that in the trivial category, as it is a major issue. Joining the European public prosecutor system, which is already in the treaty, or extending its powers when we had joined it is a very serious issue affecting the whole of our judicial system. Then we come to—

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Liddle]

My Lords, I am very disappointed with the Minister’s reply to this debate. I think that we have made a simple argument in support of these probing amendments and it is not fair to criticise us on their detail. That is not the point. We are trying to put forward the argument that if the issue of whether a referendum should take place is in question, an issue of proportionality also has to be addressed. We do not want to have multiple referenda. Let us have them, as your Lordships’ Constitution Committee has said, on fundamental matters of importance. The question is how those fundamental matters of importance are to be decided. With these amendments we are thinking about a mechanism by which these issues could be considered in an objective and rational way that is detached from political partisanship.

Amendment 39B in particular proposes the setting up of an independent review committee that would advise both Houses of Parliament on whether an issue was large enough to pass the test of proportionality and thus whether a referendum should take place. To me, that is a simple argument which is worthy of consideration, but I do not feel that the Government have shown that they are really prepared to give it that proper consideration.

Members on this side of the House stand for greater parliamentary accountability in terms of the EU. We are arguing for Acts of Parliament for any changes that are made as passerelles, simplified revision treaties or whatever else. These would require Acts of Parliament, not just a resolution of Parliament. That marks a change from what happened under the previous Government, and it is quite a big change. It puts in place an additional safeguard in politics because it would not be just Ministers in their department pushing through parliamentary resolutions, it would require them to get the agreement of colleagues through the Cabinet Legislation Committee in order for the matter to be taken forward. It makes this much more of a collective decision of the whole Government and would enable more thorough scrutiny of issues through the procedure of creating an Act of Parliament.

We are in favour of parliamentary accountability. The question is this: what are the circumstances in which in addition to greater parliamentary accountability, there should be referenda? The Minister says that there are what he calls “key decisions” that require referenda, and puts forward a lot of proposals for change that no one on this side is actually proposing. We have not put forward dramatic proposals for the extension of QMV or for large transfers of competences and powers to Brussels. What we have said is that, as a Government who are sensibly trying to make the European Union work, some flexibility is required to deal with difficult issues as they come up. Moreover, circumstances change, so what you think about the future now might not necessarily still be what you think in five years’ time. Judging what would require a referendum to be held and what would not is of vital importance, so we are proposing a mechanism here that can deal with questions of proportionality.

What we are proposing here would fit the coalition agreement far better than what the Government are proposing. The coalition agreement draws a very clear distinction between treaties which would require referenda and other changes which would simply require primary legislation. That is what is in the coalition agreement which the Liberal Democrats signed up for. As with the Bill on the National Health Service, it is a bit like the Liberal Democrats have been sold a pup, because they have not got what is in the agreement they signed up for. What they signed up for here was a clear distinction between future treaties and other small changes which would be dealt with differently. We are proposing a mechanism which would enable that to be done. I hope that when we get to Report stage people will think again about this Bill and have the common sense to see that the mechanisms that we are proposing are in the national and the public interest. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 39A withdrawn.

European Union Bill

Lord Liddle Excerpts

Monday 9th May 2011 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Liddle]

29A: Clause 6, page 4, line 32, leave out “or otherwise support”

[Lord Liddle]

My Lords, I hope that this amendment will not take up too much of the Committee’s time. Its purpose is to amend Clause 6(1), which currently says:

“A Minister of the Crown may not vote in favour of or otherwise support a decision … unless … the draft decision is approved by Act of Parliament, and … the referendum condition is met”.

Amendment 29A would delete “or otherwise support” and Amendment 32A, which is in this group, would add at the end of subsection (1) that,

“the Minister may indicate support in principle for a decision if the Minister also gives notice that a vote in favour is subject to approval by an Act of Parliament and the referendum condition being met, if required”.

I understand why within the logic of the Bill—although it is a logic that we on this side of the Chamber do not accept—the Minister cannot sign up Britain for institutional changes without the conditions of an Act of Parliament or a referendum, if required, being met. However, surely it should be possible for the Minister to indicate support in principle for something that is proposed subject to the requirements of the Act. I do not understand why Clause 6(1) has the words “or otherwise support”.

I hope that what I have just said will find acceptance on the Front Bench opposite and, if that is the position, I shall not delay the Committee any longer. However, it seems that it does not, so perhaps I had better explain why I think that this is an important point.

If Ministers are not allowed on behalf of the Government to give any indication of the Government’s attitude towards any proposal, I do not see how they can be expected to represent this country in the councils of the European Union. Can they not discuss with their partners what they might and might not recommend? There is a danger, it seems to us, that the Government are trying to turn our Ministers in the Council of the European Union into perpetual “no” men and women who every time they are asked a question about what might happen can only say, “No, this isn’t permitted under this Act of Parliament”.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

My Lords, I shall respond to the spirit of the probing amendment that the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, rightly moved. It is useful to probe on this. I do not think that I can respond to all the points that the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Stamford, raised, because they seem to me to stem from a deep conspiratorial assumption about the implicit plot behind the Bill, and I suspect that reasoned argument cannot reach that deep.

I should point out that Articles 235(1) and 238(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union make it clear that abstaining in a decision requiring unanimity is effectively counted as a supportive vote, and so an abstention could be classed as supporting a decision. Those of us who have been involved in any way in Brussels decisions will know that formal voting is not the most common form of decision-making in Brussels. A great many are taken by consensus and the chair taking the sense of the meeting. That is no doubt part of the reason why the previous Government, in their wisdom—I am not saying that they were always wrong, let alone that they pursued conspiracies of their own—put in this phrase “or otherwise support”. That does not mean that a Minister cannot indicate support in principle for a decision if the Minister also gives notice that a vote in favour is subject to approval by Act of Parliament and to the referendum condition being met, if that is required by the decision.

The noble Lord, Lord Pearson of Rannoch, was determined to get enhanced co-operation into the discussion even though we are not discussing that amendment. Enhanced co-operation is under way. The British Government are indeed involved in the process of enhanced co-operation on patent law. We do not believe that Britain will become more marginal because enhanced co-operation takes place among others. After all, if one looks at what is happening with European co-operation in defence, one will see that the United Kingdom and France are, in effect, leading in defining practical co-operation in that regard. The myth behind the Bill—that we will somehow be pushed to the margin, which the noble Lord thinks is a good thing but the noble Lord, Lord Davies, thinks is a wicked thing—is not the case. In an EU of 27, which is about to be an EU of 28, 29 or 30, it is likely that there will be a number of issues on which smaller groups—which will often including the United Kingdom, though sometimes not—will move ahead on their own through enhanced co-operation. In most cases that will not require treaty change. They will merely be moving ahead because it is not possible for all 27, 28, 29 or 30 to agree. Therefore, that will not be caught by the Bill.

[Lord Liddle]

If Britain agreed to enhanced co-operation but the member states participating in enhanced co-operation then decided under the provisions of the Lisbon treaty to change the decision-making process to qualified majority voting, would the Bill cover the situation?

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

As a hypothetical situation, at that point it would because it would be a change in power and competence. The enhanced co-operation itself would not. That is the distinction. Let me reiterate: a Minister can make very clear that the Government support a decision but that they must also seek the necessary approval of Parliament and the public first. Britain is not alone in this respect. This is the way in which national Governments very often have to proceed.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

I suspect that the noble Lord may know the answer to that. As I have made clear, when we are not discussing questions of the transfer of power and competence, these questions do not apply. As for the parliamentary scrutiny reserve, these questions occasionally do apply. As the noble Lord will be aware, the thrust of this Bill is partly to respond to those who fear that the European Union much prefers to talk about process, competences and institutions than about policy and outcomes. We want a European Union which focuses on policy and constructive outcomes and does not spend too much time focusing on institutions.

[Lord Liddle]

My Lords, of course this side of the House will not pursue this amendment and we will withdraw it. Before I withdraw it formally, I should say that I am very glad that we have put forward this amendment because it has raised some interesting points. The point made by the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, has not been adequately answered by the Government. In this discussion, we also have had a first: it is the first time since we started Committee stage that the Government have said that they might go away and look at something, which is quite remarkable. We have been passing rather like ships in the night.

The government Benches on the one hand and the Opposition and opinion generally throughout the House on the other hand have been talking, although not really engaging. This is the first time that the Government have said that they will consider the wording. I should have thought that if the need is to find a form of words to cover the agreement on a consensus without a vote one could find more specific words than “or otherwise support”. I see no objection to adding something on the lines of what is suggested in Amendment 32A in order to make clear that this is not intended to be a restraint on Ministers.

[Baroness Nicholson of Winterbourne]

Is it not proper for this Bill and, therefore, this Government to use the correct wording found in the Lisbon treaty? That is exactly where the wording comes from.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Liddle]

The noble Baroness may have a point—and she may not. I would prefer that in legislation before this House we use words which are clear as to their meaning. I have the greatest respect for Jim Murphy who is one of the most talented people in today’s Labour Party. The fact that the Minister has managed, with the help of his civil servants, to dig up one of his quotations does not put me off at all. I think that better wording could be found than that which is in this amendment.

The fact that the Government have said that they might go away and consider the wording perhaps shows that there is something about the spirit of Schuman Day; namely, that we are prepared on Schuman Day to be a little more positive in considering reasonable points about this Bill. In withdrawing the amendment, I hope we are clear that this is not a Bill which will turn our Ministers into people who have no alternative but to say no in European meetings. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 29A withdrawn.

