My Lords, before the Minister replies, perhaps I may take up the point which the noble Lord, Lord Triesman, has just made and which the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, made earlier regarding what he described as commonplace political processes in which someone would much rather be defeated on an issue than argue their case differently. In theory, that sounds perfectly reasonable. However, is that precisely because Ministers’ rhetoric and Governments’ rhetoric in the past has never quite matched the decisions that have emerged?
It is commonplace in politics for someone to put forward an argument, and the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, quoted the German case. To avoid a certain procedure within the German constitution, people would say, “A nod and a wink. I’ll do a bit of talking here. I’ll put up a good fight but at the end of the day I know perfectly well that I’m going to get beaten and therefore everything will be all right on the night”. In some senses, that can be seen as normal but others may see it as chicanery. People might see that as undermining the process in Brussels but some, and I am one of them, may argue that there was a prolonged period in history when cases were put in exactly that way with exactly that outcome, which led the people drafting this legislation to take measures—they may not be the most elegant but perhaps the Minister can confirm that they exist—to protect against that precise situation. Let us face it: if a parliamentary decision has to be taken on a particular proposal, a political argument develops in the media to try to influence it, and a Minister sitting at the table can play a major part in creating and framing the debate when it goes into the media and try to build support for it. There is nothing wrong with that. The idea that people are going there secretly with one particular agenda but in fact pretending to have another is precisely why the European Union is in so much trouble with the population of this country. I hope that the Minister can indicate whether that is part of the rationale behind this or whether our fears are unsupported.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Triesman, for indicating his general support for at least subsection (1) of Clause 7. It reflects the general view that we have heard in the debate so far that primary legislation is the right instrument in a number of fields, which we have discussed at considerable length.
This clause also brings the UK more into line with the commendable practice of a number of other partners, in particular, Germany, of ensuring that national parliaments have a greater say in the developments of the European Union. It is also consistent with the principles of Laaken, to which I have referred frequently at this Dispatch Box in the past, and it is consistent with the trend in the Lisbon treaty to give more control to national parliaments across Europe.
I want to come to the specific issues that have been raised with considerable knowledge and expertise and try to offer what I hope will be a constructive response. First, I refer to the theme on which a good deal has been made in the debate on the words, “or otherwise support”, raised by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, my noble friend Lady Williams, the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, and others. The noble Lord, Lord Davies of Stamford, would immediately call me to order if I were to say that this is inherited phraseology. When I sat where the noble Lord, Lord Triesman, now sits, through the long nights that we were dealing with the Bill on the Lisbon treaty, I am trying to remember whether we had amendments on these words. I cannot remember and do not have the electronic memory to retrieve it, but the words were in the Bill which became an Act and which was drawn up by the previous Government, ratifying the then Lisbon treaty. Those with long memories will remember that people like me were not terribly enthusiastic about the treaty or how it should be treated.
However, that is the past and out of the past has come this phrase, “or otherwise support”, which also raises some difficult questions, to which the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, rightly referred. Of course, we want to see in this Parliament a pattern of legislation in this enormously complex area of EU measures which minimises the obscurity and maximises the clarity. I should like to take away the points that have been put very clearly and reflect on the noble Lord’s arguments. I do not know whether that constitutes, in the words of the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, “breaking ducks”, merely passing balls gently to the boundary, or whatever, but the matter clearly needs some reflection because there is clearly obscurity. I suspect that that has been pointed out again and again in debates on European legislation in the past few years; it is nothing new but it does not mean to say that we cannot get it better now, so I will reflect on the points that have been made.
Will the noble Lord confirm that he will take away and look at all the references in the legislation to the words “or otherwise support”? Here we are discussing only one of them. I am sure that his intention is to look at all of them: if he will confirm that, I will happily agree that he has scored a boundary.
Reflections on the words as they appear here will be bound to have cross-reading repercussions. I will put it like that: that is what I am saying that I will seek to do.
I turn now to Article 333(1) of the TFEU, on enhanced co-operation. The pat answer that the Bill gives if you stare it in the face is that if a sensitive veto listed in Schedule 1 is removed, there will be primary legislation for the removal of other vetoes. That is something that the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, questioned. He cited the German example to which the noble Lord, Lord Empey, also referred. That is stretching it a bit. I cannot see that the pattern in Germany—for which there may well be good reasons, such as anxiety not to offend the Länder—arises here. I trust that it does not sound too austere to say that it would not be our way to go through that kind of action in the hope that people would understand that we really wanted to do the reverse. Nevertheless, it is a complex point and I have more to say about it.
This is to do with whether we maintain or surrender a veto in these areas. We are not talking about action in those areas: I am sure that that is perfectly obvious to noble Lords. Enhanced co-operation decisions will not be agreed overnight: they will be agreed as a matter of last resort in areas of sensitivity for some member states. A move to set up enhanced co-operation has happened only once, and is being proposed now in the context of the European patent.
I had hoped that the Minister would score another boundary: he was starting splendidly with his exegesis on Germany, with which I entirely agreed. Does it not say in Clause 7(4)(e) and (f) that we are talking about a particular enhanced co-operation? We are not talking about the general rules for enhanced co-operation. I accept the first point that the Minister made about precedent. It seems to me—and, I think, to him—to be an insufficient answer, but it was a sort of answer. The point that he is making now surely does not apply, because paragraphs (e) and (f) state that the decision will relate to a specific reinforced co-operation in which we will be a participant.