European Union Bill

Lord Liddle Excerpts

Tuesday 3rd May 2011 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Liddle]

23C: Page 4, line 7, at end insert—
“( ) provisions that strengthen the effectiveness of the European Union to mitigate the effects of climate change”

[Lord Liddle]

My Lords, with the permission of your Lordships, in order to expedite the business of the Committee—because we have no desire to be thought to be unduly delaying the consideration of the Bill—it would help if, for Clauses 4 to 7, we have a single debate on the remaining groups of amendments that we have tabled that come under the same broad heading. The common features of these amendments are that these are all areas where we believe that there is a broad ranging, cross-party political consensus in this House and in the country that Europe is a good thing and that we would like to see Europe acting effectively in these areas. There is a consensus on these issues and on the need to have a more effective Europe. Also we agree with the Government’s argument that, to a very large extent, the Lisbon treaty provides the European Union with sufficient competences and powers to deal with many of these issues.

We agree with that argument with two exceptions. One is the point that I made with some force—although I know that the Government did not agree with it—namely, that the Government are trying to have their cake and eat it on the Lisbon treaty. They are saying that the Lisbon treaty gives us all that we need but they are also trying to say that the provisions of the Lisbon treaty cannot in important respects be brought into force without referendums. The Government wish to restrict the passerelles, Article 48(6) and anything which provides flexibility within the Lisbon treaty. So it is not true that the Government stand behind the Lisbon treaty; they are seeking to tie up its implementation in important ways, which could be detrimental to the European Union being effective in the areas that we wish it to be effective.

Secondly, treaty drafters are not blessed with perfect foresight; they cannot anticipate all the circumstances that might occur ahead of them in the real world. A good example of that is the need for the treaty change, under the simplified revision procedure, to establish a European stability mechanism to deal with the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area. No one anticipated that at the time that the Lisbon treaty was going through the House. One has to recognise that circumstances can change.

When the Government say, “No change in anything for this Parliament” and, “We will not have lots of multiple referenda but we may at some stage in the future have another big revision”, we fear that it will defer the possibility of flexibility in the European Union powers for some considerable time—probably, at the minimum, a decade. We have to ask ourselves whether this is a sensible, realistic policy. The Government say that it is realistic because there is no will on anyone’s part to change the treaties and, therefore, that their policy is not out of line with the rest of the European Union. However, we saw in the establishment of the European stability mechanism that, when faced with a crisis, the European Union was prepared to act and to take the necessary powers.

The amendments deal with a series of areas and I do not intend to go over each one. I shall give one or two examples of where, within a medium-term time horizon, there might be a need for action which could result in pressure within the EU for some kind of treaty change, probably under the simplified revision procedure. The fear on this side of the House is that the Government are putting themselves in a position where they will rule it out on principle, without any serious consideration of the issues, and Britain will find itself isolated and ineffective when I am sure many of us in this Chamber want it to be playing a leading and effective role in the Union.

The examples in Amendments 23C and 23E relate to climate change and energy security. On climate change, the commitment of the EU to put itself at the forefront of the battle to tackle climate change has been striking. At the same time, at the Copenhagen summit the EU found itself largely bypassed. On energy, we all know that there is a real problem. There is a lack of common policy, particularly among the big member states of the Union, in our dealings with the major energy suppliers, particularly Russia. These are problems that are widely accepted within the European Union. There is a desire for Europe to be stronger on these issues. It is possible—I am not saying it is certain—that people might come up with treaty proposals or amendments to the treaty under Article 48(6) to address these weaknesses.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Deben]

What would the referendum question be, were such a suggestion to be made? Would that referendum question be capable of a reasonable yes or no answer for the majority of the people of Great Britain?

[Lord Liddle]

The noble Lord, Lord Deben, has made an apposite intervention. I do not know what the relevant question would be but this is something in the real world that Ministers might have to address. It could enormously strengthen the Union’s capacity to deal with climate change and energy issues.

Amendments 23J and 23L are further examples. Amendment 23L is on piracy. We know that there is a growing problem of piracy, particularly in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. We know that an EU force is attempting to deal with this problem but that its efforts are inadequate. What is the reason for that? Is it a lack of resources or commitment on the part of the member states? That is possible, but another explanation is that the basis on which the force is patrolling this area does not match the tough circumstances that need to be dealt with. There is no agreement between the member states on the terms of engagement between the EU force and the pirates. There is no agreement on the circumstances in which force can legitimately be used.

These are difficult issues to tackle within the European Union because they touch on terribly sensitive issues to do with defence and armies, areas where the European Union has rightly been cautious in getting involved. I am not in favour of a European army, nor is the Labour Party, so do not try to say that this is trying to open the door to that.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

It would be a European navy.

[Lord Liddle]

Yes, the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, is right about that.

We are not talking about that but it could be, if we are going to have an effective force for this purpose, that we need to have a much more integrated force posture with common rules of engagement. That is a possibility that member states in these particular circumstances ought to be prepared to consider.

Look at north Africa, where the events occurring mean that the European neighbourhood policy and the Union for the Mediterranean require a complete rethink in their light. We need, as a European Union, to develop a coherent policy which particularly offers those countries in north Africa which are going down the path of strengthening democracy and human rights incentives for going further in that direction. I was interested in a piece that I read—I think it was yesterday—by Peter Sutherland about what might be necessary in order to make that policy happen. It involves tackling very sensitive and difficult issues, such as the need to have more flexible rules on immigration for people from those countries so that they can come and study in Europe, spend time here and then go back there. It requires having more flexible rules on trade so that trade with the European Union can boost their economies and jobs. That would do something about the appalling problems of youth unemployment in those countries. It may require a more common approach to asylum. We are potentially facing having 400,000 people in refugee camps in north Africa, so I read in a newspaper article the other day. These are issues that cannot be addressed in 10 years’ time but on which the European Union needs to develop credible policies, in its own interests, in the next year or two.

Most of the time, we obviously want Europe to use its existing powers under the existing treaties. Yet are we saying that we would not contemplate any change at all? This is the Williamson question which was asked earlier. The Government are getting themselves into a trap here. The coalition has pursued a positive approach to the European Union so far in its negotiations, but if they really believe that they are pursuing a pro-European policy, we urge them to be flexible on these issues and to recognise that we do not want to tie ourselves down with referendum requirements in areas where there is cross-party agreement and a general consensus that we need a stronger and more effective European Union. I beg to move.

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

My Lords, the most important theme emerging from the contribution on this side of the Committee to the debate tonight is the need for the European Union, like any businesslike and serious organisation, to retain the capability for flexibility in responding to what are unpredictable and therefore, necessarily, unpredicted situations. That is enormously important and it is quite clear that the Government are, by contrast, saying of the European Union that we should remain rigidly anchored on the existing constitutional arrangements until and unless, by some enormous shift involving a public referendum in this country, there is a sudden, seismic change. That is the fundamental difference between the perception on this side of the House and that on the other side of the way that the European Union ought to be conducted.

Many of us on this side have the considerable suspicion that, because the Government’s attitude is so unrealistic in relation to what would be the requirements of any organisation that expected to survive in the modern world, there is actually a Machiavellian plan deliberately to make the EU inflexible, to cause crises and conflicts and, at some dramatic interlude, to stymie the whole of the EU. We know that many members of the Conservative Party have had that agenda for a long time.

There is a particular issue of flexibility facing me at the moment. As I understand my noble friend, he has suggested that in the interests of the House and of making rapid progress, we should debate in one session all the amendments from Amendment 23C to 23L. I understand that they cannot be formally moved together en bloc, but my noble friend’s suggestion was that they should be discussed and debated as such and I am happy to do that. If I receive so much as an eyebrow signal from either Front Bench that I am doing the wrong thing, I will sit down and try to address the House again under Amendment 23L, which is what I was intending to do. Unless I receive such a signal, I shall proceed to make a few remarks about that amendment against the background of the theme that I have just set out, which is the unifying theme in all the debates that we are having on this clause.

Amendment 23L deals with the issue of piracy. As my noble friend rightly says, this is a grave and serious problem that does not merely affect east Africa but, unless we get this right, could affect large areas of the world because, if piracy is shown to be something that pays and makes a lot of money with impunity, others will inevitably get involved in it. We will return to a situation that we thought we had left behind in the 19th century when the Royal Navy, above all, in collaboration with the navies of other civilised countries succeeded in more or less extirpating piracy, which had been such a threat to lives, to civilisation and to developing world trade, and I do not think anyone wants that to happen.

My noble friend Lord Liddle sensibly said—I agree—that there may be great advantage in trying to review and standardise the terms of engagement of our various naval units and fleets that are off the coast of east Africa at present. It is slightly absurd that we have three task forces there—one American, which we are supporting, one NATO and one EU. That does not seem a sensible way of making progress, but I leave that matter aside.

I agree with what my noble friend said about the probable need for greater operational co-ordination. I am not sure whether that raises the issues of the Bill in relation to changes in the competences or powers of the European Union, but I have a suggestion to make to the House. I listened with respect, as I always do, to the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, when he commented the other day that, by saying that in future the EU might need some particular power and it would not be sensible for us to deprive ourselves in advance of the opportunity of granting the EU that power in the interests of us all, I was raising hypothetical issues. He said that I did not actually come up with concrete scenarios or specific cases. I hope that I have his attention now because I am coming up with just such a specific scenario.

Anyone with a business or economics background will always look at the demand side before they look at the supply side, on the grounds that the supply side emerges only when there is a demand for something. I put it to the Minister that one of the big problems with piracy is that, on the demand side, people are prepared to pay the money. That issue has not been addressed at all. I have to tell the House that every week ransom payments are paid amounting to millions of pounds. Sometimes they are paid through banking channels, and sometimes they are paid literally with cash dropped out of chartered aircraft on to the coast of Somalia that is then picked up by pirates. As a result, some individual or ship is released from imprisonment by the pirates who have illegally hijacked them. This happens the whole time; I repeat, it happens every week. Every year tens of millions of pounds are paid in this way; indeed, the figure may well be getting into hundreds of millions in the course of a year. I have spoken about this to underwriters in the City of London, who confess that to pay ransoms to pirates is becoming quite a normal part of their business.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Liddle]

My Lords, I fear that in trying to be helpful to the Government in helping the business in Committee to go forward more quickly, we have ended up with a long omnibus debate and are sitting late. I shall be very brief.

In his reply, the Minister somewhat distorted what the Opposition are trying to achieve. We are not arguing for vast new treaties; that is a straw man. We are not arguing for the massive centralisation of powers in Brussels; that is a straw man. We are arguing that there are issues that we as a nation state cannot tackle effectively on our own. There are issues such as energy and climate change, our dealings with north Africa and the financial crisis in the banks, which are cross-border in nature. There are issues that have to be tackled at EU level which the nation state can no longer tackle, and we must ensure that there are the necessary competencies and powers at that level to act effectively. Otherwise, we will let our people down. That is not an argument for centralisation or for sweeping new treaties, but it is an argument for flexibility in cases where we discover—because we do not have perfect foresight and neither do the drafters of treaties—that those powers are lacking.

I argue that in the contributions that we have heard from all sides of the House tonight, we have had examples of where, not in 10 years’ time but possibly in two years’ time or less, we may need changes. There are issues such as human trafficking; energy, where in order to deal with networks and negotiations with third parties we may need to establish an exclusive competence at EU level; north Africa, where for a group of new democratic countries we may have to adopt an entirely new type of relationship; and for the financial crisis in the banks, where we may need a cross-border resolution mechanism.

The Government should be open to the Article 48(6) simplified revision of the treaty of the type that the euro area has had to agree to to establish the stability mechanism, rather than closing the door. That is the test of an effective European policy; “Are you prepared to do the things that are necessary to make Europe effective where it needs to be effective?”. The truth is that this Government do not want to do that. Instead, they want to apply this referendum lock, which will not enable Europe to be effective in all circumstances, and they are going to throw away the key.

Our position is a pragmatic one. It is not saying that these things are inevitable; it is saying that we have to be open to them happening. As part of the structure of the Bill, the Government are saying that there are certain grounds for exempting measures from the need for a referendum. We have tried to illustrate what those grounds might be and, on some of the other flexibilities in the treaty, we have tried to demonstrate where the significance test might be widened from the very narrow circumstances in which it is currently allowable.

If the Government want to improve the Bill, I urge them to come back to this House by Report with a set of amendments that give us cause for hope that Britain can play a leading role in the European Union rather than always having to say to colleagues, “No, we can’t possibly agree to that because we’re not allowed to have a referendum”. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 23C withdrawn.

European Union Bill

Lord Liddle Excerpts

Tuesday 3rd May 2011 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Liddle]

21: Page 3, line 43, leave out subsection (3)

[Lord Liddle]

My Lords, I readily confess that in the annals of arcaneness this is a very arcane subject for an amendment but it is not the fault of noble Lords on this side of the Committee. The fact is that this is an extremely arcane Bill with provisions of mind-boggling complexity. Therefore, if we are to address it with proper scrutiny we will inevitably end up moving arcane amendments.

In simple terms the purpose of Ministers is, we have been told in this legislation, to detail every possible transfer of power to Brussels and bind it in the form of some indestructible referendum lock, which will last at least for this Parliament and probably a long way beyond. Their argument is that this is necessary to restore public trust in the European Union. This proposition is made without any real evidence being offered that this is an effective means of restoring trust in Europe. I could argue with equal force that a more effective European Union would be a better way to address this problem. In making the argument that we need these multiple referenda, the Government are launching the greatest attack on the sovereignty of Parliament that we have seen in recent times. The noble Lord, Lord Stoddart, argues that those of us on this side of the Committee who find the multiple referenda proposed in the Bill objectionable do so because we are frightened of losing. We are not frightened of losing but we stand for parliamentary sovereignty and representative democracy, and this Bill is a denial of those principles.

The second point is that the situation in which this Government intend to put their Ministers is profoundly against the national interest in dealings in the European Union, because it denies Ministers the pragmatic flexibility to agree to passerelles in the Lisbon treaty or to small changes which will enable Europe to be more effective and to win back that trust. The consequence will be not to stop things happening but that the rest of the European Union, if it thinks the issue sufficiently important, will go ahead without Britain being involved. For good reason or ill, the United Kingdom is already out of the euro and out of Schengen. We on this side of the Committee believe that the consequence of the Bill will be to put us out of virtually all areas of expanding EU activity. It will marginalise Britain in Europe and deny the British Government the power to tackle problems that the nation state on its own cannot tackle. This is not just a matter of applying a lock to change; it is also throwing away the key.

On previous days in Committee, we have argued that this extreme position that the Government have adopted on the referendum lock can at least be modified in a number of ways. In our previous day in Committee, we argued from this side that where changes need to be made on grounds of urgency they should be permitted. We also argued that the significance test, which is included in the Bill and which allows Ministers to decide that—

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

I certainly do not want to make a habit of too many interruptions, as we all know that debate in this place goes more smoothly without, but the noble Lord has made a number of statements which jar so strongly with the reality that I have to ask him what he means by them. He says that the passerelle and other arrangements in the Lisbon treaty would enable rapid changes to be made but we all know that any treaty, including the one now going through, takes 21 months. How can 21 months possibly be described as rapid? Furthermore, he seems to assume that the efficient and effective operation of the European Union demands all kinds of new treaties and to ignore the fact that within the vast range of competences that it has, a great deal can, must and will be done. Countries throughout the European Union are extremely reluctant to embark upon the complex, long process of European treaty change. These are all facts and they contrast completely with what the noble Lord has said in the past five minutes.

[Lord Liddle]

The Minister has misunderstood what I have been trying to say. I apologise to the Committee if I have been giving a false impression but this amendment’s subject encapsulates fully the point that I am trying to make. What concerns us is: why tie up all the flexibilities that are within the existing, ratified structure of the Lisbon treaty, which were discussed in this House in the previous Parliament? Why tie all of those up in referendum locks that could have a very negative effect on Britain's power to act in its own interests within the European Union? That is the point and this amendment looks at one of those specific and unnecessary locks. Let me try and explain its point.

Clause 4(1)(m), which we debated last week, requires an automatic referendum if any amendment is moved to the Lisbon treaty, as it could be within the terms of that treaty, to alter the right of member states to ensure suspension of the legislative procedure. In Euro-speak, this is called the emergency brake and covers three areas of EU activity: social security, judicial co-operation and cross-border crime. It is the right of a member state to refer a matter where legislation is proposed in those areas to the European Council before the legislation can proceed any further. Britain supported emergency brakes in these areas in the passage of the Lisbon treaty. It did so because the previous Government thought that as regards social security, judicial co-operation and cross-border crime there might well be an argument in principle for more Europe. Indeed, there were compelling arguments for more Europe in this area but as a safeguard, just in case we did not like the look of the way things were going, we wanted to see how it worked. Therefore there was a need for an emergency brake.

The logic of this very pragmatic position is that if we find in future years that the European Community is doing a good job in these fields, we will be prepared to rid ourselves of that emergency brake provision. Those who are disposed by nature to see everything that the EU does as a threat will never believe that anything can work, but those of us who think that it can be an opportunity should be open-minded about the possibility of the changes that are provided for in the Lisbon treaty.

I argue that these three areas are issues that are not of the highest national importance, like whether we join the euro, but are of significant importance where change might be necessary in processes that the Government might want to agree to. However, the Bill will require an automatic referendum. Look at them: first, social security legislation, which, as we know, is tied up with the right to work, study, and settle for retirement wherever you want in the EU, which is one of its most appealing citizenship rights; secondly, judicial co-operation, which is essential if we are going to effectively tackle the terrorist threats of the kind that the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, talked about earlier in his Statement on Osama bin Laden; and thirdly, cross-border crime, in terms of which we are all aware of the increasing problems of criminal gangs operated from outside the EU but often on its borders, in countries like Russia and some parts of the Balkans.

Surely we want to retain the flexibility to make Europe effective in those areas. That may require changes in these so-called emergency-brake provisions but, on a narrow but significant point, the Government are saying, “Oh no, we can’t do anything for at least seven years or so because we have to have a referendum and we are certainly not going to do anything about that this Parliament”. The argument from this side of the House is a different one: let us not tie ourselves up in these knots but have the confidence that in a representative democracy Parliament should deal with these questions; there is no place for a referendum on them.

[Lord Blackwell]

My Lords, I must apologise to the House and the Minister for having been unable to contribute to the debate on the Bill so far. I feel compelled to contribute at this point by the extraordinary speech of the noble Lord, Lord Liddle.