That is precisely the point that I am making. I mentioned the European patent, which is a good example. A decision to move to qualified majority voting would not be something that we would agree overnight. It would be much more likely to be subject to negotiation over a lengthy period, not least because it would result in one or more member states being outvoted. I simply do not accept that the provision would hold up the taking of a specific decision. I am afraid that my mind may not be meeting that of the noble Lord, Lord Kerr. I cannot see what his concern is. This is to do with removing the veto, not taking that decision. That is the best explanation that I can give: I think that it meets his concern, which he put forward in a very valuable and experienced way.
If we are talking about a specific enhanced co-operation, and the Minister accepts that we are, we have something going on out in the field—this is Article 333 on common foreign security policy. A particular kind of external activity is taking place and we do not know what it is. Those who are taking part in it have to make rapid decisions. They have to decide what we do tomorrow about situation x. The treaty says that if they unanimously so decide, they may take implementing decisions by qualified majority in relation to that specific deployment, or whatever it is. They are not changing the treaty or the general rules but are dealing with the problem that has arisen now. I do not understand the different scenario that is being presented when the Minister says that this will be prepared over time and that there will be a lot of consideration. This is about implementation. It is about people in the field. That is why I think it is rather inappropriate. Is the Minister quite sure that it is appropriate to make this a matter on which the UK would need to pass primary legislation?
I am not sure I agree with the picture of decisions having to be taken instantly. On the contrary, it seems to me to be much more likely that there would be all kinds of negotiation, not least because it would result in one or more member states being outvoted. I do not think these are. This is a very complex matter, and I have sought to try to explain as best I can how we see it working but, of course, I will write to the noble Lord in more detail about his precise concerns. I am not sure that he has really satisfied me about the cutting edge of his amendment, and I have clearly not satisfied him. We will just go on boxing and coxing while other noble Lords have to listened, so I think it is better if I write to him and try to clarify the Government’s understanding of the reasoning and the reason why primary legislation would be justified against his clearly very strongly held view that it would not be justified and might hold things up.
Will the Minister ensure that all Members of the Committee who have taken part in our debates so far also receive the letter that he is going to send to the noble Lord, Lord Kerr?
Yes, of course I will.
I want now to turn to the next point that the noble Lord raised, which is to do with Article 64(3) of the TFEU on the reverse of liberalisation of capital movements to or from third countries. The noble Lord, Lord Kerr, indicated he did not fully understand what the Bill means. He interpreted it as allowing a move back from QMV to unanimity. Article 64(3) allows for unanimity for the adoption of,
“measures which constitute a step backwards in Union law as regards the liberalisation of the movement of capital to or from third countries”.
I do not know where this phrase “step back” originally emerged from. I do not know whether it was way back in the original draft of the European constitution. It may have been. It is used to do that which we believe should be subject to an Act of Parliament. Once again, I will obviously look at it very closely, but that is why we believe it is in the Bill in the form that it is and why we think an Act of Parliament is the right way forward.
Those are the detailed points that were raised. As I said about the phraseology that comes down to us from legislation under a previous Government, there is matter for further reflection. I fully accept that just because it was there before does not automatically mean that it is the right way forward now, although the previous Government undoubtedly thought that there were good reasons for it, otherwise they would not have put it there.
Clause 7 covers four categories of passerelles—I do not want to detain the Committee by listing them all now—that cover a wide range of different passerelle devices with which we are concerned. I like to think that Clause 7 represents a clear step, which in principle although maybe not in detail has the support of noble Lords generally, towards enhancing parliamentary control over the Government’s participation in a range of important passerelle decisions at EU level. The result ought to be—indeed, the coalition Government believe it will be—an increase in Parliament’s, and ultimately the British public’s, sense of ownership of and engagement with the future direction of the EU.
Of course, in the highly sensitive areas listed in Schedule 1, as we know and have debated endlessly in Committee, the referendum lock would apply on top of parliamentary approval. However, an Act of Parliament is required in the other areas listed in the clause, which surely can only be a bonus for the public trust and accountability that we are all working towards in this legislation and in our work on the European Union generally.
I thank the noble Lord warmly for his reply, particularly for what he said about looking again at the wording “or otherwise support”. Whatever its origins, I am sure the Government can do better and that the change would solve a lot of problems not just in Brussels but here. How would the Government advance the case for the Act of Parliament that would be necessary if the law prevented them supporting it? We are slightly in Alice in Wonderland here, and plenty of adjustments to the wording would solve our problem.
The noble Baroness, Lady Falkner, asked me a question that I do not quite understand. My objection to Clause 7(3) is based purely on its wording “or otherwise support”. My objection to Clause 7 as a whole applies in addition to the list in Clause 7(4), which, as the Minister understands, I think is a little too long. I have no objection to Clause 7(2), but I am puzzled by Clause 7(4)(c), (e) and (f). I am very grateful to the Minister for saying that he will reflect on Clause 7(3). I echo the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, in talking about the locus classicus for “or otherwise support”. The phrase is most likely to cause us major problems at the start of Clause 6, which deals with bigger issues than those that we are looking at in Clause 7.
I am grateful to the Minister for saying that he will reflect on the matter and that he will write to me about Clause 7(4)(e) and (f). I hope that he might also write to me about Clause 7(4)(c), if only to explain to someone ignorant like me exactly what the relevant passage of the treaty is all about, and why the Government would object to a move back to unanimity, which seems to me to be slightly inconsistent with their overall stance on decisions.
I do not wish for the moment to protract the discussion on whether Clause 7 should stand part.