When the Government of the day brought the Lisbon treaty to this House, one of their proud claims was that they had protected the red lines that they had set out, including the red lines on areas such as social security and judicial co-operation, through the introduction of these emergency brakes. If legislation was brought forward in the European Union that was seen to be against our national interest in these areas, or against things that we could tolerate, we had the right to say, “We will not go along with this. We don’t think this should be applied to the UK”. Effectively, we have a veto. The other member states can proceed without us if they wish, but it gives us a cast-iron guarantee that in these very sensitive areas the EU cannot override the UK Parliament and the UK people in legislating in what are regarded as areas of national importance. For the noble Lord to say that we should now throw these emergency brakes away—

[Lord Liddle]

I am not saying that at all. I am saying that we should not tie ourselves up indefinitely in the need to have a referendum to make this change. That does not mean that I am in favour of immediate change in these things; I am not. But I want to hold open the possibility of flexibility in order that we can meet new circumstances if necessary.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

I was not aware that any of these clauses in any way undermined the Lisbon treaty. The noble Lord, Lord Kerr, who was much involved in the EU convention, is not here. Those of us who have read, as I have, a certain amount on the EU convention and the Lisbon treaty, which followed it, are well aware that the clauses on the emergency brake and passerelle were agreed after hard negotiations, in which it was not the United Kingdom versus all the others. Several member Governments in this now rather large and complex European Union wanted some reassurance that, as they touched on such sensitive areas as national sovereignty, law, finance and welfare provision—some of the issues covered by these emergency brake provisions—they would have, at the back, the ability to say, “No, we are not happy with what is proceeding”. That is what the emergency brake is about. It is not the case that Britain stands alone against 26 other member states that are determined to integrate further and sweep more powers into Brussels.

The United Kingdom and several others are pushing for further co-operation in a range of areas. Coalitions across the European Union differ according to each subject on which we negotiate. The noble Lord, Lord Liddle, knows better than me what it looks like once you are inside government. The emergency brakes are there to reassure member states—their public and their Governments—and those who care not just about the peculiarities of English criminal law and justice but about those of Polish and Romanian criminal law and justice. I have read what the then Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, said about this when he gave evidence to the House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee on the Lisbon treaty. He said that the Government hoped that the emergency brake would never have to be used, but that it was there as a reassurance to national Governments. I emphasise “Governments”; this was not just about the British.

Jack Straw went on to say to the House of Lords European Union Committee:

“So it is an additional protection and I think really rather an important one”.

Perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, drafted this. Jack Straw then said:

“Again, it is quite a paradoxical point but I think the effect of it may be to provide greater confidence to British Government to get involved in opting into instruments, which is actually in principle what we want to do, and having done that then some additional surety which will get a satisfactory answer so that we do not have to apply the emergency brake”.

The noble Lord, Lord Liddle, said that sometimes the arguments around all this are arcane and of mind-boggling complexity. That sentence was not the easiest to read. However, the whole purpose of the emergency brakes is precisely to reassure national Governments on sensitive issues. It is not intended that they should be regularly used. It is highly unlikely that any Government will wish to remove them in the foreseeable future. Therefore, I suggest humbly that this amendment is one of the least useful that we have to consider.

[Lord Liddle]

I think the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, is trying to distort the position that I have put forward. I am not in favour of removing the emergency brakes. I am saying that the flexibility is there in the Lisbon treaty to do this. Those of us who have doubts about the Government’s Bill are saying that since this flexibility could be exercised only by Act of Parliament, why does it have to be done through a referendum? That is fundamentally the point. We heard the argument about what the former Foreign Secretary, David Miliband, said about the Lisbon treaty late at night in the previous session of the Committee. The point is that David Miliband recommended the Lisbon treaty to the other place on the basis of the flexibilities that it contains. However, the problem with the Bill is that it tries to tie up all those flexibilities with its wretched referendum lock.

The noble Lord, Lord Wallace, is trying to cover up the fact that his party is allowing the Conservative Party a second bite at the cherry on the referendum on the Lisbon treaty that it failed to secure. That is what much of the Bill is about. It is to my great regret that the British party that has been the strongest supporter of Britain’s membership of the European Union has gone along with what the Conservatives are asking for in this case. They are after a re-run of Lisbon. The amendments that we on this side of the Committee have put forward say, “Let us take the Lisbon treaty as it is and accept that the flexibilities within it do not require referenda”.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire]

It is my great regret that for 13 years under the previous Labour Government the balance of public opinion in this country became steadily more sceptical about the European Union and that the Government of Tony Blair and then of Gordon Brown failed to make a positive case for European Union engagement. That has left us with a very sceptical public and a deeply sceptical and antagonistic press. That is the problem with which this Bill deals. It is another problem that we have inherited from a succession of previous Governments. The noble Lord, Lord Liddle, might well have tried to do something about that at the time from inside government, but unfortunately he did not succeed.

[Lord Liddle]

We can have academic debates about these questions in other places, and I do not want to delay the Committee. However, on the facts, there has been no great swing of British public opinion against the European Union over the past 15 years or so. It has fluctuated with circumstances over time. The Eurosceptic press was not created by the previous Government; unfortunately, it has been with us for a lot longer than that.

We on this side fundamentally object to the idea that plebiscitary democracy is the way to restore public trust. I am surprised that the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, is going along with this. I do not know what the noble Lord’s views are on the current referendum campaign, but there does not seem to be a high quality of public debate on referenda, given the way in which some of the people involved in the referendum campaign have argued that we are missing out by not having these issues decided in Parliament, where there would at least be a more balanced consideration of them.

I will, of course, withdraw this amendment. However, we on this side have moved several amendments on these lines, and we see no give whatever on the Government’s part. On subsequent Committee days I will refer to the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Williamson, to which the Government must face up: namely, if they think that something has to be done in the national interest, would it still require a referendum, and what would be their position on that? That question is highly relevant.

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick]

What sort of policy proposals would the noble Lord want the emergency brake lifted for? Given that the emergency brake is there purely as a defensive mechanism, to be used rarely on occasions of national interest as a negative power, what circumstances can he envisage in which he would want to get rid of it? In all the areas that he has mentioned on which there might be co-operation, we can agree to co-operate anyway.

[Lord Liddle]

The noble Lord is right, of course, but it seems to me that on judicial co-operation, for instance, we had established the confidence that the former Foreign Secretary Jack Straw talked about and that Europe was important and effective in these areas. We might wish at some stage—I am not saying that we would but we might—to see some change in the processes. After all, it might be not only us who want to apply the emergency brake. Other member states might wish to do so, and that might be detrimental to the possibility of getting agreement on these questions. If we look back to Maastricht, we see that justice and home affairs were included in the European treaties for the first time on the basis of unanimity. However, by the time we got round to Lisbon there was an overwhelming consensus among member states that these matters should not be in a separate pillar but should be part of the main business of the Community, and that in the vast majority of cases there should be majority voting. Opinions change in the light of circumstances. Therefore, why should we tie ourselves up in referenda?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Liddle]

The noble Baroness comes to my aid and makes good points, for which I thank her. I shall withdraw the amendment, but the Government should think hard about flexibility in the Bill. At the moment it is profoundly damaging to the British national interest because it gives our Ministers no flexibility whatever in their dealings with the European Union.

Amendment 21 withdrawn.

EU and NATO: Peace in Europe

Lord Liddle Excerpts

Thursday 28th April 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

I think I heard a bit of immoderation the other way at that point. There is reason and sense in all these points of view and if anyone strives to go too far in claiming perfection for one organisation over the other it is bound to produce a reaction, which is just what we are hearing today.

[Lord Liddle]

Does the Minister agree that instead of this raking over the past of whether NATO or the EU made the biggest contribution to peace we should be looking to the future? Does he accept that this is a future where our great ally the United States, the anchor of NATO, is looking to Europe to step up to the plate and live up to its responsibilities in Libya and north Africa and that there is a huge responsibility on the British Government, with our French allies, to persuade the rest of Europe to live up to those responsibilities? We will be successful in doing this only if we have a British Government who are fully committed to and not semi-detached from the European Union. Will he persuade the Prime Minister to make a strong case for a bigger role for Europe in accepting these wider responsibilities?

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

The noble Lord makes a number of points. It is certainly true that the United States is expecting the European Union to contribute more to the overall NATO scene as we are doing. This explains why the original worries of the United States about duplication and overlapping have evaporated and the EU and NATO are working very effectively together. The coalition Government believe that we should have a very positive role in the present European structure, in its reform and in meeting its future problems. However, there is a wider world as well, with which we have to connect, and many of these issues are not just American responsibilities or European responsibilities but global responsibilities requiring a global partnership.

European Union Bill

Lord Liddle Excerpts

Tuesday 26th April 2011 Lords Chamber

Tabled by

[Lord Liddle]

17: Clause 3, page 3, line 4, leave out “(1)(i) or (j)” and insert “(1)”

[Lord Liddle]

My Lords, I will speak to the amendments in this bloc—Amendments 17, 18, 19, 19A and 28. They relate to matters that we discussed extensively in our earlier debate. To help the House, I am willing not to move these amendments at this stage, on the understanding that we will probably come back to these issues of pragmatic flexibility on Report. We have had a very long discussion on this and the best thing is probably to move on. However, there may be Members who wish to have a bit of a discussion on whether Clause 3 should stand part.

Amendments 17 to 19A not moved.

European Union Bill

Lord Liddle Excerpts

Tuesday 26th April 2011 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Liddle]

16A: Clause 3, page 3, line 2, at end insert “either”

[Lord Liddle]

My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendment 16B. These are amendments to Clause 3 and their purpose is to allow Ministers pragmatic flexibility to act in the national interest in cases of urgency. The arguments I will make are very similar to those I will make for Amendments 17, 18 and 19, and I intend to move those formally when the time comes. Amendments 17, 18 and 19 are about extending the significance test that the Bill gives Ministers to a wider range of issues than currently listed in Clause 4(1).

It is important when debating these amendments to emphasise that we are not talking about treaties that are subject to the full ratification process. We have different views about whether those should be subject to referenda, but that is not the topic of the amendments. They are about the use of referenda in cases where, under Article 48(6) of the treaty, the simplified revision procedure is used. This procedure can be used only when it does not extend the European Union’s competencies. Its purpose is to give member states flexibility to meet new situations that the treaty drafters had not anticipated when they wrote the treaty. Any changes agreed under these provisions would of course be subject to full parliamentary ratification. On this side of the House, we are not disputing that requirement.

On the first day in Committee, we considered amendments by the noble Lords, Lord Hannay, Lord Dykes, Lord Tomlinson and Lord Richard, who argued that in such cases only parliamentary ratification should be necessary and that that should be the end of the matter. In reply, the noble Lord, Lord Howell, argued, on behalf of the Government, that this was simply not good enough to restore public trust in the European Union. However, I regret to say that, from our perspective, he was unable to give a satisfactory answer as to why this was not good enough, and he was unable to cite examples of where, in these special circumstances, referenda would be required in other member states. This set of amendments enables us to come back to the same issues of giving Ministers more flexibility of action in another way.

Clause 3(4) introduces the concept of significance into whether a referendum is required. We think that that is quite a sensible approach. The Minister should have the flexibility to decide what is significant and insignificant, and put that to Parliament. Unfortunately, the Bill restricts this ministerial discretion very narrowly indeed. The Minister can apply this test of significance only under Clause 4(1)(i) and (j). The noble Lord, Lord Howell, gave us an example of what that test might be—for instance, if the Government decide that the new reporting requirements they have to make to Eurostat, in order to comply with the new economic governance arrangements, are not a change of sufficient significance to require a referendum. I think we would all agree with that.

However, we are seeking, first in this set of amendments, a provision that no referendum should be required in urgent cases; and, in Amendments 17 to 19, that the significance test should apply to all those matters listed in Clause 4(1). Why does this make sense? It is for the obvious reason that what is being talked about is a requirement to put fairly minor changes through a double ratification process. The Lisbon treaty went through a thorough ratification process in this House and the other place, but this Bill states that, to use its provisions, we have to go through yet another ratification process—this time involving a referendum. This double ratification does not seem to make any sense, particularly when it is not on issues of major significance.

That is not to deny that on this side of the Chamber we of course accept that the European Union has a significant legitimacy problem, and I think we are all alarmed by the rise of populist parties in various member states. However, our analysis is that the root of the problem is not so much an accretion of power to Brussels as a failure of political leadership in Europe to use the powers that Europe has to address the economic problems, social malaise and environmental and political challenges facing the Union. I think that this affects Britain as much as any other member state. We all recognise—at least I hope that we do—that in this world of interdependence there are a lot of these challenges and they can be met only by our acting together.

No one on this side of the Chamber is arguing for a transfer of powers to Brussels simply for its own sake. However, the huge problem with the Bill is that it is designed not, as its promoters claim, to build support for Europe in Britain but rather to appease those who do not really want us to be members of the European Union at all. By introducing this new constitutional concept of perpetual referenda, the Bill rules out the pragmatic flexibility that we need within the European Union to pursue our national interests. It is ironic that as, next week, we approach the first nationwide referendum in 36 years in this country, we should be debating in this Bill the possibility of 56 different issues which could be subject to a referendum. That does not seem to make sense; it is a denial of the pragmatism for which the British are famed. I think that this is a very un-British piece of legislation, and it is very limiting. Who can tell what urgent situations might arise or what minor changes might be necessary to make the EU effective?

I dearly hope that later, either in Committee or on Report, we will be able to argue and persuade this House to accept amendments that will sunset the Bill and mean that it does not apply beyond the present Parliament. However, if that attempt fails, we need to find pragmatic solutions within the context of the Bill that will enable the UK to continue to play a leading role in the European Union. We have to strike a better balance than the Bill does at present between what we need to do in our national interest and what needs popular assent. Therefore, with these amendments we are arguing for an exemption from the referendum requirement in cases of genuine urgency and where the test of significance can be applied more widely.

The Government say that they are trying to institute a referendum lock on major decisions. I think that what we have here is referendum paralysis on lots of minor decisions. I believe that the amendments would help to make a bad Bill marginally less bad and increase Britain’s ability to negotiate from a position of strength in Europe.

[The Lord Speaker (Baroness Hayman)]

It may be for the convenience of the Committee if I report that my understanding is that, after the debate on this group of amendments, we will take the Statement on the Middle East and north Africa.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Liddle]

My Lords, we have had a long debate on a series of relatively small amendments designed to improve the Bill, but it has been a very interesting one. Three weeks ago, when we had our first day in Committee, I have to say that I felt a bit sorry for the noble Lord, Lord Howell. He cut a rather lonely figure, with no one on the Benches behind him coming to his defence. I thought that he was having difficulty persuading the House that the Bill before us is essentially as he described it: a pro-European measure. In the mean time, the Government have called in their reinforcements. We have heard speeches from the noble Lords, Lord Waddington, Lord Flight, Lord Risby and Lord Hamilton of Epsom, all defending the Government’s position. I wonder if the Minister feels any better as a result of the people who have come to his aid, because my reaction to what they said is that if they—the noble Lords, Lord Waddington, Lord Flight, Lord Risby and Lord Hamilton of Epsom—truly represent balance and the moderate centre on these issues, then God help us and particularly God help Britain in Europe. The only reason that they see their position as balanced is that this Bill essentially does not contain what they really wanted. What they really wanted was an in-or-out referendum on Britain’s European membership and the repatriation of powers. I hope that the scales are beginning to fall from the eyes of some of their Lib Dem coalition partners about what really lies behind the motive for this piece of legislation. It is to appease anti-Europeanism—I was going to say Euroscepticism, but it is not scepticism, it is anti-Europeanism in this country.

[Lord Pearson of Rannoch]

My Lords, does the noble Lord accept that those of us who are described as Eurosceptic are not anti-European? We are against the project of European integration. We love the real Europe, the Europe of separate nations each with its glorious and distinctive past and future, if it could get out of this ill-founded and unfortunate project.

[Lord Liddle]

I certainly do not want to contradict what the noble Lord has said, but he ought to remember that, loving Europe’s history as I do, I know that it is also a history of bloody conflict, of massacre and genocide, which the European Union has played a major part in bringing to an end. I listened to the Minister’s supporters speaking from his Benches, and it seems that they all think that the history of the European Union is essentially one of betrayal. So when Winston Churchill called for Europe to unite, that was a betrayal, and when Harold Macmillan decided to take us into the Common Market, that was a betrayal.

[Lord Waddington]

I wonder if the noble Lord would allow me to put him right on this matter because it was raised the other day by my noble friend Lord Howell. In his great speech at Zurich, Winston Churchill said that he wished America, Britain and even perhaps the Soviet Union to be the godfathers of the new Europe, and he quite obviously was not considering that we were qualified for membership because of our own worldwide interests. He said that Germany and France should bury their differences and build a new Europe of which we would be the godfathers. We want no more of this nonsense of pretending that Winston Churchill committed himself to Britain being a member of the European Union, because he said exactly the opposite.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Liddle]

We can all trade our Winston Churchill quotes, but certainly the thrust of his intervention was greatly to promote the cause of European union. Was it a betrayal when Lord Cockfield pursued the White Paper on the single market? Was it a betrayal when the noble and learned Lord, Lord Howe, fought for the Single European Act in order to bring that White Paper into legislative effect? Was it a betrayal when the noble Lord, Lord Brittan, as a Commissioner, fought tooth and nail to extend the single market? And was it a betrayal when John Major and the noble Lord, Lord Hurd, agreed to the Maastricht treaty, which has led to a more effective Europe on issues such as cross-border crime, freedom of movement, an effective presence in the world and progress towards co-operation in defence? The trouble for the noble Lord, Lord Howell, is that although he is right to say that the leaders of Europe can take Europe forward largely by using the existing powers granted to the European Union, most of those sitting behind him seem to think that those existing powers are a great betrayal. I do not understand the logic of their position.

The noble Lord, Lord Risby, argued that referenda are now part of our political culture. Let us be clear: Members on this side of the Committee believe in referenda on big issues. Were we to join the euro, there should be a referendum. Were there to be some equivalent of the European constitutional treaty, there should be a referendum. But the point of this Bill is not major referenda of that kind, but proposals for, I think, 56 different issues on which referenda could be held. Next week, we will have the first national referendum in Britain for 36 years. This is not a coherent policy. The fact is, as my noble friend Lord Richard brilliantly outlined, that many of the topics which are to be subject to a referendum would just be the subjects of ridicule if we ever got to the point of having such a contest. Indeed, as the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, pointed out, there are grave dangers to our democracy in multiple referenda, which give power to big money because it is big money that wins. That, of course, may be the position in the referendum next week.

I would say that, yes, Europe should largely work within its existing powers and we should not be arguing for big transfers of powers. That is not the purpose of these amendments. Their purpose is to give Ministers pragmatic flexibility to deal with situations in the real world as they arise. I was not at all satisfied by what the Minister had to say about crises. What would Britain do if there was a major banking crisis which affected cross-border banks and something needed to be done at the European level in order to rescue the banking system? This is a hypothetical case, but what would Britain do? How can a Government credibly sign up to measures to tackle the problem if they know that they have to go to the country in a referendum? That is the basic argument for the amendment, which would allow Ministers to sign up to things in cases of urgency.

Listening to the Minister, one might think that there is a lot of pragmatic flexibility in the Bill to decide whether matters are significant. But that is not what the Bill says. The significance test is presently limited to Clause 4(1)(i) and (j). Its application is therefore very limited.

We are not arguing for massive transfers of powers; we are arguing for pragmatic flexibility within the structure of the Bill, and that is why we have put forward these amendments. Doubtless we will come back to these issues on Report. In the mean time, I am happy not to press Amendments 16A and 16B.

Amendment 16A withdrawn.

European Union Bill

Lord Liddle Excerpts

Tuesday 5th April 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Liddle]

My Lords, despite the remarks of my noble friend Lord Richard, I think that your Lordships’ Committee has got off to a cracking good start. There was certainly a flavour of a repeat of Second Reading but there were some memorable moments in it. Although in many respects I do not agree with the description given by the noble Lord, Lord Deben, of the Bill as the Conservative version of the Hunting Bill, I think that that is a very accurate political description of the politics that lie behind the Bill. The constitutional outrage of the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, was well put, and I think that my noble friend Lord Foulkes is right that this is something of a threat to our sea-walled garden, although, at the risk of getting my metaphors mixed up, we need to live in a world of pooled sovereignty in order to protect our sea-walled gardens.

We started with a Shakespearean reference from the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard. He compared his role with that of Bernardo starting the play. If I may say so, I thought that he played the part of a minor character somewhat unconvincingly. Many noble Lords will probably be looking to him as the Committee stage proceeds for wise advice about the meaning of the various amendments before us, just as he has provided very wise advice in his various capacities in the past. Indeed, while we are on the subject of Shakespeare, I thought that my noble friend Lord Kinnock was right to depict the Bill as a move from tragedy to farce.

I turn my attention to the specifics of the amendment. They are, as I think the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, described them, rather abstruse technicalities. However, the core of this debate is whether the use of the so-called simplified revision procedure of the Lisbon treaty, under Article 48(6), should be included in this Bill at all. That is essentially what this group of amendments is about.

The purpose of the article is to give very strictly limited flexibility to member states, acting by unanimity and only by unanimity, to amend the treaty without having to go through the whole paraphernalia of treaty ratification according to their own constitutional provisions. It does not preclude proper parliamentary accountability for these matters for decisions taken under Article 48(6). Heads of Government are clearly accountable to their own national parliaments for any decisions they take in Brussels. In an extreme case, of course, a Government would fall as a result of a motion of confidence if they took a decision with which their parliament violently disagreed.

Therefore, the flexibility does not preclude accountability and under Article 48(6) it is limited. The EU treaties are clear. The Article 48(6) procedure cannot widen EU competence, and many of my noble friends—Lord Tomlinson, Lord Davies and others—have made that point with great force. However, it seems that the Government have drafted the Bill on the contrary premise that somehow or other matters under Article 48(6) can widen competence. The noble Lord, Lord Howell, shakes his head and I look forward to his explanation, but I think that, first, he needs to clear up this confusion. Why is something that under the treaty cannot extend competence regarded as being subject to the balls and chains put around our Ministers in the Bill?

That leads to two further problems with the inclusion of Article 48(6) in the Bill. One is a legal issue and the other is a good faith issue so far as concerns negotiation. On the legal issue, I turned to the Fifteenth Report of the Session of the Commons European Scrutiny Committee on the EU Bill. It took evidence from various legal experts about what this all meant. I think that the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, has already referred to what the Council’s former legal adviser, Jean-Claude Piris, said about it. Perhaps I may quote what the eminent legal expert, Professor Craig, said about the Bill. At paragraph 60, the report says that he,

“drew our attention to the conflict between clause 3 of the Bill, a clause which he described as ‘deeply problematic’, and the Lisbon Treaty. Article 48(6) TEU states expressly that a Decision made there under ‘shall not increase the competences conferred on the Union in the Treaties. Clause 3 of the Bill, by contrast, is predicated on the contrary assumption”.

So it is not just me making this up; this is an eminent legal expert. He goes on to say:

“To be sure Clause 3(3) embodies the exemption condition …This does not, however, alter the force of the point being made here: from the EU’s perspective no Article 48(6) Decision can increase EU competence; from the perspective of the … Bill some such Decisions can do so. This will inevitably lead to legal and political tension between the EU and UK”.

He also goes on to point out that further clauses of the Bill,

“in imposing constitutional requirements where none is foreseen by the Lisbon Treaty, may be in breach of EU law”,

and he sets out why he judges that to be the case. I think that in Committee it is perfectly reasonable for the Opposition to ask what the Government’s view is of this eminent legal advice.

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine]

Does the noble Lord accept that, although competences are defined, powers are not? Paragraph 21 on page 5 of the Explanatory Notes says:

“As the majority of treaties and Article 48(6) decisions will require the exercise of judgement as to whether a transfer of power or competence is involved”.

To me, the confusion between Clauses 1 and 3 arises because of the lack of a definition of “power”, and I wonder whether the noble Lord can comment on that.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Liddle]

The noble Baroness makes an interesting point. I am no lawyer and I do not think that she is a lawyer either. Eminent lawyers have made these points. I think that it is up to the Government to provide us with a clear explanation.

However, I am trying to make more than a legal point; there is also a moral argument here. The British Government are reneging on a compromise that they signed up for in the negotiations on the Lisbon treaty in 2007. They are overturning promises to our partners that they solemnly made. Of course the Government are entitled to say that for future treaties they can bring in new processes of ratification; they are perfectly entitled to say that and we can debate those processes. However, in relation to Article 48(6), the Bill proposes to introduce new procedures that place new obstacles to the use of treaty provisions to which Britain has already signed up. We signed up to that with the explicit purpose of not being subject to the cumbersome processes of ratification that the Government are now, retrospectively, trying to impose. That raises questions about the Government’s integrity.

[Lord Kinnock]

I am following my noble friend closely, and I am sorry to interrupt him, but does he accept that his declaration that the Government are entitled to make provision for the future is a moot point in the context of this Bill? The Government, as well as presenting this Bill, have repeatedly and solemnly declared that no use will be made of it in the lifetime of this Parliament—none whatever—because there will be no concession in the direction of competences or powers, however defined. That being the case, are not the Government seeking to do what no Government or Parliament can do, and that is to bind future Parliaments?

[Lord Liddle]

My noble friend Lord Kinnock, for whom I have enormous respect, corrects me on this point. I was trying to make a point about whether our European partners were aware of the new constraints being imposed on the British Government’s flexibility in relation to provisions which the British Government have already signed up to. Has the Prime Minister written or otherwise communicated to his European Council colleagues to explain that the deal which Britain did in 2007 is now off the table? Can Parliament be informed of the reaction of our partners to the knowledge that the flexibility which they thought the British had signed up to is no longer available? If we have not got that from our European partners, there should be a pause—after yesterday, pauses in the legislative process are almost a formal part of our proceedings. There should be a pause while this communication with our partners takes place, because it is not right to go back on these promises.

I would like to talk briefly about what I regard as the impracticalities of the Government’s proposals, to which several noble Lords have referred. The most notable instance of the use of Article 48(6) is the way in which it is being used for the establishment of the European stability mechanism in the euro area. That is clearly not a decision that extends the EU's competence because the Maastricht treaty provided for the creation of a single currency and the establishment of an economic and monetary union, both objectives to which the previous Conservative Government subscribed. However, a gap emerged in the framework for managing the euro when the sovereign debt crisis came about. The stability mechanism was established to deal with the crisis, and the clauses of the treaty have been used for this purpose.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Pearson of Rannoch]

My Lords, I wonder whether I could press the noble Lord to give an answer to a question that I put to other noble Lords but which they did not answer. Why does he think that the European Union, Brussels and so on, will stay within the legal confines of the treaty? Of course, Article 48(6) says that it shall not be used to increase the competences conferred on the Union in the treaties. The two examples that I gave, to which I would like the noble Lord to reply, are the European Union’s abuse of what was Article 308, which is now Article 352. I did not weary your Lordships with all the examples of where that abuse was manifest, but I shall give the reference if anybody wants to find it. In future, students of these matters may want to consult Hansard for 18 June 2008 at col. 1074. That is a clear example of where a clause designed to allow the Council to take action,

“in the course of the operation of the Common Market”,

was used to do all sorts of other things. When it came before the Luxembourg Court for judgment in 1996, those words were simply ignored by the Court. I gave noble Lords the example of Article 308 in the past. I also give noble Lords the example of Article 122, which was used in the interregnum between one Government and another. Can the noble Lord answer those points and set your Lordships’ mind at rest that Article 48(6) will be followed, unlike the way in which those articles—and there are more flexibility clauses—have not been obeyed in the past?

[Lord Liddle]

With the greatest respect, I think that the noble Lord is confusing two things. I am looking in the direction of the noble Lord, Lord Kerr. I think that Article 48(6) deals with cases where there is a clear competence—for instance, in the case that I was talking about of the single market in financial services and in the previous case about the euro, the establishment of economic and monetary union and of a single currency. I think that the noble Lord is talking about the general clauses which are now subject, under the Lisbon treaty, to considerable constraints. I will look into that and perhaps we can have a discussion.

[The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Lord Howell of Guildford)]

My Lords, it would be an implausible exaggeration to say that I have enjoyed this debate, but it is a privilege to hear the fine minds of many of your Lordships playing on these issues, which are undoubtedly complex. I do not make any apology for that, because much of the EU legislative scene is extremely complex, as are our relations with it. I strongly agree with the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, that although this seems to be an abstruse issue, which I shall address in great detail in a moment, it is also central and raises fundamental points about the whole nature and purpose of the Bill. I should also put in a good word for my Belgian friends, who came in for criticism of the kind that, frankly, I do not like. I will let that pass for the moment.

As the debate has ranged a little beyond the central point, to which the noble Lord, Lord Tomlinson, rightly urged we return, I hope that I will be allowed a few paragraphs trying to explain the context in which we come both to adherence to the central issue of the amendment and to the Bill.

We believe that there has been disaffection among the British electorate in recent years. I think that it is a mistake for the most enthusiastic supporters and builders of the European Union and our membership of it to ignore that fact, because it has led, through the successive handing over of powers to the EU—often for excellent reasons but without consultation with or the consent of the British people—to a good deal of distrust. That works totally against good Europeanism and an effective development and strengthening of the European Union, which are certainly required today.

The competences and powers have been handed over, in many cases—this is an argument that we have heard buzzing across the Floor of your Lordships’ House this afternoon—for good reasons. As my noble friend Lord Deben said, great things can be and have been gained by the handing over of competences and powers, whether or not you call it pooling of sovereignty. Others would argue, as we have heard today and often before, that the handing over of those powers has not been for the good. That wider debate has gone on and will continue in future.

Of course, the Bill does not concern what has been handed over in the past. I know that that is a matter of criticism for some of my noble friends and others in the other place, where there was considerable criticism that the Bill did not try to wind things back into the past, although it is worth reminding ourselves, as the noble Lord, Lord Stoddart, did, that the House of Commons passed the Bill and gave it to us for scrutiny, which we must perform in detail.

However, that fact of dissatisfaction cannot be dismissed or pushed aside by those who seek to understand the disquiet not just in the media and in the so-called anti-European or Eurosceptic papers but among a wide number of people and organisations, including some extremely learned people and leading lights in the legal profession. That is why the coalition’s programme for government gives the undertaking:

“The Government believes that Britain should play a leading role in an enlarged European Union, but that no further powers should be transferred”.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

It is certainly true that in your Lordships’ House there has been a notable weight of criticism against the Bill. I fully accept that. I have to remind the noble Lord that the House of Commons passed this Bill without the opposition of his party. This is a House of Commons Bill, as the noble Lord, Lord Stoddart, reminded us. It could be that those who feel strongly and are most expert in aspects of it or feel most strongly about broader issues are those who come forward to speak.

[Lord Liddle]

The Minister said this at Second Reading. Labour put down a reasoned amendment in the other place which expressed many reservations about the Bill. It is not true to say that Labour did not oppose it.

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

Labour did not oppose the Bill overall, but it certainly urged that we should scrutinise it and that, by heavens, is what we are doing. No doubt we will be doing a good deal more of that.

With this legislation, we are, in our view, plainly acting in the spirit of the Laeken declaration, which noble Lords will remember urged that we should seek to find ways, which are widely recognised throughout the whole of the European Union, not just in this country, to bring the processes of the Union and its legislative procedures closer to the people. That was 10 years ago. It urged us to act on that basis. It seems to me timely—if anything, a little tardy—and certainly appropriate for the era in which we now live that we should bring forward legislation on which, we hope, we can build an architecture of faith and commitment to the European Union for the future and a building that we hope will last although, obviously, we would not like to see—we will be debating this later—future Governments remove the foundation stones from that architecture and destroy it. That would be a pity, but it will again be a matter of opinion and debate. The Bill is put forward with that kind of faith and intention in our minds. Frankly, calling it a fraud on the public is a deeply regrettable statement—deplorable, in my view—and not at all in line with the tone of debates in this House of Lords. I think that it is a pity that people should speak in that way.

I want to come to the core issue in the debate. The simplified revision procedure allows the European Council to decide to make amendments to the part of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union that concerns internal policies. That is what the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, stated quite clearly. This is the Article 48(6) issue. The noble Lord said that the treaty changes under the simplified revision procedure are not allowed to transfer further competence from the UK to the EU. Here I hesitate, because I am going to challenge the viewpoint and authority of the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, and many others, but certainly the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, who is a great expert. After all, he was, I understand, rapporteur of the European constitution, which came to, I am afraid, a sticky end, but he has vast expertise. However, it is possible to transfer further powers from this country to the institutions of the EU. The potential for a substantial amendment to be made under this mechanism means that we should treat, logically, changes under the simplified revision procedure in the same way as we would treat other types of change. I was challenged again and again about what sort of things are involved. I have a long list of powers in the past, present and future that will be affected by the transfer of powers.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

I was just about to make points on the question raised. It would have been reasonable—I would not put it higher than that—for the noble Lord, whose wisdom I respect, to have allowed me to go ahead with what I was saying rather than interrupt me to say something that I was about to say and so lengthen the whole business: we have already been on this debate for two and a quarter hours. I plead with your Lordships that if we could just restrain ourselves a little we would make some progress.

I was turning to the important point about what other countries do when they are trying to get through treaty changes. That seemed to be absent from the attitude of many of the understandable critics among your Lordships about what is going on in the European Union. We heard speeches at Second Reading and in this debate implying that we were stepping out alone and marginalising Britain, that this was a completely different pattern and that we would cause the fury of other European member states. Incidentally, I am not sure that I can answer fully the noble Lord’s perfectly justifiable question on the consultations we have had and at what level with our European partners but I can assure noble Lords that all our posts in Europe have been fully briefed on this and have discussed it with their opposite numbers.

Let me just go through some of the immense hurdles, some of which are higher than anything we are proposing here, which many other member states already practise. In Austria, the President must certify that treaty changes are in conformity with the Austrian constitution. If changes are judged to be a revision of the federal constitution, a referendum is required. In Denmark, a referendum is constitutionally required if the treaty transfers competences to the EU and is not voted on by five-sixths of the majority in Parliament. In France, a referendum is required if a treaty change necessitates a constitutional amendment, and incidentally I notice that the French require a referendum on future accession treaties, which of course do not arise in this Bill. That may be to the dismay of some, and we can debate it later. In Ireland, a referendum is required if a treaty is thought to alter the scope and objectives of the European Union, as we know. In Lithuania, a referendum is mandatory according to the constitution if treaty changes involve the partial transfer of competences of government bodies to the institutions of the European Union. In Slovakia, a referendum would be held on a treaty which relinquished sovereignty to the European Union, although there is a rider that the Slovakian constitutional court can also consider the case. Similar referendums may be required in the Czech Republic, Greece and the Netherlands. I suspect that that is not the end of the list because I do not think I have mentioned the German position.

[Lord Liddle]

My Lords—

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

If I may just finish my sentence. The list builds up a picture of sensible attempts by member states who are enthusiastic supporters of the European Union to make sure that their people are closely involved in the processes wherever there is any transfer of competence or power.

If I must have another interruption, I will take it, but I only plead with your Lordships that we are getting to the point of completely unreasonable interruptions in what I am trying to say.

[Lord Liddle]

I am deeply sorry, but I think that there is a fundamental point to be made here. There is a confusion which should not be allowed to enter this discussion. What the Minister has read out are the constitutional requirements of member states for full treaty ratification, whereas in this set of amendments we are talking about what is required for the simplified revision procedure. It is there precisely to avoid this full rigmarole. Why are we putting this in the treaty?

[Lord Howell of Guildford]

It is simply because the simplified revision procedure involves changes in the treaty. In many cases I have described, particularly where the significant test is applied and is not satisfied under paragraphs (i) and (j) in Clause 4, there would not be referenda here or in many other countries. But in other areas, through the simplified revision procedure and part of what we called the passerelle in our impassioned debates on this issue in the House at the time of the Lisbon treaty, it is possible to generate either transfers of competence or transfers of power. These are things on which there would be a natural incentive for the better use of existing powers in order to achieve certain objectives, like better co-operation over civil nuclear power or one of the other things that has been raised. They would also be matters where a real effort would be made by all countries because of the complexity they all face in pushing through treaty changes of any kind; even some quite small changes would trigger elaborate procedures in other countries. There will be a natural and sensible tendency to avoid changes and developments that involve treaty changes.

We simply do not accept that there is an appetite in the European Union for a further round of treaty change, given the arduousness of the ratification process, let alone one that would transfer further power from the UK to the EU. We certainly do not subscribe to the view that the addition of the simplified revision procedure will launch a new culture of regular treaty changes that seek to transfer power on a single issue. That is not the way the system has worked or will work in the future, as those who have been involved in it will know. My last involvement was many decades ago, but I had my share of it back in the 1970s and 1980s. Nations will know that when they come to deal with these issues, they have political capital to spend and they will spend it carefully, not rush into treaty changes at every opportunity. It is highly improbable that all 27 member states will push to agree a treaty change unless it was considered both urgent and important, such as the European financial stability mechanism, which the noble Lord rightly mentioned. But even then, that urgent treaty is expected to take two years—I repeat, two years—to be approved by all member states. The proposition that tiny little treaty changes would somehow be pushed through and promote a referendum here when they take two years for any country to get through is an absurdity.

I know that this is complex but it is a comprehensive approach to the whole question of the transfer of competences and powers. I beg noble Lords to understand that that is the reality of the position. Otherwise, individual issues are bound to be deferred—this is going to be the natural way; it has worked in the past and it will work again—until a whole raft of issues requiring attention can be wrapped up and packaged. That would ensure one treaty change which would cover a multitude of issues and one ratification process and, where relevant, one vote, as was the case with the Lisbon treaty. We recognise the kind of creature that comes along—it is the Lisbon treaty. That is just the sort of amalgamation of small and large issues, some of which under this Bill would certainly require a referendum, that should be and should have been put to a referendum.

We disagree most strongly with the proposition—this House disagreed with it and I think we carried sensible public opinion with us in doing so—that the Lisbon treaty should be somehow brushed aside and not put to a referendum because of the arguments about whether it did or did not parallel the European constitution beforehand. The noble Lord, Lord Tomlinson, said it would not but he remembers, because he was a doughty campaigner in all those Lisbon debates, that there was a very strong sentiment the other way which remains to this day, enlivened and reinforced by the fact that if you actually read the words in the two documents, the constitution and the Lisbon treaty, they turn out over a broad stage, as the noble Lord, Lord Stoddart, knows very well, to be identical. We are not fools, and nor are the public when they are told about this matter.

I see that the noble Lord wants to intervene again.

Inter-parliamentary Scrutiny: EUC Report

Lord Liddle Excerpts

Thursday 31st March 2011 Lords Chamber

One point that has not been made so far was made to me last night by the noble Lord, Lord Roper. If the meetings are in Brussels, it is much more likely that one can get access to the high representative—the noble Baroness, Lady Ashton—which is exactly what we want. We must make this new organisation cost-effective. I wish the noble Lord well and I am sure that he will come back with a satisfactory solution.

[Lord Liddle]

My Lords, on behalf of the Opposition, I welcome this Motion from the noble Lord, Lord Roper. We support the recommendations for the establishment of an EU Inter-parliamentary Conference on Foreign Affairs and Defence and Security. We have had interesting contributions from my noble friend Lord Davies of Stamford and the noble Lords, Lord Dykes and Lord Jopling.

I could hardly do otherwise than support the committee recommendation, given that I was on the committee when the recommendation was formulated, but it seems to be a wise set of recommendations. As an historian I share in the nostalgia of the noble Lord, Lord Jopling, for the Western European Union, but the WEU was rather a long time dying, if I may put it like that. I first remember this coming up when the noble Lord, Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, was Secretary of State for Defence in 1998. We had a discussion between the Ministry of Defence and No. 10 and the Foreign Office when I was an adviser in No. 10 about folding the WEU into the existing NATO and EU structures. It has been a long time since Britain first put forward that proposal.

The recommendations that we now have are right. We need a body made up of national parliamentarians to maintain some form of parliamentary accountability in the area of EU defence and foreign policy. The EU is a complex hybrid of supranationalism and intergovernmentalism. It has become an even more complex one with the passage of the Lisbon treaty and the setting up of the double-hatted high representative who has both a responsibility in the Commission and is accountable to the Foreign Ministers’ Council. It is very important that, because the intergovernmental nature of these things remains crucial, there is a body made up of national parliaments which can question the high representative. It also seems to me that there is a very strong political case for this type of body. I am sure that the European role in these questions is going to grow greatly in the years ahead in response to the pressures of globalisation and the insistence of the US, as we see in the events in north Africa, that we live up to our responsibilities as Europeans. It is inevitable that Europe’s role will grow, but it is also inevitable that these matters, at least in the first instance, will be handled intergovernmentally, I suspect for quite a period. Therefore, it is very important that such a mechanism as proposed exists.

We support the committee’s recommendations on structure. They seem to provide for an efficient and cost-effective body. We welcome the efforts of the noble Lord, Lord Roper, to achieve consensus on these matters. I would say that the essence of the position should be that, first, this should be an EU-led body. That does not preclude having observers, but the primary focus should be the European Union, and I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Stamford, on that point. Secondly, the primacy within the body of national parliamentarians should be absolutely clear-cut. Thirdly—and here I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Jopling—the meetings should be in Brussels, because that is where we are most likely to get engagement with the key people. There should not be some fancy gallivanting off to the Azores, or elsewhere. Fourthly, because the meetings should be in Brussels, I think one has to be careful about how many Members of the European Parliament one tolerates within this new institution. I spent a lot of time rather enjoyably in the convention that was set up to discuss the EU constitutional treaty. It was a great innovation in that convention that there were representatives of national parliaments there, but they got rather quickly overwhelmed by the Brussels bubble. You have to watch that something that meets in Brussels does not become dominated by those who are based in Brussels.

Those are the principles on which I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Roper, will represent us in the meetings next week. We support this recommendation. This new body should be more than mere tokenism; we want it to be effective and serious. We hope that he will be able to come up with a consensus that meets our concerns.

[The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Lord Howell of Guildford)]

My Lords, I join in the congratulations to the noble Lord, Lord Roper, on both bringing forward this Motion and for presiding over this excellent report and, indeed, if I may say so more widely, for the way that he administers his very influential and effective duties in the EU Committee structure, which are of enormous benefit not only to this House but to general debate on the pattern and development of all European Union affairs.

I also find myself ready to endorse almost everything that the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, said. He rightly emphasised the intergovernmental nature and how crucial it was that it should be preserved in this vital area. The only point where things slightly jarred was when he mentioned his work on the constitutional treaty. A shadow passed through my memory as I recalled that unhappy episode that, alas, did not lead to fruitful results. For the rest, the noble Lord has rightly endorsed some sensible proposals.

The Government attach significant importance to the issue of parliamentary scrutiny of the EU’s common security and defence policy and want to ensure that the cross-European parliamentary debate on European defence issues, performed currently—and for the next few months—by the WEU Assembly, continues. Inter-parliamentary discussion serves to enhance and enlighten the national scrutiny work of Parliaments and complements the breadth of knowledge that already exists in this House. This can only be a good thing; I am unambiguous about that.

Let me be clear to your Lordships about the Government’s role in this process. In March last year, Governments decided to close up the Western European Union, the bulk of its functions having already transferred to the European Union. I share my noble friend Lord Jopling’s tinge of nostalgia, since it seems to me that the WEU was part of our lives in at least the last three or four decades of the previous century. Many of us regard it as a familiar part of the European Union landscape, but times pass and the decision to close it up has been taken.

In doing so, we recognised the value of the continuing inter-parliamentary debate on European defence and security so, to ensure that a future forum could be established to facilitate that, we have worked to help discussion with interested parliamentarians on how this might be taken forward. During those discussions, we set out the Government's preferences for such a body, but it is obviously for national European parliamentarians to decide the form that future scrutiny arrangements should take. It is certainly not for the Government to dictate the terms; that would be quite wrong.

The Government's priorities in this process are clear. First, we believe in the primacy of national parliamentary scrutiny of the EU’s common foreign security policy. That reflects the policy’s intergovernmental nature, which we have all emphasised, and within it, the common security and defence policy. These are intergovernmental matters and, given the role played by national parliaments, there is no need for any new arrangements to involve expanding the European Parliament’s competence to scrutinise CFSP. While the European Parliament has a role, as is recognised in the report, we believe that an inter-parliamentary body better reflects the intergovernmental nature of CFSP.

Secondly, we believe that any new arrangements should be better suited to supporting and informing the national security process. They should capitalise on the expertise of relevant parliamentarians in this policy area and allow for a free and open exchange of information among European states.

Thirdly, new arrangements need to demonstrate value for money to the taxpayer, as many of your Lordships have emphasised. Given the current financial pressures facing Europe and all its member states, we support the proposal in the EU Committee report that any future mechanism for inter-parliamentary dialogue on CSDP should operate with the minimum possible cost and bureaucracy. The UK’s current annual subscription to the WEU is €2.3 million. While the WEU Assembly played a useful role in engaging views from across Europe, we and other WEU council members believe that this inter-parliamentary debating function can be delivered much more efficiently outside the WEU structures. The new body, as envisaged in the EU Committee report, will operate at a fraction of the current cost and, more appropriately, will be paid for by national parliaments, not Governments.

The Government believe that the new arrangements should include third states outside the 27 members of the European Union, as the noble Lord, Lord Jopling, and others have referred to. One of the major strengths of the CSDP is its ability to draw support from outside the EU. The report acknowledges that. We welcome that it extends a standing invitation to EU candidate countries, of which there are five at the moment—including, as the noble Lord, Lord Roper, says, the important candidate country of Turkey—but we remain convinced that non-EU European NATO members such as Norway should also receive a standing invitation. European defence policy and NATO share common political and security interests. Norway in particular has provided valuable contributions to EU operations and is currently an associate member of the WEU. We can see no reason why its inclusion in future arrangements should be anything other than permanent, and we hope that the decision that the noble Lord mentioned will go forward. We ask: why slam down the door so dismissively on good friends and a valuable contributor to European defence?

In this policy area we see a real value in inter-parliamentary collective debate that informs the national security process of EU member states. The European Union Committee report is an important and valuable step towards developing practical, low-cost and inclusive arrangements that will benefit parliamentarians across Europe, and I urge your Lordships’ House to back it fully.